RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL

KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER

CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, TAGUIG CITY, AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The judicial quest to discern who may be offenders as defined in a penal statute is at times abstruse in itself. One
such instance is whether Republic Act (RA) No. 9262,[1] or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004, allows the father to apply for protection and custody orders against the mother who is alleged to have
committed violence against their child.

ANTECEDENTS

In 2005, Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American citizen, met Rosalina Sibal Knutson (Rosalina) in Singapore.
They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby). In 2011, the family lived in the
Philippines. However, Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs. Anyhow,
Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby. Thereafter, Rosalina got hooked in casinos. Randy learned that Rosalina
spent weeks in gambling dens and left Rhuby under the care of strangers. Worse, Rosalina incurred large debts from
casino financiers prompting her to sell the house and lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the
family. Rosalina then rented an apartment and got herself a boyfriend. Randy advised Rosalina to be discreet in her
illicit affairs because it is not good for Rhuby to see her mother with another man. Later, Randy discovered that
Rosalina maltreated her own mother in Rhuby's presence. Rosalina also hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her
face and knocking her head. One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even
texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station
but the authorities explained that they cannot assist him in domestic issues. Afterwards, Rosalina sent Randy her
naked pictures with a message that he would not see that body again. Meantime, the neighbors of Rosalina
complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in her apartment. The lessor even terminated the lease after
marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises.[2] On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed
against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders
before the Regional Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 69 (RTC) docketed as JDRC Case No. 313. Randy averred
that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological
development.[3]

In an Order[4] dated January 10, 2018, the RTC dismissed the petition explaining that protection and custody orders in
RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. The RTC ratiocinated that the
child's mother cannot be considered as an offender under the law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the
father because he is not a "woman victim of violence." The RTC cited the ruling in Ocampo v. Arcaya-
Chua[5] (Ocampo) that a protection order cannot be issued in favor of a husband against his wife,[6] thus:
Notably, the offender under [RA No.] 9262 is any person who is the husband, former husband, those who had
sexual or dating relationship with the woman or with whom she has a common child. On the other hand, the
offended party may be the wife, former wife, a woman who has or had sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the man has a common child or HER child.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that in the definition of an offender, a child's mother is not included as one of
the offenders. In stark contrast, a child's mother is specifically mentioned in the definition for offended party.
This could lead to no other conclusion that a child's mother cannot be considered as an offender under [RA No.]
9262.

Moreover, a protection order is defined under Section 8 of [RA No.] 9262, to quote:
"SECTION 8. Protection Orders. — A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and
granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order should serve the purpose of
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. [x x x]"
Based on the foregoing, the issuance of a protection order is for [the] purpose of preventing further violence
committed by an offender (any person who is the husband, former husband, those who had sexual or dating
relationship with the woman or with whom she has a common child) against a woman or her child. It does not
pertain to a mother who allegedly abused her own child. Hence, a protection order under [RA No.] 9262
cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child.
Further, petitioner's prayer for the granting of a temporary or permanent custody of Rhuby under [RA No.] 9262 is
likewise misplaced as Section 28 of the said law specifically states:
"SECTION 28. Custody of children. — The woman victim of violence shall he entitled to the custody and
support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old [or] older but with mental or physical disabilities
shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.["]
As it is, [RA No.] 9262 does not apply in the case at bar. The petitioner, who is not a "woman victim of violence[,"]
cannot avail of the remedies provided therein particularly the issuance of a Temporary/Permanent Protection Order
and the granting of a temporary or permanent custody of Rhuby to him.

To be further enlightened, in OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR versus JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-
CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City [633 Phil. 79 (2010)], a judge in a custody case issued a TPO
under Sec. 15, [RA No.] 9262, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein
petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and
office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor. The issuance of said TPO was questioned
considering that it was issued in favor of petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. In [its] ruling[,] the Supreme Court pronounced:
"x x x x

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando
that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner
Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under
[RA] No. 9292 (sic), known as the Anti[-]Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family
court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of [RA] No. 9292 (sic)."
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence to the case at bar, considering that the petitioner is the husband, a Protection
Order cannot be issued against herein respondent, his wife.

On a final note, granting that respondent neglected, abandoned or physically abused Rhuby, her minor daughter,
there are laws and rules specifically created for the latter's protection and safety that petitioner and/or Rhuby could
avail of. Unfortunately, [RA No.] 9262 is not one of them.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[7] (Emphases supplied)

Randy moved for a reconsideration[8] and argued that RA No. 9262 used the term "any person" which is not limited to
male offenders. The law must be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children. In an Order[9] dated March 14, 2018, the RTC denied the motion and reiterated that
RA No. 9262 does not apply to a situation where the mother committed violence against her own child. The RTC
expounded that the word "children" should not be isolated with the term "women" because the title of the law used the
conjunction "and" which denotes joinder of words, phrases, and clauses. As such, the children being protected refer
to those under the care of the woman victim of violence,[10] viz.:
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner alleged that a mother may be the offender under [RA No.] 9262. He
submits that Section 3 of [RA No.] 9262 does not limit the offender to a male person. Otherwise, the law could have
used the term, "any male person", and not "any person". Citing the case of Garcia v. Drilon, petitioner argued that the
term "any person" includes lesbian relationships, to quote:
"There is likewise no merit to the contention that [RA No.] 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who [has] or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships." ([Emphases in the original])
Petitioner's reliance on foregoing jurisprudence is misplaced.

Notably, the aforementioned pronouncement is not applicable to the case at bar considering that there is no lesbian
relationship between respondent [and Rhuby] as they are mother and child.

Moreover, the "person" referred to in the afore-quoted pronouncement pertains to the individual who [has] or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the woman as a victim of violence.

It is thus clear that the foregoing provision does not apply to a situation where it was the mother herself who
had committed violent and abusive acts against her own child.

Petitioner further argued that the restrictive interpretation of the court on the definition of an offender under [RA No.]
9262 does not hold water, taking into account Section 4 of [RA No.] 9262, which speaks of the liberal construction of
the act to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
The said argument is without merit.

Petitioner isolates the word "children" in order to avail the relief of a protection order under [RA No.] 9262 in
favor of Rhuby against her own mother. However, a perusal of the title of [RA No.] 9262 explicitly states: "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefore, And For Other Purposes". The conjunction used in the title is the conjunctive word "and"
not the word "or". Hence, there is joinder and not independence. x x x

xxxx

For emphasis, violence against women and their children is defined under Section 3 of [RA No.] 9262 as:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child[,] whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
Aside from the foregoing, the definition of children under Sec. 3(h) of said act is clear, to quote:
"(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of
themselves as defined under [RA No.] 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim
and other children under her care."
Obviously, the victim being referred to in said definition is the woman subjected to acts of violence by her
offender. As it is, children being protected under [RA No.] 9262 refer to the biological children and other
children under the care of the woman/victim. Thus, the court maintains its position that a child's mother is
not included as one of the offenders under [RA No.] 9262.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[11] (Emphases supplied)

Aggrieved, Randy directly filed a Petition for Certiorari[12] before the Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in dismissing the application for protection and custody orders. Randy contends that he availed of
these remedies on behalf of his daughter, who is a victim of violence in the hands of her own mother. Furthermore,
Randy maintains that RA No. 9262 does not limit the offender to a male person and the legislative intent is to provide
all possible protection to children.[13]

RULING

The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive but shared with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the RTC.[14] However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not give a party unbridled freedom to
choose the venue of action. The policy on the hierarchy of courts adjures the Court from dealing with causes that are
also well within the competence of the CA and the RTC to resolve.[15] This Court is a court of last resort and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions.[16] The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is both a
constitutional imperative and a filtering mechanism to enable the Court to focus on more important
matters.[17] Corollarily, the Court's jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should generally be exercised with respect
to actions or proceedings before the CA, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for
some reason or another are not controllable by the CA.[18]

However, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule and is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit: (a)
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the
issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that
will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (e)
where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews
the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of
their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.[19]

Here, circumstances exist to justify direct recourse to this Court. The case presents an issue of first impression, i.e.,
whether the father can avail of the remedies under RA No. 9262 on behalf of his minor child against the mother's
violent and abusive acts. To be sure, there is no definite ruling yet on this question to serve as a guidepost for future
cases.[20] Also, the interests of justice and public welfare demand the resolution of the controversy because it will
benefit not only the parties but also children similarly situated. More importantly, the petition raises a pure question of
law and does not involve an examination of facts and probative value of evidence.[21] Hence, it is an opportune time
for this Court to answer the novel query with far reaching implications on whether the father may apply for protection
and custody orders against the mother who is alleged to have committed violence against their child.

RA No. 9262 allows the

father of the offended party
to apply for protection and
custody orders.
In Garcia v. Drilon[22] (Garcia), the Court pointed out that the Congress excluded men as victims under RA No. 9262.
The legislative intent is to limit the protection against violence to women and children only. The classification rests on
substantial distinctions because women and children are vulnerable victims of abuse compared to men.[23] The
difference in treatment is consistent with the declared policy of the law to value the dignity of women and children,
and protect them from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.[24] In that case, the Court likewise
upheld the constitutionality of the remedies of protection and custody orders to prevent further acts of violence
committed by the offender against women and their children.[25] Inarguably, the offended parties under the law are
only women and children. Nevertheless, it is improper to conclude that the law denies a father of these remedies
solely because of his gender or that he is not a "woman victim of violence."

Section 9 (b)[26] of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to file a petition for
protection orders. The exact provision was incorporated in Section 12 (b)[27] of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA No. 9262 and Section 8 (b)[28] of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,[29] or the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children. The statute categorically used the word "parents" which pertains to the father and the
mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear language
and no explanation is required.[30] There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is
not ambiguous.[31] Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for
protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts
must not distinguish.[32]

In any event, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC states that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner to petitions for
protection orders.[33] Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, "[a] minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may
sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem." In this
case, the title of the petition for issuance of a protection order is unequivocal, to wit: "RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON
acting on behalf of minor RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, Petitioner, -versus- ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON,
Respondent."[34] There is no question that the offended party is Rhuby, a minor child, who allegedly experienced
violence and abuse. Thus, Randy may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as the parent of the offended party.

Contrary to the RTC's theory, the ruling in Ocampo is inapplicable. In that case, respondent judge issued a protection
order directing the common law wife to stay away from her common law husband's house and office. Respondent
judge also granted the father provisional custody of his minor daughter. The Investigating Justice found that the
protection order is justified with respect to the minor daughter but not to the common law husband. Under the law, a
protection order cannot be issued in favor of the husband against the wife. The Investigating Justice explained that
the "TPO against [the wife], insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of [the husband], to
cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening [the husband] and to refrain from acts of commission or
omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of [the husband], was
anomalous."[35] However, the Investigating Justice clarified that there is justification to award the temporary custody of
the minor daughter to the father. There is substantial evidence that the protection order in favor of the minor daughter
was necessary and would serve her paramount interest. The psychological evaluation report and the statements of
material witnesses all confirmed that the mother has not been a good influence to her daughter. The Court sustained
these factual findings and adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent judge is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.[36]

On the other hand, Randy is not asking for a protection order in his favor. As intimated earlier, Randy filed the petition
on behalf of their minor daughter Rhuby. The petition is principally and directly for the protection of the minor child
and not the father. Admittedly, Randy also asked for the temporary custody of their daughter because the mother was
allegedly unfit. Yet, the RTC did not evaluate the case whether the mother may be divested of custody over the child.
The RTC ignored the evidence on the pretext that the father is not allowed to apply for protection and custody orders
because he is not a woman victim of violence. On this point, the Court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC that amounted to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[37] As in Ocampo, the RTC should have examined the evidence on record and made a prima
facie determination as to the ideal person to whom the temporary custody of the child should be awarded. The best
interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern.

