The God Beyond Being in Dionysius and Marion

Cynthia R. Nielsen Dionysius & Augustine Dr.
Harrington/ Spring 2007
The God Beyond Being in

Dionysius and Jean-Luc
Marion
Introductory Remarks: Dionysius
As Eric Perl observes, “[f]or Dionysius, as for Plotinus, God is
‘beyond being,’ beyond not only all affirmative but also all negative
predication, indeed not only ineffable and unknowable but beyond
ineffability and unknowing.”1 Turning to Dionysius himself, we read,
“[s]ince the unknowing of what is beyond being is something above
and beyond speech, mind, or being itself, one should ascribe to it an
1
Perl, “Signifying Nothing,” p. 138.
1
understanding beyond being.”2 In light of God’s transcendence, that
is, that he is not a being but beyond being and hence beyond our
rational processes, our proper response is both praise and a “wise
silence”—the latter being of course a manifestation of the former.
Jean-Luc Marion, a contemporary Roman Catholic scholar, and one
who holds Dionysius in high esteem, likewise speaks of wise silence
befitting of God. Yet, Marion also observes that the greatest difficulty
with silence is understanding what silence says. In other words, there
are many and varied silences. For example, we can offer a silence of
reverence, but we can also engage in a silence of contempt. “Silence,
precisely because it does not explain itself, exposes itself to an infinite
equivocation of meaning.”3 Then concluding his section on silence,
2
Dionysius, DN I.1, p. 49.
3
Marion, God Without Being, p. 54.
2
Marion writes, “[t]o free silence from its idolatrous dishonor would
require nothing less than to free the word ‘God’ from the Being of
beings. But can one think outside Being?”4 Given the strong
Dionysian influence on Marion’s thought (particularly his theological
writings), this essay attempts (1) to better understand Dionysius’
teachings, as well as (2) Marion’s use of Dionysius’ doctrines in his
own distinctively postmodern project.
Selected Dionysian Doctrines
In The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius describes a hierarchically
ordered cosmos in which each level receives illumination from that
which is above it, and each level then passes what it receives to those
below it. According to Dionysius a hierarchy is a “sacred order, a
4
Ibid., p. 60.
3
state of understanding and an activity approximating as closely as
possible to the divine.”5 The goal of a hierarchy “is to enable beings to
be as like as possible to God and to be at one with him.”6 Certain
angelic beings have an “immediate participation” in God, and
consequently, a more direct participation than those perfected through
a mediator.7 Though the illumination is dimmer as one descends the
levels of beings, it never ceases to be good—in other words, it remains
good all the way down. Here we should emphasize that in Dionysius’
emanationist system, light, (illumination) not being is what is
emanated down the hierarchy. For Dionysius God alone can give
5
Dionysius, CH 2.1, p. 153.
6
Ibid., CH 2.2, p. 154.
7
Ibid., CH 8.2, p. 168.
4
being because he alone is not a being but is beyond being.8 In his
letter to the monk Gaius, Dionysius writes,
His [God’s] transcendent darkness
remains hidden from all light and
concealed from all knowledge.
Someone beholding God and
understanding what he saw has not
actually seen God himself but rather
something of his which has being and
which is knowable. For he himself
8
“One truth must be affirmed above all else. It is that the transcendent Deity has out
of goodness established the existence of everything and brought it into being. It is
characteristic of the universal Cause, of this goodness beyond all, to summon
everything to communion with him to the extent that this is possible” (CH 4.1, p.
156).
5
solidly transcends mind and being. He is
completely unknown and non-existent.
He exists beyond being and he is known
beyond the mind. And this quite
positively complete unknowing is
knowledge of him who is above
everything that is known.9
Dionysius, as is the case with Parmenides and Plotinus, firmly held
that to be is to be intelligible.10 In other words, being and knowledge
9
Dionysius, Letter One, p. 263.
10
This is not to suggest that these three thinkers held everything in common, as
clearly that is not the case. There are significant differences that manifest given
Dionysius’ Christian emphases. For example, Dionysius, in contrast with Plotinus,
taught that every level of the hierarchy directly participates in God (not in his
essence of course). That is, God is directly responsible for the being of each thing.
6
go hand in hand. Being implies that which is determinate and
derivative; hence, God is not a being but is the creator of being, who
necessarily transcends being. God is not a “facet of being. Rather,
being is a facet of him. He is not contained in being, but being is
contained in him.”11 Given what we have said so far, we discern a
strict logic at work: if to be is to be intelligible, and God is not a
being, then God is not intelligible. That is, God transcends our
rational abilities—“He is completely unknown.” Moreover, since God
is beyond being and knowing, he is likewise beyond predication. As

