International Journal of Comparative and Applied

Criminal Justice

ISSN: 0192-4036 (Print) 2157-6475 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcac20

Exploring the consequences of prolonged pretrial

incarceration: evidence from a local jurisdiction in
the Philippines

Raymund E. Narag

To cite this article: Raymund E. Narag (2019) Exploring the consequences of prolonged
pretrial incarceration: evidence from a local jurisdiction in the Philippines, International Journal of
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 43:2, 117-134, DOI: 10.1080/01924036.2018.1444651

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2018.1444651

Published online: 01 Mar 2018.

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
2019, VOL. 43, NO. 2, 117–134
https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2018.1444651

Exploring the consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration:

evidence from a local jurisdiction in the Philippines
Raymund E. Narag
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Prolonged pretrial incarceration is a key issue facing the criminal justice Received 8 September 2017
systems of many developing countries. Detainees stay in jail for years Accepted 16 February 2018
while undergoing trial but are still unconvicted. However, little is known KEYWORDS
about the consequences of this troubling phenomenon. Informed by Prolonged pretrial
relevant prison and criminological theories, this paper analyses jail official incarceration; case delay;
data and qualitative interviews from detainees in a local jurisdiction in the legal cynicism; Philippine
Philippines to understand the magnitude and consequences of prolonged jails
pretrial incarceration. Results suggest the emergence of a legally cynical
view of the criminal justice system shared by the detainees. These senti-
ments likely serve as bases for popular opinions that justify use of violence
and vigilante justice on offender populations. Implications on judicial and
penal reforms in the Philippines are discussed.

Introduction
Prolonged pretrial incarceration, or the length of time a defendant is detained while awaiting final
disposition of a case, is a key issue facing the criminal justice systems of many developing countries
(Open Society Foundation [OSF], 2011, 2014; Walmsley, 2016). Worldwide estimates suggest that
there are 3 million pretrial detainees in a given day and around 10 million new pretrial detainees are
processed each year (Open Society Foundations, & United Nations Development Programme (OSF
& UNDP), 2011). Diverse countries such as Nigeria, Brazil, and Pakistan have a sizable number of
their prisoner populations who are in jail for years while undergoing trial but are still unconvicted
(Hafetz, 2002; OSF, 2014). In Nigeria, for example, unconvicted pretrial detainees stay in jail for an
average of 3.7 years (OSF, 2014). In many developing countries, the number of pretrial detainees,
also called remand detainees, far exceeds the number of convicted prisoners in the total prison
population (Schonteich, 2015; Walmsley, 2016). Countries such as Libya, Monaco, Paraguay, and
Bangladesh have pretrial detainees that comprise more than 70% of their total prison populations
(Walmsley, 2016). In most jurisdictions, the trial courts will find many of the pretrial detainees not
guilty and some detainees will stay in jail longer than the imposed penalties (Hafetz, 2002; OSF,
2011, 2014; Nagy, 2016; Narag, 2017). Prolonged pretrial incarceration, thus, mirrors a country’s
challenges to observe the rule of law and inefficiency in the administration of justice (Hafetz, 2002;
OSF, 2011). This trend is projected to worsen in the coming decades as the number of pretrial
detainees continues to grow (Walmsley, 2016). Despite the gravity of the problem, very little is
known about the consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration. This paper aims to bridge this
gap by investigating the experiences of defendants detained in one of the most populous city jails in
Metro Manila, Philippines.

CONTACT Raymund E. Narag rnarag@siu.edu Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois
University Carbondale, 4224 Faner Hall SIUC, Carbondale, IL, USA
© 2018 School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University
118 R. E. NARAG

The nexus of preventive detention and case delay

There are two separate but related issues that contribute to the phenomenon of prolonged pretrial
incarceration: the prevalence of preventive detention and the delay in criminal case proceedings, the
nexus of which leads to prolonged pretrial incarceration. A number of countries, even among the
developed world, utilise restrictive policies in the pretrial stage. This includes the use of preventive
detention where defendants who are viewed as “dangerous” are likely to be denied bail (Goldkamp,
1985; Alschuler, 1986; Metzmeier, 1996; McSherry & Keyzer, 2011; Nagy, 2016). Defendants who are
at risk of committing crime while out on bail, or who are likely to intimidate their accusers, or likely to
escape or fail to appear during court hearings, are generally detained during trial (Goldkamp, 1985;
Van Kalmthout, Knapen, & Morgenstern, 2009). Additionally, several countries predominantly rely
on financial bail systems, which preclude indigent defendants to post bail (Hafetz, 2002; Karth, 2008;
Stevenson & Mayson, 2017). Other countries also have few options for pretrial release programmes,
such as release on recognisance, pre-arrest diversion, surety bonds, electronic monitoring, home
detention, and supervised released (Goldkamp, 1985; Hall, 1987; Reaves, 2013; Open Society
Foundations, 2014; Nagy, 2016). And while electronic monitoring may be available, defendants may
not be able to afford the associated costs (Payne & Gainey, 2000). These restrictive policies result in the
high prevalence of detained defendants while undergoing trial.
Studies in the United States and other developed countries suggest that preventive detention is
related to negative jail and criminal justice outcomes. That is, preventive detention leads to jail
overcrowding and violence (Hall, 1987; Tartaro, 2002), to forced admission of guilt by the accused,
where they are induced to plead guilty so they can bargain for a lesser penalty (Sacks & Ackerman,
2012), and the overall perceptions of injustice (Alschuler, 1986; Miller & Guggenheim, 1990;
Robinson, 2001). These studies also document the financial costs associated with their detention
sustenance and the lost economic productivity while they are incarcerated (Foote, 1954; Lowenkamp,
VanNostrand, & Holsinger, 2013). Since pretrial detainees, compared to bailed defendants, are more
likely to be convicted than acquitted, and when convicted, are more likely to be meted out longer
prison sentences instead of probation, these studies also document the impact of pretrial detention on
the equity of the criminal justice system (Ares, Rankin, & Sturz, 1963; Kellough & Wortley, 2002;
Leiber & Fox, 2005; Rankin, 1964; Sacks & Ackerman, 2012). Additionally, since pretrial detainees are
predominantly poor and racial minorities, these studies also raise concerns about the impact of
pretrial detention on social and racial justice (Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005; Spohn, 2008).
Finally, pretrial detention may exacerbate the pains of imprisonment (Sykes, 1958) faced by the
detainees and potentially lengthen their exposure to criminogenic scripts as jails and prisons are
usually considered schools of crime (Gendreau, Cullen, & Goggin, 1999).
The second compelling issue is the delay in the criminal case proceedings, which is more
pronounced in many developing countries. That is, accused suffer from long duration of criminal
case proceedings – from arraignment, to presentation of prosecution and defence evidence, to
determination of guilt, and to the imposition of sentences (Hafetz, 2002). Delay in criminal case
proceedings could be attributed to a host of interrelated structural, organisational, and cultural
factors. For example, many jurisdictions report of structural deficiencies, such as insufficient
number of court personnel, inadequate facilities, and shortage of office equipment, which trans-
late to case overload and case backlog (Hafetz, 2002; Iruoma, 2008; Narag, 2017). These structural
deficiencies impinge on the organisational capabilities of the court actors. For example, court
judges oftentimes postpone case hearings as prosecutors and defence lawyers are absent, which
regularly happen when they serve multiple other courts (Iruoma, 2008; Narag, 2017). The lack of
office equipment means that courts could not monitor cases that are long overdue (Hafetz, 2002).
These structural deficiency and organisational inefficiency translate to a court culture (Church,
Carlson, Lee, & Tan, 1978) where maxims like “it is okay to delay the cases” have become
acceptable. For example, the working group culture among judges, prosecutors, and defence
lawyers may be in the form of “professional courtesy” (Church et al., 1978; Narag, 2017), where
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119

