Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MAGDI S. MAHMOUD
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Systems Engineering Department
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
HARIS M. KHALID
Higher Colleges of Technology
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
MUTAZ M. HAMDAN
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Systems Engineering Department
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Academic Press is an imprint of Elsevier
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Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-323-85261-6
Part 1. Background
1. Overview 3
1.1. Cyberphysical security modeling systems (CPS) 4
1.1.1. Introduction 4
1.1.2. Wide-area monitoring, protection and control systems 5
1.1.3. Wide-area protection 5
1.1.4. Phasor measurement units 6
1.2. Cyberattack taxonomy 6
1.2.1. Cyberattack classification 8
1.2.2. Coordinated attacks on WAMPAC 8
1.2.3. Cyberphysical security using game-theoretic approach 9
1.2.4. Cyberlayer risk assessment 11
1.2.5. Attack modeling 12
1.2.6. Game formulation and solution strategies 13
1.3. Challenges in cyberphysical power systems 14
1.3.1. Signal sampling 14
1.3.2. Signal quantization 15
1.3.3. Communication delay 18
1.3.4. Packet dropouts 21
1.3.5. Medium access constraints 27
1.3.6. Channel fading 28
1.3.7. Power constraints 29
1.4. Secure industrial control systems 35
1.4.1. Introduction 35
1.4.2. Progress of SICS 36
1.4.3. Major security objectives 37
1.5. Game-theoretic methods 39
1.5.1. Robustness issue 39
1.5.2. Resilient control design 40
1.5.3. Hierarchical systems 42
1.5.4. Physical layer control system problem 43
1.6. Notes 45
References 46
vii
viii Contents
Index 389
About the authors
sioned. Other terms that you might hear when discussing these and related
CPS technologies include
• internet of things (IoT),
• industrial internet,
• smart cities,
• smart grid.
In addressing CPS design challenges, it is important to take into considera-
tion that a resilient CPS design includes three features:
Stability: No matter how the environment generates noise and uncer-
tain factors, the control system should always reach a stable decision result
eventually;
Security: The system should be able to detect and countermeasure cy-
berphysical interaction attacks;
Systematization: The cyber and physical components should be seam-
lessly integrated together into a systematic design.
The impact of the development of sensor technology, electromechanical
systems, and digital communication networks enhances the fundamental
framework and motivates the dynamic growth of control systems (CSs).
Effectively, the elements of CSs are more intelligent, and they will never
act as the single role of a controlled object or controller, rather an agent is
now capable of integrating sensing, computing, and executing.
Power systems are very complex artificial systems. With the devel-
opment of the smart grid, high penetration of wind, solar power, and
customers’ active participation have lead smart grids to operate in more
uncertain, complex environments. Traditional power system analysis and
control decision-making are primarily dependent on physical modeling and
numerical calculations. The traditional methods find difficulty in address-
ing uncertainty and partial observability issues so that they cannot meet the
requirements of future development of smart grids. On the other hand,
widespread deployment of advanced metering infrastructures (AMI), wide-
area monitoring systems (WAMSs), and other monitoring/management
systems produce massive data and provide a data basis for algorithm/model
training in AI applications and the design of improved safe (secure) con-
trol/estimation/fault tolerant methods. These will be some of the enabling
technologies for the future development and success of smart grids.
Outstanding issues in this regard include:
• The uncertainties of wind and solar energy cause many challenges for
power systems. We should look for a potentially powerful tool to im-
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period a policy of reculer pour mieux sauter, suggesting that her
hand, though hidden, was never really withdrawn from the affairs of
the Forbidden City. To some extent the suggestion is justifiable; but
Tzŭ Hsi’s retirement in the I-Ho Yüan lasted, roughly speaking, for
ten years, during a considerable portion of which period she
undoubtedly ceased to concern herself with affairs of State, other
than those which directly affected the replenishing of her privy purse.
But while divesting herself of the outward and visible signs of
rulership, Tzŭ Hsi had no intention of becoming a negligible quantity,
or of losing touch with current events. From her luxurious retreat at
the foot of the hills which shelter Peking, she could keep close watch
on the doings of the Emperor, and protect the interests of her
personal adherents in the capital and the provinces. Her power of
appointing and dismissing officials, which drew much of its
inspiration from the Chief Eunuch, was never surrendered.
