Risk Analysis Report ISMA Erlanger

International Safety & Risk Management Group
PERFETTI VAN MELLE
DUST EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT
OF POWDER INSTALLATIONS
IN ERLANGEN, USA
Report VBI03/0051
copyright 2003 ISMA N.V.

Heiveldekens 8
B-2550 Kontich
tel.: (+32)(03)451.01.30
fax.:(+32)(03)451.01.31
Email: gerard.vanlaar@irmaco.be
PERFETTI VAN MELLE Reference VBI03/0051 Page 2 of 32
Title : Dust explosion risk analysis of powder installations in Erlangen,

USA
Reference : VBI03/0051
Assignor : PERFETTI VAN MELLE

P.O. Box 3000
NL-4800 DA Breda
Contact : Mr. K. van Belois and Mr. B. MacGillivray.
Date : July 2003
Author : G.F.M. van Laar
SUMMARY
At the request of PERFETTI VAN MELLE an assessment has been carried out into the
dust explosion risks of the powder installations at the production plant in Erlangen Kty, USA.
From the dust explosion risk analysis for this plant the following conclusions can be
derived:
 The silos have become an acceptable risk due to the outside installation of their vented
tops.
 The relatively highest risk is the sugar milling section where, mainly due to an open air
inlet and the relatively high probability of ignition in the mill system, an explosion may
hurt personnel and create damage to the installations.
 Also the receiving hoppers for sugar and maltodextrine and the central dedusting filter
pose a more or less unacceptable risk, but which is lower, due to their small volumes.
 These risks are mainly caused by the relatively high ignition sensitivity of maltodextrine
and sugar, in combination with the process.
In order to reduce the explosion risks to acceptable levels, meaning that personnel will not
be in risk during normal operation, the following measures are recommended:
 Measures with highest priority:

o General preventive measures: good housekeeping, grounding and bonding,
antistatic filter elements, suitable electrical equipment, training personnel.
o Prevention of internal non-conductive hoses and flexibles in the truck unloading,
storage silos and the sugar milling system, plus silo. Ask for a written statement
about the internal conductivity of the hoses and flexibles
o Make the silo deck a no go area and prevent ingress of explosion via the door to
the silo deck.
o Ensure that the flexibles between silos and their vibrating cones can withstand the
expected reduced explosion pressure.
o Ensure that the bottom valve of a silo is closed during filling, or ensure a minimum
product level above the valve of about 1 m.
o Protect the air inlet of the sugar mill against explosion propagation by reinforcement
and explosion barriers.
o Limit the diameter of the pressure relief lines on the silos to less than 1’’, in this way
stopping potential explosion propagation.
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o Ask for a written statement that the explosion containing equipment of the sugar
milling installation is 10 bar strong, including all ducting involved.
o Check the pressure resistance of the icing sugar silo including all appendages on it
and, if necessary, reinforce. Ask for a written statement.
o Install flameless venting devices on the maltodextrine and sugar receivers.
o Protect the central dedusting unit by explosion venting in combination with an
explosion barrier in the inlet duct.
o Install an explosion check valve in the outlet of the mill filter to protect the fan and
ducting from overpressure.
 High priority.
o Use the activation signal of the check valves to stop the installation to prevent
explosion propagation.
o Install a lightning protection device on the building if not yet there.
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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 5
1.1. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 5
1.2. OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 5
1.3. SCOPE .................................................................................................................. 5
1.4. APPROACH ............................................................................................................ 5
1.5. BUILD-UP OF THIS REPORT ...................................................................................... 5
2. INVENTORY OF PROCESS AND PRODUCT ....................................................... 7
2.1. INVENTORY OF PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT ................................................................. 7
2.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 7
2.1.2. Description ..................................................................................................... 7
2.2. DUST EXPLOSION CHARACTERISTICS OF POWDERS CONCERNED ............................... 10
2.2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 10
2.2.2. Dust explosion characteristics ..................................................................... 10
2.3. INTERPRETATION OF DATA ..................................................................................... 12
2.4. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 14
3. RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT ................................................................ 15
3.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 15
3.2. EXPLOSIBLE MIXTURES.......................................................................................... 15
3.3. IGNITION SOURCES ............................................................................................... 15
3.4. CONFRONTATION OF IGNITION SOURCES WITH EXPLOSIBLE MIXTURES ....................... 16
3.5. RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................................ 19
3.6. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 20
4. RISK REDUCTION MEASURES .......................................................................... 21
4.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 21
4.2. GENERAL: PREVENTIVE MEASURES ....................................................................... 21
4.3. GENERAL: EXPLOSION EFFECT REDUCING OR POST-OPERATIVE MEASURES ............... 22
4.4. RISK REDUCING MEASURES FOR THE SPECIFIC INSTALLATION ................................... 23
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................... 26
5.1. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 26
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 26
6. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 27
7. APPENDIX 1: STATIC ELECTRICITY ................................................................. 28
8. APPENIX 2: INFORMATION ABOUT BIG BAGS ................................................ 31
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1.Introduction
1.1.Background
At the Erlangen site of PERFETTI VAN MELLE several powders are used in the
production of sweets. The powders mainly used are sugar, maltodextrine and dextrose,
but also starch and citric acid is used, but in smaller quantities.
Because these powders are flammable, the dust formed is explosible when mixed with air
and when also sufficiently strong ignition sources are present or formed. Therefore
explosion risks may be present in this part of the plant.
A fire or explosion with victims may lead to loss of life, property and production, but also
the corporate image may be exposed in a negative way. These negative effects are to be
prevented with all reasonable means.
1.2.Objectives
At the request of PERFETTI VAN MELLE the potential dust explosion risks in the powder
installations have been assessed. Following an explosion incident, the installations
already have been provided with several risk reduction measures.
The assessment has been carried out to evaluate up to which extend additional safety
measures have to be taken, in order to reduce the potential explosion risk in the surveyed
installations to an acceptable level. An acceptable level of risk means that personnel runs
no risk by the effects of a dust explosion, but also that damage to the plant and production
is limited to the minimum.
1.3.Scope
The investigation is limited to the powder installations: beginning at the road tankers and
ending at the point where the powders are extruded together with liquid ingredients to form
a chewy product.
The site and installation has been visited on the 9-11th July 2003, giving a good insight of
the building and installation.
1.4.Approach
The investigation is based upon information received from the assignor such as process
information and upon data gathered at the visit to the installations on the 9-11th. July 2003.
By confrontation of potential ignition sources with explosible mixtures the explosion risks
can be analysed. Depending on the acceptability of risks, the necessity of dust explosion
risk reducing measures is assessed.
Because this study has a qualitative character, possible additional measures will be
selected and discussed, but not engineered in detail.
The risk analysis follows the logical steps as given in figure 1 (from EN 1050).
1.5.Build-up of this report

After this introduction the report starts a short description of the installations concerned
and the explosion parameters of the products concerned with practical interpretation. The
next chapters describe the actual risk analysis and the recommended safety measures.
The report finalizes with conclusions and recommendations.
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Start
Determination
of the limits of
the machinery
Risk Risk
analysis assessment
Hazard
identification
Risk
estimation
Risk
evaluation
Is the YES
machinery END
safe?
NO
Risk
reduction
Figure 1. Steps in a risk analysis conforming to EN 1050.
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2.Inventory of process and product

