Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

The development of discourse strategies in

adolescent argumentation
Mark K. Felton
College of Education 0074, San Jose State University, 1 Washington Square, San Jose, CA 95192-0074, USA

Received 1 June 2002; received in revised form 1 July 2003; accepted 1 September 2003

Abstract

Earlier research [Discourse Process. 23 (2/3) (2002) 135] on argumentation suggests that adults
use advanced discourse strategies more consistently, more frequently, and more flexibly than do
adolescents. The present study examines the development of argumentation skills during adolescence.
Forty-eight seventh and eighth graders were assigned to one of two conditions. Both groups engaged
in pretest and posttest measures of strategy use on two topics (capital punishment and abortion)
and then engaged in five weekly dialogues on the main topic only (capital punishment). Control
group participants engaged in dialogue only while experimental group participants engaged in a
combination of dialogue and paired reflection on dialogues. Experimental group participants showed
greater advances in argumentative discourse than control group participants. Results suggest that
change in adolescents does indeed progress in the direction of adult discourse and that a combination
of practice and reflection is more effective in promoting change than practice alone. The implications
of these findings for a developmental model of argumentative discourse are discussed.
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Development; Discourse strategy; Adolescent argumentation

Argumentation can be defined as a social discourse activity in which individuals advance

competing claims. However, argumentation is more than simply constructing arguments
in a public space. To gain advantage in argumentation, we must build an argument using
points that our opponent has conceded. In so doing, we engage in a process of negotiation
that requires us to question and challenge a conversational partner (Hamblin, 1970; Leitão,
2000; Rips, 1998). This process of competitively co-constructing arguments is accomplished
through the use of discourse strategies. Understood in this way, skilled argumentation entails
two distinct though related sets of cognitive skills — argument construction and discourse

E-mail address: mfelton2@yahoo.com (M.K. Felton).

0885-2014/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2003.09.001
36 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

strategy. Ultimately, the degree to which individuals have mastered these two skill sets may
determine the quality of their argumentation.

1. Argument construction in argumentation

Argument construction entails three component skills — producing justifications, pro-

ducing counterarguments, and rebutting counterarguments. A substantial body of research
demonstrates that all three of these skills are present in the discourse of young children
(Anderson, Chinn, Chang, Waggoner, & Yi, 1997; Benoit, 1984; Burleson, 1980; Coirier &
Golder, 1993; Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Shantz, 1987; Stein & Miller, 1993). In fact, social
contexts often scaffold young arguers’ ability to produce complicated argument structures
(Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Resnick, Zeitz, Wathen &
Halowchak, 1993). Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) videotaped naturally occurring disputes
among nursery school children and found that 3- to 4-year-old children rarely let disputes
end in a simple refusal, or what the authors call a “no” response. Instead, children were
much more likely to end a dispute with a justification or a mutually acceptable alternative
proposition. This finding suggests that when engaged in disputes, very young children ex-
pect justifications from their adversaries. Unjustified assertions or non-compliance are seen
as an insufficient response (Stein & Miller, 1993). In addition, the data suggest that when
prompted, children are able to provide justification to support their claims. While these jus-
tifications are not always compelling to adults, they nonetheless represent an understanding
of the role of justification in argumentation.
Other research suggests that young children produce justifications even without prompt-
ing from an interlocutor (Orsolini, 1993). Orsolini recorded hours of spontaneous argu-
ments between children and found that justifications appeared, without prompting, in three
contexts: (1) when children described negative events, (2) when children made negative
assertions, and (3) when children had a high commitment to the truth of what they were
saying. Throughout, the children demonstrated a clear capacity for producing justifications
of their ideas, assertions, and observations. Orsolini then looked at contexts in which teach-
ers prompted children to provide justifications with “why” questions. She found that, for the
most part, teachers prompted justification in these same three contexts. These data suggest
that children’s notion of justification may develop as a result of experience in discourse
with adults and that children are aware of the need to answer the counterclaims of others.
Children also challenge the claims of others. In the context of a dispute, a counterargument
can be as simple as an opposing claim supported by a justification. Therefore, it is not
surprising to find that 5-year-olds who produce justifications show the ability to produce
rudimentary counterarguments as well (Anderson et al., 1997; Chinn & Anderson, 1998;
Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981). However, young children also demonstrate more sophisticated
forms of counterargument. For example, Stein and Miller (1993) cite a study by the first
author (Stein, 1990) in which young children advanced qualifications and counter evidence
that effectively negated their opponents’ claims. Elsewhere, Stein and Trabasso (1982) have
shown that children can even produce counterarguments on either side of an issue. That is,
when prompted to do so, young children could produce arguments which countered each
other regardless of the child’s own position on the issue.
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 37

It would seem from the substantial literature in this area that the ability to construct an
argument is not at the heart of developmental differences in argumentation. The skills of ar-
gument construction develop early in the lifespan and most probably do not account for later
differences in argumentation. But argument construction may represent only the point of en-
try into developing the skills of argumentation. Later advances in argumentation may involve
developing discourse strategies to construct arguments competitively in social contexts. In
social contexts, individuals must combine their understanding of argument construction with
an understanding of how to direct the course of a conversation to their own conclusions.