they become lenient when any of them are absent during a trial date, which leads to numerous
continuances, and ultimately, to delay of cases.
The delay in case proceedings was once a subject of intense scrutiny in the United States as it
contradicted the cherished vision of speedy trial (Zeisel, Kalven, Buchholz, 1959; Sipes & Oram,
1988). This spurred a series of court management reforms introduced in the 1980s and led to the
relatively speedier disposition of cases (Neubauer, Lipetz, Luskin, & Ryan, 1981). For example, court
management techniques, like case flow management, calendar of hearings, and sure trials were
introduced to lessen continuances (Neubauer et al., 1981). The introduction of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms also contributed to the diversion of cases and reduction of court workload,
which eventually led to the shortening of case proceedings (Edwards, 1986; Lieberman & Henry,
1986). Specifically with the United States, the use of plea-bargaining has provided mechanisms to
shorten trial proceedings (Barbara, Morrison & Cunningham, 1976; Smith, 1986; Ross, 2006).
Preventive detention and delay in case proceedings are separate but interrelated issues. In the
developed countries, pretrial detainees comprise around 15–25% of their total prison population
(Walmsley, 2016) but the average length of stay is around 2 weeks to 2 months. In the United
States, for example, there are around 400,000 pretrial detainees in any given day (Wagner &
Sakala, 2014) but their average length of stay is relatively short. In a study done by Lowenkamp
and colleagues (2013) in Kentucky, the mean length of stay in jail for the 112,030 defendants
detained between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010 is 6.28 days, with around 78% detained for less
than 4 days. In another study among firearms offenders detained in St. Louis, Missouri, the
average time from day of filing to case disposition is 130 days (Williams & Rosenfeld, 2016). A
longer pretrial detention is recorded in Canada with an average length of stay of 214 days but with
53% of the detainees staying for a week or less (Weinrath,2009).
However, in many developing countries, court jurisdictions heavily rely on preventive deten-
tion and suffer from criminal case delay translating to many defendants who are incarcerated for
prolonged period while undergoing trial. African countries, such as Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone take an average of 20 months in pretrial detention (OSF & UNDP, 2011). Majority of the
Latin American countries take an average of 1 year of stay in jail before their cases are disposed
(Hafetz, 2002).1
There are reasons to believe that lengthy pretrial incarceration observed in the developing world is
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different from the relatively short period of pretrial
detention commonly documented in the western literature. Intuitively, a 2-month pretrial detention is
qualitatively different from a 2-year pretrial detention. However, since most of the studies were
conducted in the developed world, very few scholars have documented the consequences of prolonged
pretrial incarceration in the developing world. This paper aims to fill in the gap by documenting the
narratives of defendants detained in one of the most populous city jails in Metro Manila, Philippines.
Informed by relevant prison and criminological theories, this paper explores the experiences of
detainees who had been in jail for more than 5 years but are still unconvicted. This paper investigates
the coping mechanisms of the detainees to address prolonged pretrial incarceration and documents
how a deeply cynical view on the criminal justice system develops among some of the defendants. It
also attempts to trace how these attitudes are related to the emergence of a popular sentiment on
vigilante justice that currently sweeps Philippine society. Prolonged trial detention is viewed as a
manifestation of a broken justice system, a sentiment that is utilised to rationalise extra-judicial
killings by the police (Curato, 2017). Finally, this article outlines theory-based policies and pro-
grammes that can address the causes of inefficiency in the administration of justice in the Philippines.

Review of related literature

Traditional prison studies characterise jails and prisons are places of deprivation. Prisoners are
deprived of liberty, autonomy, good and services, and heterosexual relationships (Sykes, 1958;
Jewkes, 2005; Crewe, 2011). These deprivations induce prisoners to engage in coping mechanisms
120 R. E. NARAG

