oe ppELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE OF PAKISTAN KARACHI BENCH KARACHI Present: DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, A.M, MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, J.M. ITA No.228/KB/2023 (Tax Year 2017) u/s.161(1) M/s. Advance Seed Corporation, Tando Allayar... Versus The Commissioner-IR, RTO, Hyderabad. Represented by Ir. Kamran Rizvi, Advocate Appellant by 1. Kamran, D.R. Respondent by Date of hearing: 27-04-2023 Date of order: 31-05-2023 ORDER ‘DR: TAUQEER IRTIZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant/taxpayer against the impugned order No.297 “dated 27.07.2022 passed by the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals), {yderabad, on the grounds as set-forth in the memo of appeal. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an AOP. Being a prescribed agent it was liable to withhold tax on payments as required by law. The officer initiated audit of withholding taxes by issuing a notice u/s 161(1A) followed by reminders but no compliance was made by the appellant. The proceedings so initiated culminated in charging tax and default surcharge by passing an order u/s.161/205 of the I.T. Ord., 2001 by the officer concerned.2 peing agorieved with the order of the ACIR/DCIR, the taxpayer learned Commissioner (Appeals), 022 5 preferred Hyderabad, who vide confirmed the order passed by the ACIR/DCIR, Still dissatisfied, the appeal before the impugned order No.297 dated 27, taxpayer has preferred second appeal before this forum against the order arned Commissioner-IR (Appeals), Hyderabad. passed by the le 4. On hearing from time to time, Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advocate, attended on behalf of the appellant/taxpayer whereas Mr. Kamran, learned D.R, represented the respondent/department and case was discussed with them in detail in the light of arguments forwarded by both the rival parties, the orders of both below authorities, record available to the court, relevant provisions of law and the case laws which came under discussion. The learned A.R. argued that the learned CIR (A) has rejected the peal both on merit and also being barred by time. The ing it as 5. appellant's ap| CIR(A) was also not justified to reject the appellant's appeal treati time barred as the appellant had filed appeal on the basis of true copy of order u/s 161 obtained from the department and appeal was filed within 25 days after the said true copy was obtained. The order u/s 161 was passed ex-parte as NO notice was received by the appellant, neither the appellant was in knowledge of passing of such an order. The impugned order may have been issued through IRIS but the appellant being an wn of interior Sindh did not have i te ate person living in a remote tor .access to the computer or internet. However when the recovery f the appellant was approached, “proceedings were initiated and the bank of the appellant came to know about an order passed and the huge ; ‘outstanding tax demand against him, At that time he contracted the current AR who applied for a true copy of the order u/s 161 which was issued to him on 12-06-2022 and the appeal against the order was filed within 25 days on 07-07-2022 as admitted by the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals) in his impugned order. Therefore, he continued, that the appeal ref was very much in time but the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals) has wrongly held that appeal is time barred.3 6. _The contention of the appellant was examined and the record wa: " — examined minutely. Its is noted that CIR(A) in his order has first observed mv that the appeal is barred by time but at the end he rejected F it on mer Facts and circumstances evident from record show ne that the appellant was not aware of the proceedings or order U/S 161 being passed by the Proceedings were conducted in a completely one sided manner. The AR has further informed this Court that on obtaining the copies of TCS receipts from the Income Tax Office it was revealed that address given on them Was wrong as it only mentioned Kamal Khan Market Tando Soomro road but no name of city or town was mentioned in the address, The appellant's business is in Tando Allah Yar while the officer who issued the notices was in Hyderabad. In this back drop the contention of AR carries weight that the order u/s 161 was only issued on IRIS and was not served properly upon the appellant and the appellant was not aware of the order. As the -=~-€ppellant is doing his business in Tando Allah Yar which is a remote and = backward town of interior Sindh, so it is not justified to expect him to be computer literate and internet savy. A minute examination of record also revealed that appeal before CIR(A) was filed on the basis of true copy of : order u/s 161 which is duly stamped, dated and signed. Hence we fail to understand that why the CIR(A) treated the appeal being barred by time O< ‘as he did not dilate upon this issue and gave no reasons that why in the presence of a true copy, he treated the appeal as barred by time limitation, The CIR(A) has not even mentioned any fault in the true copy ‘on the basis of which it could be rejected. However, while observing that appeal is time barred he also rejected it on merit. This is enough evidence that by rejecting the