Structure and Infrastructure Engineering

Maintenance, Management, Life-Cycle Design and Performance

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A simple network-based probabilistic method for

estimating recovery of lifeline services to buildings
after an earthquake

Negar Mohammadgholibeyki, Maria Koliou & Abbie B. Liel

To cite this article: Negar Mohammadgholibeyki, Maria Koliou & Abbie B. Liel (20 Feb
2023): A simple network-based probabilistic method for estimating recovery of lifeline
services to buildings after an earthquake, Structure and Infrastructure Engineering, DOI:
10.1080/15732479.2023.2177876

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15732479.2023.2177876

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STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING
https://doi.org/10.1080/15732479.2023.2177876

A simple network-based probabilistic method for estimating recovery of lifeline

services to buildings after an earthquake
Negar Mohammadgholibeykia , Maria Kolioua and Abbie B. Lielb
a
Zachry Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, USA; bDepartment of Civil,
Environmental and Architectural Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The assessment of how to regain pre-event functionality of buildings after an earthquake within an Received 7 October 2021
adequate time has gained attention in the last years, where a critical aspect is to identify the restor- Revised 9 November 2022
ation time of the lifeline services that serve those buildings. Existing studies focused on developing Accepted 17 November 2022
frameworks for specific topologies and hazard levels. These methods are mostly out of reach for prac-
KEYWORDS
ticing engineers because of the necessity of identifying the network topology, performing complex Community connectivity;
network analysis, or conducting a regional seismic hazard analysis. This study develops a generic, net- damage; functional
work-based probabilistic method to estimate the restoration time of interdependent lifeline services to interdependencies; lifeline
buildings after an earthquake. By avoiding the complexities above, this method links lifeline networks network recovery; recovery;
to utility service restoration to generate service restoration curves useful for building functional recov- resilience; restoration;
ery assessments. An application to Shelby County and Napa is presented, showing reasonable agree- service; utility
ment with more complex network-based analyses. Due to limitations in estimating component
quantities and fragility information in regions without data, as well as other assumptions, differences
are observed while comparing this method to more rigorous approaches. Still, those differences are
acceptable considering the scope of this work for supporting building decision analyses.

1. Introduction lifeline infrastructure system’ (Sattar et al., 2021). This per-

Significant damage and disruption to communities, includ-
ing their buildings, critical infrastructure, and social institu-
tions, from hazard events, such as earthquakes, hurricanes,
or tornadoes, has underscored the importance of commu-
nity resilience in recent decades. Accordingly, substantial
research has been conducted on the definition and quantifi-
cation of community resilience (Ayyub, 2014; Bruneau
et al., 2003; Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Cutter et al.,
2008; Koliou et al., 2020; Miles, 2015; Nan & Sansavini,
2017; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum,
2008; Sharma, Tabandeh, & Gardoni, 2020). Built infrastruc-
ture, including buildings and lifeline systems, is fundamental
to community resilience (O’Rourke & Briggs, 2007).
These concepts have recently been translated into an
objective of maintaining the functionality of individual
buildings and lifeline networks after an event (Mieler &
Mitrani-Reiser, 2018), which is not only a research goal but
also a policy goal (Sattar et al., 2021). These objectives have
been expressed in terms of functional recovery, which is
defined as ‘a post-earthquake performance state in which a
building or lifeline infrastructure system is maintained, or
restored, to safely and adequately support the basic intended
functions associated with the pre-earthquake use or occu-
pancy of a building, or the pre-earthquake service level of a
formance state can inform buildings’ design and retrofit to
enhance community resilience (NIST Special Publication,
2018; Williams, 2018).
Experience from past earthquakes, e.g., the Northridge
Earthquake in Los Angeles (Hall, Holmes, & Somers, 1994),
and the Maule Earthquake in Chile (Due~ nas-Osorio &
Kwasinski, 2012), among others, indicated that lifeline serv-
ices, such as utility services and transportation services, are
both critical for community resilience goals and affected by
the damage to the built infrastructure. This damage also sig-
nificantly affects the achievement of building functional
recovery goals (Sattar et al., 2021). In particular, the recov-
ery time of lifeline networks affects the availability of lifeline
services at each building and, therefore, how and when a
building is functional. State-of-the-art methods for assess-
ment of lifeline network recovery is a complex process that
depends on many factors, including damage to the network,
interdependencies between the various lifeline networks
affecting damage or recovery (e.g., between water and power
networks), and repair decisions and process factors such as
the availability of crews, repair priorities, and repair costs
and budgets. All these factors directly influence the time of
service restoration, which is the formative parameter for
building functional recovery purposes.