to overcome the pains of imprisonment (Flanagan, 1980). Due to the deprivation of goods and
services, prisoners may be enticed to participate in an underground prison economy (Lankenau,
2001; Copes, Higgins, Tewksbury, & Dabney, 2010). Stripped of heterosexual contact, they may be
enticed to participate in same sex relationships (Ibrahim, 1974; Hensley, Tewksbury, & Koscheski,
2002). To facilitate these coping exchanges, prisoners develop informal codes, roles, and value
systems (Sykes, 1958). Newly arrived prisoners are then prisonised, where they take in to a greater
or lesser degree the language, values, and norms of the prison community (Clemmer, 1940;
Thomas, 1977). In developing countries, the material and physical deprivations are more acute
(Birkbeck, 2011), which resulted to the dependency of jail and prison custodial officers on the
support of the prisoners through a mechanism of shared governance (Garces, Martin, Darke,
2013; Martin, Jefferson, & Bandyopadhyay, 2014; Narag & Jones, 2016; Narag & Lee, 2017).
On top of the deprivations faced by prisoners, prison studies also suggest that prisoners import
their pre-prison characteristics into the prison community (Irwin & Cressey, 1962). Prisoners bring
with them their street criminal orientations and oppositional culture (Anderson, 1999) inside prisons.
For example, prisoners who are active street gang members may continue their gang-related beha-
viours while in prison (Jacobs, 1974; Delisi, Berg, Hochstetler, 2004). Prisoners with negative encoun-
ters with the police and other state authorities may share these experiences to other prisoners that
amplify their own negative experiences (Myrstol & Hawk-Tourtelot, 2011). These personal and
vicarious experiences may push prisoners to hate the custodial guards, as they represent state
authority, and the society in general so they can be in solidarity with other prisoners (Jacobs, 1975).
When applied to the phenomenon being studied, prolonged pretrial incarceration thus tends to
intensify the deprivation faced by the detainees and extend their exposure to criminogenic influ-
ences. General strain theory (GST), formulated by Robert Agnew (1992), suggests that strains can
lead to negative emotions like anger and frustration, and which can trigger negative forms of coping,
such as crime and delinquency. Consistent with the claims of GST (Agnew, 1992), detainees
undergoing trial may experience myriad individual, family, financial, and work strains that are
exacerbated by longer stay. The financial drain associated with prolonged trials, in the form of
lawyers’ fees, transportation costs, case preparation, and other legal expenses can be construed as a
major form of strain (Anderson, 2008). Pretrial detainees may have to contend with uncertainties in
case outcomes, that is, whether they will be acquitted or convicted (Dervan & Edkins, 2013)
translating to emotional and psychological stresses. The notion that they are detained for very
long periods, even when presumed innocent, may introduce doubts on the legitimacy of the legal
system (Tyler, 2003). The intensity of negative emotions derived from these strenuous conditions
may translate to the formation of criminogenic attributions (Agnew, 1992). These conditions may
all contribute to the cumulative strains (Agnew, 1992) faced by the detainees, which can lead to
negative coping beliefs and behaviours inside the jails and even upon release.
Prolonged pretrial incarceration also tends to lengthen the exposure of detainees to the crim-
inogenic jail environment. Consistent with the claims of social learning theory (SLT; Akers, 1985),
pretrial detainees who stay in jail longer may acquire neutralising beliefs (Sykes & Matza, 1957)
peddled by other detainees to explain away accountability in their own cases (Scully & Marolla,
1984; Ugelvik, 2012). It may also increase their exposure to vicarious negative encounters with the
criminal justice system, such as police abuse, hardening their oppositional and cynical view of the
society (Jacobs, 1974, 1975). Their proximity and intensive encounters with other detainees may
differentially expose them to definitions favourable to crime. Longer periods of detention may also
increase the likelihood that detainees learn new techniques and strategies of crime-making (Akers,
1985; Sutherland, 1947) as jails are known as schools of crime (Gendreau et al., 1999).
Empirical studies suggest that the level of deprivation is related to individual, jail, and
criminal justice outcomes (Blevins, Listwan, Cullen, & Jonson, 2010; Hochstetler & Delisi,
2005; Liebling, 2011; McCorkle, Miethe & Drass, 1995; Morris, Carriaga, Diamond, Piquero, &
Piquero, 2012; Rocheleau, 2013). Prisoners who feel that the jail or prison facilities are more
depriving tend to be less cooperative to jail authorities, tend not to participate in
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121

rehabilitation programming, and tend to experience maladjustments, such as suicides (Gover,

Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000; Liebling, 2011; Slotboom, Kruttschnitt, Bijleveld, & Menting,
2011). Jails and prison that are rated as depriving tend to report more self-inflicted violence,
inmate-to-inmate violence, inmate-to-guard violence, (Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002,
Liebling, 2011) and occurrences of disturbances such drug and gang activities. Finally, stress-
ful jail and prison environments also tend to report higher recidivism rates among the
inmates and inmates tend to view their incarceration experiences cynically (Listwan,
Sullivan, Agnew, Cullen, & Colvin, 2013)
Combining these theoretical insights and empirical findings suggest that prolonged pretrial
incarceration can serve as an additional strain for detainees and could be associated with different
negative individual, jail, and criminal justice outcomes. It also suggests that exposure to crimino-
genic environments become more acute. The prevalence of prolonged pretrial detention is thus a
phenomenon that has a direct implication to the administration of justice in many developing
countries. It is therefore necessary to investigate the specific mechanisms of how prolonged
pretrial incarceration relates to these potential negative outcomes.

Research setting
Pretrial detention is heavily utilised in the Philippines. Of the 264,000 persons deprived of liberty,
more than 222,000 are unconvicted detainees, comprising 84% of the prison population. Around
162,000 of these unconvicted detainees are under the supervision of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) and another 60,000 are under the supervision of Provincial
Jails managed by 87 different provincial governments (Personal communications, BJMP National
Head Quarters Officer, June 2017).2 While there are currently no available national data on the
length of stay in jail of the detainees, a recent study documents that 8915 detainees in six jails in
Metro Manila have been detained for an average of 529 days or 1 year and 5 months, and their
trial are still ongoing (Narag, 2017). Anecdotal reports also suggest that a number of detainees had
stayed in jail for as long as 15 years or more while waiting for a final verdict on their cases
(Macaraig, 2016).
There are two features of the Philippine Criminal Justice system that make prolonged pretrial
detention prevalent. First is the notion of “non-bailable offenses” which are capital crimes or
heinous crimes identified by the Philippine Congress (Narag, 2017). Crimes such as murder, rape,
and drug trafficking, for example, are considered non-bailable offenses. Trial court judges are
mandated by law to automatically deny bail in this type of offenses. While the defendants are
given remedies by allowing them to submit petitions for bail, these petitions must be done in open
court and must be heard and debated on merits similar to a full-blown trial. On average, bail
petition takes 126 days.
Another feature is the reliance on financial bail. Majority of the defendants are poor, which
prohibit them to post bail (Caparas & Feliciano, 1987; Lopez, 2009). While motion for the
reduction of bail and motion to apply for release on recognisance are available, very few detainees
avail of these remedies (Caparas & Feliciano, 1987). Such petitions must also be heard and
debated in open court and entail a number of restrictions (Narag, 2017).
These characteristics and processes translate to high prevalence of prolonged pretrial
detention (Narag, 2017). To address these issues, plea-bargaining is authorised under
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and must be entered during
the pretrial stage of the criminal proceedings. Around 25% of the detainees avail of this
remedy but not after staying in jail for an average of 5 months. Additionally, a Speedy Trial
Law (Republic Act 8943) was introduced in 1998 specifying time limits for the different
stages of adjudication. However, the law provides multiple exclusions in computing the
length of time that the court actors can liberally draw from to justify delay in case
proceedings (Narag, 2017).
122 R. E. NARAG