2.1.Inventory of process and equipment
2.1.1.Introduction
This description is based upon:
 Information gathered at the plant visit on 9-11th. July 2003 including changes in the
silo region installed after the explosion in May 2003.
 Drawings of the original plant, before the silo explosion in May 2003.
Building drawings:
 15654, 177, rev. B, dtd. 08/28/95
 15654, 178, rev. B, dtd. 09/01/95
 15654, 179, rev. B, dtd. 08/30/95
 15654, 180, rev. B, dtd. 09/15/95
Flow sheets and equipment drawings:

 95-971-5A, 971F00, rev. H, dtd. 11/22/96
 02-741-1, 0274108, rev. D, dtd. 10/08/02
 02-741-1, D44964, rev. B, dtd. 11/01/02
 02-741-1, D44968, rev. C, dtd. 11/05/02
 02-741-1, C49447, rev. B, dtd. 10/09/02
 02-741-1, D44987, rev. B, dtd. 11/07/02
 02-741-1, C49447, rev. B, dtd. 10/09/02
 02-741-1, D44977, rev. B, dtd. 11/06/02
 02-741-1, C49447, rev. B, dtd. 10/09/02
 02-741-1, C49450, rev. B, dtd. 10/09/02
2.1.2.Description
General
In this plant candy is produced, named ‘Air heads’. For the production the several powder
ingredients are shipped in, stored, processed and blended with liquid substances to be
extruded and form a sticky candy which is cooled down and packed.
The main ingredients are dextrose, sugar and maltodextrine, which are shipped in by bulk
trucks and blown to three silos.
Starch and citric acid also are used but in much smaller quantities. Starch is shipped in by
FIBC’s (official name for big bags or super sacks), citric acid in 20 kg bags.
Other ingredients are flavours and colours but are used in relatively small quantities:
addition is done with plastic bags, cans etc.
Sugar
The sugar is shipped in by bulk trucks and blown pneumatically to the sugar silo. The
transport air is dried and cooled to about 40 °C before it is blown to the truck. The truck is
earthed (earthing control device, but can be overridden by putting it on another piece of
metal). The hose used is bonded by internal spiral, the inside rubber or plastic is not
specified as antistatic or conductive (surface resistance of inside surface must be less
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than 108 Ohm). When transporting sugar, the truck driver metioned to see strikes of static
discharges inside the hose.
The carbon steel internally coated silo is provided with a filter on its top provided with an
explosion panel of 0.37 m² (opening pressure 0.075 barg). The silo body is inside the
building, the top outside (this is a change of the situation before the explosion, when the
silo top was inside the building).
The silo itself is not provided with explosion panels or other explosion vent items, but in
the future will be provided with a weak seam roof. The pneumatic ducting inside the
building is out of stainless steel and provided with bonding wires at flanges or cupplings.
The silo dimensions are as following:

 Diameter: 2.8 m
 Height of cylinder: 10.36 m
 Cone height: 0.91 m
 Outlet diameter: 0.3 m
The volume is 65.9 m³ and the height/diameter ratio is 4.13.

The silo has no level indicator anymore: it stands upon weigh cells.
Product from this silo falls via a shut valve into a screw conveyor which transports the
sugar to the mill air inlet point where also starch from a starch receiver is transferred by
screw. This more or less open air inlet point acts as the feed to the Bauermeister mill:
sugar and some starch enters the mill and the sugar is milled to icing sugar. The milled
product is sucked to a reception vessel with rotary valve and filter.
This filter vessel has an estimated volume of 5.3 m³ and is built to resist 10 bar pressure
without collapse. Also the mill is rated for such a pressure. Clean air from this filter is
sucked to the fan located in the compressor room for unloading bulk trucks.
Via the rotary valve under this receiver the icing sugar is blown (cooled compressed air of
about 40°C) to the fine sugar hopper, partly via a flexible hose. The silo dimensions are as
following:
 Diameter: 1.8 m
 Height of cylinder: 3.7 m
 Cone height: 0.5 m
 Outlet diameter: 0.3 m
The volume is 10 m³ and the height/diameter ratio is 2.42.

It is provided with an explosion panel (vent area is 0.52 m²) on the top venting outside
through the roof via a short vent duct (1 m). The replaced air is pushed to a small filter
(0.36 m³ and also able to resist 10 bar pressure) next to this silo, also with partly a flexible
duct. Via a rotary valve the same blow line coming from the receiver to this silo is fed.
The two rotary airlocks have the following features:

 Number of vanes: 8
 Blade thickness: 1.59 mm
 Clearance: maximal 0.2 mm
 Able to resist 10 bar.
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Fine sugar from this silo finally falls via a valve into a send vessel and is pneumatically
transferred to the sugar receiver hoppers in the two mixing stations. On the send vessel
an air relief duct is installed and connected to the silo top. This duct has a diameter of
1.5’’ and is partly flexible.
The metal duct parts are joined with a clamp system in this way bonding both ends to
each other electrostatically.
Maltodextrin
Maltodextrin is shipped in by bulk trucks and blown pneumatically to its silo on the same
way as sugar. Also the silo is the same as the sugar silo: here the weak seam already
has been installed. The opening pressure is 0.4 bar, the silo strength is given as 2.6 bar.
Also on the filter a vent panel is installed behind the filter bags.
The existing big bag filling installation will not be used anymore.
Product from this silo falls via a shut valve into a vibrating sieve and then into a send
vessel and is pneumatically transferred to the receiver hoppers in the two mixing stations.
On the send vessel an air relief duct is installed and connected to the silo top. This duct
has a diameter of 1.5’’ and is partly flexible.
Dextrose
See maltodextrine: silo not yet adjusted with venting and filter also has no venting
installed.
Starch
Starch is shipped in by big bags. A big bag is hung in a hopper and emptied slowly into a
hopper feeding a pneumatic send hopper which sends the starch either to the sugar mill
feeding hopper or to one of the two filling hoppers (mixers). To prevent dust formation the
hopper is provided with a small filter, with fan blowing inside the area.
Citric acid
Citric acid is shipped in by 20 kg bags. The bags are opened and dumped inside a
debagging hopper with dust extraction. From here a spiral conveyor (PE duct with slowly
rotating spiral) feeds the two citric feed hoppers at the mixers.
Mixing units
The five main powdery products end up in two mixing stations. Each mixing station has
five dust hoppers where the products are conveyed to. The hoppers that are filled
pneumatically have a diameter of 0.71 m and an estimated volume of about 0.36 m³.
From these loss and weight feeders the necessary quantities are fed to two small hoppers
to feed the extruder mixer. In this extruder mixer also liquid products such as water, corn
syrup and vegetable oil are injected. The result is a chewy product that is not dusty.
A central dedusting filter is installed near the two mixers to dedust the several filling points
under these hoppers. This filter is not protected and the fan blows directly inside the
room.
Miscellaneous
Generally speaking the plant was rather clean.
Only locally heavy dust formation could be observed:
 Under the silos due to the sieve units and transport system.
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 Under the starch big bag hopper.