CONTACT Maria Koliou maria.koliou@tamu.edu Zachry Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station,
TX, USA.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/15732479.2023.2177876.
ß 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.
These factors depend on the regional built environment
and the regional extent of the damage. Yet, to a priori quan-
tify functional recovery of individual buildings, as required
to design or retrofit for functional recovery goals in accord-
ance with policy directives (Sattar et al., 2021), service res-
toration of lifeline systems should be considered, even while
this information and assessment methods are not generally
available to building designers. This conundrum necessitates
a more generic probabilistic model to represent the recovery
time of lifeline networks that is relevant to building design
decisions and accessible to engineers. The term ‘generic
model’ refers to a model applicable to lifeline service restor-
ation to buildings in different regions that does not require
an engineer to define the networks’ topologies, perform
detailed and complex network analyses, or conduct a
regional seismic hazard analysis.
Several studies have examined the damage to and recov-
ery of lifeline networks such as electric power systems (EPS)
(Anagnos, 2001; Park, Nojima, & Reed, 2006; Shinozuka,
Dong, Chen, & Jin, 2007), water distribution systems
(WDS) (Choi, Yoo, & Kang, 2018; Davis, 2014; Kakderi &
Argyroudis, 2014; Tabucchi, Davidson, & Brink, 2010), nat-
ural gas systems (NGS) (Ameri & van de Lindt, 2019;
Cimellaro, De Stefano, & Villa, 2013), and telecommunica-
tion systems (TS) (Deodatis, Ellingwood, & Frangopol, 2014;
Leelardcharoen, 2011) after an earthquake, obtained through
both analytical and empirical models. For example,
Kammouh, Cimellaro, and Mahin (2018) collected damage
and restoration data of lifeline networks from 32 earth-
quakes and developed data-driven restoration curves for
these systems. Other studies have accounted for the inter-
dependency between the different components of networks
in developing fragility and restoration curves (Due~ nas-
Osorio, 2005; Due~ nas-Osorio, Craig, & Goodno, 2007;
Due~ nas-Osorio & Kwasinski, 2012; Gonzalez, Due~ nas-
Osorio, Sanchez-Silva, & Medaglia, 2016; Hernandez-
Fajardo & Due~ nas-Osorio, 2011; Lin et al., 2019; Lin &
El-Tawil, 2020; Masoomi, Burton, Tomar, & Mosleh, 2020;
Ouyang, 2014). These studies consider both functional inter-
dependencies between lifeline networks, i.e., the situation in
which the functionality or material flow of one system
depends on the other, and spatial interdependencies, i.e., the
situation in which two systems have geographical overlap
(Due~ nas-Osorio et al., 2007; Hernandez-Fajardo & Due~ nas-
Osorio, 2011; Lin & El-Tawil, 2020; Poljansek, Bono, &
Gutierrez, 2012).
Considering Shelby County, Tennessee, as a testbed, a num-
ber of studies (e.g., Due~nas-Osorio et al. (2007); Hernandez-
Fajardo and Due~ nas-Osorio (2011); Leelardcharoen (2011);
Lin and El-Tawil (2020); Sharma et al. (2020)), generated ana-
lytical frameworks for assessing lifeline networks’ damage and
restoration using the HAZUS (FEMA., 2003) lifeline network
component damage and restoration as a basis. Centerville, a
virtual community, was also used as the testbed for developing
the restoration curves of NGS networks accounting for inter-
dependency relationships between gas and power systems
(Ameri & van de Lindt, 2019).
There has also been a growing interest in assessing build-
ings’ post-earthquake functionality, considering the disrup-
tion of lifeline services. Masoomi et al. (2020) developed a
functional recovery model for the Napa, CA building inven-
tory as a case study, accounting for the damage and recov-
ery of electric power and water distribution networks in the
recent Napa earthquake. They concluded that the recovery
process of the building inventory itself (inspections, financ-
ing, and repair, etc.) tends to take longer than the restor-
ation of the EPS and WDS. Even so, considering Shelby
County, Zhang, Lin, Wang, Nicholson, and Xue (2018) pro-
posed a framework for predicting functionality loss of build-
ing portfolios considering the disruption of power and
water networks. They showed that neglecting the impact of
disruption in utility services results in considerable under-
estimation of building portfolio functionality loss after a
hazard event.
On the building side, Terzic, Villanueva, Saldana, and
Yoo (2021) and Cook, Liel, Haselton, and Koliou (2022)
have introduced frameworks for post-earthquake functional
recovery assessment of buildings through a set of fault trees
defined for building systems to identify the components that
hinder the building’s functionality. These frameworks require
an understanding of lifeline service provision as input. In
essence, current models and frameworks for lifeline damage
and recovery assessment require three main inputs: (1) the
lifelines’ network topology and location of the network com-
ponents, (2) the seismic hazard of the region, either for a
single scenario or as one of several scenarios that are prob-
abilistic and hazard-consistent (DeBock & Liel, 2015; Han &
Davidson, 2012; Miller & Baker, 2015), and (3) an under-
standing of recovery resources required and resources avail-
able. Using those inputs, network damage and recovery are
quantified through detailed network analysis as described by
the references cited above. However, collecting these inputs
for a region of interest is not straightforward. It requires a
vast effort to develop region-specific network- and compo-
nent-level models that present a barrier to building design
and assessment with functional recovery goals in mind.
Thus, a probabilistic model that does not require the user to
provide such inputs while capturing the damage, interdepen-
dencies, and restoration process as well as linking these to
the recovery of utility services in the buildings of a commu-
nity is essential.
2. Scope
The scope of this study is to introduce a method for quanti-
fying lifeline service recovery to buildings that is suitable for
incorporation into functional recovery estimations of build-
ings for various seismically active regions and lifeline sys-
tems of different topologies. This method aims to estimate
the system services recovery to buildings without conducting
a data-intensive system restoration analysis, regional seismic
hazard analysis, and complex network analysis. To achieve
this goal toward an application of building functional recov-
ery, a set of contributions is developed, including: (1) a set
of inventory data and regression models developed to be

adopted by the user without requiring the collection of net-
works’ topology data; (2) an approach for linking disparate
intensity measures at the building site and the lifeline-net-
work level; and (3) a method that accounts for the interde-
pendencies between lifeline network components by
defining primary-secondary relationships in which one com-
ponent or set of components (primary) controls the restor-
ation of others (secondary).
In addition, this method is flexible in presenting the out-
comes in terms of a return period of interest or just in the
case of a single earthquake scenario, depending on the user’s
preference. Crucially, the outcome of the proposed method-
ology is suitable for integration into simulations assessing a
building’s functional recovery (Cook et al., 2022) with much
less computational effort than network-level lifeline simula-
tions and with the data that is available to a building design
engineer.
3. Proposed method
Figure 1 presents a schematic view of the proposed meth-
od’s inputs, simulations (developed in MATLAB (2020)),
and outputs. The method considers the EPS, WDS, NGS,
and TS because the quality of the service these systems pro-
vide affects the buildings’ post-earthquake functionality
(Cook et al., 2022).

The input box defines the inputs needed to perform the
damage and restoration assessments of lifeline networks
Figure 1. A schematic view of the inputs, simulation, and outputs of the proposed method for estimating lifeline service restoration to buildings.
STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 3
related to the type of lifeline system, building/community
location, and hazard level of interest.

The simulation box refers to a set of probabilistic simula-
tions performed related to the damage and restoration
assessment of interdependent lifeline networks using the
developed Monte Carlo simulation code. The network
restoration time is translated into buildings’ utility ser-
vice restoration as needed for achieving building func-
tional recovery goals by estimating the probability of
service provision at each building and considering differ-
ent quality service levels ranging from no service to full
service.

The output box identifies the method’s output, which is
building utility service restoration curves representing
the probability of service restoration as a function of
time.
The proposed simulation method comprises four major
steps, depicted schematically in Figure 2. Step 1 involves
collecting and calculating a set of inputs and metrics
required for the probabilistic simulations, including the
quantities and types of lifeline network component quanti-
ties relevant to service restoration and interdependency rela-
tionships therein, as well as network-based damage fragility
curves. Step 2 involves the damage assessment of the lifeline
networks using the inputs and metrics. Step 3 calculates net-
work restoration time. Finally, Step 4 relates this time to
building service restoration. These steps are described in
detail in the following.
4 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.

Figure 2. Flowchart indicating key steps of the proposed method for estimating lifeline service restoration to buildings.