Data and methods

This paper utilises a combination of jail official data and qualitative interviews of detainees in a
local jurisdiction in Metro Manila, Philippines. The jail is an all-male facility with a rated capacity
of 280 detainees but with a current jail population of 2868 detainees. Similar to all the jails
managed by the BJMP and the provincial governments, detainees in this jail are undergoing trial.
Upon conviction, detainees are transferred to the National Bilibid Prisons, a facility managed by
the Bureau of Corrections. A few recalcitrant detainees (engaged in violence and drug distribution
in the jail) may also be transferred to the Metro Manila District Jail as mechanism to impose
security (Narag, 2005).
The jail official data contain the historical and current Alpha List (complete listing of detainees)
that was made accessible to the researcher as part of a training programme to improve the capacity
of the jail staff on court data management. The series of trainings were conducted in the Summer of
2017. The Alpha List was de-identified before the researcher had access to the data to protect the
privacy of the detainees. The historical Alpha List contains information on 19,015 defendants who
were incarcerated in this jail from January 2007 to December 2016. The information includes
manner of exit from the jail (convicted, acquitted, dismissed, bailed out, transferred to other jail, and
others) and the date of commitment and date of exit. These pieces of information allowed for the
computation of the length of stay for each defendant who entered and exited the facility. The
current Alpha List contains information on date of commitment and current date (the date the data
were made available to the researcher) from where the length of stay of the detainees was computed
(that is, current date minus date of commitment). This simple computation revealed that, on a
particular day in the Summer 2017, there were 167 detainees who had stayed in jail for at least 5
years. This subset population, by their sheer length of stay, became the basis for their inclusion in
the study. From the list of 167 detainees, 30 were randomly selected (using an excel random number
generator). Three detainees were not available for interview due to court hearings, 2 had visitors,
and 1 refused to participate, yielding a total of 24 interviewees. Almost all (20 of 24) of the
interviewees currently hold positions in the inmate hierarchy, and due to seniority, these detainees
are respected in the inmate society (See also Narag, 2005; Narag & Lee, 2017; on inmate social
dynamics). The detainees were interviewed in a location provided for by the warden that was
beyond the hearing and sight of jail officers and other detainees. This area is usually reserved for
lawyer visitations, which was designed to maximise confidential interviews. The detainees were
interviewed one-on-one using a semi-structured interview schedule and lasted for at least 2 hours.
Participants were promised confidentiality of information and sought of their informed consent
prior to the interviews. Participants were asked about their experiences in jail, their views about the
trial proceedings of their cases, and their sentiments on the criminal justice system in general. Notes
were taken during interviews and immediately transcribed and translated to English after the
interviews. The narrative data were analysed using NVIVO 8 software. The face-to-face interview,
the transcription of data, and multiple reading of the transcripts provided different stages of
exposure to the qualitative data. Using an iterative process, emergent themes were developed. The
lived experiences of the participants (Creswell, 2007) were highlighted to understand the phenom-
enon of prolonged pretrial incarceration. The literature review provided sensitising concepts
(Bowen, 2006) that informed the researcher on what key themes to develop further.

Findings
Magnitude of the problem
The current Alpha List shows that 2868 detainees had an average stay in jail of 658 days (1 year
and 9 months) and their trial are still ongoing. The longest staying detainee had languished in jail
for 15 years and 6 months but is still unconvicted. There are 15 other unconvicted detainees who
had stayed in jail for 10 years or more. Looking at the type of courts that had jurisdiction over the
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 123

Table 1. Magnitude of pretrial incarceration in a jail facility in the Philippines.

Number of Average stay Number of inmates who reached threshold Percent of inmates who
Type of court inmates in days (6 months for MTC; 3 years for RTC) are “overstaying”
MTC 207 275 71 34.30
RTC 2661 680 439 16.50
Grand total 2868 658 510 17.78

cases suggests some important findings. In this jurisdiction, there are two types of courts:
metropolitan trial courts (MTC; which are mandated to litigate less serious offenses or those
cases with penalty of not more than 6 years) and the regional trial courts (RTC; which are
mandated to litigate more serious offenses or those cases with a penalty of 6 years or more).
Table 1 shows that 207 detainees are charged in the MTC and had, on average, stayed in jail for
275 days (9 months). A total of 34% of the detainees charged in the MTC courts had already
served at least 6 months and candidates for immediate release as mandated by the Supreme Court
Circular Task Force for Speedy Disposition of Cases.3 The data also show that 439 detainees
(16.5%) who are charged in RTC had stayed in jail for more than 3 years and had already
exceeded the threshold. Analysis of the historical Alpha List also shows that of the 19,015
detainees who were incarcerated in this jail, there were 735 detainees who were eventually
found not guilty but nevertheless stayed in jail for an average of 3 years and 6 months.
Additionally, there were 22 detainees who languished in jail for at least 10 years and were
eventually found not guilty.
This prolonged pretrial detention has a profound effect on the lives of the detainees. The
qualitative data described below document how the detainees lived through the phenomenon, the
different factors they perceived to have led to these situations, and the different consequences to
their lives, to the jail facility, and to the criminal justice system in general. Here is a narrative that
captures the overall essence (Creswell, 2007) of this phenomenon:
I was only 19 when I was accused of robbery, now I am almost 30 years old. This is where I spent most of
my youth. I don’t have the money to post bail. My parents are in the province. They seldom visit me in jail.
If I have the money, I could have been a free man a long time ago. It takes the court forever to decide my
case. One [judge] was promoted, one was transferred, and the other died. I have bad luck with judges. . . It is
just painful to see how my years are wasted in this crowded cell. You do nothing but count the bars. I don’t
know how I could ever recover. . . Probably, I will get back at the police who framed me up, or probably, just
engage in a life of crime. I have made a lot of friends here already through the years that I am no longer
afraid. Life in jail and outside seems not that different anymore. . .I had been a cell mayores (inmate leader)
so I have some privileges. . . But I hate some of these detainees, these criminals. Especially these repeat
offenders. The police should just kill them. They just contribute to crowding. (Domingo, 11 years in jail)

From the statements above, a number of key themes emerge: the causes of long-term incarcera-
tion, the pains and difficulties the detainees experience, the coping mechanisms they employed,
and their emergent views of the criminal justice system. These statements also hint of the
contradictions of their views about themselves and of the other detainees. The nuances of these
findings are elaborated below.

