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Law
Juridical review of law enforcement enforcement
on money launderers: case study on money
launderers
from Indonesia
Meiryani
Accounting Department, School of Accounting, Bina Nusantara University,
Jakarta, Indonesia, and
Dezie Leonarda Warganegara
Management Department, BINUS Business School, Doctor of Research in
Management, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia

Abstract
Purpose – Efforts to prevent and eradicate the crime of money laundering require a strong legal basis to
ensure legal certainty. This paper aims to analyse law enforcement on money launderers with juridical review
perspectives.
Design/methodology/approach – The research method used in this study is the statute approach,
which is to examine all laws and regulations related to the crime of money laundering. The writing method
used is the normative method, which is a type of research that uses the analysis of certain legislation.
Findings – Three new findings were discovered. In assessing the validity or validation of a business
ownership or business transaction, there are at least three pieces of evidence that need to be used, namely,
presence/absence of company/business registration in an official government database; the presence/absence
(including the amount) of tax reported on income tax and VAT; and the presence/absence of other legal
documents relating to the existence or general licensing of a business.
Research limitations/implications – The results of this study are also expected to be helpful for the
community, government agencies, or institutions, such as the police, to combat corruption, and money
laundering. The Prosecutor’s Office and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) describe the handling
of money laundering crimes originating from money laundering crimes.
Social implications – This research can provide an overview and input for the broader community as an
early warning so as not to commit money laundering crimes.
Originality/value – This is one of the pioneer studies looking into law enforcement on money launderers
with comprehensive juridical review.
Keywords Law enforcement, Money launderers, Juridical review, Perspectives
Paper type Literature review

Introduction
Law enforcement against perpetrators of the crime of money laundering has recently shown
an increase (Harvey, 2005). At this time, money laundering has become a social phenomenon
and challenge. Money laundering is a serious crime (Masciandaro et al., 2007). The financial

This study is supported by BINUS University 2022 funding, as a part of Research Grant of Proyek
Inisiatif BINUS (BINUS Initiative Project) entitled “Publikasi International Bereputasi, Hak Kekayaan
Journal of Money Laundering
Intelektual dan Multidisiplin Research Output dalam Integrated Catur Dharma Perguruan Tinggi” or Control
“Reputable International Publication, Intellectual Property Rights and Multidisciplinary Research © Emerald Publishing Limited
1368-5201
Output in Integrated Catur Dharma College”. DOI 10.1108/JMLC-05-2022-0062
JMLC system is very functional for organized and white-collar criminals (Reuter, 2007). The
purpose of money laundering is to obscure the origin of what is entered into the financial
system (Walker, 2007). Indonesia is a country based on law where everything related to the
life of society, nation and state is regulated by law and various kinds of regulations such as
laws, Presidential Regulations, Government Regulations and Regional Regulations (Simser,
2013). The state of Indonesia is ranked 3 as a place for money laundering, from the CPI
(Corruption Perception Index) rating of 88 below Nigeria and above Russia. One of the
crimes that are directly related to money laundering in Indonesia is the criminal action
of corruption (Veng Mei Leong, 2007). The participation of the government of the
Republic of Indonesia in efforts to eradicate money laundering activities is contained in the
United Nations, namely, the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988, which was later ratified by the government through Law
Number 7 of 1997. Money laundering is the process of removing traces of the origin of
money resulting from illegal activities or crimes through a series of investment activities or
transfers carried out repeatedly with the aim of obtaining legal status for money invested or
entered into the financial system (Teichmann, 2020a).
Money laundering is an attempt to hide or disguise the origin of money/funds or assets
resulting from a criminal act through various financial transactions so that the money or the
price of assets resulting from a crime is carried out through various financial transactions so
that the money or the price of the assets appears as if it came from activities (Harvey, 2004).
According to a report from the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the typology
of money laundering is divided into five forms, namely:
(1) concealment within the company;
(2) legitimate business abuse;
(3) use of fake documents or identities;
(4) exploitation of international jurisdiction issues; and
(5) use of unnamed asset types (Walker, 1999).

In practice, money launderers use more than one typology and combine them with complex
schemes. This makes money laundering difficult to track and requires cooperation and
understanding from law enforcement and mature judges as well as a strong rule of law
(Schneider, 2008). In general, perpetrators of criminal acts try to hide or disguise the origin of
assets, which are the result of criminal acts in various ways so that the assets resulting from
criminal acts are difficult to trace by law enforcement officers and that they can freely use
the assets for both legal and illegal activities (Muller et al., 2007). The economic, political,
legal, social and cultural damage caused by money laundering is so great that it undermines
the very foundations of the structure of society (Sharman, 2008). Money laundering has the
potential to destroy the economy and security and has social impacts (Van Fossen, 2003).
Therefore, the crime of money laundering does not only threaten the stability and integrity
of the economic system and financial system, but can endanger the foundations of social,
national and state life based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of
Indonesia (Schneider, 2010). For this reason, efforts to prevent and eradicate the crime of
money laundering require a strong legal basis to ensure legal certainty, the effectiveness
of law enforcement as well as tracking and returning of assets resulting from criminal acts
(Hughes, 1991).