Table 1. Component types for lifeline networks considered in this study from Focusing on the data needs and workflows of building
Lin and El-Tawil (2020) and Leelardcharoen (2011). engineers, this step is accomplished through one of two
EPS WDS NGS TS approaches: (1) a database of network component quantities
Gate Stations Joints Regulator Point of developed herein for seismically active regions in the United
stations presence (PoP)
Substations Pumping stations Gate stations Tandem office States where information is available, and (2) regression
Transmission Tanks Joints End office models defined to estimate parameters related to the lifeline
lines networks’ topologies and component quantities based on the
Pipelines Pipelines
population and/or the area of the region of interest for
regions where explicit data on the lifeline networks are not
3.1. Network data collection (Step 1) available. The database is compiled from public sites and
available literature (US Energy Information Administration,
Step 1 involves collecting data related to network compo- 2020). Supplemental material also suggests an order for cal-
nent quantities, categorising components based on their culating component quantities that can recognise network
interdependency relationship with components of other life- components’ interdependencies (described next).
line networks considered, and collecting relevant network-
based damage fragility curves from the literature.
3.1.2. Categorise network components based on inter-
dependency relationships (Step 1b)
3.1.1. Determine component quantities for each lifeline Components then are categorised into three groups depend-
network (Step 1a) ing on their interdependency state with components of
Component quantity is a metric used in the proposed other lifeline networks. The focus is on interdependencies in
method to identify how many different types of components the recovery phase. These are interdependencies in which a
(within each lifeline network) exist in the region of interest component’s functionality is dependent on the functionality
(e.g., number of pumping stations and number of electrical of another component. Interdependency in the damage
substations, etc.). These quantities, noted as NC, are input to phase, which implies that a component will fail if another
the network damage estimation and the determination of component fails, is addressed by adopting interdependent
restoration times. Table 1 summarises the different compo- network-based fragility curves available in the literature
nent types for the EPS, WDS, NGS, and TS that affect net- (Step 1c).
work damage and recovery and are therefore considered The various components of lifeline networks of interest
herein. can be categorised into three groups in terms of their

relationship to each other. The first group comprises facili-
ties that can be restored independently of other compo-
nents; however, their recovery is crucial for the functionality
of other networks’ components; these are referred to as
‘primary’ components. The second group is ‘secondary’
components, those whose functionality cannot be recovered
unless the components in the first group are recovered.
Components that belong to neither the first nor the second
group are categorised into the third group. As illustrated in
Figure 3, for example, the functionality of the EPS substa-
tions can be achieved independently; however, their func-
tionality is critical for restoring the functionality of
components of other networks, such as pumping stations in
the WDS and regulator stations in the NGS (Lin & El-
Tawil, 2020). Thus, substations are classified as primary
components.
However, gate stations in the EPS cannot be functional
unless the intersection nodes and pipelines in the WDS are
functional and can deliver water to the gate stations; as a
result, the EPS gate stations are classified as secondary com-
ponents with regard to the relevant primary components
(Lin & El-Tawil, 2020). Finally, the WDS tanks belong to
the third category, which can be recovered independently,
and their recovery does not affect the functionality of any
components of other lifeline networks. The set of interde-
pendencies adopted is listed in Table 2, which was devel-
oped using information available in the literature on the
functionality of different components of networks (Lin &
El-Tawil, 2020; Momeni, Prasad, Dharmawardena, Piratla, &
Venayagamoorthy, 2018). For the TS, it is assumed that all
the components are secondary components for substations
of the EPS. The categorised component quantities are noted
as CQC.
Figure 3. Illustration of interdependency relationships between different network components (armaxgaz, 2021; Freepik, 2021; iconfinder, 2021; icon-library, 2021;
istockphoto, 2021; w7cloud, 2021).
STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 5
3.1.3. Collect interdependent network fragility curves
(Step 1c)
To estimate the level of damage in a lifeline network given a
hazard level, this study adopts existing interdependent net-
work-based fragility curves are adopted from the literature.
Network-based fragility curves available in the literature
include those for the EPS and WDS developed in the context
of Shelby County (Due~ nas-Osorio et al., 2007; Hernandez-
Fajardo & Due~ nas-Osorio, 2011), for TS (Leelardcharoen,
2011), as well as for the European NGS (Poljansek et al., 2012),
as reported in Tables 3 and 4. Functional and spatial interde-
pendencies in the damage phase, which are unidirectional,
were considered in these referenced studies for the develop-
ment of interdependent damage fragility curves. Other curves
can be used as they are developed, but this method does not
presume that an engineer would have the bandwidth to
develop a new set of curves for a region of interest.
The network damage state (DS) measure for these studies
is connectivity loss for the EPS, WDS, and NGS following
several recent studies (He & Cha, 2018, 2020; Lin & El-
Tawil, 2020). Network connectivity loss (CL) is defined as
(Hernandez-Fajardo & Due~ nas-Osorio, 2011):
1 X
jN j
d
PcAi
CL ¼ 1  (1)
jNd j i¼1 PcBi
where, Nd indicates the sets of distribution nodes in the net-
work, PcAi indicates the number of remaining paths from a
generation node to a distribution node after a disruption,
PcBi indicates the total number of paths available from a
generation node to a distribution node before any disrup-
tion. Several recent studies have used connectivity loss to
evaluate lifeline systems’ performance (He & Cha, 2018,
6 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.

Table 2. Categorisation of components of different lifeline networks based on the interdependency relationships.
EPS WDS NGS
Gate Stations Secondary of WDS Joints Primary for EPS (gate Regulator stations Primary for EPS (gate
(pumping stations stations) stations)
/pipelines)
Secondary of NGS None Secondary of EPS
(regulator stations) (substations)
Substations Primary for WDS Pumping stations Secondary of EPS None
(pumping stations) (substations)
Primary for NGS Tanks None Gate station None
(regulator stations)
Primary for TS (central Pipelines Primary for EPS (gate Joint None
offices) stations)
None Pipeline None
Transmission lines None

Table 3. Fragility curve parameters for a lognormal distribution adopted from the literature for the EPS, and WDS based on connectivity loss
(Hernandez-Fajardo & Duen ~as-Osorio, 2011).
EPS WDS
Damage state Connectivity loss (in %) Mediana (g) Standard deviation Median (g) Standard deviation
DS1 30 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.22
DS2 50 0.22 0.12 0.20 0.26
DS3 70 0.22 0.12 0.25 0.17
DS4 90 0.28 0.16 0.31 0.20
DS5 100 0.36 0.18 0.35 0.19
a
These are the median ground motion intensity at the onset of the damage state, considering the maximum PGA intensity over the entire
network in units of (g).

Table 4. Fragility curve parameters for a lognormal distribution adopted from the literature for the TS based on the level of congestion for a public-switched
telecommunication network (Leelardcharoen, 2011).
Standard
TS damage state Level of congestion Blocking probability (in %) Description Median (g)a deviation
DS1 Slight congestion 50 Average 2 attempts required for 0.11 0.12
a successful connection
DS2 Moderate congestion 80 Average 5 attempts … 0.13 0.14
DS3 Extensive congestion 90 Average 10 attempts … 0.15 0.13
DS4 Complete block 99 Average 100 attempts … 0.21 0.10
a
These are the median ground motion intensity at the onset of the damage state, considering as the intensity the maximum PGA over the entire network in
units of (g).