Causes of long-term incarceration

It can be discerned from the narrative above that two factors led to long-term pretrial incarcera-
tion: lack of resources to post bail and court organisational issues. Indeed, the official data suggest
that 35% (1003 of 2868 detainees) could have been bailed out if they had the resources to post bail
or know the procedures on how to post bail (Narag, 2005). The average amount of bail for these
detainees is PhP10,000 (US$ 200); none of whom can afford the amount. Majority of the
defendants are indigent and do not have the capacity to post bail (Lopez, 2009). A narrative
supports this claim:
124 R. E. NARAG

I had money for bail. But then my wife asked a pyansador (informal court people who help navigate through
the bail process) for help and the pyansador ran with our money. He swindled us. My bail is only Php 5,000
(US $ 100) but I could no longer raise that money. (Edgar, 6 years in jail)

Majority (60%) of the detainees are also charged with non-bailable drug offenses (Republic Act
9165) which is the centrepiece of the current President’s anti-crime efforts. Thus, first time non-
violent drug users are automatically denied bail. Since his assumption of office in 30 June 2016,
the national BJMP population ballooned from 100,000 to 162,000 detainees or an increase of 62%
in just 1 year. The current cohort of detainees in this jail has registered an average stay of 658 days
(1 year and 9 months), which is expected to prolong as courts become more overburdened.
Majority of these detainees will have their cases eventually dismissed for lack of evidence.
Court organisational issues are also common themes raised by the participants. Most court
hearings happen only once in 3 months, only to be postponed due to absence of any of the parties
(judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and witnesses). Thus, in a year, detainees are “lucky” if their
cases are heard once. One research participant laments:
There are different reasons why a hearing is postponed: the police did not appear, judges and lawyers have
mandatory trainings, there are torrential floods that swept the city, the bus carrying the detainees to the
courts malfunctions, the subpoena from the courts were not received by the jail records, judges not feeling
well, lack of material time, and other crazy reasons. Thus, I had been here 8 years, I had seen the courthouse
only around 24 times, and I had hearings that pushed through 8 times. Once a year. And many detainees
consider that lucky. (Vergel, 8 years in jail)

Indeed, the constant postponement of hearings is common complaint raised by all research
participants. This is attributed to the lack of coordination among the different agencies involved
in a hearing (the courts, police, and jail agencies) and the leniency of court judges towards
postponements (Narag, 2017).

Consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration

The narratives of the research participants are replete with sorrowful sentiments on how prolonged
pretrial incarceration impacted their lives. At the individual level, it has economic, familial, and
psychological consequences. Here are common narratives that capture the economic difficulties:
I sold my house and cars already just so I can pay my lawyer. My daughter, who was supposed to go to
college had to go abroad and work as a domestic helper to help us out. I have two small kids that I had sent
to my brother. My wife takes care of our other two children. (Lito, 7 years in jail)

Due to my prolonged trial, I am financially broke. I sold my agricultural land in the province, my house and
lot, used all my life savings, and borrowed money from relatives. The appearance fees of the lawyers,
transportation cost during hearings, the transcripts notes, coupled with lost income, that will make you
broke. (Gerry, 8 years in jail)

From these narratives, one can discern how the dragging of cases had negatively affected the
trajectory of the household. Since it is a continuing experience, it is not only the detainee but also
the family members who suffer the consequences of the imprisonment experience. This is
especially made salient in the Philippine jail context where, due to limited resources, detainees
heavily rely on family for sustenance (Narag & Lee, 2017). An interviewee laments:
The food is not enough. We need to bring our own food, clothes, beddings, and medicines. That is why, my
family visits me every week. Or else, I will die of sickness. Many detainees die of manas (swelling). Our
finances are drained; we have mountains of debt. (Roger, 7 years in jail)

Not all detainee families endure the difficulties of prolonged pretrial incarceration. Of the 24
detainees interviewed, more than half (15 detainees) admitted that they eventually succumbed to
marital separation. Though some research participants had altruistic motives for letting their
spouses go, some participants harbour ill feelings when spouses leave them:
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125

When I was in jail for three years and counting, I told my wife to just forget me and have a new life. I told
her to go to the province and forget about me. I was correct. Now I had been in jail for 6 years. I heard she
has a new family. It is painful but that is the best solution for us. (Edgar, 6 years in jail)

When I get released, I will go after my wife. She was the reason why I was put in jail and now she abandoned
me. I told her, she should wait because I will soon be released. She did not wait. (Jose, 6 years in jail)

Prolonged pretrial incarceration also has direct consequences on the mental state of the detainees.
The economic and familial strains noted above provided layers of anxieties that detainees had to
deal with. A recurring theme is how prolonged pretrial incarceration deprived them of work:
My lawyer promised me I should be bailed out in 6 months. That has long gone. I lost my job already, how
can I get that job back, even if I am acquitted, I lost that job. They should fast track the hearings. (Roger,
7 years in jail)

I am afraid, even if I get released, I will be a burden to my family. Because, I lost my job and I have not
gained new skills here in jail. When I get back, things have changed. Everything now is in computer. How
can I be competitive? The future is very bleak for me. (Ernesto, 10 years in jail)

Eight of the 24 interviewees are also frustrated by the presumption of guilt and social stigma
(Petersilia, 2000) that accrue because of their long-term pretrial incarceration. These detainees
argue that the reason why they surrendered and faced the charges head on is because they wanted
the system to clear them of the charges. Here is a statement that captures these sentiments:
People in my village and my work think that I am already guilty. They say, “if you are innocent, then why is
it taking that long for your case to be resolved. The judge must think you are guilty because he is keeping
you that long.” It is very frustrating. I am fried with the oil they extracted from me. (Gerry, 8 years)

Additionally, the prolonged pretrial incarceration keeps the detainees on the edge. They are not
sure of the final outcome of their cases, a phenomenon described by Jefferson and Gaborit (2015,
p. 13) as “judicial limbo.” Historical data from this jail suggest that because of poor police and
prosecutorial work, only around 18% of the detainees are found guilty by the trial court, giving
them reasons for optimism. Still, this long wait is perplexing:
It is the mental worry that kills you. It would be even better if you are already convicted, you can plan your
life ahead. I have a co-accused who admitted guilt at the very beginning of the case, he is now in Bilibid
(national prison). He is more relaxed there. He knows when he will be released. Here, I don’t know the date
because my case is forever pending. I can’t concentrate, I can’t think well. (Roger, 7 years)

You feel like you are in a bad dream, in a state of suspended animation. It doesn’t end; there is no closure.
Because the case is ongoing forever, you are harbouring the hope that you will be acquitted. In which many
detainees are eventually acquitted. Though it takes that long. . . You already suffered the penalty because of
the long trial process but that is better because you don’t want to be branded as a convict. . . Even if it takes
forever to clear your name. But then, again, you suffer these mental anxieties. What if you get a life sentence,
for example? (Ernesto, 10 years in jail)