2. Discourse strategy in argumentation

When engaged in argumentative discourse, speakers have essentially two duties: first, to
secure commitments from the partner which can be used to support the speaker’s own claims;
and second, to cooperate with the partner’s attempts to do the same (Walton, 1989). Strate-
gically, a speaker must pursue three goals in argumentation. First, he or she must be able to
conceive of the premises necessary to justify a claim. And, if a premise is presumptive, the
speaker must secure a commitment from the partner that concedes this premise (Hamblin,
1970; Walton, 1996). Second, the speaker must be able to identify unwarranted claims in the
partner’s argument. The speaker must then challenge these unwarranted premises in order
to shift the burden of proof and ultimately undermine the partner’s argument (Rips, 1998;
Walton, 1996). Finally, the speaker must be able to rebut or neutralize challenges that the
partner advances against his or her argument (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988; Walton,
1996). All three of these skills, in the dialogic context, require the ability to direct discourse
with questions, critiques and rebuttals. Thus, the question is not whether one can construct
an argument, but whether one can guide the process of competitively co-constructing an
argument in the context of discourse. To do so, speakers must understand how to use dis-
course strategies to direct their partners’ reasoning. What then do these discourse strategies
look like?
For the most part, past research in peer discourse has focused on the effects of discourse
rather than the process (Forman & Kraker, 1985). Few researchers have looked directly at
the strategies used in argumentative discourse, and fewer still have attempted to track their
development. Nonetheless, some studies have laid the groundwork for investigating the
development of discourse strategies, while others identify the direction for future research.
For example, Anderson et al. (2001) have tracked the early development of argumentation
among fourth graders. Their data suggest that as children interact in discourse contexts, they
share and appropriate each other’s strategies. As a result, strategy use gradually “snowballs”
in discourse communities. The strategies identified included attempts to make premises
explicit, to articulate one’s position relative to conversational partners, and to challenge
competing arguments with hypothetical scenarios and critiques. While these strategies do
not necessarily direct discourse towards argumentative goals, they do represent an early
example of coordinating conversation with the goals of argumentation. The next step in
development involves developing more sophisticated goals for argumentation.
Clark and Delia (1976) have identified developmental differences in the discourse goals of
children and adolescents. Children in that study often made appeals without thinking about
38 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

how they might impact their audience. Adolescents, on the other hand, were more likely to
both anticipate and address the counterarguments of their target audience. In other words,
adolescents demonstrate a greater sensitivity to the competitive nature of argumentation than
children do, and they construct their arguments accordingly. While this is not a difference
in discourse, per se, it represents a more sophisticated concept of the goals and structure of
argumentation. Once adolescents recognize the competitive goals of argumentation, they
are then ready to acquire strategies for meeting those goals.
Felton and Kuhn (2001) have developed a system for categorizing strategies in argumen-
tative discourse. Applying this system to the argumentative dialogues of adolescents and
young adults, they found that adults employ argumentative strategies more adaptively, more
consistently, and more effectively than do adolescents. That is, adults were more likely to
adjust their strategies to fit the demands of their context. When they met with agreeing
partners, adults engaged in qualitatively different discourse than when they met with dis-
agreeing partners. They recognized that there are different argumentative goals in the two
contexts and adjusted their strategies accordingly. Adolescents, on the other hand, having
fewer strategies to begin with, showed little or no adaptation to the different contexts.
Felton and Kuhn (2001) found that adults were more consistent than teens in pro-
ducing discourse strategies characterized by three features: (a) eliciting and critiquing
partners’ arguments, (b) directing partners’ reasoning, and (c) blocking or rebutting at-
tempts by the partner to critique arguments. They found nine strategies of argumentative
discourse on which adults and adolescents differed: Adding, using case-based questions,
asking clarifying questions, interpreting, counterarguing, using case-based cornering se-
quences, interpretation-based cornering sequences, rebutting, and blocking. The first three
of these strategies occurred more frequently among adolescents and represented less ef-
fective discourse. The remaining six were more frequent among adults and characterized
more advanced argumentative discourse. These six were also found to be common in the
argumentative discourse of experts.
Overall then, adults in the study exhibited a greater facility with discourse strategies
than did the adolescents. They employed a wider variety of strategies, used them more
consistently, and used them more effectively than their younger counterparts. Clearly, these
differences suggest a trajectory in the development of discourse skill. However, the work
of mapping the development of discourse skill remains incomplete.
Because the Felton and Kuhn (2001) study is cross-sectional, drawing developmental
conclusions (based on differences between adult and adolescent discourse) is risky. The
question remains whether we can find changes within individuals that match the trajectory
suggested by the cross-sectional data. Also, there is the question of what kinds of expe-
riences promote the development of more strategic discourse in adolescents. The extant
research suggests that as adolescents come to understand the structure and goals of argu-
ment, their skills of argumentation increase (Clark & Delia, 1976). The present study is
designed to test two hypotheses: (1) that the development of argumentative discourse in
adolescents proceeds in the direction of adult discourse, as suggested in the findings of
Felton and Kuhn (2001); and (2) that a combination of dialogue and reflection on argumen-
tative discourse is more effective in promoting such development than dialogue alone. As
in Felton and Kuhn (2001), participants were given the opportunity to engage in argumen-
tative discourse with peers over a period of five sessions. However, in the present study,
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 39