2020; Lin & El-Tawil, 2020). For the TS, the level of conges-
tion (defined in Table 4) is used, which is network blocking
probability (Leelardcharoen, 2011).
3.2. Network damage assessment (Step 2)
Step 2, initiating the Monte Carlo realisations, focuses on
estimating network-level damage using the network-based
fragility curves from Step 1c. To do so, the network
Intensity Measure (IM) consistent with a hazard level of
interest at the desired building site must be estimated first.
Commonly, lifeline networks’ performance is evaluated con-
sidering Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) as the network
IM (Lin & El-Tawil, 2020; Masoomi et al., 2020), whereas
spectral acceleration at the fundamental period of the build-
ing, Sa(T1), is more commonly adopted for the performance
assessment of buildings. In addition, the Sa(T1) used in
building assessment is determined at the building location,
whereas the network IM is typically taken as the maximum
over the region (Due~ nas-Osorio et al., 2007; Hernandez-
Fajardo & Due~ nas-Osorio, 2011). To relate the IM for the
building functional recovery assessment with the IM for the
network damage and loss of function, an expedient
approach for relating the two IMs is introduced in Step 2a.
Then, the network DS is identified using the network-level
fragility curves and IM (Step 2b). Given the DS of networks,
the probability of damage to components is estimated
through a mapping process in Step 2c. Then, the necessary
component repairs in each network are calculated (Step 2d).
3.2.1. Calculate network IM (Step 2a)
An approach (graphically shown in Figure 4) to expediently
relate the IM at the building site, e.g., Sa(T1) at some hazard
level, and the network IM, e.g., maximum PGA over the net-
work, is introduced in this study. First, probabilistic seismic
hazard analysis is performed for the building site of interest
(the building for which the engineer desires to perform func-
tional recovery assessments), considering a return period of
interest. Then, the seismic sources contributing to the hazard
are deaggregated, and the dominant sources (e.g., the first 3 to
5 contributors with the highest percentage of contribution)
are identified. This information is available from the USGS
(2020) for sites across the US and is commonly used by build-
ing design engineers. Next, a single appropriate ground
motion prediction equation (GMPE) representative of the tec-
tonic environment of the region is identified, and the given
magnitude (M) and distance (R) for each of the selected

Figure 4. Proposed approach for connecting building-level IM with network-level IM, which uses available USGS (2020) tools and is consistent with building design
engineers’ workflow.
sources from the hazard deaggregation are deterministically
inputted to compute the median and standard deviation of
the IM, e.g., PGA, at each site over the region, from which the
maximum value can be determined over the region for the
needed network IM. These calculations are repeated for all
the dominant sources selected from the deaggregation data of
one building site and weighted based on the hazard deaggre-
gation. The proposed approach can be applied to any desired
hazard level or return period.
3.2.2. Determine network DS, given IM (Step 2b)
Using the defined network-based fragility curves (Step 1c)
and the determined network IM (Step 2a), the network
damage state in terms of connectivity loss is probabilistically
determined (Figure 2).
3.2.3. Map network DS to component damage (Step 2c)
In this step, the extent of component damage in the network
is estimated, based on the network-level damage, as follows:
NC, DSC, i ¼ NC  PðDSC, i jDSN Þ
in which, DSC refers to the component damage states defined
per HAZUS-MH (FEMA., 2003). The ith damage state can be
‘None’, ‘Slight’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Extensive’, and ‘Complete’ for
most of the components (for pipelines of the WDS and NGS,
the damage states are ‘Leakage’ and ‘Breakage’). NC, DSC, i is the
STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 7
number of components with DSC,i; NC refers to the total
number of components of that type. DSN refers to the net-
work damage states defined in Step 2b.
The probabilities needed in Equation (2) are estimated
from logical relationships defined in this study relating com-
ponent and network damage. For instance, at zero connect-
ivity, it is expected to see most components in a ‘complete’
damage state. In order to apply such logical relationships, a
set of parabolic and cubic functions (for pipelines and com-
ponents other than pipelines, respectively) with the appro-
priate boundary conditions were assumed for different
component damage states. Such functions can be repre-
sented as y ¼ ax2 þ bx þ c and y ¼ ax3 þ bx2 þ cx þ d con-
sidering ‘x’ as the network connectivity and y as
PðDSC, i jDSN Þ: The boundary conditions applied in these
functions are summarised in the supplemental material,
while the graphic example view of this relationship is shown
in Figure 5(a) for network components other than pipelines
and Figure 5(b) for pipeline components.
For any network connectivity (%) and other logical
(2) assumptions, Equation (3) should be satisfied:
€i¼DSn€
X
PðDSC, i jDSN Þ ¼ 1 (3)
€ 0€
i¼DS
DS0 stands for ‘None’, and DSn stands for ‘Complete’
and ‘Breakage’ damage states for components other than
8 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.
Figure 5. Assumed logical mapping of network damage states to the damage of components: (a) components other than pipelines and (b) pipelines.
pipelines, and pipelines, respectively. Through Equation (2),
the number of components of a particular type within the
lifeline network damaged, and to what degree, can be esti-
mated given the damage state of the network. This value is
computed for each type of component listed in Table 1.
Equation (2) is proposed because the component damage
(associated with the already quantified network-level dam-
age) is used subsequently for quantifying the repair that
should be performed after the earthquake. The WDS joints
are assumed to not be vulnerable to earthquakes for slight
to moderate damage levels (Lin & El-Tawil, 2020).
3.2.4. Calculate repair quantities for each component
(Step 2d)
In this step, the repair quantity is calculated. This metric
quantifies the number of components that need to be recov-
ered for the network to restore its full functionality. The
repair quantity for each categorised component type (shown
in Table 2) is calculated using:
RQC ¼ PðDSC, i jDSN Þ  CQC
where RQC refers to the repair quantity for one categorised
component type, and CQC refers to the component quanti-
ties categorised as primary or secondary and defined in
Steps 1a and 1b. In this step, the uncertainty in the estima-
tion of component quantities (from Step 1a) and probabil-
ities (from Step 2c) is accounted for by randomising repair
quantities (via either a normal or lognormal distribution)
considering a user-defined dispersion.
3.3. Network restoration assessment (Step 3)
Step 3 determines the restoration time of lifeline networks
based on the damage assessments produced by Steps 1 and
2. The repair time for damaged components is calculated
first. The restoration time of the network is then calculated
by summing up the restoration time of the components and
incorporating their interdependencies by considering the
delay to the recovery time of secondary components result-
ing from the recovery of primary components.
This calculation depends on a user-defined number of
repair crews. Assumptions considered in the literature for
the number of crews include 3, 5, 10, and 15 units of 8-per-
son crews per network (Lin & El-Tawil, 2020), 10 crews for
the EPS, and 40, 4, and 4 crews for pipelines, pumping sta-
tions, tanks of the WDS, respectively (Masoomi et al., 2020),
and 1, 2, 5, 10, 25 crews for the NGS components (Ameri &
van de Lindt, 2019). The number of crews depends on vari-
ous critical factors, such as the extent of network damage,
the post-event timeframe, the availability of labor, and
reciprocal cooperation between utility companies (Chang,
Svekla, & Shinozuka, 2002; Masoomi et al., 2020).
3.3.1. Calculate the repair time of each component
(Step 3a)
To calculate the restoration time of each component, the
restoration functions introduced in HAZUS (FEMA., 2003)
are adopted, which, despite being in need of a comprehen-
(4) sive update, have been widely used in the literature
(Due~nas-Osorio et al., 2007; Hernandez-Fajardo & Due~ nas-
Osorio, 2011; Leelardcharoen, 2011; Lin & El-Tawil, 2020;
Masoomi et al., 2020; Masoomi & van de Lindt, 2018;
Sharma et al., 2020). The parameters of these functions are
presented in Table 5. The repair time for a given compo-
nent type and damage state is calculated by multiplying the
repair quantity for that component (Equation (4)) with the
restoration times, assuming no economies of scale.
3.3.2. Calculate component restoration time, accounting
for interdependencies (Step 3b)
Next, the time needed to restore components of the lifeline
networks is calculated, accounting for the interdependencies
between primary and secondary components. It is assumed
that a secondary component can be repaired, but cannot
gain its functionality unless its corresponding primary com-
ponent is restored and fully functional. Thus, the restoration
time of a secondary component can be calculated per
 STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 9