In Plotinian thought, the One imparts being to the first hypostasis and the process is
mediated as one descends the hierarchy. Consequently, for Plotinus, the lower things
can be understood clearly because the being is less and thus the comprehensibility
more. However, this is not the case with Dionysius because he advocates a direct
creation—that is a direct impartation of being to all things that are. Hence, even the
lowest things have a level of incomprehensibility.
11
Dionysius, DN V.8, p. 101.
7
Dionysius explains in the Divine Names, his purpose is not to reveal
God in his transcendence—that is an impossible task beyond mind and
words altogether—rather, he wants to “sign a hymn of praise for the
being-making procession of the absolute divine Source of being into
the total domain of being.”12 In other words, Dionysius recognizes that
the divine names in no way (quidditatively) define God, yet this is not
to say that Dionysius is confined to complete silence. Rather,
Dionysius emphasizes the significance of the divine names in their
liturgical, and hence, doxological context. Given that God himself,
who is completely enfolded (and beyond our comprehension), unfolds
himself via the hierarchs and a mediated process of illumination, the
divine names do in fact refer to God in a non-exhaustive, yet
meaningful manner. In fact, Dionysius’ opening words of the Divine
12
Ibid., DN V.1, p. 96.
8
Names provides a kind of broad outline as to what he hopes to
accomplish in his work, as well as what he understands himself to be
communicating and not communicating. Though somewhat lengthy,
the following passage is worth quoting in full:
I come now to an explication of the
divine names, as far as possible. Here
too let us hold on to the scriptural rule
that when we say anything about God,
we should set down the truth “not in the
plausible words of human wisdom but in
demonstration of the power granted by
the Spirit” to the scripture writers, a
power by which, in a manner surpassing
speech and knowledge, we reach a union

9
superior to anything available to us by
way of our own abilities or activities in
the realm of discourse or of intellect.
This is why we must not dare to resort to
words or conceptions concerning that
hidden divinity which transcends being,
apart from what the sacred scriptures
have divinely revealed. Since the
unknowing of what is beyond being is
something above and beyond speech,
mind, or being itself, one should ascribe
to it an understanding beyond being. Let
us therefore look as far upward as the
light of sacred scripture will allow, and,
10
in our reverent awe of what is divine, let
us be drawn together toward the divine
splendor. For, if we may trust the
superlative wisdom and truth of
scripture, the things of God are revealed
to each mind in proportion to its
capacities; and the divine goodness is
such that, out of concern for our
salvation, it deals out the immeasurable
and infinite in limited measures.13
As Dionysius explains, he seeks to explicate (to “unfold”) the divine
names in so far as this is possible. Likewise, he contrasts “plausible
words of human wisdom” with those of scripture, which were given in
13
Ibid., DN I.1, p. 49.
11
a revelation which surpasses human cognitive abilities. In other
words, the scripture writers were granted a special illumination from
God—not through their own rational processes—but through a union
that surpasses human knowledge. Yet, they in turn hand down what
they have received in a way that those below them in rank can
understand. Thus, the divine names are not the product of (merely
human) theological activity in which human beings attempt to form
propositions about God that define him in quid. Rather, the divine
names are given by God through a process of mediated illumination,
and thus “we may trust the superlative wisdom and truth of scripture.”
Consequently, the divine names are one way in which Dionysius’
“wise silence” speaks.
12
In recent years a number of postmodern thinkers have become
interested in negative theology and Neoplatonism. 14 For example,
Jean-Luc Marion has found within negative theology an inexhaustible
resource that harmonizes well with his own theological and
phenomenological project. Jacques Derrida has also engaged negative
theology; however, he seems to have a somewhat ambivalent attitude
toward it and particularly dislikes what he interprets in Dionysius’
thought as the retention of a “transcendental signified.” As Eric Perl
explains,
14
E.g., John D. Capato, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1997); Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. Trans.
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1969); Kevin Hart, The
Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989); Jean-Luc Marion,
God Without Being (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991).