RA No. 9262 covers a

situation where the mother
committed violent and
abusive acts against her own
child.
Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as "any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty." The law criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had sexual or dating relationship
with the woman, or with whom the woman has a common child. However, the Court in Garcia emphasized that the
law does not single out the husband or father as the culprit. The statute used the gender-neutral word "person" as the
offender which embraces any person of either sex. The offender may also include other persons who conspired to
commit the violence, thus:
As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus,
in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan [588 Phil. 532 (2008)], the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son
(Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.[38] (Emphases supplied)
Differently stated, the fact that a social legislation affords special protection to a particular sector does not
automatically suggest that its members are excluded from violating such law. This is not the first time that social
legislations in the Philippines with penal character used the phrase "any person" to describe who may be offenders.
There are parallel provisions in RA No. 7610,[39] or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act,[40] RA No. 7277,[41] as amended by RA No. 9442,[42] or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons,[43] RA No. 8042,[44] as amended by RA No. 10022,[45] or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995,[46] RA No. 4670,[47] or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,[48] RA No. 9433,[49] or the Magna Carta for
Public Social Workers,[50] and RA No. 7305,[51] or the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers.[52] In other words,
identification or association with such groups will not exempt their members from criminal liability. A child 16 years old
and above who acted with discernment may still be charged with violation of RA No. 7610 if he induces or coerces
another child to perform in obscene exhibitions. A person with disability is likewise criminally liable under RA No.
7277, as amended, if he discriminates or publicly ridicules another person suffering from restriction, impairment, or a
different ability. The same is true with a migrant worker who engages in the act of illegal recruitment punished under
RA No. 8042, as amended. Lastly, a public school teacher, a public social worker, or a public health worker who
interferes or prevents similar professionals in the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties are criminally
liable.

Logically, a mother who maltreated her child resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological violence defined and
penalized under RA No. 9262 is not absolved from criminal liability notwithstanding that the measure is intended to
protect both women and their children. In this case, however, the RTC dismissed Randy's petition for protection
orders on behalf of his minor daughter on the ground that the mother cannot be considered as an offender under the
law. To restate, the policy of RA No. 9262 is to guarantee full respect for human rights. Towards this end, the State
shall exert efforts to address violence committed against children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

Specifically, Section 3 (2), Article XV of the 1987 Constitution espoused the State to defend "[t]he right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; x x x." Also, Article 25 (2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights advocated that "[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.
All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection." Further, the Philippines as a
state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child has the following international commitments, to wit:
Preamble

The States Parties to the present Convention,

xxxx

Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up
in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,

xxxx

Article 2

xxxx

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's
parents, legal guardians, or family members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-
being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

xxxx

Article 9

1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except
when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be
necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the
parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child's place of residence.

xxxx

Article 19

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the
child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment,
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any
other person who has the care of the child.

xxxx

Article 39

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place
in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child. (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the Committee on the Rights of the Child commented that "all forms of violence against children, however
light, are unacceptable. x x x Frequency, severity of harm and intent to harm are not prerequisites for the definitions
of violence."[53] The United Nations Children's Fund recognized "violence against children x x x as global human
rights and public health problems of critical importance."[54] Also, violence against children "takes many forms,
including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, and may involve neglect or deprivation. Violence occurs in many
settings, including the home, school, community and over the Internet. Similarly, a wide range of
perpetrators commit violence against children, such as family members, intimate partners, teachers, neighbors,
strangers and other children."[55] The World Health Organization said that "[v]iolence against children includes all
forms of violence against people under 18 years old, whether perpetrated by parents or other caregivers, peers,
romantic partners, or strangers."[56] Verily, mothers may be offenders in the context of RA No. 9262. The Court finds
no substantial distinction between fathers and mothers who abused their children that warrants a different treatment
or exemption from the law. Any violence is reprehensible and harmful to the child's dignity and development.

The RTC maintained its position that the child's mother is not included as one of the offenders under RA No. 9262
anchored on the interpretation based merely on the title of the law. To recall, the RTC explained that the word
"children" should not be isolated with the term "women" because the title of the law used the conjunction "and" which
denotes joinder of phrases and clauses. As such, the children being protected refer to those under the care of the
woman victim of violence. Yet, the penal provisions under Section 5 of RA No. 9262 do away with the conjunctive
word "and" and used the disjunctive term "or" that signals disassociation or independence, thus:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the
victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute
rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or
her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child;
and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial
of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphases supplied)
Section 4 of RA No. 9262 mandates that the law "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children." Obviously, the RTC's restrictive interpretation requiring that the
mother and her child to be victims of violence before they may be entitled to the remedies of protection and custody
orders will frustrate the policy of the law to afford special attention to women and children as usual victims of violence
and abuse. The approach will weaken the law and remove from its coverage instances where the mother herself is
the abuser of her child. The cramping stance negates not only the plain letters of the law and the clear legislative
intent as to who may be offenders but also downgrades the country's avowed international commitment to eliminate
all forms of violence against children including those perpetrated by their parents. The RTC's consoling statement
that children who suffered abuse from the hands of their own mothers may invoke other laws except RA No. 9262 is
discriminatory. The supposed reassurance is an outright denial of effective legal measures to address the
seriousness and urgency of the situation. Suffice it to say that only RA No. 9262 created the innovative remedies of
protection and custody orders. Other laws have no mechanisms to prevent further acts of violence against the child.

In sum, the Court refuses to be an instrument of injustice and public mischief perpetrated against vulnerable sectors
of the society such as children victims of violence. The Court will not shirk its bounden duty to interpret the law in
keeping with the cardinal principle that in enacting a statute, the legislature intended right and justice to prevail.[57]

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 10, 2018 and March 14,
2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 69 in JDRC Case No. 313 are SET ASIDE. Let
a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion
for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of
this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005,
barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by
R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss
arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground
that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.
No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14 contending that the doctrine
of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing
that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the
relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of
R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage
of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF

SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to
R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by
giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3
thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a
factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot
be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only
unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3
of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor
Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be
sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of
R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the
words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article
39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting
the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
 (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory
construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a
means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to
defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out
in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a
trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is
centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No.
9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or
necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July
11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against
respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and
gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against
Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven
years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the
natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her
to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about
his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was
just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his
ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom
he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the
latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered
to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job.
He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household
expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the
bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.
 f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to
its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the
bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
 c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things
from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with
the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter
was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex
Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys,
Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the
maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts

of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating

in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
 3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the
three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children
directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00

for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders,
and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure
of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND
THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT

R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in
this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the
RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not
an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of
which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted
an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of
a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes
are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence
apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the
main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the
men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we
would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity
to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and
abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr.
President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that
the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter
how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic
environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to
the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because
the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that
in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always
the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing
that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is
not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-
year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that.
It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but
not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating
that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a
family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone
has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance
than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common
law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze.
They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United
States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women
per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often
present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide
victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the
role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing.
The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women
and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total
cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of
4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year
2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A.
9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200

2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lasciviousne 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ss

Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018 1,588
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28

RA 9262 218 924 9,974 9,021
9 7 9 5

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinag
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
e

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

 Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 4 8

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the
smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89%
of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse
are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles
to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-
drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result
in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women
are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress'
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often
serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack
of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August
5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as

a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so
vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld –
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days
(5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not
to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently
forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due
process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued
to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that
this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation
and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311
of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject
for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection
is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
1âwphi1

receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and
the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would
be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of
law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1 dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner for
violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 .

The facts of the case follow.

On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session
and went to the boarding house of AAA.3 At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were in an
ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common children (then aged four and two years
old). Dinamling and his friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed. Suddenly,
Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and
a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as
a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as she
could not carry the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding
bottle outside the house, causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and requested the
latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already
had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by the friends back to
AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and AAA.
Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the police, she was
merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a
policeman himself.4

Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred. AAA was at the
house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When
she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked
him why he kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name
and told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling
caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down
AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants
and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a
motorcycle.5 AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She
found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital.
There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was
hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts. 6

As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal
Informations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section
6(f)7 of RA No. 9262. The two Informations against him read:

Criminal Case No. 1701:

That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with
whom he has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or
humiliation by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting
utterances directed against the victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating
circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Criminal Case No. 1702:

That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with
whom he has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or
humiliation by boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant(sic) and
panty (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating
circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried
jointly.8

For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused,
only petitioner testified for and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he
was on duty at the town's police station at the time that the offenses were committed.9

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of both charges.
For Criminal Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court
ordered him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed and the one
in Criminal Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as maximum.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding his defenses of
denial and alibi as well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a
prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the
abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or could have been caused by an infection or
other factors.11

This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will modify some of the penalties
imposed by the appellate court.
The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the
appellate court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review brought before this Court.12 Time and again, the Court has
consistently declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review. 13 Factual
findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on
this Court.14

But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be entertained by this
Court in a petition for review, to wit:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,15

None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by the petitioner as a ground to grant
his petition. But even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of substantial justice, that any of the
exceptions above were indeed invoked, as the petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give
weight to petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi as well as to his stance that the testimony of Dr.
Diaz exculpates him from the crime, this Court, upon a close examination of the case records, still
found no error in the appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.

On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In
particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was clear,
categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence. Herein below are excerpts of her
testimony:

Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the evening of March 14, 2007, could you
please tell the court what transpired?

A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven or eight o'clock in the evening, I was
letting my kids sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a drinking spree and x x x he
started to evict us from that boarding house because according to him, I (was) using that boarding
house as a whore house (by) bringing in partners, et cetera to that boarding house. That (was) why
he was letting us out of it. And he even told me that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the
basura (garbage) bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he placed the ducklings to pack our
things and leave the place. That night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was waiting for
him to stop talking and leave but he never left us up to the time he threw the feeding bottle of my
baby outside that caused it to break and that was also the time I decided to go to the house of BBB
because it is the place where my landlady (was) staying.

xxxx

Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.

A. He threw it outside, Sir.

Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused that evening?

A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it was directed (at an) innocent
individual and that is very painful.

Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the time the accused was acting that
way?

A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again inflict those pain (on) us.

Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened next?

A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with one of the kids but to my dismay, even
the milk of my baby was not there any more; that night because it was around 11:00 o'clock, we had
to use the feeding bottle of BBB's son together with the milk because when they went to fetch the
kids, the milk was gone.

Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it happened (sic) previously?

A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was) prompted to go back home and to my
relatives for protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).

Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did he do, if any?

A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting my head, pulls my hair kicks me and
there was a time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is some kind of family problem that
we could talk xxx over and so it was left that way. I thought leaving him would be the best thing to do
but he kept on following us.16

xxxx

Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007. Will you please tell the court what
happened that late afternoon or early evening?

A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of what happened on March 14, 2007
when we left the boarding house.
 xxxx

Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?

A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and shouted words that (on) final count, (I)
should be out of that place.

Q. And what else happened?

A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.

Q. What transpired next?

A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside and I inquired (as to) why he (kept
on) following us when we (already) left the boarding house and then he started shouting at me,
shouting my family name, x x x x that I (was) good for nothing and that I (could) sue him (in) court
and he (would) pay me. So I said "I thought when we already left, you were at peace with yourself
already." When I was going down, going to the barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I
tried to go back, he kicked me. He pulled my pants down and pulled even my panty and he said x x x
he (did) that to me because I was worthless.

Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants and your panty?

A. Front of CCC.

Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?

A. Road.

Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby, that road, that spot where he pulled
down your pants and panty?

A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There are houses above and then one of
them told me he saw but he is afraid to come out.

Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?

A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.

Q. Was it still early evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About what time?

A. Around 9 o'clock.

Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road, what else happened?
A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting at me, my family name. It is very
hurting because my family (had) nothing to do with this.

xxxx

Q. And what happened the following day?

A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early morning of March 21, there was pain at my
back. That night when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I (would) just go tomorrow for
medication but I did not reach the day because I was bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there
(was) blood so I said I think I am going to abort. There (was) blood already so I decided to go to bath
before I (went) to the hospital but when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse bleeding so they
(had) to carry me with the use of a blanket to the hospital.17

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child with
Dinamling. She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his
motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be abused. She previously filed with the
police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she learned from Dinamling that
he had been discharged as a policeman.18

The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said testimony of AAA which the Court of
Appeals has affirmed. Under such circumstances, this Court has little option but to accord said
findings with great respect, if not finality. The findings off act of the trial court, as regards the
credibility of a witness, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the evidence on
record are accorded finality.19

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like a corpse"
because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her daughter,
including the times that she saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the
boxing and kicking that she had received from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was a married
man when he had his relationship with AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with
AAA and the children because he always went home to his own wife.22

The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA
No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the law
states:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the
crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;23

 (2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;24

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.25

As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have
been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was
then in a five-year ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling
had two common children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal
abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her children were
actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend
and the children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that
AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling her to pack
her clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle
outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her children. Dinamling also left
and took with him the elder child and left the baby behind. AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the
children but the latter found only the baby. According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was
not an isolated one, as similar incidents had happened previously.