Table 5. Restoration times for lifeline network components (FEMA., 2003).

Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Component Median Standard deviation Median Standard deviation Median Standard deviation Median Standard deviation
Gate station 1.0 0.5 3.0 1.5 7.0 3.5 30.0 15.0
Substation 1.0 0.5 3.0 1.5 7.0 3.5 30.0 15.0
Transmission tower — — — — — — 2.0 1.0
Elevated tank 1.2 0.4 3.1 2.7 93.0 85.0 155.0 120.0
Pumping station 0.9 0.3 3.1 2.7 13.5 10.0 35.0 18.0
Gate station 0.9 0.3 3.1 2.7 13.5 10.0 35.0 18.0
Regulator station 0.9 0.3 3.1 2.7 13.5 10.0 35.0 18.0
Communication facilities 0.5 0.2 1.0 1.0 7.0 7.0 40.0 40.0
Leakage Breakage
Component Small diameter Large diameter Small diameter Large diameter
Pipeline (4(Person No.)/4)/24 (6(Person No.)/4)/24 (8(Person No.)/4)/24 (12(Person No.)/4)/24
Description:
All times are assumed to follow the normal distribution. Units: days
For pipelines:
A four-person crew needs 4 hours to fix a leak and 8 hours to fix a break for small pipes, 6 hours to fix a leak, and 12 hours to fix a break for large pipes.
The number of persons per crew for pipeline repair (Person No.) is user-defined.
For the cases with unknown pipe diameters, it is suggested to use the average repair time of small and large pipes.

Equation (5), and is governed by the longer of the second-
ary component’s repair time and the repair time of its asso-
ciated primary component:
RTC, Secondary ¼ maxðRPTC, Secondary , RPTC, Associated
where, RTC,Secondary indicates the restoration time of a sec-
ondary component, RPTC,Secondary stands for the repair time
of the secondary component, and RPTC,Associated primary stands
for the repair time of the associated primary component.
3.3.3. Calculate network restoration time (Step 3c)
There are two options for the user to define the number of
repair crews. Considering N as the user-defined number of
crews:
Option 1: N ¼ n, a single value for the whole network
In this option, the user assumes that n crews are available
for a given lifeline network. The user does not identify the
crews’ expertise or specify any order for the restoration of
components. Work can be done in serial or parallel, subject
to the number of total crews available.
Option 2: N is a series of crew number assigned to each
component type
In this option, the user can assign different numbers of
the crew to different component types of a network, assum-
ing that crews can have different expertise suitable for dif-
ferent component types. For example, the user can specify
n1 crews for pipelines and n2 crews for pumping stations of
the WDS. The restoration time is calculated by taking the
maximum time required for the repair of different compo-
nent types of a network, assuming that the crews start the
repairs simultaneously (in parallel), as follows:
N ¼ fn1 , n2 , . . . , ni g; i ¼ number
 of component types
RTtype1 RTtypei
Network restoration time ¼ max , ...,
n1
RTtypei refers to the repair time of one component type.
Eventually, for both options, the mean restoration time of
all the realisations is calculated. The result can be presented
as interdependent network restoration curves, which show
connectivity loss and restoration as a function of time for
all the lifeline networks considered.
primary Þ
(5)
3.4. Link network restoration to the building utility
service (Step 4)
The availability of the EPS, WDS, NGS, and TS in a building
after an earthquake plays a crucial role in the building’s func-
tionality. The fundamental step for functional recovery is to
estimate the time needed for buildings to regain utility services
after an earthquake. Essentially, this step generates a link
between the network restoration curve and the percentage of
buildings gradually getting different levels of utility service.
Three service level states are considered in this study: full ser-
vice, partial or low-quality service (e.g., intermittent power,
water available but under boil water notice), and no service
(Davis, 2014).
Estimating the percentage of buildings having different
levels of service after an earthquake in a community
requires making a logical connection between the network
connectivity loss and the probability of buildings being in
each of the three service level states. For 100% connectivity
loss, all buildings in a network are assumed to have no ser-
vice available, while for networks with less connectivity loss,
the number of buildings with no service declines. The
approach assumes that greatest number of buildings will
have low-quality service for intermediate connectivity losses.
Given a seismic hazard level and the initial network con-
nectivity loss determined in the method, the probability of
buildings lacking service is defined as the summation of the
probability of buildings with no service and with low-quality
service given the network damage state and is assumed to
be equal to the value of damage measure (CL for the EPS,
ni
WDS, NGS, and Congestion level for TS). As also shown in
(6) Figure 6(a), the probability of buildings lacking service
reduces along with the increase in the functionality of the
network (i.e., the decrease in connectivity loss).
10 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.
Figure 6. An example set of assumptions estimating (a) the probability of buildings lacking service and (b) the associated weight ( mean values –determined fol-
lowing a lognormal distribution with a lognormal standard deviation of 0.4.).
Figure 7. Example result of lifeline service restoration usable for building func-
tional recovery assessments.
Consequently, the probabilities of buildings with no ser-
vice and low-quality service can be estimated by identifying
a distributing coefficient (weight factor). Equations (7) and
(8) can then be written as:
PðBuilding, No ServicejDSN Þ
¼ Wi  PðBuilding, Lacking ServicejDSN Þ
PðBuilding, Low Quality ServicejDSN Þ
¼ ð1  Wi Þ  PðBuilding Lacking ServicejDSN Þ
Wi is a percentage (no service weighting factor) used to
define the portion of those buildings lacking service that
have no service, which depends on the properties of the net-
work. Figure 6(b) presents a set of assumed weighting fac-
tors for estimating these two random variables
corresponding to the different levels of network damage. In
Figure 6(b), greater weights for connectivity losses over 60%
imply that the probability of buildings with no service
would be much higher than the probability of buildings
receiving low-quality service. However, at lower connectivity
losses, the weight decreases, implying that the portion of
buildings with low-quality service will rise due to the grad-
ual restoration of utility services. The weights can also be
randomised with associated mean and standard deviation
values. The functions of Figure 6 are subject to verification
and validation from real events which are not available in
the literature yet.
Following the calculation of probabilistic network restor-
ation curves (Steps 1-3) and incorporating the approach
linking to the building function (Step 4), a set of resultant
curves are presented in Figure 7. These curves show the
mean percentage of buildings with no service and low-qual-
ity service is generated and their reverse which shows the
probability of service restoration,
4. Summary of assumptions and limitations
With the goal of developing a generic probabilistic method
for building utility service restoration, several assumptions
were necessarily adopted. These are summarised herein.
Table 6 presents the sources of uncertainty in the proposed
method and indicates the level of importance of each source
(i.e., the level of influence each source has on the results).
(7)