appeal on merit the CIR(A) actually ignored the aspect that appeal was time barred and decided the same on merit. We are of the opinion that in any case the appellant had sufficient and plausible reason for delay in filing of appeal which was successfully covered when he filed the appeal on true copy of the order. So prima facie4 the frst appeal by the appellant does not seem to be barred by time. But as the CIR(A) has himself ign 2 limita Rowninakeieamne 7. While discussing the merit of the case, the A.R. contended that the inpwane ore inde Seton 161 has been passed without appreciating ie appellant and in total disregard of the relevant provisions of law. The A.R. explained that the appellant was not a prescribed person liable to withhold tax for the charge year as its turnover was less than the threshold of prescribed limit of Rs.50 (M) for the preceding three years. In order to support his contention, the A.R. submitted copies of Income Tax Returns of the appellant for previous three years. The A.R. further contented that the officer failed to appreciate the proper application of section 161 of the Ordinance which could not be invoked without discharge of initial burden, which was on the department, to identify the failure of the appellant to withhold taxes on the alleged transactions. He contended that tax liability cannot be created on consolidated figures and on the basis of estimates and assumptions. The burden was on the officer to identify the “recipients”, the “nature of payment” made and time of payment before passing an adverse order which was not done in the instant case. On the contrary, instead of establishing the nature of payment, the recipient parties and the amount Zrinvolvéd In each payment made along with the amount of tax defaulted, the officer took the whole amounts in direct and indirect expenses and subjected them to tax in an arbitrary and illegal fashion. For invocation of. the provision of section 161 of the Ordinance it was the legal obligation of = officer to establish failure of deduction of withholding taxes on the © gleged transactions. Inthe instant case this burden was not discharged by the Officer, hence, his order has no legal sanctity. In support of his cases of Commissioner Inland Revenue, arguments he relied on the LTU vs. MCB Bank Limited (2024 SCMR 1325), 2015 PTD Narowal vs. CIR, Sialkot (2018 PTD ellate Zone - I, (Trib.) 654, Nawaz Steel Furnace, (Trib.) 500) and contended that the aforementioned cases of App Tribunal are on all fours viz a viz the facts of the instant case. As per the A\R., in both the cases of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue quoted above it was held that the law does not allow creation of a liability invacuum. Such a blind levy is not the intent of the law makers, Not only th Ne ne parties to whom payments on account of goods and services were mad “were made must be ascertained by the Inland Revenue Officer, but also the payments made to them and the time of payment must be brought on record before passing an order under section 161/205 of the Ordinance and. all information collected by the officer must be confronted to the ‘taxpayer in default’ in order to satisfy the requirement of sub section (1A) of section 161 of the Ordinance. It was also held that allegation of non-deduction of tax under the provisions of the Ordinance on the consolidated figures for the whole year without identifying parties and payment, time of payment and amount of tax was illegal and not is accordance with law. The case laws cited above make it abundantly clear that initial burden is on the department to prove that the taxpayer failed to withhold tax on a transaction. This burden could only be discharged if the department identifies parties head wise/category wise, time of payment and the amount of tax involved. In the instant case, the action of the officer is a gross misapplication of section 161 of the Ordinance that only prompts tax =< @uthorities to launch fishing expeditions and roving inquiries which is not Simaissible under the law. The impugned order passed u/s 161 was sly one sided as the appellant did not receive any notice from the ‘department. The AR added that the impugned order of the department is an utter violation of Article-119 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat which makes it thandatory for the department to bring the evidence on record to substantiate its allegation against the appellant which the department totally failed to do. He concluded that the action taken by the officer to levy tax for default of withholding taxes was entirely a work of his wild imagination as he was not in possession of any evidence to establish that appellant was involved in default of withholding tax. 8 On the other hand, the learned D.R. supported the order of the officer as well as of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) who upheld the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner in toto. However it is observed that the officer’s order and DR’s arguments were based on the premise that the onus to produce party wise payment evidences rested upon the appellant being a withholding agent and in absence of party wisedetails the officer was unable to identify the persons to whom nays ayments were made. 9, We have heard both the parties in detail. The