13
Deconstruction is fundamentally a
theory of signification, which attacks the
(supposedly) traditional notion that a
signifier (word, text, or image) refers to
a signified, the meaning which itself is
prior to and independent of the signifier.
Derrida calls this the “transcendental
signified”: the meaning underlying the
expression, the archetype underlying the
image, that which is not sign but “pure
signified.” On the traditional
assumption, any system of meaning, be
it a written text or the cosmos itself, has
such a transcendental signified. In the
14
case of a text, it is the author’s intent,
what he means to express; in the case of
the world, understood as a system of
signs, it is God.15
Derrida takes the description above to be characteristic of Western
metaphysics, and thus his own project attempts to show that no such
transcendental signified can be found outside, beyond or prior to the
text or world. In the end, all we have are signs. “We can never
transcend signs to arrive at a pure signified which is not itself a sign.”16
Here is where Derrida’s attraction to negative theology and
Neoplatonism comes in focus. As we have seen, in Dionysian thought,
God is beyond being and thought. That which can be thought exists
15
Perl, “Signifying Nothing,” p. 125.
16
Ibid., p. 126.
15
and that which is is not God but “only an image, sign, or expression.”
Hence, for Derrida, the common bond between negative theology and
deconstruction is their mutual agreement that everything in the realm
of existence and hence thought is sign all the way down. No
transcendental signified or ultimate meaning is accessible, but remains
forever deferred. “But whereas for Neoplatonism this implies that the
world is infinitely meaningful, the manifestation of God, for
deconstructionism it implies that the world is meaningless.”17
Though Derrida has no doubt contributed significantly to
contemporary thought and his insights have and should continue to be
appropriated, one wonders whether he has correctly interpreted
Neoplatonism and negative theology particularly as manifest in
Dionysius. For Dionysius, as is the case with Plotinus, God is both
17
Ibid., p. 126.
16
beyond being (transcendent) and excessively present (immanent). As
Dionysius explains,
God is […] known in all things and as
distinct from all things. He is known
through knowledge and unknowing. Of
him there is conception, reason,
understanding, touch, perception,
opinion, imagination, name, and many
other things. On the other hand, he
cannot be understood, words cannot
contain him, and no name can lay hold
of him. He is not one of the things that
are and he cannot be known in any of
them. He is all things in all things and

17
he is no thing among things. He is
known to all from all things and he is
known to no one from anything.18
Here Dionysius highlights both creation (i.e., everything that exists) as
theophany, where everything that is manifests God, and God’s radical
transcendence in light of the fact that He is beyond the order of being,
the created realm.19 Derrida seems to focus only on the “and” side of
the Dionysian world, i.e., on God as wholly other—other in the sense
of a transcendental signified, a being beyond Being who is still
18
Dionysius, DN VII.3, p. 109.
19
As Perl aptly explains, “[s]ince all being is theophany, the unfolding of God into
the intelligible multiplicity which constitutes beings, every cognition is an
experience of God; and since he is not any being whatsoever, no cognition grasps
him. It is in this sense that all creatures, i.e., beings, are symbols or images of God”
(“Signifying Nothing,” p. 139).