Damage Estimation:
^ The network damage assessment depends on the net-
work-based fragility curves available in the literature.
(8)
The curves for Shelby County are adopted and it is
suggested that these may be used for other regions in
the US applying the proposed method, assuming
similarities in the seismicity, component typologies,
and regional seismic response of networks. However,
these fragilities can be updated if more detail is avail-
able for a local network.

^ TS damage does not consider servers and other
components of modern data services.

^ Although the proposed method includes the NGS
and its components’ interaction with other net-
works, examples thus far do not consider the NGS
 STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 11

Table 6. Sources of uncertainty in the proposed method.

Importance level Source of uncertainty
High
Lack of regional-specific network fragility curves

Using collected data to calculate network component quantities in lieu of region-specific network topology information

Preliminary functions for probability of buildings lacking service and weight factors

Calculating network IM based on seismic hazard deaggregation for a building site using a single GMPE

Not considering spatial variability in damage and restoration
Medium
PSHA at one building site

Using assumed cubic and parabolic functions for mapping network to component damage
Low
Using HAZUS component restoration functions

Definition of crew numbers

Table 7. Component quantities and their categorisation for Shelby County.

EPS Quantity
Gate Stations Secondary of WDS 9 9
(Pumping stations/pipelines)
Substations Primary for WDS (Pumping stations) 9 36
None 27
Primary for TS (Central offices) 36
Transmission None 100
lines
WDS
Joints Primary for EPS (Gate stations) 9 34
None 25
Pumping Secondary of EPS (Substations) 9 9
stations
Tanks None 6 6
Pipelinesa Primary for EPS (Gate stations) 71
TS.
Central offices Secondary of EPS (Substations) 36
a
Pipelines are divided into segments of 1 km.
because these fragility curves are not available for
the US. The NGS network fragility curves developed
for Europe (Poljansek et al., 2012) are not used in
this study due to the different seismicity of the con-
tinent and differences in network design.

^ Regional hazard-consistent seismic hazard maps
for assessment of the performance of community
infrastructure systems have been proposed by Han
and Davidson (2012), Miller and Baker (2015), Wu
(2017), and others. Interdependent network-based
fragility curves generated based on these studies
(which are not available in the literature yet and
can be generated in future research studies) can be
substituted with the current curves considered in
this method.

Lifeline system & component interdependencies:
^ The NGS regulator stations, which are primary for
EPS gate stations, are assumed to be the same stations
as the regulator stations secondary for EPS
substations.

^ All pumping stations in the WDS are assumed to
be secondary for substations of EPS.

^ Additional assumptions about primary and sec-
ondary components are listed in Table 2.

Restoration process/sequence:
^ The restoration process is initiated simultaneously
for all the networks following the literature
(Masoomi et al., 2020; Masoomi & van de Lindt,
2018). At present, delays after the earthquake and
before the restoration is initiated (sometimes called
impeding factors) are not considered.
Total
100
71
36
Figure 8. Comparison of EPS mean restoration curves for Shelby County, TN
using the proposed method and the study by Lin and El-Tawil (2020).
^ Buildings in the network are equally likely to receive
different levels of service; i.e., no network flow ana-
lysis performed, meaning that there is no consider-
ation of greater likelihood for service restoration for
buildings at some locations. Similarly, the priority of
providing services to critical facilities is not
considered.
5. Verification of the proposed method through
comparison to a more detailed network analysis
To further verify the proposed methodology and compare
the results derived with those available ones in the literature,
studies by Lin and El-Tawil (2020) for Shelby County, TN,
and Masoomi et al. (2020) for Napa, CA, were considered.
These are both studies that perform a detailed network-level
analysis, providing a basis for comparison with the simpler
proposed method, given the lack of data from prior earth-
quakes for verifying the proposed methodology.
To compare the proposed methodology with the study by
Lin and El-Tawil (2020), the component quantities (taken
from Lin and El-Tawil (2020)) for the EPS and WDS were
categorised as shown in Table 7 (needed for Step 1). The
region’s maximum PGA was equal to 0.34 g (needed for
Step 2, taken from Lin and El-Tawil (2020)). Finally, crew
numbers 10 for the EPS and 15 for the WDS were consid-
ered (needed for Step 3). Figure 8 compares the restoration
curves for the proposed method and the method using a
more detailed network analysis from Lin and El-Tawil
(2020). Despite the simplifications in the proposed method,
12 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.
comparable values are observed for the initial post-earth-
quake connectivity (100-CL) (15.7% vs. 17.1%) as well as
the total restoration time (difference in time varying
between 13%-20% for larger crew numbers). More specific-
ally, for: (a) 15 crews, the total restoration time is computed
as 48 days and 55 days using the proposed method and the
study by Lin and El-Tawil (2020), respectively, and (b)10
crews, the total restoration time is computed as 74 days and
62 days using the proposed method and the study by Lin
and El-Tawil (2020), respectively.
To compare the results of the proposed method with
Masoomi et al. (2020) for Napa, CA, the component quanti-
ties (taken from Masoomi et al. (2020)) for the EPS and
WDS of Napa, CA were categorised per Table 8 (needed for
Step 1), the maximum PGA of the region was taken equal
to 0.85 g (taken from Masoomi et al. (2020), needed for Step
2) and crew number of 10 was considered for the EPS while
40, 4, and 4 crews were considered for pipelines, pumping
stations, and tanks of the WDS, respectively (taken from
Masoomi et al. (2020), needed for Step 3).
Figure 9 compares the mean restoration curves of the
EPS and WDS using the proposed method and the study by
Masoomi et al. (2020). For the EPS, both the total restor-
ation time (80 days per the proposed method vs. 66 days in
Masoomi et al., i.e., overestimated by roughly 20%) and ini-
tial connectivity levels (0 in both cases) show good agree-
ment. For the WDS, the full restoration time is
overestimated by approximately 40%, computing values
equal to 621 days and 444 days using the proposed method
Table 8. Component quantities for Napa, CA (Masoomi et al., 2020).
EPS
Gate Stations Secondary of WDS
(Pumping stations/pipelines)
Substations Primary for WDS (Pumping stations)
None
Transmission lines None
WDS
Joints Primary for EPS (Gate stations)
None
Pumping stations Secondary of EPS (Substations)
Tanks None
Pipelinesa Primary for EPS (Gate stations)
a
Pipelines are divided into segments of 1 km.
Figure 9. Comparison of mean interdependent restoration curves of the (a) EPS and (b) WDS of Napa, CA using the proposed method and the study by Masoomi
et al. (2020). EPS provided means ‘connectivity’ for the proposed method and ‘the service demand supplied by networks’ for the study by Masoomi et al. (2020).
and the study by Masoomi et al. (2020), respectively. The
main difference between the two studies lies mostly in the
initial connectivity predictions for the WDS, which is esti-
mated to be 5% by the proposed study and 55% by
Masoomi et al. (2020).
However, it is noted that here connectivity is quantified
in terms of connectivity loss, whereas for Masoomi et al.
(2020), this represents the percentage of the city’s demand
supplied by the network. It is hypothesised that the primary
reason for this difference is the overestimation of network
damage by using Shelby County fragility curves for the pro-
posed method. For example, this study considered that the
median PGA for connectivity loss of 100% (DS5) is 0.35 g
(Table 3), which may not be representative of the seismicity
on the West coast. Therefore, it results in overestimating
the damage in lifeline networks in Napa, which have been
designed to resist higher seismic hazard levels than in
Shelby County. The proposed method shows good agree-
ment with the adoption of more representative fragility
curves. This is shown in Figure 10.
6. Application example of the proposed method
The applicability of the proposed method was investigated
through an example of the major lifeline networks of Shelby
County, TN, which is in the New Madrid seismic zone and
includes the city of Memphis. For this example, the restor-
ation of the EPS, WDS, and TS was assessed without con-
sidering the interdependencies with the NGS.
Quantity 6.1. Collect and prepare data of networks (Step 1)
1
The component quantities (Step 1a) for Shelby County were
3 adopted from the literature (Lin & El-Tawil, 2020) and the
0 US Energy Information Administration website (US Energy
530
Information Administration, 2020). The network-based fra-
3 gility curves for the EPS, WDS, and TS for Shelby County
16 were presented in Step 1c in Tables 3 and 4. Component
10
15 quantities and their categorisation (Step 1b) were identified
612 from publicly available sources and are presented in
Table 7. For the telecommunication network, 36 central
 STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 13