microgenetic analysis and the use of comparison groups permits a closer examination of the
development of argumentative discourse skill as well as insights into possible mechanisms
of change.

3. Method

3.1. Design

A pretest–posttest design was employed to compare the effects of two interventions on

argumentative discourse skill. Participants in the study were randomly assigned to either
a dialogue-only condition (control) or a dialogue-plus-reflection condition (experimental).
Both groups were allotted equal time on task, but the experimental group was given the
opportunity to reflect on the structure of the arguments they employed in their dialogues.
The purpose of the design was to test whether a combination of practice and structured
reflection promotes developmental advance over and above the effects of practice alone.
At the pretest participants engaged in a combination of written and oral tasks. The written
tasks were designed to ascertain each participant’s position and measure the quality of his
or her individual argumentative reasoning regarding capital punishment (the main topic)
and abortion (the transfer topic). The oral tasks were designed to measure each participant’s
level of argumentative strategy use in argumentative dialogues with a peer. All participants
then engaged in a series of five weekly dialogues on the main topic with different peers.
During this 5-week period, the control group participants engaged in dialogue alone while
experimental group subjects engaged in a combination of dialogue and metacognitive re-
flection (described in detail in the following). After the 5-week period, posttest measures
were taken to compare the effects of the two treatments on argumentative strategy use across
the two topics of argument. The transfer topic was added to the design to test whether the
impact of the interventions would generalize beyond the topic discussed in the five weekly
dialogues.

3.2. Participants

Forty-eight students from the seventh and eighth grades of an urban middle school partic-
ipated in the study. Even numbers of students from each grade were assigned to each group
and none of the students in the study had been either skipped or held back a grade. The
school primarily serves Latino and African American families from a lower-middle-income
community. All but two of the participants in the study spoke English as a native language.
The remaining two, though non-native English speakers, were judged by their teacher to
speak English with sufficient fluency to participate in the study.
The process of selecting a sample began by administering opinion scales on capital
punishment (CP) and abortion to the entire population of seventh and eighth graders at the
school. Based on their responses, students were then assigned to either a “pro” or “con”
pool for each topic. Next, to insure equal numbers of same-sex dyads in which partners
held opposing opinions, 8 girls and 16 boys were randomly selected from each pool and
assigned in equal proportions to either the control or experimental condition. Each of the
40 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

final groups comprised a total of 8 girls and 16 boys whose opinions were equally divided
on the topic of CP. The opinions of these same groups also divided equally on the abortion
topic. Due to technical difficulties in the process of data collection, two posttest dialogues
were lost. As a result, four participants from the control condition were dropped from the
final data analysis.

3.3. Procedure

3.3.1. Pretest and posttest

All participants engaged in two pretest measures. First, participants filled out a three-part
survey of their opinions. Participants were asked to identify their opinion regarding CP (the
main topic) on a 13-point opinion scale. The opinion scale, adopted from Kuhn and Lao
(1996), presents 13 statements of position from which participants may choose. The middle
position on the scale reads, “I have mixed or undecided opinions about CP.” Each position
above and below the middle point is slightly more extreme in favor or against the topic than
the one before. Once they indicated their opinions, participants were asked to “write a brief
argument that explains, justifies, and supports your view on the death penalty.” Finally, they
were asked to list on the back of the sheet all of the arguments they could recall either in favor
or against CP. Participants were given roughly 25 min to complete the opinion scale, the
written essay, and the list of arguments for each topic. Most were able to complete these tasks
in 20 min per topic. All of the remaining participants were able to finish in the 25 min allotted.
Second, participants were randomly paired with an opposing-opinion peer and asked
to engage in a dialogue on CP. Specifically, participants were instructed to identify and
address their differences of opinion on the topic. They were also asked to try to reconcile
any differences of opinion that they identified.
The same pretest procedure — opinion scale and dialogue — was administered on the
topic of abortion (the transfer topic).
The two opinion surveys (main and transfer topics) were administered in the same 50-min
period. Dialogues were conducted at a later time. All participants engaged in the two pretest
dialogues within 1 week of completing the opinion scales. In most cases, participants en-
gaged in dialogues on both topics in a single class period. In some cases, the second dialogue
was conducted later in the day. The order of these dialogues was held constant, with par-
ticipants discussing CP before they discussed abortion. All of the verbal data in the study
were recorded on audio- and videotape and transcribed at a later date for analysis.
A posttest was administered approximately 6 weeks after the pretest. The posttest was
identical to the pretest: a written opinion scale and dialogue for each topic of argument.
Dialogues were conducted in the same order with the same partners as at the pretest.