18
entangled in a signifier/signified dualism. Hence, the Derridean read
of Dionysius is that of “a kind of ‘mystical iconoclast,’ who calls us to
strip away all created symbols and images and attain a non-symbolic
vision of and union with God as ‘pure signified.’”20 Dionysius,
however, in no way suggests that we must finally do away with all
symbols in order to encounter God. “This divine ray can enlighten us
only by being upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils which
the Providence of the Father adapts to our nature as human beings.”21
Hence, we experience God not by peeling away or overcoming signs,
but by embracing the signs as icons. In other words, God is present
and manifest in the signs and “sacred veils” that both conceal and
reveal Him. Derrida has done a superb job of describing the
20
Ibid., p. 141.
21
Dionysius, CH I.2, p. 146.
19
concealing aspects of Dionysius; however, it seems that he has not
properly understood the iconic function of signs.22
As previously mentioned in passing, Dionysius (in contrast with,
e.g., St. Thomas) held that our highest activity is an un-knowing, a
union. Yet, Dionysius also believes that in the life to come “we shall
be ever filled with the sight of God,” and “we shall have a conceptual
gift of light from him.”23 In other words, we will be engaged in three
activities: seeing, knowing, and unknowing (i.e., union). For
Dionysius, the highest activity is an unknowing, a union—that which
22
For a detailed discussion of Derrida’s understanding of Neoplatonic thought in
relation to his own project, see Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,”
trans. Ken Frieden, as found in Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity
in Literature and Literary Theory, eds. Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser (New
York, 1989), pp. 3-70.
23
Dionysius, DN I.4, p. 52.
20
is beyond nous. In other words, for Dionysius our perfection comes
in a non-cognitive union with God. Though Dionysius is denying that
our ultimate perfection is in knowing, he does not deny that we have
no knowledge or true apprehension of God whatsoever. However, such
knowledge is inferior to our ultimate non-cognitive experience of God,
i.e., to our union with God in the life to come. Again, we find a very
strict logic in place, yet a logic that willingly bows to mystical
experience. That an unknowing union is our ultimate perfection must
be the case since our knowledge is limited to that which is and
therefore necessarily excludes God who is beyond being. “If all
knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the
existent, then whatever transcends being must also transcend
knowledge.”24
24
Ibid., DN I.4, p. 53.
21
Marion: A Postmodern Dionysian of
Sorts
Now that we have discussed a number of Dionysius’ teachings and
have established a basic background for interpretative purposes, we
turn to Jean-Luc Marion in order to examine the various ways that he
incorporates Dionysian thought into his own project. As was the case
with Dionysius, Marion, particularly in his theological works, is
concerned with upholding God’s transcendence and avoiding
conceptual idolatry of any sort. For Marion, there are two basic
orientations to world: (1) an iconic consciousness or (2) an idolatrous
consciousness. As Marion explains, “[t]he idol measures the divine to
the scope of the gaze of he who then sculpts it.”25 Hence, an idol is
25
22
produced when we attempt to conceptually circumscribe God, which is
in essence to limit God to the human gaze. In our attempts to measure
God by human understanding, we become trapped in a kind of self-
reflexivity in which the idol becomes a mirror that reflects the human
gaze back to itself. In contrast, the icon allows one’s gaze to move
through the icon (visible) to that which is invisible. That is,
[w]hat characterizes the icon painted on
wood does not come from the hand of
man but from the infinite depth that
crosses it—or better, orients it following
the intention of a gaze. The essential in
the icon […] comes to it from elsewhere.
[…] Contemplating the icon amounts to
seeing the visible in the very manner by

23
which the invisible that imparts itself
therein envisages the visible—strictly, to
exchange our gaze for the gaze that
iconistically envisages us.26
As was noted with Dionysius, signs and images are not to be despised,
as they can and should be used as contemplative aids in our worship of
God. In fact, not only does creation itself function iconically to reveal
the invisible things of God through that which is visible (Rom 1:20),
but Christ Himself is said to be the Icon of God (Col 1:15; ὅς ἐστιν
εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου).27 Given the kind of creatures that we are,
it is fitting that we embrace signs and images which simultaneously

26
Ibid., p. 21.
27
For an excellent discussion on this topic see, John Damascene, On the Divine
Images: Three Apologies Against Those Who Attack the Divine Images, trans. David
Anderson (Crestwood: NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1980).

