Family Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree

PEOPLE V. GODOFREDO SAYAT

FACTS: Accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat, alias "Bobby" or Buboy,"

was charged with five crimes of rape in five separate criminal
complaints subscribed by eight-year old Marites Sayat and separately
docketed. Said complaints were identically formulated, to wit:

That on or about (no date given in the website) in the Municipality of

Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of threat, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant, Marites, a minor of eight
years old, (sic) against her will and consent.

The prosecutions version of incident was based principally to the

testimony of the offended party Marites Sayat. She was 8 years old then
when she was raped by her brother ("kapatid sa ama") 18 years her
senior.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship can

be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar
eventhough the certificate of live birth of Marites Sayat, marked as
Exhibit "F" was not formally offered in evidence.

HELD: The identification of documentary evidence is different from its

formal offer. The first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; the second
is made when the party rests his case. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as exhibit does not mean that it will
be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. 27 The party
may decide to formally offer it if he believes this will advance his cause,
but then, again, he may decide not to do so at all. 28 Alternative
circumstance of relationship between him and the victim can not be
proved by said document which was not submitted in court.

Unfortunately for said appellant, however, the victim unequivocally

testified that he is actually her half-brother ('kapatid sa ama',) 29 and
said declaration was never successfully refuted. Section 40, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that they reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one
of its members, may be received in evidence of the witness testifying
thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family geneology, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. 30

Declarations as to pedigree may not ordinarily be proved by hearsay

evidence or by affidavit; but except for evidence of reputation which
usually is limited to members of the family, any competent witness,
including the person whom the declaration relates, may testify thereto.
It has been held proper for one to testify to facts of family history which
relate to him, such as the identity of his parents or other relatives or the
place of his birth or his age. 31Parenthetically, it will be observed that
Marites and appellant bear the same family name "Sayat."
PEOPLE V. APOSTOL, G.R. NOS. 123267-68,DECEMBER 9,1999

FACTS: On August 4, 1995, accused Anthony Apostol filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. On September 16, 1995, the accused was
transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
In this appeal, accused Anthony Apostol raised only one assignment of error,
that is, the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of statutory rape. Furthermore, accused asserts that the carnal
intercourse between him and the victim could not amount to rape because they
were lovers, and the sexual coitus was consensual.
There is no merit in this appeal, for reasons to be discussed hereunder.
In reviewing the evidence for the prosecution in cases of rape, the courts have
been guided by three settled principles: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to
make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must
stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense. We shall be guided by these principles in reviewing the
facts of the instant case.
The law provides that carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is
under twelve (12) years of age.
Accused Anthony Apostol tries to escape conviction by contesting the age of the
victim at the time of the commission of the crime. He cites the testimony of the
head teacher of Brgy. Lanipe, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras, Mateo Geroma, who
testified that based on Amy Tacuyans Form 1, she was born on October 25, 1981.
However, based on Amy Tacuyans birth certificate, she was born on October 24,
1982.
This piece of evidence would not help the accused escape conviction. Whichever
would be used to determine the age of the victim, the result would be the same.
Amy Tacuyan was under twelve (12) years old when accused had carnal
knowledge of her in September 1993. In terms of evidentiary value, we accord
greater weight to the birth certificate.
Under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a birth certificate
is the best evidence of a persons date of birth. It is an entry in the official record
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines and is
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The evidentiary
value of the birth certificate is not affected by the late registration by the mother
of the birth of her child.
Moreover, when the mother of the victim was presented on the witness stand
she categorically stated that Amy was born on October 24, 1982 and that she
was ten (10) years and eleven (11) months old when the rape took place on
September 14, 1993. Being the person who gave birth to the child, the mother is
the best person to know the age of her child. Amy herself said in open court that
she was born on October 24, 1982.
It is long settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino (3 Phil. 118
[1903] and U.S. v. Angeles (sic) and Sabacahan (36 Phil. 246, 250 [1917]
citing U.S. v. Estavillo and Perez (10 O.G. 1984), that the testimony of a person
as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no
personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of
his age is acquired from what he is told by his parents ( U.S. vs. Evangelista, 32
Phil. 321, 326 [1915] he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his
parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family
tradition (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742)x x x"
The testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the victim and her own mother, as
to the fact that the victim was born on October 24, 1982 fall under the exception
to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. Section 40 provides in part:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.- The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. x x x"
Going now to the "sweetheart defense", accused Anthony Apostol claimed that
he could not be convicted of rape because he and Amy were sweethearts and
the sexual intercourse that occurred on September 14, 1993 was consensual. He
denied that they had sexual intercourse on September 1, 1993. He said that it
was not "morally sound for the court to convict" him "of the crime of statutory
rape" because the victim's parents were aware of their relationship.
The "sweetheart defense" is a "much-abused defense that rashly derides the
intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience. '"Even if it were true that
accused-appellant and Amy Tacuyan were sweethearts, "this was no license for
accused-appellant to force himself upon Amy. "
Anthony's conviction on two counts of statutory rape is still in order because it
is not the victim's consent that is material, but the fact that the victim was
under twelve (12) years old when it happened.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, the "gravamen of the offense of
statutory rape as provided under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. 30 "The only
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. It is not
necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used
against her because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim on
account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own. 31
In the present case, the prosecution established these elements. Amy was raped
in the afternoon of September 1, 1993 and in the evening of September 14, 1993.
This Court has time and again said that the "testimony of child-victims are given
full weight and credit.32 The prosecution conclusively proved that the victim was
under twelve (12) years old when she was raped.
The accused did not deny the intercourse on September 14, 1993. He only raised
the defense of denial and alibi in relation to the September 1, 1993 charge. "No
jurisprudence is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for
which reason it is generally rejected especially when the complaining witness
sufficiently and positively established the identity of the accused." 33
Thus, the trial court did not err in finding accused Anthony Apostol criminally
liable for two (2) counts of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, for each count. Despite the allegation that accused used
a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the crime, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death as provided under Republic Act 7659 could not
be imposed because the crime was committed on September 1 and 14, 1993,
when the amending law was not yet effective. At that time, the death penalty
was abolished by the 1987 Constitution.
Pursuant to Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, and in line with current
jurisprudence, we increase the award of forty thousand (P40,000.00) pesos civil
indemnity ex delicto to fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos.34 An award of moral
damages in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos is in order even in
the absence of proof therefor.35
The Court, therefore, affirms the appealed decision with the above modification.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMSthe appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, Branch 39, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41755-41756 finding accused
Anthony Apostol alias "Otoy" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, on each
count, with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim, Amy
Tacuyan, the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, for each count of statutory
rape.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