Figure 10. (a) Comparison of a hypothetical network fragility curve representative of seismic performance of EPS in West Coast with EPS network fragility curve of
Shelby County and (b) improvement of the network restoration curve by using the hypothetical fragility curve in the proposed method.

Table 9. The calculation of maximum PGA over the region of Shelby County by the approach proposed in Step 2a, consistent with a 475-year hazard level at
the building site of interest.
Scaled Max median The weighted average
Sa(T1) at the percentage of PGA (g) over Standard of the Max median PGA (g)
Building Return period building site Source contribution M R (km) the county dev. over contributors
Building site: 475 year 0.17 1 53.5 7.6 105.9 0.27 0.61 0.39
coordinate: 2 37.5 7.6 105.6 0.33 0.60
(35.037, 3 9.0 5.2 13.2 1.40 0.68
89.872) 975 year 0.29 1 52.0 7.6 97.3 0.34 0.61 0.56
2 35.2 7.6 97.4 0.58 0.61
3 12.8 5.2 8.8 1.39 0.68
2475 year 0.49 1 48.0 7.7 90.3 0.57 0.61 0.72
2 20.7 5.2 5.5 1.38 0.61
3 31.3 7.6 91.4 0.52 0.61

Table 10. Median values of network damage state in percentage at each haz-
ard level.
Median network DS (%)
Return period EPS WDS
475 year 0 0
975 year 70 50
2475 year 100 100
offices (including Point of Presence (PoP), tandem office,
and end office) exist in Shelby County (Leelardcharoen,
2011).
6.2. Network-level damage assessment (Step 2)
According to Step 2a of the proposed method, the network
IM (i.e., the maximum PGA over the Shelby County region)
was calculated for three levels of hazard (475, 975, and
2475 years of return period) based on the deaggregation at
one building site (selected as [35.037, 89.872], imagining
that this is the building location of interest for functional
recovery). The Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
(PSHA) results and the deaggregation table of hazard con-
tributors were extracted from the USGS website (USGS,
2020), while the GMPE developed by Pezeshk, Zandieh,
Campbell, and Tavakoli (2018) for Central and Eastern
North America was used to calculate the distribution of
PGA over the region. The process to calculate the weighted
average of the maximum of median PGAs over the region is
presented in Table 9. This value for a 475-year return
period is 0.39 g according to the proposed approach and is
0.33 g in the study by Due~ nas-Osorio et al. (2007).
TS Given the maximum PGA over Shelby County and the
50 network fragility curves, the network damage state was
99 probabilistically estimated using the network fragility curves
99
in Step 2b. Then, through Step 2c, the probability of compo-
nent damage given the network damage state was estimated,
as shown in Figure 5. Table 10 indicates the median DS for
the EPS, WDS, and TS over all realisations for each level of
hazard.
In Step 2d, at each realisation, the estimated probabilities
from Step 2c were multiplied by the component quantities
presented in Table 7 to calculate repair quantities needed to
be accounted for in the network restoration assessment
(Step 3). Mean repair quantities for each component type at
each hazard level are shown in Table 11. As expected, for
the 475-year return period, the highest repair quantity
belongs to the ‘None’ component DS for all systems, while
for the 2475-year return period, the highest repair quantity
was obtained for the ‘Complete’ component DS.
6.3. Network restoration assessment (Step 3)
To assess each network’s restoration time, each crew was
assumed to include 8 persons with no limitation in their
expertise. Fifteen such crews were assigned to all components
of each network equally, considering 10,000 Monte Carlo
14 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.

Table 11. Mean repair quantities at each hazard level.