 Under the citric acid hopper, mainly due to leaking of the screw conveyor.
 The mixing stations on the mezzanine floor, due to leaks and spills.
Plant personnel should clean up the dust every shift, but as it seems this routine can be
improved.
On most locations in which equipment with powdery products are installed, one could
notice a very fine film of dust: this most probably is caused by the several filter outlets
blowing inside the building. The outlets still will contain dust, but only the finest dust which
may pass the filters and will in time settle on objects etc.
Electrical equipment looks in good condition and well maintained. However, the so-called
‘bug zappers’ may not be suitable for installation in potentially dusty area.
Finally two battery loading units for forklifts etc. are installed in a enclosed room where
also a compressor is installed. This room has no extra ventilation and a truck was seen to
be loading very close to the wall where also electrical cabinets are placed which are not
explosion proof for hydrogen.
2.2.Dust explosion characteristics of powders concerned
2.2.1.Introduction
The main products concerned here are:
 Maltodextrine
 Sugar
 Dextrose
Other products in smaller quantities are:

 Starch (modified cornstarch, with about 5% moisture content)
 Citric acid
2.2.2.Dust explosion characteristics

The following explosion properties are of importance:
Lower explosion limit LEL g/m3

Maximal explosion overpressure Pmax bar
Dust explosion constant or K value Kst bar.m/s
Minimal ignition energy MIE mJ
Min. ignition temperature dust cloud MIT ºC
Minimal ignition temperature of dust layer
(thickness 5 mm) or Glowing Temperature GT ºC
Burning Group BG
The burning behaviour of a dust heap, once ignited, is described by the Burning Group
(BG). It is a measure for the capability of ignition and intensity of burning of a dust layer.
With a gas flame or a hot platinum wire (1000 ºC) it is tried to ignite a defined dust heap.
The results will lead to classification of the dust into the following burning groups:
BG 1 No ignition
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BG 2 Short ignition and quick extinguishing

BG 3 Local burning or glowing without spreading
BG 4 Spreading of a glowing fire
BG 5 Spreading of an open fire
BG 6 Explosible burning
All data are from open literature (ref.1) and given in table 1.
Table 2: Dust explosion data of concerned products

Product Median LEL Pmax Kst MIT GT BG MIE
part. size
µm g/m3 Bar bar.m/s C C mJ
Dextrose <63 60 7 91 500 570 3 100/1000
Sugar <63 30 9.1 140 330 420 3(5) 8
Maltodextrine <100 15 8.6 133 380 melts 5 4
Corn starch 20 60 8.2 167 410 310 2 >10
Citric acid 30 100 explodes explodes / / 2 /
/ means not found
() means value when sugar is adsorbed on adsorbing materials as sand or ashes.
Remarks:
 The specific resistance of the products may not be an ignition or explosion related
property, it may be important concerning the generation of static electricity and its
retaining it in time. No data are given in the quoted references. However, dry starch
and in particular maltodextrine are known as quite isolating products: one can expect
that the specific resistance of the powder may lie in the order of 10 12 Ohm.m.
 MIE given as 100/1000 mJ means that the test at 1000 mJ was positive (ignition) and
negative at 100 mJ.
 MIE can be measured with induction inside the measuring circuit, and without. For
interpretation of these values the value found without induction is to be applied for
evaluation of the ignitability for static discharges. The value with induction is to be
used for evaluation of ignitability for mechanical sparks. In case of low MIE´s (<5-10
mJ) it does not make a difference anymore. Data with induction noramally are a
factor of 10 lower than carried out without induction. The data given in table 1 are all
with induction.
 The thermal stability of the products is not exactly known, but there are indications
that the onset temperature of ignition of larger starch and/or maltodextrine deposits is
between 135 and 180 ºC, meaning that at those temperatures spontaneous ignition
may take place. Data from a report from Dust Tech DTI report 1998-C gives a value
of 225 ºC for self ignition.
 The MIE is very dependent of temperature: MIE´s will rapidly drop at higher
temperatures. See table 2.
Table 2. Influence of temperature on MIE

Temperature MIE MIE MIE
°C mJ mJ mJ
20 100/1000 8 4
50 26/170 3 2
95 8/34 2 1
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 In particular the MIE of maltodextrine has turned out to be very sensitive for moisture
contents. When approaching 0-1 % of moisture, there are indications that its MIE
may become lower than 1 mJ.
2.3.Interpretation of data
 The products concerned are explosive: the maximal explosion pressure inside a closed
vessel or room may reach 9.1 bar under normal conditions. Such pressures will destroy
all normal not protected equipment.
 The standardised maximal rate of pressure rise, Kst, is maximal 167 for starch, but will
depend upon moisture content (not given yet). Sugar and maltodextrine also are in the
same range, but slightly lower. This implicates that the explosion violence is moderately
high.
 The minimal ignition energy or MIE is a measure for the ignition sensitivity of a dust-air
mixture for electrical sparks and electrostatic discharges. Dextrose is not very sensitive
for the smaller static discharges. Starch by experience is less sensitive for ignition than
sugar or maltodextrine: when more details are known a final stand point on starch can be
given. Maltodextrine and sugar are very sensitive for even the smaller static discharges.
 So-called corona discharges are not dangerous: the energy content is less than 0.1
mJ.
 So-called brush discharges may be triggered on highly charged insulating
materials such as transportation belts or plastic bags, but are not capable to ignite
these dust-air mixtures.
 So-called spark discharges originate between charged conductors with different
voltage and may ignite the mixtures concerned if the capacitance C in Farad and the
voltage difference V in Volts are large enough, or when the spark energy E to be
calculated with "E = 0.5 CV2" is larger than MIE.
Examples are spark discharges from normal equipment that loose their bonding to
earth, such as a loose bolt, a piece of metal that may fit inside a bag, a filter cage, a
duct part: energy levels of about 20 mJ then still can be expected. This, however,
means that both sugar and maltodextrine can be ignited easily.
Also see table 3.
Table 3. Ignition potential for spark discharges