contentions of both the rival parties were given a keen and dispassionate consideration. The contention of AR was found to carry a lot of force, It is correct that the oa has completely over looked this aspect that whether the appellant was liable to withhold tax or not and charged tax for default of withholding tax without bringing on record any evidence to substantiate his action. From a minute examination of the impugned order we have observed that rather than pointing out any incidence of failure of the appellant to deduct tax on the expenses, the officer has charged tax at consolidated figures applying a flat rate and shifted the entire burden to the appellant to contradict the same. No head of expense or nature of expense was pointed out. No payment was identified wherein the default of tax was committed. No vendors were pointed out from whom the tax should have been charged. The rates of tax applied are also not according to different rates prescribed by law. Furthermore, neither monthly breakup of deductions nor the amounts actually deducted and the difference thereof iygs.confronted to the appellant which is against the ratio settled by the HoRorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of MCB relied upon by “AR which’ shall be discussed later in this order. Therefore, the manner in Wihich the alleged tax in default has been worked out is contrary to the very provisions of section 161 of the Ordinance. 40. It has been time and again reiterated by this Tribunal in numerous decisions that before holding a taxpayer as in default of not withholding tax, identification of respective payment/ transaction and the payee is sin- qua-non. In this connection the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 161 of the Ordinance are relevant to this discussion, which are reproduced below for ready reference :~ “(1) Where a person— (a)fails to collect tax as required under XII or deduct tax from a payment as r Part or Chapter XII or as required unt Ordinance; or Division II of this Part or Chapter required under Division III of this \der section 50 of the repealedJo —_—7 (b)having collected tax under Division I of this Part or Chapt ter XI of deducted tax under Division III of this Part or Chapter XII fails t Is to pay aes Personally liable to pay the amount of tax to the who maj > Rae 'y pass an order to that effect and proceed to (2) Alas tered) liable for an amount of tax under sub-section (1) ae ee collect or deduct the tax shall be entitled to le person fr ee per from whom the tax should have been 11. It is apparent from the above provisions that the tax default has to be worked out with reference to a specific payment from which tax was required to be deducted/charged but was not deducted/charged or having been deducted, was not deposited in the govt. treasury. The specific words used on purpose in the provision are ‘a payment’ which clarify that each payment has to be identified. And when the payment is identified, the amount of defaulted tax and recipient of payment will be inevitably 1 If this identification is not done for the purpose of working out ‘default, the withholder would not be able to recover such tax levant withholdee which would result in rendering the provision from the'rel of sub-section (2) above redundant. It is a settled law that one provision of law. cannot be interpreted or applied in such a manner as to render “anbther provision in the same statute redundant. If the department fails to SS85itiy the parties from whom the tax was to be charged and recovers the said tax from the payer (as in the instant case), then the vested right of the seller to recover the tax from the parties to whom the tax belongs as enshrined in sub-section (2) of Section 161 is infringed or taken away from the payer, thus it makes the provision of sub-section (2) redundant, which is against the principles of law and interpretation thereof and purpose of legislature. 12. The Appellate Tribunal in a case reported as 2015 PTD 1572 has observed and we quote —i El ~The Appellate Tribunal in its order passed in ITA No.1104 dated 02-03-2012 held as under — LLO4/IB/2010 *we have given due consideration to the rival arguments and also gone through the relevant record available on file. We have noted that the Taxation Officer passed the Order u/s.161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without doing any homework ie. scrutiny of the withholding statements filed by the respondent company electronically, The method of levy of tax as adopted by the Taxation Officer is appears to be highly unprofessional and illogical because the tax has been charged in a sweeping manner without making allowance for exempt, BTL amounts etc, etc. which must have been part of the overall expenses. It is by now a fairly well settled legal proposition that a subject can be burdened with the levy of tax only in accordance with law. Had the Taxation Officer examined the withholding tax statements alongwith audited statements of account, he could have identified the amounts of default, if any, and confront the same to the respondent company for explanation/reply. Thereafter a judicious order could have been passed after considering the taxpayer's explanation. Since this exercise was not undertaken by the Taxation Officer while passing the Order