Ethics Internal Sanjana Karnavat

SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, PUNE
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

CLINICAL COURSE III
~ INTERNAL ASSESSMENT
CASE ANALYSIS, ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS AND RESEARCH ARTICLE
SUBMITTED BY-
SANJANA KARNAVAT
VTH YEAR BBA LLB- E
PRN: 17010126452
INDEX
PAGE
S. NO. PARTICULARS NO.
I. COMPOTENT I- CASE ANALYSIS 4-38
1. Re: Arundhati Roy 4
2. A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu 8
11
R.K. Anand V. Registrar, Delhi High Court
3.
4. Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat 18
5. Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal 22
6. Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry 25
7. Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar 28
8. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 31
9. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP 34
10. Noratanmal Chouraria v. M R Murli & Anr. 37
II. COMPOTENT II- ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS 39-41
1. Problem I- In the Books of Sinha Enterprises 39
2
2. Problem II- In the Books of Emran Enterprises 41
III. COMPONENT III- CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 42-76

LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH ARTICLE
1. Critically analyse the Indian Legal Profession in the Age of 42
Globalization vis-à-vis the Advocates Act including the probable
pros and cons of the entry of Foreign Law firms in India.
Substantiate your opinion with case laws, legislations and best
practices across the globe.
2. Prepare a research article on the contemporary development of the 51

law relating to contempt as under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 and the law pertaining to contempt in foreign jurisdictions
(US, UK etc). Analyse the provisions in light of recent landmark
judgments.
3. A lawyer owes a duty to be fair not only to his client but also to 64
the court as well as to the opposite party in the conduct of the
case.”
In light of the above statement, examine and critically evaluate the
duties of a lawyer towards the Court and the opposite party in light
of their conduct and behaviour towards the Court. Substantiate
your opinions and views with relevant examples and provide
suggestions on what practices can be adopted to improve the Bar
Bench relationship?
3
COMPOTENT I- CASE ANALYSIS
1. In Re: Arundhati Roy
CITATION: AIR 2002 SC 1375

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DECIDED ON: MARCH 6, 2002
BENCH: JUSTICE G PATTANAIK AND R SETHI
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns a suo-moto contempt petition initiated by the SC against Ms. Arundhati
Roy, a Booker-prize winning author (hereinafter ‘Respondent’). During the course of a writ
petition by the Narmada Bachao Andolan, the SC addressed issues of environmental damage
and displacement of marginalized communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on
the river Narmada. Following a Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam
to be increased, the Respondent wrote an article entitled ‘The Greater Common Good’ which
was published in Outlook Magazine, criticizing this decision. The Court thereafter issued an
order directing that the Respondent should ‘desist from acting in a manner which has a
tendency of hindering the due administration of justice.’ Subsequently, however, Narmada
Bachao Andolan and the Respondent laid a Dharna in front of the SC, shouting abusive
slogans against the court, ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the institution.
This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the
proceedings, all Respondents denied the allegations concerning specific slogans and banners
and the proceedings were dropped. However, along with the denial, Respondent’s response to
the show-cause notice criticized the Court for issuing proceedings in the first place. On the
basis of the above averments, suo-moto contempt proceedings were initiated against the
Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. In her reply affidavit to the contempt notice,
the author reiterated her stance and stressed her continuous dissent against the decision of the
4
Supreme Court. She further noted that she believed this to be a matter of her right to express
her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer.
ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE
- Whether the paragraphs in Ms. Roy’s affidavit amounted to contempt of court under the
Contempt of Courts Act.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. The Constitution of India

a. Article 19(1)(a)- Freedom of Speech and Expression
b. Article 19(2)- Exceptions to Article 19(1)(a)
c. Article 129- Power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt
ii. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

a. Section 2(c)- Definition of criminal contempt
b. Section 12- Punishment for contempt of court
c. Section 14- Procedure for contempt before the Supreme Court or High Court
d. Section 15- Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases
ANALYSIS
The preliminary argument of the Respondents seeking recusal of the judges who issued
notice of contempt in the instant matter was rejected by the Court. The Court opined that
contempt proceedings were initiated for comments made against the integrity of the judicial
institution as a whole and not the judges in particular, who issued the notice. The decision of
denying recusal appears to be fallacious as it goes against the law laid down under Section 14
of the Act. Principle of natural justice, due process requirement after the decision in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India,1 and ordinary notions of justice demanded the judge to refuse to
hear the matter and to recuse from the Bench. There is a tendency to inherit bias in contempt
1
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
5
proceedings initiated by the court suo-motu, thus creating a scope pf injustice and violation of
the cherished freedoms of the contemnor.
The Court stated that the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution is
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the Contempt of Court
Act which, amongst other objectives, was directed at maintaining the dignity and the integrity
of the courts and the judiciary. It dismissed as irrelevant the Respondent’s argument that the
issue of whether truth could be pleaded as a defence to contempt proceedings had to be
determined. Contempt proceedings had been initiated against on the basis of the offending
and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit which made wild allegations against the court,
thereby scandalising its authority. There was no point or fact in those proceedings which
required to be defended by pleading the truth. The Court stated that the purpose of the
contempt proceedings was to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. In order to be
considered fair criticism, the Court said that the statement “must be made in good faith and in
the public interest, which is to be gauged by the surrounding circumstances including the
person responsible for the comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the
comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved.”
Further, the Court distinguished the instant case from that of P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker ,2
where the SC considered criticisms of judiciary made by a person who used to be a part of the
Judiciary. Thus, liability in contempt cases will differ depending upon the person who makes
criticism of the judicial system. Such a view is highly skewed, discriminating between two
categories of the citizens and violating right to equality guaranteed under Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The Court considered that the Respondent’s statement was not based on any
understanding of the law or the judicial system. Her statements alleging the judiciary’s
willingness to issue notice on “an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition” whilst
exhibiting a lack of willingness to entertain a case concerning “national security and
corruption in the highest places” and its intention to silence criticism along with her lack of
remorse, made it difficult “to shrug off or to hold the (unsubstantiated) accusations made as
comments of an outspoken ordinary man”.
This verdict of the Court reflects that exercising of fundamental rights would require formal
learning and can be a prerogative of few elites well versed with the legal conundrums thus,
2
P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker, AIR 1988 SC 1208.
6
making the right illusory. Further, the observation of the SC to the effect that the law
"punishes the archer as soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target"
reflects another anomaly in the law (as interpreted) to the requirement of mens rea in a charge
of contempt. The Court ultimately found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and
sentenced her to “symbolic” imprisonment of one day and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000 with
the proviso that if she failed to pay the fine, she would be imprisoned for three months.
CONCLUSION
The higher Judiciary's powers to punish for contempt are a moody jurisdiction which is often
indifferently and indiscriminately applied. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines
criminal contempt as that which ‘scandalizes the court’ or ‘prejudices judicial proceedings’
without providing any explanation of these key terms. There are few restraints on the exercise
of this power and more often than not, it is likely to be exercised arbitrarily. The Court has
more than once failed to realize that the authority of the court which is imposed by penalties
under contempt powers can procure submission, but not respect. A more relaxed system will
reflect greater confidence on the part of the judiciary, and may find inspiration from the
famous quote of Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme Court, Power of judiciary lies not
in deciding cases, nor in imposing sentences, nor in punishing for contempt, but in the trust,
confidence and faith in the common man.
7
2. A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu

DECIDED ON: MARCH 6, 2010
BENCH: JUSTICE MARKANDEY KATJU AND GYAN
SUDHA MISRA
FACTS OF THE CASE
A resolution was passed by the Coimbatore Bar Association exhorting its members not to
defend the policemen who were the accused in a particular criminal case. The resolution was
challenged before the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court made some observations
about the Coimbatore Bar Association in its judgment. A civil appeal was filed before the
Supreme Court seeking to quash the observations made against it. While granting the plea of
the Coimbatore Bar Association in Civil Appeal No. 10304-10308 of 2010 that the
observations made against it in the impugned judgment of the High Court of the Madras
should be quashed, the Supreme Court also considered the validity and propriety of the
resolution passes by the Bar Association.
- Whether professional standards and ethics require advocates to defend all accused
persons.
- Whether the resolution passed by the Bar Association not to defend accused policemen in
criminal cases violates the right to be defended under Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. Constitution of India
a. Article 22(1)- Protection against arrest and detention
b. Article 142- Enforcement of orders of the Supreme Court
8
ii. Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
a. Chapter II, Part VI: Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes
ANALYSIS
The legality of the Bar Association resolution that none of its members will appear for an
accused came up for consideration in this case. It has been noticed that several Bar
Associations have passed resolutions in the past as follows- (i) That they will not defend a
particular person or persons in a particular case; (ii)When there are clashes between the
policemen and lawyers, that no one will defend the policeman in the criminal case; and (iii)
That they will not defend a person who is alleged to be a terrorist or a person accused of a
brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape case.
There is ample evidence to show that Indian Lawyers have never shirked their responsibility
on the ground that they would become either unpopular or it is personally dangerous for him
to defend such persons. It was noticed that in spite of such high traditions established by Bar,
several instances have occurred about the refusal to defend certain accused persons like, a)
The revolutionaries in Bengal during British rule were defended by lawyers; b) Indian
communists were defended in the Meerut conspiracy case; c) Razakars of Hyderabad were
defended; d) Sheikh Abdullah and his co-accused were defended; e) Alleged assasins of
Mahatma Gandhi and Indira Gandhi were defended; f) Dr. Binayak Sen has been defended;
and g) Bhulabhai Desai defended the accused in INA trials in Red Fort at Delhi (1945 to
1946).
The Constitution of India and Rules framed by Bar Council of India imposed a duty on the
lawyers to defend the causes and not to refuse to accept briefs. The Constitutional provisions
guarantees that no person arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as
soon as may be the ground of his arrest and shall not be denied the right to consult and be
defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. The rules framed by the Bar Council of India
provides that an advocate is bound to accept any brief in Courts or tribunals before any other
9
authorities in or before which he proposes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at
the Bar and the nature of the case.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that professional ethics requires that a lawyer cannot refuse a brief, provided a
client is willing to pay his fee, and the lawyer is not otherwise engaged. Hence, the action of
any Bar Association in passing such a resolution that none of its members will appear for a
particular accused, whether on the ground that he is a policeman or on the ground that he is a
suspected terrorist, rapist, mass murderer, etc. is against all norms of the Constitution, the
Statute and professional ethics. It is against the great traditions of the Bar which has always
stood up for defending persons accused for a crime. Such a resolution is, in fact, a disgrace to
the legal community.
The Court declared that all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India are null and void and
the right-minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy and
rule of law to be upheld in this country. Thus, a resolution of the Bar, that no member of the
Bar will appear for a particular accused, is against all norms of the Constitution, the statute
and professional ethics. It is also against great traditions of the Bar which took cases where
persons were accused of treason and other serious offences. Democracy and the rule of law
can be maintained only by providing access to justice through legal profession and no person
shall be denied of the right to be defended by a lawyer. The Supreme Court’s decision
upholding the right of a person to be defended by a lawyer and corresponding duty of the
lawyer to defend strengthen, not only the cause of legal profession but also strengthens the
rule of law and democracy in the Country
10
3. R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court
CITATION: (2009) 8 SCC 106

