Words in this chapter: (910)

AFTERWORD: UNDERSTANDING COMPLEXITY

The aim of this book was to stimulate transdisciplinary discussion on the

subject of complexity. It is my contention that the traditional methods of science

and analytic philosophy are not sensitive enough to the dynamics of complex

systems. I have therefore been critical of the analytical method (carving things

up), deductive logic, atomism, formal rule-based grammars, closed algorithms

and symbolic representation. The shortcomings of these approaches were

pointed out in analyses of information theory, formal symbol systems, Searle's

Chinese Room argument and Fodor's mental representationalism. As an

alternative, I proposed a connectionist approach, arguing that this approach is

intrinsically more sensitive to complexity. It focuses is on the behaviour of

collections of many interconnected, similar elements that do not have

(atomistic) significance by themselves, but that obtain significance through a

complex set of non-linear, asymmetrical relationships in a network. Important

characteristics of these networks include distributedness, self-organisation, and

the operation on local information without central control. I have also shown

that these models already have practical applications, for example, in pattern

recognition problems, and that an understanding of them as complex systems

can help to improve their practical performance. Throughout I tried to intertwine

philosophical and scientific discourses. The idea was not only to show how

philosophical considerations can benefit scientific practice, but also the other

way round. It was specifically the burden of the final chapter to show how a

practical understanding of complexity can contribute to some of the key areas

 5
in postmodern philosophy.

As far as the application of these models of complexity is concerned, this

conclusion marks only the beginning. It must be clearly understood that the

general understanding of complexity developed here does not supply a

complete description of any specific complex system. If we want to analyse, for

example, a living cell as a complex system, the ideas presented here merely

provide a framework. The framework will have to be filled in with the

(biochemical) detail relevant to the specific case. Similarly, we have

characterised language in terms of a complex system, but this has to be seen

as a very tentative first step. For the development of useful, wide-ranging

connectionist models of language, and for their implementation in machines –

should that prove to be possible – a great deal of very hard work still lies

ahead. My hope is that this study could provide a certain theoretical orientation

when difficult and complex projects such as these are attempted.

Finally, I am very much aware of the fact that I could be criticised for

committing the performative fallacy, i.e. attempting to do what I claim is not

possible. In this case the problem would lie in trying to develop a theory that

insists on radical contingency, yet claims to be generally valid. This is exactly

the same problem that Derrida (1981: 26) faces when he claims “there are only,

everywhere, differences and traces of traces”. To insist that this fallacy should

not be committed, makes it extremely difficult to maintain any radically critical

position. This demand marks the starkest division between the analytical and

the postmodern positions. What is seen as the ultimate knock-down argument

on the one side is seen as an evasion of the real issues by the other.

Perhaps a truly postmodern response to this demand would be to just ignore

it. However, Derrida responded quite strongly when this kind of accusation was

made against him by Habermas,1 and perhaps I should take the risk of
 6
responding as well. I cannot counter the argument on its own grounds – in

that respect it is a show stopper. However, I do think that one should consider

the contents of the theory being accused of the performative fallacy. Just like

Derrida's theory of the trace, the characterisation of complexity presented here

is a very sparse one, it claiming very little. It describes in general the structure

of complex system, but at a very low-level. This means that the higher level or

emergent properties play no role as such in the theory itself, they have no

“higher” importance. Just as Derrida's model of language is held together by

traces only, complex systems are held together by local interactions only. The

model does not attempt to specify the effects of those interactions.

This argument can be explicated by referring, for the last time now, to a

similar problem concerning the training of neural networks. Neural networks are

said to be non-algorithmic in the way they solve problems, yet the network is

trained with a learning “algorithm”. This learning algorithm, however, knows

absolutely nothing about the structure of the specific problem being addressed.

The same “algorithm” can be used to change the weights in networks that are

applied to any number of problems. It operates at such a low level that it has no

content by itself, and is only given content in specific, contingent applications.

Similarly, the descriptions of complexity provided here do pretend to be

general, but at a low level. It does not pretend to provide an accurate, detailed

description of any specific complex system. As a matter of fact, it remains

sceptical of such descriptions exactly because of the dynamics apparent at the

low level.

This point will surely not eliminate the charge of performing the performative

fallacy, or other criticisms, for that matter, but hopefully it communicates

something of the spirit in which this book is offered: one of openness,

provisionality, and adventure.

7
1
Notes

See the Afterword to Limited Inc (Derrida 1988) for this response.