In marrying the Emperor to her favourite niece, Tzŭ Hsi intended
to avoid a repetition of the mistake which she had committed in the
case of her son, the Emperor T’ung-Chih, whose marriage with the
virtuous and courageous A-lu-te had resulted in dangerous intrigues
against herself, until death had removed the offenders. Warned by
this experience, she made her selection in the present instance less
with a view to the Emperor’s felicity than to the furtherance of her
own purposes, which necessitated the presence by his side of
someone who would watch over, and report on, his proceedings and
proclivities. This part her niece played to perfection. In appearance
she was unattractive, and in disposition and temper unsympathetic,
but she possessed a considerable share of the Yehonala intelligence
and strength of will. From the very first she was on bad terms with
the Emperor. It was no secret at Court that they indulged in fierce
and protracted quarrels, in which the young Empress generally came
off victorious. As a natural result, Kuang-Hsü developed and showed
a marked preference for the society of his two senior concubines,
known respectively as the “Pearl” and “Lustrous” consorts.
Upon the Emperor’s assumption of rulership, there was shown a
strong feeling amongst the senior members of the Yehonala clan that
the opportunity should be taken to consolidate its position and power
by conferring on the Emperor’s father rank in the hierarchy higher
than that which he had hitherto held, with a view to his ultimate
canonisation as Emperor. The manner in which this proposal was put
forward, and Tzŭ Hsi’s refusal to act upon it—while giving all
possible “face” to Prince Ch’un—throw light upon one of the
undercurrents of China’s dynastic affairs which are so difficult for
Europeans to follow.
The views of Prince Chun’s adherents were voiced in a Memorial
addressed to the Empress Dowager by Wu Ta-ch’eng, formerly Vice-
President of the Censorate, who at that time held the post of Director
of the Yellow River Conservancy. This Memorial, after referring to the
services rendered by Prince Ch’un as head of the Admiralty, and
praising his patriotism, zeal and extreme modesty, proceeded to
observe that he was, after all, the Emperor’s own father, and, as
such, entitled to higher respect in a Dynasty which “won the Empire
by virtue of its respect for filial piety.” The Memorialist further
recommended that the Son of Heaven should be authorised to grant
special recognition and honour to his parent, on the principle laid
down by Mencius that “the main principle underlying all ceremonies
is that satisfaction should be felt by those concerned.” As usual, the
Memorialist strengthened his request with reference to historical
precedents, and quoted a case, referred to by the Emperor Ch’ien
Lung in his edition of Chu Hsi’s famous historical work, where two
parties in the State under the Sung Dynasty disagreed as to the title
to be accorded to the father of the Emperor (a.d. 1050). In that
instance the opinion of His Majesty Ch’ien-Lung (as a commentator)
was opposed to that of the historians, for he supported the
contention that the Emperor’s father, as a simple matter of filial piety,
is entitled to special honour. He quoted a case where, under the
Ming Dynasty (1525), the Emperor desired to have his father raised
to the rank of Emperor, although he also had been born only to
princely rank; in other words, the Emperor Ch’ien Lung, who is justly
regarded as the highest authority on precedents produced by the
present Dynasty, placed the blood-tie between father and son above
all the theories and conventions that might be raised by courtiers as
to their official relationship. The Memorialist concluded by
recommending that the title of “Imperial father” be given to Prince
Ch’un, and that the Empress Dowager should announce this as the
last act of her rule, so that His Majesty’s filial piety might be fittingly
displayed.
There is every reason to believe that the above Memorial was
inspired in the high quarters immediately concerned, so as to afford
Her Majesty an opportunity for putting on record her own views,
while bestowing great honour on the house of Ch’un. After praising
the Prince and his unswerving loyalty, she continues:—
To which the Emperor adds the filial remark on his own account:
“That Her Majesty had acted in accordance with the admirable virtue
which always distinguished her, and that, in spite of his own wishes,
he was bound reverently to obey her orders in the matter.”
China’s complete and ignominious defeat by the Japanese forces
undoubtedly inflicted no small loss of prestige on the Manchu
Dynasty, and was a direct cause of the violent agitation of the
Southern Provinces for reform, which led in turn to the coup d’état
and to the Boxer rising. It is doubtful whether war could have been
avoided without even greater sacrifices and humiliation, and the
Empress Dowager showed her usual sagacity therefore in refraining
from expressing any opinion or taking any share of responsibility in
the decision taken by the Emperor. She knew, moreover, that, by the
action and advice of her Chief Eunuch, the Navy had for years been
starved in order to provide her with funds to rebuild and decorate the
Summer Palace, a fact of which some of China’s most distinguished
advisers were at that time unaware.
As Viceroy of the Metropolitan Province, Li Hung-chang was
generally blamed for advising the Court to maintain China’s
suzerainty over Corea by force of arms, but, speaking from personal
knowledge of this subject, we may state that, like many other
Ministers similarly situated, he hesitated until the very last moment
before taking risks which he knew to be enormous in both directions.
