CIVIL LAW REVIEW II

CASE DIGEST
(2021-2022 cases)

Submitted to:
Atty. Crisostomo Uribe

Submitted by:
Frederick C. Egalla
Sunday 8:00-12nn
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Table of Contents
I. Obligations – Arts. 1156-1304

A. In General

1. Definition – Art. 1156

2. Kinds of Obligations as to basis & enforceability – Art. 1423-1430; RA
6809
3. Prescription of Actions- 1139-1155

4. Elements of Obligations

B. Sources of Civil Obligations – Art. 1157

1. Law – Art. 1158

2. Contracts – Arts. 1159, 1305
3. Quasi-contracts – Arts. 1160, 2142-2175

a. Negotiorum Gestio
b. Solutio Indebiti
c. Other Quasi-Contracts

4. Acts or omissions punished by law – Arts. 1167, 2177, Arts. 100 &104
RPC
5. Quasi-delicts – Arts. 1162, 2176

C. Compliance with Obligations – Arts. 19, 1163-1166, 1244, 1246, 1460, 442,
440 -

D. Kinds of Civil Obligations

1. As to Perfection & Extinguishment

a. pure – Arts. 1179, 1197
b. conditional – Arts. 1181-1190
c. with a term or period – Arts. 1180, 1193-1198

2. As to Plurality of Prestation

a. conjunctive
b. alternative – Arts. 1199-1205
c. facultative – Art. 1206

3. As to rights & obligations of multiple parties – Arts. 1207-1222

a. Joint
b. Solidary – Arts. 927, 1824, 1911, 1915, 1945, 2157, 2194, 2146
Arts. 94, 121 FC ; Art. 90 RPC
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c.Disjunctive

4. As to performance of prestation – Arts. 1221-1225, 1209-1210

a. Divisible
b. Indivisible
c. Joint indivisible
d. Solidary indivisible

5. As to the presence of an accessory undertaking in case of breach

a. with a Penal Clause – Arts. 1226-1230 Distinguish from Liquidated

Damages

E. Breach of Obligations – Art. 1170

Manner of Breach
1. fraud – Arts. 1171, 1338, 1344 – DBP vs. Evelina Togle (16)
2. negligence – Arts. 1171-1173 – KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
vs. Dr. Jose Tiongco(18)
3. delay – Arts. 1169, 1165, 1786, 1788, 1896, 1942 – DBP vs.(16)
Evelina Togle
4. any other manner of contravention

Excuses for non-performance

1. Fortuitous Event – Arts. 1174, 552, 1165, 2147, 2159
2. Act of creditor

F. Remedies for Breach of Obligations – Arts. 1165-1168, 1170, 1177-1178,

1191-1192, 2236, 302, 1708; Arts. 153, 155 FC; Rule 39 Sec. 13
1. Extra-judicial remedies
a. expressly granted by law – Arts. 1786, 1788, 1526
b. stipulated

2. Judicial remedies
a. principal remedies – Arts. 1191, 1170
b. subsidiary remedies – Arts. 1380, 1177
c. ancillary remedies – Rules of Court

G. Modes of Extinguishment of Obligations – Art. 1231, Other Modes

1. Payment or performance – Arts. 1232-1244, 1246-1251, 1302;

RA 529, RA 8183; PD 72, Secs. 31-32

Special Forms of Payment

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a. Dation in Payment – Art. 1245

b. Application of Payments – Arts. 1252-1254, 1248
c. Payment by Cession or assignment – Art. 1255
d. Tender of Payment and Consignation – Arts. 1256 - 1261

2. Loss of the thing due or Impossibility of Performance – Arts. 1262-1269,

1189, 1174, 1165, 1268, 1942, 1979, 2147, 2159

3. Condonation or remission of the debt – Arts. 1270-1274, 748, 749

4. Confusion or Merger of Rights – Arts. 1275-1277, 1215, 1217

5. Compensation – Arts. 1278-1290, 1243, 1215

Kinds of Compensation
a. legal
b. conventional facultative c. judicial

6. Novation – Arts. 1291-1304, 1215 – Asian Construction vs.

MERO Structures(20)
Kinds of Novation

a. As to its nature
i) subjective or personal
ii) objective or real

b. As to its form
i) express
ii) implied

II. Contracts – Arts. 1305-1422

A. In General

1. Definition – Arts. 1305

Auto-contract – Arts. 1491, 1646, 1890

2. Paolo Anthony De Jesus vs. Dr.

Elements of Contracts –
Romeo Uyloan(22)
a. essential
b. natural
c. accidental
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B. Fundamental Characteristics/Principles of Contracts

1. Consensuality of Contracts – Arts. 1305, 1317

Contract of Adhesion

2. Autonomy of Contracts – Arts. 1306, 1799, 2088, 2130

3. Metro Alliance
Mutuality of Contracts – Arts. 1308-1310, 1182 –
Holdings and Equities vs. Phil. Veterans Bank
- PNB vs. AIC Construction(24)
Acceleration Clause
Escalation Clause

4. Obligatory Force of Contracts – Arts. 1159, 1315-1316, 749 – PNTC

Colleges vs Time Realty(28)

5. Relativity of Contracts – Arts. 1311-1314, 1177-1178, 1381(3) Privity of

Contracts

C. Classification of Contracts

1. according to degree of dependence

a. preparatory – Arts. 1479, 1767, 1868
b. principal – Arts. 1458, 1638, 1642, 1933, 1962
c. accessory – Arts. 2047, 2085

2. according to perfection
a. consensual – Arts.1315, 1475
b. real – Arts. 1316, 1934
c. formal – Arts. 1356

3. according to solemnity or form – Arts. 1356

a. any form
b. special form

4. according to purpose
a. transfer of ownership – Arts. 725, 1458, 1638
b. conveyance of use – Arts. 562, 1642, 1933
c. rendition of service – Arts. 1642, 1868

5. according to nature of obligation produced

a. bilateral – Arts. 1642, 1458
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b. unilateral – Arts. 2047, 2093

6. according to cause – Arts. 1350

a. onerous – Arts. 1458, 1638, 1642
b. gratuitous or lucrative – Arts. 725, 1933
c. remuneratory

7. according to risk
a. commutative
b. aleatory – Arts. 2010

8. according to name
a. nominate
b. Innominate – Arts. 1307

9. according to subject matter

a. thing
b. right
c. service

D. Stages of Contracts

1. Negotiation

Contract of Option – Arts. 1324, 1479, 1482

2. Perfection

3. Performance
4. Consummation

E. Essential Elements of Contracts – Arts. 1318

1. consent of the contracting parties – Socorro P. Cabilao vs.

Tampan(29)
Arts. 1319-1346, 37-42, 739, 1476(4), 1490-1491, 1533(5), 1646, 1782,
1409(7) Arts. 87, 124, 234 FC; RA 6809; Art. XII, Secs. 7 & 8 1987
Constitution

Cognition Theory / Manifestation Theory

2. object certain which is the subject matter of the contract – Arts. 1347-
1349, 1311, 1178
3. cause of the obligation_– Arts. 1350-1355

Delivery
Due observance of prescribed formalities
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F. Form of Contracts – Arts. 1356-1358

1. any form – oral

2. special form

a. validity – Arts. 748, 749, 1744, 1773, 1874, 1956, 2134,

Act 1147, Sec. 22
b. enforceability – Arts. 1403, 1878
c. greater efficacy or convenience – Arts. 1358

G. Reformation of Contracts – Arts. 1359-1369

H. Interpretation of Contracts – Arts. 1370-1379

I. Kinds of Contracts as to Validity

1. Valid
a. Valid and binding
b. Valid but defective
i) Rescissible Contracts – Arts. 1380-1389, 1191 ii)
Voidable Contracts – Arts. 1390-1402, 1327-1328,
1330 iii) Unenforceable Contracts – Arts. 1403-1408,
1317, 1878
2. Void or Inexistent – Arts. 1409-1422, 1318, 1353, 1378, 1491, 1898

Rescissible Contracts

Voidable Contracts

Unenforceable Contracts

Void or Inexistent – Alberto Hidalgo vs. Conrado Bascuguin(30)

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Special Contracts

SALES

A. In General

Definition – Art. 1458, 1488

Characteristics - Art. 1458, 1475
Kinds of Sale - Art. 1458, 1463
Distinguished from other transactions – Art. 1245, 1466, 1467, 1468

B, Elements of a Contract of Sale

Essential Elements - Art. 1459-1465, 1469-1474, 1489, 1327, 1390, 1403, 1489, 1490, 1491,
1492, 1348, 1347, 1624-1627–Heirs of Herminio Marquez vs Heirs
of Epifania Hernandez(31)
1. consent of the contracting parties - Heirs of Herminio Marquez vs
Heirs of Epifania Hernandez(31)
2. determinate subject matter [thing or right] – Reynaldo Reyes vs. Sps.