u/s.161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the said Order was not sustainable and was rightly annulled by the CIR (Appeals). We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the order of the learned CIR (Appeals) and uphold the same.” In another case reported as (2012) 105 TAX 489 (Trib) = 2012 (Trib) 122, the Tribunal, while explaining the procedure to be followed) for involving the provisions of section 161 held that no “transaction can be held to have escaped deduction under section 161, Unless it is established that: (i) taxpayer Is withholding agent, (li) a VON particular transaction is liable to deduction/withholding and (ji) that a specified tax of a specific person was to be withheld, who could take credit “6f the tax recoverable under Section 161. These findings are fortified by subsections (1B) and (2) of Section 161. Under the subsection(1B) if the amount of tax required to be deducted, is paid meanwhile by the person, who's tax was to be deducted then the taxpayer proceeded under section 461 shall pay only default surcharge of the period, when he failed to deduct tax till it was paid by that person. Subsection (2) declares that a person held personally liable under section 161(1) shall be entitled to recover the tax from the person from whom the tax should have been collected or deducted. These provisions shall become redundant, if a person is held personally liable without identifying the person who's tax was not collected or deducted and without identifying the amount of such 13. tax.14, The same view was expressed by the Tribunal in the judgement reported as [(2004) 89 TAX (Trib.) 430] with reference to the provisions of 52/ 86 of the late Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 which are pari materia with the provisions of section 161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Tribunal held as under:— “From the perusal of the above provisions of section 50(4), it is obvious that the tax is liable to be deducted on payments being made by a “payer” to a “recipient” on account of supply of goods or for services rendered to or on the execution of a contract. In the case before us, the assessment order reveals that the assessing officer, falled to point out or specify the Payments made by the assessee's company being a payer to person being “a recipient which were liable to deduction of tax u/s.52 on the amount of =pbchases worked out by him on the basis of assumption s and guess Work. Tt is important to point out here that the provisions of section 52 ate different from the provisions of section 62 under which the assessing Officer required to determine the income and to charge tax thereon. In the case of section 52, the assessee being a “payer” has been made liable for deduction of tax on behalf of the department not being his liability. He is required to perform the function of a department as a withholding = agent for which he is not rewarded or compensated in any manner. The assessee as a 'payer’ has to perform extra work for deduction of tax which is to be deposited in the treasury following with the submission of monthly as well as annual statements. As discussed above, the tax u/s.50(4) is to be deducted by a withholding agent at the time of making any payment ‘on account of supply of goods, service rendered to or execution of contracts. In the case before us, the assessing officer failed to point out any such payment liable to deduction of tax u/s.50(4) of the Ordinance. Under the circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere on behalf of the revenue.” 15. In a recent land mark judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of MCB Bank Ltd. reported as 2021 SCMR 1325 = 2021 PTD 1367 (S.C. Pak) referring to the case law re: Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. reported as 2002 PTD 1 (S.C. Pak.), has given the following findings : “11. Bilz is sometimes taken (and the department certainly so acts) as an authonty for a broad and general proposition, namely, that since the taxpayer especially has knowledge of the person to whom payments are being made, al that the tax authorities have ae fo pues Cae 1161 is to identity the payments, whether singly or in lumy je. part of a broader class or category of such payments). a taxpayer entirely to show whether the required deductions were and if he fails to do so then section 161 comes into operation. This, in our view, is a complete misunderstanding of the law, and misreading of Bilz. it sized It is therefore most unfortunate that the tax authorities have se certain observations made in Bilz and, taking them out of context, a misusing a leave refusir arder of this Court as a too! and instrument harass taxpayers. This so-called ‘understanding’ and application10 decision must be strongly deprecated. It m Bilz is not, and cannot be used as, a ae a Understood that launch fishing expeditions and roving inquires. 