As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In
addition to the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender,
the prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public
ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling and
counting down on AAA for the latter to come out of the house where she was staying;

b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;

c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"

d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;

e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and
calling her worthless;

f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he left.

All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public
ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering is
so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in her.

All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the
crime as prescribed in the law.

It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The
testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act, as long as it is
credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because evidence is weighed and not
counted.26 If, in criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical and credible testimony
of a lone witness is deemed enough to support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a
case of violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner the
testimony of a single but credible witness for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner, corroborative testimony is not needed to support a conviction.29

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted
on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical,
sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a)

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof
of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of
the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and
alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at XXX Police
Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However, on cross examination, he admitted that it
takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's boarding house. 33

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as
inherently weak34 and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over
the positive declarations of the victim.35 In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight
relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where
there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted
by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.37

In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal
and positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator
is not an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at
that time carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two common children.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only
was heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its
commission.38 Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged
location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in the
same municipality as the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this
police station is just "two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused
admits that he was in the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be
said that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime, and his defense of alibi
cannot prosper.39

Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a
negative assertion that is weaker than the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost has no
probative value and may be further discarded in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the
part of the witness to impute so grave a wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given
weight if the accused failed to demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed.42

But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance
of which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.

By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy
of a medical certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:

a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;

b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;

c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow. 43

The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by Dr.
Baguilat.44 Dr. Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the court from
his current place of work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-
gynecologist of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical certificate indicated that
AAA was pregnant, but that her incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her
"mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the contusion
and hematoma were caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body. 47 When cross-
examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive
organ or urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines, while another cause of anemia is
malnutrition.48

Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as
to whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.

The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries
from the mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is
charged. Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the
testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not
indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an
element of the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking,
unnecessary.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by
the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i)
of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the
accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of
physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical
violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and
stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also
instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's
public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of
the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on her as well as to the mental and emotional
suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to
have led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the
case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the
absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or
physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of this particular crime.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical
suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the
offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by the other
subsections of the law's provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or
property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused
mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if
they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of
mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz,
or even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner
Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's
miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is
alleged to have caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it
is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an
aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5
hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.49
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for
the penalty to be properly imposed.50

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the
crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of
miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating
circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven
by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course
of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion
secondary to the mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete
abortion or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present
contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of pregnancy.
The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in
this petition. Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been
established and it may be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that aggravates
Dinamling's criminal liability.

Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the
trial court and appellate court.51

As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime. Although it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of AAA's
1âwphi1

children, such fact was not alleged in the information and therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered aggravating because it neither
facilitated the commission of the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the
offender.53 The fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged
and established. This single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises
his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also
Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a
maximum penalty that is derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the
minimum penalty should come from the penalty one degree lower than prision mayor which is prision
correccional, whose range is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.55 Therefore, this
Court modifies the trial court's Order dated September 17, 2009, 56 which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and imposes on petitioner Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of
prision mayor as maximum. The trial court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is upheld.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating
circumstance. Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of
RA No. 9262 and Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals are to be modified. The maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in
its maximum period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. And again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be
imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of
a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and the order for him to undergo psychological
counseling, as upheld by the appellate court, are hereby affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are
punishable by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the
greater ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the minimum and
maximum lengths of the sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No.
1701.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any
reversible error in the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby
AFFIRMED and MODIFIED only as to the penalties imposed, to wit:

1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is,
likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling;

2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6) years of prision correccional as minimum
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in
the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13,
20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal
Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information which states:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the
complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence,
RA 9262 was inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had
lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible
for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior
dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against
women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Issues

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered
by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. 6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm
was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical
harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to
purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such
as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to
amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made. 1âwphi1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210
are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is
directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.

SO ORDERED.
 ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, PETITIONER, VS. PATRICIA ROGGENKAMP, RESPONDENT,

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An acquittal from a charge of physical violence against women and their children is not a bar to the
filing of a civil action for damages for physical injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code if an
acquittal was due to reasonable doubt, without any declaration that the facts upon which the offense
arises are nonexistent.

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Alastair John Kane, assailing the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214,
Mandaluyong City, dismissing Patricia Roggenkamp's Complaint for Damages against Alastair John
Kane. The Complaint, which was based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, was dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction.

Alastair John Kane (Alastair John) and Patricia Roggenkamp (Patricia) are Australian
citizens.5 They met in January 2004 in Brisbane, Australia, and became lovers immediately.6

Patricia decided to put up a business in the Philippines, and eventually travelled with Alastair John to
Manila. They settled in a condominium unit located in Paranaque City supposedly owned by
Patricia.7

On March 30, 2006, an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with Patricia as the private
complainant. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-0413, was then raffled to Branch 260 of
the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City.8

According to Patricia, she and Alastair John attended a party hosted by her son, Ashley Richard
Cayzer (Ashley Richard) on November 30, 2004. The next day, December 1, 2004, after they had
just arrived at their residence at about 1:00 a.m., Patricia confronted Alastair John for allegedly
looking at the underwear of other female guests at the party. Ignoring Patricia, Alastair John went on
to lie down on the bed. Patricia then sat on a nearby chair.9

Alastair John, angered by Patricia's remarks, allegedly approached Patricia, lifted her off the chair,
and dropped her on the floor. Patricia further claimed that Alastair John punched her in the head,
dragged her by the hair to the bed, and pushed her head against the pillow. Patricia fought back
and, when she had the chance, ran to the bathroom and locked herself inside.10

The next day, on December 2, 2004, Patricia's son, Ashley Richard, visited his mother and saw her
lying in bed in pain. Alastair John told Ashley Richard that his mother had too much liquor the night
of the party and, when they arrived home, Alastair John tried to carry her to the bed. Unfortunately,
he accidently dropped her on the floor because the bed, which allegedly had wheels, moved.11

Ashley Richard then brought Patricia to the San Juan de Dios Hospital where she was prescribed
painkillers for 12 days. After the trip to the hospital, Patricia went home to Alastair John. Their
situation went back to being peaceful, and they even went on vacation from December 26, 2004 to
January l,2005.12
On January 6, 2005, or merely five (5) days after, Alastair John allegedly verbally abused Patricia.
He then left the next day, taking Patricia's car with him, as well as the keys to their Paranaque
residence and another condominium unit in Pasig City where he stayed. Patricia, accompanied by
her driver, went to the Pasig condominium unit and recovered possession of her car.13

On February 4, 2005, Patricia finally reported the incidents to the police. She explained that, prior to
the December 1, 2004 incident, there were already prior incidents of abuse committed against her by
Alastair John. After preliminary investigation, probable cause for violation of Republic Act 9262 or
the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was found against Alastair John.14

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paranaque City acquitted Alastair John on the
ground of reasonable doubt.15 The Paranaque trial court was of the opinion that Alastair John's
account of the events—that he accidentally dropped Patricia on the floor while he was carrying her—
was "in accord with human experience[,]”16 while that of Patricia's was not. It further said that "if
[Patricia] was really a victim of violence or abuse, she should have told the same to her son [Ashley
Richard], especially because the latter, according to her, is a lawyer."17 The Paranaque trial court
more particularly said:

The Court noted that there was a heated altercation between the private complainant and the
accused after they came from the birthday party of the former's son on December 1, 2004. Kane
was accused of looking and peeping at the girls during the party. The Court is inclined to give
credence to the version of the accused. The same is in accord with human experience. On the other
hand[,] the version of Patricia is not in accord with human experience. She claimed that she was
grabbed by the hair, hit her head and chest, neck, pelvic area and shoulder but the clinical abstract
does not indicate any signs of physical violence. This court finds it unnatural why Patricia declared to
the doctor that she accidentally fell on a marble floor. This is her same declaration to her son,
Ashley. If she was really a victim of violence or abuse, she should have told the same to her son,
especially because the latter, according to her, is a lawyer. This court is also surprised why she did
not leave the accused if it is true that he manhandled her. She could easily do those things because
her relationship with the accused was that only of lovers and there was no marriage to protect and
family to save. To reiterate, the version of Mr. Kane is shown by the parties' actuations after the date
alleged in the information. They even celebrated Christmas in a beach resort with friends and with
the accused playing Santa [Claus]. Noteworthy is the filing of the case almost one year after the
alleged incident and after the parties started to have issues on property.18

WHEREFORE, due to reasonable doubt, the accused, ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, is

hereby ACQUITTED of the crime [of] violation of Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 9262, penalized by Sec. 6 (a) of
the said Act.

SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis in the original)

Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Patricia argued that the right of action provided in Article 33 in cases of physical
injuries is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action earlier commenced against Alastair
John.20

Further, she added that the civil actions for damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code, called independent civil actions, "are not deemed instituted with the criminal action and may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation." Considering that Alastair John
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, not because he wasn't the author of the act
complained of, Patricia argued that he may still be held liable under Article 33 of the Civil Code.21
Opposing the civil action, Alastair John filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
improper venue.22 Alastair John claimed that the dismissal of the criminal case barred the filing of
the civil case, because the cases allegedly involved identical causes of action. He emphasized that
the cases were both based on his alleged physical abuse of Patricia, a matter already found to be
not "in accord with human experience."23 With respect to the venue, Alastair John argued that it was
improperly laid. The action for damages was a personal action, yet none of the parties resided in
Mandaluyong City where the civil action was filed.24

In an April 20, 2009 Order, the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the 214th Branch of the Regional
Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, then presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.25

The trial court held that civil liability was not extinguished, because Alastair John's acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the action filed by Patricia was an independent civil action
which, together with the actions provided in Articles 32, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, is separate
and distinct from the criminal action and may be enforced against an offender, separately or
simultaneously, with his civil liability ex delicto under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally,
the trial court held that venue was properly laid because at the time of the filing of the civil complaint,
Patricia was already residing in Mandaluyong City.26 In the words of the trial court:

"The motion is unimpressive.

"While it is true that accused's (herein defendant) guilt in the criminal case had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court in Paraiiaque City, the decision however did not state in
clear and [unjequivocal terms that he did not commit the offense charged. Hence, impliedly the trial
court of Paraiiaque acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt[,] then the instant civil complaint must
proceed. Civil liability arising from criminal and civil liability arising from Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176
quasi-delict for contract (Art. 31) are entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that may
be brought by injured party (International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. vs. Argon, 364 SCRA. 792)[.]

"Even if the guilt of the accused has not been [satisfactorily] established, he is not exempted from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 33 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or
omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case
are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though
both actions involve the same act or omission.

The civil liability is not extinguished where acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387).

"An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex deli[c]to, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
felony, e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Article 32 and 34, and culpa aqiiilkma under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an independent and distinct criminal action
(Article 33, Civil Code). Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender
(separately and simultaneously) subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes (Cando, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002). However, a separate civil action
based on subsidiary liability cannot be instituted during the pendency of the criminal case (Remedial
Law, Herrera).