Common Reputation
Part of the Res Gestae

Startling Occurrence

PEOPLE V. ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG, G.R. NO. 208749,NOVEMBER 26, 2014

FACTS: This is a rape case on automatic review to the Supreme Court committed
by the accused against his 13 year old daughter,AAA. According to the
information, the accused raped his daughter on February 5, 2009. Apparently,
BBB, the wife of the accused and mother of AAA, together with the latter,
complained to Police Officer 3 Fretzie Cobardo, the officer assigned at the
Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center of Taguig City.
It was she who investigated the whole incident and took the sworn statement of
AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. Members of the Barangay Security
Force Michael Estudillo and Ronilla Perlas arrested the accused. She testified in
court. However, AAA, did not appear in court despite several subpoenas. Later
on, BBB and AAA, manifested their desistance stating that AAA has already
forgiven her father.

As a result, the incriminatory statements, which were allegedly made by AAA,

were conveyed to the court by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In
particular, PO Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was AAA’s
narration of her ordeal, along with her observations of her demeanor during the
investigation.

The trial court convicted the accused, ruling that the testimony of PO3 Cobardo
was part of the res gestae.

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to the absence
of AAA’s testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his daughter; that the
testimonies of the prosecuting witness PO3 Cobardo and other, not being
themselves victims or witnesses to the “startling occurrence” of rape cannot
create the hearsay exception of res gestae.

The CA convicted the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies presented be considered as hearsay

evidence due to the fact that there was no cross-examination made by the
adverse party, against the original declarant (AAA).

Ruling: The testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements

were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right
of the accused-appellant to confront evidence against him.

All witnesses must be subjected to the cross-examination by the adverse party

as further elaborated in Section 6, Rule 142 of the rules of Court, “Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witnesses may be cross-examined by
the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.” This equally applies to non-criminal
proceedings.

The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about
the trustworthiness and reliability of the hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to
cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory,
veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.

Also, excluding hearsay aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to
cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have direct knowledge of the
transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to
cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration
of justice.

Therefore, the accused is acquitted.