Garcia(33)
3. price certain in money or its equivalent
Natural Elements
Accidental Elements

C, Perfection of the Contract – Rosalinda Turla vs. Heirs of Patrocinio

Dayrit(35)
Contract of Option
Formalities of Contract of Sale - Art. 1483

D. Rights and Obligations of the Vendor

To transfer ownership - Art. 1459, 1477-1478

Double Sales
Risk of Loss - 1504
To deliver the object - Isabelo Cabalhin vs. Sps. Lansuela(37)
Warranties

E. Rights and Obligations of the Vendee

Payment of Price
Right of Inspection
Acceptance

Maceda Law – Realty Installment Buyer Act [RA 6552]

F. Remedies for Breach of Contract

Remedies of an Unpaid Seller

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Remedies of the Buyer - Art. 1481

Recto Law – Sale of Movables on Installment - Art. 1484, 1486

G. Extinguishment of Sale

Causes
Redemption [Conventional & Legal] – BPI vs. LCL Capitals(38)

Barter or Exchange

LEASE

I. Nature

A. Kinds of Lease

1. Lease of things [Art. 1642]

2. Lease of work or service [Art. 1642]
a. household service
b. contract of labor (employment contract)
c. contract for a piece of work
d. contract with common carriers(contract of carriage)
3. Lease of right – License/Franchise

B. Definitions
C. Characteristics
D. Distinguished from other contracts/legal relations

II. Essential Elements

A. consent
B. object /purpose : period
C. cause Formalities

III. Rights and Obligations of the Lessor & Lessee

A. Necessary repairs
B. Improvements
C. Collapse of a building
D. Reduction of the Rent
E. Extension of the Lease
F. Right of First Refusal
G. Sublease & Assignment of the Lease

IV. Rights and Obligations of Third Persons

A. Suppliers
B. Buyers
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V. Termination of the Lease

A. Loss of the thing

B. Death of either party
C. Expiration of the period
Implied New Lease or Tacita Reconduccion

AGENCY

I. In General : Nature
A. Definition
B. Characteristics
C. Distinguished from/compared with other relations
[Features of a contract of agency]

II. Kinds of Agency

A. Actual agency
Kinds of Actual Agency
1. As to manner of creation: express & implied
2. As to compensation
3. As to scope of authority

B. Apparent or Ostensible Agency (Art. 1473)

C. Agency by Estoppel (Art. 1431)

III. Essential Elements of a Contract of Agency

(1) Consent of the contracting parties: principal & agent only
(2) Object : execution of a juridical act
(3) Cause : presumed to be for compensation
Form : 1869, 1874, 1878

IV. Obligations of the Agent A. To

carry out the agency
1. To act within the scope of his authority. (Art. 1881)
2. To act on behalf of his principal. (Art. 1868) Liability of two or more
agents …:

B. To render an accounting of his transactions and to deliver… (Art. 1891)

C. To be responsible for the acts of the substitute. (Art. 1892)
D. Rules applicable to a commission agent :
Rules applicable to a guarantee commission agent: Del credere agent

V. Rights and Obligations of the Principal

A. To comply with all the obligations which the agent may have contracted within
the scope … and in representation of the principal. (Art. 1910)
B. To advance to the agent the sums necessary …. Art. 1912)
C. To reimburse the agent the sums advanced … (Art. 1912, 1918)

Liability when there are two or more principals: solidary (Art. 1915)
Rights of Third Persons in Incompatible contracts with agent and principal
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VI. Modes of Extinguishment of Agency : Art 1919

PARTNERSHIP

I. In General
A. Definition
B. Characteristics of Partnership as a Contract
C. Distinguished from other Combinations and Relations

II. Essential Requisites

A. Consent of the contracting parties; B. Object certain : to engage in lawful
activity
C. Cause
Formal Requirements

III. Classes of Partnerships

A. As to its Object : Universal & Particular Partnership
B. As to Liability of Partners : General & Limited Partnership
C. As to term : Fixed Term, Particular Undertaking & Partnership at Will

IV. Classes of Partners

A. According to their liability : General & Limited Partners
B. According to their contribution : Capitalist Partner & Industrial Partner
C. According to the time they join the partnership : Incoming
D. According to Special Duties : Managing [Article 1792]

V. The property rights of a partner are: [Articles 1800 to 1814]

A. His rights in specific partnership property;
B. His interest in the partnership; and
C. His right to participate in the management.

VI. Obligations of Partners Among Themselves

A. To make good his promised contribution
B. Fiduciary Duty
C. To participate in the losses
Nature of Liabilityof individual partners:
Pro-rata, Subsidiary, Joint or Solidary

VII. Obligations of Partners with Regard to Third Persons

VIII. Dissolution, Winding Up and Termination

A. Nature & Effect of Dissolution
B. Causes of Dissolution
C. Distribution of Assets

IX. Limited Partnership

Trusts
1. In General – Art. 1440
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2. Kinds of Trusts – Art. 1441

a. Express
b. Implied – Doris Marie S. Lopez vs. Aniceto Saludo
Jr.(39)
i) Resulting – Arts. 1448-1454
ii) Constructive – Arts. 1455-1456

Credit Transactions : Loan, Deposit, Guaranty & Suretyship

I. Nature of Credit Transactions

A. Definition
B. Scope
C. Distinguished from Bailments

II. Loans
A. Definition : Purpose
B. Kinds of Loan :
i) Commodatum : Precarium
ii) Mutuum or Simple Loan
C. Characteristics
D. Essential Elements : Consent, Object, Cause
Formalities

E. Rights & Obligations of Bailor & Bailee in Commodatum

Liability for loss/deterioration due to a fortuitous event [Art. 1942/1943]

F. Rights & Obligations of Bailor & Bailee in Mutuum

To pay interest : Kinds : Rate – PNB vs. AIC Constructions(26)
G. Modes of Extinguishment

III. Deposit

1. Nature : Definition : Purpose

2. Kinds of Deposit
1. Extra-judicial: Conventional & Necessary : Irregular Deposit
2. Judicial
3. Characteristics
4. Essential Elements : Subject Matter
5. Rights & Obligations of Depositor and Depositary
6. Modes of Extinguishment

II. Aleatory Contracts – Insurance, Gambling, Life Annuity

III. Guaranty and Suretyship : Distinctions

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A. Nature : Definition : Purpose

B. Characteristics
C. Effects of Guaranty
1. Between the Guarantor and the Creditor : Benefit of Excussion
2. Between the Guarantor and the Debtor : Subrogation
3. Between Co-Guarantors : Benefit of Division

D. Modes of Extinguishment

Credit Transactions : Pledge, Mortgage & Antichresis

RA 11057 [Personal Property Security Act]

I. Provisions common to Pledge and Mortgage [Arts. 2085-2092]

A. Nature : Definition : Purpose

B. Essential elements
C. Indivisibility of the Contract
D. Pactum Commissorium
E. Right to recover deficiency : Who is entitled to excess?
F. Equity & Right of Redemption

II. Pledge [Arts. 2093-2123 NCC]

1. In general
a. Kinds of Pledge
b. Characteristics of Pledge
c. Extent/Coverage of the Pledge
B. Rights and Obligations of the Pledgor [Debtor or Third Person]
C. Rights and Obligations of the Pledgee [Creditor]
D. Modes of Extinguishment

III. Chattel & Real Estate Mortgage

[Arts. 2140-2141, 1484-1485 NCC, Act No. 1508, Chattel Mortgage Law (1906), Art. 319, RPC]
[Arts. 2124-2131 NCC, Rule 68, Act. No. 3135]

A. In general
1. Characteristics
2. Subject Matter
3. Extent/Coverage of the Mortgage
B. Essential Requisites
Formal Requisite; Affidavit of Good Faith
C. Rights and Obligations of the Mortgagor [Debtor or Third Person]
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D. Rights and Obligations of the Mortgagee [Creditor]

E. Modes of Extinguishment

IV. Antichresis [Arts. 2132-2139 NCC]

A. Nature and Characteristics

B. Rights and Obligations of the Debtor and Creditor

V. Concurrence and Preference of Credit [Arts. 2236-2251 NCC;

Act No. 1956, as amended, Insolvency Law]
A. General Provisions
B. Classification of Credits
C. Order of Preference of Credits