"Likewise, the ground of improper venue cannot be sustained. It was clarified by plaintiff that when
she testified on May 22, 2007 and May 13, 2008 she considered herself a resident of Paraiiaque,
however, in November 2008 and subsequently thereafter[,] she stayed at the condominium unit of
her friend in. . . Mandaluyong City. In other words, at the time of the filing of the complaint on
November 29, 2008 she was already residing in Mandaluyong City[.| Clearly, plaintiff for purposes of
this instant case is a resident of Mandaluyong City”27 (Emphasis in the original)

With his Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, Alastair John filed his
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Patricia, her Reply. Issues were joined and the case was
set for pre-trial.28

In the meantime, Judge Sorongon was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Judge
Ofelia Calo then acted as Presiding Judge of the Mandaluyong trial court29 and, in the June 8,
2010 Order, dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground oi res jiidicata and lack of
jurisdiction.30

The Mandaluyong trial court said that, after "[taking] a closer look at the records extant to the instant
case[,]"31 any subsequent proceeding in the civil case would be "a waste of time"32 since the
decision of the Paranaque trial court had the effect of res judicata. Specifically, the Mandaluyong trial
court declared that the Parafiaque trial court's evaluation of the parties' respective evidence meant
that "the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."33

Consequently, the action based on Article 33 allegedly had no basis, and Patricia effectively
committed forum shopping. Finally, it ruled that the Paranaque trial court's decision in the criminal
case already attained finality, thus depriving the Mandaluyong trial court of jurisdiction over Patricia's
Complaint for Damages.

A closer look at the records of the instant case filed by plaintiff would show that this court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case.

The instant case which is for damages was also the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 06-413
litigated in another court, the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 260 wherein a Decision
rendered by the said court acquitting the accused, the herein defendant.

Although the motion to dismiss filed by defendants on the grounds that the instant complaint is
barred by prior judgment and improper venue was already denied for lack of merit in an Order dated
20 April 2009, the undersigned acting presiding judge deemed it proper to take a closer look at the
records extant to the instant case considering that proceeding to the initial trial will just be a waste of
time and any proceedings taken by the court will only be a nullity if the court has no jurisdiction
because of the principle of res judicata.

Verily, the evaluation made by the RTC, Branch 260, Paranaque City of the criminal case giving
credence to the version of the accused, which the Court perceived to be in accord with human
experience, and pointing to factual circumstances and explaining why the version of Patricia is not in
accord with human experience, is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
With the decision rendered by the RTC Branch 260, Paranaque City involving the same cause of
action and relief sought, and identity [of] parties, this court perceives that the filing of the instant case
in this jurisdiction constituted forum shopping. . . .

Considering that the RTC, Branch 260, Paranaque City has already taken cognizance of the case
involving the same cause of action and identity of parties, and has in fact rendered a decision which
has attained finality, this court therefore has no jurisdiction to try the same action.34

Patricia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied in a November 19, 2010
Order.35

Alleging error on the part of the Mandaluyong trial court, Patricia appealed before the Court of
Appeals. In the March 25, 2014 Decision,36 the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed
the June 8, 2010 and August 23, 2010 Orders of the Mandaluyong trial court.

The Court of Appeals first discussed how an act or omission may give rise to two (2) separate civil
liabilities on the part of an offender. The civil liability ex delicto or that arising from the crime is
provided in Article 100 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, independent civil liabilities are provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code, which are liabilities separate and distinct from the
criminal action and may be pursued independently of it. Reservation to file the civil action is even
unnecessary. Thus, an offended party may pursue any of these civil liabilities, whether ex delicto or
not, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil Code prohibiting double recovery.37

The Court of Appeals then emphasized that the civil case filed by Patricia was based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action. Thus, contrary to the Mandaluyong trial court's ruling, the
decision of the Paranaque trial court acquitting Alastair John did not operate as res judicata so as to
bar the filing of the Complaint for Damages under Article 33. It was immaterial that the decision of
the Paranaque trial court had already become final and executory, because the causes of action
between the case for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 and the one filed under Article 33 of the Civil
Code are different.38

The Court of Appeals held that Patricia did not commit forum shopping because the causes of action
for the criminal action and the Complaint for Damages are different. There can also be no forum
shopping, according the Court of Appeals, when the law expressly allows the filing of an
independent civil action in cases of physical injuries.39

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the venue was properly laid. Under the Rules of Court,
personal actions, such as an action for damages, must be filed in the plaintiff or defendant's
residence, at the election of the plaintiff, unless the parties agree on another venue. Considering that
Patricia was already residing in Mandaluyong City at the time of the filing of the case, she correctly
filed the Complaint for Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong.40

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' March 25, 2014 Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Orders dated June 8, 2010 and November 19, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214 in Civil Case No. MC08-3871
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214 is
DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. MC08-3871, to continue with the proceedings and to resolve
the same with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.41 (Emphasis in the original)

Alastair John then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the September 3, 2014 Resolution.42

On October 9, 2014, Alastair John filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari.43 Upon the directive of
this Court, Patricia filed her Comment,44 to which Alastair John replied.45

Petitioner mainly argues that he may no longer be made liable for damages under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. According to petitioner, the Paranaque trial court's decision on the criminal case for
violation of Republic Act No. 9262 clearly established that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist."46 Therefore, there is no basis to hold him liable for damages for the
alleged physical injuries sustained by respondent.47

Further, petitioner maintains that respondent's Complaint for Damages was already barred by res
judicata. He claims that the Complaint for Damages was based on the alleged intentional physical
injuries sustained by respondent. In the criminal case, however, the Paranaque trial court already
ruled that the physical injuries resulted from an accident. With the decision of the Paranaque trial
court having attained finality, it is allegedly binding upon the parties, and the Complaint for Damages
was correctly dismissed by the Mandaluyong trial court.48

It follows that in filing the Complaint for Damages, respondent committed forum shopping.
Specifically, respondent allegedly sought damages after she failed to secure a favorable ruling with
the Paranaque trial court.49

Finally, petitioner contends that the venue for the civil action was improperly laid. Although the term
"residence" merely refers to a physical habituation or actual residence, the physical presence and
actual stay in that place must be more than temporary and must be with continuity and consistency.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to establish such continuity, as she testified under oath in
two (2) proceedings that she was a resident of Paranaque City:50 (1) one in 2007; and (2) another in
2008, both after the filing of the Complaint for Damages. These declarations should bind respondent,
since her declarations were given under pain of prosecution for perjury.51

Respondent counters that the Court of Appeals committed no error in ruling that petitioner may still
be held liable for damages, regardless of his acquittal in the criminal case. According to respondent,
nowhere in the text of the Paranaque trial court decision could it be inferred that the fact from which
petitioner's civil liability might arise did not exist.

On the contrary, the Paranaque trial court explicitly stated that it acquitted petitioner "due to
reasonable doubt[.]"52 Consequently, the Mandaluyong trial court should have proceeded to trial,
and petitioner's liability for physical injuries, if any, should have been ascertained.53

Respondent further submits that res jiidicata does not apply in the present case. She maintains that
the civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are independent civil actions
which may be separately filed by the offended party, even without reservation in the prosecution of
the criminal action. Therefore, respondent is legally "allowed to file two (2) separate suits for the
same act or omission. The first a criminal suit where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto
is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict[,]"54 and the independent civil action
may proceed regardless of the result of the proceedings in the criminal case.'55

On the issue of forum shopping, respondent contends that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on
the issue. According to respondent, the civil liability under Article 33 of the Civil Code is separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an
offended party may pursue both kinds of civil liability, even simultaneously, without offending the rule
against forum shopping.56

Lastly, respondent maintains that, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the venue was
properly laid. She argues that "whether [she] lived in other places prior to [the filing of the complaint]
is irrelevant[,]"57 and in this case, she clearly established that she was a resident of Mandaluyong
City when she filed her Complaint for Damages under Article 3358

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not petitioner Alastair John Kane may still be held civilly liable because his acquittal
was based on reasonable doubt;

Second, whether or not the Complaint for Damages was already barred by res judicata;

Third, whether or not respondent Patricia Roggenkamp committed forum shopping; and,

Fourth, whether or not the venue was properly laid.

This Petition must be denied. The Mandaluyong trial court seriously erred in motu proprio dismissing
respondent's Complaint for Damages on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent based her Complaint for Damages against petitioner on Article 33 of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Article 33 is explicit that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries., the civil action is
"entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action" and shall "proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution." Accordingly, Article 33 "contemplates a civil action for the recovery of
damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case."59 Even the quantum of
proof required—preponderance of evidence, as opposed to the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases—is different, confirming that the civil action under Article 33 is independent of the
criminal action.

Reservation of the right to separately file a civil action for damages under Article 33 need not even
be made. The civil action under Article 33 may be pursued before the filing of the criminal
case,60 during the pendency of the criminal case,61 or even after the criminal case is
resolved.62 The only limitation is that an offended party cannot "recover [damages] twice for the
same act or omission" of the defendant. Rule 111, Section 3 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action

SECTION 3. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Further, "defamation," "fraud," and "physical injuries," as used in Article 33, are to be understood in
their ordinary sense. Specifically, the "physical injuries" contemplated in Article 33 is bodily injury,
not the "physical injuries" referred to in the Revised Penal Code. As first explained in Carandang v.
Santiago:63

[Article 33 uses the words "defamation", ''fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code
using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the
term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the
Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in
the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and
battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature
when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action
for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as
the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of
physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.64

Madeja v. Caro65 reiterates that "physical injuries" in Article 33 means bodily injury.

Alastair John was charged with violating Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm[.]

Section 5 enumerates the various "acts of violence against women and their children," generally
defined as:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.66
Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 5 specifically refer to acts of "physical violence," which, under
the law, includes "acts that include bodily or physical harm[.]"

It is not hard to see that respondent properly availed herself of a separate action for damages under
Article 33 after the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. The criminal action filed against
petitioner was one for physical injuries in the sense contemplated in Article 33, that is, bodily injury.

Nevertheless, Alastair John claims that his acquittal should have barred the filing of the Complaint
for Damages. He maintains that, as allegedly held by the Paranaque trial court, the act or
commission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist; hence, there is no civil liability ex
delicto to which the Article 33 action may be anchored.

The contention is without merit.

Under Rule 120, Section 2 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judgment acquitting
the accused must state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the judgment must determine
if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist:

RULE 120
Judgment

....

SECTION 2. Contents of the Judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential to indicate whether the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Without such declaration, it must be presumed that the acquittal was due to reasonable doubt,
and the accused is civilly liable ex delicto. Thus, the general rule shall apply: every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.67

In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,68 accused George Manantan was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The trial court acquitted him of the crime charged, leading the
heirs of the deceased to appeal the civil aspect of the trial court decision. Despite Manantan's
acquittal, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal, declared Manantan to be the "proximate cause of
the vehicular accident,"69 and held him civilly liable.

Among Manantan's arguments before this Court was that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him
civilly liable, because the trial court already found that he was neither imprudent nor negligent. To
this, this Court said that nowhere in the text of the trial court decision can it be inferred that no
negligence or imprudence existed. All the judgment provided was that Manantan was
"NOT GUILTY of the crime charged[.]"70

Thus, the Court of Appeals "was not precluded from looking into the question of [Manantan's]
negligence or reckless imprudence[,]"71 for "even if [his guilt] has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only."72 In
other words, Manantan's acquittal was not because the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. Therefore, Manantan was correctly held civilly liable by the Court of
Appeals. Explained this Court:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules
of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals
in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.73 (Citations omitted)

Like in Mcmantan, nowhere in the decision of the Parafiaque trial court in the criminal case does it
state that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. On the contrary, the
trial court was unequivocal that petitioner was acquitted due to reasonable doubt:

WHEREFORE, due to reasonable doubt, the accused, ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, is

hereby ACQUITTED of the crime [of] violation of Sec[.] 5(a) of R.A. 9262, penalized by Sec[.] 6 (a)
of the said Act.

SO ORDERED.74 (Emphasis supplied)

Having been acquitted due to reasonable doubt, petitioner is not exempt from civil liability. This is
true even if his guilt was not satisfactorily established.

II

Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's argument, the decision of the Parafiaque trial court acquitting
him did not operate as res judicata so as to bar the filing of the Complaint for Damages under Article
33 of the Civil Code.

The concept of res judicata was expounded in Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista:75

Res judicata "literally means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; [or] a thing
or matter settled by judgment.'" Res jiidicata "lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit."

Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that precludes the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second aspect is
conclusiveness of judgment, which states that "issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action."

The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action[.]76 (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original)

It is settled that a decision acquitting the accused is not res judicata on the independent civil action,
even if the latter action arises from the same act or omission on which the criminal action was
based.