Literature review
Changes in the legal basis of money laundering in Indonesia are as follows:
 Law Number 15 of 2002 concerning the Crime of Money Laundering. Law
 Law Number 25 of 2003 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2002 enforcement
concerning the Crime of Money Laundering. on money
 Law Number 8 of 2010 concerning the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of launderers
Money Laundering regulates the forms of money laundering in seven articles,
namely, Articles 3–10. The other forms of criminal acts related to money laundering
are in six articles, namely, Articles 11–16.
 Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 1 of 2013 concerning Procedures for
Settlement of Applications for Handling Assets in the Crime of Money Laundering
or Other Crimes.

Law of the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 25 of 2003, which has been amended into
Law Number 8 of 2010 concerning the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Money
Laundering, where money laundering is divided into three criminal acts:
(1) Active money laundering is any person who places, transfers, spends, pays,
grants, entrusts, takes abroad, changes form, exchanges for money or securities or
other actions on assets that he/she knows or it is reasonable to suspect that it is the
result of a criminal act as referred to in Article 2 paragraph (1) with the aim of
concealing or disguising the origin of assets (Article 3 of the Law of the Republic of
Indonesia Number 8 of 2010).
(2) Passive money laundering is imposed on any person who receives or controls the
placement, transfer, payment, grant, donation, safekeeping, exchange or use of
assets which he/she knows or reasonably suspects is the result of a criminal act as
referred to in Article 2 paragraph (1). This is also considered the same as money
laundering.
(3) Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 8 of 2010 is also imposed
on those who enjoy the proceeds of the crime of money laundering, which is
imposed on anyone who hides or disguises the origin, source of location, allocation,
transfer of rights or ownership. In fact, the assets which he/she knows or
reasonably suspects are the proceeds of a criminal act as referred to in Article 2
paragraph (1).

Money laundering method


There are several methods commonly used in money laundering activities, namely:
(1) Buy and sell conversions. This is done through buying and selling of goods and
services. So the money related to the crime is turned into assets, to be sold again.
This makes the money as if it is a legal income.
(2) Offshore conversions. Money related to these crimes is diverted to countries that
are known as tax havens to be deposited in banks or financial institutions in those
countries. Funds deposited in this country are then transferred back to banks or
financial institutions of other countries or become assets. The transfer to a tax
haven country was because of the tendency for looser tax regulations, banking
regulations regarding the protection of customer confidentiality or easy business
provisions. This confidentiality and convenience makes customers or investors
free to enter and rotate funds related to illegal activities in that country.
JMLC (3) Legitimate business conversions. It is practiced through business or legitimate
business activities as a means to transfer these funds into business activities so
that they are mixed in company funds. Then, the funds are converted back through
checks, transfers or other payment instruments and transferred to the account of
the original fund owner. This makes the origin of the funds obscure because it is
mixed with company funds.

Law No. 15 of 2002


Law No. 15 of 2002 explains that money laundering is an attempt to hide or disguise the
origin of assets obtained from criminal acts as referred to in Law No. 15 of 2002. Law 25/
2003 ARTICLE 1 NUMBER 1: Money laundering is the act of placing, transferring, paying,
spending, donating, entrusting, bringing abroad, exchanging, or other actions on assets that
are known or reasonably suspected to be criminal acts with the intent to hide or disguise the
origin of assets so that they appear to be legitimate assets. Law 8/2010 ARTICLE 1
NUMBER 1: Money laundering is any act that fulfills the elements of a criminal act in
accordance with the provisions of the law.

Law No. 8 year 2010


Based on Law No. 8 of 2010, the scope of money laundering is as follows:
Suspicious financial transactions are (Article 1 number 5 of Law No. 8/2010) as follows:
 financial transactions that deviate from the profile, characteristics or habits of the
transaction pattern of the relevant service user;
 financial transactions by service users which are reasonably suspected to have been
carried out with the aim of avoiding reporting of the relevant transactions that must
be carried out by the reporting party in accordance with the provisions of this law;
 financial transactions carried out or canceled using assets suspected of originating
from the proceeds of criminal acts; or
 financial transactions requested by PPATK to be reported by the reporting party because
it involves assets suspected of originating from the proceeds of criminal acts.

Article 2 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Law No. 8 of 2010:


The proceeds of criminal acts are assets obtained from criminal acts: corruption, bribery,
drugs, psychotropic substances, smuggling of labor, migrant smuggling, banking, capital
market, insurance, customs, excise, trafficking in persons, trafficking in illicit weapons,
terrorism, kidnapping, theft, embezzlement, fraud, counterfeiting money, gambling,
prostitution, in the field of taxation, in the forestry sector, in the environment, in the marine
and fishery sector or other criminal acts punishable by imprisonment of four years or more
committed in the territory of the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) or outside the
territory of the Republic of Indonesia and the crime is also a crime according to Indonesian
law. Assets that are known or reasonably suspected to be used and/or used directly or
indirectly for terrorist activities, terrorist organizations or individuals are considered to be
the proceeds of criminal acts as referred to in paragraph (1) letter.
Article 3 Law NO. 8/2010: Everyone who places, transfers, spends, pays, grants, entrusts,
takes overseas, changes form, exchanges with currency or securities or other actions on
assets known as intended in Article 2 paragraph (1) with the aim of concealing or conveying
the origin of the assets shall be punished for the crime of money laundering with a
maximum penalty of 20 years and a maximum fine of Rp. 10,000,000,000.
Article 4: Any person who hides or disguises the origin, source, location, designation, transfer Law
of rights or ownership, which is actually on assets that are known or reasonably suspected to be enforcement
the proceeds of a criminal act as referred to in Article 2 paragraph (1) Money Laundering with a
maximum imprisonment of 20 years and a maximum fine of Rp. IDR 5,000,000,000.
on money
Article 5: launderers
(1) Any person who receives or controls the placement, transfer, payment, grant,
donation, safekeeping, exchange or use of assets which are known or reasonably suspected
to be the proceeds of a criminal act as referred to in Article 2 paragraph (1) shall be
sentenced to a maximum imprisonment of five years and a maximum fine of Rp.
1,000,000,000.