Charged Capacitance Voltage Potential spark energy
conductor pF kV mJ
Screw 1 5 0.01
flange DN100 10 10 0.5
200 l drum 200 20 40
person 300 10 15
road tanker 1000 15 100
 At very high charge levels (pneumatic transport in plastic ducts, hoses, in coated
metal ducts and internally coated silos, but also at fast emptying of non-conductive
big bags) so-called propagating brush discharges can occur. This kind of
discharge is very intense (1-2 Joule) and will easily ignite the dust air mixtures
concerned here. In case that the silo walls are coated with insulating materials or the
walls themselves are made of insulating material such discharges may be triggered
at tangential inlets or during a collapse of a product bridge in the silo. Wrapping metal
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foils or metal wire around a plastic pipe or imbedded metal spirals connected to earth
do not make much difference.
Such discharges can be prevented as following:
 Conductive coating or,
 A coating thinner than 30 m or,
 A coating with breakdown voltage of less than 4 kV or,
 Wall thickness of plastic or rubber more than 10 mm or,
 Sufficiently conducting rubber or plastic
Ignition by such discharges is positively possible, but taking the appropriate
measures, can easily prevent them.
 So-called cone or Maurer discharges are triggered on or just under the surface of
a dump cone inside (even grounded metal) silos. Conditions for such discharges are:
 Pneumatic transport.
 A specific resistance of the product in the dump cone higher than 1010 Ohm.m.
 A relative humidity less than 65 %.
It is the combination of coarse and fine particles in the product that enhances the
formation of these discharges.
The energy content theoretically may reach to 100 mJ, depending upon the silo
diameter and the particle size of the granules (when all other conditions are fulfilled).
In particular, synthetic organic products easily create such discharges at pneumatic
transport into silos.
The energy content depends upon the median diameter of the product and the silo
diameter (ref. 2):
3.36 1.462
E = 5.22 x D xd (mJ)
In which: E = maximal discharge energy of cone discharge in mJ
D = silo diameter in m
d = median particle size in mm
Looking at the silos with diameter of 2.8 m one can calculate that, in case of sugar
with a median value of 0.3 mm, the expected theoretical energy of the discharge will
be about 30 mJ.
With median diameter of 0.1 mm the energy then still may reach 10 mJ! Both sugar
and Maltodextrine still may be at hazard then.
 Lightning type discharges that sometimes can be seen in large dust clouds during
volcano eruptions and, of course, during thunderstorms have not been detected in
silos. In silos they can be ruled out.
 Electrical sparks are able to ignite all of these products.

 The lowest MIT of 310ºC can be judged as quite low.
 For the estimation of the igniting power of mechanical sparks the MIE based upon
measurement with induction and MIT are key parameters.
o Impact sparks are caused by a single short impact: i.e. by a hammer.
o Grinding sparks are sparks caused by fast moving equipment during short contact.
o Frictional sparks are a kind of grinding sparks that are formed at endured contact.
Table 4 shows the sensitivity for the several mechanical spark types for sugar because that
is the one product involved in intensive mechanical friction by milling.
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Table 4. Ignition sensitivity of maltodextrine for mechanical sparks.

Temperature Hazard Hazard grinding Hazard frictional
°C impact sparks sparks sparks
20 No Yes Yes
50 No Yes Yes
 Maltodextrine shows exothermic behaviour at about 225°C.

 A low conductivity means that static charging can be expected and that also charge on
the product cannot dissipate fast.
 Electrical equipment that is to be used inside equipment (division 1) or near equipment
on locations where dust may accumulate (division 2) must be of class II, group G.
2.4.Conclusions
 The several products are explosive.
 In particular maltodextrine , but also sugar, is very easily ignitable by smaller static
discharges and mechanical sparks.
 Electrostatic charging is expected at pneumatic transport meaning that static hazards
can be expected then.
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3.Risk analysis and assessment

3.1.Introduction
The conditions for explosion are:
 An explosible mixture (a mixture of dust and air above the LEL and below the UEL).
 A sufficiently strong ignition source at the same place and time.
Only ignition sources due to process and equipment will be taken into account.
Ignition sources due to human action such as smoking, hot work activities as
welding etc., will not be taken into account.
3.2.Explosible mixtures
Inside equipment
Explosible mixtures can be expected inside the silos, receiver filters, send vessels,
pneumatic transport lines, the dust extraction filter, the mill and the sieves.
Outside equipment
The building was rather clean such that in most locations explosible mixtures are not
expected to be formed in case of vibrations of wind gusts. Only at failure of equipment
(flexibles, leaks, collapse of equipment) such mixtures can be expected.
Exceptions were:
 Under de silos around the send vessel and sieves.
 Around and under the starch FIBC unloading station.
 On the mezzanine floor of the receiver hoppers prior to mixing.
3.3.Ignition sources
Here the following ignition sources are possible:
 Static discharges.
Also see chapter 2.3. Static charge can be formed due to friction: in particular
pneumatic transport has a very high charging potential.
Sparks may be expected only in the case of non-grounded or bonded equipment, cone
discharges are expected in silos and hoppers and finally propagating brush discharges
due to wrong hoses and coatings.
 Mechanical sparks, frictional heating and glowing particles may be created by fast
moving parts or slower moving parts with high contact pressure. Here only the mill is
such an apparatus.
 Electrical equipment
Non-suitable and/or failing electrical equipment can lead to ignition sources. Inside
process apparatus this, however, is not expected here, because no or only appropriate
equipment should be installed.
 Self-heating, exothermic behaviour
Such phenomena may cause fire, glowing or burning products or even direct ignition of
a dust explosion. However, all processes are under relatively low temperatures and
thus not expected.
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In scheme 1 the several potential ignition sources are given with significance here.
Scheme 1. Ignition sources and effectivity on product.

Ignition sources
Possible Relevant Significant
Hot surface Yes, inside mill Yes, inside mill
due to foreign
objects, mill failure
etc..
Flames, hot gases and hot particles Yes, due to mill Yes, inside mill and downstream of mill
Mechanically generated sparks Yes, due to m ill. Yes, inside mill and downstream of mill
Electrical apparatus Yes Depends upon appropriate selection in
relation to hazardous environment:
must be Class 2 division 1 or 2, Group
G.
Stray electric currents, cathodic protection No
Static electricity:
Corona discharges Yes No, too low energy
Brush discharges Yes No, too low energy
Propagating brush discharges Yes, due to Yes
internally non
conductive hoses
and flexibles.
Also possible when
internal linings in
storage silos are
not appropriate.
Cone discharges Yes, in vessels fed Yes, for sugar and maltodextrine silos,
by pneumatic No, for small receivers because
transport energy too low.
Spark discharges Yes, all locations Yes, but not expected to be very
when metal parts hazardous for dextrose.
are not grounded
and bonded
Lightning Yes, storage silos Yes, when lightning destroys vent
and vent panel on panels.
icing sugar silo.
Radiofrequency electromagnetic waves: 104 Hz No
to 3.1012 Hz
electromagnetic waves: 3.1011 Hz to 3.1015 Hz No
Ionizing radiation No
Ultrasonics No
Adiabatic compression and shock waves No
Exothermic reactions, including self-ignition of No, no exothermic
dusts behaviour at ruling
temperatures
3.4.Confrontation of ignition sources with explosible mixtures

General
When a non-protected and inside-located vessel explodes it will collapse due to
overpressure and the explosion will be vented inside that room:
 A fireball will emerge with a volume of about 10 times the vessel volume.
 By the explosion pressure coming from the vessel the room may also collapse or be
heavily damaged. A fire will follow the explosion.
ISMA N.V.
 Personnel will be at high risk by the fireball, but also missiles such as manhole lids are
a high risk.
 If the room already was dusty, the first explosion will whirl up dust, causing this dust
also to explode: secondary explosions. Such secondary explosions may continue to
propagate as long as dust is available, in this way destroying complete plants.
 Is the exploding vessel connected to other vessels, then the explosion may propagate
via the open connections to the other vessels, involving them also in the explosion.
For vessel located outside the direct effects will be the same (fireball, pressure wave and
missiles) but thanks to the outside location no secondary explosions are expected. Are
vessel connected than of course explosion propagation still is possible via those
connections.
In case silos are installed near to each other it is possible that an exploding silo will entrain
the near silos in the explosion. The silo roof flying off, pulls away all kinds of other
structures such as piping, railing etc. and in this way also may also pull off the roof of
another silos etc..
Because it will happen outside, the effects will be limited to the direct environment near
the silos. However, if silo roofs or other parts as filters may fly off and reach longer
distances, the hazards of these missiles should be considered.
Specific situation
The several process steps will be discussed one after the other.
Truck unloading and silos