DECIDED ON: JULY 29, 2009
BENCH: JUSTICE B.N. AGRAWAL, G.S. SINGHVI AND
AFTAB ALAM
FACTS OF THE CASE
The present appeal is a fall out from a criminal trial arising from a hit and run accident in
which a car travelling at reckless speed crashed through a police check post and crushed to
death six people, including three policemen. Facing the trial, as the main accused, was
Sanjeev Nanda coming from a very wealthy business family. It was in this background that a
well-known English language news channel called New Delhi Television (NDTV) telecast a
programme on May 30, 2007 in which one Sunil Kulkarni was shown meeting with IU Khan,
the Special Public Prosecutor and RK Anand, the Senior Defence Counsel (and two others)
and negotiating for his sell out in favour of the defence for a very high price. Shocked by the
programme the Delhi High Court suo-motu initiated a proceeding (Writ Petition (Criminal)
No.796 of 2007). It called for from the news channel all the materials on which the telecast
was based and after examining those materials issued show cause notices to RK Anand, IU
Khan and Bhagwan Sharma, an associate advocate with RK Anand why they should not be
convicted and punished for committing criminal contempt of court as defined under section 2
(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The High Court held that RK Anand’s and IU Khan’s acts squarely fell within the definition
of contempt under clauses (ii) & (iii) of section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. It,
accordingly, held them guilty of committing contempt of Court vide judgment and order
dated August 21, 2008 and in exercise of power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India
prohibited them, by way of punishment, from appearing in the Delhi High Court and the
courts subordinate to it for a period of four months from the date of the judgment. It also held
that RK Anand and IU Khan had forfeited their right to be designated as Senior Advocates
11
and recommended to the Full Court to divest them of the honour. In addition to this the High
Court also sentenced them to fine of rupees two thousand each. Thus, these two appeals by
RK Anand and IU Khan respectively are filed under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts
Act against the judgment and order passed by the Delhi High Court.
- Whether the conviction of the two appellants for committing criminal contempt of court
is justified and sustainable?
- Whether the procedure adopted by the High Court in the contempt proceedings was fair
and reasonable, causing no prejudice to the two appellants?
- Whether it was open to the High Court to prohibit the appellants from appearing before
the High Court and the courts sub-ordinate to it for a specified period as one of the
punishments for criminal contempt of court?
- Whether the role of NDTV was justified in carrying out sting operations and telecasting
the programme based on the sting materials in regard to a criminal trial that was going on
before the court.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

a. Section 2(c)- Definition of criminal contempt
b. Section 19(1)- Appeal from a decision of the HC
ii. Advocates Act, 1961

a. Section 34- Power of High Courts to make rules
iii. Constitution of India

a. Article 145- Power of the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating the practice and
procedure of the court
b. Article 215- Power of High Court to punish for contempt
12
ANALYSIS
Contempt of Court-
The Standard of Proof in Contempt of Court Proceedings is one of the striking issues in the in
the present case. The manner in which the Court decided whether the charge of criminal
contempt had been established or not, the standard applied was not different from the
precedent case law. The approach of the Court was in consonance with the law laid down in a
range of cases from In Re Vinay Mishra3 to Daroga Singh and Ors. v. B.K. Pandey4. The
Court spelt it out clearly that there is a difference between the manner of proof in a contempt
proceeding and that in a criminal trial. While the standard of proof in both was said to be the
same, namely, that of proving a fact “beyond reasonable doubt”, the manner of proof in both
was contended to be different. The settled position of law was noted to be that proceeding of
contempt of court was sui generis.
The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act were not
applicable in such a proceeding. Instead, the principles of natural justice were said to apply.
The absence of a fixed procedure to be followed in these types of trials has led to the
following shortcomings in the manner in which the contempt of court proceedings are
conducted. In this regard, the lacunae which can be identified from a reading of R.K. Anand
v. Registrar, Delhi High Court are: Firstly, the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses is
very rarely given to the person charged with criminal contempt. In the case of Daroga Singh
and Ors., it was noted that one of the reasons for denying the opportunity to cross-examine is
the need to decide the case expeditiously. R.K. Anand’s request to cross-examine Poonam
Agarwal was turned down by the High Court. But the point to be noted is to what extent
should interests of expediency be given priority to interests of fairness and uncovering the
truth. Further, the reasoning behind denial of the opportunity to cross examine was that what
had transpired between the parties were already there on the micro-chips and the CDs. It was
stated that no statement by Poonam Agarwal would change this state of affairs. But the point
to be noted is that it was the reliability of these CDs that was being questioned by RK Anand
in the first place.
3
In Re Vinay Mishra, 1995 CriLJ 3994.
4
Daroga Singh and Ors. v. B.K. Pandey, 2004 CriLJ 2084.
13
Secondly, IU Khan was let off the hook on the ground that the tape, containing his recording,
submitted to the Court was incomplete and hence its veracity was not adequately established.
However, it doesn’t seem that the veracity of RK Anand’s sting tape was proved either.
Attempts to do so were struck down by the Court. Thirdly, the judgment states that RK
Anand did not deny the recording, which was broadcasted by the news channel, in the first
instance. This fact seems to have weighed against him, especially since, as is mentioned in
the judgment, that IU Khan had, right at the beginning, claimed that the recording had been
doctored. However, the fact of the matter is that the judges should not have referred to
statements made by the persons, in interviews to television channels, in the first place. Such
observations do not have any place in the judgment. These faux pas which have been pointed
out would not have taken place at all if the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence
Act procedural standards had been followed.
Professional misconduct vis-à-vis Criminal Contempt of Court-
Khan’s behaviour was held to be professional misconduct whereas Anand was charged with
criminal contempt of court. While Anand was given a period of eight weeks from the date of
service of notice for filing his show-cause as to why punishment awarded to him should not
be enhanced, Khan’s case was directed back to the Delhi High Court for consideration and he
had no prior notice as to the action of the SC. In the case of In re Vinay Mishra5, the SC held
that under Article 142 of the Constitution the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court
which are supplementary in nature and are provided to do complete justice in any manner, are
independent of the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court under Article 129 which
cannot be trammelled in any manner by any statutory provision including any provisions of
the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The implication of this case
was that the SC was vesting in itself the power to try cases of professional misconduct by
advocates which was actually vested in the Bar Council as per Section 35 of the Advocates
Act, 1961.
Fortunately, this decision was overruled in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
India,6where it was held that the SC must not exceed its jurisdiction and it must act with
5
Supra Note 3
6
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SSC 409.
14
restraint while exercising its powers under Article 142. Thus, it was unacceptable for the
Court to "take over" the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and "perform"
their functions. While the Bar Council is considering cases relating to professional
misconduct, it follows a fixed procedure where a Disciplinary Committee is set up, the
advocate is allowed to defend himself and most importantly an appeal to the decision of the
Committee lies with the SC. This procedure as contrasted with the contempt proceedings
seems much fairer as the advocate is allowed one appeal. It is surprising that Criminal
Contempt of Court which is a graver offence does not have either a fixed procedure or a
process of appeal. With reference to the case, if IU Khan is dissatisfied with the decision of
the Del HC, then it is highly unlikely that his appeal will be successful since the Supreme
Court has already pre-judged the matter.
Role of the Media:
Several issues emerge from the RK Anand which need to be scrutinized. One of the questions
posed by J. Singhvi to the lawyers concerned was whether it was appropriate for the media to
air the tapes during court proceedings of the BMW case? Does it adversely affect or prejudice
the parties involved? At a broader level does this vitiate fair trial? Several issues emerge from
the RK Anand which need to be scrutinized. It is important to conduct such scrutiny in light
of recent incidents and practical considerations. The question posed by J. Singhvi to the
lawyers concerned was whether it was appropriate for the media to air the tapes during court
proceedings of the BMW case? Does it adversely affect or prejudice the parties involved? At
a broader level does this vitiate fair trial?
The present judgment explains that trial by media takes place where the impact of television
or newspaper coverage on a person’s reputation creates a widespread perception of guilt
regardless of any verdict in a court of law. In such cases the media has tried and found the
person guilty and thus adjudicated upon the very issue pending before the court and this
makes a fair trial virtually impossible regardless of the its result. In this case, an important
issue which came up before the Court was whether NDTV was guilty of criminal contempt
under the Contempt of Courts Act? The Court held that this case fell squarely under the
defence under the new Section 13(b) of the Act which provides that justification by truth and
public interest put together form a defence. The Court also accepted Shri Salve’s compelling
argument that NDTV was in fact trying to prevent the advocates’ attempt to interfere in the
15
course of justice. It exposed erring lawyers. Further, the stings had nothing to do with the
accused, Sanjeev Nanda. It did not conjecture about the culpability of the accused which is
what the Court thought the standard is. However, it is interesting to note at this point that
there were television interventions even in December 2007 when the Anand contempt case
was before the Delhi High Court.
CONCLUSION
The present BMW's Case precisely revolves around winning over and influencing the star
witness, Sunil Kulkarni. The two appellants, defence counsel as well as special public
prosecutor, were caught through live conversation in a sting operation conducted by Poonam
Agarwal, a journalist of NDTV. Entire recordings in both the stings were accepted. R.K.
Anand and IU Khan both were prohibited by way of punishment, from appearing in Delhi
High Court and all the courts subordinate to if, for a period of four months from the date of
judgment and a fine of Rs. 2000 too was imposed. In the event of appeals against the above
judgment of the Delhi Court, the appeal by RK Anand was dismissed by the Supreme Court,
subject to the notice of enhancement of punishment. He was allowed eight weeks’ time from
the date of service of notice for filing his show-cause.
In case of I.U. Khan, he was supposed to know about the ongoing game plan that was afoot
for subversion of the Trial. His omission to inform about the same to prosecution and the
court, as per the Delhi High Court was likely to have a very serious impact on the trial and
thus formed a case of professional misconduct. But, as per the Supreme Court, on the basis of
materials on record the charges of criminal contempt cannot be held to be satisfactorily
established against him. The appeal filed by I.U. Khan was therefore allowed and his
conviction for criminal contempt was set aside. The period of four month's prohibition from
appearing in Delhi High Court and the courts sub-ordinate to it was already over by then,
however, the punishment of fine given to him by the High Court was set aside.
The Supreme Court further held that the Full Court of the Delhi High Court may still consider
whether or not to continue the honour of Senior Advocate conferred on him in light of the
findings recorded in this judgment. Additionally, in order to avoid any such controversies in
future all the High Courts that have so far not framed rules under Section 34 of the Advocates
16
Act are directed to frame the rules without any further delay. While appreciating the TV
channel’s exposure of a renowned criminal lawyer’s crime of bribing a witness, the apex
court declined to regulate media in the interest of an autonomous judiciary and a free media.
I would like to conclude by quoting J. Singhvi, “What appeared in the telecast was
outrageous and tended to confirm the cynical but widely held belief that in this country the
rich and the mighty enjoyed some kind of corrupt and extra-constitutional immunity that put
them beyond the reach of the criminal justice system.” The Apex court termed this sting as
opening of another chapter in trial. NDTV has sufficiently documented the entire episode,
which is essential to nail criminals. Their half-an-hour program on delays in the trial inspired
witness Kulkarni to work with TV channel to expose prosecution-defence nexus.
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4. Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat

DECIDED ON: FEBRUARY 2, 2009
BENCH: JUSTICE DALVEER BHANDARI AND J.M.
PANCHAL
FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant had joined service of respondent as Food Inspector. The appellant worked for
14 years as Food Inspector at Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar. In 1996, he was transferred to
Rajkot, where remained for three years. Again, the appellant was transferred to Bhuj.
However, he did not join duty at Bhuj. Though the appellant was relieved on 05.10.1999
from Rajkot, yet he did not join duty at Bhuj. The Assistant Commissioner, Bhuj called upon
the appellant to immediately join the duty, but the appellant did not comply with his
direction. The appellant on 17.01.2000 filed a reply to the show cause notice and bluntly
refused to join duty at Bhuj. Ultimately, the appellant was suspended from the service.
The appellant was served with a charge-sheet on 05.05.2000 containing seven charges like
remaining unauthorizedly absent, deciding on his own the place of discharging his duty
without permission of the competent officer, exerting mental pressure and giving threats,
acting beyond his official under the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, flouting and disobeying the orders of the Head of the department as well as
the Head of the office, Ignoring the office orders issued by the Government, using
intemperate language.
- Whether the appellant is liable under Rule 6 and other Provisions of Gujarat Civil
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules for continuous absence from services and
disobeying the Head of the office.
18
RULE APPLICABLE
i. Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971

a. Rule 6- Nature of Penalties
ANALYSIS
This case is a decent example of totally unaccepted justifications for disobeying the order of
Head and deliberately remaining absent from one’s duties. The judgment delivered is very
obvious in nature. This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in a
Letters Patent Appeal. Initially in the inquiry, the appellant was given full opportunity to
defend his case. The Inquiry Officer in his report found the appellant guilty of all the charges
levelled against him and sent his report to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary
Authority concurred with the same and the appellant was served with second show cause
notice calling upon him to show cause within 15 days as to why one of the punishments
indicated in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules should not be
imposed.
In view of the serious allegations levelled by the appellant against respondent, he decided to
refer the matter the State of Gujarat for passing appropriate orders in the matter and after
considering the replies of respondent by his impugned order dismissed the services of the
appellant. The appellant challenged the dismissal order by filing a writ petition before the
learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge observed that the scope of judicial review of
action taken by the disciplinary authority against the delinquent is very limited. It is not only
when such an order of punishment is found to be so perverse that no reasonable person can
pass such order or the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt
established or there is violation of any fundamental rights or the principles of natural justice.
The appellant aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge preferred Letters Patent
Appeal before the High Court. The Division Bench analysed the submissions of the appellant
in great detail and dismissed the entire case.
19
Now, hearing the matter, the Division Bench observed that the appellant flouted the order of
transfer and deliberately remained absent from the duty without leave for over six months and
he indulged in the practice of brow-beating the superior officers and using intemperate
language. The Division Bench has reproduced the instances of use of intemperate language
which were reproduced in the judgment of the learned Single Judge A strict view was
required to be taken in the matter of discipline of the institution. When the disciplinary
authority has taken appropriate view in the facts and circumstances of the case then it should
not be interfered with. The learned Single Judge observed that no leniency in the punishment
can be shown in the facts of this case and as under: “The facts of this case do not warrant
any such conclusion to be drawn by this Court and no interference with the decision of the
disciplinary authority is warranted. If the petitioner is allowed to escape with minor penalty,
it will certainly form a bad precedent and in a given case, some other unscrupulous
Government employee would resort to arm twisting of his superior for extorting a decision in
his favour. Such leniency cannot be permitted.”
It is well established proposition of law that scope of judicial review of the action taken by
disciplinary authority against the delinquent is very limited. It is only when such order of
punishment is found to be so perverse that no reasonable person can pass such order or the
punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt established or there is
violation of any fundamental rights or the principles of natural justice. The facts of this case
do not warrant any such conclusion to be drawn by this court and no interference with the
decision of the disciplinary authority is warranted. If the petitioner is allowed to escape with
minor penalty it will certainly form a bad precedent and in a given case, some other
unscrupulous Government employee would resort to arm twisting of his superior for extorting
a decision in his favour. Such leniency cannot be permitted. Further, he has been held guilty
not only of that charge, but composite charge of in all seven different nature which have been
adequately prescribed in the charge-sheet.
The Division Bench was not oblivious of the fact of the limited jurisdiction which it has in
the appeal but in the interest of justice they gave full length hearing to the appellant and
decided every aspect of the matter. The legal position has been crystallized in number of
judgments that transfer is an incidence of service and transfers are made according to
administrative exigencies.7 In the instant case, in the entire tenure of more than 18 years, the
7
The Correspondent, Malankara v. J. Rabinson Jacob And Ors., (1998) 3 MLJ 595.
20
appellant was only transferred twice. The appellant's transfer order cannot be termed as mala
fide. The appellant was not justified in defying the transfer order and to level allegations
against his superiors and remaining absent from official duties. In the interest of discipline of
any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the employees cannot be
countenanced.
In Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani,8 This court
observed that Transfer from one place to another is necessary in public interest and efficiency
in the public administration. The respondent lost his service as he refused to comply with the
order of his transfer from one place to the other. Similarly, in Mithilesh Singh v. Union of
India and Others,9 Court held that absence from duty without proper intimation is indicated
to be a grave offence warranting removal from service. After thoroughly examining the
matter in the instant case, the court dismissed the appeal considering that the appeal is devoid
of any merit and on consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case,
no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
CONCLUSION
The appellant in the present matter failed to show cause as to why one of the punishments
indicated in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules should not be
imposed on him. The appellant has been giving improper and unaccepted justifications for
failing to obey the order of Head and remaining absent from his duties. It is observed through
the analysis that all the tribunals that the appellant has taken resort to decided rightly against
the appellant considering the carelessness and indiscipline on his part. It is thus concluded
that the court in hearing the present case has very well dismissed the appeal against the
appellant as the appellant failed to give answers for his unjustified and clearly seemed to be
deliberate absence from his duty calling him to be liable under the Provisions of Gujarat Civil
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
8
Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433.
9
Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India and Others, AIR 2003 SC 1724.
21
5. Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

DECIDED ON: AUGUST 22, 2013
BENCH: JUSTICE B.S CHAUHAN AND S.A BOBDE
FACTS OF THE CASE
It is a suo motu contempt proceedings initiated against Advocate on Record (AOR),

Rameshwar Prasad Goyal. In the instant case, Goyal filed an application for restoration of an
appeal which was earlier dismissed by the Court, as none appeared to press the appeal. The
Court was of the view that the facts contained in the restoration application were not correct
and the counsel appearing for the applicant was not able to clarify the same. The Court
passed over the matter and asked the counsel appearing to call the AOR, Goyal, who would
be able to explain the factual controversy. Goyal never turned up before the Court to explain
the facts. It was pointed out that Goyal had filed extremely large number of cases in the
Supreme Court but never appeared in the Court. In view of the refusal of the AOR to come to
the Court, the Court dismissed the application and issued a show cause notice to Goyal, as to
why his name should not be removed from the register of Advocates. On-Record. In response
to the same, Goyal had filed his reply tendering an absolute and unconditional apology and
gave an undertaking that he would not repeat such a mistake again in future. He had also
given many reasons for not appearing in the Court but none of them had impressed the Court.
- Whether in cases, the non-appearance of AOR in the court will tantamount to contempt of
the court.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. Order IV, Supreme Court Rules, 1966- Registration as Advocate on Record
22
ANALYSIS
An advocate being an officer of the court has a duty to ensure smooth functioning of the
Court. He has to revive the person in distress and cannot exploit the helplessness of innocent
litigants. If the AOR does not discharge his responsibility in a responsible manner because he
does not appear whenever the matter is listed or does not take any interest in conducting the
case, it would amount to not playing any role whatsoever. In such a fact-situation, lending
signatures for consideration would amount to misconduct of his duty towards court. In case
the AOR is only lending his signatures without taking any responsibility for conduct of a
case, the very purpose of having the institution of AORs stands defeated.
This Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. U.O.I. & Anr.,10 observed: “In a case of
contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate on-
Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw
his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by this
Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it…”
Thus, it is evident that this Court is competent to proceed against an AOR suo motu, without
any complaint from any person, if prima facie it is of the opinion that an AOR is guilty of
misconduct or of conduct unbecoming of an AOR. In fact, Supreme Court has conferred a
privilege upon the AOR to carry out certain responsibilities and failure to carry out the same
would definitely tantamount to unbecoming conduct of an AOR, if not misconduct. If a
lawyer refuses to attend the court, it is not only unprofessional but also unbecoming of a
lawyer disentitling him to continue to appear in Court.11
In Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.) ,12 this Court held that it is the duty of every
advocate who accepts a brief to attend the trial and this duty cannot be overstressed. It was
further reminded by the Court that “having accepted the brief, he will be committing a
breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend.” This Court has depreciated the
practice of name lending in Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangani & Ors. v. Ramchand Issardas
Sadarangani & Anr.,13 wherein the High Court had dealt with a case of a firm of advocates
10
Supreme Court Bar Association v. U.O.I. & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 1895
11
Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. UOI & Anr, AIR 2003 SC 739.
12
Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1984 SC 618.
13
Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangani & Ors. v. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani & Anr., AIR 1993 SC 1182.
23
merely lending its name and did not take further responsibility to plead or act. Such an
arrangement most unfortunate and contrary to the duty and obligation of a counsel towards
the clients as well as to the court.
In this case, the AOR's conduct is reprehensible and not worth pardoning, however,
considering the fact and circumstances involved herein, the Supreme Court censured his
conduct and warned him not to behave in future in such manner and to appear in court in all
the cases wherever he has entered appearance. The court will examine his conduct for one
year from now and if no improvement is found, it may initiate the proceedings again. With
these observations, the matter was closed for the time being.
CONCLUSION
The AoR in the present case has converted this noble profession into a profession of cheating.
An AoR, whom the litigant has never briefed or engaged, has lent his signature for a petty
amount with a clear understanding that he would not take any responsibility for any act in any
of the proceedings in the Registry or the court in the matter. The advocate, who has been
obliged by such an AoR, must be going inside the Registry in an unauthorised manner and
must be appearing in the court directly or engaging a senior advocate without any
knowledge/authorisation of the AoR.
An AoR is the source of lawful recognition through whom the litigant is represented and
therefore, he cannot deviate from the norms prescribed under the rules. Lawyers must
remember that they are equal partners with judges in the administration of justice. If lawyers
do not perform their function properly, it would be destructive of democracy and the rule of
law.
24
6. Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry

DECIDED ON: JULY 26, 2001
BENCH: JUSTICE K.T. THOMAS AND Y.K. SABHARWAL.
FACTS OF THE CASE
A complaint was filed by appellant against respondent. An advocate of the Bar Council of
Rajasthan was referred to the disciplinary committee of Bar Council of Rajasthan. The
complaint was that the respondent while appearing as a council in a suit pending in a civil
court wrote a letter to Mahant Rajgiri (his client) and stated that another client told him that
the concerned judge accepts bribe and he has obtained several favourable orders in his favour
and for that reason he (the client) should send him a sum of ₹10,000, so through that, the suit
got decided in favour of Mahant Rajgiri. The State Bar Council noticed that the respondent
admitted to the contents of letter as true and come to a conclusion that his acts amounted to
professional misconduct. The Court held him guilty of professional misconduct under section
35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. He was also been suspended from his practice for a period of
2 years. This order was challenged, but the disclosure of Bar Council of India enhanced the
punishment and directed that the name of the respondent must be stacked off from the role of
advocates and thus debar him permanently from practice.
- Whether bribing the judge is considered as a professional misconduct under section 35 of

the Advocates Act, 1961.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. The Advocates Act, 1961

a. Section 35- Punishment of advocates for misconduct.
25
b. Section 44- Review of orders by disciplinary committee.
ANALYSIS
Legal Profession is not a trade or business, Members belonging to this profession have to
strive to secure justice to their clients and not propagate dishonesty and corruption. The
members who don’t follow the conduct of the profession are charged with heavy
responsibility under Advocates Act, 1961 and to take disciplinary action when the credibility
and reputation of the profession comes under a clout on account of acts of omission and
commission by any member of the profession. In this case, the appellant filed a complaint
against the respondent before Bar Council of Rajasthan was referred to Disciplinary
Committee constituted by the State Bar Council.
In this case, the respondent advised his client to bribe the judge to get an order in favour of
him. The respondent did not dispute the letter but the respondent stated that he did to protect
his client’s interest and also added that he did not get money from his client. The State bar
Council noticing that the respondent had admitted the contents of the letter came to the
conclusion that it constitutes misconduct. Holding respondent guilty of misconduct under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, State Bar Council suspended him from practice for a period
of two years with effect from 15th June, 1997. The respondent further challenged the order
before the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India. The Disciplinary committee of
India enhanced the punishment and directed that the name of the respondent should be struck
off from the roll of advocates and debarring from practicing his profession, on the order dated
on 31.07.1999.
Further to this order, the respondent filed a review petition under Section 44 of the Advocates
Act, the review petition was allowed. The Court in the review petition suggested in
modifying the order to an extent that suspension for life to be revoked and he is only
reprimanded. But the Court during the review knew that the exercise of power of review does
not empower a Disciplinary Committee to modify the earlier order passed by another
Disciplinary Committee taking a different view of the same set of facts. Additionally, the
court stated that Members of the legal profession are officers of the court. Besides courts,
they also owe a duty to the society which has a vital public interest in the due administration
of justice.
26
The said public interest is required to be protected by those on whom the power has been
entrusted to take disciplinary action. It is evident that the Bar Council considered that a high
standard of morality is required from lawyers more so from a person who has put in 50 years
in profession. One expects from such a person a very high standard of morality and
unimpeachable sense of legal and ethical propriety. Since the Bar Councils under the
Advocates Act have been entrusted with the duty of guarding the professional ethics, they
have to be more sensitive to the potential disrepute on account of action of a few black ships
which may shake the credibility of the profession and thereby put at stake other members of
the bar.
CONCLUSION
In the present case, it was found that the respondent was guilty of his acts. Since the Bar
Councils under the Advocates Act have been entrusted with the duty of guarding the
professional ethics, they have to be more sensitive to the potential disrepute on account of
action of a few black sheep which may shake the credibility of the profession and thereby put
at stake other members of the bar. Under these circumstances, the court had no hesitation in
setting aside the impugned order dated 4th June, 2000 and restoring the original order of Bar
Council of India dated 31st July, 1999.
27
7. Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar

DECIDED ON: JANUARY 28, 2014
BENCH: JUSTICE B.S CHAUHAN, J. CHELAMESHWAR
AND MY EQBAL.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner filed a special leave petition against judgment of the magistrate regarding
fraud and bouncing of post-dated salary cheques. Without giving them sufficient time to file a
reply, the Petitioner filed a complaint before the Magistrate at Danapur, Patna under
provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as IPC) and Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as NI Act). The private respondent challenged
the said order by filing the petition before the High Court which concluded that there was
nothing on record to show that the notice had ever been served upon the private respondent
and ultimately allowed the said petition on the ground that it was a case of civil nature as it
was a matter of recovery of salary. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court making
the averment in the petition that accused persons had been running a fake institution and
offered the appointment to the petitioner on certain terms and in spite of working therein, he
was not paid the salary. Hence, this petition.
- Whether an Advocate-on-Record can refuse to attend Court proceedings of his case and
send a proxy on his behalf.
- Whether petitioner can ask court to ignore certain pleadings deemed irrelevant to the case.
28
RULE APPLICABLE
i. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

a. Section 3- Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt.
ii. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

a. Section 165- Judge’s power to put questions or order production.
ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the Advocate on Record to appear for the case brought in a proxy counsel
without notifying the Bench of even the name of such proxy counsel. On insistence by the
Court of the presence of the AOR Manu Shanker Mishra after his absence in the first round
of hearing, the AOR refused to come to the court in the second round of hearing. The
Supreme Court was miffed by the conduct of the AOR, as this Court in an earlier judgment in
In Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,14 held that in case the AOR does not appear in the court,
his conduct may tantamount to criminal contempt of Court. The Supreme Court opined that
no lawyer as proxy counsel must be allowed to abuse and misuse the process of the Court
creating an impression that he is allowed to waste public time without having any authority to
appear in court from either side.
On issuance of notice to the Petitioner to show cause of reason of the petitioner to join and
continue working in the institution as mentioned in the impugned judgment to which the
petitioner submitted that such pleadings be ignored and may not be taken into account for the
purpose of disposal of the instant petition. The Court disallowed a party from making a
pleading in a petition and then submit to the court to ignore it as such an issue had no bearing
on the merits of the case. Pleadings have to be true to the knowledge of the parties and in case
a person takes such misleading pleadings, he can be refused not only any kind of indulgence
by the court but can also be tried for perjury. More so, whether such a pleading is relevant or
not is a matter to be decided by the court and under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act,
14
In Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, (2014) 1 SCC 572.
29
1872, court has a right to ask the party even relevant or irrelevant questions and the parties or
their counsel cannot raise any objection to any such question.
CONCLUSION
Being an Advocate-on-Record is an honourable task, and comes with allied duties and
conduct that befits the conduct of such a position. The practice of sending a proxy on behalf
of an advocate is pretty common, but doing so in the apex court with complete disregard of
court procedure and the essence of law itself is downright contemptuous. Refusing to appear
in Court and sending proxies without notifying the bench of any relevant particulars is
detrimental to the process of law as well as to the trust people have towards the judiciary. The
judiciary owes a duty to the people, and the AOR must also work in keeping that duty
pervasive. The Court did not file contempt charges against the AOR for his disregard of the
Court and court procedures, but merely took serious note of the conduct and warned him to
behave in an appropriate manner, declaring that his conduct will be under close watch. While
the case dealt with issues of fraud and/or civil money dispute, the Court delved into the
ethical practices of lawyers. Furthermore, the Courts observation on the petitioner’s action by
asking the highest court of the Country to ignore a pleading he had plead is in complete
disregard of the process of law and is close to making a mockery of the apex court.
30
8. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India

DECIDED ON: December 17, 2002
BENCH: JUSTICE CJI DORAISWAMY RAJU, S.N
VAREVA AND DM DHARMADHIKARI
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Officiating Secretary, Bar Council of India, Mr. C. R. Balaram filed an affidavit on
behalf of the Bar Council of India wherein he states that a 'National Conference' of members
of the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils was held on 10th and 11th September,
1994 and a working paper was circulated on behalf of the Bar Council of India by Mr. V. C.
Misra, Chairman, Bar Council of India, inter alia on the question of strike by lawyers. In that
working paper a note was taken that Bar Association had proceeded on strike on several
occasions in the past, at times, State-wide or Nationwide, and while the profession does not
like it as members of the profession are themselves the losers in the process and while it is
not necessary to sit in judgment over the wider question whether members of the profession
can at all go on strike or boycott of courts, it was felt that even if it is assumed that such a
right ensures to the members of the profession, the circumstances in which such a steps
should be restored should be clearly indicated.
-Whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycotts of Court/s.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. The Constitution of India

a. Article 145- Rules of procedure made by SC
31
ii. The Advocates Act, 1961
a. Section 7- Functions of Bar Council of India.
b. Section 30- Right of advocates to practise.
c. Section 34- Power of High Courts to make rules.
d. Section 38- Appeal to SC.
e. Section 49- General Power of Bar Council of India to make rules.
ANALYSIS
The petitioners submitted that strike as a mean for collective bargaining is recognised only in
industrial disputes. He submitted that lawyers who are officers of the Court cannot use strikes
as a means to blackmail the Courts or the clients. He submitted that the Courts must take
action against the Committee members for giving such calls on the basis that they have
committed contempt of court. He submitted that the law is that a lawyer who has accepted a
Vakalat on behalf of a client must attend Court and if he does not attend Court it would
amount to professional misconduct and also contempt of court. The Respondent submitted
that lawyers had a right to go on strike or give a call for boycott. He further submitted that
there are many occasions when lawyers require going on strike or gave a call for boycott. He
submitted that this Court laying down that going on strike amounts to misconduct is of no
consequence as the Bar Councils have been vested with the power to decide whether or not
an Advocate has committed misconduct.
It was held that it is the duty of every advocate who accepts a brief in a criminal case to
attend the trial day to day. It was held that a lawyer would be committing breach of
professional duties if he fails to so attend. This Court in K. John Koshy and Ors. v. Dr.
Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw15 held that the Court could not refuse to hear the matter as
otherwise it would tantamount to Court becoming a privy to the strike. Since the duty of a
lawyer is to assist the court in the administration of justice, the practice of law has a public
utility flavour and, therefore, an advocate must strictly and scrupulously abide by the Code of
Conduct beholding the noble profession and must not indulge in any activity which may tend
to lower the image of the profession in society. In conclusion it is held that lawyers have no
15
K. John Koshy and Ors. v. Dr. Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw, (1998) 8 SCC 624.
32
right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a token strike. The protest, if any is
required, can only be by giving press statements, TV interviews, carrying out of Court
premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour arm bands, peaceful
protest marches outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc.
All lawyers must boldly refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be
visited with any adverse consequences by the Association or the Council and no threat or
coercion of any nature including that of expulsion can be held out. It is held that no Bar
Council or Bar Association can permit calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a call
for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for such meeting must be ignored. It is held that
only in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar
and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention
from work for not more than one day.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those
who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had
by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional
has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the
Court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do,
affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the
civilised society.
33
9. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP

DECIDED ON: JULY 5 , 2016
BENCH: JUSTICE R. DAVE, KURIAN JOSEPH AND
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL.
FACTS OF THE CASE
An appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the
judgment and order delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the
High Court found the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt for intimidating and threatening
a Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two
months with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- The High Court further directed the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh to consider the facts contained in the complaint of the Civil Judge (Senior Division)
Etah, and to initiate appropriate proceedings against the appellant for professional
misconduct. The appeal was admitted by Supreme Court and the part of the impugned
judgment, which imposed the sentence, was stayed and the appellant was directed not to enter
the Court premises at Etah. Notice was issued to the Supreme Court Bar Association, Bar
Council of India and to the Attorney General.
- Court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory power of Bar Council on conviction of an advocate

for criminal contempt and his right to practice.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. Constitution of India
a. Article 129- Power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt
34
ii. Advocates Act 1961
a. Section 24A- Disqualification for enrolment
b. Section 38- Appeal to the Supreme Court
ANALYSIS
In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India,16 the court while examining its powers
under Article 129 of the Constitution with regard to awarding sentence of imprisonment
together with suspension of his practice as an Advocate held that while in exercise of
contempt jurisdiction, this Court cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary committee of
the Bar Council and it is for the Bar Council to punish the advocate by debarring him from
practice or suspending his license. It was further held that this court or the High Court can
prevent the contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts till he purges himself
of the contempt which is different from suspending or revoking the license or debarring him
to practice. Debarring a person from appearing in Court is within the purview of the
jurisdiction of the Court and is different from suspending or terminating the license which
could be done by the Bar Council. 17 Moreover, the Rule for barring a lawyer from appearing
in any court till he got himself purged of contempt by an appropriate order of the court does
not violate Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution nor amounts to usurpation of power
of adjudication and punishment conferred on the Bar Councils.18
In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court ,19 with reference to Section 34 of the
Advocates Act, it was held that the court has a right to bar the advocate concerned from
appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time. Regulation of right of
appearance in courts is within the jurisdiction of the courts. 20 In the present case, inspite of
direction of the High Court as long back as more than ten years, no action was taken by the
Bar Council. In view of such failure of the statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State
of Uttar Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has to exercise appellate
jurisdiction under the Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary
16
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409.
17
Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650.
18
Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, 2004) 6 SCC 311.
19
R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106
20
Ex-Captain Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45.
35
action. In Supreme Court Bar Association, it was held that where the Bar Council fails to take
action inspite of reference made to it, this Court can invoke its appellate power under Section
38 of the Advocates Act and exercise suo motu powers for punishing the contemnor for
professional misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court disposed of this appeal and upheld the conviction and the direction by the
Allahabad High Court that the advocate shall not be permitted to appear in courts in District
Etah until he purges himself of contempt. The Court also held Section 24A of the Advocates
Act applies to an advocate also and under this the enrolment of the contemnor Advocate will
stand suspended for two years. The Court also said that, as a disciplinary measure for proved
misconduct, the licence of the contemnor will remain suspended for further five years. The
Court has however set aside the imprisonment imposed on the Advocate. Supreme Court also
observed that there is an urgent need to review the provisions of the Advocates Act dealing
with regulatory mechanism for the legal profession. It has requested the Law commission and
Government of India to take appropriate steps in this regard.
In view of above the Law Commission of India had undertaken a study and requested the Bar
Council of India and all State Bar Councils, Bar Association of the Supreme Court and
Advocates on Records Association of Supreme Court, Advocates Associations’ in the High
Courts and their respective Benches to send their comments. Law Commission through its
Report No 266 titled “The Advocates Act 1961 (Regulation of Legal Profession)”, dated
March, 2017 has recommended that comprehensive amendment should be brought forth in
the Advocates Act, not only keeping in view the present requirements, but such other
requirements that may arise in future for the better management and regulation of the legal
profession. The Law Commission has also recommended Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 2017
which has been placed for consideration of the Central Government.
36
10. Noratanmal Chouraria v. M R Murli & Anr.

DECIDED ON: APRIL 16 , 2004
BENCH: JUSTICE S.B. SINHA AND S.H. KAPADIA.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The relationship between the appellant and respondent is that of landlord and tenant. A rent
control proceeding was initiated by the Respondents against the Appellant. During the
pendency of the proceeding before the Small causes Court, the Appellant alleged misconduct
(battery) by the Respondent during three occasions dated 8.10.1993, 26.10.1993 and
1.03.1995. The appellant filed a complaint before the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu to initiate
proceedings against the respondent which was later transferred to the Bar Council of India.
The said committee was prima facie of the view that the factum of occurrence of the said
incidents were not reliable and moreover the first respondent appeared in the rent control
proceeding not in the capacity of an advocate but as a litigant. Hence the present Appeal.
- Whether the acts of the Respondent constitute professional or other misconduct.
RULE APPLICABLE
i. The Advocates Act, 1961

a. Section 25- Authority to whom applications for enrolment may be made.
ANALYSIS
The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India observed that the factum of
occurrence of the said incidents are not reliable as the acts of omission and commission on
37
the part of the respondents, no criminal proceeding was initiated by filing a complaint
petition by the appellant. No charge-sheet had also been filed by the police in relation to the
occurrence dated 26.10.1993 where for an FIR had been lodged. It was further accepted that
the first respondent had not been appearing in the aforementioned rent control proceedings as
an advocate but as a party in person. Having regard to the fact that till the date of passing of
the impugned order neither the appellant herein produced any document to substantiate any
follow up action on his part in respect of complaint filed by him before the police authority,
nor did he file any private complaint. Based on the above observations, the Committee held
that there was no prima facie evidence to incriminate the respondent for misconduct.
The Counsel for the Appellant argued that under Section 35 of the Advocate’s Act, 1961,
proceedings can be initiated for committing any misconduct which is not only confined to
professional misconduct and referred to various cases with respect to the same. However, the
Respondent argued that the allegations made by the Appellant were false and the appellant
was harassing the Respondent by filling false cases. The Court in the present case held that
misconduct under section 35 of the Advocate’s Act, 1961 envisages breach of discipline
although it would not be possible to lay down exhaustively as to what would constitute
misconduct and indiscipline, thereby giving a wide scope to the meaning of misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The Court attempted to provide a definition for misconduct in the present case. However, the
court did not delve into the question of whether the acts of the respondent constitute
misconduct. It merely decided this case on facts and did not find it relevant to go into the
merits to examine whether the conduct for the respondent was misconduct.
38
COMPOTENT II- ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS
Problem – I
IN THE BOOKS OF SINHA ENTERPRISES
JOURNAL ENTRIES FOR THE PERIOD
1ST APRIL 2025 TO 31ST MARCH 2026
Sr. No. Particulars LF Debit Credit
01.04. Cash/BankA/c Dr. 1,00,000

2025 To Capital A/c
1,00,000
(Being owner started business)
2. Furniture A/c Dr. 7,000
To Cash A/c 7,000
(Being purchased furniture for cash)
3. Purchases A/c Dr. 3,000
To Cash A/c 2,000
To SLS Retail A/c 1,000
(Being purchased goods for cash and credit from SLS
Retail)
4. Law Bros A/c Dr. 12,000
Cash A/c 5,000
17,000
To Sales A/c
(Being sold goods to Law Bros)
5. Drawings A/c Dr. 2,000
To Cash/ Bank A/c 2,000
(Being withdrew money for personal use)
6. SLS Retail A/c Dr. 500
To Cash/Bank A/c 500
(Being made payment to SLS Retail)
7. Cash/ Bank A/c Dr. 10,000
To Law Bros A/c 10,000
(Being amount received from Law Bros)
39
8. Salaries A/c Dr. 2,000
To Cash/ Bank A/c 2,000
(Being salary paid)
Total: 1,41, 500 1,41, 500
40
PROBLEM – II
IN THE BOOKS EMRAN ENTERPRISES

JOURNAL ENTRIES FOR THE PERIOD
1ST APRIL 2025 TO 31ST MARCH 2026
Sr. No. Particulars LF Debit Credit
1. Cash A/c Dr. 57,500