1t canoes csamies to eat or oe a a of show cause Tie ee ee jeness and breathtaking generality. And it liberate burden unde s 16, fom the very inception, wtoly sea see wpayer by the expealent of simply identifying ane or more payinents we a class or category of payments. OMENS Cr, on ma ee iad Fel becomes applicable not simply because f a transaction or event happens) but rather failure to either collect tax ire that the fale or deduct it. It is the failure that is the It is in our view a gross misreading of it to conclude that for the section jpply all that the Commissioner has to do is point to a payment, and that Sufficient to cast the burden wholly and solely on the taxpayer to show that there was no failure. There must, at least inially, be some reason or ‘information available with the Commissioner for him to conclude that there was, or could have been, a failure to deduct. That reason or information must satisfy the test of objectiveness, /.e., must be such as would satisty a reasonable person looking at the relevant facts and information in an objective manner.” 16, In the light of above the above quoted case laws of Honourable Supreme Court and Appellate Tribunal -IR, the contention of AR was given further consideration and the order of the assessing officer u/s 161 is found to be in grave contravention of the findings and directions embodied in the orders of higher appellate authorities quoted above. The contention rect that rather than establishing the incidence of failure of the of AR is col the officer to deduct/collect taxes on the payments made, charged tax on consolidated figures at flat rate and shifted the burden to the appellant to contradict the same. No evidence whatsoever of default of withholding taxes was brought on record or confronted to the appellant. Furthermore, neither monthly breakup of payments made nor of collectible/deductible amount was confronted to the appellant which is st the ratio settled by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in MCB case cited above. The action taken by the officer was in shear ior courts in their judgments appellant entire agains the of contravention of the ratio settled by the superi quoted above. 17. Guidance was also sought from other case laws, some of which are mentioned below:2015 PTD In this case the Honourable Appellate Tribunal-IR Observeg that reading of Ss.161, 177, 120 & 122C of the IT. Ord., 2001 oe 'Y revealeg OF S.161 of the LT. Ord., 2001 without audit under Section 177 of the LT. Org, 2001 that these sections were interconnected. Direct invoking constituted fishing and roving inquiry and had the effect of increasing the taxable income assessed under Section 120 of the IT. Ord., 2001, being Violation of over-riding effect of Section 120(1) and (1A) of the IT, Ord., 3/2001 and action under $s.161/205 of the I.T. Ord., 2001 was not 012 PTD (Trib.) 12 relied in 2015 PTD (Ti 478 Jn these cases the Honourable Tribunal has observed regarding ‘Specification of names of suppliers, etc. that without specifying the names and addresses of the parties or persons from whom and how much tax was to be deducted, provisions of Section 161 could not be invoked. It appears that the Inland Revenue Officer was of old frame of mind and could not appreciate that the tax rendered to be deducted under Section 161 has to be of some identified taxpayer/person and the taxpayer cannot be declared personally liable after establishing that he was withholding agent who failed to deduct tax from the transaction liable to such tax. It is observed that in the above cited cases, after making the observations mentioned above, the Honourable Tribunal had annulled the orders of the assessing officers. 18. Furthermore, higher appellate authorities have held that section 161 is not a charging section and it cannot be used only to raise tax demand as the amount of tax deducted under this mode. Reliance is placed on 2008 PTD (Trib) 1683, 2003 PTD 1167 and 2012 PTD (Trib) 1189 19. At the end it is held that orders of honorable Supreme of Pakistan mentioned in the body of this order are binding on this court under Article 189 of Constitution of Pakistan. Moreover, all the above quoted case laws of Hon,able Tribunal are also binding on us as it is a settled law that the decisions of one Division Bench of the Honourable Appellate TribunalInland Revenue are binding on another DB of ATIR. In this é ‘ " : is resi reliance is placed on ratio of decisions reported as 2004 PTD 62, i , 201 PTD 1552, 2009 PTD 1507, PLD 1995 SC 423, 1995 scp 3 ; 2012 PTD 1123. = 20. Conclusion 20.1 The assessment record reveals that during the impugned Proceedings 3 notices were issued by the officer whose bar code and date of dispatch is given in the order but no diary number is mentioned, However notices were sent by courier service and not served manually. ppellant on the other hand denies to have received any notice. The cenrone ») AR’explained that on obtaining the copies of TCS receipts from the Income ‘Tax office it was revealed that address given on them was wrong as it only mentioned Kamal Khan Market Tando Soomro road but no name of city or town was mentioned in the address. The appellant's business is in Tando Allah Yar and not in Hyderabad where the officer resides. That is the reason that no notice reached the appellant ever. It looks that for all practical purposes the officer concluded the proceedings u/s 161 after issuing notice only via courier service and despite non-compliance from the appellant he did not feel the need to serve a notice manually before creating a demand of millions of rupees against the appellant. We find force in the arguments of the learned A. R. that before finalizing the order under section 161/205 of the Ordinance the