KARNAVATI UNIVERSITY

UNITEDWORLD SCHOOL OF LAW

LEGAL METHODS

ROMESH THAPPAR v STATE OF MADRAS

AIR 1950 SC 124: 1950 SCR 594

Submitted To:

Mr. Manthan Sharma

(Lecturer)

Submitted By:

Kashak Agarwala (202304010016)

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our professor, Mr. Manthan Sharma, for his
guidance and support throughout the Legal Methods course. Manthan sir is an innovative and
knowledgeable educator who made the course both challenging and enjoyable. His lectures
were clear and engaging, and he was always available to answer our questions and provide
feedback on our assignments. I am particularly grateful for his emphasis on practical
application.
I would also like to thank my classmates for their support and collaboration throughout the
course. In addition to our professor and classmates, I would like to thank our family and
friends for their support during the course. They encouraged us to stay motivated and to do
our best work. I am grateful for their love and support.
Finally, I would like to thank the Dean ma’am, United world School of Law, Prof. Dr. P.
Lakshmi for providing us with the opportunity to learn from such a distinguished faculty and
to study in such a supportive environment.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Contents Page no

Name of the Parties 1

Name of the Judges 1

Name Of Advocates 1

Introduction 2

Jurisdiction 3

Facts 4

Issues before the court 5

Contentions by the parties 6-7

Judgements 8-9

Ratio Decidendi 10

Over Ruling 11

Doctrines of Interpretation 12

Conclusion 13

References 14

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NAME OF THE PARTIES

Petitioner: Romesh Thappar

Respondent: State of Madras

NAME OF THE JUDGES

Saiyid Fazal Ali,

Harilal J. Kania,
M. Patanjali Sastri,
Mehr Chand Mahajan,
Sudhi Ranjan Das,
B.K Mukherjee.

NAME OF ADVOCATES

Petitioner: C.R. Pattabhi Raman

Respondent: K. Rajah Ayyar

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most prized liberties in a democratic nation is the freedom of speech
and expression. It is essential to a democracy. The primary goal of our Constitution is to
guarantee the accessibility of the freedom to express one’s thoughts and opinions freely, as
the Preamble of the Constitution states that its subjects have the basic right to liberty of
thought, speech, belief, faith, and worship. It is quite appropriately believed that this freedom
is the foundation of all other rights, having been placed on the greatest platform among nearly
all nations in the globe. It is an essential condition for a healthy democracy since intellectual
development cannot occur in the absence of free thought.
A functional democracy must have press freedom, which extends beyond newspapers to
include other channels of information dissemination. One could argue that in the modern era,
this right includes the freedom to voice one’s thoughts on different digital platforms without
worrying about the consequences. The Supreme Court has noted the following in the Indian
Express Newspapers v Union of India1 case:
Press freedom is one of the most prized rights in a fully democratic system of government
because of this freedom, the press is able to expose the transgressions of those in positions of
power to the general public. Freedom of speech and expression were at the centre of the
historic 1950 Indian court case Romesh Thappar v State of Madras 2. A journalist Named
Romesh Thappar filed a challenge under Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public
Order Act, 1949, against the Madras government for banning his publication, Cross Roads.

JURISDICTION
1
(Express Newspaper v. Union of India, 1984)
2
(Romesh Thappar v State of Madras, 1950)

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 IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL JURISDICTION

(under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)

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FACTS
 Romesh Thappar, the petitioner was the printer, publisher and editor of a journal in
English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay, which was a
troublesome journal for government policies.
 • In the interest of morality and public order, the journal's admission and
dissemination were prohibited in the former State of Madras under Section 9 (1-A) of
the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act3, 1949.
 In response to the ban, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court,
averring that the powers under the Act were an excessive restriction on freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India4.
 The respondent State's claim was that the restriction was necessary to maintain public
order and safety. This may be compared to the security of the State, which is seen
under Article 19(2) as a legitimate limitation on the right to freedom of expression 5.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

3
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949
4
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)
5
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(2)

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  Does the order issued by the Madras Government infringe upon the petitioner’s
fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression?
 Is Section 9(1-A) of the impunged Act 6 valid under Section 13(1) of the Constitution 7,
considering its potential inconsistency with the petitioner’s fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression?
 Can the petitioner directly approach the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of
the Constitution8 for relief, or is it necessary to first approach the High Court of the
respective State under Article 2269?

CONTENTIONS BY THE PARTIES

6
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949
7
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13(1)
8
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32
9
The Constitution of India,1950, Article 226 – Power of High Courts to issue writs

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PETITIONER:

 Advocate of the petitioner argued that the ban imposed by the State of Madras on the
entry and circulation of his journal, "Cross Roads," violated his fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian
Constitution.
 Petitioner contended that the provisions of the Madras Public Security Act, under
which the ban was imposed, were vague and overly broad. He argued that the
language used in the Act was not specific enough, leading to arbitrary and excessive
restrictions on free speech. Section 9(1-A) of The Madras Maintenance of Public
Order Act, 1949, was inconsistent with Section 13(1) of the Constitution since it
encroached upon the petitioner’s fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression.
 Raman emphasized the vital role of the press in a democratic society and argued that
any restriction on the press should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that it does not
undermine the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution.

RESPONDENT:

 The Advocate-General of Madras, representing the respondent, raised a preliminary

objection in Romesh Thappar vs State of Madras regarding the petitioner's decision to
approach the Supreme Court of India under Article 32, arguing that the petitioner
should have sought redress from the High Court of Madras first under Article 226.

 The Advocate-General in Romesh Thappar vs State of Madras argued that petitioners

should seek relief from lower courts before seeking a High Court in criminal revision
petitions under Article 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code 10, bail and transfer
applications under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code 11. He referenced the case of
Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha12 and two American cases, Urquhart v. Brown13
and Hooney v. Kolohan14, which showed that the Supreme Court of the United States
requires exhaustion of all available remedies in Federal and State Courts before
10
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 435
11
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 24
12
(Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha, 1933)
13
(Urquhart v. Brown , 1907)
14
(Hooney v. Kolohan, 1935)

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 allowing certain remedies, like habeas corpus or certiorari, to be pursued in the
Supreme Court.

 The State of Madras argued that the inclusion of section 9(1-A) in the Act was
necessary to protect the state’s security under Article 19(2) and maintain public order.
The ban was imposed to prevent the circulation of news l that could incite violence or
disturb public tranquility. The government argued that restrictions on certain
publications were necessary for public safety. The State of Madras asserted its
authority to regulate the entry, circulation, and possession of publications within its
jurisdiction.

JUDGEMENT

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  The court emphasized that freedom of speech and expression encompasses the
freedom to propagate ideas, which is ensured by freedom of circulation.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner had the right to decide whether to seek
redress under Article 32 or 226 of the Indian Constitution. Article 32 provides a
“guaranteed” remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, which are considered
fundamental rights. The court emphasized that it is the Supreme Court's duty to
entertain applications seeking protection against infringement of fundamental rights.
The court noted that no similar provision is found in the United States Constitution
and did not consider American decisions in point. The court responded to the
respondent’s contentions, citing Urquhart v. Brown and Mooney v. Holohan.
 The court referred to LoveIl v. City of Griffin15 and emphasized the importance of
freedom of circulation, as it is as essential as the liberty of publication. The court
examined the validity of section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order
Act, 1949, which allowed the state government to regulate the entry, circulation, sale,
or distribution of documents in the Province of Madras. The court defined ‘public
order’ as the state of tranquillity among political society due to internal government
regulations. Public safety, in the court's view, typically means the security of the
public or their freedom from danger. However, the court noted that securing public
safety may not necessarily include securing public health or preventing reckless
driving on public roads, and that undermining the security of the State under Article
19(2) meant endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow.
 The court referred to Entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, which differentiated
between the ‘security of the State’ and the ‘maintenance of public order’. It
acknowledged that these terms are separate and independent subjects of legislation.
The court noted that the Constitution requires a line to be drawn in the field of public
order, marking off between serious and aggravated forms of public disorder that
endanger the security of the State and minor breaches of peace of purely local
significance. Only when a severe threat undermines the security of the state can the
curtailment of freedom of speech and expression be justified.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the draft Constitution initially included the term
“sedition” as a reasonable restriction on freedom of speech and expression under
Article 19(2). However, the word was removed during the final version, stating that

15
(Lovell v. City of Griffin, 1938)

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 criticism of the government should not justify restricting freedom of expression or the
press unless it threatens state security or overthrows the state. This decision reflects
the importance of freedom of speech and the press in democratic organizations.
 The court referred to Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor 16, which ruled
that acts or words must incite disorder or satisfy reasonable men. However, the Privy
Council King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao 17 overruled this, stating that the
offense consists in exacerbating bad feelings towards the government, not mutiny or
rebellion. The court observed that a restriction on freedom of speech and expression
could only be imposed if its sole objective was to prevent the “undermining or
overthrow of the security of the State.” Therefore, Section 9(1-A) of the impugned
Act was declared invalid and unconstitutional, as it went beyond authorized
restrictions.
 The court used Article 13 of the Indian Constitution to check the validity of section
9(1-A) of the impugned Act, stating that it was invalid due to its non-severable nature
and potential unconstitutional application, thus declaring the Act void and
unconstitutional.

RATIO DECIDENDI

16
( Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor, 1939)
17
(King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 1947)

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The ratio decidendi, or fundamental legal concept, in the Romesh Thappar v State of Madras
case can be summed up in a few important points:

 Freedom of Expression and Speech: The case highlighted the basic freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
 Reasonable Restrictions: The court acknowledged the value of free expression but
also recognized that reasonable limitations might be put in place to protect morality,
decency and public order.
 Indistinctness of Limitations: The court emphasized the necessity for clarity in
establishing constraints on fundamental rights as it examined the ambiguous and too
wide character of the restrictions imposed by the Madras state.
 Pre-censorship: The court ruled that censoring a publication before it is published
constitutes a grave violation of press and expression freedoms and should only be
used in specific, limited situations18.
 Judicial Role: The case emphasized the judiciary’s responsibility to protect
constitutional rights and make sure that limitations on fundamental freedoms are
appropriate, specific, and required.

OVER RULING

18
( Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State of Delhi, 1950)

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The case of Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras has not been overruled; it continues to be a
significant precedent in Indian constitutional law and its continuously being cited and relied
upon. Overruling occurs when a subsequent court decision overturns the legal precedent
established by a prior case. In the context of Romesh Thapar, there is no indication that the
Supreme Court or any other judicial body has overruled the principles established in this
case.

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DOCTRINE OF INTERPRETATION
The doctrine of interpretation, in this context, was crucial in determining the constitutionality
of the impugned provisions.

 Liberal Interpretation of Fundamental Rights : The Court adopted a liberal and

expansive interpretation of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression, emphasizing the need to protect this right as a cornerstone of a democratic
society.
 Presumption of Constitutionality: While interpreting the impugned provisions, the
Court applied the presumption of constitutionality, but at the same time, it held that
the government must justify any restrictions on fundamental rights.
 Strict Scrutiny of Restrictions: The Court subjected the restrictions on freedom of
speech to strict scrutiny, insisting that any limitations must be reasonable and in the
interest of public order.
 Doctrine of Severability: The Court applied the doctrine of severability, which allows
the invalid portion of a law to be severed from the valid parts, to save the
constitutionality of the law to the extent possible.

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CONCLUSION
Romesh Thappar’s constitutional battle for freedom of speech and expression has
significantly impacted the world, establishing legal frameworks for journalists and press. The
verdict led to the first-ever constitutional amendment in 1951, defining public order, friendly
relations with foreign states, and incitement to an offense under Article 19(2). The judgment
has been the basis of several court decisions, including Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 19,
which recognized that unpopular discussion or advocacy is not a violation of Article 19(2).
Romesh Thappar’s precedent underscores the importance of protecting free expression rights
and promoting healthy dialogue.

19
(Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015)

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 REFERENCES

Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor, 703 (Calcutta High Court July 110, 1939).
Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State of Delhi (Supreme Court of India 1950).
Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha, 186 of 1933 (The Allahbad High Court August 18,
1933).
Express Newspaper v. Union of India, 515 (Supreme Court of India December 16, 1984).
Retrieved from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/223504/
Hooney v. Kolohan (U.S. Supreme Court January 21, 1935).
King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 89 (BOMBAY HIGH COURT February 18,
1947).
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (US SUPREME COURT 1938).
ROMESH THAPAR VS STATE OF MADRAS. (n.d.). Retrieved from iasexpress:
https://www.iasexpress.net/ie-pedia/romesh-thapar-v-state-of-madras-1950/
ROMESH THAPPAR V STATE OF MADRAS. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/456839/
Romesh Thappar v State of Madras, XVI of 1950 (The Supreme Court May 20, 1950).
Retrieved from
file:///C:/Users/agarw/Downloads/Romesh_Thappar_vs_The_State_of_Madras_2605
1950__SCs500006COM42907.pdf
ROMESH THAPPAR VS STATE OF MADRAS. (n.d.). Retrieved from MANUPATRA:
https://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=AwrO5vtix2Zly9ACaMpXNyoA;_ylu=Y29sbwNncT
EEcG9zAzEEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Ny/RV=2/RE=1701263331/RO=10/RU=https%3a
%2f%2fwww.manupatrafast.com%2f/RK=2/
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Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 (Supreme Court of India March 24,
2015).
Urquhart v. Brown , 205 U.S. 179 (US SUPREME COURT 1907).
Urquhart v. Brown (United States Supreme Court March 18, 1907).
Dubey, V. (2021). An analysis of the right to speech and expression and contempt of court.
Raza, A. (2016). ‘Freedom of Speech and Expression’ as a Fundamental Right in India and
the Test of Constitutional Regulations: The Constitutional Perspective.

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