Mean repair quantities wrt component DS
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Network Component Component Category Hazard level (year) None Leakage Breakage — —
EPS Gate Station Secondary of WDS (Pumping station/pipeline) 475 5.56 0.34 0.55 1.22 1.35
975 3.37 0.49 0.84 1.95 2.35
2475 1.68 0.53 1.01 2.48 3.30
Substation Primary for WDS (Pumping station) 475 5.56 0.34 0.55 1.21 1.35
975 3.37 0.49 0.84 1.95 2.35
2475 1.68 0.53 1.01 2.48 3.30
Primary for TS (Central office) 475 22.24 1.33 2.19 4.85 5.40
975 13.49 1.94 3.37 7.81 9.39
2475 6.71 2.14 4.03 9.93 13.20
No relation 475 16.68 1.00 1.64 3.64 4.04
975 10.11 1.46 2.53 5.85 7.04
2475 5.03 1.61 3.02 7.44 9.90
Transmission line No relation 475 61.77 3.70 6.07 13.48 14.98
975 37.46 5.42 9.37 21.68 26.07
2475 18.64 5.93 11.21 27.57 36.65
WDS Joint Primary for EPS (Gate station) 475 5.21 2.76 1.05 — —
975 3.69 3.56 1.75 — —
2475 2.42 4.14 2.43 — —
No relation 475 9.91 3.59 3.11 4.81 3.58
975 6.05 3.05 3.36 6.31 6.25
2475 3.08 2.38 3.34 7.32 8.87
Pumping station Secondary for EPS (Substation) 475 3.56 1.29 1.11 1.73 1.29
975 2.17 1.10 1.21 2.27 2.25
2475 1.11 0.86 1.21 2.64 3.19
Tank No relation 475 2.38 0.86 0.74 1.15 0.86
975 1.45 0.74 0.80 1.51 1.50
2475 0.73 0.57 0.80 1.76 2.13
Pipeline Primary for EPS (Gate station) 475 41.07 21.77 8.15 — —
975 29.13 28.05 13.82 — —
2475 19.14 32.63 19.24 — —
TS Central offices Secondary for EPS (Substation) 475 11.58 4.33 4.63 8.84 9.62
975 5.15 3.06 4.67 11.03 15.08
2475 1.70 2.31 4.40 11.86 18.74

realisations. Over all realisations, the restoration of the EPS
and WDS is mostly governed by the secondary components,
while the restoration of the primary components of the EPS
dominates the restoration of the TS. In the proposed method,
the key factor in the primary or secondary components gov-
erning the restoration is the quantity of each group of com-
ponents and their corresponding unit restoration time, which
in this implementation is derived from HAZUS.
The mean interdependent restoration curves of the EPS,
WDS, and TS are presented in Figure 11. As expected, for
the hazard level of the 475-year return period at the build-
ing site, the initial percent of connectivity for the networks
is greater than for other hazard levels (975- and 2475-year),
and the networks’ recovery time is shorter for the 475-year
return period. The initial connectivity for all hazard levels is
less than 20% for the TS (Figure 11c) because, considering
Table 4, the median PGA for the TS for the ‘Complete’
damage state is equal to 0.21 g, which is smaller than the
network IM values. Thus, at the majority of Monte Carlo
realisations, it was expected for the TS to be in a ‘Complete’
damage state for all three levels of hazard.
6.4. Link network restoration to the building utility
service (Step 4)
The building service restoration curves for Shelby County,
considering three levels of service (none, low-quality, and
full), are presented in Figure 12. For any given building and
realisation in the functional recovery framework, the service
condition can be determined using these curves (assuming a
uniform distribution of the y-axis). According to Figure 12(a),
for the 2475-year return period, after 20 days of repairs,
roughly 60% of buildings in the community have full access to
the EPS service, while 25% of buildings have access to low-
quality EPS service (85%, read from any service curve, is
deducted from 60%, read from full service curve, referring to
Figure 7), and 15% of the buildings experience a complete
power outage (100% is deducted from 85%, read from any ser-
vice curve, referring to Figure 7). Similar to the system restor-
ation curves of Figure 11, the service restoration also depends
on the hazard level under assessment. For instance, as the TS
vulnerability is greater than the EPS or WDS, the probability
of having full or any service at time zero is lower than the
same value for the EPS and WDS, as shown in Figure 12(c).
Figure 12 will be used in the functional recovery assess-
ment framework proposed by Cook et al. (2022). In this
framework, depending on the building occupancy and the
building tenant requirements, the building system fault trees
are updated that depend on utility services’ availability.
Then, the effects of utilities available at different service lev-
els on the building system performance and tenant require-
ments are included. Finally, one building’s post-earthquake
service level and utility service restoration time is probabilis-
tically estimated through Figure 12 and incorporate it in the
updated fault trees, thereby, the building functional recovery
assessment framework.
 STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING 15

Figure 11. Mean interdependent restoration curves of the: (a) EPS, (b) WDS, and (c) TS of Shelby County using the proposed method. The hazard level in the
legend corresponds to the hazard level at the building site of interest.

Figure 12. Service restoration curves of Shelby County usable for building functional recovery assessments for the: (a) EPS, (b) WDS, and (c) TS.
16 N. MOHAMMADGHOLIBEYKI ET AL.
7. Conclusions
Building functional recovery has gained significant momen-
tum as a concept that can be used to design and mitigate
buildings to support post-earthquake community resilience
goals. This study develops a simple network-based probabilis-
tic method for estimating the restoration of services to build-
ings after an earthquake, which is needed for building
functional recovery assessments. The proposed method bene-
fits the engineers, researchers, and stakeholders interested in
assessing building functional recovery goals without perform-
ing detailed network-level analyses for the different lifeline
systems varying in topology and component dependencies.
Moreover, this method requires considerably lower computa-
tional efforts and analysis time due to exempting users from
performing complex network and regional seismic hazard
analyses. Thus, it is more aligned with the workflow of build-
ing design engineers. Currently, most engineers are unable to
consider lifeline disruption for buildings due to lack of time,
data, and experience with lifeline network analyses.
Two comparative studies were conducted for Napa, CA,
and Shelby County, TN, to evaluate the proposed method’s
consistency and agreement with studies available in the litera-
ture. Despite simplifications in this study, a good agreement
was observed between the results obtained from this compari-
son. Some levels of deviation between the results obtained by
the proposed method and those obtained from a more rigor-
ous network assessment for Napa, CA, are considered accept-
able in this study, noting that several assumptions were
necessary to develop this method and the relative simplicity
of the approach. The difference was mainly observed in the
initial connectivity predictions associated with using Shelby
County network fragility curves for Napa, CA.
The applicability of the proposed method was also high-
lighted by a step-by-step case study for Shelby County, consid-
ering various return periods. Based on this application study, it
was found that both system and service restoration depends on
the hazard level considered. The fidelity of the method can be
improved if better estimates of component quantities or net-
work fragility become available for a particular region.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
Financial support for this work was provided by the US Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology under Financial
Assistance Award Number #70NANB19H058. This financial support is
gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and
may not represent the official position of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology or the US Department of Commerce. Authors gratefully
acknowledge contributions from Drs. Dustin Cook and Amir Safiey.
ORCID
Negar Mohammadgholibeyki http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4636-1816
Maria Koliou http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0686-493X
Abbie B. Liel http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9241-5144
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