officer should have ensured proper service of notice and confront the amount of tax which he intended to levy to provide an opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. This clearly shows that sufficient opportunity of being heard was not provided to the appellant before passing an order resulting in creation of huge tax demand. Furthermore, the alleged tax in default was worked out in a slipshod manner, The AR of the appellant provided copies of Income Tax Returns of appellant for the T/Y 2016, 2015, and 2014 which show the turnover at Rs.49.6(M), Rs.48.5(M) and Rs.47(M) respectively which was below the required threshold limit prescribed by the law as per clause (h) of sub-section (7) of Section 153; hence the appellant was not liable to withhold tax on payments made during the period under appeal. Therefore the impugned order passed against the appellant holding it liable for iey . / 13 default of withholding taxes has Peouely No legal authority and is totam illegal. The officer not only very conveniently ignored this glaring fact at continued with his march against the appellant and took the figures of purchases, other indirect expenses, salaries and travelling expenses and charged tax on them at flat rates without even considering minimum threshold limit of payment prescribed by law. The officer was required to identify the each and every payment and incidences of default of tax withholding and proposed tax to be charged and confront them to the appellant which is the requirement of law as discussed above but he failed to do so. The only thing which the officer relied upon was his presumption. ‘ed of resorting to presumptions, the officer ought to put some effort y0-dig-out the evidence against the appellant which should have been confronted to the appellant before completing the impugned action. Not only ‘that the appellant remained unaware of the intentions of the officer “but it was also not aware of the huge tax liability which was to hit him. “The officer failed to confront the appellant with any evidence if he had in his possession to establish the charge against the appellant. However the officer very conveniently and completely shifted the burden to appellant to prove himself innocent. The appellant never got the sufficient opportunity to defend himself before the verdict was passed against him. This is against the principles of justice and fair play. Norms of justice and fair play were clearly violated while passing all the impugned orders u/s 161 of Income Tax Ordinance 2001. Moreover, no due regard was given to provisions of sub-section (2) and (1B) of Section 161 and Section 153(7)(h) of the I.T. Ord., 2001 as discussed above and the order was passed in complete disregard of the aforementioned provisions. This shows that how serious and responsible was the concerned officer and how diligently the proceedings were conducted and the decision was arrived at. The officer needed to have a judicious approach even if the appellant was not compliant. The officer completely missed or ignored the glaring fact evidently visible on record that the turnover of the appellant for the preceding three years was less than the threshold prescribed to make it a withholding agent.4 i. ‘The learned Commissioner (Appeals) on the other hand vide ord lated 27-12-2017 has rej a “jected the appellant's al . ‘ ppeal on merit with discussing the merit of th — case. We are of the view that sn the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has failed to apply his mind and take into account th a @ manner in which the officer has Worked out the tax in default and | aa the findings recorded by him do not reveal that what was in his mind and how he considered that the appeal before him had no merit. CIR (a) also missed the pivotal point that the appellant was not liable as per lavrto withhold taxes for the period under question. > 22. For what has been discussed above concerning the factual as well as ‘ legal aspects of the case, we have no hesitation to hold that the order Passed by the officer under section 161/ 205 of the Ordinance does not = Stand the test of appeal. The whole proceedings are infested with inherent legal infirmities and substantive illegalities that tantamount to patent violation of mandatory statutory provisions and order was also passed in utter disregard of principles of law settled by the superior judicial fora quoted above. Therefore, the impugned order u/s.161 is not sustainable in the eyes of law both on factual as well as legal grounds. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) also failed to consider the lapses which rendered the impugned order having no effect and therefore, he was not justified in upholding the same. For the foregoing reasons and by respectfully following the binding case laws mentioned above, we hold that the orders passed by both the below authorities are suffering from factual and legal infirmities which are fatal and cannot be cured; hence both the orders of below authorities are held to be illegal and are hereby annulled. 23. The appeal is disposed of in the manner as indicated above. Sd/- (DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA) Sd/- ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (AAMIR MAQSOOD) JUDICIAL MEMBERve Na. DdrXtewe Bai ; No - ENGST = Sass Ss atm, yA S%o6/22