This mental anguish breaks the will and the mind of the detainees. Though majority of the
participants are viewed by their fellow detainees as maprinsipyo (man of principles) for fighting it
out, the long delay eventually casts doubts on the utility of fighting the case. The feelings of
powerlessness eventually take over. Here is an intimate sentiment shared by one of the
participants:
Our new defense lawyer said that he would negotiate for a plea bargain. We will be given a penalty of
10 years and since we had stayed longer than that, we can be released. He says that if we continue to
fight the case, we might end up staying another 7 years here, just because the case drags so slowly. We
have no option. I have been telling that I am innocent. But anything that will keep me out of jail will
be a better option. We are powerless. I have to swallow my pride so I can go home. (George, 13 years
in jail)

Thus, majority of the detainees develop feelings of anger and frustration:

126 R. E. NARAG

We are not here to be punished. We are here because we are accused and still in the process of determining
our guilt or innocence. But they already made us pay. What if we turn out innocent? Which usually happens.
Can they bring back the years and resources that we spent? (Gerry, 8 years in jail)

Coping mechanisms to overcome prolonged pretrial incarceration

The prolonged pretrial incarceration contributes to jail overcrowding and to the inadequacy of
personnel, facilities, and resources. These organisational deprivations compound the individual
strains faced by the detainees. However, despite these individual- and organisational-level strains,
detainees have developed coping mechanisms (Sykes, 1958) to overcome prolonged pretrial
incarceration. Since the jail lacks operational resources, it informally allows detainees to bring
in their personal resources, which is maximised by the detainees to recover their pre-jail amenities
(Narag, 2005). Most research participants concur to this statement:
You find a way to survive. Befriend other detainees and guards. Contribute your resources and skills. Bring
money. And when you learn how to navigate the jail life, you can have amenities. Cell phones, big kubols
(cubicles), you can get out of jail occasionally. Visit family. If you do it discreetly and you make them (jail
guards) happy, you can re-create your life outside in the inside. (Lucas, 6 years in jail)

Aside from bringing in resources, detainees can also contribute their labour to the jail either as
custodial, rehabilitation, or administrative aides (Narag & Jones, 2016). Detainees while away time
performing these functions. Most of the detainees interviewed for this study, due to their seniority
in the cell hierarchy, have become the esteemed mayores (cell leader) or nanunungkulan (cell
officer) and have gained power over other detainees. The same research participant who had
stayed in jail for 13 years has this to say:
I manage 700 detainees in my brigade. I am the gang leader, I keep this function just to keep my mind busy,
to have other things to think instead of the case. But I tell you, most jail officers are dependent on me. If they
wanted any of their programs running smoothly, they need to get my endorsement. I have the complete
loyalty of my inmate gang members. (George, 13 years in jail)

Other coping mechanisms that emerged in the jail include the formation of an inmate economy
where detainees are free to barter goods and services to other detainees (Narag, 2005; Narag &
Jones, 2016; Narag & Lee, 2017). In some instances, detainees can bring personal appliances such
as TV sets, electric fans, refrigerators, and other amenities, if they know how to navigate through
the system (Narag, 2005; Narag & Lee, 2017). An informal inmate code (known as the patakaran
ng selda) (Sykes, 1958) emerges that is shared by all detainees in the jail community (Gutierrez,
2012; Jones, Narag & Morales, 2015; Narag & Jones, 2016; Narag & Lee, 2017). The inmate code
prescribes and proscribes the appropriate behaviour and conduct for detainees inside the cells.
Detainees recognise and follow the inmate code more than the formal jail policies. These coping
mechanisms, while helpful in the short-run, provide the long-term detainees ways to beat the
system. The coping mechanisms eventually alter jail management and the modify perceptions on
the administration of justice.

Impact on jail management and perceptions on the administration of justice

One of the major impacts of prolonged pretrial incarceration is the hold of veteran powerful
detainees on jail management. The informal inmate structures provide opportunities for long-
term detainees to rise above the inmate hierarchy and wield power. Additionally, the BJMP has a
policy of transferring wardens every 2 years, thus, new wardens have become dependent on the
inmate leaders for support. One research participant claims:
This jail will not function without our (mayores) cooperation. The wardens are always new in the job, they
don’t know the ins and the outs of this jail. The wardens cannot just come here and impose their policies,
they need to consult us. Wardens come and go, we stay longer. And if we don’t like them, we can always
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 127

stage a noise barrage4 or a riot and they will be booted out of this jail. They needed us more than we needed
them. (Lito, 7 years in jail)

The detainees collectively benefit from the power of the prolonged pretrial detainees. Buoyed by
their informal authority generated from the informal system, detainees attempt to re-create their
pre-prison lives inside the jail. For example, they can successfully negotiate or pressure jail
wardens to grant extended conjugal visitation hours, to prepare their own meals, and to create
their own schedules and movements. A research participant admits:
Inside the cells, except for the overcrowding, detainees can practically do what they want. They have access
to cell phones, alcohol, cigarettes, even prostitutes who pretend as visitors. Of course, these are done
discreetly and there is punishment for those who are caught. But the jail management knows fully well
that they cannot and should not remove these little amenities. Or else, there will be riots. The mayores, the
long-term detainees, they are the ones who relay these messages to the warden. It is a give and take. We
negotiate and they listen. (George, 13 years in jail)

The informal society created in the jail induces the formation of criminogenic thinking that is
transmitted from one generation of detainees to the next (Clemmer, 1940). The prolonged pretrial
detainees have become the repository and medium of transmission of these criminogenic narra-
tives. Given their valued positions in the inmate hierarchy, they tend to influence the views of
newly arrived detainees. The following narratives capture these sentiments:
At first, I did not believe that there were detainees who were victimized by the police and prosecutors. I thought
those were only in the movies. But after seeing many detainees who got released after bribing police and
prosecutors, I am now fully convinced of how corrupt the current system is. No one can trust this system. It is all
about money and whom you know. Pity the poor like us. We will be in jail for longer. (Luis, 6 years in jail)

I cannot be released yet. All eyes are still in my case. I let it ripen. Anyway, I am okay in the jail. I have what
I need, my kubol, visitors. I am quite comfortable here. When the opportune time comes, I will be released. I
am just waiting for the opportunity to bribe the police. (Edward, 5 years in jail)

If I get released, I will never be put in jail again. Should I have known it is all about money – bribing the
police, prosecutor and judge, I should have done it immediately. The police asked for 25,000 pesos so my
case will be dropped. I told him, “Better file a case because I am innocent. I will be acquitted.” Then it took
this long the finish my case. I should have taken the bait early. (Jericho, 13 years in jail)

When I get released, I know how to avoid punishment, how to evade arrest, I now know the behavior of
police and lawyers. The best time to settle is when they ask money. Don’t delay. So if you are a drug dealer,
when you have a big hit, you save money for bribing or for bail, you will need that. That is what the police
are after anyway. (Peter, 8 years in jail)