In Cancio v. hip,77 cases for estafa were filed against Emerenciana Isip for issuing checks with
insufficient funds. After it had failed to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss
the estafa cases, but reserved the right to file a separate civil action. The motion was granted, and
the private complainant, Jose Cancio, Jr., subsequently filed a case for collection of sum of money to
recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases.

Isip filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that that the collection case was barred on the ground of res
judicata. The trial court agreed and dismissed the collection case. It held that "the dismissal of the
criminal cases. . . on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the
merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection."78

On appeal, this Court set aside the trial court's decision. It explained that an act or omission causing
damage to another may give rise to two (2) separate civil liabilities: (1) civil liability ex delicto, or that
arising from the crime, and (2) independent civil liabilities, i.e., those not arising from the crime, or
those where the law expressly grants the injured party the right to file an independent and distinct
civil action from the criminal action. An action for collection of sum of money is not an action arising
from the crime but from contract, an independent civil action which, according to this Court, may be
pursued even without reservation.79

This Court rejected the contention that the collection case was barred by res judicata. Among the
elements of res judicata is that there is an identity of causes of action between the actions, and
between a criminal case based on culpa criminal and an action based on culpa contractual, there is
no such identity of causes of action. The independent civil action:
. . . remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being
deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of
action, i.e., culpa contractual80 (Citation omitted; emphasis in the original)

The defense of res judicata was likewise raised but nonetheless rejected in Lim v. Kou Co
Ping.81 The case involved withdrawal authorities issued by a cement corporation, thereby allowing
holders of the instrument to withdraw cement bags from the corporation's cement plant. Kou Co Ping
had earlier bought withdrawal authorities, which he subsequently sold to Lily Lim. When Lim failed to
withdraw cement bags covered by the withdrawal authorities, she sued Kou Co Ping
for estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

The trial court acquitted Kou Co Ping of estafa for insufficiency of evidence. However, it set the case
for reception of evidence on Kou Co Ping's civil liability. After trial on the criminal case, the trial court
also absolved Kou Co Ping of civil liability to Lim.

This caused Lim to subsequently file a complaint for specific performance and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Moving to dismiss the complaint, Kou Co Ping argued that his
acquittal in the estafa case was res judicata on the specific performance and damages case.

The Manila trial court denied the motion to dismiss, which was affirmed by this Court. Citing
Cancio, this Court discussed how an act or omission may give rise to civil liability arising from
different sources. The source of the civil liability arising from the offense is different from that arising
from contract, and an offended party may pursue either or both, subject to the prohibition on double
recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. Considering that the complaint for specific
performance and damages is premised on a civil liability, and not arising from crime but from
contract, this Court held that the decision on the civil aspect of the estafa case had no bearing on the
case for specific performance and damages. In Lim:

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender — (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that
is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil
liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases
of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For
this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for
the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on
delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicala. As explained in
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be
1âшphi1

stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and
distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the
criminal action based on cirtpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no
bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against [the
offender] did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the
same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored
on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.82 (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original)

Applying the foregoing, petitioner's acquittal in the case for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 9262 is not res judicata on the action for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code. One of the
elements of res judicata is the identity of causes of action, with "cause of action" being the "act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another."83

While the criminal action and the action for damages arise from the same act or omission—the
alleged physical violence committed by petitioner against respondent—these actions violate two (2)
different rights of respondent: (1) her right not to be physically harmed by an intimate partner under
Republic Act No. 9262; and (2) her right to recover damages for bodily injury under Article 33 of the
Civil Code.

In other words, the criminal case and the civil case do not have identical causes of action, and
respondent had the right to pursue either petitioner's civil liability arising from the violation of
Republic Act No. 9262, or the independent civil liability provided for in Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Even the finality of the acquittal is immaterial in the present case. To reiterate: actions under Article
33 of the Civil Code are '"separate, distinct, and independent' of any criminal prosecution based on
the same act [or omission]"84 on which the civil action was filed. As this Court said in Cancio, "a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on [the] independent civil action based
on an entirely different cause of action[.]"85
All told, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's res judicata argument.

III

Corollarily, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling that respondent did not commit forum-
shopping when she filed the Complaint for Damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Forum
shopping is committed

by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively,
in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or
increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action[.]86 (Citation omitted)

To determine whether there is forum shopping, it is necessary to ascertain "whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another[.]"87 The test is "whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought."88

Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious."89

The following requisites must concur for litis pendentia to be present: (1) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for; and (3) the identity of the two (2) cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.90

As discussed, the final judgment on the violation for Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 does not
amount to res judicata in the action for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, Article
33 expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action for damages arising from physical injuries that
can proceed independently of the criminal action. With one of the crucial elements of res
judicata being absent, there can be no forum shopping in this case.

IV

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the venue was properly laid.

Venue is "the place where the case is to be heard or tried[.]"91 Under our Rules, the venue of an
action generally depends on whether it is a real or personal action.

Real actions are those affecting the title or possession of a real property, or interest therein, to be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.92 All other actions, called personal actions, may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs reside, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants reside, at the election of the plaintiff.93

The action for damages filed by respondent does not involve the title or possession of a real
property, or interest therein. It is a personal action, and respondent, as plaintiff, had the option of
either filing it in her place of residence or the defendant, petitioner's, place of residence. She chose
to file the civil case in her place of residence, that is, Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner, however, maintains that Mandaluyong City is not respondent's place of
residence. While respondent alleged in her Complaint for Damages that she resides in a
condominium unit in Mandaluyong City, petitioner cites two (2) instances where respondent testified
that she residesat a condominium unit in Paranaque City. The venue, petitioner argues, was
improperly laid and the Complaint for Damages should be dismissed accordingly.

Looking into petitioner's allegations, he cites parts of the proceedings in the criminal case,
specifically, the hearing held on May 22, 200794 and May 13, 200895 where respondent testified
that she resided in a condominium in Paranaque.

The Complaint for Damages, however, was filed on November 28, 2008,96 and it could very well be
that, as respondent had alleged in her civil complaint, she was already a resident of Mandaluyong
City at that time. Absent proof to the contrary, this Court affirms the findings of the Court of Appeals
that "[a]t the time of the filing of this case, [respondent] was already residing [at Mandaluyong City].
Thus, venue was properly laid at the [Regional Trial Court] of Mandaluyong City."97

As a final note, not only did the Mandaluyong trial court err in dismissing the action based on Article
33 of the Civil Code by assuming that the acquittal, by itself, is a declaration that the facts upon
which the civil action can arise did not exist is already presumed. The court that tried the civil case
also possibly erred in the manner by which it interpreted the facts on the basis of what it considered
as which narrative is "in accord with human experience."98

The two (2) points articulated in the decision regarding the criminal case seems to reveal the severe
lack of gender sensitivity and/or practical wisdom on the trial court judge's part. The first is the
assertion that the woman chose to hide her lover's transgressions against her person before the
doctor, as well as her son. The second is the judge's assertion of his conclusion that the hesitation of
the woman to immediately leave her lover is an unnatural act and, hence, unbelievable.

These assumptions that provide the filters for a judge to eventually acquit, demonstrate that there is
a possibility that another civil action may interpret the facts differently. A more enlightened
interpretation of the evidence may involve a less caricaturized, less patriarchal set of
assumptions. For instance, the capability of women to sacrifice their own welfare in favor of
those who they care for and love is known to many women.

Thus, protecting the husband's reputation before a stranger, even if that stranger be a doctor, or
sparing the son from a premature dilemma that undermines his view of his father, is possibly a more
ordinary and enlightened view of respondent's motive, assuming the facts as established by the
court trying the criminal case.

Similarly, that someone, usually the woman, would hesitate to simply leave her family and deprive
them of her caring for her part in maintaining the household, even at peril to herself or her dignity, is
not outlandish, inconceivable or, sadly, even exceptional. Certainly, it is "in accord with human
experience."99

These motives, often perpetuated by culture, are the precise targets of our laws which underscore
gender equality in every type of relationship. It is the awareness of the possibility of abuse that a
more gendered perspective of human intentions is privileged by laws on sexual harassment—
including the law which seeks to prohibit violence against women in intimate relationships. The
rather dismal failure to consider the complexity of the human psyche in the criminal case may not be
how the judge in the civil case will consider the case given the same set of evidence. It is in these
respects that We see the wisdom of our current rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' March 25,
2014 Decision and September 13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96341 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The

Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, is hereby DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case
No. MC08-3871, continue with the proceedings, and to resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 XXX,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
DELOS SANTOS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated March
19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39690, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated October 27,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, which found petitioner XXX (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[4] otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
The Facts
In an Information dated February 10, 2012, the Associate Prosecution Attorney II of Iba, Zambales charged petitioner
with violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That in or about the month of October 2010 or near thereto and up to the present time, in [x x x] and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then married to complainant [YYY], did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon the person of said [YYY] by
maintaining an [extramarital] affair with Pearl Manto and bringing her to their conjugal home to live together, which
acts of the accused caused and still causes mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to said [YYY],
to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the
merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Private complainant YYY is the legal wife of petitioner. YYY testified that during her 23 years of marriage with
petitioner, he had a habit of getting drunk and womanizing. Sometime in October 2010, petitioner started a fight with
YYY, as it is his usual habit when he is intoxicated. Petitioner drove YYY and her four children, AAA, BBB, CCC, and
DDD, out of the house and claimed the he alone owned the house. YYY, along with her daughters, fled to her
parent's house in x x x. However, the spouses' eldest child, EEE, convinced his three sisters to return to their house
so their father will be forced to support them, leaving CCC with their mother. Later on, YYY's daughters, particularly
AAA, reported to her through text messages that petitioner was always drunk and even brought them to a videoke bar
and introduced one Pearl Manto (Pearl) as their aunt. She thereafter learned from her daughter that the same woman
was already eating lunch for two months in their house and ultimately lived with them.[6]
The estranged spouses' daughter, AAA, corroborated her mother's allegations and testified that her parents had a
fight and they were driven out of their home. Out of fear that her father would hurt them, she, along with her mother
and siblings, went to her grandmother's house. AAA admitted that when she and her two sisters returned to their
house and lived with their father, the latter always had drinking sprees. She also knew Pearl as his father's mistress
and that his father frequented the videoke bar where Pearl worked. During her stay with her father, AAA admitted that
Pearl lived with them and had her own room in the house. Often, when her father thought that she and her sisters
were already asleep, he would transfer to Pearl's room. After two months, the sisters decided to leave their father as
he had no time for them and they did not like his mistress.[7]
Version of the Defense
For his part, petitioner denied having an extramarital or any romantic affair with Pearl. He admitted though that he
knew Pearl to be a guest relations officer of a videoke bar, which has already closed.[8]
Petitioner alleged that the reason why he and YYY fought was the mismanagement by the latter of the family
resources by being an incorrigible borrower as evidenced by the real estate mortgage executed by YYY without his
consent and a case for estafa filed against her. He likewise denied driving his wife and his children away from their
conjugal home, rather, it was her who left the house when they had a fight.[9]
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.[10]
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense charged. YYY convincingly
testified that she suffered pain from petitioner's womanizing and openly living with his mistress in their conjugal home
together with their minor children. Petitioner's acts of evicting his wife and his children from their conjugal home and
inviting his mistress to live with him in the same house in the presence of their three minor daughters consisted of
psychological violence on both his wife and their children under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.[11]
The Ruling of the CA
In his appeal before the CA, petitioner interposed the following arguments: (1) that the testimony of YYY did not prove
the presence of anguish caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of support or custody or access to their children; (2) that the allegation of his extramarital affair with Pearl is
hearsay; (3) that the mental and emotional anguish brought about by the introduction of Pearl to their children was
suffered by their children and not by YYY; and (4) that he should be acquitted since YYY and their daughter already
executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[12]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[13] The CA concurred with the RTC that all the
elements of the offense charged were duly established by the prosecution. There is no doubt that petitioner inflicted
psychological violence upon his wife when he evicted her and their children from their conjugal home and when he
maintained an extramarital affair with Pearl in their conjugal home where they lived as a couple. The said acts caused
mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation to YYY.
Even if YYY had no personal knowledge of the extramarital affair of petitioner and merely learned about it through
their children, this does not mean that the same did not take place and that she was not emotionally affected by them.
The testimony of their daughter AAA about the extramarital affair of petitioner is sufficient to establish the existence of
psychological violence caused by petitioner against YYY. It is a common occurrence in small towns where the parties
live that news and gossips about the philandering ways of either spouse would easily spread. Moreover, the
allegation that the psychological violence is merely an isolated incident and not a repetitive act does not support the
acquittal of petitioner as the law does not require that the act must be repetitive.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case before the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court asserting that the CA erred in ruling that the offense charged was proven by moral certainty.
The Issue
The issue for resolution is whether all the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262
were duly established.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious as the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the conviction of petitioner for
violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.