Money laundering modes


Various forms of money laundering modes that have developed to date are as follows:
 Loan back: By borrowing his/her own money; this mode is detailed again in the
form of a direct loan, by borrowing money from a foreign company in the form of a
shadow company where the directors and shareholders are himself/herself. In the
form of a back to loan, where the perpetrator borrows money from a foreign bank
branch on a stand-by letter of credit or certificate of deposit that the money was
obtained on the basis of money from a crime, and the loan is then not returned so
that the bank guarantee is disbursed.
 C-Chase mode of operation: This method is quite complicated and cumbersome to
remove traces; for example, in the case of Mr X ordering couriers to come to Bank A
to deposit funds of US$10,000 to escape the reporting obligation. Then, several
transfers were made, namely, Bank NY to Country B to a bank branch in S, then
there was a conversion in the form of a certificate of deposit to guarantee a loan in
the same amount taken by a person from Country D. Loan for Country O which is
famous for its tax haven: Here the loan is never billed, but only by withdrawing the
certificate of deposit. From Country D, the money is transferred to the country
through a drug dealer’s account and there the money is distributed according to the
needs and the dark business. The results of this investment are washable and safe.
 The mode of international trade transactions. This mode uses L/C document
facilities. Because the focus of bank affairs, both correspondent bank and opening
bank, is the bank document itself and does not recognize the condition of the goods,
then this can be a target for money laundering offenses, in the form of making large
invoices for small goods or even non-existent goods. Cash smuggling mode or
parallel banking system to other countries: This is a mode of smuggling physical
sums of money out of the country. Because in this way there are risks such as being
robbed, lost or caught, a mode in the form of electronic transfer is used, namely,
transferring from one country to another without physical transfer of the money.
 Mode of acquisition: The acquired company is the company itself. For example, a
company owner in Indonesia owns a company illegally in Cayman Island, a tax
haven country. The results of operations in the Cayman are deposited in the name of
a company in Indonesia. Then, the Cayman companies buy shares from Indonesia
(by acquisition). In this way, the company’s owner in Indonesia has legal funds
because it has been laundered through selling their shares in Indonesian companies.
Real estate carousel mode, namely, by selling a property often to companies in the
same group. Money laundering actors own several companies (majority
shareholders) in the form of real estate.
JMLC  Certain investment modes: This particular investment is usually in the business of
dealing in goods or paintings or antiques. For example, the perpetrator buys a
painting and then sells it to someone who is actually ordered by the perpetrator
himself/herself at a high price. Paintings with immeasurable prices can be set at the
highest price and are legal. The proceeds from the sale of the painting can be
categorized as legal funds. Over invoices or double invoice mode: This mode is
carried out by establishing the country’s own export-import company, then abroad
(with a tax haven system) also establish a shell company. The company in this tax
haven country exports goods to Indonesia, and the company overseas makes a
purchase invoice at a high price; this is called an over invoice; when two invoices are
made, it is called double invoices.
 Stock trading mode: This mode has occurred in several countries. In a case in the
ABC State Securities Busra, involving a securities company, some of the clients of
this securities company became the perpetrators of money laundering. This means
that the funds from their invested customers come from black money. The bank
created two accounts for these customers, one for customers who lost and one for
profit. The account is attempted to be opened in a place where confidentiality is
guaranteed, so that it is difficult to trace who the beneficial owner of the account is.
 Deposit taking mode: Establishing financial companies such as Deposit Taking
Institution (DTI). DTI is famous for money laundering facilities. The money
laundering case involved DTI, including transfers via telex, securities, foreign
exchange, purchasing government bonds and treasury bills.

Money laundering is generally carried out through three stages, as follows:


(1) Placement is an effort to place cash funds resulting from a criminal activity in a
form that is easier to transfer and is not suspected to be further processed into the
financial system, especially the banking system, so that traces of the origin of these
funds can be traced and removed. The perpetrators of the crime of money
laundering enter their illegal funds into the accounts of fictitious companies such
as precious stone jewelry companies or convert the funds into monetary
instruments such as traveler’s checks, money orders and other negotiable
instruments, then collect the money and deposit it into bank accounts. As an
example of the proceeds of the drug trade, the money consists of small coins in
large piles and is heavier than the drugs, which are then converted into larger
denominations of money and deposited into a bank account and monetary
instruments such as checks and money orders purchased.
(2) Performing complex financial transactions (layering), layered and anonymous with
the aim of separating the proceeds of a crime from its source into various accounts
so that it is difficult to trace the origin of the funds; in other words, hiding or
disguising the origin of the assets resulting from the crime (the layering stage).
Money launderers also do this by setting up fictitious companies, being able to buy
securities or means of transportation such as planes and heavy equipment on
behalf of other people.
(3) The stage where the perpetrator re-enters the funds that have new origins into
assets that appear to be legitimate either for direct enjoyment, invested in various
forms of material or financial wealth, used to refinance legitimate business
activities or to refinance criminal activities (integration stage).
Research methodology Law
The research method used in this study is the statute approach, which is to examine all laws enforcement
and regulations related to the crime of money laundering. The writing method used is the
normative method, which is a type of research that uses the analysis of certain legislation.
on money
To analyze and find answers to the problems in this study used types of legal materials, launderers
namely primary legal materials. The source the legal material used is the primary source of
legal material, namely, Law No. 8 of 2010 concerning the crime of money laundering. In this
study, the authors use a normative juridical approach. Namely, the author discusses the
problems in this study based on existing laws, regulations, and norms that exist in society
by using theories and existing legal principles. The research method used is normative,
namely, examining an inventory of favorable laws that apply in Indonesia.

Result and discussion


1. Law enforcement money launderers
The laws that apply to money launderers in Indonesia are as follows:
 The government issues a money laundering law: Law No. 15 of 2002, which was
amended by Law No. 25 of 2003 and lastly replaced with Law No. 8 of 2010
concerning the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering Crimes and
various related laws, such as the Law on Corruption and so on.
 Bank Indonesia issues Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI). Bank Indonesia Regulation
(PBI) NO.3/10/PBI, TGL. JUNE 18 2001 AND PBI NO.3/23/PBI/2001 Concerning
implementation of Know Your Customer Principles (KYC). The last PBI NO.11/28/
PBI/2009.

2. Law No. 8 of 2010 concerning the prevention and eradication of the crime of crime of
money laundering
Law on the prevention and eradication of the crime of money laundering in lieu of Law
Number 15 of 2002 concerning the crime of money laundering as amended by Law
Number 25 of 2003 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2002 concerning the
crime of money laundering. The content material contained in this Law, among others,
are as follows:
 Redefinition of the definition of matters related to the crime of money laundering;
 perfecting the criminalization of the crime of money laundering;
 regulations regarding the imposition of criminal sanctions and administrative
sanctions;
 strengthening the application of the principle of recognizing service users;
 expansion of the reporting party;
 determination of the type of reporting by providers of other goods and/or services;
 arrangements regarding compliance supervision;
 granting authority to the reporting party to postpone the transaction;
 expansion of the authority of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise to
carry cash and other payment instruments into or out of the customs area;
 granting authority to investigators for predicate crimes to investigate allegations of
money laundering;
JMLC  expansion of agencies entitled to receive Financial Transaction Reports and
Analysis Center (PPATK) analysis or examination results;
 restructuring of Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK)
institutions;
 additional authority of Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center
(PPATK), including the authority to temporarily suspend transactions;
 re-arrangement of the law on the examination of the criminal act of money
laundering; and
 regulation regarding confiscation of assets originating from criminal acts.

3. Money laundering case: case study from Indonesia

Decisions on money laundering offenses stemming from corruption crimes


Since 2005, there have been more than 289 decisions on money laundering offences (PPATK:
2020). Based on the alleged predicate crime, corruption is the highest decision with 80
decisions or 41.3% compared to decisions with other predicate crimes. Details of the
comparison of the number of money laundering case decisions (January 2005 to November
2020) based on the alleged predicate offense are presented in Table 1.
Several decisions on money laundering offenses originating from criminal acts of
corruption will be reviewed, especially in the section on evidence used to fulfill the elements
of money laundering offenses.

1. Case of Bahasyim Asyifie


Bahasyim Asyifie, a former official of the Directorate General of Taxes at the Ministry of
Finance who has the authority to conduct tax investigations, was identified in 2009 as
having Rp. 64,000,000,000.00. Based on tracing the flow of funds, his assets came from a
number of cash deposits since 1998 and were deposited in the accounts of his wife and the
accounts of his two children. There was also a deposit in his wife’s account from a company
owner of Rp. 1,000,000,000. In addition to cash deposits, this amount is also the result of

No. Original crime No. of decisions (%)