3.3.2. Control condition

Between the pretest and posttest, control group participants engaged in a series of five
weekly dialogues on the topic of CP. Each week participants met in groups of four: two
students in favor and two students against CP. At the start of each session, participants
were assigned to dyads. Each dyad was composed of one participant in favor of CP and one
participant against CP. The first dyad was asked to engage in a dialogue about CP. At the start
of each dialogue participants were given the same directions they received for the pretest
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 41

dialogues. They were instructed to find out where they agree and disagree on the topic and
to come to an agreement, if possible. During this time, the second dyad was instructed to
listen to the dialogue without interrupting. Afterwards, the two dyads switched places; the
second dyad was instructed to engage in dialogue and the first dyad was instructed to listen.
The topic, CP, remained the same. Each dyad had approximately 15 min per session to
engage in dialogue. Participants met in same-sex dyads with a different partner each week.
Due to the limited number of girls in the study, girls met with a different partner for 4 of
the 5 weeks. For the fifth week, they met with a partner that they had met with once before.

3.3.3. Experimental condition

As with the control group, experimental participants met in groups of four for five weekly
sessions. They were given the same amount of time per session and received the same in-
structions to engage in and listen to dialogue. However, the experimental condition received
an additional task. Whereas the control group was given 15 min to engage in dialogue, the
experimental group was given 10 min to engage in dialogue and 5 min to engage in a reflec-
tive exercise. In the reflective exercise, the speakers separated and met with their same-side
peers who had listened to the dialogue. These same-side dyads were given a worksheet
(Appendix A) and instructed to review the major arguments, counterarguments and rebut-
tals in the preceding dialogue. The peer who had listened to the dialogue led the speaker
through the questions and wrote down the speaker’s responses on the worksheet. After the
reflective exercise, participants switched places. The second dyad repeated the task with a
new dialogue and the same reflective exercise.

3.4. Instruments

3.4.1. Analytic scheme for argumentative discourse

The coding scheme developed by Felton and Kuhn (2001) was applied to the transcripts
of the participants’ conversations (Appendix B). Thirty percent of the data set was ran-
domly selected and used to calculate inter-rater reliability. Two raters who were blind to
the treatment, time, and identity of the participants coded transcripts of the dialogues. For
each turn in each dialogue, raters segmented the turn into utterances, coded each utterance,
checked their agreement, and then tallied reliability. Raters resolved any disagreement be-
fore moving on to code the next utterance. Each conversational turn could be assigned as
many three codes depending on the number of codable utterances. When raters disagreed
on the number of utterances in a single turn, the higher number was added to the total
number of codes and the disagreement was noted. Percentage agreement between the raters
during the coding process was 87% (Cohen’s Kappa = .85). The remaining dialogues were
segmented and coded by one of the raters, again, blind to treatment, time, and identity of
participants.
For the purposes of this study, specific sequences of codes were also identified. Each
strategic sequence comprises a set of two to three contiguous turns in which specific utter-
ances occur. Sequences, therefore, were identified strictly as a specific series of codes and
were not identified in a separate coding process. However, each strategic sequence identified
in the data set was checked to verify that it did not occur randomly. No random sequences
were found in the data.
42 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

4. Results

The hypothesis that, across topics, practice plus reflection has a greater affect than practice
alone on the argumentative discourse of adolescents was tested using a 2 × 2 MANCOVA.
This analysis produced estimates of two main effects (Group and Topic) and one interaction
effect on the use of each strategic utterance, which was predicted to be significant (specifi-
cally, the strategic utterances were Add, Counter-C, Interpret, Clarify-?, Case-?), following
the results of Felton and Kuhn (2001). The same analysis was used to test the two main
effects and the interaction effect on the use of strategic sequences (Interpretation-based
Cornering, Case-based Cornering, Rebutting, and Blocking), again, following Felton and
Kuhn (2001). Means of strategic utterances are presented as percentages of total utterances
per dialogue while strategic sequences are presented as simple frequencies per dialogue.
For each analysis, pretest levels of each strategy or sequence was used as a covariate to
account for its effects on posttest levels.

4.1. Change in the use of strategic utterances

The means for all strategic utterances are displayed in Table 1. After controlling for pretest
levels for each utterance, significant interaction effects (Group × Topic) were found on two
of the five strategic utterances: Counter-C and Add. There were no significant interactions
or main effects on the remaining three strategic utterances: Interpret, Case-?, and Clarify-?.