PEOPLE V. VILLARICO, SR., G.R. NO. 158362, APRIL 4,2011

CASE DOCTRINE: The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae
is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

FACTS: Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide Cagatan. During
the trial, prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Remedios, sister-in-
law of the victim, who testified that she saw accused pointing their gun at the
victim; (2) Lolita Cagatan, mother of the victim, who testified that she was at the
sala when she heard gunshots followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking
for help stating that he was shot by Berting (accused); (3) Francisco, father of
the victim; who testified that he also heard gunshots and saw accused aiming
their guns upward and were about to leave. RTC convicted the four accused of
homicide aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to the positive
identification of the accused by the Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate
review, the CA modified the RTC's decision and convicted the accused with
murder. The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually
see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony is a hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the victim
immediately after the shooting incident is admissible in evidence

HELD: Yes. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception
to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides: “Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.” The
term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative
of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

PEOPLE V. VARGAS Y JAGUARIN, G.R. NO. 230356,SEPTEMBER 18, 2019

FACTS: Edgardo Vargas was convicted of murder based on eyewitness

testimony.
The victim, SPO1 Alfredo Dan Cocjin, was shot to death on January 4, 1992, by
an unidentified assailant.
Seven months after the shooting incident, eyewitness Job Bieren gave a sworn
statement identifying Vargas as the one who shot the victim.
Vargas was arrested, charged, and found guilty of murder by the trial court.
Vargas appealed the decision, arguing that Job's delay in reporting the crime
made his testimony unreliable.

ISSUE: Is the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness affected by the delay in

reporting the crime?

RULING: The Supreme Court found no reason to deviate from the findings of the
trial court regarding the credibility of the prosecution witness.
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, but modified it with respect to
the award of damages.
Ratio: The Court held that Job's delay in reporting the crime does not necessarily
affect his credibility.
The delay was sufficiently explained by Job's fear of retaliation from Vargas,
who was the cousin of the municipal mayor.
Job only felt safe to come forward and report what he knew about the killing
after the mayor lost in the election and was replaced.
The Court also found that Job's testimony was corroborated by the physical
evidence on record.
The Court ruled that Job's testimony should be given credence and full probative
weight, as there was no evidence of any ill motive for him to falsely testify
against Vargas.
The Court emphasized that the findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the witnesses' credibility, are accorded high respect unless there
are cogent facts and circumstances that were overlooked or misappreciated.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Vargas for murder and
ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages, civil indemnity, and
moral damages.
The Court found that Job's delay in reporting the crime did not affect his
credibility, and his testimony, along with the corroborating evidence, was
sufficient to establish Vargas' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. FLORESTA Y SELENCIO, G.R. NO. 239032,JUNE 17, 2019

FACTS: The RTC and CA convicted Gilbert for the crime of Murder under Art. 248
of the RPC. Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito (Jay Lourd) was having a drinking session
with his friend Allan Andaya (Allan) and a certain Benjie at the kitchen of his
house. After drinking two (2) shots of gin, Jay Lourd suddenly stood up and said
to Allan, "Pare, I was hit, may tama aka." As Allan was about to hug Jay Lourd,
he heard a cracking sound behind him, causing him to run away. Meanwhile, Jay
Lourd's wife, Jennifer Bones (Jennifer), was breastfeeding their youngest child
when she heard the gunshot coming from the kitchen. She hurriedly went to the
kitchen and saw Jay Lourd bloodied on the floor, prompting her to cover his
wound with a piece of cloth. At that moment, he told her, "Panggay, you see if
Gilbert is still there?" Subsequently, she hid in a room with her elder child until
her uncle and sister-in-law arrived to bring Jay Lourd to the hospital. She then
decided to stay behind and wait for the police officers to arrive. However, when
they informed her that they would continue the investigation the following day,
she proceeded to the hospital where she was informed that Jay Lourd was
already dead. Thereafter, she went to the Masbate City Police Station to tell the
authorities that it was Gilbert who shot Jay Lourd. Consequently, Gilbert was
apprehended by the police.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD: Yes. Be that as it may, the Court is aware that in certain instances, the
prosecution may still sustain a conviction despite the absence of direct
evidence, provided that it is able to present circumstantial evidence that would
establish an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact
in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient
for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
Applying these principles to the evidence that appear on
record, the Court finds that the prosecution had likewise failed to present
sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish Gilbert's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Records show that aside from Jay Lourd's utterance, there is only one (1)
other circumstance that could possibly point to Gilbert as the assailant, and that
is their previous quarrel with one another. 26 However, the totality of these
circumstances is insufficient to produce a moral certainty that it was indeed
Gilbert who shot and killed Jay Lourd. Wherefore, appeal is granted. Gilbert
Selencio is acquitted of the crime of Murder.