1 Corruption 80 41.3
2 Narcotics 51 39.1
3 Fraud 25 19.4
4 Embezzlement 19 11.2
5 Banking 16 9.2
6 Letter forgery 11 7.4
7 Psychotropic 6 3.1
8 Gambling 5 3.4
9 Theft 4 3.1
10 Cash-carrying violations 4 3.1
11 Forestry 3 2.1
12 Bribery 3 2.1
Table 1. 13 Other crimes 6 4.6
Money laundering
case Source: Results of data processing
additional interest from a sum of money that is simultaneously invested in various products Law
such as Bank Indonesia certificates (SBI), placements in time deposits, placements in enforcement
Investment Banks and insurance. Besides being invested, there is a pattern of book-entry of
a number of funds between Mr A’s account and his family, and there is also a book-entry to
on money
a newly opened account and closing an old one. In addition, it is known that the Bahasyim launderers
family owns a family company which was founded in 2005. However, it can be identified
that the assets owned by the family do not come from the results of business activities, as
seen from the period of acquisition of family assets since 1998, which is played in various
family accounts and invested in products, investment banking, and insurance. Based on the
company’s account mutation, it does not show any significant transactions that can show
the results of business activities. Ownership of significant amounts of assets and the
existence of a deposit from a private company owner are considered unreasonable and
indicate a criminal act of corruption considering that the person concerned is an official in a
government institution tasked with supervising the field of state financial revenues. At the
cassation level, Bahasyim was found guilty of committing a criminal act of corruption in the
form of visiting the taxpayer, asking for money and receiving Rp. 1,000,000,000 from
the taxpayer. Bahasyim is also considered to have committed acts that meet the elements of
money laundering offences. Although the person concerned showed a number of evidences
that his assets came from a business, the panel of judges considered that the evidence
presented was insufficient for consideration, one of which was because in the period
between 2004 and around March 2010, the defendant formally did not have a business.
Subsequently, the panel of judges ordered the state to confiscate cash in the amount of
Rp. 783,637, Rp. 5,679,763, Rp. 1,178,343,800 and Rp. 217,530,156, which was originally in
the account of the child concerned.

2. Case of Argandiono
From 2004 to 2010, when Argandiono served as Head of Prevention and Investigation
in Makassar and Palembang then Head of the Customs and Excise Service Office
Type A Juanda Regional Office VII DJBC Type A Surabaya, the person concerned
could be proven to have received Rp. 1,651,000,000 from several export and import
entrepreneurs as well as several other entrepreneurs who are engaged in business
fields related to the positions and authorities concerned. Argandiono never reported
the receipt of funds from these entrepreneurs to the KPK, and used the money for
personal interests, such as buying vehicles and houses in the name of other parties. At
trial, Argandiono stated that the source of his money came from a loan because
friendship was not related to the authority concerned. However, for the loan, the panel
of judges still considered that Argandiono could not show valid evidence of the source
of his acquisition. The panel of judges assessed that Argandiono’s actions had
fulfilled the elements of the money laundering crime.

3. Case of Wa Ode Nurhayati


Wa Ode Nurhayati is a member of the DPR RI and a member of the Budget Committee of the
DPR RI. In 2010, Wa Ode, through his assistant, can be proven to have received
Rp. 6,250,000,000 in connection with the allocation of Regional Infrastructure Adjustment
Fund (DPID) for a number of budget regions in 2011. In 2010 and 2011, Wa Ode placed the
money and placed other funds by the person concerned or his assistant repeatedly until the
amount was more than IDR 50.5bn in his account. The amount of money is then used for
placements in insurance, placements in time deposits, paying installments on credit facilities
with deposit collateral, paying installments for the purchase of houses, apartments, gold and
JMLC transferring some to the accounts of his assistants. At the trial, the public prosecutor also
succeeded in showing that since he was sworn in as a member of the DPR in October 2009–
2011, he received a salary and allowance of Rp. 1,699,393,050. The panel of judges at the
district court, appeal and cassation level assessed that Laode’s action had fulfilled the
elements of the crime of money laundering.

4. Case of Djoko Susilo


In 2010 and 2011, Djoko Susilo, as the Head of the Police Traffic Corps and as the Budget
User Proxy, can be proven to have enriched himself by Rp. 32,000,000,000 and other people
related to the procurement of driving simulators for two- and four-year clinical trials. Budget
2011 in the Traffic Police Corps. Djoko Susilo has used the proceeds of corruption to buy a
number of lands and properties in the names of other parties. In addition to this money,
Djoko Susilo is also known to have other assets worth Rp. 54,625,540,129 and US$60,000,
which he obtained during the period 2003–2010. At the trial, Djoko Susilo presented
evidence and witnesses regarding the origin of the acquisition of his assets, which
essentially states that the source of his wealth comes from his established business and is
carried out in cash. However, in the LHKPN, Djoko Susilo did not report information about
his business. The panel of judges assessed that the assets did not match the income of the
defendant as a member of the National Police, so that the assets should be suspected of
being the result of a criminal act of corruption. Besides that, however, the panel of judges is
of the opinion that the evidence does not provide sufficient legal grounds for consideration.
In addition to the LHKPN evidence, the ML act in this case is proven by the Public
Prosecutor with evidence in the form of documents or letters regarding the ownership of
land/property/vehicles on behalf of another party. In addition to imprisonment, the panel of
judges sentenced Djoko Susilo for corruption to pay a replacement fee of IDR 32,000,000,000
and revoked his political rights. Meanwhile, in the ML case, the panel of judges ordered the
state to confiscate a number of land and buildings as well as vehicles. There are land/
vehicles that are returned to their owners.

5. Case of M. Akil Muhtar


M. Akil Muhtar, as Chairman of the Constitutional Court, during the period 2010–2013,
received more than Rupiah. Most of the bribes received were using the account of a company
called CV Ratu Samagat, which was founded in 2010. The owners and management of the
company are listed as the children and wives of Akil Muchtar. The company’s
establishment should be suspected as an attempt to deceive the financial industry from
detecting suspicious financial transactions, considering that an account was created by
using the company’s name. The account received deposits from third parties, including
underlying businesses such as buying and selling palm oil and heavy equipment. Most of
these transactions have been proven by investigators to be not actual transactions but
transactions related to the election dispute settlement case handled by Akil Muchtar.