The preceding narratives picture the criminal justice system as fully corrupt. Though not all
detainees in the jail population experienced corruption, the voices of the prolonged pretrial
detainees are usually the ones heard. Thus, according to the participants, newly arrived detainees,
after repeated exposure to the dominant voices of the long-timers, come to share these world-
views. It provides a mechanism to downplay their accountability and guilt in own their cases, the
opportunity to portray themselves as victims, and the occasion to reject their rejectors. Here are
sentiments shared by many participants:
We are punished not because we committed a crime, we are punished because we are too foolish to be
caught by the police; because we are too poor not to be able to bribe our way out. There are bigger criminals
out there, but they are in Congress and they are never get caught. (Luis, 6 years in jail)

I asked myself, why am I the one punished. Yes, I used drugs, but I am not a criminal. I used drugs to
support me in my work (taxi driver), to keep me awake. There are many other people who commit more
serious crimes and they are not caught. I stay in jail because of the long trial, which they purposefully delay.
(Lucas, 6 years in jail)

Every day, you talk to new detainees and you asked them why they are here and the answers suggest there is
a pattern: yes, there are involved in drugs, one way or the other, but then, during that time of arrest, they
128 R. E. NARAG

were not actually involved in drugs. The police just planted the evidence. I can pinpoint to you all the
detainees who have been victim of planting of evidence by the police. The police cannot be trusted. (Warren,
9 years in jail)

This perception of personal and vicarious victimisation is a common theme peddled by the long-
term pretrial detainees. Even though these detainees are currently enjoying the benefits of their
esteemed positions in the inmate hierarchy (20 of the 24 interviewees are inmate leaders, 5 are
owners of stores, 9 has big kubols, all have tarimas (beds), and other informal privileges), they
articulate their sentiments as if they are the most lowly and deprived inmates in the hierarchy.
What they are trying to convey is not necessarily reflective of their personal objective conditions
but more reflective of their collective perception of injustices (Liebling, 2011). Thus, the prevailing
ethos in the jail is that “all detainees are deprived” (lahat kami ay sawi) despite the substantial
informal privileges that had been conceded by the jail management to selected favoured long-term
detainees.

The endorsement of vigilante justice

The prolonged pretrial incarceration provides opportunities for detainees to observe the iniquities
of the criminal justice system. Majority of the participants attest that they witnessed “real
criminals,” such as murderers and rapists, who play the game as “victims” and eventually beat
the system and get free. They also witnessed numerous “drug addicts” who repeatedly come and
go without changing their ways. They also witnessed hundreds of “street snatchers” who ply their
trade despite repeated warnings by the police. All these observations led to legal cynicism or
distrust to the legal system and its actors (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Tyler, 2003), which gave
rise to the endorsement of vigilante justice. Here are statements that echo these sentiments:
I had been in jail long enough to observe some of these criminals; they had made the jail their vacation
places. They stay here for a year, get released and then, after a month, they are here again. It is okay with
them because they knew the people here, they are assigned in the same cell or gang, and they keep their
esteemed status. Jail is not a deterrent anymore. That is why, for better or worse, killing them had become a
popular option. And I think it is just appropriate. (Vergel, 8 years in jail)

These detainees are hardheaded. They just keep the jail full and overcrowded. The government cannot do
anything about them. Sorry if they are killed but they deserve it. (Orly, 12 years in jail)

The police know that if they keep the suspects alive and send them to jail, these suspects will simply bribe
their way out. And the suspects will even taunt the police saying, “I told you, all your efforts to pin me down
is a waste, I have my connections”. So the police take matters into their own hands and salvage (summary
execution) them. I know some detainees who were summarily executed upon release. I think they deserve it.
(Warren, 9 years in jail)

At first glance, it is surprising that majority of the long-term pretrial detainees endorse the
execution of their fellow detainees. But as one participant has justified it, “sila yun, hindi kami”
(it is them, not us), meaning, they don’t see themselves as the “incorrigible offenders;” rather, they
see themselves as the victims of the system. In their minds, the deprivations created by their
prolonged pretrial detention qualify them as “victims,” while the early release of these “incorri-
gible offenders” suggests that they beat the system, and thus deserving of vigilante justice. Though
highly subjective, the message they want to convey (Liebling, 2011) reflects their cynicism on the
broken justice system (Curato, 2017).

Discussion, limitations, and policy implications

This paper explores the magnitude, causes, and consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration
of detainees in a local jail in Metro Manila, Philippines. It documents the extent of the problem
and how it impacted the lives of the detainees, the jail management, and the overall perception of
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129

the administration of justice. Consistent with the claims of GST (Agnew, 1992), prolonged pretrial
incarceration serves as an additional strain that have economic, familial, and psychological
consequences to the detainees. These individual-level strains are combined with organisational-
level strains, such as jail overcrowding and lack of personnel, facilities and resources, which are
also induced by the prolonged incarceration of the detainees. Taken together, these cumulative
strains provide the foundation for negative attributions on their conditions. Consistent with the
prisonisation theory (Clemmer, 1940), these individual and organisational deprivations (Sykes,
1958) induce the formation of informal coping mechanisms adapted by the inmates. These
include the formation of the mayores system, the inmate code, and kubols (Narag, 2005; Narag
& Lee, 2017). Long-term detainees, by virtue of their seniority, take the esteemed positions and
roles in the inmate hierarchy. While helpful in the short-run, the informal inmate structures
supplant jail administration (Narag & Jones, 2016). Inmates can re-create their pre-prison
luxuries. This set-up also introduces criminogenic scripts that explain away inmates’ guilt or
accountability in their own crimes or scripts that valorise detainees as victims of the criminal
justice system (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Consistent with the claims of SLT, long-term pretrial
detainees serve as the role models where newly arrived detainees learn definitions and techniques
of crime-making (Akers, 1985). Detainees’ personal negative experiences with the police, the
prosecutors, and judges are imported (Irwin & Cressey, 1962) in the jail community and are
collectively stored in the memories of the long-term detainees. These are then re-articulated and
reframed to highlight their feelings of victimisation. These narratives are consciously utilised by
the long-term detainees as bases to unite the inmate population in their perceived opposition to
the system. Paradoxically, long-term detainees’ exposure to the iniquity of the criminal justice
system, where they observe incorrigible offenders come and go, provides them with the justifica-
tions to have their fellow detainees summarily executed.
This paper is exploratory and has a number of limitations. First, the research participants were
drawn from an all-male mega-city jail located in an urban area and which is known for its chronic
overcrowding problems. The inmate coping strategies and jail culture that emerged may be
unique to this jail, thus the findings on the consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration
may have limited generalisability. It appears that the consequences of prolonged pretrial incar-
ceration are strongly mediated by these organisational coping mechanisms. Since jail and prison
studies in the Philippines suggest that the formation of informal inmate structures is ubiquitous
(Gutierrez, 2012; Narag, 2005; Narag & Jones, 2016; Narag & Lee, 2017), more research needs to
be conducted to determine how the informal inmate structures mediate the impact of prolonged
pretrial incarceration.
Second, the participant selection criterion of at least 5 years of incarceration was conveniently
set. The researcher initially thought that by choosing this subset population, the phenomenon
would be better captured. In hindsight, and after doing the analyses, the researcher realised that
limiting the participants to a subset population inherently introduced bias. That is, the voices of
the prolonged detainees are the ones privileged, and the voices of the newly arrived detainees were
not incorporated, yet it appears that the newly arrived detainees carry the brunt of the excesses of
privileges enjoyed by the long-term detainees. Third, the veracity of the participants’ claims is
difficult to ascertain. Though the researcher made diligent efforts to establish consistency to the
responses of the participants by probing and asking for examples to prove a point, participants
may simply be parroting experiences they heard from other detainees and not based on their own
personal experiences. For example, given that many detainees report being abused by the police,
the participants may report that they too were victims to be in solidarity with other detainees.
These claims of victimisations, whether true or not, are difficult to ascertain.
Given these limitations, future studies must replicate this research using different meth-
odologies and in various settings. Future research may be conducted in other settings, such as
jails with less detainee population and less overcrowding problems, jails in rural areas, or jails
with female detainees. This will tease out the impact of prolonged pretrial incarceration over
130 R. E. NARAG

