FRANCISCO JUAN LARANÑAGA vs.

PHILIPPINES
Date of Initial Submission of Communication: August 15, 2005
Date of Adoption of Views: July 24, 2006

The Human Rights Committee (herein named as Committee) under Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considered Communication
No. 1421/2005 submitted by the author, Francisco Juan Laranñaga on August 15, 2005.

Francisco Juan Laranñaga is a Filipino and Spanish National who is sentenced to death and
imprisoned at New Bilibid Prison in the Philippines. Laranñaga claims to be a victim of violations of
Article 6, 7, 9, and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the Philippines. As his
Communication is considered, the Committee adopts its power to forward its views to the State Party,
the Philippines, through the Optional Protocol which is entered into force for the State Party on
November 22, 1989.

Hence, the Committee herein examines Larranñaga’s complaint in view of the facts submitted by
the same.

FACTS OF THE CASE

According to the prosecution, the author, Francisco Juan Laranñaga, along with seven
other men, kidnapped Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong in Cebu City on July 16, 1997. On the
same day, the two were allegedly raped. Marijoy was pushed into a ravine, while Jacqueline was
beaten. Jacqueline’s body remains missing.
On September 17, 1997, the police tried to arrest Laranñaga without a warrant. Two
days after, the counsel of Laranñaga requested for a preliminary investigation and prayed that
they would be given 20 days to file the defense affidavit however, the prosecutor denied such
request. The counsel, then again, on September 19, 1997, appealed to the Court of Appeals to
prevent the filing of criminal information against Laranñaga however, criminal charges had
already been filed on September 17, 1997 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The
counsel requested the RTC of Cebu to prevent Laranñaga’s arrest but the same was arrested
with a warrant issued by the court. Said decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court and
despite pending appeal, Laranñaga was brought before a judge on October 14, 1997. Laranñaga
did not enter a plea thus the judge entered a plea of not guilty to two counts of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention. The Supreme Court temporarily restrained the judge from proceeding
with the case to prevent issues before the court from becoming moot. On October 27, 1997, the
Supreme Court set aside the inquest investigation and held that Laranñaga was entitled to a
proper preliminary investigation.
The trial began on August 12, 1998 in the Special Heinous Crimes Court in Cebu City. The Special
Heinous Crimes Court found Laranñaga guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of
Jacqueline Chiong and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua on May 5, 1999. It decided that
there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong.
On May 10, 2000, Laranñaga appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, on its
February 3, 2004 decision, found Laranñaga guilty not only of the kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape of Jacqueline Chiong, but also of the complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong. Laranñaga
was sentenced to death by lethal injection. A motion for reconsideration was lodged with the
Supreme Court but the same was rejected.
Aside from Laranñaga’s complaints that the evaluation of facts and evidence by the
Special Heinous Crimes Court and the Supreme Court were manifestly arbitrary and amounted
to a denial of justice due to procedural irregularities, Laranñaga also complains that his right
was violated because the Court sentenced him with death penalty after abolishing it, and such
sentence arbitrarily deprived him of his life.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court of the Philippines is correct in imposing upon Laranñaga the
death sentence.
RULING
The International Human Rights Committee concluded that the imposition of death
sentence on Laranñaga is not correct and amounts to inhuman treatment, hence in violation of Article
7 of the Covenant which provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.

The Committee then recalls its jurisprudence that the automatic and mandatory
imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, which is in violation
of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Covenant. At the same time, the Committee notes that the
Philippines has adopted Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of death penalty
in the country. Hence, in the light of the Philippines’ recent repeal of the death penalty the Committee
considers that this claim is no longer a live issue and need not be considered in the circumstances of the
case.

Therefore, the Committee has obliged the Philippines to provide Laranñaga with an effective
remedy, including the commutation of his death sentence and early consideration for release on
parole. Moreover, the Philippines is obliged to take measures to prevent similar violations in the
future.
 Despite the Philippines’ citation of the drafting history of the provision of the death penalty and
its argument that it was never abolished, and that the imposition of such for certain crimes is purely a
matter of domestic discretion, save for the limitations that it be imposed only for the “most serious
crimes,” the Committee notes from the judgments of both the trial Court and the Supreme Court that
Laranñaga was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “when the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped… the maximum penalty shall be imposed.”
Thus, the death penalty was automatically imposed by the operation of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Committee then recalls its jurisprudence that the automatic and
mandatory imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, which is
in violation of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, in circumstances where the death penalty
is imposed without any possibility of taking into account the defendant’s personal
circumstances or the circumstances of the particular offence. At the same time, the Committee
notes that the Philippines has adopted Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of
death penalty in the country. Hence, in the light of the Philippines’ recent repeal of the death penalty
the Committee considers that this claim is no longer a live issue and need not be considered in the
circumstances of the case.

Therefore, the Committee has obliged the Philippines to provide Laranñaga with an effective
remedy, including the commutation of his death sentence and early consideration for release on
parole. Moreover, the Philippines is obliged to take measures to prevent similar violations in the
future.