Psychological violence under R.A.

No. 9262 is duly established.
In the instant case, petitioner was charged and convicted with the crime of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
Petitioner insists on his innocence and asserts that the prosecution was not able to establish the elements of
psychological violence as contemplated by law.

Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence inflicted against women and their
children which are committed through any of the following acts:

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access
to the woman's child/children.

The elements of the aforequoted crime are as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.[15] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Psychological violence is considered an indispensable element in violation of Section 5(i).[16] It is defined in Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 9262 as:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A judicious study of the case reveals that all the elements of the crime charged were duly established.

The first and second elements of the offense are uncontested. The offended party is a woman and her child or
children. YYY is the wife of petitioner with whom they have five children. One of their children, AAA, testified in court
about the infidelity of her father and how his mistress lived with them in her parents' conjugal home.
As to the third and fourth elements, it is duly established that petitioner committed psychological violence through
marital infidelity and public ridicule or humiliation, which caused mental anguish and emotional suffering upon his
wife.
Here, the trial court gave greater weight to the categorical and positive testimony of YYY and her daughter AAA over
the defenses of denial and alibi of petitioner.

Herein petitioner contends that the presence of psychological violence has not been duly proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution. Petitioner avers that his wife YYY could not have suffered psychological violence since she
did not have personal knowledge of the existence of the crime or of his alleged marital infidelity. YYY only came to
know of his alleged marital infidelity through their daughter AAA, who sent text messages to her mother regarding his
father's mistress. Petitioner posits that the RTC and the CA Decision were based on hearsay evidence.

Petitioner's argument fails to convince.

Truly, hearsay is considered an inadmissible evidence under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[17] However,
this rule does not apply to independently relevant statements. The doctrine of independent relevant statement is
clearly discussed in Gubaton v. Amador, viz.:
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant,
and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or
falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in
itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Accordingly, the
hearsay rule does not apply, and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.[18]
In this case, YYY indeed did not have personal knowledge of the marital infidelity of petitioner. YYY's statement may
be considered an independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is to
merely establish that a statement was made. YYY was only testifying that she and her children were driven out of
their home and thereafter she learned through her daughter AAA that her husband, petitioner, is having an affair with
Pearl, who eventually lived with her husband and their children in their conjugal home.

An excerpt of YYY's testimony is hereby reproduced, thus:

PROS. BARTOLOME TO WITNESS:

Q Now, you mentioned that you were driven away by your husband?

A Yes, sir.
 xxxx

Q So, when you were driven away from your house along with your four children[,] where did
you go?
A To my parents in [x x x], sir.

Q And, how about your four children, did they stay also during the same period?

A On the night that I separated from my husband[,] one of my children [EEE] talked to my
other three children to return to the house.

xxxx

Q And so, what [happened] after your three children returned to your residence at [x x x]?

A Yes, they stayed with their father, however, my children reported to me that their father was
always drunk and usually [goes] to the Videoke bar.

Q And, what reason do they tell you of [these] stories that your husband is out at [night]
drinking?
A They went to the house of their Lola and even my daughter [sent] text messages to me
informing me of the activity of my husband.

Q Who among your children would report to you?

A AAA, sir.

Q Are there other matters which AAA would report to you regarding your husband?

A Yes, sir, regarding the other woman whom he introduced.

Q And were you able to know from your daughter AAA how this woman of your husband was
introduced to them?
A Yes sir. He introduced the woman because the woman was working in a Videoke bar.
Q Are you trying to say that AAA would accompany her father to the videoke bar?

A One time they dropped by together with the two other siblings corning from the market at
the videoke bar.

Q And, did you come to know of the name of this other woman?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is her name?

A Pearl Manto, sir.[19]
It is clear that the making of such statements is circumstantially relevant to the case at bench and hence, may be
considered in evidence against petitioner. Notably, YYY's statements were corroborated by her and petitioner's
daughter, AAA, who testified as follows:

PROS. CATOLICO TO WITNESS:

Q Do you recall what they were fighting about?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And, tell us please.

A They were fighting over my father's womanizing, ma'am.

Q And, what did you notice of your father when he was fighting with your mother?

A He was drunk, ma'am.

Q And, what other things happened during that night?

A He drove us away from our home, ma'am.

Q When you said "we", whom are you referring to as the person that your father drove away
from your house?
A My mother and my siblings, ma'am.

xxxx

Q And, where did you go?

A In my grandmother's house at [x x x], ma'am.

xxxx

Q Do you know this Pearl Manto?

A She is the other woman of my father, ma'am.

Q And do you know where she was working?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Where?

A Double "A" Videoke Bar, ma'am.[20]

Q And you stated in your affidavit also that Pearl Manto at first was taking lunch every day in
your house and later on she lived with your father in [x x x], so where were you then when
Pearl Manto started at first taking lunch in your house and then later on living with your
father in his house at [x x x]?
A I was at home, ma'am.

Q What house?

A In [xxx], ma'am.

Q So you were still in the house of your father in [x x x]?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Will you describe to us the relationship of your father to Pearl Manto?

A What I know is that, she is the other woman of my father and she would only go to our
house.

Q When she decided to live in the house of your father in whose room was he sleeping?

A She stays with [us] in our room but when she thought that we were already asleep she would
transfer to my father's room. My father would [be] the one to transfer.

Q Your father would transfer in whose room?

A To Pearl Manto, ma'am.

Q So, Pearl Manto has her own room?

A Yes, ma'am.[21]
Again, there is no doubt that the hearsay rule is not applicable in this case. However, YYY's statements are
admissible as independently relevant statements. Considering further that the statements made by YYY were duly
corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay, the Court finds no compelling reason to declare that the hearsay
rule applies in this case.

It is fundamental that the defense of denial is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. In this case, other than bare denials, herein petitioner did not proffer any
convincing defense to disprove the testimony of his wife and his daughter about his marital infidelity. As such, there is
no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the RTC, as concurred in by the CA, that indeed, petitioner committed
marital infidelity against his wife.

Petitioner also postulated that the CA erred in ruling that mental or emotional anguish is similarly proven as that of
moral damages since mental anguish must be proven by the testimony of the victim herself. In the instant case,
petitioner contends that YYY did not narrate the form of mental or emotional anguish she suffered through acts of
public ridicule and humiliation. Allegedly, YYY's mental or psychological pain is merely imaginary. Petitioner went on
to argue that if his marital infidelity were true and indeed he introduced Pearl to his children and made her live with
them, their children were the ones who would have suffered mental or emotional anguish and not YYY.[22]
It is worthy to stress that the determination of whether mental anguish and suffering was duly proven by the
prosecution is a question of fact that is beyond the province of a Petition for Review on Certiorari. It has long been
established that the Court is not a trier of facts. In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the Court is limited to the resolution of questions of law. Factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed
by the CA, is accorded respect and even finality.[23] Having failed to show that the circumstances in this case fall
under any of the exceptions, petitioner cannot insist on the review of the factual findings of the lower and appellate
courts.
At any rate, petitioner is correct that in order to establish mental anguish, the testimony of the victim must be
presented as the experiences are personal to her. In Dinamling v. People, the Court explained that:
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on
the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in
Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Both the RTC and the CA gave credence to the testimony of YYY that due to petitioner's marital infidelity, she
suffered mental anguish and emotional suffering. An excerpt of YYY's testimony is hereby reproduced:

Q And, although you were already residing in your mother's house, when you learned about
this incident wherein your husband brought his mistress to your conjugal house, what did
you feel, YYY?
A I was hurt and I couldn't sleep, because I was thinking of my children, ma'am.

Q What did you feel personally as the wife of XXX?

A I was really hurt, and I cannot accept what happened, ma'am.[25]

Again, the credibility of witnesses is a matter best assessed by the RTC who has the unique position and firsthand
opportunity to note the demeanor, attitude, and candor of the witnesses.[26] Given the fact that, in this case, the CA
affirmed the findings of the RTC, and considering that there is no indication that facts of substance and value were
overlooked, the Court is doctrinally bound by the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses.
While petitioner sorely attempts to downplay the effect of his marital infidelity, the pain and suffering of his wife is
without a doubt real and raw and far from being imaginary. Just because the wife was not bodily present to witness
the unfaithfulness of her husband, it does not negate the emotional pain and anguish his infidelity caused her. Worthy
to mention also is the observation of the CA that Barangays x x x and x x x are proximately close and are situated
within the town of x x x. Indeed, gossip easily spreads in small towns like x x x. All the more when the hot issue is
about a husband bringing his mistress into the family home to live with his children. In this case, the mental anguish
suffered by the wife is compounded by public ridicule and humiliation.
Herein petitioner also alleged that the CA failed to consider the Affidavits of Desistance of YYY and their children,
which belied the accusations against him. It is well-settled that affidavits of desistance, more so when made by a
witness after the conviction of the accused, deserve scant consideration.[27] In People v. Dela Cerna,[28] the Court
declared that an affidavit of desistance, especially when executed as a mere afterthought, has no persuasive value.
Thus, the CA properly ruled that the Affidavits of Desistance are merely noted without action considering that
petitioner has already been convicted of the offense charged and that the State is the real complainant in this case.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed
psychological violence, through marital infidelity, which caused mental anguish and emotional suffering on his wife in
violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.

The Penalty
As to the proper penalty imposed upon petitioner, Section 6(f) of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the crime is punishable
by, inter alia, prision mayor. It is well established that if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as in the case of R.A. No. 9262, the ascertainment of the indeterminate
sentence will be based on the rules applied for the crimes that are punishable under the RPC.[29]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, while the maximum term shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending
the commission of the crime.[30] The Court deems it proper to impose upon petitioner the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.[31]
Notably, the RTC and the CA failed to impose a fine on petitioner and the mandatory psychological counseling or
treatment.[32] In addition to imprisonment, these are additional penalties that are set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No.
9262, thus:
Section 6. Penalties. —The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be
punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
xxxx

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, petitioner is directed to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 and to undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated March 19,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39690 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
(1) Petitioner XXX is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i) of
Republic Act No. 9262 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

(2) Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY a fine in the amount of P100,000.00; and

(3) Petitioner is DIRECTED to UNDERGO mandatory psychological counseling or

psychiatric treatment and to report his compliance therewith to the court of origin within 15
days after the completion of such counseling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.
 AAA,[*] PETITIONER, V. BBB,[*] RESPONDENT.

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,[1] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed
through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition[2] for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 2014[3] and May 2, 2014[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the
motion to quash the Information[5] which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as
follows:
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally
married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a certain
Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed
letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the
aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC
was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.[6]
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in
September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside
and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children
moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.[7]
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically.
This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical
and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.[8] As can be
gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor
found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital
infidelity.[9]
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived. [10]
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case,
Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest[11] was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:
Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is
probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of
him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and
emotional anguish "wherever she goes", jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the
acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that
there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act
itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial limits
of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the emphatic word "causing" in
the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into existence of something. Hence, the
mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought about or into existence by a criminal act
which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to
it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws -
territoriality.
In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children"- it becomes clear that there must be an act
which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a
criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" which
has been conceded to have been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information must still be
ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best, the
Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.[12] (Emphasis in the
original)
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought
direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in
danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is
as if husbands of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any
consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is
an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not
only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take
cognizance of the case.
In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.
In his Comment[13] filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an
acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this
petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition
was belatedly filed.
We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was belatedly filed. The
date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension[14] was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers to
the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this Court.
The motion was in fact filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the
intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Court in a Resolution[15] dated June 9, 2014,
granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.
In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response to her
Letter[16] dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for
assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the
extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the petition
if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al.,[17] where
the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the
absence of the OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so
requires.[18]
Morillo,[19] also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is
not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper
term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal
and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the
merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant
could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such
case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.[20] (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only
be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused
would be twice placed in jeopardy.[21]
Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved."[22] "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted,
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."[23]
Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is
a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,[24] the Court reiterated that:
[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law
prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question
of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.[25] (Citations omitted)
We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the
evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for resolution
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not
Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No.
9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on
this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that
probable cause exists in the case.[26] Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by
the law,[27] the RTC furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate
through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights.[28]
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a great number of
Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In April to September 2016, the number of overseas
Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas
contract workers or those with existing work contract; while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract.[29] It is thus
necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of
psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on
abroad.
Ruling of the Court
There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common."[30] In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be committed against women and their
children:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:
xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but
is not limited to the following:
xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal ease is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,
threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v.
People,[31] this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are
derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.
xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub- parts of Section 5.
xxxx

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.[32] (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted
under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the
spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People,[33] the Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[34] (Emphasis in the original)
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7
provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of
damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the
vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in
Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa.