The truck is bonded before transport is possible: no sparking possible.
The hose, however, is not internally conductive or antistatic: if propagating brush

discharges are created this will result in ignition followed by fire and explosion in the silo
connected.
In case the coating inside the silos is not appropriate (break down voltage must be less
than 4 kV) these discharges also can be expected.
Finally cone discharges and sparks due to failure of bonding may result in explosion.
The silo will explode. Since the silo heads are outside the damage due to venting should
not be inside the building, but mainly outside: collapse of silo roof, fire ball and flame jets
and possible formation of missiles due to weak filter.
However, a few remarks should be made here:

 The explosion pressure during venting of an explosion here will be directed horizontally,
because of the roof opening up. This means that at explosion of the silo closest to the
building, the flame jet and pressure wave may enter the building via the door and wall
panels and do damage in that part of the building.
 The flexible between the silo and vibrating cone must be as strong as the expected
reduced explosion pressure in the silo might be (see below).
 Also in case of an empty silo being filled with open valve to the sieve, an explosion may
enter the sieve and destroy it, leading to an explosion inside the building.
 The silos for dextrose and maltodextrine have a pressure relieve duct between the silo
top and send vessel. An explosion in the silo may propagate back to the send vessel or
the other way around static discharges (propagating brush discharges) in the flexible
duct parts may cause ignition and result in silo explosion.
ISMA N.V.
Taking into account that the roof fails at 0.4 bar and the vent surface will be about 8 m²,
the expected reduced overpressure in the silo will be about 0.6 bar (calculated by using
VDI3673 version 2001). The vent on the filter will hardly contribute to the venting because
it is blocked by the filter elements. The filter probably still will be blown off by this pressure.
The flexible between silo and vibrating cone must be able to withstand this pressure or
one must assure that the silo never has a lower level than about 0.5 m above this flexible.
These hazards are mainly expected for sugar and maltodextrine due to their low MIE’s.
Lightning also may be a cause, but with lower likeliness, but for all three silos.
The probability of explosion in those silos is rather high, but the effects will be limited to
the outside thanks to the silo tops being located outside, under condition that the flexibles
do not collapse at the expected reduced explosion overpressure and the bottom valve is
closed during filling of an empty silo. Risk to personnel is low.
Sugar milling and storage

The mill is a strong potential ignition source. An ignition therefore has a relatively high
probability. At ignition explosion will most likely take place inside the receiving filter. It is
built to resist 10 bar explosion pressure and will not collapse. However, following may
happen, because no explosion barriers are installed:
 Explosion propagation from the filter back into the mill and into feed to mill, which is an
open system: this will result in a flame jet or fireball coming out of that air inlet point
inside the working space of operators: high risk for personnel and possible
secondary explosions.
 Propagation of pressure to the fan which then may collapse inside the compressor
room. Equipment damage expected.
 Since no detection of any occurrence is present, the rotary valve will continue to feed
product and possibly burning product to the icing sugar silo which then also will be
involved.
Since the volume of the mill is relatively small and duct length also small (5 m) we expect
no extreme pressure piling effects when an explosion starts in the filter and runs back into
the mill. The explosion may accelerate towards the mill, but higher pressures than 10 bar
or even detonations are not expected.
The rotary valves are able to withstand and stop an explosion: its clearance between
vanes and body is not more than 0.2 mm. To stop a sugar explosion the clearance should
be 0.4 mm or less. Of course the rotary valve should be stopped at explosion to prevent
feeding of burning and glowing material into the next process step.
If an explosion occurs inside the icing sugar silo (possible due to static) it will be vented by
the vent panel. Taking into account that the vent panel fails at 0.1 bar and the vent surface
is 0.52 m² the reduced overpressure in the silo will be about 0.69 bar (calculated by using
VDI3673 version 2001). The silo should be able to withstand this pressure, including the
flexible between silo and vibrating cone.
Here also the pressure relieve duct between the silo top and send vessel may act as
ignition source or a way for explosion propagation: An explosion in the silo may propagate
back to the send vessel or the other way around, static discharges (propagating brush
discharges) in the flexible duct parts may cause ignition and result in silo explosion.
ISMA N.V.
The explosion probably will propagate to the little filter, but this filter can withstand 10 bar,
so we expect no collapse of this filter.
If the silo can withstand the expected overpressure of 0.69 bar the effects will be limited to
the outside.
There are parts in this installation with a high risk for personnel and building.
Starch
Since the big bags are emptied very slowly static hazards are not expected here.
Other ignition sources are not expected or it must be due to non-bonded elements. Still
then igntion is not be expected to occur easily.
In case so-called type C bags are used, earthing of the bag is absolutely necessary.
In case that the bags are to be filled in a fast mode, the bags should be of type B. For
more information about big bags see appendix 8.
Low ignition and explosion risk due to handling the big bag.
Citric acid
No hazards expected.
Mixing units
In case of loss of bonding inside a hopper ignition due to static sparks can be expected
for maltodextrose or sugar. Dextrose and starch are less sensitive for ignition and thus no
ignition expected.
Cone discharges will be present but too low in energy due to the small hopper diameter.
At ignition a hopper may collapse inside the building: because the environment can be
rather dusty secondary explosion then cannot be ruled out.
Personnel in the direct environment will then be at risk.
Moderate explosion risk for personnnel and equipment.
Central dedusting unit

In case of loss of bonding inside the filter, ignition due to static sparks can be expected,
leading to explosion and possible collapse of the filter inside the building. Also the
explosion may propagate back into the extracted points under the hoppers for the mixers
at the loss and weight feeders.
Moderate to high explosion risk to personnel and equipment.
3.5. Risk assessment

In generaI the risk in an installation can be defined as the product of probability and
effects.
Here a qualitative assessment is given concerning the explosion probability and the
expected consequences for the several process parts. The risks will be assessed and
listed in relation to the seriousness.
In relation to risk assessment and evaluation we have the following remarks:

 Exact risk estimation is difficult: hardly any quantitative data are available. In practice
therefore a more qualitative approach is feasible.
 What residual risk is acceptable? In many cases it is stated that personnel should not
be at risk.
ISMA N.V.
The risks can be assessed as following:

 Truck loading and silos: basically an acceptable risk because of outside location of silo
vents and personnel normally not at danger.
 Sugar milling:
o Risk of explosion emerging from air inlet point is not acceptable, because
personnel may get hurt and inside damage to installation is possible.
o Icing sugar silo is acceptable risk when its strength is able to withstand the
o Ducting around the pressure resistant equipment is no risk when it is strong enough
to withstand 10 bar.
o Damage to fan of the receiver vessel mainly is an equipment risk.
 Hoppers sugar and maltodextrine of mixing unit and central dedusting filter: not
acceptable risk because personnel may get hurt and inside damage to installation is
possible.
3.6.Conclusions
From the risk assessment the following conclusions can be drawn:
tops.
and sugar in combination with the process.
ISMA N.V.
4.Risk reduction measures

4.1.Introduction
Explosions risks can be reduced in the first place by trying to prevent explosions
(preventive measures) followed by measures to reduce the consequences of a still
occurring explosion in such a way that the residual risk is acceptable (post-operative or
constructive measures).
So two categories of measures should be taken:
 Reduce the risk by preventing the explosion:
 Prevention of explosible mixtures.