6. Case of Rudi Rubiandini


In 2013, Rudi Rubiandini, as the Head of the Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas
Business Activities (SKK Migas), was convincingly proven guilty of committing a criminal
act of corruption in the form of receiving a cash prize of SGD200,000 and US$900,000, from
the relevant private sector implementation of a limited auction of the State’s share of crude
oil and condensate in SKK Migas. In addition, Rudi Rubiandini also received SGD 600,000,
US$200,000, US$150,000 and US$50,000, from several SKK Migas officials. The proceeds of
the crime are then deposited in cash into the accounts concerned, transferred to other parties,
placed in the SDB in the name of the person concerned in one of the banks, deposited in the Law
SDB on behalf of the other party, exchanged in other currencies and spent on buying enforcement
vehicles, paying off the purchase of a house as well as buying a luxury watch. The panel of
judges assessed that Rudi Rubiandini’s actions had fulfilled the elements of the crime of
on money
money laundering. launderers

7. Case of Labora Sitorus


This case is related to a.n Labora Sitorus who is a police officer. From 2010 to 2012, PT Seno
Adhi Wijaya has been transporting and selling fuel oil using a number of motorized tankers.
The company carries out the transportation of fuel without having a transportation business
license and/or it is found that fuel is not accompanied by transportation documents. In
addition, PT Rotua can be proven to have received, bought or sold, received a deposit or has
forest products which are known or reasonably suspected to have originated from forest
areas that were taken or collected illegally. PT Rotua also does not have a legal entity and
business license in the forestry sector. Legally and formally, Labora’s name is not listed in
the management of the two companies. However, the transactions between the two
companies use an account in the name of Labora Sitorus, and Labora has full authority over
all transactions with these companies. Labora is also known to have an identity card with a
private job that is used to open an account. According to the judge at the cassation level, this
has fulfilled the elements of money laundering.

8. Case of Asian Agri Group


The case of Asian Agri Group is making fraudulent transactions in its business activities to
reduce the amount of tax it has to pay. Although in this case the Asian Agri Group was not
charged with the Money Laundering Article, it is evident from this practice that the state
suffered losses of up to 2.5tn from unpaid taxes. Therefore, the practice of money laundering
has a direct impact on the state’s income from taxes.

9. Case of Benny Tjokro’s


Rp. 50bn Money Laundering Case. The Yogyakarta District Prosecutor’s Office (Kejari) has
transferred the case of Benny Tjokrosaputro regarding the alleged case of money laundering
(TPPU) worth around Rp. 50bn to the Yogyakarta District Court (PN). “To hear the case, we
have formed a team of public prosecutors from the Prosecutor’s Office of Yogya and
Jampidum,” said Yogyakarta’s Chief Prosecutor Gatot Guno Sembodo in his statement,
Thursday (20/1). In this case, Benny, who is a convict of the PT Asuransi Jiwasraya
corruption case as well as a defendant in the ASABRI case, is suspected of obscuring the
origin of the money as if it came from legal activities. According to Gatot, the disguised
Rp. 50bn was suspected to be the proceeds of a crime to collect public funds in the form of
deposits without a business license from Bank Indonesia or from other criminal acts. “In
order to raise funds, a meeting was held at a hotel in Yogya,” said Gatot. The modus
operandi used by Benny, said Gatot, was to establish PT Hanson Internasional and the
Hanson Mitra Mandiri Cooperative as a means of money laundering as a result of criminal
acts of collecting funds from the public. “It should also be suspected that the laundered
funds came from other companies belonging to the suspect. The company is suspected to
have received a flow of funds related to corruption cases,” said Gatot. There are also four
staff of Benny’s company who are suspected to be involved in this case. Those who are now
suspects with Benny are RAS, RA, JI, and RM. Benny and the other suspects in this case
were charged with Article 3 and Article 4 in conjunction with Article 10 of Law No. 8 of 2010
concerning Prevention and Eradication of ML in conjunction with Article 55 (1) of the 1st
JMLC Criminal Code and violates Article 46 (1) (2) of Law No. 7 of 1992 concerning Banking Jo Law
No. 10 of 1998 concerning banking.