Torts & Damages

I. Introduction
A. Nature of Quasi-delict
B. Quasi-delict distinguished from Tort, Crime, Contract
C. Scope/Sources of Law

II. Elements of Quasi-Delict

A. Act or Omission, there being Fault or Negligence

1. Concept of Negligence –KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs Dr.

Jose Tiongco(18)
2. Standard of Care : Degree of Diligence –Kuwait Airways vs.
Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance(41)
3. Proof of Negligence : Burden of Proof

Presumptions of Negligence
B. Kuwait Airways vs. Tokio
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur –
Marine and Fire Insurance(41)
- Jessica Maitim vs. Ma. Theresa Aguila(43)

C. Damage or Injury
D. Causal Connection between the Act or Omission and the Damage

III. Persons liable

A. The Tortfeasor
B. Vicarious Liability : Persons liable for Tortious Acts of another – Jessica
Maitim vs. Ma. Theresa Aguila(43)
C. Nature of Liability
D. Defenses
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1. Absence of an element
2. Fortuitous Event
3. Contributory Negligence
4. Paulo Anthony De Jesus vs. Dr.
Prescription –
Romeo Uyloan(22)
5. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
6. Double Recovery
7. Lack of Jurisdiction

IV. Liability for Torts : Damages

A. In General

B. Kinds of Damages

1. Actual or Compensatory
2. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs. Dr. Jose
Moral –
Tiongco(18)
3. Nominal
4. Temperate or Moderate
5. Liquidated
6. Exemplary or corrective
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Development Bank of the Philippines Vs. Evelina Togle and Catherine Geraldine Togle

G.R. No. 224138. October 6, 2021

Lazaro-Javier J. First Division

Nature of Action: annulment of the foreclosure proceedings with reconveyance

FACTS:

Respondent Catherine Togle applied a loan with DBP to fund a poultry grower project.

In compliance with DBP's requirements, she submitted a feasibility study for the construction of four (
4) poultry houses with a total broiler capacity of20,000.7 The broilers will be supplied by Vitarich.
Finding the feasibility study acceptable, DBP approved Catherine's P5,000,000.00 loan application
which was secured by the subject properties. On November 15, 1995, Catherine issued a promissory
note for P3,000,000.00 in favor of DBP 9 and received the first drawdown of 3,000,000.00 two (2) days
later. Using the first drawdown, Catherine was able to put up four ( 4) poultry houses, a bodega, and a
water tank. She, too, was able to install poultry machineries, equipment, and a generator set.
Subsequently, by Letter dated February 2, 1996, Catherine requested for the release of an additional
P500,000.00, which DBP denied because allegedly the respondent failed to comply with the load
specification such as the infusion of equity and the construction of 12 poultry houses. This was the first
time the respondent was informed of the alleged requirements.

After due notice, 14 DBP applied the acceleration clause and declared them in default. On
November 22, 1996, DBP foreclosed the properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the auction
sale. Thereafter, DBP stationed guards on the properties to prevent them (respondents) from
harvesting the fruits and leasing out the farm. Catherine was charged with violations of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 (BP 22) and estafa by her unpaid suppliers, forcing her to leave Davao City.
Believing that the acceleration of their loan was unwarranted, and the foreclosure of the mortgage was
premature, respondents sought to annul the foreclosure proceedings and have the subject properties
reconveyed in their favor. RTC declared the foreclosure proceeding to be null and void which was later
affirmed by the CA on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBP acted in bad faith in withholding the remainder of the loan stipulated in the
load agreement?

Whether or not Catherine breached her obligation in the load agreement for her to be considered
in default?
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RULING:

1. Where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be
determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered
from that language and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written
contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it
purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be
understood in a different sense.

The Court sustained the finding of the CA that based on the express terms of the loan
agreement, the release of the loan proceeds was not conditioned on the construction of a specific
number of poultry houses. Worse, DBP acted in evident bad faith when it unilaterally amended the
loan specifications and prescribed a number of poultry houses to be constructed, broilers to be
raised, and equity to be infused.

As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, the loan agreement was silent on the specific number of
poultry houses to be built, the number of broilers to be housed, and the equity to be infused by
respondents. Verily, the contract does not contain any stipulation regarding the construction of
twelve (12) poultry houses for 60,000 broilers, or of any supposed equity requirement for that matter.
Hence, it was DBP itself which breached the loan agreement when it failed to release the additional
loan proceeds of respondents.

2. There is no breach of obligation on the part of Catherine. In reciprocal obligations such as a

loan, a party may only be deemed in breach when the other has already fulfilled his or her obligation.53
As established here, DBP withheld the additional loan proceeds of i"500,000.00 without a valid reason.
In other words, it failed to fulfill its obligation under the loan agreement. Consequently, it cannot compel
respondents to fulfill their end of the bargain, hold them in default should they fail to comply, and
foreclose their mortgaged property thereafter. As in the case of DBP vs. Guarina, by its failure to
release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP had no right yet to exact on Guarina.a
Corporation the latter's compliance with its own obligation under the loan. While a creditor and a
debtor could regulate the order in which they should comply with their reciprocal obligations,
it is presupposed that in a loan[,] the lender should perform its obligation the release of the full
loan amount before it could demand that the borrower repay .the loaned amount.
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KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Vs. Dr. Jose M. Tiongco

G.R. No. 212136. October 4, 2021

Hernando J,. Second Division

Nature of the Action: Complaint for Damages with Attorney’s fee

FACT:

Petitioner Dr. Tiongco booked a flight from Manila to Kazakhstan via KLM Royal Dutch Airlines.
when he arrived at NAIA he checked-in his suitcase containing a copy of his speech, resource
materials, clothing for the event, and other personal items. Singapore Airlines departed from Manila as
scheduled. Upon his arrival in Frankfurt, Dr. Tiongco searched for a KLM employee. After two hours,
he found a KLM employee whom he informed at once about his missed flight to Almaty, as well as his
speaking engagement and his checked-in suitcase. The employee assured him that his suitcase would
be travelling with him. Before the passengers of Turkish Airlines flight no. TK1350 boarded, its
personnel asked them to identify their luggages on the tarmac. Dr. Tiongco looked for his suitcase but
could not locate it. So as not to miss his connecting flight he went on board without his suitcase but
was assured that it will be loaded in the next flight as soon as it is found. When he arrived in Almaty,
no KLM, Turkish Air or Lufthansa Employee assisted him, and his suitcase nowhere to be found. He
delivered his lecture on his slacks at sweatshirt and no resource materials. Upon his arrival in the
Philippines, he sent a demand letter demanding compensation for his luggage, but to no avail. He filed
a complaint for damages against KLM, Turkish Air, Singapore Air and Lufthansa. KLM insisted that it
performed extraordinary diligence in transporting Dr. Tiongco to his last destination. It denied liability
for the lost suitcase since it is not his first or last carrier.

RTC ruled that KLM is solely liable for the damages suffered by Dr. Tiongco which was affirmed
by the CA on appeal.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not KLM is liable under the breach of contract of carriage.

2.Whether or not Dr. Tiongco is entitled for Moral and Exemplary Damage?

RULING:

1. Yes. A contract of carriage is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or goods from one place to another for a fixed price. The
nature of the business which involves the transportation of persons or goods makes a contract of
carriage imbued with public interest. It is therefore bound to observe not just the due diligence of a
good father of a family but that of "extraordinary" care in the vigilance over the goods as required under
Article 1733 of the Civil Code. Considering that a contract of carriage is vested with public interest, a
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of lost or
damaged goods unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Hence, in an action
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based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common
carrier was at fault or was negligent. He or she is only required to prove the existence of the contract
and its non-performance by the carrier.

There is no dispute that KLM and Dr. Tiongco entered into a contract of carriage. Dr. Tiongco
purchased tickets from the airline for his trip to Almaty, Kazakhstan. KLM, however, breached its
contract with Dr. Tiangco when it failed to deliver his checked-in suitcase at the designated place and
time. Worse, Dr. Tiangco' s suitcase was never returned to him even after he arrived in Manila from
Almaty. Thus, KLlM’s liability for the lost suitcase was sufficiently established as it failed to overcome
the presumption of negligence.

2. Yes. Dr. Tiongco is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

The bad faith on the part of KLM as found by the RTC and the CA thus renders the same liable
for moral and exemplary damages. However, the amounts thereof must be modified further to be fair,
reasonable, and commensurate to the injury sustained by the passenger.

The award of moral damages is proper to enable the injured party to obtain means of diversion
or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering they underwent because of another's
culpable action. Here, KLM displayed indifference to the plight and inconvenience suffered by Dr.
Tiongco when he lost his luggage. It made empty promises that his luggage would be travelling with
him and even failed to inform Dr. Tiongco that his suitcase had been found. Moreover, it did not return
the luggage to him even after it was found.
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Asian Construction and Development Corporation Vs. Mero Structures, Inc., substituted by
Novum Structures Llc, Inc., First Centennial Clark Corp., and National Development Company

G.R. No. 221147. September 29, 2021

Hernando J., Second Division

Nature of the Action: Collection of Sum of Money with Damages

Facts:

First Centennial Clark Corporation (FCCC) entered into a construction agreement with petitioner
Asiankonstrukt for the finalization of the Architectural design, and to undertake all the necessary
construction works for the Exposition Theme Park in Clark Special Economic Zone. The petitioner on
the other hand entered into an agreement with Respondent MERO Structures for its Materials only
Proposal for the undertaking between FCCC and the petitioner. FCCC received a proposal from the
Petitioner regarding the construction agreement which includes the full payment of the imported MERO
spaceframe structures. On the same they FCCC approved the proposal, and petitioner informed
respondent about the award of the contract for design and that FCCC would latter pay the for the
materials not later than june 1998. On Aug. 10,1098, the petitioner requested FCCC the full payment
of the space frame and the payment of the installation since both became due last June 17, 1998.

In the series of letters between the Petitioner and the Respondent, to which the latter is
seeking payment for the spaceframe. Another series of letter dated October 13, 1999, MERO
requested that it be paid directly by the FCCC and that Asiakonstruk't notify FCCC that the work
is complete and satisfactory and that full payment should be made. By way of response,
Asiakonstrukt, in a letter dated November 8, 1999, stated that it interposed no objection to
MERO's request to collect payment directly from the FCCC.

Despite the demand made by Respondent MERO, to payment was made which prompted the
institution of the action in the RTC. FCCC argued that it is not privy to the Contract between Asiakonz
and MERO. On the other hand the petitioner’s argument hinges on the theory that its obligation to pay
MERO was extinguished by novation of either or both of the aforementioned contracts, as evidenced
by the letters exchanged between it and MERO.

RTC ruled that the Petitioner and FCCC is liable to pay MERO. On Appeal CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC reiterating that the obligation of the Petitioner to pay the respondent is based on their
contract and the obligation of FCCC on the other hand is based on the fact that it benefitted from the
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is novation and that the Petitioner is substituted by FCCC to pay the
obligation to the respondent, as evidenced by the letter exchanges.

RULING:

There is no Novation in this case.

Novation extinguishes an obligation between two parties when there is a substitution of objects
or debtors or when there is subrogation of the creditor. It occurs only when the new contract declares
so "in unequivocal terms" or that "the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with
each other. For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: 1) There must be a
previous valid obligation. 2) The parties concerned must agree to a new contract. 3) The old contract
must be extinguished. 4) There must be a valid new contract.
 21

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it is evident that there was neither an express nor
implied novation through the letters exchanged between MERO and Asiakonstrukt;

First there is nothing in the letters that unequivocally states that the obligation of
Asiakonstrukt to pay MERO would be extinguished.

Second, there is also no mention that MERO would substitute or subrogate

Asiakonstrukt as FCCC's payee/obligee as the letters merely show that MERO was
allowed by Asiakonstrukt to try collecting from FCCC directly.

Lastly, using the test of incompatibility, Asiakonstrukt’s non-objection to MERO's

request to collect from FCCC directly is not incompatible with the obligation of
Asiakonstrukt to pay MERO. It merely provided an alternative mode in collecting
payment to MERO, which is not even valid as far as FCCC is concerned since the
latter did not even consent to the same, not to mention there is no existing contractual
relationship between MERO and FCCC.

With regard to the last point, it must be stressed that the consent of the third party,
which is FCCC in this case, must also be secured for the novation to be valid.
Again, FCCC was never a part of the letters exchanged between MERO and
Asiakonstrukt. Thus, FCCC clearly could have not consented to any substitution or
subrogation of the parties.

Since there was clearly no novation, Asiakonstrukt' s obligation to MERO remains valid
and existing. Asiakonstrukt, therefore, must still pay respondent the full amount ofUS$570,000.00
with the applicable interest.
 22

Paolo Anthony C. De Jesus Vs. Dr. Romeo F. Uyloan, substituted by his wife Salvacion

Uyloan, Asian Hospital and Medical Center and Dr. John Francois Ojeda

G.R. No. 234851. February 15, 2022

Gesmundo CJ., First Division

Nature of the Action: Claim damages under Art. 1170 and 1173

Facts:

Petitioner undergone a surgery performed by Dr. Uyloan at Asian Hospital and Medical Center
to remove gall bladder stones. The procedure is laparoscopic cholecystectomy which consist of just
four small incisions around the umbilical area. Instead the respondent performed and open
cholecystectomy without his approval. During the operation in which his abdomen was opened up, he
lost a lot of blood, which necessitated blood transfusion. Dr. Uyloan explained to him that the conversion
of the operation from laparoscopic cholecystectorny to open cholecystectorny was a result of a
"punctured cystic artery.

After sometime after petitioner was discharged he experienced abdominal pains and bile leak, which
according to the respondent is just part of what he is going to experience post operation. Dissatisfied,
the petitioner sought second opinion which resulted to another operation to rectify the botched surgery
performed by the respondent. Petitioner filed a breach of professional duty under their medical contact
against the respondents. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription and forum
shopping. RTC ruled that there is sufficient allegations as a cause of action for damages. Respondent
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA reversing the decision of the RTC, dismissing the complaint
since prescription had already set in, because the cause of action is indisputably based on medical
negligence with a period of prescription of 4 years. Petitioner argued that he is suing under the theory
of breach of contract and not under medical malpractice, hence the prescription period is 10 years. He
stresses that patient-doctor relationship has all the elements of a valid contract.

ISSUE:

1. whether the cause of action is based on contract or quasi-delict?

2. Whether or not the cause of action had already prescribed?

RULING:

1. The cause of action is one of quasi delict.

When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is

generated. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim (patient) has available tq_ him or her to redress
a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.24 For lack of a specific
law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical profession in this
jurisdiction, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a
physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily
employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.
There are thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation.
 23

Thus, where the complaint contains averments of the foregoing elements and the defendant
doctor failed to observe such degree of care which caused damage or harm to the plaintiff patient, the
cause of action is one for medical negligence under the law on torts rather than contract. An action for
medical malpractice based on contract must allege an express promise to provide medical
treatment or achieve a specific result.
 24

Metro Alliance Holdings and Equities Corporation, Polymax Worldwide Limited and

Wellex Industries, Inc. Vs. Philippine Veterans Bank/Philippine Veterans Bank Vs. Metro Alliance

Holdings and Equities Corporation, Polymax Worldwide Limited and Wellex Industries, Inc.

G.R. No. 240495/G.R. No. 240513. September 15, 2021

Inting J., Second Division

Nature of the Action: Complaint for Annulment of Notice of Sheriff’s Sale and Damages with
prayer for the issuance of TRO with writ of Preliminary Injuction

FACTS:

On January 7, 2004, PVB granted a sho1i-tem1 loan accommodation in favor of MAHEC

and Poly1aax _in the amount of P550,000,000.00 under a Loan Agreement8 of even date. The
loan was availed of in two tranches: P200,000,000.00 uncle Promissory Note No. (PN) 901-14-
04-00 ( 029 dated January 7, 2004 and P350,000,000.00) under PN 901-14-04-0000310 dated
January 7, 2004, both bearing the maturity date April 6, 2004. The loan agreement underwent
several amendments to accommodate the extension of its maturity date.

As of July 25, 2008, MAHEC and Polymax's alleged total liability was Pl53,739,400.28.12
At that time, the registered Real Estate Mortgage13 dated October 13, 2006 executed by Well ex
in favor of PVB was among the remaining securities and collaterals for the loan obligation. As of
November 2, 2006, MAHEC and Polymax were only able to make partial payments and their
alleged loan exposure was P98,278,949.05. Subsequently, PVB filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure17 of Real Estate Mortgage with the RTC of Pasig City, to which the petitioner
opposed. Foreclosure sale ensued, however since the proceeds of the foreclosure sale fall short
to fully satisfy the obligation, the respondent went after the other collaterals such as the shares
of stocks of the petitioners. However, the petitioners were able to secure a TRO for the auction
sale of the said shares.