Table 1
Mean frequencies of strategic utterances
Strategy Control group Experimental group

Main topic Transfer topic Main topic Transfer topic

Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest

Add
M 25.39 13.79 28.52 28.46 20.07 8.72 24.15 11.24∗∗∗
S.D. 19.41 17.49 20.11 21.41 14.64 10.99 15.42 10.47
Counter-C
M 9.00 16.34 10.64 11.06 13.04 18.00 10.26 24.62∗
S.D. 6.85 16.13 16.31 12.82 13.16 10.17 11.72 16.69
Interpret
M 0.33 1.14 2.15 0.81 1.79 1.21 2.19 1.29
S.D. 1.49 1.94 2.85 1.53 4.70 2.38 1.07 2.31
Clarify-?
M 3.91 6.05 4.26 5.96 5.35 7.88 4.76 5.08
S.D. 6.20 8.31 5.80 8.13 6.11 8.27 5.12 6.12
Case-?
M 6.12 7.62 3.12 2.09 5.87 9.21 3.63 8.68
S.D. 9.05 7.41 4.64 3.36 6.22 9.65 5.46 9.86
∗ P < .05.
∗∗∗ P < .001.
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 43

4.1.1. Add
Adding represents an attempt on the part of the speaker to extend an idea or argument
advanced by the partner. This operation is not common in strategic discourse since it nei-
ther advances the speaker’s position nor undermines the partner’s position. Cross-sectional
comparisons reveal that adolescents devote a larger proportion of their dialogues to Add
strategies than do adults (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). Therefore, we should expect to see the
experimental group produce fewer Add utterances at the posttest than the control group. As
Table 1 indicates, while both groups showed a decrease in the use of Add on the main topic,
only the experimental group showed a similar decrease on the transfer topic. The differ-
ence observed in the interaction between group and topic at the posttest was significant,
F(1, 44) = 4.73, P < .05, with a medium effect size (partial Eta squared = .06).

4.1.2. Counter-C
The two groups showed a similar pattern with the use of Counter-C. Counter-C is defined
as the criticism to an argument or claim advanced by a partner. In producing a Counter-C,
an individual expresses not only dissent, but also a direct critique of the partner’s argument.
As such, this strategic utterance is fundamental to argumentative discourse. Since adults
produce Counter-C operations in argumentative discourse more often than do adolescents
(Felton & Kuhn, 2001), we should expect to find significant differences between groups in
the use of this strategy at the posttest. Again, while the two groups showed roughly parallel
increases in the use of Counter-C on the main topic, only the experimental group showed a
similar increase on the transfer topic. The interaction between group and topic on the use of
Counter-C at the posttest was significant, F(1, 44) = 5.91, P < .05 with a medium effect
size (partial Eta squared.07).

4.2. Change in the use of strategic sequences

The means for all strategic sequences are displayed in Table 2. Unlike the strategic
utterances, there were no significant interactions found for the strategic sequences. However,
significant main effects were found for group on two strategic sequences: rebutting and
case-cornering. There were no significant main effects for group in the use of cornering or
blocking sequences.

4.2.1. Rebutting
These sequences represent an attempt by the speaker to remove the strength of a critique
advanced by the partner. They are a basic element of argumentative discourse. Ideally, a
speaker should rebut every critique to his or her argument. If not, then the partner has
successfully undermined the speaker’s position. Since adults produce Rebutting sequences
in disagreeing dialogues more often than adolescents (Felton & Kuhn, 2001), we should
expect greater use of Rebutting sequences by the experimental group at the posttest.
As seen in Table 2, the experimental group showed greater use of rebuttals than the
control group across topics at the posttest. Between-group differences across topics were
significant, F(1, 44) = 4.19, P < .05 with a small to medium effect size (partial Eta
squared = .05).
44 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

Table 2
Mean frequencies of strategic sequences
Strategy Control group Experimental group

Main topic Transfer topic Main topic Transfer topic

Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest

Rebuttal
M 3.00 4.10 3.10 3.50 1.25 5.75 1.58 5.75∗
S.D. 3.97 4.79 4.95 4.81 2.14 4.91 2.81 4.99
Interpret-Corner
M 0.40 0.80 0.70 0.64 0.33 1.25 0.50 0.67
S.D. 0.70 1.03 1.25 0.92 0.65 1.22 0.85 0.98
Case-corner
M 0.90 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.08 1.33∗
S.D. 0.88 0.92 0.42 0.00 0.39 0.74 0.29 1.43
Block
M 0.00 0.90 0.09 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.17 0.25
S.D. 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.65 0.78 1.17 0.39 0.45
∗ P < .05.