24
hide and reveal that which exceeds this, so to speak, “clothing” of the
formless.
Marion’s aim is of course to bring us into a more iconic
consciousness, which in turn allows God to manifest himself according
to his terms (not ours). If we embrace an iconic orientation, then, as
Marion puts it, we must abandon any attempt to measure the divine by
our own human gaze. Here Marion seems very much in harmony with
Dionysius. That is, for both Marion and Dionysius, there is no concept
that adequately captures God. God, who is beyond being, is ipso facto
beyond definition, and Marion is at pains to free God from our limiting
(idolatrous) gaze. As Robyn Horner observes, Marion both continues
within the Dionysian trajectory and also furthers the conversation with
his own distinctive contributions. That is, in addition to drawing our
attention to conceptual idols, Marion likewise speaks of conceptual

25
icons as a way of thinking God in a non-idolatrous way. This path
does not move “through the traditional metaphysical route that focuses
on being, but through the mystical route of love.”28 Marion also adds
to the discussion of icons, the idea of our being gazed upon and hence
transformed by the other. Instead of a self-reflexive gaze necessitated
by the idol, the icon breaks the circle of reflexivity and “gives the
invisible to thought, not on the basis of the capacities of the
metaphysical ego, but on its own terms.”29 Contrasting the two gazes,
Marion writes that with the icon
our gaze becomes the optical mirror of
that at which it looks only by finding
itself more radically looked at: we
28
Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theological Introduction, p. 63.
29
Ibid., p. 64.
26
become a visible mirror of an invisible
gaze that subverts us in the measure of
its glory. The invisible summons us,
“face to face, person to person” (1 Cor.
13:12), through the painted visibility of
its incarnation and the factual visibility
of our flesh: no longer the visible idol as
the invisible mirror of our gaze, but our
face as the visible mirror of the invisible.
[…] It [the icon] transforms us in its
glory by allowing this glory to shine on
our face as its mirror—but a mirror
consumed by that very glory,
transfigured with invisibility, and by dint
27
of being saturated beyond itself from
that glory, becoming, strictly though
imperfectly, the icon of it: visibility of
the invisible as such.30
Though the icon indeed “opens distance,” it never claims nor pretends
to exhaust God or to produce any kind of comprehensive knowledge of
the incomprehensible.
In light of Marion’s emphasis on love over being, we should turn
to his engagement with Dionysius and the divine names. In chapter
three of God Without Being, Marion enters the debate over the so-
called maxime proprie name for God.31 Following what he takes to be
30
31
Marion of course has St. Thomas in mind who claims (based on Ex 3:14) that the
most proper name of God is esse or ipsum esse.

28
a Dionysian emphasis on God as Goodness, Marion links agape with
bonum, and does so on the basis of certain texts of Dionysius seem to
justify such a connection.32 Hence, the debate between ens and bonum
is for Marion a debate between ens and agape (1 John 4:8, ho theos
agapē estin), with the latter connoting personal and Trinitarian
overtones. First of all, Marion wants to underscore that when
Dionysius privileges Goodness as the first divine name, he is not
simply replacing one category for another, which would be to replace
one conceptual idol with another. In fact, Goodness as the first name
32
See God Without Being, p. 74. Here one might ask whether Marion is following
Dionysius himself or the Dionysian tradition as interpreted by the Franciscans. For
an intriguing discussion on this topic, see Michael Harrington’s article, “The
Drunken Epibole of Plotinus and its Reappearance in the Work of Dionysius the
Areopagite,” Dionysius Vol. XXIII (Dec. 2005), pp. 117-138 (see especially, pp.
134-138).
29
for God speaks against any categorical statement concerning God. As
Marion explains, Dionysius
does not pretend that goodness
constitutes the proper name of the
Requisite, but that in the apprehension of
goodness the dimension is cleared where
the very possibility of a categorical
statement concerning God ceases to be
valid, and where the reversal of
denomination into praise becomes
inevitable. To praise the Requisite as
such, hence as goodness, amounts to
opening distance. Distance neither asks
nor tolerates that one fill it but that one