RTC rendered its decision declaring the interest stipulated in the Promissory notes as Null
and void which allowed the respondent PVB to unilaterally fix interest, and all collaterals and
mortgages securing the load be discharged and released. It declared that the imposition of 14%
interest per annum from Jan 7, 2004 to May 6 2004 is valid, but with respect to the interest rate
of 14.74 % from may 6, 2004 to January 2006 is null and void having been fixed and unilaterally
adjusted by PVB without the consent of the Petitioners.

On appeal, CA modified the ruling of RTC to which it ordered to desist the foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage of the share of stocks of the petitioner and nullified the previous foreclosure
of real state mortgage due to the nullity of unilateral interests imposed by PVB.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the interest rates imposed are null and void?
 25

RULING:

Yes the interests rates imposed are null and void

In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the
parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality." This
principle of mutuality of contracts is pronounced in Article 1308 of the Civil Code which states
that a contract "must bind both contracting parties; ts validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them." Under the principle of mutuality of contracts, a contract must be rendered
void when the execution of its terms is skewed in favor of one party.

The interest rates imposed by PVB subsequent to the initial stages of the loan agreement
is not only one-sided and unilateral but also violative of one of the fundamental characteristics of
contracts, that is, the essential equality of the contracting parties, oftentimes called the principle
of mutuality of contracts. Under the principle of mutuality of contracts, a contract must be
rendered void when the execution of its terms is skewed in favor of one party.

Even if the Loan Agreement between PVB, as creditor, and MAHEC and Polymax, as
debtors, gave PVB the license to fix and adjust the interest rate at will during the term of the
loan,80 that license would be null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality essential
in contracts. It would invest the Loan Agreement with the character of a contract of adhesion,
where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party' s (the debtor) participation
being reduced to the alternative "to take it or leave it.
 26

Philippine National Bank Vs. AIC Construction Corporation, Spouses Rodolfo C. Bacani and Ma.

Aurora C. Bacani

G.R. No. 228904. October 13, 2021

Leonen, J.Third Division

Nature of the Action: Annulment of interest and penalty increases, accounting, exemption of
family home and damages

FACTS:

In 1988, AIC Construction opened a current account with Philippine National Bank. About
a year later, Philippine National Bank granted AIC Construction an omnibus credit line in the
amount of PlO million. As security, the Bacani Spouses executed a Real Estate Mortgage over
parcels of land.8 They also undertook to be jointly and severally liable with AIC Construction for
the amounts released under the credit line.

Through the years, the omnibus credit line increased little by little.10 When the loan
matured in September 1998, the loan amounted to P65 million, with P40 million as principal and
P25 On April 30, 2001, Philippine National Bank made its final demand to AIC Construction for
the full payment of the loan in the amount of Pl40,837,5ll.29.million as interest charges capitalized
by the Philippine National Bank into principal. Eventually, the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed.

On February 27, 2002, AIC Construction filed a complaint against Philippine National
Bank, the ex-officio sheriff of Mandaluyong, and the sheriff of Makati for annulment of interest
and penalty increases, accounting, exemption of family home and damages. PNB asserted that
the interest and penalty charges were valid because AIC Construction freely, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered into the loan contract with full knowledge of the interest charges.20 It claimed
that AIC Construction is now estopped from questioning the interest as they have been availing
of the credit line for more than a decade through several renewals. RTC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, CA modified the ruling of RTC. It held that the applied interest rates were
unreasonable, usurious, and unconscionable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loan interest rates imposed violates the mutuality of contracts.

RULING:

Yes the interest rates imposed by PNP to AIC are unreasonable and it violates the
mutuality principle of contracts.

Article 1308 of the Civil Code states: "The contract must bind both contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." The principle of mutuality of
contracts is premised on the condition that there must be an essential equality between the
parties so that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between them. If a
condition in the contract depends solely on the will of one of the contracting parties, it is void. This
principle applies to interest rates. Monetary interest is always agreed upon by the parties and
they are free to stipulate on the rates that will apply to their loans. However, if there is no true
 27

parity between the parties, courts may equitably reduce iniquitous or unconscionable interest
charges.

In the case of Vitug v Abuda, the freedom to stipulate interest rates is granted under
the assumption that we have a perfectly competitive market for loans where a borrower
has many options from whom to borrow. It assumes that parties are on equal footing during
bargaining and that neither of the parties has a relatively greater bargaining power to command
a higher or lower interest rate. It assumes that the parties are equally in control of the interest
rate and equally have options to accept or deny the other party's proposals. In other words, the
freedom is granted based on the premise that parties arrive at interest rates that they are
willing but are not compelled to take either by force of another person or by force of
circumstances.

Voluntariness of stipulations on interest rates is not sufficient to make the interest

rates valid. Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with
the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of and the parties must meet as to the
proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement In the
case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the most important
component.

The case is similar to the facts of Spouses Silos case, The interest rates are yet to be
determined through a subjective and one-sided criterion. These rates are no longer subject to the
approval of respondents. The parties did not agree on the interest rate. Rather, the interest rate
was imposed by petitioner, and respondents were left with no choice but to agree to it.
 28

PNTC Colleges, Inc. Vs. Time Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 219698. September 27, 2021

Hernado, J., Second Division

Nature of Action: Complaint for Delivery of Personal Properties with Damages with Counterclaim

FACTS:

PNTC Colleges, Inc. (PNTC) and Time Realty, Inc. (Time Realty) entered into a Contract
of Lease wherein Time Realty leased to PNTC the Extremadura Streets, SAmpaloc, Manila from
2005-2007. While the term of the lease ended on Dec. 31, 2005, the contract was impliedly
renewed on a monthly basis after said date. With the acquiescence of Time Realty, PNTC
continued to occupy the premises for an increase rental rate. Sometime in April 2007, PNTC
commenced the transfer of its operations in Intramuros, Manila. However, Time Realty alleged
that PNTC did so without settling its outstanding rentals, and service charge. Hence, Time Realty
retained the remaining properties of PNTC. It averred that its retention of PNTC’s properties as
security was in accordance with the Contract of Lease in case of Breach or Default.

Thus, PNTC filed a Complaint for Delivery of Personal Properties with Damages dated
August 18, 2007 before the RTC. Times Realty answered with counterclaim, arguing that the
withholding of the remaining properties is pursuant to the lease contract. PNTC denied that the
lease contract was still in effect when respondent retained their reaming property. RTC dismissed
the complaint and the counterclaim, stating that PNTC has no cause of action and that it will
cause unjust enrichment on the part of the respondent if counter claim be granted knowing for a
fact that it already retained the property of the petitioners. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC but it included the counterclaim of Respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Times Realty has the right to retain the property of PNTC for violating the
stipulations in the contract of lease?

RULING:

Yes, respondent has the right to retain the property based on the stipulation in the contract
of lease that they executed.

Relevantly, the lease contract provides that Time Realty has the prerogative to take
control or possession of PNTC’s properties in the event the latter violates a provision of the
contract, including non-payment of rent and other charges. To expound, PNTC incurred the
obligations mainly because of Par. 23 of the Lease Contract which states that Time Realty can
retain PNTC’s properties as security for unpaid rentals and other charges.

It is well to remember that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith. The parties are allowed by law to enter into stipulations, clauses terms and
conditions they may deem convenient which bind the parties as long as they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

Essentially the stipulations in the Contract of Lease are clear and show no contravention
of law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As such, they are valid, and the
parties’s rights shall be adjudicated according to them.
 29

Socorro P. Cabilao Vs. Ma. Lorna Q. Tampan, rep. by her Attorney-in-fact Judith Tampan-
Montinola & Danilo Tampan

G.R. No. 209702. March 23, 2022

Hernando J., Second Division

Nature of the Action: Nullity of a Pacto de Retro sale

FACTS:

Lorna Tampan purchased a house and lot to Socorro Cabilao and executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale. When the buyer decided to transfer the title to her name, she found out that the duplicate copy
was lost hence they filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate. However, her petition
was opposed by Lelita arguiung that they are in possession of the title after buying the property to
Socorro. Lorna lodged a complaint for declaration of nullity of pacto de retso sale entered into by
Socorro and Lelita. Socorro, on her end, filed an action for annulment or cancellation of Document,
alleging that she was the absolute and registered owner of the subject lot who sold the property to
Enriqueta through pacto de retro sale, and eventually to Lelita. She denied the sale of the property in
favor of Lorna. She stated that the Tampans would let her sign various documents whenever she
borrowed money and the claimed that the alleged Deed of Sale is one of those documents.