4.2.2. Case-cornering
When used alone, Case-? is associated with less advanced discourse (Felton & Kuhn,
2001). However, when coordinated with Counter-C, it represents a form of leading question
similar to cornering sequences. With Case-cornering sequences, participants express an
understanding of the role of Case-? in dialogue —to force the partner to choose a course
of action that would be inconsistent with his or her position on a topic. Cross-sectional
research has shown that although adolescents produce Case-? significantly more often than
adults, the two groups produce roughly equal amounts of case-based sequences (Felton &
Kuhn, 2001). This would suggest that adults are more aware of the strategic purpose of
Case-?. Thus, we should expect the experimental group to use Case-cornering sequences
more often than the control group at the posttest.
As with rebutting sequences, significant between-group differences in the use of case-
cornering were found across topics at the posttest, F(1, 44) = 16.52, P < .001 with a large
effect size (partial Eta squared = .17).

5. Discussion

5.1. Argumentative strategy use

As stated in the introduction, the primary hypotheses of this study were twofold: first,
that the development of strategy use in adolescent argumentative discourse would continue
along a trajectory towards adult argumentative discourse; and second, that a combination
of reflection and practice has a greater effect in promoting developmental advance than
practice alone. Results from the present study support both hypotheses. That is, across
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 45

topics, experimental group participants showed a greater advance in the basic strategies
associated with advances in discourse skill. These advances were a general decline in the
use of Add, and an increase in the use of Counter-C, Case-?, Rebutting, and Case-cornering
sequences.
In addition to these results, trends in the data suggest important between-group differences
in the use of strategic utterances on the two topics of argument. While the two groups showed
almost parallel advances in the use of Add and Counter-C on the main topic, they did not
show parallel performance on the transfer topic. What may have caused this interaction?
First, practice in argumentation on the main topic may have produced positive change in
both groups. This finding would be consistent with other extant research (Anderson et al.,
2001; Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997).
There are three possible means by which such practice may have improved argumentative
discourse on the main topic: (1) the participants adopted these new critiques from their peers;
(2) they generated them themselves; or (3) they generated them with their peers in the course
of dialogue. Lower skilled participants were exposed to the critiques and rebuttals that more
advanced peers presented in discourse. In that time they may have assimilated these new
arguments and integrated them into their own dialogues. In addition, participants engaged in
a total of seven dialogues on the main topic (including the pretest, posttest, and five weekly
dialogues), so they had ample opportunity to generate critiques on their own or with the aid
of their conversational partners. In either case, participants did not have to develop any new
understanding of discourse to show improvement. Improvements may have simply been the
result of increased facility with the topic, or a greater repertoire of arguments to cite.
Developmental advance on the transfer topic required a different kind of change in the
adolescents. In order to transfer the use of counterargument, participants had to understand
the relative value of the strategies independent of the topic of argument. They had to under-
stand its function in the context of argumentative discourse. This conclusion is supported
by the results regarding strategic sequences. Strategic sequences represent a more advanced
level of discourse than simple utterances. In order to stage an effect rebuttal or case-corner
sequence, an individual must be aware of the structure and goals of discourse. These se-
quences result from an appreciation of the need to defend our own claims while dismantling
our opponents’ claims. As a result, increases across these two strategies emerged only in the
experimental group across topics. Reflection seems to have promoted development across
topics and evinced a significant effect on participants’ skills of discourse. These results
suggest that while practice may account for some of the observed advances made by the
adolescents, it does not account for all of them. Further study in the effects of extended
practice may reveal that over an extended period of time, practice alone can, in fact, open
the door to metacognitive understanding. However, it is clear from the present data, that at
least in rather brief interventions, structured reflection on discourse is an effective method
of enhancing transferable skills of discourse.

5.2. Patterns of development in the skills of argumentative discourse

What, then, do basic developments in discourse skill look like, based on the cross-sectional
findings of Felton and Kuhn (2001) and the present experimental results? When we exam-
ine the advances of experimental group participants on either topic, we see development
46 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