30
traverse it, in an infinite praise that feeds
on the impossibility or, better, the
impropriety of the category. The first
praise, the name of goodness, therefore
does not offer any “most proper name”
[contra Thomas and ipsum esse as the
maxime proprie name of God]33 and
33
On the basis of Ex 3:14, Thomas argued the Being (ipsum esse) is “the most proper
name of God.” As Marion explains, Thomas’ reasoning is that “this name ‘does not
signify form, but simply being itself [ipsum esse]. Hence since the being of God is
His essence itself [esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia], which can be said of no other
[…] , it is clear that among names this one specially nominates God [hoc maxime
proprie nominat Deum]. The whole question consists precisely in determining
whether a name can be suitable ‘maxime proprie’ to God, if God, can have an
essence, and (only) finally if this ‘essence’ can be fixed in the ipsum esse/actus
essendi” (Ibid., p. 76).

31
decidedly abolishes every conceptual
idol of “God”34 in favor of the luminous
darkness where God manifests (and not
masks) himself, in short, where he gives
himself to be envisaged by us.35
As Marion indicates, the name of Goodness as “first praise” neither
defines God nor predicates anything in quid of God. Rather,
Goodness, as well as the other divine names, functions iconically,
revealing and concealing God in “luminous darkness.” In other words,
Marion seems to suggest that with Dionysius, a different discourse is
34
Throughout God Without Being, Marion places “God” in quotation marks to
indicate a conceptual idol, whereas God (crossed out) points to the true and living
God.
35
32
in place. That is, God-talk itself is not understood via the scholastic
categories of equivocity or univocity, as scientific predications and
definitions in the scholastic sense are wholly outside of the Dionysius
framework. Instead, the divine names function as iconic speech,
which like prayer “opens the distance”36 so that we may glimpse God’s
self-manifestation—a manifestation which shows itself in “luminous
darkness.” This discourse of praise likewise implies a liturgical
context in which the divine names are most meaning-ful, as it is in this
milieu that they best express their doxological and supplicatory
functions.
36
Marion uses the term “distance” in multiple ways in his writings, which makes it
an extremely difficult concept to understand. For an excellent discussion of the
various meanings of distance, see Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theological
Introduction, pp. 51-60. One way to understand Marion’s distance is to see it as a
kind of transcendent-immanence communicating something similar to Dionysius’
luminous darkness or presence and withdrawl.

33
In contrast with Derrida’s conclusions on Dionysius and negative
theology, Marion does not find a wholly hidden God, but a God who
in distance reveals himself in and through signs and symbols. In fact,
for Marion God is not only present but present in excess. That is, just
as one would experience a kind of auditory overload in attempting to
listen to ten symphonies playing simultaneously, in like manner (but of
course infinitely more so), we are bedazzled by God’s presence such
that we mistake superabundance for complete absence.37 From our
explorations in the present essay, one can see that for Marion,
Dionysius’ silence has much to say. The divine names neither exhaust
nor define God, but rather grant in distance an iconic communion with
37
In his phenomenological works, Marion develops the themes of excessive presence
and bedazzlement with his notion of saturated phenomena. See., e.g., Being Given:
Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Trans., Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2002.