Photography Equipment A/c 32,500
90,000
To Capital A/c
(Being owner invested cash and equipment in business)
2. Insurance Premium A/c Dr. 1500
Prepaid Insurance A/c Dr. 1500
To Cash A/c 3,000
(Being insurance premium paid)
3. Debtors A/c Dr. 10,000
To Photographic Services A/c 10,000
(Being services rendered to client for Rs. 10,000)
4. Office Supplies A/c Dr. 1400
To Cash A/c 400
To Outstanding Expenses A/c 1000
(Being Office supplies purchased)
5. Cash A/c Dr. 2,000
To Debtors A/c 2,000
(Being cash received for photography fees)
6. Cash A/c Dr. 15,000
To Unearned Photographic Services A/c 15,000
(Being customer paid in advance for future services)
7. Photography Equipment A/c Dr. 1,00,000
To Cash A/c 25,000
To Bills Payable A/c 75,000
(Being photography equipment purchased)
Total: 2,21,400 2,21,400
41
COMPOTENT III- CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
AND RESEARCH ARTICLE
Question 1: Critically Analyze the Indian Legal Profession in the age of globalization
vis-à-vis the Advocates Act including the probable pros and cons of the entry of Foreign
Law Firms in India. substantiate your opinion with case laws, legislations and best
practices across the globe.
INTRODUCTION
Globalization has impacted the noble profession of law by allowing professionals form the
around the world to contact with each other and increase the horizon of their knowledge
substantially. It has increased the velocity and the complexity of the legal profession.21
The last decade has been a mini-revolution in legal service sector with the best legal impact
on corporate legal arena. Activities in project financing, intellectual property protection,
environmental protection, competition law, corporate taxation, infrastructure contract,
corporate governance and investment law were practically obscure before the 90's. The
number of law firms capable of managing such work was also very limited. Even though
globalization is not new, but in the purview of legal services, it is now gaining momentum
due to the growth of the Internet, automation of legal processes, developments in data
security and emerging technology tools. It is clear that need of professional service has been
tremendous in the legal service sector.22
In recent years the number of law firms, in-house firms and individual lawyers with expertise
in providing legal services in corporate field has increased exponentially. These are defining
times in the disposition of emerging legal sectors towards settling disputes through ADR.
Globalization has extended the inward and outward demand for legal services. Domestic law
firms are expanding their services beyond local jurisdiction; joining forces with foreign
counterparts and forming intercontinental mergers, obliterating traditional boundaries on the
21
Harsiman Singh, Globalization of Legal Services: An Indian Perspective, Singh & Associates (November 20,
22:30), https://www.mondaq.com/india/management/696680/globalisation-of-legal-services-and-indian-
perspective.
22
Akansha Negi, Effects of Globalization on Legal Profession in India, Legal Service India (November 20,
22:30), https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4503-effects-of-globalization-on-legal-profession-in-
india.html.
42
geographical scope of the practice of law. As law firms continue to expand their presence
globally, globalization will continue to reshape the landscape of the legal industry in the
coming years.
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INDIAN LAWYERS
India has been putting efforts to liberalize its legal services sector, to allow foreign law firms
and lawyers, the right to operate in India. Global integration in the legal profession would
help India in increasing her share in the global services trade.
One of the best revolutions brought by globalization was that finally foreign inventors and
companies were allowed to export their state-of-the-art technology to India. Advancement in
technology made it possible for countries around the world to connect with each other in a
swift manner which in turn let our legal professionals to communicate with professionals
from outside India. Earlier it was telephones, telegraphs, fax, pager etc. that were used by our
esteemed professionals to communicate with professionals from outside India but now the
internet is used to communicate. This allowed domestic law firms to partner up with foreign
firms on certain cases and also provided an opportunity to sole practitioners to connect and
work with firms outside the domain of India.23
Young law graduates also benefited from this as from the start of their career’s they had the
golden opportunity of training themselves to work both onshore and offshore projects with a
clientele available to them from all around the world. 24 Changes brought forward by
Globalization gradually changed the dynamic of the composition of graduates seeking jobs in
the corporate sector more than entering the litigation field, due the vastly prevalent but some-
what wrong belief that there is more of an opportunity to grow as a professional in cooperate
sector as compared to a career in litigation due to the impact globalization had on that sector.
Litigation is lagging behind in the race because still the Indian courts and the law makers are
not allowing foreign litigators to work in Indian courts in full capacity.25
23
Legal Profession in India: Retrospect and Prospect, Indian Bar Review, September 2001, Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 2
& 3.
24
Disciplining the Lawyers: Law and Professional Ethics, Cochin University Law Review, 2003, pp. 153-223.
25
A Sketch of the Development of Legal Profession in India, Indian Bar Review, 1986, Vo. 13, Nos. 3 & 4, pp.
353-373.
43
PROVISIONS OF THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
Section 7(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 26 lays down the principle of reciprocity, which
means that a national of another country may be admitted as an advocate in India if Indians
nationals are allowed in the other country. However, the Act prohibits foreign nationals from
practicing the legal profession in India.
Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 lists the conditions for enrolment of advocates to their
respective State Bar Councils. Indian citizenship, inter-alia, is one of the conditions for the
enrolment. The proviso to sub-section (1), however, allows foreign nationals to enrol in India,
subject to reciprocity in their home country.27
The reciprocity provisions of Section 47 empower the BCI to prescribe conditions, subject to
which non-Indian citizens with foreign law degrees may enrol as advocates in India. It also
attempts to protect Indian citizens from unfair discrimination in foreign countries. Section 47
(1) prohibits foreign nationals from practicing law in India if there is no reciprocal
arrangement in their home country.28
Section 49 empowers the BCI to make rules for enrolment of non-Indian citizens with a
foreign law degree.29
FREEDOM OF ENTRY TO FOREIGN FIRMS: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION-
 Lawyers Collective v. Bar Council of India30 (1995)
The main issue in the Bombay HC Judgment was whether foreign law firms could open
liaison offices in India in non-litigious matters without being registered as lawyers under the
Act.
The Bombay High Court held that the term "to practice profession of law" used in Section 29
of the Act is sufficiently broad to include both litigious and non-litigious practice. As a result,
international lawyers and law firms are obliged to comply with the law. India's Reserve Bank
was not justified in granting permission to open liaison offices in India to foreign law firms.
26
Section 7, The Advocates Act, 1961, Act No. 25 of 1961.
27
28
29
30
Lawyers Collective v Bar Council of India, WP No 1526/1995.
44
 A.K Balaji v. Government of India: Madras High Court31 (2012)
The main issue posed in the Madras HC Judgment was whether foreign lawyers and law
firms were able to practice law in India in the case of litigation and trade.
The Madras High Court held that There was no bar on foreign lawyers and law firms to
participate in international commercial arbitration in India. It was observed that foreign
contracting parties are entitled to lawyers from their own country. Foreign lawyers and law
firms can fly in and fly out of India for advising their clients in India on foreign law and there
is no bar on the same.
 Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji (2018)32
On the issue whether there is a bar on foreign lawyers and law firms to visit India on a fly in
and fly out basis for giving legal advice regarding foreign law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held a casual or temporary visit for giving advice will not be covered under practice and the
same is permissible.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that foreign law firms/lawyers cannot practice
profession of law in India either in the litigation or non-litigation side, without compliance of
relevant provisions of the Act and concerned Rules and Regulations. This implies that the
foreign law firms/lawyers cannot be allowed to set up permanent set ups or liaison offices in
India and can only visit India on temporary or casual visits which have been held to be not
amounting to practice.
REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS IN INDIA RULES, 2016
The draft rules relating to registration and management of foreign lawyers in India include
the following provisions:
 Foreign law firms and lawyers are allowed to set up an office in India, on a condition that
they register with BCI for an initial period of 5 years and practice only non-Indian law.
 Foreign lawyers would be considered as Indian lawyers under Section 29, 30, and 33 of
the Advocates Act.
 Foreign lawyers are barred from appearing before Indian courts and tribunals, and cannot
provide legal advice relating to any case filed before them.
31
A.K Balaji V Government of India, AIR 2012 Mad 124
32
Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 214.
45
 Foreign lawyers are allowed to hire Indian lawyers or form a partnership with them.
 A registration fee of $25,000 for individuals and $50,000 for partnership firms are
required to be paid
 Individuals are required to pay a renewal fee of $10,000 and partnership firms have to pay
$20,000.
 Foreign lawyers are allowed to participate in international arbitration in India.
 Foreign lawyers are required to pay a security deposit to practice in India. This amount is
refundable
 Foreign lawyers are only registered on a reciprocal basis.
 The ethics and code of conduct applicable to Indian lawyers are also applicable to foreign
lawyers.
 Some cases related to the influx of foreign law firms in India.
PROS OF THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN LAW FIRMS IN INDIA:
 Transfer of Knowledge
Entry of foreign players into India would allow exchange of knowledge, expertise, and skill
between Indian and foreign firms. This will facilitate enrichment and transfer of resources at
a mutual level.
 Global Opportunities for Indian Lawyers
Allowing foreign law firms in India on reciprocal basis will provide Indian lawyers the
opportunity to practice abroad. The result will be a wider net of opportunity to provide
services to leading companies, locally as well as globally.
Indian firms will be able to widen the net of their practice by providing advice on
transnational transactions involving Indian companies.
 Infrastructural Development at Institutional Level
46
This kind of development is necessary at both academic and practical training level. Entry of
foreign law firms will raise the bar of present legal education. The focus will shift from
academic cramming to instilling practical knowledge and training in students.33
 Job Creation
If foreign law firms set up shop in India, they will need manpower in the form of lawyers
who are well versed with the local law. Indian attorneys who know the local working
conditions first-hand fit the bill perfectly. Even if a small percentage of the total workforce
consists of foreign lawyers, it is still a huge job creation opportunity for the Indian legal
service sector.
The Indian legal fraternity stands to gain from this move and not lose out. Graduates fresh out
of law school will be able to find lucrative opportunities in their home country, but with
international exposure.
 Improved Quality of Service
The competition that emerges at an international level will help improve the present quality
of legal service. Service that conforms to international standards will eventually lead to
superior quality of service being offered at competitive prices. This will prove to be a
substantial relief for a client who have to shell out significant sums of money to avail quality
legal service.
CONS OF THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN LAW FIRMS IN INDIA:
 Loss of opportunities for local law firms and Indian attorneys is the primary concern at
this moment. Just as the entry of retail giants like Amazon has hit small time retailers and
dealers in India, this move is being perceived in a similar vein.
 Another concern is the considerable gap in legal training and education in India when
compared to its foreign counterparts. This raises serious questions about the
employability of fresh graduates and young legal professionals.
 Stringent immigration laws and astronomical tuition and bar exam fee is another area of
concern for those wanting to equip themselves with a foreign law degree.34
33
Pragya Chaturvedi, Foreign Law Firms in India: Why it isn’t a bad thing, Bar and Bench (November 20,
22:30), https://www.barandbench.com/columns/foreign-law-firms-india-not-bad-thing.
34
Vidushi Gupta, Entry Of Foreign Law Firms ? A Boon Or A Bane For Indian Lawyers, Manupatra Articles,
(November 20, 22:30), https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/Entry-Of-Foreign-Law-Firms-A-Boon-Or-
A-Bane-For-Indian-Lawyers.
47
CONCLUSION:
With the introduction of globalization in the economy legal profession and all around
development of the economy goes hand in hand. Globalization has opened doors of
opportunities to the people who excel in various fields and our legal profession is one of
those. The advocates and the legal practitioners have become more socially and technically
sound to cater to the needs and demands of the 21st century.
Globalization of the legal profession has led to many world-wide changes in the economy. It
has fostered the growth and development of legal outsourcing with has impacted and boosted
our economy in many ways. It has given in-house attorneys an opportunity to collaborate
with international firms and gain a world-wide acclamation. Advocates not only help us to
settle our dispute inside the courtroom but have also helped in the settlement of dispute
outside the court by the processes of arbitration, conciliation and mediation, which is
economical and, thus, helps to avoid the long court proceedings that is carried on for years
and years.35
Lastly, globalization of the legal profession has taken our country and our economy at a
global level and gained a world-wide acclamation. It has helped advocates to present
nationally and internationally abiding by the rules of the native as well as the foreign
countries.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASE LAWS AND LEGISLATIONS-
35
Pallavi Nayyar, Impact of Globalization on Legal Profession, Legal Desire International Journal on Law Vol.
8 Ed. 26, pp 1- 12.
48
 Section 7, The Advocates Act, 1961.
 Lawyers Collective v Bar Council of India, WP No 1526/1995.
 A.K Balaji V Government of India, AIR 2012 Mad 124.
 Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 214.
 Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar Etc, 1975 AIR 2092
 Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. State of U.P. & Anr, 1973 AIR 231.
 Bhatraju Nageswara Rao v. Hon'ble Judges of the Madras High Court, AIR 1955 SC 223.
 Biji v. Registrar, High Court of Kerala, 2001 (3) KLT 99.
 C. Dinakar v. Karnataka State Bar Council, AIR 2006 Kant 252.
BLOGS AND JOURNAL ARTICLES-

 Harsiman Singh, Globalization of Legal Services: An Indian Perspective, Singh &
Associates (November 20, 22:30),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/management/696680/globalisation-of-legal-services-and-
indian-perspective.
 Akansha Negi, Effects of Globalization on Legal Profession in India, Legal Service India
(November 20, 22:30), https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4503-effects-of-
globalization-on-legal-profession-in-india.html.
 Pragya Chaturvedi, Foreign Law Firms in India: Why it isn’t a bad thing, Bar and Bench
(November 20, 22:30), https://www.barandbench.com/columns/foreign-law-firms-india-
not-bad-thing.
 Vidushi Gupta, Entry Of Foreign Law Firms ? A Boon Or A Bane For Indian Lawyers,
Manupatra Articles, (November 20, 22:30), https://articles.manupatra.com/article-
details/Entry-Of-Foreign-Law-Firms-A-Boon-Or-A-Bane-For-Indian-Lawyers.
 Pallavi Nayyar, Impact of Globalization on Legal Profession, Legal Desire International
Journal on Law Vol. 8 Ed. 26, pp 1- 12.
 Legal Profession in India: Retrospect and Prospect, Indian Bar Review, September 2001,
Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 2 & 3.
 Disciplining the Lawyers: Law and Professional Ethics, Cochin University Law Review,
2003, pp. 153-223.
49
 A Sketch of the Development of Legal Profession in India, Indian Bar Review, 1986, Vo.
13, Nos. 3 & 4, pp. 353-373.
BOOKS-
 B. K. Goswami, Legal Profession and its Ethics (1995)
 J. S. Gandhi, Sociology of Legal Profession, Law and Legal System: The Indian Setting
(1987)
 K. Gururaja Chari, Advocacy & Professional Ethics (2013)
 K. L. Sharma, Sociology of Law and Legal Profession (A Study of Relations between
Lawyers and their Clients) (1984)
 P. Ramanatha Aiyer, Legal & Professional Ethics (2003), Vol. 3
 Q. B. Reddy, Practical Advocacy of Law (2002)
 Raju Ramchandran, Professional Ethics for Lawyers: Changing Profession, Changing
Ethics (2014)
Question 2: Prepare a research article on the contemporary development of the law

relating to contempt as under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the law pertaining
50
to contempt in foreign jurisdictions (US, UK etc). Analyse the provisions in light of
recent landmark judgments.
INTRODUCTION
According to the Oxford Dictionary, contempt is the state of being despised, dishonoured or
disgrace. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, it is the act of demeaning the court,
preventing justice administration, or disobeying a sentence of the court. Contempt cannot be
confine to four walls of a definition. Therefore, what would offend the court’s dignity and
what would lower the court’s prestige is thus a matter which can be decided by the court
itself and it’s for the court to deal with each case of contempt under the facts and
circumstances of that case. The Indian legislature does not provide with a concrete definition
of contempt, however Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [the “Act”] states
that ‘contempt of court means civil contempt or criminal contempt’. Section 2(b) & section
2(c) of Act defines civil and criminal contempt. It is generally felt that the existing law
relating to contempt of court is somewhat uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory. The
Constitution of India also mentions Contempt of Court and at Article 129 and Article 142(2).
The Act extends to the whole of India except the state of Jammu and Kashmir except in
certain conditions. It repeals the older Contempt of Court Act, 1952. The Act is of great
importance as it seeks to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court, ensure compliance
with the directions of Court, and preserve an effective and impartial system of justice.
SCOPE OF THE ACT
In India, contempt is classified under two major categories: Civil and Criminal contempt.
Civil Contempt
According to Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 36 civil contempt amounts to
wilful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. There are two important essentials
to constitute civil contempt.
(1) Disobedience of any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court
or an undertaking given to the court
36
Section 2(b), The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Act No. 70 of 1971.
51
There should be disobedience of a valid order to constitute contempt of court. An order
includes all kinds of judgments, orders-final, preliminary, ex-parte, contempt order.37
Disobedience of a decree, direction, writ or other process of a court, or an undertaking given
to the court, will also amount to contempt of court. It was held by the Supreme Court, in the
case of H. Puninder v. K. K. Sethi,38 that in absence of the stay order in appeal or revision of
higher court, the order appealed against should be complied with, subject to any order passed
at later stage, otherwise it is open for the contempt court to proceed further on merit of the
contempt case.
A different view was upheld by the Supreme Court in case of interim relief/stay order. The
Supreme Court, in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohammad Yakub Khan ,39
held that where stay vacation application has been promptly filed by the respondent against
whom the stay order has been passed and the same is pending for disposal the court should
not proceed in the contempt case unless and until the stay vacation application has been
decided.
Such an undertaking can be given to the court in two ways: by moving an application or
filing an affidavit clearly stating the terms of the undertaking. 40 And by giving a clear and
express oral undertaking which is incorporated by the court in the order. 41 A wilful breach of
an undertaking would amount to contempt of court.42
(2) The disobedience or breach must be wilful, deliberate and intentional
Mere disobedience or breach of the court’s order by the person is not sufficient to constitute
civil contempt.43 Such a disobedience or breach must be wilful, deliberate and intentional. In
order to exercise its power to punish the contemnor the court has to be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the contemnor has wilfully, deliberately and intentionally violated the
court’s order.44
No court including contempt court is entitled to take trivialities and technicalities into
account while finding fault with the conduct of the person against whom contempt
37
U.P. Residential Employees Co-operative, House B. Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority,
AIR 2003 SC 2723.
38
H. Puninder v. K. K. Sethi, (1998) 8 SCC 640.
39
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohammad Yakub Khan, (1992) 4 SCC 167.
40
R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171.
41
Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, 5332 (NCE) of 1993.
42
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr vs State Of Gujarat & Ors, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
43
LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagles Homes Pty Ltd, [1999] FCA 1213.
44
M/S. Gatraj Jain & Sons v. Janakiraman, Patent Appeal No.1 of 2009.
52
proceeding is taken.45 Where the order has been substantially complied with and a reasonable
explanation has been provided for the delay in compliance with the order, 46 the contempt will
not lie as the violation is not wilful and deliberate.
Criminal Contempt
According to section 2(c)47, criminal contempt means the publication of any matter or the
doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes, lowers the authority of any court,
prejudices any judicial proceeding, or obstructs the administration of justice in any other
manner. There are four important essentials to constitute criminal contempt:
(A) Publication of any matter
The word publication has been given a very wide meaning so far as contempt of court is
concerned. It includes words (spoken/written), signs and visible representation. 48 It also
includes the publication of any material in the newspaper and magazines, the broadcasting of
any material on the radio and exhibition of anything in cinemas, theatres and television. 49 If
these materials contain anything which scandalizes or lowers or tends to scandalize or lower
the authority of any court, prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial
proceeding or interferes or tends to interfere with administration of justice, it will amount to
criminal contempt of the court.
(B) Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court
Scandalizing might manifest itself in various ways but in substance, it is an attack on