The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon
City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others
x x x[.][35]
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.[36]
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the
victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element
of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must
be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond
reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband.
What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra
marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place
a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 224946, November 09, 2021 ]
CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 assailing the Decision[2] dated February 17,
2016 and Resolution[3] dated May 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36913 affirming the
Decision[4] dated August 26, 2014 of Branch 270, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 34-
V-13, which convicted petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon (Christian) for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act (VAWC Law).

Facts
An Information was filed against Christian, the accusatory portion of which states:

That sometime in (sic) January 25, 2012, up to the present, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial support to the said
complainant.[5]
Christian pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial and trial then ensued. The version of the prosecution, as
summarized by the RTC, is as follows:

[AAA][6] testified that she and [Christian] have been sweethearts for six (6) years before they got married on
September 30, 2011, in a civil wedding officiated by Mayor Gatchalian. On October 6, 2011 or only six (6) days after
their wedding, [Christian] left to work at Pizza Hut, Brunei as delivery rider. As placement fee, they borrowed the
amount of P85,000.00 with 3% monthly interest from their godmother, Emelina So. She and [Christian] agreed that
the latter would send money in the amount of Php9,633.00 per month in payment of their loan. However, [Christian]
did not send money on a regular basis. All in all, he was able to send money in the total amount of Php71,500.00
only, leaving the balance in the amount of Php13,500.00. For which reason, she felt so embarrassed with Emelina So
because she could not pay the balance. She even pleaded to So not to lodge a complaint to the barangay. Emelina
So communicated to the employer of [Christian] in Brunei about their debt to her.
Moreover, while in Brunei, [Christian] maintained a paramour in the person of Melete Domalaon. The manager of
[Christian] and his board mate, Jovelyn Pastrano disclosed to her the indiscretions of [Christian]. [AAA] identified the
photographs marked as Exhibits "C" to "C-5" depicting [Christian] and his alleged paramour. This brought her so
much anguish. The womanizing activity of [Christian] extremely hurt her feelings and caused her depression. The
message of [Christian] that he no longer cares for her since they are childless destroyed her whole being. [AAA]
identified [Christian] in open court and her sworn statement (Exhibit "A") she executed in connection with this case.

On cross, she stated that when [Christian] left in December 2011, she [was] jobless. Presently, she is gainfully
employed. She lost communication with [Christian] since January 2012. According to the employer and friends of
[Christian], the latter is living with his paramour in Brunei. She filed this case because she was extremely hurt and
she experienced emotional agony by the neglect and utter insensitivity that [Christian] made her endure and suffer.[7]
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as likewise summarized by the RTC, is as follows:

Christian Acharon vehemently denied the accusations against him. According to him, his original stay in Brunei was
two (2) years and three (3) months. However, when he left on October 6, 2011, he was able to come back to the
Philippines only in February 2014. He had to extend his stay in Brunei to bring some money to his family. While he
was in Brunei, his rented place was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident which required him to spend [a
significant] sum of money. He and [AAA] had an on and off communication from October 2011 until April 2013. [AAA]
demanded for him to pay their debt in the entire amount.

He used to send money to [AAA]. But it was the latter who told him not to send money anymore. He also claimed that
he was able to send the total amount of Php71,000.00 to [AAA] in payment of their loan. He agreed that the same is
not enough to fully pay their loan in the total amount of Php85,000.00. In their exchange of messages [on] Facebook,
he and [AAA] were talking about their debt, his alleged womanizing, and their separation.
On cross, he testified that [when he met a minor motor accident, he managed] to go back to the office. He confirmed
that [medical expenses are included in his Employment Contract in Brunei] (Exhibit "I"). He told the court that when
he arrived in Brunei, he was made to sign another contract which has lower basic salary and big amounts were
deducted from it. When he met [the accident] he paid for his medicines because it would take [a] long period of time
to process and claim it to their office. For a year, he estimated that he spent about $1,000.00 for medical expenses
only. He affirmed that he was the one who encourage[d] [AAA] to look for another man (Exhibit "J"). Jovelyn Ranoso
Pastrana is her former friend. It is not true that he was staying in his girlfriend's house while he was in Brunei.[8]
Ruling Of The RTC
In its Decision[9] dated August 26, 2014, the RTC convicted Christian, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, ACCUSED CHRISTIAN ACHARON y PANTONIAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
with a term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional [as minimum,] to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor [as maximum] of his indeterminate sentence and a FINE of One Hundred (sic) Pesos
(P100,000.00). The accused is further sentenced to undergo mandatory psychological counseling under the
supervision of any government accredited clinical psychologist/psychiatrist and shall immediately report to court his
compliance thereto.[10]
The reasons advanced by the RTC for adjudging Christian guilty were his failure to maintain an open communication
with his wife, his having a paramour while he was in Brunei, and his neglect of his legal obligation to extend financial
support.[11]
Aggrieved, Christian filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA
In its Decision[12] dated February 17, 2016, the CA denied Christian's appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA
held that the refusal to give financial support constitutes violence against women. According to the CA, Christian's
failure to provide financial support, especially for the payment of the loan they used to send him to Brunei, constitutes
economic abuse. Thus, the CA upheld his conviction.
Christian then filed this present appeal.

Issue
Whether the CA erred in finding Christian guilty of causing psychological or emotional anguish when he allegedly
failed to: (1) financially support AAA; and (2) keep the communication lines open with the latter.[13]
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the appeal. Christian is, as he should be, acquitted of the charge.

The present case is limited only to

Christian's alleged lack of financial
support
At the outset, it must be emphasized that Christian's criminal liability should be adjudged only on the basis of his
alleged failure to give financial support to his wife as this is the only allegation contained in the Information.
"No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him."[14] The purpose of the law in having a right to be informed "is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense."[15] By virtue of this right, "an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him."[16]
In this case, the Information filed against Christian only alleged that he "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial
support to the said complainant."[17]
It was error, therefore, for the RTC to have allowed the introduction of evidence tending to establish, for instance, that
Christian had a paramour when he was in Brunei as this is an irrelevant issue in this case in light of its absence in the
Information. Needless to say, the RTC further erred in appreciating these pieces of evidence in establishing his guilt.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to determine whether Christian is indeed guilty of violating
R.A. 9262 by denying financial support to AAA.
Mere failure or an inability to provide
financial support is not punishable by
R.A. 9262
Christian was charged, and later on convicted by the RTC and the CA, under an Information that alleges a violation of
Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, as the Information accused him of "caus[ing] mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to his wife AAA, by denying financial support." Section 5(i) considers as "violence against women" those
acts "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or denial of access to the woman's child/children."[18] In Dinamling v. People,[19] the Court laid down the elements to
prove a violation of Section 5(i):
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar
such acts or omissions.[20]
Not all of the foregoing elements, however, are present in this case. Specifically, the fourth element was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well-settled that "criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or
extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language cannot be
enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the
statute was enacted."[21]
The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in defining the criminal
act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire"[22] or "the act of not allowing someone to do
or have something."[23] The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would
not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the fact of not doing
something [one] should have done,"[24] which in turn connotes passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used,
the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom,
and intelligence,[25] in order to consummate the crime.
In this connection, the Court deems it proper to clarify, as Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Mario V.
Lopez pointed out in their respective Opinions that the crimes penalized under Sections 5(i) and 5(e) of R.A. 9262
are mala in se, not mala prohibita, even though R.A. 9262 is a special penal law.[26] The acts punished therein are
inherently wrong or depraved,[27] and the language used under the said penal law requires a mental element.[28] Being
a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime. "Actus
reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the
accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying the actus reus."[29]
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny
financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as
it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or
consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish
upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support,
while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and
be proven in court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children."[30] In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator"[31] with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be
punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of
inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her,
with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said
purpose.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of
criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even
if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused
merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to
the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.
To be sure, under the Family Code, the obligation to support is imposed mutually upon the spouses.[32] In other
words, both the husband and the wife have the obligation to give support to each other. However, even as the law
imposes the obligation to support mutually upon the spouses, the failure of the wife to financially support the husband
only results in civil liability, whereas if it is the husband who fails to provide financial support to the wife, this will
result not only in civil liability, but also criminal liability under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. Surely, this cannot be the
case, as the law recognizes no substantial distinction between the husband and the wife as regards their
responsibility to provide financial support to each other and the family.
It is also worth emphasizing that the obligation to give support is measured "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family"[33] — which also implies that it may depend on who is earning for the family. As well, the amount of support
"shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient."[34] As previously
stated, therefore, the prosecution must first establish that there is an amount of support legally due the woman, and
that the partner willfully denied the same to her to cause mental or emotional anguish, before a conviction under
Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 may be had.
The elements of a violation of Section 5(i), insofar as it deals with denial of financial support, are therefore:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;

(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children
financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and

(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose
of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.
Applying the foregoing discussion to the facts of the present case, the Court finds that Christian is not guilty of
violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 for the failure of the prosecution to establish the third and fourth elements of the
crime. The Court finds him innocent, for there is undenied evidence that Christian tried, as he successfully did for a
time, to provide financial support. He testified under oath that he failed to continue providing support only when his
apartment in Brunei was razed by fire, and when he met a vehicular accident there. There is also no dispute that he
had already paid P71,000.00 out of the P85,000.000 of the debt that the spouses — not the husband alone — were
obligated to pay from their community property.
While Christian eventually failed to continue providing financial support, this, however, is not enough to support a
conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. Again, to be convicted under Section 5(i), the evidence must
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause the victim mental or emotional
anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation through the denial of — not the mere failure or inability to provide
— financial support, which thereby resulted into psychological violence. As the prosecution failed to establish
that fact, i.e., willful refusal to provide financial support, then Christian cannot be held guilty of violating Section 5(i) of
R.A. 9262.
Neither could Christian be held guilty of
violating Section 5(e)
The Court is aware that cases involving denial of financial support typically involve Informations charging a person
with a violation of either Section 5(e) or Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. This is so because Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262
punishes the acts of:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — x x x

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to
her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, the Court has previously held that a person charged for violation of Section 5(i) may, in the alternative, be
convicted instead for violating Section 5(e) by applying the variance doctrine.