PEOPLE V. DAGSA Y BANTAS, G.R. NO. 219889,JANUARY 29, 2018

FACTS: On October 11, 2004, the victim, AAA, a young girl who was then four (4)
years old, was walking home with two of her classmates after having been
dismissed from their class in Kapangan, Benguet. While they were on their way
home, herein accusedappellant, who is the cousin of AAA's father, blocked their
path and told AAA's classmates to go ahead as he would be giving AAA a candy.
AAA's classmates left her and, after walking a little farther, they looked back
and saw accused-appellant remove AAA's panty and proceeded to fondle her
vagina. Thereafter, when AAA arrived home, her mother, BBB, noticed that the
victim immediately removed her panty, saying that she no longer wanted to use
it. The following day, while BBB was giving AAA a bath, the latter refused that
her vagina be washed claiming that it was painful. Upon her mother's inquiry,
AAA replied that accused-appellant played with her vagina and inserted his penis
in it. BBB immediately went to talk to AAA's classmates about the incident
whereby the said classmates relayed to her what they saw. They then proceeded
to the police station to report the incident. AAA's classmates gave their
statements, but AAA was not able to give hers as she was too shy. A criminal
complaint for rape was eventually filed against accused-appellant. In an
Information dated November 25, 2004, the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet
charged accused-appellant with the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6(5), both of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 83533 (RA
8353), in relation to Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610). After trial, the RTC
rendered its Judgment dated September 21, 2012 finding accusedappellant
guilty as charged. On August 29, 2014, the CA promulgated its Decision holding
that "the combination of all the circumstances presented by the prosecution
does not produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt against [accused-
appellant] for the crime of rape."9 The CA found that the evidence of the
prosecution failed to establish that [accused-appellant] had carnal knowledge of
AAA."10 What the classmates of AAA saw was that accusedappellant fondled
her vagina. The CA also held that the admission of AAA to her mother that
accused-appellant sexually abused her may not be considered as part of the res
gestae because such was not spontaneously and voluntarily made. The CA,
nonetheless, held that accused-appellant may be convicted of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness as the said crime is included in the crime of rape, and the
elements of which were sufficiently established during trial.

The CA did not commit error in finding accused-appellant not liable for rape. In
the present case, the combination of all the circumstances presented by the
prosecution does not produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt against
Edwin for the crime of rape. Here, the evidence of the prosecution failed to
establish that Edwin had carnal knowledge of AAA. Michael's testimony did not
show that Edwin had carnal knowledge with AAA. He only testified that he saw
Edwin holding AAA's vagina. x x x Clearly, Michael and Jemie's testimonies
failed to prove that Edwin inserted his penis [into] AAA's vagina. What they saw
was only his act of fondling AAA's private part which is not rape. Nonetheless,
the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness. Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section
4,18 in relation to Section 5,19 Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
affirmed by settled jurisprudence,20 even though the crime charged against the
accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights
because said crime is included in the crime of rape. The ruling of the CA finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness is based on the
testimonies of the two classmates of the victim, AAA, who saw accused-
appellant fondle the latter's vagina. The CA found accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child, as follows: The essential elements of
this provision are: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age.32 As to the first element. Records show that
the prosecution duly established this element when the witnesses positively
testified that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October 2004.
The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a
child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.33 This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was
either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and (b) she is a
child as defined under RA 7610.34 Anent the third element, there is no dispute
that AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, on
the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA correctly found accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610

Verbal Acts

TALIDANO V. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES,INC., G.R. NO. 172031,

JULY 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime

and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is
based in Korea.
His one (1)-year contract of... employment commenced on 15 October 1996
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against
and maltreated the vessel's Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-
complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF)
in London
Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21 January 1997.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the
vessel after having been warned several times of dismissal from service for his
incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
superiors.
As proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
incident,... reporting the vessel's deviation from its course due to petitioner's
neglect of duty at the bridge,[8] as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge
issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
LA... the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complain

NLRC
NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter

CA
Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate court nonetheless
declared petitioner's dismissal from employment as valid and reinstated the
Labor Arbiter's decision.

ISSUES: YES... these fax messages cannot be considered as res gestae because
the statement of the ship master embodied therein is just a report.

RULING: Section 42 of Rule 130[40] of the Rules of Court mentions two acts
which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal
acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence,
whereas in... verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act.
We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
spontaneous exclamation
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the... occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.

Assuming that petitioner's negligence which allegedly caused the ship to deviate
from its course is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the
statements contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the
alleged incident. In addition, no dates have... been mentioned to determine if
these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent
the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part
of the res gestae of the first kind.

verbal acts
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its
admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2)
the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must
accompany the equivocal act; and (4)... the statements give a legal significance
to the equivocal act.

Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at

least proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the
equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by
the fax statements adverted to as parts of... the res gestae. No date or time has
been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made
simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.

Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The
matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master,
who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He
obtained such information only from the
Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay.