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Transparent Lobbying
and Democracy
Šárka Laboutková · Vít Šimral

Petr Vymětal
Transparent Lobbying and Democracy
Šárka Laboutková • Vít Šimral
Petr Vymětal
Transparent Lobbying
and Democracy
Šárka Laboutková Vít Šimral
Technical University of Liberec University of Hradec Králové
Liberec, Czech Republic Hradec Králové, Czech Republic
Petr Vymětal
University of Economics, Prague
Prague, Czech Republic
ISBN 978-3-030-36043-6 ISBN 978-3-030-36044-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3
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Foreword
The book Transparent Lobbying and Democracy is written by a group of

young Czech researchers—Šárka Laboutková, Petr Vymětal, and Vít
Šimral—who belong to new talented academic generation. They aim to
grasp, capture, and really understand hidden dynamics of key political pro-
cesses in Central Europe. They are lead experts on transparency and
accountability in the region, stay very vocal, and shy not away from
involvement into public discourse around it. At their own academic insti-
tutions, they work as real pioneers in lecturing students, publishing and
highlighting importance and direct relation between transparency, lobby-
ing, quality of democracy and integrity of institutions.
In my profession, as head of Transparency International Czech chapter,
my team and myself we face every day dubious political decisions made
behind closed door, in the dark with limited or no accountability. We see
political corruption, opacity in decision-making, and undue influence as
challenges for our political systems that deeply undermine its legitimacy.
However, in order to address that smartly, we rely heavily on analytical
findings and scholarly insights, helping us to frame policy-making and
public debate over transparency and lobbying issues.
There are numerous opponents who deny any need for rules on lobby-
ing and sunshine principles, in every legislative clash. Many still prefer
doing it their “traditional” way (at golf course usually). To win an argu-
ment against such mentality, you need to convince not only decision-
makers and public officials that public demands disclosure and public
scrutiny, but first you need to talk straight to professional lobbyists and
consultants themselves, representatives of business associations, chambers
v
vi FOREWORD
of commerce, and many other special interests. You need to make it clear
that times are changing, and it is time to come out of the shade. That is
what makes it difficult—as “lobbyists themselves often lobby against regu-
lation of lobbying”. To change that and break through this veil of secrecy,
you need to arm yourself with sound conceptual and methodological
framework, reliable data, and plenty of locally based examples and case
studies. And that is exactly what this book magnificently and elo-
quently provides.
Authors come up with some innovative tools, namely “Catalogue of
transparent lobbying”. They look and evaluate the impact on both key
stakeholders (lobbyists and targets of lobbying), monitoring of lobbying
activities and sanctioning for breaches of rules. This tool holds out bench-
marking capacity of sound framework for understanding of lobbying in
the context of democracy, legitimacy of decision-making, and account-
ability. But it is not dry theory only; in fact it has very practical implica-
tions to policy process and comes up very timely. In most of Central and
Eastern European countries, there is currently lively political debate over
lobby regulations; how to make it workable, sensible, and enforceable; and
how it affects quality of democracy.
This book covers efficiency of pro-transparency rules and lobbying
environment around the world. But specifically, it offers rare insight into
democratic and transparent decision-making in Central Europe. So, if you
want go beyond biased and superficial coverage, read this book. Credible
authors offer to any reader pretty unique level of clarity of this part of
Europe and its political machinery. The research focuses on Visegrad 4
countries plus Austria and Slovenia (one might think of its former Austro-
Hungarian past). New democracies are fragile, vulnerable, challenged,
and often misunderstood, but at the same time they consist of viable seg-
ments of civil society, educated population and strong yearn for demo-
cratic, liberal and inclusive political environment.
David Ondráčka, member of global Board of Transparency

International, head of Transparency International—Czech Republic
July 29, 2019
Prague
FOREWORD vii
As a political scientist and civil society expert, I have followed the efforts
of my colleagues Šárka Laboutková, Petr Vymětal, and Vít Šimral with
great interest. They have been intensively engaged in researching the
influence of transparent lobbying on the democratization process in
recent years. I am very pleased that one of the outputs is a comprehen-
sive publication that you are opening right now. Issues related to civil
society, democracy, the public sphere, political culture, and lobbying are
the lifelong interest of my professional career; I am the author of a num-
ber of scholarly books and articles on these issues. Currently, I am the
head of the Department of Political Science at the University of
Economics, Prague. The topic investigated in this book is also close to
my heart because of my active involvement in local politics and a num-
ber of NGOs.
In the past, I collaborated with two of the authors, Šárka and Petr, on
the first Czech scholarly book on lobbying titled Lobbying in Modern
Democracies (2010) to provide an overview of the topic and to fill an
extensive gap in the understanding of lobbying in liberal societies. But we
knew that much more had to be done. All of the authors have participated
in research into other related topics from this area—for example, transpar-
ency in lobbying, corruption, and political parties funding. They all have a
long history of analyzing and interpreting the aspects of transparent
decision-making and I am convinced that it is their personalities and expe-
rience with the given subject that guarantee the quality of this book. It
should certainly be included in the library of both scientists and practitio-
ners dealing with lobbying and related issues.
This book is another big step forward. Just as we were very careful in
the original book that the message about the legitimacy of lobbying in
modern democracies and the resolute distinction between lobbying and
corruption is unambiguous, the authors of this book are very convincing
in claiming that transparent lobbying is an essential part of responsible
decision-making and contributes to the quality of democracy. The pre-
sented book is of a high quality thanks to the authors’ complex approach
to the issue, as well as a combination of theoretical and empirical investiga-
tion of transparent lobbying rules. The results of such research represent a
fundamental contribution to the theory of democracy, to the process of
democratization, and to the specification of sophisticated factors strength-
ening the institutional quality and the institutional reflexivity.
viii FOREWORD
The leitmotif, which winds like red thread through the whole book,
are rules of transparent lobbying in connection with transparent decision-
making. The starting point of this book is on the lack of systematic effec-
tive regulation of lobbying activities and its evaluation so far. The authors
state that “it is not easy to build strong rules that meet the requirement
of transparency and efficiency for all subjects in the industry” and “almost
no studies address the quality lobbying environment in the broader scope
of the means on decision making”. Nevertheless, they argue, it is “neces-
sary to involve more variables for an evaluation of the overall level of
transparent lobbying […] where the transparency in lobbying is concep-
tualized in the broader environment of decision making”. For this pur-
pose, the authors create an innovative catalogue of lobbying transparency
containing four main categories—lobbyist, targets of lobbying, sunshine
principles, and sanctions. I warmly welcome the submission of this cata-
logue as a challenge for further discussion not only in the professional
community and between practitioners but also as a great opportunity for
the general public to realize how complex the transparent decision-mak-
ing environment can be. Every day, decisions influencing the lives of
many are taken by public officials. The opportunity to see them “under
the microscope”, see what standards they use and who influences them, is
in the interest of all citizens. The book also presents a critical view of
rational choice theory, as well as problems related to the failure of the
government in connection with poorly-determined regulation and admin-
istrative burdens.
The significant contribution of this book is also in the empirical analysis
of lobbying in Central and Eastern European countries, with detailed data
for Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
based on the catalogue created by the authors. The added value is that the
authors also evaluate the results in terms of historical context and in the
context of the development of civil society in the region. The political and
legal culture in this region is influenced not only by several generational
experiences with the totalitarian regime but also by the economic and
social consequences of rapid economic and social liberalization without
properly functioning institutions and rules.
The book Transparent Lobbying and Democracy by Šárka Laboutková,
Vít Šimral, and Petr Vymětal definitely provides a comprehensive view
into the phenomenon of lobbying. Personally, as a well-established scien-
tist specializing in democracy, civil society, and the public sphere, I see it
FOREWORD ix
as a useful and enriching contribution to the debate on lobbying, its nec-

essary transparency and its role in the democratization process. I am sure
the book has the potential to reach an international audience of experts
and interested lay persons, and both complement and compete with pub-
lications on similar issues.
Karel B. Müller, University of Economics, Prague

July 18, 2019
Prague
Preface
This book deals with the current, as yet unsolved problem of transparency
of lobbying. In the current theories and prevalent models that deal with
lobbying activities, there is no reflection of the degree of transparency of
lobbying, mainly due to the unclear distinction between corruption, lob-
bying in general, and transparent lobbying.
In the complex world of public policy-making, it is desirable for public
administrations to engage in continuous dialogue with outside stakehold-
ers. All interested parties should be able to have their say, but this should
be done in a transparent way. As lobbying activities can raise risks of cor-
ruption and regulatory capture, it is desirable to have mechanisms in place
to frame such activities. Such mechanisms can help to create both clarity
and transparency in the relationship between public authorities and out-
side stakeholders. As such, they can help to reduce the risk of corruption.
This book provides a perspective on transparency in lobbying in a com-
prehensive and structured manner. Our approach is innovative in its focus
on the factors of transparent lobbying which have never been previously
considered. The book delivers a new solution consisting of both an inter-
disciplinary approach to the topic and especially the effort to create a
methodology for assessing the transparency of lobbying, its role in democ-
ratization process and a methodology for evaluating the main conse-
quences of this transparency.
The text is a result of a four-year-long research project on transparency
of lobbying and democratization, funded by the Grant Agency of the
Czech Republic and carried out at the Technical University of Liberec by
the authors. The particular conclusions were published in several articles
xi
xii PREFACE
in peer-reviewed journals during last three years and presented at interna-

tional conferences and forums. A list of the articles is a part of references
within the first chapter. Findings of these separate works have been synthe-
sized; the particular conclusions and parts of the theoretical basis were
actualized and incorporated to the book. Some theoretical assumptions
were taken from the Czech-language monograph Lobbying in Modern
Democracies (2010), co-authored by Šárka Laboutková, and Petr Vymětal.
Liberec, Czech Republic Šárka Laboutková

Hradec Králové, Czech Republic Vít Šimral
Prague, Czech Republic Petr Vymětal
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, under grant
number GA16-08786S “Impact of Transparency of Lobbying on
Democratization and Its Consequences”, and by the Philosophical Faculty
of the University of Hradec Králové, under grant project “Specific Research
2018—International Conference in Social Sciences on Public and Private
Interest”.
xiii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Democracy and Lobbying 31
3 Transparency in Democratic Decision–Making 51
4 Methodology of Research on Lobbying Regulation 79
5 A Theoretical Model of Lobbying111
6 Past and Present Practices of Lobbying and Its Regulation143
7 Transparent Lobbying in Central and Eastern European

Countries181
8 Open Government and Its Impact on the Lobbying

Environment in CEE Countries217
9 Conclusion241
xv
xvi CONTENTS
ppendix A: Components of CPI Index (Revised 2014

A
Version) 259
Appendix B: Components of CII Index263

About the Authors
Šárka Laboutková works as an associate professor at the Economics

Department of the Faculty of Economics at the Technical University of
Liberec (TUL) and guarantees there the curriculum of the master’s pro-
gram Economic Policy in the Global Environment.
Her research activity is primarily focused on the theory of impact of non-
economic factors on decision-making in public policy, especially lobbying.
She also deals with the circumstances of transparent environment of
decision-making as corruption, institutional quality, and so on. She is an
author of many journals’ articles and co-author of the first Czech compre-
hensive publication on lobbying, and constantly cooperates with anti-
corruption NGOs as well as professional associations of lobbyists.
Vít Šimral serves as a Councilor of the City Prague, responsible for edu-
cation, sports, science, sports, and business development. Previously to
entering politics, he was a member of several anti-corruption bodies in
Europe, both in the NGO and in the public sector. He remains a part-time
member of the Czech academia, carrying out research or teaching at the
University of Hradec Králové and the Technical University of Liberec. His
academic research focuses on issues of corruption, public procurement,
political funding, and lobbying. Among his most recent works are chapters
in the books titled Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter
(2018) and Handbook of Political Party Funding (2018).
xvii
xviii About the Authors
Petr Vymětal works as an assistant professor at the Political Science

Department of the Faculty of International Relations at the University of
Economics, Prague. His main field of research is lobbying and interest
representation, political parties’ funding and campaign financing, corrup-
tion, and the political-economic factors influencing economic policy. He is
the co-author of the first Czech comprehensive publication on lobbying.
He collaborates with anti-corruption civil sector organizations and is a
member of working group on lobbying at the Ministry of Justice of the
Czech Republic.
List of Figures
Fig. 4.1 CII methodology structure. (Source: Krsmanovic 2014,

p. 105)107
Schema 5.1 Actor-centered model of lobbying. (Source: Own
construction, first used in Laboutková and Žák 2016) 127
Schema 7.1 The Ninefold theory and V4+2 countries. (Source: Build on
Krsmanovic 2014, author’s own calculation) 210
xix
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Old and new models of democratic government/governance 41

Table 3.1 Institutional quality and transparency of decision-making in
reports of international organizations 63
Table 3.2 Statistics of Delphi method scores of democracy indices 69
Table 3.3 Delphi method scores for individual indicators in democracy
indices71
Table 4.1 Kalniņ š models of lobbying regulation 83
Table 4.2 Summary of standards and measurements for transparent
lobbying84
Table 4.3 Main categories of lobbying transparency 87
Table 4.4 Transparency measures on lobbyists 88
Table 4.5 Transparency measures on targets of lobbying 90
Table 4.6 Sunshine principles affecting transparency in decision-making 93
Table 4.7 Oversight and sanctions 98
Table 5.1 Summary analysis of the described scenarios 129
Table 6.1 An alternative model of lobbying regulation 171
Table 6.2 An extended model of lobbying regulation 172
Table 7.1 Evaluation of transparency in lobbying in Visegrad Group + 2 in
the main categories of the catalogue 192
Table 7.2 Detailed evaluation of transparency in lobbying at the level of
specific measures in V4+2 countries 193
Table 7.3 CPI Index for V4+2 countries 204
Table 7.4 CII Index for V4+2 countries 207
Table 8.1 The potential impact of country’s commitments (title),
relevance to OGP values, starred commitments, and completion
of these commitments (in %) 232
xxi
xxii LIST OF TABLES
Table 8.2 The country’s commitments in terms of Access to information

(AI), Civic participation (CP), Public accountability (PA), and
Technology and innovation for openness and accountability
(TI) (in %) 233
Table 8.3 Number of commitments in surveyed countries with a real
impact to open government, greater transparency, and
reduction of the corruption environment 234
List of Boxes
Box 3.1 Limits of evaluation of Freedom House’s “Functioning of

Government” indicator: the case of the Czech Republic 66
Box 5.1 Lobbying—A Description of Stakeholders’ Activities—General
Diagram126
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 The Recent Growth of Regulation

and the Lobbying Industry
In the last four decades, lobbying has become a universally acknowledged

political and economic activity in Europe, North America, and elsewhere.
Lobbyists are now an accepted part of liberal democratic political systems.
The acknowledgment of lobbying as a legitimate professional field
derives mainly from its real-world usefulness. Lobbyists have their value
both for people outside of governing bodies, as they voice the people’s
concerns to the government, as well as for elected representatives, for
whom they supply expert information and knowledge. There is also a
growing consensus among politicians and practitioners of lobbying as well
as among academic experts that, to ensure democracy legitimacy, lobbying
must be regulated. For instance, the legal scholar Johnson argues that
rules governing lobbyists should ensure (1) that all persons have a fair
opportunity to be heard by the government, (2) that the government
enjoys the confidence of the people, (3) that official decisions are based on
accurate information, (4) that the citizenry knows how the government
operates, and (5) that the performance of public business benefits from
the wisdom of the community (Johnson 2006, pp. 13–14).
The United States has been developing its lobbying regulations since
the nineteenth century. Already in the 1850s, the House of Representatives
in Washington felt the need to protect itself from the influx of lobbyists
© The Author(s) 2020 1

Š. Laboutková et al., Transparent Lobbying and Democracy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3_1
2 Š. LABOUTKOVÁ ET AL.
pushing forward the agendas of various interest groups (Schlozman and

Tierney 1986, p. 318). Despite that, all attempts to pass a lobbying law at
the federal level were unsuccessful and it was only in 1938 that the first,
partial regulation was adopted as the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
The first general lobbying law came after Second World War: the Federal
Regulation Lobbying Act as a part of the broader regulation Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.
At the state level, the attempts at regulation followed a similar, gradual
path of progress that culminated in the 1940s. In 1953, the legislatures of
29 US states and the territory of Alaska featured a mandatory lobbyists’
register (Zeller 1954, p. 217). After the Watergate scandal, the remaining
states also chose to adopt these registers and other lobbying regulations
and in 1988, Arkansas was the last US state to adopt a state lobbying law
(Blair 1988).
In other countries, regulations are being adopted only in the course of
the last three decades. The adoption of these regulations is accompanied
by a renewed interest in the subject; researchers can finally compare the
long-standing US lobbying regulation with the new measures discussed
and adopted elsewhere.
After the adoption of the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in
the USA, there was a hiatus of four decades before other countries also
started to consider adopting similar law in their own legal frameworks. In
1989, Canada followed suit with its southern neighbor and adopted the
Lobbyists Registration Act. Between 1983 and 1996, Australia attempted
to run a voluntary register of lobbyists at the federal level, which, however,
proved ineffective and was abolished.
In Europe, the first regulation that indirectly regulated some lobbying
activities appeared in 1951 in Germany. Interest groups, formally “associa-
tions”, were invited to official hearings, or rather sector-based commit-
tees, in the Bundestag (Rule 73, Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag).
The first laws specifically aimed at lobbying were adopted in the post-
communist countries of Georgia (1998) and Lithuania (2000). In the
speed of adoption of lobbying laws, individual European countries were in
fact beaten by the European Parliament, who already, in 1996, introduced
a regulation of lobbyists into their Rules of Procedure (Rule 9(2)). At the
national level in Europe, the trend to adopt separate lobbying laws started
only after 2000; 11 more European countries would, between 2001 and
2017, join Georgia and Lithuania in adopting such rules.
1 INTRODUCTION 3
These national lobbying laws significantly vary in several aspects: the

goals they want to achieve, the scope of the activities they regulate, the
scope of regulated actors, or the duties they put on these actors. The final
form of these laws is always the result of a political compromise, and thus
the effectiveness of the rules also varies.
While regulators are attempting to properly regulate lobbying, the
simple fact is that reality does not wait for them and the volume of lob-
bying around the globe does not shrink. In 2018, the amount officially
spent on lobbying in just the United States reached the sum of $3.42
billion, thus hitting an eight-year high since the all-time peak in 2010
(Opensecrets.org 2019). In the European Union, the official amount is
unknown, since the regulation does not include financial disclosure, but
the sum is estimated to reach $2 billion (Politico 2017). The number of
lobbyists registered in the EU Transparency register is constantly rising
(Europa.eu 2019). There is a lack of official data from other countries;
at the same time, there is no reason to doubt that lobbying activities,
their intensity, number of agents, and spending sums are grow-
ing globally.
Moreover, official lobbying is only the tip of the iceberg; there is also
“dark money” flowing into politics from unreported links with private
businesses. In the United States, the most widely used tools for undis-
closed financial influence are political non-profit organizations and super
political action committees (super PACs). Given the nature of dark money,
the aggregate sum is next to impossible to estimate, but conservative esti-
mates in the United States reach, in election years, the milestone of $1
billion (MarketWatch 2018).
In other words, there has been a global rise in the amount and intensity
of lobbying activities carried out in the democratic world. It is truly diffi-
cult to show exact numbers, but even conservatives estimates reach bil-
lions that are being spent every year on funding the lobbying industry in
the two most democratic continents in the world: North America and
Europe. The same or even higher amounts are probably spent on lobbying
that is happening outside of the scope of regulation—both in countries
which do not regulate lobbying at all as well as in the gray areas of law in
the countries where lobbying is already regulated. And it is the connection
of lobbying to liberal democracy that is crucial for understanding the cru-
cial importance of lobbying rules in advanced democratic societies.
1.2 How is Lobbying Connected to Democracy?

For their proper functioning, modern advanced democracies need to fulfill
and constantly improve on several requirements; one of them is free and
open access to the government for everyone. Today, regulated lobbying is
a recognized, legitimate point of access and an activity necessary for qual-
ity decision-making. Lobbying helps politicians to deliver adequate poli-
cies; it enables participation in the decision-making process and is a tool
for the provision of information. De facto, it is a constant interaction
between all stakeholders, based on a formalized consultation process or
within informal contacts and human relations.
That being said, in practice, some individuals or organizations often
have greater and better access to policy-makers than others. The reasons
for this disparity vary; the evidence, however, suggests that there is a
strong correlation between access and economic power (Dahl 1961;
Salamon and Siegfried 1977, etc.). There are many invisible stakeholders
in society that are difficult to organize for collective action. In a proper
democracy, all their interests must be taken into an account. The power of
private actors, their role in political acts, and the balance between indi-
vidual interests and the public good is a central question of democratic
theory. Democracy means balance of interests.
This approach is based primarily on the theoretical assumptions of lib-
eralism, which place particular emphasis on individual freedom. Social sci-
entists have looked at the freedom of the individual, equality with others,
and the legitimacy of individual or group interests in different ways. The
most important are undoubtedly the representatives of European liberal-
ism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which formulated the
ideological basis of modern democracy. The call for state authority was
primarily the result of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1755), although their initial assump-
tions are quite different (Klokočka 1991, p. 21).
Hobbes was characterized by skepticism of interest clashes, and he for-
mulated his pessimism about human nature, often with the reminiscence
of the “man of the wolf”. He considered particular interests to be extremely
egoistic and basically directed against a sovereign people. Hobbes did not
believe that confrontation of interests could result in some beneficial solu-
tions. The inequality of individual forces and interests, their egoism and
“overgrowth of pluralism”, which is negatively reflected in the process of
creating the state will, was replaced by Hobbes with a strong state a uthority
1 INTRODUCTION 5
(Hobbes 1651). Hobbes believed that the state could rule impartially
over society.
Rousseau, on the other hand, had an optimistic view of human nature
and believed in man as an individual who, by his own volition, based on an
active exchange of opinions and social attitudes, was able to free himself
from his egoistic interests and came to the knowledge of the common
good. While the state was the guarantor of morality for Hobbes, it repre-
sented a rogue of the natural order for Rousseau. He found the starting
point in the fiscal conclusion of the so-called social contract, which gener-
ates the enforcement of the general will by integrating the will of all indi-
vidual members of society (Rousseau 1755).
However, John Locke’s liberal democratic political theory (1632–1704)
was most prominent in the West. His conception of society was pluralistic.
The social contract is not in Locke’s conception of converting heteroge-
neous interests into interests fully homogeneous or beneficial (as Rousseau
thought), but is the result of competition interests and their refinement
based on social consensus. There is no need for superior authority (state)
to reach consensus in society, but the means to achieve it can be found
within society itself (Locke 1689).
The functioning of society from the perspective of various forms of
political association was examined by the French political thinker Alexis de
Tocqueville (1805–1859). Contrary to Hobbes, he argued that associat-
ing in order to achieve a common goal, whether specific or public, is more
important than simple egoism. General and private, according to
Tocqueville, is something that can never be severely separated. Tocqueville
believed in the balance of freedom and equality (political and economic)
and in the balance of the interests of the individual and society. However,
governments tend to override the general interest over particular interests.
Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to establish the subject of
general interest in advance and to strictly define the powers of the govern-
ment, since it has the tendency to expand its power and powers itself.
Tocqueville thought that ultimately government should not be about pre-
venting citizens from pursuing their interests or activities and forcing them
to do something for the common good, but showing that justice is the
common good, if everyone wants to promote their individual interests
safely (according to Müller 2003, p. 60).
In 1959, Lipset defined democracy as “a social mechanism for the reso-
lution of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups,
which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these
decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for

political office”. (p. 71). Free and open access to the government is there-
fore one of the prerequisites for a well-functioning democracy. In reality,
however, some individuals or organized groups have greater access to
policy-makers due to their economic or political power. This power and
the balance between individual and public interests are central to the dem-
ocratic theory. Scholars following Lipset have sought not only to define
the core of democracy, but also to find ways to measure its quality and its
real-world presence.
Since Dahl (1971) suggested his minimalist concept of quality of
democracy—contestation and participation—more relevant dimensions
have been identified to measure the quality of democracy; for example,
Collier and Levitsky (1997) expanded the root concept of quality-of-
democracy indices for the link between citizens and their representatives;
Diamond and Morlino (2004) pointed out eight categories: rule of law,
vertical and horizontal accountability, participation, competition, respon-
siveness, freedom, and equality; Pickel et al. (2015) added the public
sphere, mutual constraints of constitutional powers, governmental capa-
bility, transparency, and representation, which further specify the core
dimensions. Bühlmann et al. (2012) and Marshall et al. (2014) have sug-
gested a wider range of procedures and structures that drive elite decision-
making between elections. Lauth (2016) pointed out three core dimensions
of democracy—freedom, equality and control—in which citizens/civil
society groups play a crucial role, although the conceptualization of the
citizen component of democratic quality is severely underdeveloped in
existing research (Mayne and Geissel 2016, p. 635). The dimension of
freedom means both demonstrating individual preferences in free and fair
elections and the opportunity for continuing political participation (Lauth
2016), which is based on free competition of different interests. From the
political equality point of view, Lauth (2016, p. 608) stresses that “it
enables all citizens to participate in a fair and effective way in all formal
institutions needed for the democratic process”. According to him fairness
means “the equal and effective exercise of civil and political rights—
regardless of social status, gender, or ethnicity”; it is necessary to add
regardless of economic power. And he asks: “Do all citizens have the same
opportunity to exercise their rights?” To be able to answer the question, it
is important to fulfill the third core dimension of democracy—control—
which integrates both vertical and horizontal accountability.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.3 The Present-Day Relevance of Transparent

Lobbying
This brief overview of the relationship between lobbying and democracy
shows that it is indeed necessary to identify in more precise terms the spe-
cifics of that relationship. If we are to move from the classics of the demo-
cratic theory and their assumptions and theorems based more on
philosophy than on empirical data, we need to answer a battery of analyti-
cal questions. While the concept of democracy itself is also discussed in the
present book, the main research focus lies in transparent lobbying.
Despite the theories mentioned elsewhere and prevalent models that
deal with lobbying activities, there is no reflection of the degree of trans-
parency of lobbying, mainly due to an unclear distinction between corrup-
tion, lobbying in general, and transparent lobbying. It is important to
stress the transparency in association with the phenomenon of corruption
on the one side and democratization on the other side and ask the ques-
tion: Under what circumstances can transparency be an effective tool in
reducing corruption, improving the institutional quality, and enhancing
the quality of democracy?
The present book deals with the current, as yet unsolved, problem of
transparency of lobbying. So far, the process of explicit direct measuring
of the transparency of lobbying remains unsolvable until lobbying is regu-
lated. Although governments in advanced democracies have started wide
discussions on the importance of implementing lobbying regulations to
reduce the risks of corruption and support a level playing field for stake-
holders in the policy-making processes (Chari et al. 2010; Holman and
Luneburg 2012), countries with no regulation prevail. In reality, the
problem is the reluctance of political representation to enforce statutory
regulation and the differing approach to regulation of lobbying across
countries. This ranges from no regulation, through “soft” regulation (vol-
untary systems, self-regulation) to “hard”, legislative rules. Post-
communist countries are characterized by less institutional effectiveness,
and most of them are faced with the problem of a weak (and large) state,
underdeveloped civil society, and a weak liberal tradition (Müller and
Skovajsa 2009). Yet only three of them (Poland, Lithuania, and Slovenia)
have statutory regulation of lobbying; for example, in the Czech Republic
a bill to regulate lobbying was rejected three times in the past 10 years.
There are, however, a number of other measures—besides direct regu-
lation—that contribute to the transparency of lobbying: arrangements for
the funding of political parties, laws on conflicts of interest, the so-called

“revolving door” rules, legislative footprint, and the statements of officials
and politicians. These measures are found also in public procurement:
electronic auctions, all public contracts published on the web, ethical
codes of corporate or interest groups, a public guestbook at public institu-
tions, public service acts, the use of RIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment)
and the CIA (Corruption Impact Assessment) in the legislative process,
public consultation and publication of the list of consultants on govern-
ment policies, a code of practice, the quality of the legislative process
(unjustified amendments, wild-riders, etc.), fully and comfortably fur-
nished budgets, and so on. In other words, transparent lobbying exceeds
the efficiency of a single law: it should be part and package of a wider
approach to governance, based on the principles of openness, transpar-
ency, participation, and disclosure.
The problem of lack of transparent lobbying is closely related to cor-
ruption. According to the latest report made for the EU Commission
named “Corruption” (TNS 2017), over two-thirds of Europeans think
that corruption is widespread in their country, and the majority of
Europeans believe that bribery and the abuse of positions of power for
personal gain are widespread within political parties (56%) and among
politicians at national, regional, or local level (53%). In all countries, only
a minority of respondents say that there is sufficient transparency and
supervision of the financing of political parties. High proportions of
respondents—two-thirds and more—in countries of Southern and South-
Eastern Europe think that favoritism and corruption hamper business
competition in their country. This is also the case to some extent in Eastern
Europe. The same report says that nearly eight in ten Europeans (79%)
agree that there are too close links between business and politics in their
country, just under three-quarters (73%) agree that it is present in national
public institutions, and a very similar proportion of respondents (72%)
think that there is corruption in the local or regional public institutions of
their country. Only around three in ten of respondents think that govern-
ment efforts to combat corruption are effective (30%) or that there is suf-
ficient transparency and supervision of the financing of political parties
(29%) (for more see Special Eurobarometer 470, TNS 2017). According
to previous report (2014), corruption costs the European economy
around €120 billion per year (EC 2014). EU member countries have
taken many initiatives in recent years, but the results are uneven and more
should be done to prevent and combat corruption.
1 INTRODUCTION 9
The actual decision-making process of economic policy needs both the

qualitative knowledge of economic theory, focusing on the economic
causes and factors supporting the operation of markets, as well as the
knowledge of other, mainly political, factors that could influence both the
subject’s behavior and the final shape of policies and markets, particularly
in relation to the dominant reality of the redistribution process and pro-
cess of democratization. In this context transparency of decision-making
plays a crucial role. Transparency, for the purpose of the book, is defined
as the “increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political
information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders” (Vishwanath
and Kaufmann 2001; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). Transparency may help
in ensuring that the benefits of growth are redistributed and not captured
by the elite. Transparency is important because it increases efficiency in the
allocation of resources. In democratic societies, the access to information
and transparency can also be considered a human right (Bellver and
Kaufmann 2005). Finally, transparency is also critical for human develop-
ment as it provides incentives for redistribution and inclusiveness.
North (1990) defined institutions as man-made restrictions that frame
all human behavior. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws,
and constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, habits, and
rules of conduct applied by the individuals themselves), and ways of
ensuring compliance. Taken together, they define the incentive structure
of individual companies in particular economies. Institutions are not nec-
essarily, or even usually, created to be efficient. On the contrary, they, or
at least their formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those who
have sufficient bargaining power to create those rules. In this context,
several international organizations (World Bank, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Institute for Management
Development, World Economic Forum, European Commission,
Commission for the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress, etc.) devote considerable attention to reviews of institutional
quality. The main idea of these evaluations is that a good institutional
framework supports the democratic, economic (market), and social pro-
cesses. Now there is an increased focus on associations and interest groups
because of their participation in public debate and decisions, which allows
citizens to make a rational and informed choice in public services, such as
health, education, environment, civil rights and responsibilities that
enhance the quality of life. Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) constructed an
aggregate transparency index with two sub-components: economic/insti-

tutional transparency and political transparency. They have concluded that
transparency is associated with better socio-economic and human devel-
opment indicators, as well as with higher competitiveness and lower cor-
ruption. Good public institutions are the cornerstone of every competitive
and innovation-based economy, since institutions shape the legal and reg-
ulatory foundations of effective competition, business, trade, and innova-
tion. Therefore, indicators such as business conditions or degree of
regulation of the economy are significant and often monitored. Corruption,
which can be defined as an abuse of public power for private interests, is
critically assessed for its negative impact on institutional quality and the
process of democratization. Corruption deepens the moral decay of soci-
ety, but also reduces the government’s ability to perform its functions.
The result is a reduction in resource utilization efficiency and thus eco-
nomic performance. A corruptible environment, which flourishes in a
regulated economy, also discourages foreign investors. Corruption under-
mines the functioning of democratic governance and institutions, and
contributes to reducing global competitiveness.
During the last two decades, non-mainstream theories have started to
appear in economics—especially the approaches of the New Institutional
Economics and all of its forms and offsets, the approach of Public Choice
Theory, the New Political Economics, and so on. These deal also with the
application of economic theory in the analysis of “non-market” decision-
making, studying the development and influence of political systems on
the development of society, denominating interests, and seeking the
mechanisms of their promotion. The New Institutional Economics studies
the causes of the different development of countries with the same starting
conditions, using historical and comparative approaches, and also tries to
incorporate sometimes marginalized approaches and perspectives that are
out of the mainstream economic theory. It is also interested in the struc-
ture of economic organizations and institutional settings, as well as in the
question of how this structure influences the behavior of people, the allo-
cation of resources, and their equilibrium. As depicted above, in all these
theories the interests are the essential category—in models of representa-
tion, in the theory of agency, in the theory of principal-agent, in models
of bureaucracy—in an effort to explain the motives for practical economic
policy and finally also for the operation of the markets.
1 INTRODUCTION 11
1.4 The Current State of the Art

The deeper analysis of interests and the description of subjects and meth-
ods of interest promoting, advocating, and reaching a desirable goal, leads
to an independent perspective in this area—the theory of interest groups.
Revealing the importance of the role of interest groups in the decision-
making processes leads back to the need to be interested in social science
disciplines and their interactions, especially political science, sociology,
economics, and law. From the social science point of view, the emergence,
promotion, function, and consequences of special interests is mostly
approached by the interdisciplinary political sociology which deals with
the analysis of interrelations between the structures of society and political
institutions. In this context, it is necessary to mention that information is
a basic means of exchange in negotiations; it is a commodity traded
between politicians and voters under special conditions influenced by indi-
vidual interests and their promotion. The effort to influence decision-
making resulted not only in the rise of interest groups, but also in the use
of a variety of practices, of which the legitimate and the legal ones are
generally called “lobbying”.
Although in contemporary literature the view of lobbying outweighs as
a legitimate part of liberal societies, essential for informed and qualified
decisions by public officials (Janda et al. 1987; Howlett and Ramesh 2003;
Jordan and Maloney 2007; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Müller et al. 2010;
Holman and Luneburg 2012; Drutman and Mahoney 2017; Chari et al.
2019), in many societies, there is still very strong aversion to lobbying and
lobbyists, and lobbyist activity is often considered a synonym for unfair
behavior or even corruption. Also, for that reason, scholarship work on
this subject is still needed.
For a deeper understanding of the behavior of interest groups and the
lobbying role, which is often viewed only as an activity that focuses on
influencing decisions, it is possible and necessary to use the basic theoreti-
cal concepts supporting the social sciences, which can guide the under-
standing and grasp of this phenomenon. Among the most important
theoretical knowledge can be included institutional economics (Williamson
1998; North 1990; Alston et al. 1996; Machonin et al. 2000; Amable
2004; Mlčoch 2005; Voigt 2008), the agency theory (Alchian and
Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Rees 1985a, b; Stiglitz 1987;
Eisenhardt 1989) theory of bureaucracy (Weber 1998; Merton 1968;
Gouldner 1964; Crozier 1964; Niskanen 1971; Wilson 1991), the theory
of stakeholders/actors and new forms of governance (Jachtenfuchs and
Kohler-Koch 2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2007), the theory of regulation
(Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Levine and Forrence 1990; Balleisen and
Moos 2009), the theory of representation of interests (Olson 1971; Brokl
et al. 1997; Grossman and Helpman 2002; Goehring 2002), and public
choice theory, which developed quite a comprehensive analytic apparatus,
providing a rigorous explanation of corruption and its effects on the effi-
ciency of the rule of law (Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1965;
Mitchell and Munger 1991; Mueller 1989). Ferejohn (1986), Persson
et al. (2003), and Blumkin and Gradstein (2002) apply the principal-
agency framework to policy decision-making, whereby the ruling govern-
ment is viewed as an agent whose actions are only imperfectly monitored
by the public. Blumkin and Gradstein (2002) find that the more the ruling
government tends to be corruptible, the less transparent is the decision-
making process. Lack of transparency magnifies the moral hazard problem
in the interaction between the electorate and the ruler, making the control
of the latter more difficult. A more open and democratic political system
brings less possibility for corruption.
Economic models of interest groups and lobbying are based on the
economic theory of politics—more specifically on the assumption that
voters maximize the utility and that political parties (the government)
maximize electoral votes. Economic models describing the influence of
interest groups are trying to answer two basic questions: In which way do
interest groups influence policy in democratic systems? And how should
the government support or control this effect?
Scholars focus on describing the mechanisms by means of which the
rational behavior of individuals is aggregated by various institutional actions
to irrational and undesirable political outcomes. Olson’s economic model
(1971) implies the conclusion that powerful organized groups restrict eco-
nomic growth and stifle the political and economic system. The Chicago
School shows organized interests and lobbying as an influence on policy in
the context of the principal-agent problem. The role of interest groups in
shaping the relationship of principal-agent in non-market decision-making
can act as a factor explaining the specific economic policies as a result of
successful lobbying. Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976)
focused on regulation. They have identified the cause of the demand for
regulation itself within regulated industry. The state is here perceived as a
supplier of regulation (such as fixed prices, entry restrictions, subsidies,
suppression of substitutes and vice versa support of complementary
1 INTRODUCTION 13
goods). In exchange for these high-value services, regulated industries may

offer legislators contributions to their election campaign, promise them the
support of voters and a highly profitable future career. The resulting
exchange is usually not outwardly apparent.
The number of works on the regulation of lobbying has been growing
in recent years with the increase of various efforts to introduce regulation
in reality by providing comparative studies of regulatory regimes in given
countries, discussing theoretical framework and models of lobbying regu-
lation, or dealing with just one jurisdiction as a case study. The most sig-
nificant ones follow: Greenwood and Ridley (1998), Graziano (2001),
Kalniņš (2005), Chari et al. (2007, 2010, 2019), Crepaz and Chari
(2014), McGrath (2008), Müller et al. (2010), Greenwood (2011),
Holman and Luneburg (2012), Greenwood and Dreger (2013), Veksler
(2011, 2013), Crepaz (2015), Kwiatkowski et al. (2016), Bitonti and
Harris (2017), Murphy et al. (2011), Crepaz and Chari (2017),
Vargovčíková (2017), Newmark (2017), Laboutková and Vymětal (2017,
2018), Crepaz et al. (2019), Laboutková (2018), Žák (2019), Laboutková
and Šimral (2020 forthcoming). In this respect, there are almost no stud-
ies focusing on quantitative assessment using cost-benefit analysis of the
lobbying regulation (Krsmanovic 2014; Bednářová 2018a, b).
Two of the latest studies in this field are Lobbying in the European Union
(2019) by Doris Dialer and Margarethe Richter (eds.) and Regulating
Lobbying: A Global Comparison (2nd Edition) (2019) by Raj Chari, John
Hogan, Gary Murphy, and Michele Crepaz. The first book focuses on lob-
bying in the EU, particularly on the tools and techniques of effective lob-
bying, as well as the dynamics and trends in EU lobbying. The second one
deals with regulation of lobbying, compares 17 jurisdictions around the
world, and works with the concept of open government policies and ele-
ments of sunshine principles, especially Freedom of Information,
Whistleblowing, and Ethics Reforms.
The present book, Transparent Lobbying and Democracy, focuses in a
greater detail on the regulatory framework and the link between transpar-
ent lobbying and democracy. The part with new empirical data focuses on
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and emphasizes the specific con-
text of transforming communist regimes into democratic regimes, with all
its consequences. The book is a collective work of the three authors with
significant contributions made by three researchers named at the end of
Chap. 1, and smaller but very helpful contributions by a team of research-
ers and lobbying practitioners from all the researched countries.
1.5 Research Questions and Objectives

The present book aims to identify the relevant attributes of transparency
of lobbying, their role in the process of democratization, and their major
consequences. The goal of the research is to assess how transparency of
lobbying affects the democratization process and quality of institutions.
First, benefits of transparent lobbying are investigated, as they may con-
tribute to the democratic environment and the efficient allocation of pub-
lic funds. This premise assumes that adequate consultation of changes and
new legislation with stakeholders has the potential to contribute to the
improvement of the decision-making process, its legitimacy, and to the
quality of the management of public funds. This overcomes some major
challenges relating to the regulator and the regulated, such as asymmetric
information, moral hazard, and professional lack of knowledge of the reg-
ulator. A higher quality of public administration, in turn, reduces corrup-
tion and leads to greater transparency in decision-making, including
lobbying. Or vice versa, non-transparent lobbying can lead to illegal prac-
tices of influence, corruption, and its economic implications, such as inef-
ficiencies in public administration, rent-seeking, diverting money from
public budgets, low participation of countries in globalization processes,
lower economic growth, and the like.
In this book, economic institutions as well as the balance of political
forces in society are considered to be endogenous, because they are cho-
sen within the society. When selecting them, conflicts of interest between
different groups and individuals can be expected. Thus there is a danger
that institutions can develop to the benefit of stronger groups and at the
expense of others. A transparent environment where groups negotiate and
transparency in the promotion of diverse interests—transparent lobby-
ing—can significantly reduce this risk.
Second, the book shows that regulation of lobbying by itself is not
enough for its transparency. As already stated, the approaches to regula-
tion of lobbying differ largely across countries, ranging from no regula-
tion, through “soft” regulation—voluntary systems, self-regulations—to
“hard”, legislative rules. In many cases, even the quality of statutory legal
regulation is questionable, and therefore so is its real impact. For example,
the regulation in Poland focuses exclusively on professional lobbyists and
consultants, bringing to light only a fraction of actual lobbying activities.
Businessmen seeking to influence the government on behalf of their
1 INTRODUCTION 15
c ompanies are not considered lobbyists under Polish legislation, as they

are not acting in the interest of the third parties but their own. As a result,
in the Polish political reality, most activities that in fact constitute lobbying
escape public scrutiny (ALRL 2005).
While there are other factors affecting the transparency of lobbying,
not all have the same effect: they act differently over time and have differ-
ent temporal and economic requirements for their implementation.
Furthermore, they can and probably will behave differently in different
modes of governance. As governance is defined as the set of formal and
informal institutions shaping “who gets what” in a given policy, the under-
standing of governance regimes is an indispensable step toward creating a
more strategic approach to a transparent environment. Academic litera-
ture, for instance, distinguishes between three specific types of governance
regimes: open access or ethical universalism regimes, which exist in most
of the developed world; closed access regimes, divided between neo-
patrimonial—where power is monopolized by the ruler and their clique—
and competitive particularistic—where several groups compete for the
spoils, but spoiling the state remains the rule of the game (Mungiu-Pippidi
et al. 2011).
Third, the book seeks to better define and deeper understand the attri-
butes of the transparency of lobbying and evaluate more objectively the
role of lobbying in society. According to the fifth Burson-Marsteller lob-
bying survey (2013), lack of transparency is perceived as the most preva-
lent weakness in lobbying practices. The common perception in East
Central European countries is that lobbying is no more than corruption
in sophisticated disguise. However, there is no available method to mea-
sure the transparency of lobbying. A more accurate identification of the
mentioned attributes will result in a set of options to measure transpar-
ency of lobbying, which is one of the expected outcomes of this book.
This set can be used as a tool for: a) further comparative studies, and b)
ranking the countries (from the most transparent lobbying to the least
transparent) and showing the best practice. The chart of countries may
also foster the efforts of governments to improve the position of their
state in any international comparison and provide a quick reference for
foreign investors.
The book focuses on two fundamental questions. First, “Is there a
direct connection between lobbying and its level of transparency and
democracy?” This issue is elaborated in a set of sub-questions dealing with
the correlation between the two variables, lobbying transparency and

democracy, and its potential causal link:
• How is lobbying defined and how does interest representation relate

to democracy?
• Is there a causal link between transparent lobbying and the quality of
democracy?
• Can transparent lobbying and transparency in general be effective
tools in improving the institutional quality of the democratic process?
• Is transparent lobbying able to reduce the risks of non-transparent
lobbying, and therefore reduce the government’s failure due to more
competent decision-making?
The second main question “What factors affect transparency of lobby-

ing?” splits into a second set of sub-questions:
• What are the characteristics of transparent lobbying?

• What is a transparent lobbying environment and what factors affect
the transparency of the lobbying environment?
• Which elements of transparency lead to “fair and ethical” lobbying
and the same level of access for all stakeholders to decision-making?
• Can these factors fill the gap in the evaluation of institutional quality,
particularly those associated with the democratic decision-making
process?
• Under what circumstances can open government affect the transpar-
ency of lobbying and thereby reduce the corruption opportunity
space?
• What are the costs and benefits of implementing different sets of
rules of transparent lobbying?
To answer these research questions, the book uses a combination of

qualitative and quantitative research methods. It tackles transparency of
lobbying as both a dependent and an independent variable, which requires
a complex research design. To avoid the pitfall of treatment of too many
cases and observations, the empirical part of the research is limited to a
certain geographical area and a certain time, even if the book has the
ambition to produce general models and theoretical conclusions.
Narrowing down the subject of inquiry is a necessary step in every research
undertaking, but it needs to be done in a way which does not significantly
impede the methodological possibilities of that undertaking.
1 INTRODUCTION 17
In terms of geography, data used for empirical testing are limited pri-
marily to countries in East Central Europe: Austria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These countries share the com-
mon heritage of the Habsburg Empire and their cultural and socio-political
closeness makes them a well-suited region for the application of a most
similar systems design (MMSD) comparative strategy (e.g. Lijphart 1971).
The selection of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia is based on the long-term Habsburg legacy argu-
ment. The core countries of the former Habsburg Empire share striking
similarities that might have to a large degree originated in the era of their
common absolutist state. The first clashes of modern mass politics took
place between Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian, Slovenian,
and other politicians in the common representative organ, the Imperial
Council or Reichsrat. This period lasted for almost half a century, and dur-
ing these first five decades striking similarities between political systems
and party systems on respective national levels were established. Sovereign
national states that emerged from the Habsburg Empire after the First
World War carried further these features of similarity (see, e.g. Šimral
2012). Before the majority of post-Habsburg successor states turned
authoritarian, their constitutional and party-system make-ups bore close
resemblance to the pre-1914 Imperial politics. When democracy in East
Central again resurfaced after some six decades of fascist, pro-Nazi, and
communist dictatorships, the common Habsburg cultural, historical, and
political legacy resurfaced as well.
While the focus of the present work is on post-communist countries,
the inclusion of Austria in the set enriches the present work with the pos-
sibility of comparing post-communist experience with a control case that
has enjoyed democracy since after the Second World War. Most students
of post-communism focus exclusively on post-communist countries and
do not transgress boundaries that existed between the socialist Eastern
world and the “free” Western world before 1990; the same applies to stu-
dents of Western European politics and party systems. Only slowly do
these two groups merge and endeavor to juxtapose countries from the
former Eastern bloc with those of the former West. The present work
wants to add to this trend by having a mixed set of cases.
The present text also makes allusion to other countries, especially those
where lobbying has been a standard part of politics, such as the United
States or the United Kingdom. These countries are, however, discussed
only in connection with the existing literature on lobbying and secondary

sources. No further primary data were collected outside of the East Central
European region.
Regarding the time period, the book focuses on the current state of
lobbying in the researched countries and on the history of lobbying glob-
ally from the very beginnings of democracies in Britain and in the United
States until today.
1.6 Methodological Framework

The book is methodologically grounded in five existing theoretical models:
1. Exchange models based on both the interest group and social-

psychological theories to describe the exchange of benefits
between lobbyists and political decision-makers. This concept also
includes the principal-agent models. This kind of an agency rela-
tionship also exists between the legislator and his constituents and
the legislator and the public officials—regulators. The exchange
models highlight the importance of taking into an account the
relationship of the policy-maker to his constituents in models
of lobbying.
2. Game theory as a tool to analyze strategic interactive situations to
help create a prognosis about the behavior of rational actors who
find themselves in specific situations. Among the expected games are
primarily coordination and mixed-motives games.
3. Rent-seeking model which views lobbying activities as a straightfor-
ward quid pro quo exchange of money for favorable political deci-
sions. It demonstrates a situation that reflects visible or hidden costs
that are incurred to create artificial scarcity. This lack is usually cre-
ated by a government under pressure from interest groups. This cost
is a bribe, the costs of negotiation and alternative uses of scarce
resources. However, the positive impact of rent-seeking, which
relies on the competition of interest groups and on the important
informational role which interest group lobbying plays, is the start-
ing point in the model.
4. Communication by objective and camping models, which focus on
changing factors of communications that affect the original objec-
tive set before communication.
1 INTRODUCTION 19
5. Buchholz’s model, which shows communication strategies that are

appropriate at each phase of an issue life cycle (Buchholz 1988).
From the point of view of lobbying research, the second phase is
critical for transparency, because that is when public officials prepare
legislation proposals and legislators make their decision on the issue.
There, lobbyists may try to influence the formulation of pub-
lic policy.
When dealing with empirical data, the present book uses a combination
of both qualitative and quantitative methods. According to Kouba (2011),
interpenetration and complementarity of both methods brings positive
synergy effects.
The methodological and theoretical progression of the book follows
standard academic works. Key terms and concepts are defined in Chaps. 2
and 3 based on previous literature and theories of other scholars of lobby-
ing and a review of existing legal norms. In Chap. 4, the theory-building
part begins with the introduction of a catalogue of pro-transparency rules
on lobbying. These rules are found by juxtaposing several existing assess-
ments of lobbying rules and finding their common core and general prin-
ciples. The qualitative assessment of the positive and negative effects of the
proposed categories is performed via a Regulatory Impact Analysis within
the method of Cost-Benefit Analysis. Chapter 5 presents an actor-centered
model of lobbying and the use of the rational-choice theory in research
into lobbying regulations. Lobbying and the concept of informational
symmetry are treated as variables of game theory. Chapter 6 presents a
comparison of lobbying regulations around the globe. In Chap. 7, a
descriptive analysis is used to provide a full picture of the development of
lobbying regulation in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
and the chapter evaluates the current situation via a newly created cata-
logue of transparent lobbying. A cost-benefit analysis of lobbying in these
countries is used in the form of a comparison of lobbying regulations with
their benefits—using CPI Index—and the costs incurred in connection
with implementation, functioning, and checking of regulatory rules—
using CII Index. Chapter 8 describes initiatives associated with the intro-
duction of open government data, especially the Open Government
Partnership project, and calculates to what degree partnership countries
from CEECs fulfill requirements set by the project. Chapter 9 summarizes
theoretical and methodological proposals introduced in the book and
evaluates their strengths and weaknesses.
1.7 The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into nine chapters, with Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5 focused
mainly on the theory of lobbying and Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 dealing with the
empirical data, primarily on CEECs.
In Chap. 2, the relevance of lobbying for modern democracy is dis-
cussed. First, the notion of accountability as the key part of democracy is
juxtaposed with other key notions of the democratic theory—participa-
tion, government, and governance. Then, specific models of democracy
are briefly reviewed and compared, namely deliberate, participatory, and
procedural democracy. The relationship of lobbying to these models is
discussed. Finally, the two models, old and new, of government and gov-
ernance, respectively, are presented together with the problem of a defini-
tion of lobbying.
In Chap. 3, the necessity of transparency for the democratic decision-
making process is highlighted and the link between transparency of lobby-
ing and transparency of the decision-making process is pointed out. First,
the chapter deals with the concept of good governance, which is under-
stood as a framework for transparency. Transparency, along with the con-
cept of good governance, has become a central issue in the public policy
debate in recent years. The cornerstones of transparency are rules, so rules
are the other fundamental issue in this chapter; two basic questions arise
concerning them: What is the transparency of the rules itself? What is
transparency in the process of their adoption? In this chapter, both these
questions are addressed and rules and their outcomes are discussed,
together with the process of their formulation and implementation.
In Chap. 4, various ways to approach and evaluate lobbying regulation
are discussed. Four basic aims for lobbying regulation are noted: to limit
lobbying or its intensity; to combat the risks of its penetration with cor-
ruption and confine a corruption space; to recognize lobbying as a legiti-
mate and beneficial part of the political process; to implement transparency
of lobbying practice and thus to enhance a transparent environment for
decision-making and create a fair environment for all stakeholders. This
chapter offers a comprehensive approach conceived in the draft measures
for transparent lobbying in the form of a unique catalogue of transparency
of lobbying, which aims to contribute to the transparency of the decision-
making process itself. The positive and negative effects of proposed mea-
sures for transparent lobbying are then qualitatively evaluated from the
perspective of Regulatory Impact Analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION 21
In Chap. 5, a deeper theoretical analysis of rational-choice principles,

interests, subjects, and methods of mediating interests, including the posi-
tion of interest groups in democratic political systems, is offered. For sim-
plification of relations among stakeholders, a stakeholder-centered model
in lobbying is created. Three hypothetical situations are modeled: a world
with no lobbying, with non-transparent lobbying, and with transparent
lobbying. The essence of these relationships and situations is the exchange
of information. Market imperfections as well as the non-transparent envi-
ronment and the imbalance of all actors often lead to information asym-
metry. The consequences of this failure are described in the chapter. The
failures are often solved by some form of regulation; the chapter ends with
provoked discussion: should the target of the effort to improve the trans-
parent environment for decision-making achieve Pareto, Marshall, or
Nash optima in the lobbying game?
Chapter 6 discusses the past and the present of lobbying practice. First,
it describes the growth of informal lobbying and pioneering lobbying reg-
ulations in general, and then offers an overview of the development of
lobbying regulation around the world. It also shows how the defined mea-
sures of transparent lobbying are implemented into the practice and reveals
the discussion among stakeholders on the form of regulation and its subject.
In Chap. 7, attention is focused on the development of lobbying regu-
lation, the current setting of transparent lobbying, and its assessment in
CEECs. For a meaningful discussion on the issue, the broader context of
civil society evolution and the initial institutional environment in post-
communist countries is considered. The past dependency in these coun-
tries resulted in strong clientelism, corruption, and the total absence of
citizens’ engagement in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, this
has led to a misunderstanding of the role of lobbying in liberal democracy
in this region because lobbying has been and is often still seen as a syn-
onym for corruption as such. It is necessary to look at the regulatory
efforts of lobbying in these countries, unfortunately often unsuccessful or
inadequate in this pattern. The current state of the lobbying environment
is then evaluated in this chapter, both according to the new catalogue of
transparent lobbying and according to the narrower traditional way using
the well-known Center for Public Integrity assessment. CPI, which can be
understood, in simplified terms, as an index evaluating the benefits that
derive from regulation—the stricter the regulation, the greater the
transparency—is supplemented by an index evaluating the costs associated
with the implementation of these measures—the CII.
In Chap. 8, the phenomenon of open government data, currently a

very popular and promising tool contributing significantly to the elimina-
tion of information asymmetry, is investigated in more details. Recent
global initiatives that deal with the phenomenon of open government as a
supporting tool for efforts to make governments more transparent,
responsive, accountable, and effective are introduced, especially a multilat-
eral initiative called Open Government Partnership (OGP). It also dis-
cusses the circumstances under which open government may affect the
transparency of lobbying and thereby confine the corruption opportunity
space, and subsequently provides a deeper analysis on how seven member-
states of the European Union that have joined the OGP initiative, and are
also former communist CEECs, use the potential of their membership
in the OGP.
In Chap. 9, the book closes with a review of the proposed methodology
and its first empirical analyses present in previous chapters. Tentative con-
clusions as to the theory of lobbying are drawn and further research
agenda discussed.
Last but not least, this chapter closes with a list of colleagues who con-
tributed to the present book and deserve our many thanks and everlasting
gratitude:
Pavla Bednářová, Associate Professor of Economics at the Department

of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Liberec, is
the author of Sects. 4.4 in Chap. 4 and 7.4 in Chap. 7.
Milan Žák, Professor of Economics, Rector of the University of
Economics and Management, Prague, is the co-author of Sect.
5.3 in Chap. 5.
Lucie Vnoučková, Associate Professor of Business Administration, a
vice-rector of the University of Economics and Management, Prague, is
the author of an entire chapter that was originally a part of the text. The
chapter analyzes how lobbying and its impact on decision-making prac-
tices are perceived by organizational representatives and assesses the
perceived transparency of lobbying.
The main part of the chapter was a survey distributed among represen-
tatives of the public and private sectors in East Central European coun-
tries; however, the final return rate on the survey reached only 8%. Due
to the lack of input data and poor results, the chapter was not finally
included to the book. Still, the general trends coming from the survey
only verified the results of the Delphi method used in Chap. 3 to draw
1 INTRODUCTION 23
links between transparent lobbying and the quality of democracy. At the

same time, it also confirmed the low awareness of respondents outside
of the research field about the role of lobbying in the decision-making
process. In any case, the tentative conclusions made by Lucie Vnoučková
were tremendously helpful for the authors and serve as the first confir-
mation of the theoretical conclusions proposed in the book.
Finally, the following colleagues were involved in gathering primary

data on lobbying in their home countries, served as experts on the Delphi
method panel, and were the first to fill in the 158 indicators of the lobby-
ing transparency catalogue for their home countries (subsequently checked
by follow-up independent investigators):
Jennifer Kartner—Austria,
Radana Kubová—Czech Republic,
Sandor Lederer—Hungary,
Bartosz Kwiatkowski—Poland,
Emilia Beblavá and Matúš Sloboda—Slovakia,
Vid Tomic—Slovenia.
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Another random document with
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lukea kansan älykkyyden ja uutteruuden, vaan jumalan armon
ansioksi, joka on heidät johtanut sellaiseen onnistuvaan älyyn,
samoin kuin hänen kaitselmuksensa tulokseksi, sillä hän antaa
suosionsa kullekin maalle edeltä määräämänään aikana.
Eiväthän kaikki voi olla onnellisia samaan aikaan, sillä kun yhden
valtion kunnia perustuu toisen häviöön, on niiden suuruus
vaihtelevassa kiertokulussa ja niiden täytyy noudattaa sen pyörän
heilahduksia, joka ei noudata ihmisälyn määräyksiä, vaan jota
liikuttaa Jumalan käsi ja jonka voimasta kaikki kohoaa huippuunsa ja
taas laskeutuu alimpaan kohtaansa sen mukaan kuin niiden vaiheet
edeltäpäin ovat määrätyt. Sillä ei ihmisten eikä valtioiden, enempää
kuin koko maailmankaan elämä noudata sellaista kiertoliikettä, joka
yhä avartuu, vaan kulkee kehässä, jossa se noustuaan
korkeimmilleen puolipäiväpiirissä laskeutuu pimeäänpäin ja vaipuu
vihdoin näköpiirin taakse jälleen.
Senvuoksi tällaisia asioita ei saa sanoa onnen oikuiksi muutoin

kuin suhteellisessa merkityksessä ja siten kuin nimitämme luonnon
tekoja. Ihmisen järjen tietämättömyydestä tuo nimi onkin syntynyt ja
väärin käytettynä päässyt merkitsemään Jumalan kaitselmusta, sillä
mikään syy ei voi vaikuttaa satunnaisella ja säännöttömällä tavalla,
eikä ole olemassa mitään ilmiötä, joka ei johtuisi
maailmankaikkeudessa vallitsevasta eli ylemmästä syystä. Ei ole
naurettavaa hurskautta rukoilla ennen pelipöytään istumista, sillä
yksinpä arvanheitossa ja mitä epävarmimmissa asioissa on aina
määrätty ja edeltäpäin säädetty syiden ja seurausten yhteys. Mehän
olemme sokeita eikä onni. Kun meidän silmämme on liian samea
nähdäkseen onnen vaikutuksen salaisia syitä, kuvaamme sen
hulluudessamme sokeaksi ja sidomme umpeen kaikkivaltiaan
kaitselmuksen silmät. En voi hyväksyä tuota kehnoa sananpartta,
että vain hupsut ovat onnellisia, enkä sitä julkeata väitettä, että viisas
mies on onnen saavuttamattomissa, ja vieläkin vähemmän runoilijain
sille antamia häväistysnimiä, kuten portto, parittaja. Tunnustettava
on, että erikoisesti lahjakkaiden ihmisten tavallinen kohtalo on olla
vailla onnen lahjoja, mutta sehän ei millään tavoin murehduta
viisaampia ihmisiä, jotka täydellisesti ymmärtävät siinä ilmenevän
oikeudenmukaisuuden. Sillä kun he ovat saaneet ylevämpiä
rikkauksia, katselevat he kylmäkiskoisemmin noita onnekkuuden
arkipäiväisiä lahjoja.
Kerrassaan väärää mielitekoa on toivotella lisiä kaikkivaltiaan

armolahjoihin, tyytymättömänä hengenlahjoihin ja himoten
ruumiillisia etuja tai onnettaren antimia. Ja harhaoppiakin pahempi
erehdys on ihailla noita onnellisuuden täydentäviä ja toisarvoisia
asianhaaroja ja sensijaan vähäksyä niitä täydellisiä ja oleellisia
onnellisuuden ehtoja, joissa voimme saavuttaa jotakin luojamme
kaltaisuutta. Viisaammille toiveille on jo tyydytystä siinä, että on
oikeutettu onnen antimiin, vaikkakaan ei niitä saa: täyttäköön
kaitselmus hupsujen tarpeet. Se ei suinkaan osoita Jumalan
puolueellisuutta, vaan tasapuolisuutta: hän kohtelee meitä niinkuin
luonnolliset vanhempamme — ne, jotka ovat ruumiinsa ja sielunsa
puolesta kykeneviä, hän jättää oman onnensa nojaan;
heikkolahjaisemmille hän taas antaa suuremman osan ja jakaa siitä,
mitä toisella on liikaa, täyttääkseen sillä toisen puutetta.
Emme esimerkiksi ole oikeutettuja moittimaan luontoa, että se

muka jättää meidät alastomiksi, eikä meidän sovi kadehtia toisten
luotujen sarvia, kavioita, nahkapeitettä ja turkkia, koska meillä on
järki, jonka avulla voimme hankkia tuon kaiken.
Ei kannata tuhlata niin monia todisteluja kumotaksemme
ymmärtäväistä tähdistäennustamista, sillä jos siinä on jotakin perää,
ei se loukkaa Jumalaa. Jos se seikka, että satumme syntymään
Merkuriuksen merkeissä, tuottaa meille älykkyyden taipumuksia ja
Jupiterin merkeissä rikkauden lahjoja, ei minulla ole velvollisuutta silti
niiden eteen polvistua, vaan sensijaan kunnioittaa sitä armollista
kättä, joka on järjestänyt minun vähäpätöisen ja satunnaisen
syntymiseni sellaisten siunausta tuottavien olojen ajaksi. Ne, jotka
luulevat Onnen järjestävän kaikkia asioita, eivät silti olisi erehtyneet,
jolleivät olisi siihen pysähtyneet. Roomalaiset, jotka rakensivat
temppelin onnen jumalattarelle, antoivat sillä, jos kohta sokealla
tavalla, jonkinlaisen tunnustuksen Jumalalle. Sillä järkevämmin
ajatellessa, kaikki asiat alkavat ja päättyvät Kaikkivaltiaassa. On
olemassa lyhyempikin tie taivaaseen kuin Homeroksen ketju;
yksinkertainen päätelmä voi yhdistää taivaan ja maan, ja
vähemmällä vaivalla kuin monijaksoisella johtopäätöksellä voi
tunnustaa kaikki asiat Jumalan alkuunpanemiksi. Sillä vaikka
nimitämmekin ilmiöitä niiden lähimpien ja ilmeisimpien syiden
mukaan, on Jumala kuitenkin kaiken olevaisuuden todellinen ja
välttämätön syy. Hänen toimintansa, vaikka se onkin yleistä,
jakautuu kuitenkin jokaisen eri olion erikoiseksi toiminnaksi, ja hän
on se henki, jonka varassa jokainen olio ei ainoastaan ole olemassa,
vaan myöskin suorittaa tehtävänsä.
Väärä selitys ja nurinkurinen käsitys näistä toisasteisista syistä eli

Jumalan näkyväisistä käsistä on monesta hurskaasta tehnyt
jumalankieltäjän. He ovat unohtaneet uskon vakavat varoitukset ja
totelleet intohimojen ja järjen viekoituksia. Senvuoksi olen aina
koettanut sovittaa tunteen ja uskon ynnä järjen välisiä taisteluita ja
ankaria ristiriitoja, sillä sielussamme on jonkinlainen triumviraatti eli
kolmen kilpailevan voiman hallitus, joka häiritsee tämän
yhteiskuntamme rauhaa eikä suinkaan vähemmän kuin tuo toinen
kolmivalta aikoinaan Roomaa.
Samoin kuin järki ja usko ovat ristiriidassa, samoin myös intohimo

ja järki. Samoin kuin uskon esitykset tuntuvat järjen mielestä
takaperoisilta, samoin järjenkin päätelmät ovat intohimon kannalta
mahdottomia, ja sekä usko että intohimo ovat järjen mielestä hulluja.
Kuitenkin voitaisiin maltillisesti ja rauhallisesti arvostellessa niin
järjestää näiden suhde, että kaikki kolme saavat hallita eikä siitä
sittenkään tule useampia kuin yksi kuningaskunta, jossa kukin
käyttää hallitusvaltaansa ja etuoikeuksiansa oikeaan aikaan ja
oikeassa paikassa, mikäli olot kulloinkin myöntävät.
Samoin kuin filosofiassa, on jumaluusopissakin sitkeitä epäilyksiä

ja kapinallisia vastaväitteitä, joihin kohtalokas tietomme liiankin
läheisesti tutustuttaa meidät. Niistä ei kukaan ihminen ole enemmän
tietänyt kuin minä itse. Tunnustan voittaneeni ne enemmän
polvistuen kuin asettuen taisteluasentoon niitä vastaan. Sillä meidän
ei ole ainoastaan taisteltava epäilyksiä vastaan, vaan täytyy myöskin
väitellä paholaisen kanssa. Tuon viekkaan hengen katala tapa on
ottaa tutkimuksiemme esineestä jokin viittaus, joka johtaa
epäuskoon, ja osoittamalla jonkin asian luonnollisuutta saattaa
meidät epäilemään ihmeen mahdollisuutta toisessa. Niinpä, kun olin
tutustunut Paracelsuksen Archidoxis-teokseen ja lukenut olioiden
salaisesta yhteydestä, tahtoi se järkyttää uskoani vaskikäärmeen
ihmeeseen ja saada minut luulemaan, että tuo kuva vaikutti
salaperäisen yhteyden avulla ja oli sellaisena vain egyptiläinen
temppu, jolla voitiin parantaa tauteja ilman ihmettäkin.
Ja samoin, kun olin saanut nähdä muutamia kokeita maapihkan

ominaisuuksista ja lukea vielä enemmän naftasta, se kuiskasi, että
alttarin tuli saattoi olla aivan luonnollinen, ja kehoitti minua olemaan
uskomatta Eliaan ihmetyötä, kun hän laittoi alttarin ympärille
syvennyksen, täyttäen sen vedellä, sillä tuo palava aine mielellään
väistää vettä, ja palaa vastustajansa syleilyssäkin. Ja samaten se
koetti saada minua uskomaan, että Sodoman hukkuminen tuleen
saattoi olla luonnollista — että Gomorran tulen aiheutti Kuolleen
meren jo silloin ilmennyt asfalttipitoisuus.
Tiedän, että mannaa kootaan nykyään runsaasti Kalabriassa, ja

Josefus kertoo, että hänen aikanaan sitä oli yhtä runsaasti
Arabiassa. Senpävuoksi paholainen saattoi minulta kysyä, mikä siinä
oli ihmettä Mooseksen aikana? Israelilaiset näkivät hänen aikanaan
vain sen, mitä noiden maiden alkuasukkaat näkevät meidän
aikanamme. Sillä tavoin paholainen pelasi shakkia minun kanssani
ja luovuttaen talonpojan luuli voittavansa minulta kuningattaren,
käyttäen hyväkseen rehellisiä pyrkimyksiäni. Sillä aikaa kun minä
rakentelin järkeni rakennusta, koetti se järkyttää uskoni perustuksia.
Kumminkaan ei tällaisilla eikä muillakaan yrityksillä ollut sitä

menestystä minuun nähden, että ne olisivat minua vähääkään
taivuttaneet uskottomuuteen tai jumalankieltämisen toivottomiin
väitteisiin. Muuten olen näinä monina vuosina ollut sitä mieltä, ettei
näitä ole koskaan esitettykään. Ne, jotka ovat väittäneet uskonnon
olevan ihmisen erotuksena eläimestä, ovat ehkä puhuneet ja
kehittäneet periaatetta, joka on yhtä opettavainen kuin toinenkin.
Epikuroksen tunnettu oppi, joka kieltää Jumalan kaitselmuksen, ei
ollut ateismia, vaan suurenmoinen ja ylevä käsitys Jumalan
majesteetista, jota hän piti niin ylhäisenä, ettei se välittänyt näin
alhaisten luotujen vähäpätöisistä toimista. Stoalaisten opettama
välttämättömyyden laki ei ole muuta kuin Jumalan tahdon
järkähtämättömyys. Ne, jotka ovat tähän asti kieltäneet Pyhän
hengen jumaluuden, ovat saaneet vain vääräuskoisina tuomionsa,
mutta ne, jotka nykyään kieltävät Vapahtajamme (vaikka ovat
enemmän kuin vääräuskoisia), eivät sittenkään ole edes ateisteja,
sillä vaikka he kieltävät kolminaisuuden kaksi persoonaa,
tunnustavat he kuitenkin niinkuin mekin, että on vain yksi Jumala.
Se kelvoton mies ja paholaisen sihteeri, joka laati kunnottoman

kirjoituksensa Kolmesta petturista, ja joka tosin oli vailla kaikkea
uskontoa eikä ollut juutalainen, ei turkkilainen eikä kristittykään, ei
sittenkään ollut varsinainen ateisti. Myönnän, että jokaisella valtiolla
on oma Machiavellinsa ja joka aikakaudella Lukianoksensa, joista
tavallisten ihmisten ei ole hyvä mitään tietää, mutta ei
kehittyneempienkään pitäisi liian äkkiä tuomiotansa langettaa. Ne
ovat saatanan kaunopuheisuuden edustajia ja voivat helposti johtaa
harhaan heikon ja ennakkoluuloisen uskovaisen.
Tunnustan tutkineeni niitä kaikkia enkä voinut löytää niistä mitään,

mikä olisi heikontanut uskoani. Kuitenkin on ihmisiä, joita tuulen
henkäyskin horjuttaa tässä kohden. Muistan erään lääketieteen
tohtorin Italiasta, joka ei voinut täysin uskoa sielun kuolemattomuutta
senvuoksi, että Galenus sitä epäili. Ja Ranskassa tutustuin erääseen
toiseen mieheen, jumaluusoppineeseen ja muuten etevään, joka
samassa kohdassa, oli niin takertunut kolmeen Senecan riviin,
etteivät kaikki meidän vasta-annoksemme, jotka otimme sekä
raamatusta että filosofiasta, voineet hänen erehdyksensä myrkytystä
poistaa.
On olemassa sellaisia henkilöitä, jotka voivat uskoa

merimiesjuttuja, mutta epäilevät Paavalin todistuksia, ja niinikään
summakaupassa hyväksyvät Aelianuksen tai Pliniuksen tarinoita,
jotavastoin raamatun kertomuksissa herättävät kysymyksiä ja
esittävät vastaväitteitä, ollen uskomatta enempää kuin mitä pitävät
tavallisten ihmisten kirjoitusten veroisena.
Tunnustan kyllä, että raamatun kertomuksissa on sellaisia, jotka

käyvät runoniekkaan tarinoitten edelle ja oikullisesta lukijasta
tuntuvat samantapaisilta kuin Gargantua tai Bevis. Etsittäköönpä
kaikki menneen ajan tarinat samoin kuin nykyajankin merkilliset
mielikuvitusjutut, ja vaikea on sittenkään löytää yhtään, joka kelpaisi
Simsonin aseenkantajaksi. Ja kuitenkin tämä kertomus on hyvin
mahdollinen, jos otamme huomioon Jumalan avun tai vaikkapa edes
Kaikkivaltiaan pikkusormen kosketuksen.
Onhan mahdotonta, ettei joko ihmisten keskusteluissa tai Jumalan

erehtymättömässä äänessä ilmestyisi heikon käsityskykymme
kannalta epäjohdonmukaisuuksia, ristiriitoja ja säännöttömyyksiä.
Voisinpa itsekin esittää tuollaisen luettelon epäilyksiä, joita ei ole
vielä milloinkaan ajateltu eikä tietääkseni pohdittaviksi otettu, ja joita
ei voi ensikuulemalta ratkaista. Eivätkä ne ole haaveellisia ja tuulesta
temmattuja kysymyksiä ja vastaväitteitä, sillä minä en voi myöntää
jumalallisissa asioissa olevan mitään vähäpätöistä.
Voin lukea kertomusta kyyhkysestä, joka lähetettiin arkista eikä

enää palannut, silti kysymättä, kuinka se löysi kumppaninsa, joka
jätettiin arkkiin; samoin kertomusta Latsaruksesta, joka herätettiin
kuolleista, tahtomatta urkkia, missä hänen sielunsa sillä aikaa
oleskeli. Enkä liioin kysele, saiko hänen perillisensä laillisesti pitää
sen omaisuuden, jonka hänen kuolemansa sille toimitti, ja menettikö
hän itse, vaikka palautettiinkin elämään, kaiken oikeutensa entiseen
omaisuuteensa.
En kiistele siitä, oliko Eeva otettu Aadamin vasemmasta kyljestä,

sillä en ole vieläkään varma, mikä on ihmisen oikea puoli ja onko
mitään sellaista eroitusta luonnossa. Uskon, että hänet sommiteltiin
Aadamin kylkiluusta, mutta en välitä kysymyksestä, kellä
ylösnousemuksessa on tuo sama kylkiluu. Samoin jätän kysymyksen
siitä, oliko Aadam kaksineuvoinen kuten rabbiinit väittävät tekstin
kirjaimen mukaan, sillä minusta on järjenvastaista, että olisi
olemassa kaksineuvoisia, ennenkuin oli nainen, eli kahden
sukupuolen yhtymä, ennenkuin tuo toinen oli luotukaan. Ja aivan
samanarvoinen on kysymys, luotiinko maailma syksyllä, kesällä vai
keväällä, koska se luotiin kaikkien niiden kestäessä. Sillä millä
kohtaa taivasta aurinko milloinkin onkaan, ovat nuo neljä
vuodenaikaa todellakin aina olemassa. Tuon valonlähteemme
luonnon mukaista on eroittaa vuoden eri ajat toisistaan, mutta nehän
ovat yhtaikaa olemassa eri osissa maapalloa ja vuorotellen sen joka
osassa.
On olemassa joukko jonninjoutavia kysymyksiä, ei ainoastaan

filosofiassa, vaan myös jumaluusopissa, joita itseänsä kykeneviksi
kuvittelevat miehet esittävät ja käsittelevät, mutta jotka eivät
suinkaan ansaitse joutohetkiemme huomiota, saatikka vakavaa
tutkimista. Ne ovat asioita, jotka soveltuvat vain Pantagruelin
kirjastoon tai sidottaviksi Tartaretuksen kirjaan De modo cacandi.
Nämä saivartelut eivät kuulu niille, jotka tutkivat näin vakavaa

salaperäisyyttä. Sitten on toisia, joita yleisemmin kysellään ja
otetaan tarkastettaviksi, mutta joiden todenperäisyys on minun
nähdäkseni helppo ja mahdollinen.
On naurettavaa siirtää tai hukuttaa Noakin yltyleinen

vedenpaisumus Deukalionin erikoiseen tulvaan. Se, että kerran oli
vedenpaisumus, ei näytä minusta niin suurelta ihmeeltä kuin se, että
ei alinomaa ole. Kuinka kaikenlaiset eläimet, eikä ainoastaan ne itse,
vaan niille tarvittavat ruokavaratkin voitiin sovittaa yhteen ainoaan
arkkiin ja kolmensadan kuutiokyynärän tilaan, se on oikealla tavalla
tutkivalle järjelle näyttäytyvä hyvinkin toimeensaatavaksi.
On olemassa eräs toinen salaperäinen asia, josta ei kerrota

raamatussa ja joka on vaikeampi ymmärtää ja on saanut kirkkoisän
turvautumaan ihmeeseen. Ja se on tällainen: Kuinka maailman eri
osat ja toisistaan erilliset saaret saivat ensin ihmisasutuksensa,
vieläpä joutuivat tiikerien, pantterien ja karhujen asumapaikoiksi?
Onhan hyvin kummallista, että Amerikassa oli runsaasti peto- ja
vahingollisia eläimiä eikä kuitenkaan tuota niin tarpeellista eläintä:
hevosta. Mitä tietä myöten nuo, ei ainoastaan linnut, vaan vaaralliset
ja inhottavat pedot, pääsivät sinne ja kuinka siellä oli eläimiä, joita ei
ole tässä kolmen mantereen muodostamassa vanhassa
maailmassa, senhän kaiken täytyy olla hyvin kummallista meistä,
jotka oletamme vain yhden arkin olleen olemassa ja eläinten
levinneen Araratin vuorelta alkaen edemmäksi. Ne taas, jotka tästä
päästäkseen tahtovat väittää vedenpaisumuksen olleen vain
paikallisen, siirtyvät sellaiseen perusteeseen, jota ei voi millään
tavoin hyväksyä. Enkä sitä ole hyväksymättä ainoastaan pyhän
raamatun päinvastaisen ilmoituksen johdosta, vaan oman järkenikin
perustuksella, sillä minä pidän luultavana, että maailma oli yhtä
kansoitettu Noakin aikana kuin nykyään. Ja minun mielestäni oli
1500 vuotta yhtä riittävä aika maailman kansoittamiseen kuin 4000
vuotta siitä lähtien on ollut meille.
On toisiakin väitteitä ja yleisiä päätelmiä, jotka ovat raamatusta

johdetut ja joihin yleisesti uskotaan kuten raamatun sanaan, mutta
joille silti en milloinkaan kavaltaisi järkeni vapautta. Minusta on
yleisesti hyväksytty se väitös, että Metusalem eli kauimmin Aadamin
lapsista. Kuitenkaan ei kukaan kykene sitä todistamaan, kun taas
minä voin tekstistä päättäen osoittaa, että asian laita saattoi olla
toisinkin. Eikä raamatusta saa aivan täyttä varmuutta siitä, että
Juudas hirtti itsensä, vaikka se yhdessä kohdassa näyttääkin niin
kertovan ja erään epämääräisen sanan vuoksi on aiheuttanut
sentapaisen käännöksen, mutta sitten toisessa paikassa raamattu
selvemmillä sanoilla tekee sen epätodenmukaiseksi ja näyttää
kumoavan. Yleisesti uskotaan ja pidetään varmana, että esi-isämme
vedenpaisumuksen jälkeen rakensivat Baabelin tornin suojellakseen
itseään toiselta vedenpaisumukselta. Kuitenkin on raamatussa
ilmoitettu heillä olleen toisenkin aikomuksen. Sitäpaitsi se on
epätodenmukaista tornin paikasta päättäen, joka näet oli Shinearin
tasangolla. Nämä eivät ole uskonasioita, ja senvuoksi saa niistä
vapaasti keskustella.
Sitten on vielä toisia, vieläpä tekstistä itsestään helposti johtuvia

asioita, joissa (suotakoon anteeksi) en huomaa johdonmukaisuutta.
Roomalaiskatolinen kirkko päättelee hyvässä uskossa, että on
olemassa suojelusenkeleitä, ja johtaa tämän mielipiteen Pietarin
saamasta vastauksesta, kun hän koputti eräälle ovelle: »Ei se ole
hän, vaan hänen enkelinsä.» Tämähän oli (saattaisi joku sanoa)
hänen lähettinsä tai joku hänen luotaan tullut, sillä sitähän
alkuperäinen sana merkitsee ja sitä myös epäilevä ystäväpiiri saattoi
tarkoittaa. Esitin kerran tämänlaisen selityksen nuorelle
jumaluusoppilaalle, jonka oli tehtävä selkoa tästä kysymyksestä.
Muistan, että hänen fransiskaanilainen vastaväittäjänsä ei enää
siihen vastannut, vaan sanoi ainoastaan, että se oli uusi eikä
suinkaan luotettava selitys.
Nämä ovat vain ihmisten päätelmiä ja heikkoja mielijohteita

Jumalan sanasta, sillä sellaisena pidän pyhää raamattua. Kuitenkin,
jos se olisi ihmistyötä, en voisi sanoa muuta kuin että se on erikoisin
ja etevin teos mikä luomisesta asti on aikaan saatu. Jos olisin
pakana, en olisi sitä lukematta. Enkä voi olla yhtymättä
Ptolemaioksen mielipiteeseen, ettei hän pitänyt kirjastoansa
täydellisenä ilman sitä. Turkkilaisten koraani (puhun vapaana
ennakkoluuloista) on huonosti koottu teos, sisältäen joutavia ja
naurettavia filosofisia erehdyksiä, joille ei edes kannata nauraa ja
joita puolustetaan ilmeisillä viisasteluilla, käyttäen hyväkseen
tietämättömyyttä, halveksien yleisesti pätevää tietoa ja karkoittaen
kaiken opetuksen. Jälkimäinen uskonto on hankkinut jalansijaa vain
aseilla ja väkivallalla; edellinen sensijaan on itsestänsä levinnyt yli
koko maan piirin.
On sangen huomattavaa, mitä Philo ensiksi pani merkille, että