The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by Lorna stating that Socorro already repurchased
the property from Lelita and that the issue of pacto de retso sale was moot and academic. The CA
reversed the RTC’s findings. Socorro maintained that she never sold the property and that she is
illiterate, and that her signature in the deed of absolute sale was obtained through fraud. She contends
that the deed of sale is a simulated contract or one tainted with fraud therefore null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the executed Deed of Absolute sale between Lorna and Socorro is void because
it is tainted with fraud.

RULING:

The Deed of Absolute sale is valid because Socorro failed to prove the allegation of Fraud.

Article 1305 of New Civil Code (NCC) provides that a contract is "a meeting of minds between
two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service." The essential requisites are: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. In the present
case, all the elements of a valid contract are present. In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale validly
transferred the ownership over TCT No. T-59 from Socorro to Lorna in consideration of Pl 0,000.00.

While Socorro claims that she is an illiterate person, she failed to prove this fact. When a party
claims that one is unable to read or is otherwise illiterate, and fraud is alleged, a presumption that
there is fraud or mistake in obtaining consent of that party arises under Article 1332 of the NCC.

However, for Article 1332 to be applicable, the contracting party who alleges fraud or
vitiated consent must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence. The party must
show clear and convincing evidence of one's personal circumstances and that he or she is
unable to read at the time of execution of the contested contract. Here, there is nothing in Socorro's
testimony showing that she cannot read English or that she was illiterate. To the contrary, the pacto de
retro sales that she entered into with Enriqueta and Lelita, respectively, indicate that she is able to read,
affix her signature, freely give her consent and enter into contracts. Thus, the presumption of fraud did
not arise and Socorro had the burden of proving that the Tampans fraudulently secured her signature
under the guise of another loan document which she would usually sign whenever she borrowed
money.
 30

Alberto C. Hidalgo Vs. Conrado Bascuguin and Evelyn Flaminiano Hidalgo

G.R. No. 233217. October 6, 2021

Leonen, J. Third Division

Nature of the Action: Annulment of Sale with Damages

FACTS:

Evelyn Hidalgo, sold a house and lot to Bascuguin without her husband’s consent who at time
is working overseas. The sale was evidenced by a document and denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Bahay at Lupa na Muling Mabibili”. On April 22, 2004, Alberto sent a Demand Letter to Bascuguin
stating that the transaction was null and void for lack of his consent. He also expressed his willingness
to refund the P300,000.00 purchase price, plus legal interest, if Bascuguin returns the property title.9
In response, Bascuguin demanded the Hidalgo Spouses to pay P900,000.00 and threatened to eject
them and consolidate his ownership over the property, should they refuse to pay.10 On May 6, 2004,
Alberto filed a Complaint11 for annulment of sale and damages against Evelyn and Bascuguin.12 He
asserted that he did not consent to the sale and that his signature on the Kasulatan was forged. RTC
rendered a decision considering the transaction as one of an equitable mortgage. On Appeal, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC arguing that the pacto de retro sale void for lack of consent of the
husband on the sale. Petitioner asserts that he cannot be ordered to reimburse the price, much less
pay interest, considering that the sale is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable to reimburse the buyer the purchase price with interest in
a void sale?

RULING:

When the terms of a void contract have been performed, the parties must be reinstated to their
original situation as legally and equitably possible. Article 1398. An obligation having been annulled,
the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the
contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law. Similarly, Ines
v. Court of Appeals declared the reimbursement and imposition of legal interest proper following the
nullity of the sale for want of consent of one spouse. This was deemed as "a necessary consequence
of the finding that the Contract of Sale ... is void in its entirety[.]" Bucoy v. Paulino, et. al likewise applied
this rule and ordered the restoration of the property to the parties.

Strictly applying Article 1398 here, petitioner and respondents should be restored to their
original situation. Petitioner should be ordered to reimburse to respondent Bascuguin the purchase
price together with interest. On the other hand, respondent Bascuguin should return the title of the
property to petitioner. Further militating against petitioner's claim that respondent Bascuguin is
not entitled to reimbursement is the fact that petitioner himself offered to return the purchase
price in exchange for the subject property's title.
 31

Heirs of Herminio Marquez, represented by Alma Marie Marquez Vs. Heirs of Epifania M.
Hernandez, represented by Lourdes H. Tionson

G.R. No. 236826. March 23, 2022

Hernando J., Second Division

Nature: Specific Performance with damages.

Facts:

In 1955, Epifania and her heirs are occupying a certain area which forms part of the 1427 square meter
property, with the consent and tolerance of the owners Spouses Sakay. Thereafter, in 1967 the owner
sold the property to Herminio Marquez. In 1985, Herminio sold the 200 meter property on which her
house was built for 400.00 per square meter. In view of this sale agreement, Epifania supposedly
undertook to pay Herminio the total price of the subject property within the year of its purchase, or
sometime before the end of 1985. In the event that Epifania failed to comply with the terms the sale -.
agreement would be considered or treated as a lease contract, and the amounts paid by Epifania
would be treated as rentals or advances to Herminio under a continuing lease of the subject property.

Epifania made an initial payment to Herminio in the amount of 2,000.00 as evidenced by a provisional
receipt. Epifania then made payment by way of installment to Herminio by depositing certain amounts
of money in a joint account between them with the Rural Bank of Del Pilar, Inc.

Meanwhile, on December 15, 1999 and July 17, 2000 respondents received from Marquez demand
letters to vacate premises of the subject property. It appears that on August 4, 1994, Marquez and
Herminio executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights19 whereby Herminio
waived all his rights, interest and participation over the 1,417-square meter property in favor of
Marquez. Despite respondents' demands, Herminio allegedly refused to execute a deed of absolute
sale over the subject property in favor of Epifania. Thus, respondents' complaint for specific
performance against Herminio.

In his answer, Herminio argued that when Epifania reneged on her obligation to complete payment of
the purchase price in 1985, their initial agreement became one of lease, and not a contract of sale, He
also averred that he is not the real-party in interest as the title over the 1,417-square meter property
was already transferred to Marquez as early as 1996. Marquez, for her part alleged in her answer that
Epifania did not make any subsequent payments after her initial payment of P2,000.00 to Herminio.

The Trial court declared that there is a valid sale which was thereafter affirmed by the CA on appeal.

Issue:

1. Whether there is a consummated sale between Herminio and Epifania?

2. whether or not the sale is void because there is no consent on the part of Marquez as co
owner of the property?

Ruling:

1. There is a consummated sale.

As correctly pointed out by the Trial court, the sale is consummated even before Epifania made
full payment of the purchase price, and that Herminio transferred ownership over the said property
when he allowed Epifania to continue their occupation thereon consequent to the execution of the
agreement. It bears emphasis that non-payment of the purchase price of the subject property does not
ipso facto nullify the contract or sale between the parties. Based on the evidence presented which
strongly suggest a perfected contract of sale such as when Herminio received the initial payment,
subsequent issuance of checks as partial payments, the receipt of acknowledgement of Herminio from
 32

PDIC Land Bank check amounting to 61k as payment in joint saving account with epifania and the
extrajudicial settlement of heirs of Epifania stating that the proceeds of the joint saving account served
as full payment to the subject property which was conformed by Herminio.

2. The sale is valid even without the consent of Marquez as Co-owner.

Following the case of Cabrera, that [a] contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite
portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio. The undivided interest of a co-owner is also
referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite
portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property. Hence, prior to partition,
a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it
operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share.

In this case, even if the 1417 square meter property was owned in common by Herminio and
Marquez, we hold that the sale of a definite portion thereof by Herminio to Epifania is entirely valid.
This is because the moment Herminio pointed out the boundaries of the subject property, and Marquez
made no objection thereto, there is in effect a partial partition of the co-owned property.
 33

Reynaldo Reyes, as heir of Vitaliano Reyes Vs. Sps. Wilfredo and Melita Garcia

G.R. No. 225159. March 21, 2022

Hernando J., Second Division

Nature of the Action: Recovery of Ownership and Annulment of Deed of Sale

Facts:

Spouses Juian and Marcela Reyes are the owners of an unregistered parcel of land totaling to
463 meter. Sometime in 1975 the heirs of the spouses executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and
sold the half of the subject property to one of the heirs, Anastacio. The remaining other quarter was
occupied by the heirs of Vitaliano, the petitioners while the last remaining quarter of the land was sold
by Isidoro to the Spouses Garcia. It only came to the knowledge of the other heirs that it was sold by
Isidoro, when the buyer, Spouses Garcia, filed an ejectment case against the other heirs. Thus the
petitioners filed for a complaint for recovery of ownership, annulment of the Deed of Sale, and Quieting
of Title. The respondents claimed that the heirs already agreed to divide it among themselves when
they allowed a portion of the subject property to be occupied by heirs of Vitaliano. Also, they claimed
that the portion of the subject property sold to them was Isidoro's share in the subject property.