The documents upon which history might have been written with full
knowledge of the facts were unfortunately destroyed in the Viceroy’s
Yamên at Tientsin and in the Inspector-General of Customs’ quarters
at Peking, in 1900, so that the immediate causes of that disastrous
war will probably never be established with complete accuracy. Li
Hung-chang was aware that twice already Japan had been bought
off from a war of aggression against China, the first time (in 1874) by
payment of an indemnity, and again (in 1885) by admitting her to a
share in the control of Corea, a concession which had led directly to
the present crisis. He realised that even had he been willing to
surrender China’s rights over Corea (which were of no real
advantage to the Chinese Government) the concession might have
purchased peace for the time being, but it would certainly have led
before long to the loss of the Manchurian Provinces; just as certainly,
in fact, as the doom of those provinces was sealed in 1905, on the
day that China acquiesced in the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty.
Japan’s attack on China’s positions was diplomatically as
unjustifiable as the methods which she adopted in commencing
hostilities. Li Hung-chang was fully aware of the preparations that
Japan had been making for years, and equally aware of the
disorganised state of his own naval and military resources, but he
was surrounded by officials who, like the Manchus in 1900, were
convinced of China’s immense superiority, and he was assured by
the Chinese Resident in Corea (Yüan Shih-k’ai) that help would be
forthcoming from England in the event of Japan’s commencing
hostilities. There was no doubt of the British Government’s
sympathy, which was clearly reflected in the attitude and actions of
the Consul-General at Seoul.[48]
Chinese historians have openly accused Li Hung-chang of
instigating the Court and the Emperor to a war of aggression, and
the accusation has been generally credited abroad. The truth is, that
while Li was originally all in favour of sending a Chinese force to
suppress the Corean insurrection, he became opposed to taking any
steps that might lead to war with Japan, as soon as he realised that
war was Japan’s object; nevertheless, it is certain that, in the last
instance, he was persuaded against his better judgment by the
military enthusiasm of his German advisers, and that the sending of
the ill-fated “Kow-hsing” and her doomed crew to Corea was a step
which he authorised only after consultation with Peking and in full
knowledge of the fact that it meant war. No sooner had the “Kow-
hsing” been sunk, and the first military disasters of the campaign
reported, than he naturally endeavoured to minimise his own share
of responsibility in the matter.
Foreigners blamed him for making war on Japan, while his own
countrymen attacked him for betraying China to the Japanese, as
they subsequently attacked him for selling Manchuria to Russia. Tzŭ
Hsi had no great love for the Viceroy, although she admired his
remarkable intelligence and adroit methods: but when, after the war,
he was fiercely attacked by several of the Censors, and when she
found her own name associated with the blame imputed to him, she
loyally defended him, as was her wont. In 1895, a Censor named An
Wei-chün boldly blamed Her Majesty and the Viceroy for the
disasters which had overtaken China. He said:—
Tzŭ Hsi felt deeply the humiliation of her country’s defeat by the
Japanese, a race which, as Chinese historians never fail to remind
themselves, took its first lessons in civilisation and culture from
Chinese scholars and artists. Anxious at all costs to avoid another
invasion of Chihli by the conquerors, she approved the Treaty of
Peace, especially when assured by Li Hung-chang that Russia and
her Continental allies would not allow Japan to annex any portion of
the Manchurian Provinces. As above stated, she declined to permit
Li to be made a scapegoat either by her chagrined Manchu kinsmen
or by his fierce critics in the south, for she recognised the difficulty of
his position, and the fact that he was not directly responsible for the
deplorable condition of China’s defences. But, woman-like, she had
to blame someone for the disasters that had deprived her and her
capital of festivities whose splendour should have gone down,
making her name glorious, to all posterity; and it was not surprising,
therefore, if she heaped reproaches on the Emperor for entering
upon so disastrous a war without her full knowledge and consent. It
was at this time that began the estrangement which thenceforward
gradually grew into the open hostility and secret plottings of 1898,
the long bitterness between Tzŭ Hsi and her nephew which was to
divide the Palace into camps of strife, and to cease only with their
death. From this time also, as they aver who were in close touch with
the life of the Court, the Emperor’s Consort,[51] Tzŭ Hsi’s niece,
became openly alienated from him, and their relations grew more
severely strained as his reform tendencies developed and took
shape. From 1894 to 1896 there was no noticeable change in the
attitude of the Emperor to his august aunt, nor any diminution of his
respectful attentions, but the man in the street knew well, as he
always knows in China, of the rift in the lute, and when, in 1896, the
Emperor’s mother (Tzŭ’s sister) died, it was realised that the last
bond of amity and possible reconciliation between Kuang-Hsü and
the Empress Dowager had been severed.
XII
THE REFORM MOVEMENT OF 1898