Mooseksen laki pysyi voimassa 2000 vuotta ilman vähintäkään
muutosta, jotavastoin näemme muiden valtioitten lakien muuttuvan
olojen mukaan. Vieläpä semmoisetkin, jotka ovat väittäneet olevansa
jostakin jumalasta kotoisin, ovat hävinneet jättämättä jälkeä tai
muistoa. Uskon, että paitsi Zoroasteria on useita kirjoittajia ennen
Moosesta kohdannut ajan yleinen kohtalo. Ihmisten kätten teoilla on
ikänsä kuten tekijöilläkin; vaikka ne saattavatkin jäädä elämään
tekijöittensä jälkeen, kestävät ne kuitenkin vain määrätyn aikansa.
Mooseksen laki vain on liian kova ajan hampaalle eikä voi hävitä
muuten kuin siinä yleisessä tulipalossa, jossa kaikki tuhaksi muuttuu.
Olen kuullut jonkun syvästi huoaten valittavan Ciceron hävinneitä

rivejä ja toisten yhtä katkerasti ruikuttavan Aleksandrian kirjaston
paloa. Omasta puolestani luulen maailmassa olevan sellaisia liian
paljon ja voisin aivan tyynesti katsella Vatikaanin paloa ja tuhkaa, jos
vain voisin, kuten moni muukin, toivoa saavani takaisin Salomonin
kirjoittamat hävinneet lehdet. En tahtoisi olla vailla Eenokin pilareita,
vaikka niillä olisi monta lähempääkin tekijää kuin Josefus ja vaikkei
niissä olisi mitään tarunomaista.
Muutamat ihmiset ovat kirjoittaneet enemmän kuin toiset ovat

puhuneet. Niinpä Pineda mainitsee useampia kirjoittajia yhdessä
ainoassa teoksessa kuin mitä koko maailmassa tarvittaisiin.
Kolmesta suuresta Saksassa tehdystä keksinnöstä on kahdella
hankaluutensakin, ja kysymyksenalaista on, eivätkö niiden haitat ole
suuremmat kuin hyöty ja mukavuus.
Ei ole vain pelkkää minun alakuloista mietiskelyäni, vaan

paremmatkin päät ovat toivoneet, että saataisiin aikaan yleinen
kokous, ei sovittamaan yhteen uskonnon sovittamattomia
erilaisuuksia, vaan kaiken tiedon ja opin avuksi ja hyödyksi
palauttamaan sen siihen, missä se alunpitäin oli, nimittäin muutamiin
harvoihin ja kunnollisiin teoksiin, ja samalla tuomittaisiin poltettaviksi
nuo miljoonat kaikennäköiset kyhäykset, jotka ovat syntyneet vain
häiritsemään ja harhaan johtamaan heikompia oppineiden joukossa
ja ylläpitämään kirjanpainajien ammattisalaisuuksia.
Minun täytyy ihmetellä, että samarialaiset poikkeuksena kykenivät

rajoittamaan uskontonsa viiteen Mooseksen kirjaan. Minua hävettää
juutalaisten rabbiinien selitykset Vanhasta testamentista, samoin
kuin heidän jyrkkä vastahakoisuutensa Uutta testamenttia kohtaan.
Ja todellakin on enemmän kuin ihmeteltävää, kuinka tuo
halveksittava ja turmeltunut Jaakobin suku, joka kerran oli niin
halukas taipumaan pakanalliseen taikauskoon ja niin helposti tarttui
naapuriensa epäjumaliin, nyt niin itsepäisesti ja taipumattomalla
uskolla kiintyy omaan oppiinsa ja odottaa mahdottomia ihan kirkon
silmäin alla pysyen jäykkänä, niin ettei ole toivoakaan heidän
käännyttämisestään. Se on tullut heissä paheeksi, vaikka se olisi
hyvä meissä. Sillä se, mikä pahassa asiassa on itsepintaisuutta, on
hyvässä asiassa vain lujuutta. Ja tässä kohdassa minun täytyy
moittia omia uskolaisiani, sillä ei ole mitään uskoa niin häilyvää,
epävakaista, kuin kristittyjen; eikä ketään, joka niin usein muuttaisi
mielipiteitään ja siirtyisi, ei vain kristinuskon muihin muotoihin ja
lahkoihin, vaan vieläpä aivan luonnottomiin ja tavattomiin juutalaisten
ja muhamettilaisten käsityksiin. Niinpä moni saattaa tyytyä
siirtymään Vapahtajan nimestä pelkkään profeetan nimeen ja
vanhasta uskosta, että hän on tullut, siirtyi uuteen odotukseen, että
hän vasta tulee.
Kristuksen lupaus on, että hän kokoaa meidät kaikki yhteen

laumaan, mutta miten ja milloin tämä yhdistäminen tapahtuu, on yhtä
peitettyä minulta kuin viimeinen päivä. Neljästä uskonnonhaarasta
meillä on niukka osa. Tunnustan, että olemme saaneet eräitä lisiä,
mutta ne ovat kuitenkin pieniä verrattuina vastustajien saamiin
voittoihin. Ja edellisetkin on saatu vain kapinallisten pakanain
taholta, joiden jumalattomuus on kielteistä laatua, he kun kieltävät
Kristuksen siitä syystä, etteivät koskaan ole hänestä kuulleet. Mutta
juutalaisten uskonto on nimenomaan kristinuskon vastaista, ja
muhamettilaisuus on kummankin vastustaja. Sillä turkkilaista, ainakin
nykyisessä mahtiasemassaan, on aivan toivotonta koettaa
käännyttää. Jos se valtakunta hajoaa, saattaisi olla jotakin toivoa,
vaikka sekin on hyvin epätodennäköistä.
Juutalaiset ovat uppiniskaisia kaikissa vaiheissaan.

Tuhannenviidensadan vuoden vaino on heitä vain vahvistanut
erehdyksissään. He ovat jo kärsineet kaikkea, mitä voidaan yrittää
heitä vastaan, kärsineet huonon asian vuoksi, kunnes vihamiehensä
ovatkin heidät ihan kironneet.
Vainoaminen on epäsuora ja kelvoton uskonnon levittämisen tapa.
Sitä ovat kiihkoiset hurskaat onnettomuudeksi kyllä harjoittaneet eikä
ainoastaan oikean uskonnon vahvistamiseksi, vaan myös
tukeakseen vääriä harhaoppeja ja eriskummaisia mielipiteitä. Se oli
uskomme ensimmäinen kulmakivi ja perustus. Kukaan ei voi
paremmalla oikeudella kerskata vainoista ja pitää kunnianaan
lukuisampien marttyyrien rohkeutta. Sillä puhuaksemme suoraan, he
ovat todellisia ja melkein ainoita urhoollisuuden esimerkkejä. Ne
esimerkit, joita saadaan taistelukentiltä tai otetaan sotilaselämän
toimista, eivät useinkaan ole oikeastaan urhoollisuuden, vaan
pikemmin uhkarohkeuden ilmauksia, jota parhaimmissakin
tapauksissa voidaan pitää sekarotuisena urheutena.
Jos tarkoin tutkimme niitä seikkoja ja vaatimuksia, joita Aristoteles

esittää oikeasta ja täydellisestä miehuudesta, tapaamme sitä hänen
kannaltaan vain nimeksi hänen hallitsijassansa Aleksanterissa ja
yhtä vähän roomalaisessa kuuluisuudessa, Julius Caesarissa. Ja jos
joku on tuollaisella helpolla ja toimeliaalla tavalla saanut jotakin niin
jaloa aikaan, että on ansainnut tuon nimen, ovat kuitenkin marttyyrit
heidät voittaneet kärsimyksissä ja paljon kauheammissa asioissa,
ollen paljon sankarillisempina oikeutetut vaatimaan itselleen tuota
kunniakasta arvonimeä. Ei ole minkä hyvänsä rehellisen uskovaisen
voimissa päästä niin pitkälle ja kulkea taivaaseen liekkien kautta. Ei
jokaisella ole uskoa niin täydessä mitassa eikä niin rohkeata ja
päättävää mieltä, että voisi kestää näin kauheita kidutuksia ja tuskia,
vaikkapa hän rauhallisemmalla tavalla todellisesti kunnioittaa
Vapahtajaansa ja vaikka hänellä epäilemättä on usko, joka kelpaa
Jumalan edessä.
Samoin kuin ei kaikkia, jotka kuolevat sodassa, voi sanoa

sotamiehiksi, samoin en myöskään oikeudenmukaisesti voi niitä,
jotka kärsivät uskon tähden, sanoa marttyyreiksi. Konstanzin kokous
tuomitsi Johan Hussin kerettiläisenä; hänen omien kannattajiensa
kesken nimitetään häntä marttyyriksi. Se, joka sanoo, ettei Huss ollut
toista enempää kuin toistakaan, loukkaa sillä arvatenkin kummankin
jumalaa. On varmasti monta, jotka maan päällä ovat julistetut
pyhimyksiksi, mutta eivät silti ikinä tule olemaan pyhiä taivaassa. Ja
samoin on eräiden laita, joiden nimet ovat historiassa ja marttyyrien
luetteloissa, mutta jotka eivät Jumalan silmissä ole niin hyviä
marttyyreita kuin viisas pakana Sokrates, jonka kuolemaan oli syynä
niin perustava uskonnon käsitys kuin Jumalan ykseys. Minä olen
usein säälinyt sitä onnetonta piispaa, joka kärsi antipodien vuoksi,
enkä kuitenkaan voi muuta kuin moittia häntä sellaisesta
hulluudesta, että hän pani henkensä alttiiksi niin mitättömän asian
vuoksi, samoin kuin moitin niiden tietämättömyyttä ja hupsuutta,
jotka tuomitsivat hänet.
Uskonpa, että omatuntoni ei minua syytä valehtelijaksi, jos sanon,

ettei ole monta elävää ihmistä, jotka ylevästi pelkäävät kuolemaa
vähemmän kuin minä itse. Ja kuitenkin, sen siveellisen
velvollisuuden vuoksi, joka minulla on Jumalan käskyä kohtaan, ja
luonnollisen harrastuksen johdosta, jolla pyrin säilyttämään olentoani
ja henkeäni, en tahtoisi tuhoutua jonkin ulkonaisen menon, poliittisen
mielipiteen tai joutavan asian tähden. Sitäpaitsi ei uskoni ole niin
vääjäämätön, ettei se taipuisi tuollaisten syiden edessä ja suostuisi
asioissa, jotka eivät kuitenkaan ole julkijumalattomuutta.
Senpä vuoksi on sekä maallisissa että uskonnollisissa asioissa

viisaus oikea hapatus ja hiiva. Ilman sitä on poltettavaksi
antautuminen selvää murhaamista ja (pelkään) ainoastaan
siirtymistä tulen kautta toiseen tuleen.
En voi todistaa enkä liioin jyrkästi kieltää, että ihmeet ovat
loppuneet, saatikka määritellä niiden loppumisen aikaa ja
hetkeäkään. Raamatusta näkee selvästi, että niitä tehtiin Kristuksen
jälkeenkin, emmekä voi kieltää, että niitä jatkui apostolien ajankin
perästä. Lisäksi ne uudelleen esiintyivät kansojen kääntymisessäkin
monia vuosia myöhemmin, jollemme ala epäillä niitä kirjoittajia,
joiden todistuksia emme kumoa silloin kun ne käyvät yhteen omien
mielipiteittemme kanssa. Siksi voi niissäkin kertomuksissa olla
jotakin perää, joita jesuiitat kertovat ihmeteoistansa Intiassa.
Soisinpa, että ne olisivat tosia tai että niistä saataisiin muittenkin
todistuksia kuin heidän omasta kynästään heruneita. Helpostihan
saattavat uskoa noita ulkomailla tapahtuneita ihmeitä juuri ne, jotka
päivittäin näkevät suurempia ihmeitä kotonaan, nimittäin ehtoollisen
näkyväisten ainesten muuttumisen Kristuksen ruumiiksi ja vereksi.
Sillä veden muuttaminen viiniksi, jonka Jeesus toimitti Kaanaassa,
tai kivien muuttaminen leiviksi, jota saatana vaati häneltä
erämaassa, ansaitsevat tuskin tähän verrattuna ihmeteon nimeä.
Tosin ei ole, puhuaksemme totuudenmukaisesti, yksikään ihme
toistansa suurempi, sillä ne ovat kaikki Jumalan käden erikoisia
ilmiöitä, hänelle kun kaikki on yhtä helppoa: yhtä helppoa luoda
maailma kuin jokin yksityinen luontokappale.
Sillä onhan sekin ihme, että aikaansaa jonkin ilmiön, ei ainoastaan

vastoin luontoa tai sen yli, vaan myös ennen luontoa. Ja luonnon
luominen on yhtä suuri ihme kuin tehdä luonnonvastaista tai siitä
riippumatonta. Määrittelemme liian ahtaasti Jumalan voimaa, jos
rajoitamme sitä omien kykyjemme mukaan. Minun mielestäni Jumala
voi tehdä kaikkea, enkä siis voi ymmärtää, kuinka hän töissänsä
toimittaisi mitään ristiriitaista, mitä en silti uskalla kieltää. En voi
ymmärtää, miksi Jumalan enkeli olisi haastanut Esraa palauttamaan
mennyttä aikaa, jos se kerran ei ollut itse Jumalankaan vallassa, —
että Jumala olisi määrännyt kuolevaisen suorittamaan, mitä hän itse
ei voi toimeenpanna. En tahdo sanoa, ettei Jumala voi, mutta hän ei
tahdo toimittaa monta asiaa, joita väitämme hänelle mahdottomiksi.
Tämä on mielestäni toki säädyllisimmin sanottu, mutta siinä en silti
väitä olevan mitään ristiriitaista, sillä tarkoin puhuen Jumalan voima
on sama kuin hänen tahtonsakin, ja ne molemmat, kuten kaikki
muukin, muodostavat vain yhden Jumalan.
Uskon senvuoksi, että ihmeitä on ollut, enkä kiellä, että nykyisetkin