Discussion
Evidence of money laundering cases as a stand-alone crime
According to Eddy O.S. Hiariej (2012, p. 52), evidence is anything that can be used to prove
the truth of an event in court. According to him, in the context of theory, the form of evidence
can be varied, such as eyewitnesses, documents, experts, fingerprints and DNA. Colin
Evans, as quoted by Eddy O.S. Hiariej (2012, p. 52), divides evidence into two categories,
namely, direct evidence and circumstance evidence. In the trial, there was no distinction
between direct and indirect evidence; however, regarding the strength of the evidence, the
difference was quite significant. Circumstantial evidence is defined as a form of evidence
that the judge may consider regarding facts that are not directly seen by eye witnesses.
Phyllis B. Gerstenfield, as quoted by Eddy O.S. Hiariej (2012, p. 52), explains that direct
evidence is evidence that tends to show the existence of facts without additional evidence.
However, circumstantial evidence is one that requires further evidence before drawing
conclusions on the evidence. Meanwhile, Max M. Houck explained that circumstantial
evidence is evidence based on a conclusion and not from knowledge or observation. Of
course, the circumstantial evidence must be adjusted with other evidence (Hughes, 1991). On
this basis, Houck argues that not all evidence has the same proving power. It is possible that
one evidence has a more important position than the other evidence, which all depends on
the proof of a case (Van Duyne, 2003).
Larry E. Sullivan and Marie Simonetti Rosen, as quoted by Eddy O.S. Hiariej (2012,
p. 52), divides evidence into three categories, namely, direct evidence, indirect evidence and
physical evidence. Direct evidence forms the element of a crime through eyewitness
accounts, confessions or whatever is observed, including writing and sound, video or other
digital recordings. Indirect evidence is based on sound words and analysis (Stessens, 2000).
Physical evidence is produced from a criminal investigation to determine the existence of a
crime that is linked between an object, the victim and the perpetrator (Meiryani et al., 2022).
A person who commits a crime always tries to get rid of the evidence that can ensnare him.
Therefore, although in criminal cases there is no hierarchy in the evidence, testimony
usually has the main place. Letters and other written evidence, including electronic
documents, can only be used as evidence if they are related to the crime committed
(Alexander, 2001). Nevertheless, the truth of the contents of the letter and other written
evidence, including electronic documents, must also be proven. Ian Dennis, as quoted by
Eddy O.S. Hiariej (2012, p. 52), documents that evidence have an important value if they
meet the following criteria:
 regarding the authenticity of documents;
 the contents of a document; and
 if the document is implemented in accordance with its contents.

In the ML case, Article 73 of the PPTPPU Law states that the valid evidence in proving the
crime of money laundering is:
 evidence as referred to in the criminal procedure law; and/or
 other evidence in the form of information that is spoken, sent, received or stored
electronically by means of optical or optical-like devices and documents (Keesoony,
2016).
Based on Article 1 point 16 of the PPTPPU Law, documents are data, recordings or Law
information that can be seen, read and/or heard, which can be issued with or without the enforcement
help of a means, whether written on paper, any physical object other than paper, or recorded
on money
electronically, including but not limited to:
 text, sound or image;
launderers
 maps, designs, photographs or the like; and
 letters, signs, numbers, symbols or perforations that have meaning or can be
understood by people who are able to read or understand them.

Meanwhile, when viewed in Article 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code for evidence,
namely, witness statements, expert statements, letters, instructions and statements of the
defendant, then the document is one of the evidence in Article 184 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, namely, letters, but in the Money Laundering Law, documents are defined more. In
addition to letters, instructions can also be found, exceeding letters and instructions, so that
the letters and instructions in Article 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot
accommodate evidence as stated in the money laundering law, so it appears that the
development of information technology has advanced rapidly (Stessens, 2000).
The formulation of evidence in the PPTPPU law is in line with the Law on the
Eradication of Corruption Crimes; the basic difference lies in that the PPTPPU Law has
regulated information and documents as evidence, whereas in the Law on the Eradication of
Criminal Acts of corruption, the two evidences are only an extension of sources of evidence
in the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) in the form of witness statements, letters and
statements from the defendant. Based on several decisions on money laundering offenses, as
has been reviewed in part 3 of this paper, several characteristics can be identified. Among
them, that the money laundering offenses case was cumulatively indicted with corruption
cases. In this case, law enforcers have been able to identify and prove the existence of
a criminal act of corruption over all or part of the confiscated assets (Naheem, 2020). In the
case of Argandiono and Rudi Rubiandini, all of the assets charged with ML are assets that
can be proven entirely from corruption. The existence of the criminal act of money
laundering, in this case, is evidenced by the placement, transfer and safekeeping to other
parties, placement in SDB, exchange in other currencies and spending on money resulting
from the crime of corruption. In the case of Rudi Rubiandini, the act of entrusting a certain
amount of money to the SDB of another party is one of the indicators that strengthens
efforts to conceal the origin of assets resulting from crime and makes it difficult to track law
enforcement. On the other hand, although Argandiono admitted that he received a number
of funds from the private sector related to export/import activities, at the trial, he stated that
the amount of funds was a loan that had been repaid. However, the formal legality of the
loan agreement cannot be demonstrated (Favarel-Garrigues et al., 2008).
Meanwhile, in the case of Bahasyim Asyifie, Wa Ode Nurhayati, Djoko Susilo and M.
Akil Mochtar, law enforcement only succeeded in proving the existence of a criminal act of
corruption from a small portion of the assets seized by the state. The four parties in court
admitted that the source of their wealth was from business (Sheptycki, 2000). However, from
the evidence presented by the defendant, it is not enough to be sure that the source of the
acquisition comes from a legitimate business (Gilmour, 2022). The existence of a money
laundering crime in this case is proven by the presence of the following:
 Most of the assets and businesses are not reported in the State Administrator
Wealth Report.
JMLC  Based on information regarding the official income in question which can be
identified, it is certain that it cannot be a source of acquisition of assets.
 No legal ownership of a business has been found, which is supported by a pattern of
transactions that does not reflect a business activity.
 The act of placing, entrusting, transferring, diverting, etc. (Takats, 2007).