proceeds in the direction of adult discourse but is limited to more rudimentary strategies.
For example, participants showed a dramatic decline in the use of Add. Decline in this strat-
egy should occur as a first step in development since adding is maladaptive to the goals of
argumentative discourse (directing the opponent towards conceding one’s own arguments,
eliciting and critiquing the opponent’s arguments, and blocking or rebutting attempts by
the opponent to critique arguments or gain concessions). Adding represents an attempt to
extend an argument advanced by the partner. This operation is antithetical to all three goals
since it merely elaborates the opponent’s position without either advancing one’s own po-
sition or critiquing the partner’s position. Thus, a decline in adding should represent one of
the first advances in goal-directed argumentative discourse.
Another fundamental advance in argumentative discourse skill is the use of Counter-C.
Counterargument represents an understanding of the need to challenge opposing-side argu-
ments. It is important to note that in the present study, utterances were coded Counter-C even
when the speaker failed to successfully undermine an argument. Even an unsuccessful at-
tempt suggests that the speaker recognizes the need for a counterargument. As with adding,
advance in the use of Counter-C represents a preliminary development in discourse skill.
Previous research has shown that even young children are able to produce counterargument
in discourse (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981). Therefore, we should expect adolescents to use
counterargument routinely. Nonetheless, adolescents may increase their use of Counter-C
as they develop more advanced discourse strategies that incorporate counterargument like
Rebutting and Case-cornering sequences. In the context of these more advanced strate-
gies, the use of counterargument represents more than the simple ability to critique an
opposing-side argument; it represents a skilled coordination of discourse skills.
Experimental group participants engaged in coordinated argumentative exchanges on
both the main and transfer topic. They replaced simple conversational strategies like Add
with goal-directed strategies characteristic of adult dialogue. There was, however, an unan-
ticipated exception. We should expect development to proceed in the direction of decreased
use of case-based argument. Felton and Kuhn (2001) found that adults produce fewer case
questions than adolescents, but roughly equal case-based cornering sequences in their dis-
agreeing dialogues as adolescents. In that study, the authors conclude that while adults
use case questions less than adolescents, when adults do use such questions, they do so in
the context of case-based cornering sequences. Experimental group participants showed an
increase in the use of this strategic sequence across topics.
Why did participants increase their use of case-cornering sequences? To address this
question, we must take a closer look at their function in argumentative discourse. Most
often, speakers present case-cornering sequences with the goal of cornering the partner into
contradicting his or her position on the issue. In a sense, a successful case question exposes
an inconsistency in the opponent’s position and then uses that to his or her advantage. In
Table 3, Speaker A is clearly trying to corner Speaker B. He presents a case regarding the
death penalty, and then criticizes his partner’s response. He has succeeded in demonstrating
Speaker B’s inconsistency. Speaker A even calls his partner a hypocrite to drive home his
point. The problem with this critique is that the partner can simply qualify his position on
the issue. He could simply rebut by saying that he would want his mother to live, though
she would deserve to die. Speaker A has found fault in Speaker B’s commitment to his
position, but he has not found fault in a particular argument that Speaker B has advanced.
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 47

Table 3
Example of a case-based sequence
Code Speaker: utterance

Case-? A: If your mom did a crime, would you want her [. . . ] to get the death penalty or
live that you could see her in jail?
Clarify B: Well, I would pick that she’ll live, but . . .
Counter-C A: Alright, wait, excuse me, hold on a second. You just said that you’d pick that
she lives so I don’t understand why you are for the death penalty ’cos it doesn’t
matter. Right now you’re a hypocrite [. . . ]. You just contradicted yourself.

Rather than corner their partners into accepting a premise for an opposing argument,
adolescents attempt to sway their partners’ opinion by constructing compelling scenar-
ios. Once they get the partner to acquiesce to an opposing scenario, they have achieved a
“win” in the argument. Ultimately, this form of discourse fails to either prove the strength
of the speaker’s argument or disprove the strength of the partner’s argument. It is a pre-
liminary form of argumentative discourse strategy. Adolescents utilize scenarios to argue
their side in a dispute. Getting the partner to accept a narrative which conflicts with the
position he or she holds, forces the partner to acknowledge an inconsistency in position.
Thus, case-based sequences are not without value. Such discourse introduces novice ar-
guers to the notion of commitment in argument. In testing the integrity of an opponent’s
position, the speaker recognizes a basic goal of argumentative discourse. Each speaker
must gain concessions from the partner to build a successful argument. With case-based
cornering, speakers do not force their partners to concede an argument, but they do get
the partner to acknowledge an inconsistent position. The next step is to gain conces-
sions that could be used to construct an argument. This awareness of the relationship
between argument, commitments, and conclusion lays the groundwork for more sophis-
ticated discourse strategies. In this way, case questions may serve as a bootstrap for more
advanced strategies of argumentative discourse that require the manipulation of argu-
ments.
However, while adolescents in this study advanced in the direction of adult discourse,
they did not acquire the most advanced strategies found in adult discourse. No significant in-
crease occurred in manipulating the partner’s argument (Interpret), in valid argument-based
leading questions (Interpretation-based Cornering), or in dismantling leading questions
(Blocking). Rather than develop new argumentative strategies, adolescents in this study
demonstrated a growing facility with the basic strategies that they possessed at the outset.
They showed an increased facility in the more adaptive strategies that lie at the heart of
advanced discourse. They also showed a decrease in less adaptive strategies that fail to serve
the goals of argumentative discourse.

5.3. Implications for a model of argumentative discourse development

The results of this study support tentative conclusions about the development of strategies
of argumentative discourse. While adolescents demonstrate basic strategies of discourse,
they employ these strategies inconsistently and only in familiar contexts. As they begin
48 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

to develop the skills of argumentation, adolescents exhibit certain rudimentary advances.