In Melgar v. People[35] (Melgar), the Court explained that the variance doctrine may be applied because the only
difference between Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) is the element of psychological violence. In particular, the Court,
in Melgar, said that deprivation of financial support, by itself, is already sufficient to obtain a conviction under Section
5(e), while psychological distress brought by the deprivation of financial support is an essential element in order for
an accused to be punished under Section 5(i). In other words, the Court held, in Melgar, that Section 5(i), insofar as it
punishes deprivation of financial support, has the same elements as Section 5(e), but with one added element — the
element of psychological violence:
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the
woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party." Thus, in cases of support, it
must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof — which is, by itself, already a form of economic
abuse — further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no
evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish.
Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding — and taking into
consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different
from but necessarily included in the crime charged — the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation
of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element
of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.[36]
The above ruling in Melgar was affirmed subsequently in the case of Reyes v. People[37] (Reyes) where the Court,
despite affirming the Court's conviction under Section 5(i), still made an obiter dictum and said:
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA. Section 5 (e), par. 2 identifies the act or acts
that constitute the violence of economic abuse, x x x [.]

xxxx

Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the accused deprives the
woman of financial support which she is legally entitled to. Deprivation or denial of support, by itself, is already
specifically penalized therein.[38]
Thus, Sections 5(e) and 5(i), under current jurisprudence, ultimately punish the same act, i.e., the denial or
deprivation of financial support by the husband or the father of the children. And, as already stated, under present
jurisprudence, denial of financial support, by itself, is already sufficient to make a person liable for a violation of
Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.
It is thus relevant for the Court to now determine whether, like the accused in Melgar, Christian may be held liable for
a violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 even if the Information filed was for violation of Section 5(i). To this point, the
Court finds that Christian cannot likewise be held guilty of violating Section 5(e).
The current judicial interpretation that denial of financial support, by itself, is enough to convict under Section 5(e) of
R.A. 9262 is not supported by the letter of the law. To state once more, Section 5(e), R.A. 9262 punishes:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — x x x
xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to
her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
 (4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties[.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The language of Section 5(e) above is clear: the denial of financial support, to be punishable, must have the "purpose
or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's x x x movement or conduct." To be sure, Section 5(e) uses the word
"deprive"[39] which, like the use of the word "denial" in Section 5(i), connotes willfulness and intention. The denial or
deprivation of financial support under Section 5(e) is, therefore, an intentional act that has, for its purpose, to control
or restrict the woman's movement or conduct. The willful deprivation of financial support, therefore, is the actus
reus of the offense, while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman's conduct. Thus, similar to the
discussion in Section 5(i), Section 5(e) cannot be read as punishing the mere failure or one's inability to provide
financial support, which is what happened in this case.
In this connection, the Court sees it fit to use this opportunity to clarify, for the guidance of the bench and the Bar, the
applicability of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.

It is a well-established principle that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context.[40] Section 5(e), if read and understood in its entirety, punishes acts, or the employment of machinations, that
have the effect of either (1) compelling a woman and/or her child or children to do something unwillingly or (2)
preventing her and/or her child or children from doing something which is within her or her child's or her children's
right/s to do. Absent this element, the failure to provide financial support will entail only civil, not criminal,
responsibility.
A reading of R.A. 9262 in its entirety bolsters the foregoing reading of Section 5(e).

In an attempt to protect women from the different kinds of violence they experience or to which they are vulnerable to
while being in an intimate relationship, R.A. 9262 provided an encompassing definition of "violence against women."
This definition is found in Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262, which provides:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
 c) Prostituting the woman or her child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, however, Section 3(a) and its four subsections
above only provide for a comprehensive definition of violence against women and children.[41] Section 3(a) does not
provide the specific punishable acts under R.A. 9262. Instead, the specific acts that are criminalized by the law are
enumerated under Section 5 of R.A. 9262, which states:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to
her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions
or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does
not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed
against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to specify the punishable acts based upon the classifications of
violence against women already identified and defined under Section 3(a). While there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the classifications of violence against women under Section 3(a), on the one hand, and the
specific punishable acts under Section 5, on the other, it can still be reasonably gleaned that the punishable acts
spring from the multifaceted definition of violence against women which the law aims to protect women from. For
example, Sections 5(a) to 5(d) appear to protect women and their children from physical violence; Sections 5(f), 5(h)
and 5(i) from psychological violence; and Section 5(g) from physical and sexual violence. Meanwhile, Section 5(e), as
previously discussed, protects the woman from acts of violence that are committed for the purpose of attempting to
control her conduct or actions, or make her lose her agency, with most of the enumerated examples of acts having a
connection with the use of finances as the primary mode of controlling the woman. Thus, Section 5(e) could be
viewed as protecting the woman from economic abuse, as defined in Section 3(a), in some cases.

To recall, when Section 5(e) describes the act of "(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support"[42] as an act of violence against women and children, it does so in the context of having "the
purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct."[43] Such control or
restriction of movement through the use of finances may, in some cases, rise to the level of "economic abuse" as
defined in Section 3(a), as it is the financial dependence which normally allows women's partners to exercise control
over the woman's actions and decisions.
Thus, situations of economic abuse — making the woman financially dependent upon her partner — if prosecuted,
would also likely fall under Section 5(e). Just to provide concrete examples, the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence (NCADV), a non-profit organization based in the United States of America to improve legislation dealing with
domestic violence, explains that:

[b]y controlling and limiting the victim's access to financial resources, a batterer ensures that the victim will be
financially limited if he/she chooses to leave the relationship. As a result, victims of domestic violence are often forced
to choose between staying in an abusive relationship or facing economic hardship and possibly extreme poverty and
homelessness.[44]
The NCADV enumerates the different types of economic abuse as follows:

1. Interfering with the victim's work performance through harassing activities, such as frequent phone calls
or unannounced visits;

2. Denying the victim access to money or the means of obtaining it, to the point that he/she is entirely
dependent on the abuser for food, clothing and shelter;

3. Refusing to allow the victim to work or attend school, or engaging in activities that make it impossible for
the victim to do so;

4. Intentionally withholding necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, personal hygiene products, or
medication;

5. Stealing from the victim, defrauding their money or assets, and/or exploiting the victim's financial
resources or property for personal gain;

6. Requiring justification for any money spent and punishing the victim with physical, sexual or emotional
abuse;

7. Stealing or destroying the victim's personal belongings;

8. Forbidding a victim from maintaining a personal bank account;

9. Threatening to out an LGBTQ victim in their workplace;

10. Refusing to pay the victim court-ordered child or spousal support; or

11. Forcing their victim to obtain credit, then ruining the victim's credit rating or future ability to obtain
credit.[45]
Similar to the foregoing, the Battered Women's Support Services, another non-profit organization in the United
States, also enumerates the various ways by which women are economically abused:

1. Controlling paychecks and bank accounts;

2. Stealing from her;

3. Preventing the woman from accessing transportation;

4. Determining how money is spent;

5. Deciding where the woman will work;

6. Preventing the woman from working through isolation tactics;

7. Outright forbidding the woman to work;

8. Forcing the woman to work in family business with little or no pay;

 9. Forcing the woman to become pregnant;

10. Preventing the woman from accessing child care;

11. Harassing the woman at her workplace to the extent that the job is lost;

12. Controlling property decisions;

13. Destroying the woman's credit rating by using credit cards, lines of credit, without permission or filing all
financial contracts (lease, credit cards, utilities, etc.) in the woman's name and failing to make payments
on time or at all;

14. Forcing women to turn over government benefit payments including child tax benefits;

15. Using his income for his individual interests while her income is used to maintain the family collective
interests;

16. "Giving" her all the "control" of the financial decision for the family then criticizing her decisions and/or
having unrealistic understanding of what things cost;

17. Forbidding her to attend school or upgrading programs.[46]

These examples are referenced not to provide an exhaustive list of acts that constitute economic abuse, but to
highlight that there are different possible scenarios in which control of the woman is obtained through finances. As
well, the foregoing examples are used to impress that mere failure to pay financial support does not constitute
economic abuse contemplated by R.A. 9262.

The Court sees the need to clarify, however, that for purposes of determining the required specific intent to constitute
a violation of R.A. 9262, it is the letter of Section 5 which governs.[47] Section 3(a) just provides the context — the
various kinds of violence that women in intimate relationships are vulnerable to — in order to provide a full picture of
what the punishable acts under Section 5 seeks to protect women from.
In sum, this is, therefore, the proper understanding of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with the
deprivation, or threat of deprivation, of financial support: There must be allegation and proof that the act was
done with the intent to control or restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her children's actions or
decisions, consistent with the letter of Section 5(e) itself.
It is this element of specific intent to control or restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her children's actions or
decisions which is the defining characteristic that makes the act of "deprivation of financial support" under Section
5(e) of R.A. 9262 criminally punishable. It is what elevates or qualifies the act of "deprivation of financial support"
from one in which only civil liability may arise to an act that incurs criminal liability under Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262. As
previously discussed, a contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional,
consequences as the law imposes the obligation to support mutually upon the spouses.

In fine, and to reiterate, for deprivation of financial support to rise to a level that would make a person criminally liable
under Section 5(e), R.A. 9262, there must be allegation and proof that it was made with the intent to control or
restrict the woman's and/or her child's or her children's actions.
The elements of a violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with deprivation of financial support, are
therefore:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
(3) The offender either (a) deprived or (b) threatened to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or (c) deliberately provided the woman's children insufficient
financial support;

(4) The offender committed any or all of the acts under the third element for the purpose of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct.
Applying the foregoing to this case, the Court holds that Christian is also not guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A.
9262 due to the absence of the third and fourth elements. There is no proof that he deliberately refused to give
support in order to control the behavior or actions of AAA. Neither was there any allegation or proof that he prevented
AAA from seeking gainful employment or pursuing economic opportunities. The evidence in this case simply
established that he failed or was unable to provide financial support which, as discussed, is not enough to convict
under the law.
Conclusion
From the above discussions, the Court clarifies that it now hereby abandons Melgar and Reyes insofar as they hold
that a person charged with a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 may be convicted of violating Section 5(e) by
applying the variance doctrine. Based on the discussions in this Decision, the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that
deal with denial or deprivation of financial support punish different things. Section 5(e) punishes the deprivation of
financial support for the purpose of controlling the woman or to make her and/or her child or children lose their
agency. Section 5(i), on the other hand, punishes the willful infliction of mental or emotional anguish, or public
ridicule or humiliation upon the woman and/or her child or children by denying her and/or her child or children
financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children. Thus, while the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i)
that deal with denial or deprivation of financial support may seem similar at first glance, they, in reality, deal with
different matters and penalize distinct acts. As the Court comes to the realization that the said sections punish
different things, the Court, therefore, abandons Melgar and Reyes to the extent that they hold that the variance
doctrine may be applied for Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
Finally, the Court clarifies that in either case, whether the accused is prosecuted under Section 5(e) or Section 5(i),
the mere failure to provide financial support is not enough. In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i) can be
construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a conviction. Those entitled to
support and are not given any have the remedy of filing a civil case for support against the delinquent person,
consistent with the provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code. In order to be liable under the penal provisions
of R.A. 9262, therefore, it is necessary to allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or
deprivation of financial support from one in which mere civil liability may arise to one where a person may be
criminally liable.
The Court sees the need for this clarification, as R.A. 9262 was not meant to make the partners of women criminals
just because they fail or are unable to financially provide for them. Certainly, courts cannot send individuals to jail
because of their mere inability — without malice or evil intention — to provide for their respective families. In a
developing country like ours, where poverty and unemployment are especially rampant, courts would inevitably find
themselves incarcerating countless people, mostly fathers, should the interpretation be that mere failure or inability to
provide financial support is enough to convict under Sections 5(e) and 5(i). As Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
put it simply during the deliberations of this case, "poverty is not a crime x x x [and] the failure or inability to provide
support, without more, should not be the cause of a man's incarceration."

Also, while R.A. 9262 was indeed enacted to protect women, it was not meant to discount women's ability to provide
for themselves, especially when they are able-bodied. As Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen explained in his
Concurring Opinion:

Nevertheless, it is improper to think that women are always victims. This will only reinforce their already
disadvantaged position. The perspective portraying women as victims with a heritage of victimization results in the
unintended consequence of permanently perceiving all women as weak. To consider women as the weaker sex is
discriminatory. In safeguarding the interests of a discriminated class, we must be careful not to perpetuate the very
prejudices and biases that encourage discrimination of the members of the class.
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as victims will not always promote gender equality
before the law. It sometime aggravates the gap by conceding that women have always been dominated by men.

xxxx

No less than the Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building. This role is not
confined to child-rearing, honorable as motherhood may be. It is entirely possible that the woman in the sexual or
dating relationship is more financially capable than the man. Consistent with the spouses' mutual obligation to provide
support under the Family Code, the duty to provide financial support should not fall on the man alone. His mere
failure or inability to provide financial support should not be penalized as a crime, especially when the woman is more
financially capable.[48]
Given the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court herein proclaims the innocence of Christian
from the charge.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 17, 2016 and Resolution dated May 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36913 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.