ihmiset vielä voivat niitä tehdä. Mutta minulla ei ole mitään
luottamusta niihin, jotka luetaan kuolleitten tekemiksi. Ja se on minut
aina saanut epäilemään pyhäinjäännösten tehoa, tutkimaan niiden
luita ynnä tarkastelemaan pyhimyksien pukujen ja kaikenlaisten
esineitten, vieläpä Kristuksen itsensäkin muka omistamien esineiden
alkuperää. En voi ymmärtää, kuinka risti, jonka Pyhä Helena löysi ja
jolla Kristus itse kuoli, kykenisi ketään henkiin herättämään. En usko
lainkaan Konstantinuksen välttyneen putoamasta ratsunsa selästä
tai karttaneen vihamiestensä kepposia siitä syystä, että hänellä
ohjaksissaan oli niitä nauloja, joilla Vapahtajan kädet oli ristiin
naulittu. Minusta on hurskaiden valheiden joukkoon kuuluvaa eikä
paljoakaan parempaa kuin pyhitetyt miekat ja ruusut, että Baldwin,
Jerusalemin kuningas, lähetti genualaisille palkaksi heidän avustaan
sodassa Johannes Kastajan tuhkaa. Ne, joiden mielestä pyhimysten
sielun pyhyys jättää heidän ruumiiseensa jonkin pyhän vaikutteen ja
ominaisuuden, pitävät ihmeitä luonnollisina eivätkä suinkaan
lievennä epäilystä.
Yksi syy, jonka vuoksi niin vähän kunnioitan pyhäinjäännöksiä, on

luullakseni se, että yleensä niin vähän ja epäillen välitän
muinaisjäännöksistä. Sillä se, mitä todella ihailen, on parempaa kuin
muinaisuus, nimittäin iäisyys, ja se on Jumala itse. Ja vaikka häntä
ehkä nimitetään päiviltä vanhimmaksi, ei häntä kuitenkaan voi
nimittää muinaiseksi, sillä hän oli, ennenkuin maailma oli, ja on jäävä
sen jälkeen, eikä kuitenkaan ole vanhempi kuin se, sillä hänen
vuosissaan ei ole mitään asteikkoa. Hänen aikansa on ikuisuutta,
joka on paljon enemmän kunnioitettavaa kuin muinaisuus.
Mutta ennen kaikkea ihmettelen, kuinka niin monen viisaan

huomio on sivuuttanut erään suuren ja kieltämättömän ihmeen,
nimittäin oraakkelien loppumisen. Kuinka heidän järkensä oli
seisauksissa, kun tyytyivät sellaiseen etsittyyn ja naurettavaan
selitykseen kuin Plutarkoksen antamaan! Juutalaiset, jotka voivat
uskoa Joosuan aikuiseen yliluonnolliseen auringon seisahdukseen,
julkeavat kuitenkin kieltää auringon pimenemisen, jonka jokainen
pakanakin myönsi tapahtuneen Vapahtajan kuolinhetkellä. Sitäpaitsi
se on kaiken epäilyksen yläpuolella, sillä paholainen itsekin on sen
tunnustanut. Eihän tosin ole puolustettavissa sellainen omituisuus,
että tutkitaan raamatun todenperäisyyttä inhimillisen historian avulla
tai koetetaan vahvistaa Esterin ja Danielin kirjan luotettavaisuutta
Megastheneen tai Herodotoksen todistuksilla. Minä tunnustan
valitettavasti menetelleeni sillä tavalla, kunnes nauroin itsekseni
tavatessani erään kohdan Justinuksessa, missä hän väittää Israelin
lasten joutuneen Egyptistä karkoitetuiksi sen vuoksi, että he olivat
rupitaudin saastuttamia. Enkä tosiaankaan siitä asti, kun olen
ymmärtänyt maailman asioita ja tiedän, kuinka väärennetyissä ja
petollisissa muodoissa nykyinen aika esittää menneitä tapauksia,
juuri paljon enemmän usko niitä kuin tuleviakaan. Muutamat ovat
olleet samaa mieltä ja yrittäneet kirjoittaa omaa elämäkertaansa,
mutta Mooses on siinä heidät kaikki voittanut, sillä hän ei jättänyt
ainoastaan omaa historiaansa, vaan (kuten muutamat väittävät)
myöskin kertomuksen omasta kuolemastaan.
Minulle on arvoitus, kuinka oraakkelien loppu ei ole saanut
maailmasta hävitetyksi henkien ja noitien epäiltyä uskomusta.
Ovathan kyllä monet oppineet henkilöt niin voineet unohtaa
metafysiikkansa ja niin hävittää olioiden jaoituksen ja arvoasteikon,
että ovat panneet kysymyksenalaiseksi henkien olemassaolon.
Omasta puolestani olen uskonut ja nyt tiedän, että on olemassa
noitia. Ne, jotka tätä epäilevät, eivät kiellä ainoastaan heidän, vaan
myös henkien olemassaolon. He ovat siitä syystä tavallaan ateisteja,
joskaan heitä ei voi uskottomiksi sanoa. Ne, jotka voidakseen
kumota tuollaisia epäilyksiä, haluavat nähdä ilmestyksiä, eivät
varmaankaan milloinkaan saa mitään sellaista nähdä eikä heillä ole
kykyä edes ruveta noidiksi. Paholainen on jo saanut heidät
harhauskoon, joka on yhtä paha kuin noituus; jos heille ilmestys
esiintyisi, aiheuttaisi se vain heidän kääntymisensä.
Kaikista niistä petoksista, joilla paholainen eksyttää kuolevaisia, ei

ole yhtään, joka minua niin hämmästyttää, kuin sen kujeileminen
vaihdokkailla. En usko järkiolentojen muuttumista pedoiksi tai että
paholainen kykenisi muuttamaan ihmisen hevoseksi, vaikka hän
kiusasi Kristusta osoittamaan jumalallisuuttansa muuttamalla vain
kiviä leiviksi. Saattaisin uskoa, että henget voivat pitää ihmisten
kanssa lihallista yhteyttä, jopa molemmin sukupuolin, ja käsitän, että
ne voivat omaksua, varastaa tai itselleen kyhätä ihmisen hahmon,
jossa saattaa olla tarpeeksi pirteyttä tyydyttämään raihnasta halua
tai jossa on intohimoakin tyydyttääkseen täydellisempää lihallisuutta.
Kuitenkaan en kummassakaan tapauksessa usko niiden pystyvän
sukua jatkamaan. Ja siitä syystä se mielipide, että Antikristus muka
syntyy Danin heimosta, yhteydestä saatanan kanssa, on naurettava
ja vain keksintö, joka sopii paremmin rabbiineille kuin kristityille.
Minä myönnän, että paholainen todella on saanut valtaansa
muutamia ihmisiä, ja synkkämielisyyden henki on vallannut toiset ja
erehdyksien henki taas kolmannet. Niinikään myönnän, että aivan
samoin, kuin muutamat salaavat ja kieltävät paholaisen
olemassaolon, muutamat ovat olevinaan Jumalan ja hyvien enkelien
vallassa, josta seikasta erään saksalaisen neidon petoksen äskeinen
paljastaminen on kuvaava esimerkki.
Uskon edelleen etteivät kaikki, jotka käyttävät manaamisia, loitsuja

ja lumoja, ole noitia eli taikureita. Minusta on olemassa perittyä
taikuutta, jota on opittu, ei suorastaan paholaiselta, vaan toisessa
kädessä hänen oppilailtaan, nämä kun kerran saatuaan salaisuuden
haltuunsa kykenevät sitä harjoittamaan ja niin tekevätkin hänen
neuvomattaan, noudattaen siinä vain luonnon lakeja, joiden mukaan
myönteiset asianhaarat soveliaalla tavalla yhdistettyinä kielteisiin
saavat minkä hyvänsä tekijän kädessä aikaan samanlaisia tuloksia.
Niinpä luulenkin, että suuri osa filosofiaa oli aluksi taikuutta, joka
jäljestäpäin johdelmilla kehitettynä osoittautui vain filosofiaksi eikä
ollutkaan muuta kuin luonnon todellisten ilmiöiden tutkimista: se,
mitä meidän keksimänämme sanotaan filosofiaksi, on luonnosta
opittuna taikuutta. Me saamme hyvien ja pahojen enkelien
keksimistä kiittää monen salaisuuden keksimisestä. En voi
milloinkaan sivuuttaa seuraavaa Paracelsuksen lausetta, tekemättä
muistiinpanoa tai huomautusta: Ascendens constellatum multa
revelat quaerentibus magnalia naturae i.e. opera Dei [nouseva
tähtisikermä paljastaa tutkiville paljon luonnon suuria asioita, s.o.
Jumalan töitä]. Luullakseni ovat monet omiksi sepittämiksemme
luullut salaperäiset asiat olleet henkien ystävällisiä ilmoituksia, sillä
nämä jalot taivaan olennot ajattelevat ystävällisesti maan päällä
olevia henkiheimolaisiansa. Ja senvuoksi uskon, että nuo monet

Transparent Lobbying and Democracy 1St Ed Edition Sarka Laboutkova All Chapter

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Transparent Lobbying and Democracy

1st ed. Edition Šárka Laboutková

Šárka Laboutková · Vít Šimral

ISBN 978-3-030-36043-6 ISBN 978-3-030-36044-3 (eBook)

Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com

The book Transparent Lobbying and Democracy is written by a group of

David Ondráčka, member of global Board of Transparency

as a useful and enriching contribution to the debate on lobbying, its nec-

Karel B. Müller, University of Economics, Prague

in peer-reviewed journals during last three years and presented at interna-

Liberec, Czech Republic Šárka Laboutková

2 Democracy and Lobbying 31

3 Transparency in Democratic Decision–Making 51

4 Methodology of Research on Lobbying Regulation 79

5 A Theoretical Model of Lobbying111

6 Past and Present Practices of Lobbying and Its Regulation143

7 Transparent Lobbying in Central and Eastern European

8 Open Government and Its Impact on the Lobbying

 ppendix A: Components of CPI Index (Revised 2014

Appendix B: Components of CII Index263

Šárka Laboutková works as an associate professor at the Economics

Petr Vymětal works as an assistant professor at the Political Science

Fig. 4.1 CII methodology structure. (Source: Krsmanovic 2014,

Table 2.1 Old and new models of democratic government/governance 41

Table 8.2 The country’s commitments in terms of Access to information

Box 3.1 Limits of evaluation of Freedom House’s “Functioning of

1.1 The Recent Growth of Regulation

In the last four decades, lobbying has become a universally acknowledged

© The Author(s) 2020 1

pushing forward the agendas of various interest groups (Schlozman and

These national lobbying laws significantly vary in several aspects: the

1.2 How is Lobbying Connected to Democracy?

decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for

1.3 The Present-Day Relevance of Transparent

the funding of political parties, laws on conflicts of interest, the so-called

The actual decision-making process of economic policy needs both the

aggregate transparency index with two sub-components: economic/insti-

1.4 The Current State of the Art

goods). In exchange for these high-value services, regulated industries may

1.5 Research Questions and Objectives

c­ ompanies are not considered lobbyists under Polish legislation, as they

the correlation between the two variables, lobbying transparency and

• How is lobbying defined and how does interest representation relate

The second main question “What factors affect transparency of lobby-

• What are the characteristics of transparent lobbying?

To answer these research questions, the book uses a combination of

only in connection with the existing literature on lobbying and secondary

1.6 Methodological Framework

1. Exchange models based on both the interest group and social-­

5. Buchholz’s model, which shows communication strategies that are

1.7 The Structure of the Book

In Chap. 5, a deeper theoretical analysis of rational-choice principles,

In Chap. 8, the phenomenon of open government data, currently a

Pavla Bednářová, Associate Professor of Economics at the Department

links between transparent lobbying and the quality of democracy. At the

Finally, the following colleagues were involved in gathering primary

Bednářová, P. (2018b). How expensive transparent lobbying is. ACC Journal,

Senvuoksi tällaisia asioita ei saa sanoa onnen oikuiksi muutoin

Kerrassaan väärää mielitekoa on toivotella lisiä kaikkivaltiaan

Emme esimerkiksi ole oikeutettuja moittimaan luontoa, että se

Väärä selitys ja nurinkurinen käsitys näistä toisasteisista syistä eli

Samoin kuin järki ja usko ovat ristiriidassa, samoin myös intohimo

Samoin kuin filosofiassa, on jumaluusopissakin sitkeitä epäilyksiä

Liberec, Czech Republic Šárka Laboutková

2 Democracy and Lobbying 31

3 Transparency in Democratic Decision–Making 51

4 Methodology of Research on Lobbying Regulation 79

5 A Theoretical Model of Lobbying111

6 Past and Present Practices of Lobbying and Its Regulation143

7 Transparent Lobbying in Central and Eastern European

8 Open Government and Its Impact on the Lobbying

ppendix A: Components of CPI Index (Revised 2014

Appendix B: Components of CII Index263

Table 2.1 Old and new models of democratic government/governance 41

c ompanies are not considered lobbyists under Polish legislation, as they

1. Exchange models based on both the interest group and social-