First, they reduce their use of strategies ill-suited to the goals of discourse. Second, ado-
lescents increase their use of strategies well-suited to the goals of discourse. And third,
they generalize these advances to new topics of argument. This final advance represents
an important milestone in development. At the earliest stages of development in discourse
skill, adolescents may be able to employ strategies only in familiar domains. They seem
to use strategies in specific contexts, but they may not understand the role these strate-
gies play across domains of argumentation. At this point in development, metacognitive
understanding is at best tenuous.
Adolescents in the present study showed development from passive to active use of
strategies in their dialogues. They transferred strategies to a new topic, demonstrating a
nascent understanding of strategies apart from their original context. Transfer suggests that
the individual understands the strategy as a generic one that can be applied to a variety
of argumentative contexts. This most likely proceeds hand in hand with understanding the
role the strategy plays in argumentative discourse. At this initial level of development, it
is unlikely that adolescents are fully aware of the strategies that they employ. They most
likely would be unable to articulate these strategies, much less explain the merits of any
particular strategy. However, the consistent use and transfer of a strategy suggests that
adolescents are coming to refine their concept of discourse. Specifically, it represents ad-
vanced goal-directed behavior. Adolescents improve their strategy use as they come to
refine the goals they seek to achieve in discourse. Development in strategy use entails not
only acquiring more sophisticated strategies, but also defining more sophisticated goals
(Leont’ev, 1981). Skilled arguers understand that the goal of discourse is not simply to
advance an argument, but to advance that argument with the cooperation of one’s audience.
With this standard in place, adolescents begin to understand the utility of some strategies over
others.
Conceived in this way, development in argumentative discourse occurs on a contin-
uum. Basic skills emerge early in the life span with familiar content in highly supportive
contexts. Development then takes the form of greater flexibility of skills. Later develop-
ment may entail acquiring newer advanced strategies that serve clearly defined discourse
goals. Throughout the developmental process, adolescents may also demonstrate grow-
ing metacognitive awareness of the strategies they employ and the goals these strate-
gies serve. While this model is still only speculative, it is consistent with the theory
and data on the relationship between cognitive and metacognitive development (Crowley,
Shrager & Seigler, 1997; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998) and helps explain the present
findings.
In sum, we can conclude that while practice can improve discourse, its effect over
the short term may be limited to the topic practiced. In order to promote the develop-
ment and transfer of discourse skill, we must focus adolescents’ attention on the
argumentative structure behind discourse to support a greater sensitivity to the argumen-
tative goals in their discourse. Given the opportunity to reflect on the structure of their
arguments with others, adolescents begin to develop more advanced and generalizable
argumentative strategies characteristic of adult discourse. This understanding of goals
represents a critical gateway to the development of strategies in argumentative
discourse.
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 49

Appendix A
50 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52

Appendix B. Analytic scheme for argumentative discourse

Questions
Agree-? A question that asks whether the partner will accept or
agree with the speaker’s claim
Case-? A request for the partner to take a position on a particular
case or scenario
Clarify-? A request for the partner to clarify his or her preceding
utterance
Justify-? A request for the partner to support his or her preceding
claim with evidence or further argument
Meta-? A question regarding the dialogue itself (rather than its
content)
Position-? A request for the partner to state his or her position on an
issue
Question-? A simple informational question which does not refer
back to the partner’s preceding utterance
Respond-? A request for the partner to react to the speaker’s
utterance
Statements
Add An extension or elaboration of the partner’s preceding
utterance
Advance An extension or elaboration that advances the partner’s
preceding argument
Agree A statement of agreement with the partner’s preceding
utterance
Aside A comment that does not extend or elaborate the
partner’s preceding utterance
Clarify A clarification of speaker’s own argument in response to
the partner’s preceding utterance
Coopt An assertion that the partner’s immediately preceding
utterance serves the speaker’s opposing argument
Counter-A A disagreement with the partner’s preceding utterance,
accompanied by an alternate argument
Counter-C A disagreement with the partner’s preceding utterance,
accompanied by a critique
Disagree A simple disagreement without further argument or
elaboration
Dismiss An assertion that the partner’s immediately preceding
utterance is irrelevant to the speaker’s position
Interpret A paraphrase of the partner’s preceding utterance with or
without further elaboration
 M.K. Felton / Cognitive Development 19 (2004) 35–52 51

Appendix B. (Continued )

Meta An utterance regarding the dialogue itself (rather than its

content)
Null An unintelligible or off-task utterance
Refuse An explicit refusal to respond to the partner’s preceding
question
Substantiate A utterance offered in support of the partner’s preceding
utterance
Non-transactive statements
Continue A continuation or elaboration of the speaker’s own last
utterance which ignores the partner’s immediately
preceding utterance
Unconnected An utterance having no apparent connection to the
preceding utterances of either partner or speaker

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