 Prevention of ignition sources.
 Reduce the risk by minimising the effects of an explosion or stop the explosion by
constructional measures.
4.2.General: Preventive measures

Generally speaking in all surveyed installations attention should be given to the following
preventive measures:
1 Prevent formation of explosible mixtures inside equipment.

2 Prevent dust leakage from equipment and prevent spills: keep the plant dust free
as much as possible.
3 Prevent so-called trivial ignition sources.
4 Prevent ignition sources inherent to the process.
5 Other measures
Ad 1 Prevent formation of explosible mixtures inside equipment

This of course is hardly possible: dust is transported. Inerting would be a possibility, but
will hardly be feasible in already existing installations. At inerting one should also take the
risk into account of possible asphyxiation.
Ad 2 Prevent dust leakage from equipment and prevent spills: keep the plant dust free
as much as possible.
Dust leakages cause a dusty work environment. Dust deposits promote the spread of fire
while the notorious secondary dust explosions only may occur thanks to dust deposits.
If inevitably dust formation is present, good housekeeping is necessary.
Keeping the installations dust tight and immediately repairing leaks can prevent the spread
of dust.
The cleaning of installations should be done in a safe way: dust explosion proof vacuum
cleaners and brooms.
The use of pressurized air only relocates the dust and creates large dust clouds: cleaning
in such a way is very hazardous and in practice already has lead to many dust explosions.
Ad 3 Prevent so-called trivial ignition sources.
ISMA N.V.
Trivial ignition sources are those like welding, cutting, burning (in general hot work
activities), smoking, wrong use of hand lamps etc.
In general such ignition sources are a direct consequence of wrong human behaviour. By
organisational measures (hot work permits, smoking prohibition, safety training etc.) such
ignition sources can be prevented.
Ad 4 Prevent ignition sources inherent to the process.

Prevention of such ignition sources is possible by:
 Correct choice of electrical equipment and correct maintenance of electrical

installations in conformation with the NEC.
 Electrostatic grounding and bonding of all conductors (resistance to earth < 1 MOhm)
and regular checking the earth connections.
 Use conductive materials as much as possible: for instance when flexible ducts are
needed only use inside conductive ducts with a surface resistance of 108 Ohms or less
in combination with bonding the imbedded metal spiral(s) on both ends of the duct.
Also antistatic filter media are recommended.
 Prevent mechanical sparks and friction.
 Last but not least the installation should be operated and maintained in the right and
safe way.
Ad 5 Other measures
If still ignition sources can be formed, than they should be located and eliminated before
they become hazardous: detection of ignition sources by infra red with automatic
extinguishing with a water mist on cool locations or steam on hotter locations is an
example. This can be referred to as ignition source detection (ISD) with or without direct
extinguishment.
If in spite of preventive measures taken, still a realistic probability of explosion exists, then
additional measures are to be taken to limit the consequences of that explosion:
constructional measures.
4.3.General: Explosion effect reducing or post-operative measures

With these measures the consequences of an explosion, which starts in a part of the
equipment, can be limited, thereby preventing collapse of the apparatus (secondary room
explosions, flame jets etc.) and propagation of the explosion towards connected process
parts (flame jet ignition).
Generally the following measures should be taken:
 Physically separate hazardous equipment from another in order to limit the explosion
to the apparatus concerned. This can be referred to as compartimentation and can be
done by smart equipment design or by installing explosion barriers as for instance a
rotary valve, explosion diverter or a fast closing explosion proof valve.
 Automatically stop of all equipment to prevent the transport of fire, sparks and
smouldering product as much as possible.
 Constructive measures to limit the explosion effects as much as possible:
 Equipment separation and isolation always in combination with either,
 Explosion pressure (shock) resistant construction or,
 Explosion venting or,
 Explosion suppression or,
 Combinations of several.
ISMA N.V.
Explosion (shock) resistant equipment should be able to resist the expected explosion
pressures without collapse.
With explosion venting the explosion is vented from the equipment resulting in a reduced
explosion pressure inside that protected equipment. The explosion of course should be
vented into a safe direction (outside and via a duct which should be as short as possible).
An alternative is a vent device with flame arresting properties resulting in flameless
venting and hardly any pressure waves.
Of course the equipment should resist to the reduced explosion pressure and the
connections to the equipment also should be automatically closed to prevent propagation
to connected equipment.
With explosion suppression the explosion is detected in its “birth stage" and is
extinguished by fast injection of extinguishing powder. The resulting event results in hardly
any flames and a low reduced explosion pressure. Explosion suppression also is applied
as explosion barriers in ducts, for instance at the inlet of a filter.
Of course the equipment should resist to the reduced explosion pressure and the
connections to the equipment also should be automatically closed to prevent propagation
to connected equipment.
4.4.Risk reducing measures for the specific installation

From the risk assessment it turned out that explosion risks locally still are present. In
order to limit the risks several measures are recommended:
For all installations in general:

 Prevent dust formation in the building by eliminating the several air exhausts from the
clean sides of the filters: connect them to a central dedusting filter or lead them to the
outside.
 Continue and locally improve the housekeeping of the installations.
 Increase awareness of personnel for the hazards of dust explosion by training. This
automatically will encourage them to keep the installation clean.
 Check the electrical equipment on specification conform the NEC.
 Guarantee grounding and bonding of all metal parts and regular check them by
measurement.
 Use antistatic filter elements.
 Continue the high level of maintenance of the installation.
Truck unloading and silos

 Only either use completely conductive hoses or rubber hoses made out of internally
conductive material. Surface resistance less than 10 8 Ohm and bonding of imbedded
metal reinforcement wires on both sides of the hose. Also install them in the flexible
connections in the pressure relief lines and in the flexes between silos and sieves.
 Make the silo deck a no go area.
 To prevent ingress of explosion via horizontal venting into the entrance door to the silo
deck, this door should shut in such a way that it is pushed to the wall frame (as it in fact
is) and can withstand at least 0.5 bar.
 Check the strength of the flexible between the silos and the vibrating cones: they must
resist to the expected reduced explosion overpressure of about 0.6 bar.
 Ensure that the bottom valve of a silo is closed during filling, or ensure a minimum
ISMA N.V.
 The pressure relieve lines may be a way for propagating a dust explosion: by limiting
the diameter to less than 1’’ explosion propagation is stopped.
 Install a lightning protection device on the building if not yet there.
Sugar milling installation