and above the impact of inmate society and culture in a particular facility. Future studies must
also draw randomly from the general detainee population, with equal representation on the
length of stay of the detainees. This sampling design will provide a balanced view from all
detainees on their perceptions of prolonged pretrial incarceration. Future studies may also
incorporate other sources of information such as court records and jail institutional data to
complement the detainees’ narratives. This will improve the veracity of the detainees’ claims.
However, extreme care must be exercised to protect the identity of the detainees, consistent
with their status as vulnerable populations. Finally, informed by these initial findings, survey
questions may be developed and administered to quantify the extent of the consequences of
prolonged pretrial incarceration.
Despite these limitations, this paper contributes significantly to the understanding of pro-
longed pretrial incarceration, which has received scant attention in the literature especially in
developing country settings. Majority of the previous studies are descriptive, emotive, and
atheoretical. This paper utilises prison and criminological theories in developing a framework
to understand the causes and consequences of prolonged pretrial incarceration. This approach
points to the formulation of theory-based policy prescriptions. First, prolonged pretrial incarcera-
tion is a form of strain that results to different negative individual and jail outcomes. The root
causes of the strain must be first addressed in order to eradicate the negative outcomes. Currently,
in the Philippines, prolonged pretrial incarceration is popularly viewed as a manifestation of a
broken criminal justice system (Curato, 2017). Instead of viewing it as a consequence of the
prevalent use of pretrial detention and case delay, however, it is viewed as a cause of future
recidivism and violent drug offending. Thus, there is a massive support for vigilante justice, where
many Filipinos concur to the notion that it is okay to kill criminals because they are likely to evade
punishments from the justice system (Bautista, 2017; Curato, 2017). This paper suggests that such
views, despite its popularity, are misguided. Informed by GST, the proper venue for intervention
must be centred on the sources of strain, that is, in reducing the prevalence of pretrial detention
and the length of case delay. This can be in the form of structural reforms (improving the number
of court actors, creating new courts, and pouring of resources), organisational reforms (court
management trainings, caseload processing, continuous trials), and cultural reforms (profession-
alism, continuing education, and sensitivity trainings). A number of these interventions had been
introduced and preliminary assessments of the outcomes look promising.
Secondly, prolonged pretrial incarceration is a form of exposure to the criminogenic ethos
of the jail environment. Efforts to rehabilitate the detainees thus become more difficult in the
presence of prolonged pretrial detainees who peddle scripts that justify criminal behaviours.
Jail managers must be cognisant of these inmate dynamics and must design programmes that
identify and target the unique needs of prolonged pretrial detainees. While the ultimate goal is
the elimination of prolonged trial incarceration, the current long-term detainees can be
trained as partners in reformation. These “old heads,” (Anderson, 1999; Kreager et al.,
2017) when properly trained and oriented in progressive inmate programming can be utilised
as mentors for newly arrived detainees. The esteemed status accorded to these prolonged
pretrial detainees, by virtue of their seniority, can thus be utilised positively in developing
healthy jail environment.
Finally, prolonged pretrial incarceration is a worldwide concern especially among developing
countries. Current trend suggests that it will worsen in the foreseeable future (Walmsley, 2016).
International organisations and multilateral aid agencies are correct in recognising this issue as a
major challenge in propagating the rule of law and efficacy in the administration of justice. In the
context of the Philippines, long-term pretrial detainees, who are the victims of this phenomenon,
are strong endorsers of vigilante justice. Thus, more international resources must be poured in
developing mechanisms to strengthen local criminal justice institutions. Failure to reform the
slow-paced trial processes may translate to the rise and acceptance of populist leaders who
promise instant but brutal form of vigilante justice.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 131

Notes
1. The international data here is incomplete, as many countries do not systematically collect data on the length of
stay of pretrial detainees.
2. The total number of pretrial detainees reported here is a conservative estimate. There are numerous police
detention cells and Municipal Jails managed by the Philippine National Police that do not systematically
report the number of inmates under their custody. The Bureau of Corrections manages the convicted prisoner
population, which has 42,000 inmates.
3. The Task Force Katarungan and Kalayaan of the Philippine Supreme Court utilised 6 months (for MTC cases)
and 3 years (for RTC cases) as thresholds for case delay. The Task Force encourages judges to release the
detainees if they already served the threshold. If cases have a minimum penalty of more than 6 month (for
MTC cases) and 3 years (for RTC cases), judges are required to fast track the disposition of the cases. This
innovation was introduced in 2015 and its impact is currently reviewed.
4. Noise barrage is a common form of civil disobedience employed by detainees to protest perceived abuses of
the jail management. Detainees would collectively get out of their cells, resist headcounts, and make noise to
attract media and public attention on their plight.

Notes on contributor
Raymund E. Narag, PhD is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale. His research interests include pretrial incarceration and how it impacts
jail management. He has been advocating for criminal justice reforms in the Philipppines for the past 20 years.

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