Rtc ruled to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit and stated that the remaining half of the
property remains co-owned by the heirs of Spouses Reyes. CA later affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of a Co-owned Property by Isidoro to Spouses Garcia is Valid?

RULING:

The sale made by Isidoro is valid.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allot-ted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co- ownership.

Thus, Isidoro, as one of the heirs of Julian and Marcela, has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share
in the co-owned property even without the con-sent of the other co-heirs. Isidoro's sale of the remaining
half of the subject property will only affect his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale. The spouses Garcia will only get Isidoro's undivided share in the subject
property.

It follows that the proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
 34

alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. With the subsistence of co-
ownership, the spouses Garcia only owns Isidoro' s undivided aliquot share of the subject prope1iy.
The spouses Garcia and all the co-owners cannot adjudicate to himself or herself title to any definite
p0rtion of the subject property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree.
 35

Rosalinda Z. Turla and Spouses Ricardo and Myrna Turla Vs. Heirs of Patrocinio N. Dayrit,

Namely: Honorina Dayrit-Villanueva, Margarita Dayrit-Timbol, Lilibeth Dayrit, Regina Dayrit-

Canlas, Cecilia Dayrit-Kwong, Priscilla Dayrit-Solis, Emily Dayrit-Bulan, and Anthony Dayrit

G.R. No. 205743. October 6, 2021

Carandang, J. Third Division

Nature of Action: Annulment of Deed of Absolute sale

FACTS:

Patrocinio was the owner of two parcels of land, during his lifetime he executed a Conditional
sale on Nov. 11, 1983 with petitioner Turla whereby Patrocinio offered to sell the two parcels of land,
and a third real property, for the price of P317,000.00.

Ricardo shall make a down payment of P50,000.00. A partial down payment of P20,000.00 was
already paid by Ricardo. The balance of P267,000.00 shall be paid by Ricardo upon the release of his
loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) or any other bank. If Ricardo backs out for
whatever reason or the loan was disapproved or he is no longer interested, the P20,000.00 down
payment shall be forfeited in favor of Patrocinio. Ricardo applied with the DBP, and later with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) for a housing loan in the amount of P500,000.00. For this purpose, a
special power of attorney (SPA) was executed by Patronicio, in favor of Ricardo and his wife, petitioner
Myrna Turla. After Patrocinio's death, his heirs, respondents herein, checked on the titles of their
father's properties and discovered that TCT No. 40956 was already cancelled by TCT No. 104129 in
the name of petitioner Rosalinda Z. Turla (Rosalinda), Ricardo's sister. Hence, they filed a complaint
for annulment of deed of absolute sale. They averred that they were only aware of the 1983 Conditional
Sale, and as far as they know, Ricardo failed to comply with the terms and conditions thereof.
Petitioners refused to heed to their demand.

Petitioners countered that they complied with the terms of the Conditional Sale dated November
11, 1983. Several payments were made until it reached P80,000.00 covering the dates November 11,
1983 to December 17, 1984. Thereafter, an Absolute Deed of Sale was prepared and notarized before
notary public, Atty. Eric V. Mendoza. Because of the threatened foreclosure of the properties, it was
Rosalinda Turla who fully paid for the bank loan. Spouses Ricardo and Myrna Turla then transferred
ownership of the said properties to Rosalinda. RTC ruled that the sale between Turla and Patrocinio is
null and void because fraud was committed in the transfer of ownership by virtue of the spurious Deed
of Sale executed. CA later affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid sale?

 36

RULING:

The sale is valid. As between the seller and the buyer, the transfer of ownership takes effect
upon the execution of a public instrument covering the real property. As provided in Article 1458 of the
New Civil Code, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, unless the contrary appears or can be
inferred. the ownership of the three parcels of land had been transferred from Patrocinio to Ricardo
upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in January 11, 1991, further considering the
possession and occupation thereof of petitioners' family even prior to the sale.

Respondents claim that Ricardo failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Conditional
Sale. Petitioners refuted the same by presenting receipts covering the dates November 11, 1983 to
December 17, 1884 proving payments. Likewise, petitioners claimed that the proceeds of the loan were
remitted to Patrocinio to satisfy the payment of the purchase price. Having paid in full, a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 11, 1991 was executed by Patrocinio in favor of Ricardo and notarized.
 37

Isabelo Cabalhin Vs. Spouses Bonifacio Lansuela and Isidra Lansuela

G.R. No. 202029. February 15, 2022

Gesmundo CJ., First Division

Nature of the Action: Complaint for Recovery of Possession

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that he was in actual, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject land, having inherited the same from his father, Isidoro. During his
lifetime, Isidoro was in actual possession and cultivation of the land. In June 1993, while
petitioner was visiting relatives in Barobo, Surigao de! Sur, Bonifacio, with the aid of some
men, by means of force, intimidation, stealth, and strategy, entered the property and,
thereafter, planted it with rice. Upon returning from Surigao de! Sur in 1997, petitioner
immediately demanded that respondents vacate his property, but Bonifacio made threats
against his life and safety and that of his family. Bonifacio further claimed to have bought the
land from Isidoro, but petitioner could not recall any such conveyance made by his father who,
one year before his demise, had given him OCT No. P-2133 and advised him to take good
care of the land and administer it. Despite repeated demands to vacate, respondents refused
to do so.
Bonifacio narrated that the said property was already sold by Isidoro to Enrique Perales
(Perales) under a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1968. The heirs of Perales sold the same to
Teodoro Estorion (Estorion) by virtue of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with Simultaneous
Sale dated August 31, 1973. Under a Deed of Sale dated January 24, 1979, Estorion sold the
property to Segros Manaay (Manaay) who, in turn, sold it to Bonifacio under a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1988. Moreover, respondents had been paying the real estate
taxes due on the land, as evidenced by receipts of tax payments.

ISSUE:
Whether not the execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute sale alone is sufficient for
constructive delivery of the property?

RULING:
While a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, ownership of the thing sold is
acquired only upon its delivery to the buyer. Upon the perfection of the sale, the seller assumes
the obligation to transfer ownership and to deliver the thing sold, but the real right of ownership
is transferred only "by tradition" or delivery thereof to the buyer. In the case of Spouses
Santiago vs. Villamor, he execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a [prima facie]
presumption of delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession
of the land sold. "[A] person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot
transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.
There being no actual or constructive delivery of the land subject of the sale between
Manaay and respondents, the latter did not acquire its ownership. Under the circumstances,
when their vendor Manaay had no possession of either the land or the title despite the alleged
prior sale transactions over the property. The respondent Bonifacio cannot acquire a better
right to Manaay, who is the buyer seller in this case.
 38

Bank of the Philippine Islands Vs. LCL Capital, Inc./LCL Capital, Inc. Vs. Bank of the Philippine

Islands

G.R. No. 243396/G.R. No. 243409. September 14, 2021

Lopez, M., First Division

Nature of the Action: Annulment of Certificate of Titles for the foreclosed real estate mortgage

FACTS:

In 1997, LCL Capital, Inc. (LCL) obtained a loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC)
in the amount of P3,000,000.00 subject to 17% interest per annum. As security, LCL executed a
deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its two condominium units. In 2000, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) merged with FEBTC. As the surviving corporation, BPI absorbed FEBTC's assets
and liabilities. When LCL failed to pay the indebtedness including interests and penalties, BPI
applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. At the public auction sale,
BPI emerged as the highest bidder and was issued a Certificate of Sale on May 21, 2003. After
almost two months, or on July 11, 2003, BPI executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of ownership
over the foreclosed condominium units. Consequently, new condominium certificates of title were
issued in favor of BPI. Aggrieved, LCL filed an action against BPI for the annulment of the
certificates of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161 (RTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 69591. Mainly, LCL alleged that the consolidation of ownership is premature
having been made before the lapse of the redemption period. In a Decision dated November 14,
2008, the RTC declared the consolidation void and directed the Register of Deeds of Pasig City
to reinstate the certificates of title of LCL subject to the exercise of its right of redemption. On
Appeal, CA declared that real estate taxes should not be included in the computation of the
redemption price.