 Only use either completely conductive hoses or rubber hoses etc.. Also think of the
flexibles in the pressure relief line and flexes between the silo and sieve.
 Protect the air inlet against explosion propagation. This can be done in several ways:
o Install an explosion barrier between the mill and the air inlet based upon explosion
suppression. Detection in filter and mill is then needed. In this way the flames are
eliminated but the pressure not. Or
Alternatively, make the air inlet casing 10 bar strong and connect it with a duct for
fresh air inlet. In this duct a so-called explosion check valve can be installed which
closes automatically at explosion and thus preventing the flame to enter the area. A
renowned valve type (certified and already in use for tenths of years in industry) is
the VENTEX-ESI valve. In this way both flames and pressure are stopped to enter
the room. The feed screws are always filled with product and will act as chokes to
stop the explosion running back to the feed vessels. Or
Alternatively, install an explosion barrier (slide valve) between the mill and the filter
with detection. Then also still an explosion barrier (suppression) is needed on the
air inlet to stop the flames, but the 10 bar strength is not necessary anymore: 1 bar
will be sufficient.
o Install such a VENTEX-ESI valve also in the outlet of the mill filter to protect the fan
and ducting from overpressure.
o Use the activation signal of the check valves to stop the installation (at least the
rotary valves) and in such a way prevent further propagation.
o Ask for a written statement that the explosion containing equipment is 10 bar
strong, including all ducting involved.
o Check the pressure resistance (should be able to resist 0.69 bar) of the icing sugar
silo, and if necessary reinforce. Ask for a written statement. Also the flexibles
between vibrating cone and silo and vent duct must be able to withstand this
pressure.
o The pressure relieve line may be a way for propagating a dust explosion: by limiting
the diameter to less than 1’’ explosion propagation is stopped.
Mixing units
 Install flameless venting devices on on the maltodextrine and sugar receivers. A vent
area of 0.05 m² is necessary to keep the pressure down to 0.2 bar.
 Install venting on the central dedusting unit in combination with an explosion barrier in
the form of an explosion diverter in the inlet duct to prevent explosion propagation to
the connected items. Also see figure 2.
ISMA N.V.
Explosion
Diverter
Ventex valve
Vent Panel
Figure 2: Explosion venting of a filter.
ISMA N.V.
5.Conclusions and recommendations

5.1.Conclusions
From the dust explosion risk analysis for this plant the following conclusions can be
derived:
tops.
and sugar in combination with the process.
5.2.Recommendations
In order to reduce the explosion risks to acceptable levels, meaning that personnel will not
be in risk during normal operation, the following measures are recommended:
 Measures with highest priority:
o General preventive measures: good housekeeping, grounding and bonding,
antistatic filter elements, suitable electrical equipment, training personnel.
o Prevention of internal non-conductive hoses and flexibles in the truck unloading,
storage silos and the sugar milling system, plus silo. Ask for a written statement
about the internal conductivity of the hoses and flexibles
o Make the silo deck a no go area and prevent ingress of explosion via the door to
the silo deck.
o Ensure that the flexibles between silos and their vibrating cones can withstand the
o Protect the air inlet of the sugar mill against explosion propagation by reinforcement
and explosion barriers.
o Limit the diameter of the pressure relief lines on the silos to less than 1’’, in this way
stopping potential explosion propagation.
o Ask for a written statement that the explosion containing equipment of the sugar
milling installation is 10 bar strong, including all ducting involved.
o Check the pressure resistance of the icing sugar silo including all appendages on it,
and, if necessary, reinforce. Ask for a written statement.
o Install flameless venting devices on the maltodextrine and sugar receivers.
o Protect the central dedusting unit by explosion venting in combination with an
explosion barrier in the inlet duct.
o Use the activation signal of the check valves to stop the installation to prevent
explosion propagation.
 High priority.
o Install an explosion check valve in the outlet of the mill filter to protect the fan and
ducting from overpressure.
o Install a lightning protection device on the building if not yet there.
ISMA N.V.
6.References
1 BIA-Report 12/97
Brenn- und Explosionskenngrössen von Stäuben
Berufsgenossenschaftliches Institut für Arbeitssicherheit
ISBN3-88383-468-8
2 M. Glor et al.
Sicheres Befüllen von Silos und Behältern unter Berücksichtigung von Schüttke-
gelentladungen.
VDI-Berichte Nr.1272, Seite 87-110, 1996
ISMA N.V.
7.Appendix 1: Static electricity

Types of discharges
In fig. 7.1 the different discharge types are shown schematically.
The following discharge types are important:
Glow coronas
This is a one-electrode discharge. They may be formed between a highly charged pointed
object (diameter < 5 mm) and the atmosphere or a pointed grounded conductor inserted
into a region of high potential, or said in another way, inside a strong electrostatic field (for
instance inside a just filled silo).
In this case no plasma channels are produced, only a bluish haze where the ionisation
takes place. These discharges are accompanied by hissing and humming sounds with
ozone like smells.
Brush discharges
This also normally is a more or less one-electrode discharge. Brush discharges are
produced between a highly charged blunt conductive electrodes (> 10 mm diameter) and
the atmosphere or a blunt pointed grounded conductor inserted into a region of high
potential, for instance caused by a charged object near by. These discharges are
characterized by faint plasma channels starting at the conductor and ending into the
atmosphere or the charged non-conductor as a bluish haze.
On charged liquids such brush discharges are incendive at a voltage on the liquid surface
of about 48 kV.
Spark discharges
Spark discharges are real two electrode discharges and consist of a plasma channel
between the two electrodes. They occur at a field strength of 500-3000 kV/m or a potential
difference of at least 100-350 V.
Propagating brush discharges

Propagating brush discharges can be generated on the surface of polarised, insulating
sheets when the surface charge densities are very high. When a grounded object
approaches the surface, a very intense discharge may occur. If the difference in potential
between the two surfaces is higher than the breakdown voltage of the sheet, breakdown
will occur through that sheet. This also will be accompanied by such a propagating brush
discharge.
Propagating brush discharges may also be formed on highly charged foils, which are
backed by a grounded conductor. Due to induction a charge will be attracted via the earth
connection to the grounded conductor with a sign opposite to the charge on the foil. This
will also result in a polarised sheet.
Examples are plastic silos, filters and cyclones or such items made out of metal but lined
inside, lined ducts for pneumatic transport, insulating plastic hoses or ducts that become
conductive at the outside thanks to grounding wires or by moisture due to rain or by
conductive fouling and big bags during fast emptying.
ISMA N.V.
Highly charged Highly charged object

Spark non-conductor
discharge
Brush Corona
discharge discharge
Charged
conductor
Grounded conductor
++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Highly charged
+
------------------- foil
--- - - - - Propagating brush
discharge
Bulk cone
discharge
Lightning
discharge
Fig. 7.1. The several types of discharges.
Bulk surface discharges or cone discharges

Bulk surface discharges, cone discharges occur on the surface of highly charged heaps of
bulk solids during inflow of highly charged granules, as for instance polyethylene pellets.
These discharges may occur in vessels with diameter larger than 1 m, fed by a highly
charged mixture of granules and powder. Due to compaction of the charge on the dump
cone, very high fields are produced, causing ionisation of the air at the surface of the cone
and the formation of highly conductive, hot ionisation channels propagating from the
vessel wall to the centre of the cone.
These discharges are so special because under certain conditions, in spite of grounding
all conductive objects, these sometimes-dangerous discharges still may occur.
Lightning-like discharges
Such discharges have not been produced in any industrial process or in experiments with
charged dust clouds of up to 60 m 3 in volume. In nature the minimum dimensions of a
charged cloud to produce lightning is of some tens to hundreds of meters. It can be
ISMA N.V.
documented experimentally that such discharges are impossible in equipment with diame-
ters fewer than 3 m.
In real life such discharges of course are very likely to occur.
A special category of static is the phenomenon of natural lightning, but this will be dealt
with in another chapter.
Energy content and hazards