34
God in which our gaze is no longer self-reflexive but transpierced and
transformed. For Marion, this being seen by the Other is intimately
connected with the gift of Love—a gift that can only be received, not
comprehended. Yet, when received, (quidditative) predication falls by
the wayside, and a discourse of praise takes its place. “[T]o say God
requires receiving the gift and—since the gift occurs only in distance
—returning it. To return the gift, to play redundantly the unthinkable
donation, this is not said, but done. Love is not spoken, in the end, it is
made. Only then can discourse be reborn, but as an enjoyment, a
jubilation, a praise.”38
38
35
Works Cited
Dionysius. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. Trans. Colm

Luibheid. New York:
Paulist Press, 1987.
Horner, Robyn. Jean-Luc Marion: A Theological Introduction.

Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Co.,
2005.
Marion, Jean-Luc. God Without Being. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,

1991.
Perl, Eric D. “Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and

Derrida,” (pp. 125-151).
As found in Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought, Part II, ed., R.
Baine Harris. New
York: State University of New York Press, 2001.
36

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Cynthia R. Nielsen Dionysius & Augustine Dr.

Harrington/ Spring 2007

The God Beyond Being in

Introductory Remarks: Dionysius

As Eric Perl observes, “[f]or Dionysius, as for Plotinus, God is

predication, indeed not only ineffable and unknowable but beyond

ineffability and unknowing.”1 Turning to Dionysius himself, we read,

“[s]ince the unknowing of what is beyond being is something above

and beyond speech, mind, or being itself, one should ascribe to it an

understanding beyond being.”2 In light of God’s transcendence, that

rational processes, our proper response is both praise and a “wise

silence”—the latter being of course a manifestation of the former.

Jean-Luc Marion, a contemporary Roman Catholic scholar, and one

who holds Dionysius in high esteem, likewise speaks of wise silence

with silence is understanding what silence says. In other words, there

reverence, but we can also engage in a silence of contempt. “Silence,

precisely because it does not explain itself, exposes itself to an infinite

equivocation of meaning.”3 Then concluding his section on silence,

Dionysian influence on Marion’s thought (particularly his theological

writings), this essay attempts (1) to better understand Dionysius’

teachings, as well as (2) Marion’s use of Dionysius’ doctrines in his

own distinctively postmodern project.

Selected Dionysian Doctrines

In The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius describes a hierarchically

ordered cosmos in which each level receives illumination from that

below it. According to Dionysius a hierarchy is a “sacred order, a

state of understanding and an activity approximating as closely as

possible to the divine.”5 The goal of a hierarchy “is to enable beings to

be as like as possible to God and to be at one with him.”6 Certain

angelic beings have an “immediate participation” in God, and

consequently, a more direct participation than those perfected through

a mediator.7 Though the illumination is dimmer as one descends the

levels of beings, it never ceases to be good—in other words, it remains

emanationist system, light, (illumination) not being is what is

being because he alone is not a being but is beyond being.8 In his

letter to the monk Gaius, Dionysius writes,

His [God’s] transcendent darkness

remains hidden from all light and

concealed from all knowledge.

Someone beholding God and

understanding what he saw has not

actually seen God himself but rather

something of his which has being and

which is knowable. For he himself

of goodness established the existence of everything and brought it into being. It is

characteristic of the universal Cause, of this goodness beyond all, to summon

solidly transcends mind and being. He is

completely unknown and non-existent.

He exists beyond being and he is known

beyond the mind. And this quite

positively complete unknowing is

knowledge of him who is above

everything that is known.9

Dionysius, as is the case with Parmenides and Plotinus, firmly held

that to be is to be intelligible.10 In other words, being and knowledge

Dionysius’ Christian emphases. For example, Dionysius, in contrast with Plotinus,

go hand in hand. Being implies that which is determinate and

necessarily transcends being. God is not a “facet of being. Rather,

being is a facet of him. He is not contained in being, but being is

contained in him.”11 Given what we have said so far, we discern a

strict logic at work: if to be is to be intelligible, and God is not a

rational abilities—“He is completely unknown.” Moreover, since God

is beyond being and knowing, he is likewise beyond predication. As