ISSUE:

Whether RTC and CA is correct to exclude the Real Estate taxes paid and other taxes on
the foreclosed property in the computation of the redemption price?

RULING:

The real estate taxes that the BPI paid must be included as part of the redemption price.
The payment of real estate taxes is based on the actual or beneficial use and possession
of the property independent of ownership. However, the RTC excluded these expenses so
as not to give premium to BPI's void action of consolidating ownership before the redemption
period expired.

Nevertheless, this ruling has no legal basis. At most, BPI's premature consolidation of
ownership will only result in the reinstatement of LCL's certificates of title. The effect cannot be
extended to the forfeiture of BPI's right of reimbursement for the real estate taxes paid, lest it
undermines the principle of unjust enrichment. To be sure, any unpaid real estate tax is
chargeable against the taxable person who had actual, or beneficial use and possession of the
propety regardless of whether he or she is the owner.
 39

Doris Marie S. Lopez Vs. Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.

G.R. No. 233775. September 15, 2021

Hernando J,. Second Division

Nature of the Action: Reconveyance and Damages

FACTS:

Respondent alleged that sometime in April or May 1997, petitioner told him that she
knows of two parcels of land that were being offered for sale at a reasonable price. At first,
respondent was hesitant to buy the said lands. However, he was eventually convinced to
purchase the subject properties due to the persistent assurances of petitioner.

Petitioner then offered to pose as the buyer because the seller, who was het close friend,
allegedly wanted to deal only with her to keep his financial constraints within his close family
friends. Respondent then entrusted to petitioner the purchase price amounting to
P15,000,000.00, with the agreement that petitioner would be the signatory in the Deed of Sale
but will hold the properties in trust for, and subsequently reconvey the same to, respondent. After
the execution of the sale, however, respondent noticed that petitioner started evading him and
did not give any update as to the registration of the sale in his name. When respondent inquired
on the status of the properties, he found out that the properties were already registered in the
name of petitioner.

This prompted respondent to immediately assume possession of the prope1ties and

introduce major renovations on the house amounting to a total of P9,000,000.00. He likewise paid
the real property taxes thereon for 13 years. Since then, he has been in actual possession of the
properties. Respondent made several demands, both oral and written, upon petitioner to
reconvey the subject properties to him, but to no avail. He filed a complaint for reconveyance and
Damages imputing bad faith on the petitioner, claiming that he is the true owner of the property
and that former merely holds the same in trust. Petitioner claimed that respondent volunteered to
finance the renovation of the house on account of their special relationship. Thereafter,
respondent and his family occupied the said properties.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the respondent as the true and rightful owner of the
property, stating that the factual circumstances surrounding the case showed that an implied trust
existed. On Appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of the Trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is implied trust?

RULING:

There is implied trust in this case.

Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in
property and another person owning the legal title to such, property, the equitable ownership of
the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers
by the latter. The Civil Code provides that an implied trust is created when a property is sold to
 40

one party but paid for by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest in said property. An
implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or
downright fraud.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While
implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations.
 41

Kuwait Airways Corporation vs. The Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., and Tokio Marine
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 213931. November 17, 2021

Carandang J, Third Division

Nature of Action: Claim for actual Damages

Facts:

Fujitsu Europe Limited engaged the services of the Petitioner Kuwait Airways, a company
engaged in air transportation, to transport t 10 pallets containing crates of disk drives to Fujitsu
Computer Products Phil. The Cargo was insured by the respondent Tokio Marine Malayan insurance.
After arrival of the shipment, according to the MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt that there is
dent and a hole in one of the crate. Fujitsu Phil filed an insurance claim with the respondent, the in
return surveyed the alleged damaged crates. Based on the Certificate of Survey issued by the
respondent which states “the denting of the carton may have been caused by the rigor of voyage and/or
rough handling during the various stages loading to or dishcharing”. Fujitsu Phil sent a claim for
damages to Kuwait Air based on the certificate of survey. The claim was not acted upon, hence Fujitsu
filed an insurance claim and based on the subrogation receipt, the respondent filed a complaint against
the petitioner for actual damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint but upon appeal, CA reversed the
Decicion stating that MIASCOR storage receipt indubitably proved the damage, and that the damage
could not have occurred in the ordinary course of things. Likewise, CA held that all the requisites of res
ipsa loquitur are present in this case to presume the negligence of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

1. whether or not the MIASOR storage and delivery receipts are sufficient proof of damage to
presume negligence on the part of the petitioner?

2. whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is correctly applied by the CA in this case?

RULING:

1. No it is not. The receipt referred to in the inspection and the photographs do not show whether it was
conducted on the goods upon the vehicles arrival at NAIA or to one done after the unloading on the
goods upon the vehicle’s arrival at NAIA or to one done after the unloading from the vehicle. This is
critical because the Extraordinary Responsibility of the Petitioner as common carrier, lasts from the
time the goods are unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until
delivered, actually or constructively to the consignee or to the person who has a rights to receive them
such as warehouse operator at NAIA or a forwarding service who is responsible for the last leg of
transportation to the consignee. The court thinks that the photographs were taken when the cargo had
already arrived at the consignee’s premises, which at that point the cargo can no longer unconditionally
placed in the possession of the carrier. The delivery receipts aside, respondents failed to present any
other evidence that the subject cargo was indeed damaged while it was under the control of Kuwait Air.
Likewise, there is no evidence that shows testing and examination showing technical damage on the
cargo, but only a mere visual inspection. The claim of damage in this case is unsubstantiated.

2. CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case. the requirements for the doctrine
of to apply, the following requirements must be shown that a. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence, b. it is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants and c. the possibility of contributing conduct that would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
 42

In this case, the first requisite has not been met, because as extensively discussed, no injury or damage
was proven to begin with. In other words, it was not proven by competent evidence that an accident
had indeed happened.
 43

Jessica P. Maitim a.k.a. “Jean Garcia” Vs. Maria Theresa P. Aguila

G.R. No. 218344. March 21, 2022

Hernando J., Second Division

Nature of Action: Action for Damages based on Quasi-Delict

FACTS:

While petitioner Jessica Maitim was on board her vehicle with her driver Restituto Santos,
Angela Aguila was sideswiped by their vehicle causing her to be dragged about 3 meters resulting to
her right leg being fractured. Aguila was brought to St. Luke’s Medical Center and was diagnosesd to
have displaced and complete fracture of the right leg. She thus underwent operation at Asian Hospital.
Her actual hospital expenses amounted to 163, 187.32 pesos. They resorted to barangay Conciliation
but to no avail. They sent demand letters to Maitim but no response which prompted them to file an
instant action for damages based on Quasi-Delict. RTC held that Santos was presumed to be
negligent applying the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, and Maitim to be vicariously liable. CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto hence the petition. Maitim in her defense, claimed that Santos was
driving slowly and that Angela suddenly came running. She claimed that Santos was her driver for 12
years and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee hence
should not be held vicariously liable. She further averred there is contributory negligence on the part of
the mother of Angele for letting her outside the house which caused the accident.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Santos was presumed negligent applying the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur?

2. Whether or not Maitim may be held vicariously liable?

RULING:

1. Presumption of Negligence of Santos Arises by applying the doctrine. In the case of UCPB General
Insurance vs. Pascual liner, the court reiterated the applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur in vehicular
accidents, wherein it is sufficient that accident itself be established, and once established
through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already
starts to apply.

As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim
and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle is also not in
question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries,
then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos, the
person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of
presenting proof to the contrary. The presumption of negligence on the part of Santos was not
overcome by Maitim, who presented no rebuttal evidence and instead merely alleged that Santos was
driving with due care and was not speeding. Therefore, since Maitim failed to present any evidence to
the contrary, the presumption of negligence on the part of Santos stands and is deemed conclusive.

2. Article 2180 provides that The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 44

Jurisprudence has established that under Article 2180, "when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. "The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate;
it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee”.

Applying these concepts to the present case, the finding of negligence against Santos gave
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of Maitim in the latter's selection and/or
supervision of the former. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos. In the
case of Manliclic v. Calaunan, To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. In
Metro Manila Transit Corp vs. CA, The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

Maitim's attempt to deflect liability clearly falls short as she was not able to present
concrete proof that she exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of her employee, Santos. Therefore, the presumption of negligence
against her stands, and she must be held solidarily liable with Santos.