The existence of an alleged criminal act, in this case, can only be proven by means of
evidence showing the characteristics of money laundering offenses, which is strengthened
by the existence of another criminal act that has been/concurrently proven at trial. This
condition can occur because of many factors. The main factor that is most likely because of
the success of the perpetrators in breaking the chain of criminal acts with their assets. In
keeping away the origins of the assets resulting from crime, money laundering actors often
use complex, diverse, invisible and secret transaction schemes (Orlova, 2008). In addition to
using a complex financial system, money laundering actors often take advantage of the
weaknesses of inefficient or corrupt systems to carry out the money laundering process. On
the other hand, the application of the principle of reverse proof by the defendant in the trial
process actually harms the prosecution process if the public prosecutor cannot prove
otherwise based on the arguments or evidence presented by the defendant who tries to
refute the public prosecutor’s charges. This condition can occur partly because of the
possibility of perpetrators submitting evidence of business transactions from information
sources that were not successfully obtained by the public prosecutor or other law
enforcement or government agencies prior to the prosecution process. The actors in this case
are very likely to manipulate financial transaction information assisted by gatekeepers
(Pavlidis, 2020).
In handling money laundering offenses cases, the evidentiary technique to assess the
truth and validity of a business ownership is always crucial, considering that a crime that
generates finance at the end or at the time the crime is committed will always use the
underlying business to hide the origin of the acquisition of its assets (Ross and Hannan,
2007). The application of the principle of reverse proof by the defendant in the trial process,
on the one hand, can harm the prosecution process if the defendant can convince the judge
about the origin of his assets from a business activity. In fact, the perpetrators engineered
financial transaction information assisted by gatekeepers. To overcome this, it is necessary
to strengthen the evidence in ML cases, especially those originating from corruption crimes.
This strengthening of evidence is also in line with the theory of evidence and evidence which
states that evidence is anything that can be used to prove the truth of an event in court,
which is directly or indirectly related to a crime as long as it can be judged as relevant
evidence that support the evidentiary process (Teichmann, 2020b).
In a number of ML case decisions stemming from criminal acts of corruption, the
evidence used refers to the elements in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the law of money laundering in
the form of evidence confirming the act of transferring, entrusting, changing the form,
exchanging with currency or securities, hiding or disguise origins and so on. The use of
evidence and evidence to assess the truth and validity of a business ownership needs to be
encouraged as evidence related to the act of “hiding or disguising the origin” (Article 4 law
of money laundering) by investigators, public prosecutors and judges. The nature of
proving the truth of a business ownership uses the principles commonly used in civil cases,
in this case what is sought is formal truth. In formal evidence, the existence of official
documents and through verifiable means needs to be encouraged as evidence to assess the
validity or validation of a business ownership or business transaction (John Madinger,
1999).
Conclusion Law
The target in the Money Laundering Law is to prevent and eradicate the money laundering enforcement
system or process in the form of placement, layering and integration. In principle, money
laundering is an attempt to hide or disguise the origin of assets obtained from various
on money
criminal acts, such as corruption, bribery, smuggling, labor smuggling, immigrant launderers
smuggling, banking, narcotics, psychotropic substances, slave trade, women and children,
trafficking illegal weapons, kidnapping, terrorism, theft, embezzlement and fraud, which are
committed in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia or outside the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia and these crimes are also criminal acts according to Indonesian law. If
there is an indication of money laundering, the service provider is obliged to report to the
PPATK and the PPATK can forward it to the investigator (Police). To anticipate the
enactment of the Money Laundering Law, the service provider must prepare itself,
especially the administration system for prospective customers, the system and strategic
investigations that will be carried out by a special unit, and conversely the general public
must understand money laundering, in addition to the need for cooperation between parties
involved, related parties and other countries in eradicating the crime of money laundering;
without cooperation, the crime of laundering will continue to develop.
Handling of the crime of money laundering in Indonesia, which began with the
enactment of Law Number 15 of 2002 concerning the Crime of Money Laundering as
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2002
concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, has shown a positive direction. This is reflected
in the increasing awareness of the implementers of the Law on the Crime of Money
Laundering, such as financial service providers in carrying out reporting obligations, the
Supervisory and Regulatory Agency in making regulations, the Financial Transaction
Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK) in analytical activities and enforcement agencies.
Law in following up on the results of the analysis to the imposition of criminal sanctions
and/or administrative sanctions. In order for the anti-money laundering law enforcement
system to work effectively, it is necessary to improve the quality of human resources
involved in efforts to prevent and eradicate money laundering, especially in important
institutions such as the judiciary, prosecutors, police, Financial Transaction Reports and
Analysis Center and financial service providers. We need to encourage restrictions on cash
transactions in business activities and encourage the existence of an integrated, easy and
accessible database regarding business ownership and other legal documents in preventing
money laundering.

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Further reading
Harvey, J. (2009), “The search for crime money—debunking the myth: facts versus imagery”, Journal of
Money Laundering Control, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 97-100.
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Laundering Crimes, PPATK, Jakarta.
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Laundering Crimes, PPATK, Jakarta.
Center for Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis (2015), Annotation on Decisions on Money
Laundering Crimes, PPATK, Jakarta.
Gunadi (2010), Comprehensive Guide to General Tax Provisions, MUC Consulting Group, Jakarta.
Hamza, A. (2010), Introduction to Indonesian Criminal Law, PT. Yarsif Watampone, Jakarta,
First Edition.

Corresponding author
Meiryani can be contacted at: meiryani@binus.edu

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