The hazard of the different electrostatic discharges for gas and dust-air mixtures is given
in table 7.1.
It will be clear that for an ignition, the energy level of the discharge must be higher than
the minimum ignition energy of the combustible/air mixture concerned.
For humans the direct consequences are limited in most cases. However, at a value of 10
mJ involuntary muscles twitch can be expected. At values higher than 1000 mJ a
discharge may result in unconsciousness. The indirect consequences, however, could be
rather dangerous. By the shock reaction one may fall from a ladder, drop objects, or
worse, spill dangerous liquids or even end up with his hand in machines with moving parts.
The human also may become an ignition source. The maximum discharge energy he may
create is about 50 mJ. In particular for vapour and gas/air mixtures humans are known to
be notorious moving ignition sources.
Table 7.1. The energy content of the several electrostatic discharges and their potential
for ignition for explosible vapour/gas- and dust-air mixtures.
Discharge type Energy content Hazardous for Hazardous for
mJ most vapour/gas- dust-air mixtures?
air mixtures?
Spark < 10.000 ++ +
Corona < 0.1 - -
Brush < 3-4 + ?
Propagating brush < 3.000 ++ ++
Cone < 10-25 ++ +
In table 7.2 examples of potential sparks energies are given.
Table 7.2. Spark energies from normal objects

Charged Capacitance Voltage Potential spark energy
conductor PF kV mJ
Screw 1 5 0.01
flange DN100 10 10 0.5
200 l drum 200 20 40
person 300 10 15
road tanker 1000 15 100
ISMA N.V.
8.APPENIX 2: Information about big bags

Using FIBC´s might be an electrostatic ignition risk. Static electricity and their discharges
may hinder or even harm personnel or cause a fire or explosion in the plant.
By choosing the proper type of big bag and right safety measures these risks can be
limited.
Concerning the hazard of electrostatics four types of FIBC exist at this moment:
Type A: No special measures are taken against electrostatic hazards. Not

suitable for use with any potential explosive material.
Type B: Breakdown voltage of inside bag wall is less than 4 kV, thereby preven-
ting propagating brush discharges.
Experience has shown that standard FIBC's constructed by using
woven polypropylene fabrics, usually meet type B requirements,
provided any internal polyethylene coating is thinner than 20-30 μm
and provided that no liner is used in combination with the FIBC.
Type C: Resistance to earth of each point of the bag is less than 10 8 Ohms
including the hoist straps. Very often such bags consist of connected
conductive threads in the woven structure that form a Faraday cage,
thereby shielding the electrostatic field.
Earthing is necessary and, if forgotten, high hazards are to be
expected, because then an isolated conductor is charged.
Type D: FIBC's containing interwoven conductive threads, but which are not
connected to each other and thus form little isolated conductors, that
eliminate charge by dissipating it through ionisation to the air (corona
discharges).
These bags do not have to be grounded.
In table 8.1 guidelines are given, when to use which type of FIBC in order to handle dusts
safely.
Table 8.1. Rules when to use which FIBC (MIE is the minimum ignition energy)
Bulk product (median particle size < 0.1 mm) Non- Dust Gas and vapour
hazardous explosion explosion
area hazards hazards
MIE > 10 J A B C
MIE> 3 mJ B B C
1 mJ < MIE < 3 mJ C C C
MIE < 1 mJ C and inert C and inert C and inert
3 mJ< MIE < 10 J and specific bulk resistance B B C or D

< 1011 Ohm.m
1 mJ < MIE < 3 mJ and specific bulk C or D C or D C or D

resistance < 1011 Ohm.m
ISMA N.V.
For explosible powders in general type B is necessary. Only if the MIE is less than 1-3
mJ, type C or D (depending upon bulk resistivity) should be used. Also if gases or vapours
are present type C is to be used.
From table 8.1 it can be derived that the conductive type C can be used in all situations,
provided that the bag is earthed.
ISMA N.V.

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Risk Analysis Report ISMA Erlanger

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International Safety & Risk Management Group

PERFETTI VAN MELLE

DUST EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT

copyright 2003 ISMA N.V.

Title : Dust explosion risk analysis of powder installations in Erlangen,

Assignor : PERFETTI VAN MELLE

Contact : Mr. K. van Belois and Mr. B. MacGillivray.

Date : July 2003

Author : G.F.M. van Laar

 Measures with highest priority:

7. APPENDIX 1: STATIC ELECTRICITY ................................................................. 28

8. APPENIX 2: INFORMATION ABOUT BIG BAGS ................................................ 31

1.5.Build-up of this report

Figure 1. Steps in a risk analysis conforming to EN 1050.

2.Inventory of process and product

Flow sheets and equipment drawings:

The silo dimensions are as following:

The volume is 65.9 m³ and the height/diameter ratio is 4.13.

The volume is 10 m³ and the height/diameter ratio is 2.42.

The two rotary airlocks have the following features:

 Under the starch big bag hopper.

2.2.Dust explosion characteristics of powders concerned

Other products in smaller quantities are:

2.2.2.Dust explosion characteristics

Lower explosion limit LEL g/m3

BG 2 Short ignition and quick extinguishing

Table 2: Dust explosion data of concerned products

Table 2. Influence of temperature on MIE

Table 3. Ignition potential for spark discharges

 Electrical sparks are able to ignite all of these products.

Table 4. Ignition sensitivity of maltodextrine for mechanical sparks.

 Maltodextrine shows exothermic behaviour at about 225°C.

3.Risk analysis and assessment

Scheme 1. Ignition sources and effectivity on product.

3.4.Confrontation of ignition sources with explosible mixtures

Truck unloading and silos

The hose, however, is not internally conductive or antistatic: if propagating brush

However, a few remarks should be made here:

Sugar milling and storage

Central dedusting unit

3.5. Risk assessment

In relation to risk assessment and evaluation we have the following remarks:

The risks can be assessed as following:

4.Risk reduction measures

So two categories of measures should be taken:

 Reduce the risk by preventing the explosion:

 Prevention of explosible mixtures.

4.2.General: Preventive measures

1 Prevent formation of explosible mixtures inside equipment.

Ad 1 Prevent formation of explosible mixtures inside equipment

Ad 3 Prevent so-called trivial ignition sources.

Ad 4 Prevent ignition sources inherent to the process.

 Correct choice of electrical equipment and correct maintenance of electrical

4.3.General: Explosion effect reducing or post-operative measures

4.4.Risk reducing measures for the specific installation

For all installations in general:

Truck unloading and silos

Sugar milling installation

Figure 2: Explosion venting of a filter.

5.Conclusions and recommendations

7.Appendix 1: Static electricity

Propagating brush discharges

Highly charged Highly charged object