individual judges in particular or the court as a whole, 50 with or without reference to a
particular case, by casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or the
ability of the judges.51 Such conduct is punished as criminal contempt for the reason that it
tends to create distrust in the minds of common people and thereby shatters confidence of the
people in the judiciary. The Supreme Court made it clear, in the case of Arundhati Roy,52 that
criticism which undermines the dignity of the court cannot be said to be fair criticism and
does not fall under the ambit of freedom of speech and expression as is guaranteed by Article
45
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr, AIR 1998 SC 1895.
46
Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516.
47
Section 2(c), The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Act No. 70 of 1971.
48
P.N. Duda vs V. P. Shiv Shankar & Others, 1988 AIR 1208.
49
R. Rajagopal vs State Of T.N, 1995 AIR 264.
50
Indirect Tax practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain, No. 9 OF 2009.
51
King v. Almon, 243 K.B. 1765.
52
In Re: Arundhati Roy AIR 2002 SC 1375.
53
19 (1)(a) of Constitution of India. Thus, prosecution of persons for scandalizing the court is
not prohibited by constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19
(1)(a).
The Supreme Court had held that writing/drafting in pleading or petition by which
defamatory allegations have been levelled against a judge in particular or court as a whole,
would amount to criminal contempt.53 In case of U.P Residential Employee Cooperative
Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority,54 it also held that filing a false
affidavit in the court with a view to mislead the court will amount to criminal contempt.
(C) Prejudice or interference with the due course of any judicial proceeding
Any publication which prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceeding
would amount to criminal contempt of court. 55 Media trial or trial by newspaper is not
considered proper because it effects the fairness of trial and is likely to cause interference
with the administration of justice.56
The knowledge of pendency of the case and reasonable grounds to believe that the case in
pending is sufficient to make out criminal contempt and the intention and motive of the
publisher behind the content of publication is not relevant for the purpose of criminal
contempt.57 If it lowers the authority of the court and causes interference with the due course
of judicial proceeding it would amount to criminal contempt.
(D) Obstruction of the administration of justice in any other manner
The publication or doing of any act which interferes or obstructs or tend to interfere and
obstruct in the administration of justice in any other manner, would amount to criminal
contempt of court.58 This clause is a residuary clause, covering those cases of criminal
contempt which are not expressly covered by section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act.
The term “administration of justice” is much wider than the term “course of judicial
proceedings”. Any conduct which tends to prevent or actually prevents a party to approach
the court, amounts to criminal contempt of court, for example, writing a threatening letter to
53
Dr. D. C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India
54
U.P Residential Cooperative Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 1990 AIR 1325.
55
Queen v. Grey, 1900 2 Q.B. 36.
56
Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941).
57
A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil NaduAIR 2011 SC 308.
58
Ravi Karan Singh, Dispensation of Justice: Role and Accountability of Judges and Advocates (2004).
54
litigating party59 or his counsel preventing him from attending the court, 60 approaching a
judge in order to influence his judicial conscience or approaching a counsel for undue
favour61 are all examples of interference with administration of justice and are contempt of
court.
It was held by the Supreme Court in case of J. R Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan,62 that
holding a dharma or resorting to strike by itself may not amount to contempt of court but if in
doing so the presiding officer of the court, its staff, the police personnel and the litigating
parties are prevented from approaching the court, it will amount to interference in the
administration of justice and will be criminal contempt of the court.
Punishment for Contempt
Section 12 of the act deals with the punishment for contempt of Court. Contempt of court
may be punished with simple imprisonment for maximum six months, or with fine up to two
thousand rupees, or with both.63 The accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded
may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. 64 Moreover, on the
side of the Court, an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or
conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.65 This only applies to criminal contempt.
Limitation Period
Section 20 deals with period of limitation for initiating contempt proceeding. 66 It provides
that no court shall initiate contempt proceedings either on its own notions or otherwise after
the expiry of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed.
The period of limitation is applicable both in civil as well as criminal contempt. Contempt
proceedings can be initiated either by filing an application or by the court itself suo moto.67 In
both the cases, contempt proceedings must be initiated within one year from the date on
which contempt is alleged to have been committed.
59
Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, AIR 2001 SC 2509.
60
Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1974.
61
K. Gururaja Chari, Advocacy & Professional Ethics (2013).
62
J. R Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan, (2001) 6 SCC 735.
63
Section 12, The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Act No. 70 of 1971.
64
Chunilal Basu & Anr. v. The Hon’Ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Calcutta, AIR 1972 Cal 470.
65
Sanjay R. Kothari & Anr. v. South Mumbai Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, AIR 2003 Bom 15.
66
Section 20, The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Act No. 70 of 1971.
67
Biji v. Registrar, High Court of Kerala, 2001 (3) KLT 99.
55
Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Act, 2006
The statute of 1971 has been amended by the Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Act, 2006 to
include the defence of truth under Section 13 of the original legislation.
Section 13 that already served to restrict the powers of the court in that they were not to hold
anyone in contempt unless it would substantially interfere with the due process of justice, the
amendment further states that the court must permit ‘justification by truth as a valid defence
if it is satisfied that it is in public interest and the request for invoking the said defence is
bona fide.’68
CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
There have been many judicial pronouncements to explore the ambit of contempt of Court. In
Paras Saklecha v. Shri Justice A.M Khanwilkar,69 a Contempt petition was filed against Chief
Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court. A petitioner in PIL had filed the application alleging
that certain words made by the Chief Justice A.M Khanwilkar while hearing the writ petition
amounts to contempt. The Division bench who heard the application came to the conclusion
that the act of CJ cannot be termed as Contempt of court.
In V Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala & Anr.,70 the apex court stated that “Judges expect,
nay invite, an informed and genuine discussion or criticism of judgments, but to incite a
relatively illiterate audiences against the Judiciary is not to be ignored. In this case Mr
Jayarajan used two Malayalam words like ‘shumbhanmar’ (idiots. Fool) and ‘pulluvila’ (of
little value) against the Judges of High Court. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
sentences him for four weeks.
In Re: KK Mishra case,71 the lawyer abused and made allegations of bribery and corruption
against Reference Officer (civil judge) and threatened him of the consequences when he
would come out the court hours.
68
Section 13, The Contempt of Court (Amendment) Act, 2006, Act No. 17 of 2006.
69
Paras Saklecha v. Shri Justice A.M Khanwilkar, (2015) 6 SCC 1673.
70
V. Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala & Anr Case, (2010) 2 SCC 455.
71
Re: KK Mishra Contempt Application (Criminal) No. 20 of 2011.
56
In GN Saibaba v. State of Maharashtra,72 the famous author Arundhati Roy in her book titles
“The Outlook” criticized of the non-granting of bail to the Professor. Justice Arun Choudhari
dismissed the bail application and also directed registration of Criminal Contempt against the
author.
In Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd73 the House of Lords rightly enumerated
threefold purposes of the law of contempt: (i) to enable the parties to litigation and the
witnesses to come before the Court without outside interference; (ii) to enable the Courts to
try cases without such interference; and (iii) to ensure that authority and administration of law
are maintained.
In Ram Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey,74 the Court held that the object of the law of
contempt is not to provide a cloak for judicial authorities to cover up their inefficiency and
corruption, or to stifle criticism made in good faith against such officers. Administration of
justice cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained.
In Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose,75 the Calcutta High Court in has explained the
difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt. The distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is of fundamental character. While criminal contempt offends the public
and consists of conduct that offends the majesty of law and undermines the dignity of the
Court, civil contempt consists in failure to obey the order, decree, direction, judgment, writ or
process issued by courts for the benefit of the opposing party.
In Sarla Devi Bharat Kumar Rungta v. Bharat Kumar Shiv Prasad Rungta,76 it was held that
civil contempt was made out and the wife cannot be forced to take recourse to execution
proceedings, if she is forced to recover the amount by taking out execution proceedings, the
recovery of the amount may take years together and also the marriage petition to proceed
further. In case the court directs to take execution proceedings, it shall result into great
hardship and the administration
72
GN Saibaba v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 566.
73
Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1974 AC 273.
74
Ram Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey, AIR 1971 All. 170.
75
Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose, ILR 41 Cal. 173.
76
Sarla Devi Bharat Kumar Rungta v. Bharat Kumar Shiv Prasad Rungta 1988 Cr. L.J. 558 (Bom.).
57
If the order passed by court is vague or ambiguous or its not specific or complete, it would be
a defence in the contempt or alleged contemnor can raise a plea in defence that the order
whose contempt is alleged cannot be complied with as the same is impossible. 77 In case of
R.N. Ramaul vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 78 the Supreme Court directed the respondent
corporation to restore the promotion of the petitioner in service from a particular date.
In case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. State of Bihar,79 the Supreme Court clarified the legal
position by holding that where the order is incomplete and ambiguous, the parties should
approach the original court and get the order clarified by getting the ambiguity removed.
If the order whose contempt is alleged involves more than one reasonable and rational
interpretation and the respondent adopts one of them and acts in accordance with one such
interpretation, he cannot be held liable for contempt of court. 80 However, this defence is
available only when a bona fide question of interpretation arises. The intention of bona fide
interpretation can be gathered from the fact that the order has been complied with by
adopting one such interpretation. In case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka81 it
was held that this defence would not be allowed if a doubt about the order has been
deliberately created when actually there is no doubt at all.
In proceedings for civil contempt, it would be a valid defence that the compliance of the
order is impossible. However, the cases of impossibility must be distinguished from the cases
of mere difficulty. In case of Amar Singh v. K.P. Geetakrishnan,82 the court granted certain
pensioner benefits to a large number of retired employees with effect from a particular back
date. The plea of impossibility was taken on the ground that the implementation of the order
would result in heavy financial burden on the exchequer. However, the plea of impossibility
was rejected by the court as it may be difficult to comply with the order but not impossible
and therefore, it should be complied with.
UNITED KINGDOM PERSPECTIVE
77
Johnson v. Grant, (1923) SC 790.
78
R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171.
79
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1990 SCC (4) 55.
80
Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 287; K. Mony and K. Usha, Legal Drafting
Conveyancing Professional Ethics and Advocacy (2001).
81
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
82
Amar Singh v. K.P. Geetakrishnan, (2011) 3. SCC 363
58
The origin of contempt by scandalizing the court can be traced back to 1765. The case of
King v. Almon83, in which the Almon faced judicial trial against him for libel against a judge.
Justice Wilmort, in this case, gives special punishment to Almon for libel and from here the
scandalizing a court became a form of Contempt of Court. Around a hundred years later the
above case, Lord Morris in the case McLeod v. St. Aubin84 made a very wonderful statement
that for contempt by scandalizing has become outdated and in place of that the court should
leave on the public opinion whether the attacks or contempt that are derogatory or scandalous
to the Judiciary or not. However, within a year, his words about the contempt by scandalizing
being old or outdated and this has proved false in another case of Queen v. Grey. 85 In this
case, it has been conceded by the court that the judiciary is still open to criticism by the
media, but it should qualify the statement “ reasonable arguments or expostulation” must be
offered to treat a statement as a contempt.
Thereafter, the offence of scandalising the courts was abolished in 2013 after a Law
Commission report. In the famous Spycatcher case, an English newspaper published a
caricature of three judges and captioned it, “ You Old Fools”. Lord Templeman denied
initiation of contempt proceedings and wittingly replied that he was indeed an old man but
whether he was a fool was a matter of public perception, although he did not think so.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PERSPECTIVE
In the initial stages, USA considered the offence of contempt by scandalizing to be too
extreme. Every criticism to the judiciary would be considered to undermine the authority of
the Court. However, later the right to freely comment or criticise the action of a public
institution was considered to be of primary importance to the public and also for the
American idea of Democracy. As on today, the United States of America currently has
watered down the contempt law by numerous judgements which affirm that the dignity of the
courts cannot be established by silencing public opinion or by restricting the free discussions
about the Court. Contempt powers can be only used if there is a clear imminent and present
danger to the disposal of a case.
SINGAPORE PERSPECTIVE
83
King v. Almon, 243 K.B. 1765.
84
McLeod v. St.Aubin, 1899 A.C. 549.
85
Queen v. Grey, 1900 2 Q.B. 36.
59
In Singapore, the offence of scandalizing the court is committed when a person performs any
act or publishes any writing that is calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into
contempt, or to lower his authority. An act or statement that alleges bias, lack of impartiality,
impropriety or any wrongdoing concerning a judge in the exercise of his judicial function
falls within the offence. The High Court and the Court of Appeal are empowered by section
7(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act to punish for contempt of court. This provision
is statutory recognition of the superior courts' inherent jurisdiction to uphold the proper
administration of justice. The Subordinate Courts are also empowered by statute to punish
acts of contempt. Although Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
protects every citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression, the High Court has held
that the offence of scandalizing the court falls within the category of exceptions from the
right to free speech expressly stipulated in Article 14(2)(a). Some commentators have
expressed the view that the courts have placed excessive value on protecting the
independence of the judiciary, and have given insufficient weight to free speech.
In Singapore, an "inherent tendency" test has been held to strike the right balance between the
right to freedom of speech and the need to protect the dignity and integrity of the courts. To
establish the offence, the claimant must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or words
complained of have an inherent tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. The
inherent tendency test has been held to be justified by the small geographical size of
Singapore, the fact that there is no jury system and that judges have to decide both questions
of law and fact, and that the test renders proof of damage to the administration of justice
unnecessary.
Although Singapore law does not set out the sanctions that may be imposed for contempt of
court, it is accepted that the courts may impose reasonable fines and imprisonment. To decide
what punishment is appropriate, the culpability of the offender and the likely interference
with the administration of justice are considered. The only defence available to the offence of
scandalizing the court is to prove that the allegedly contemptuous act or statement amounts to
fair criticism, which involves showing that the criticism was made respectfully and in good
faith.
CONCLUSION
At the outset, it is imperative to that there is a lack of uniformity in the contempt cases even
after the introduction of the definition of “contempt” under the Contempt of Courts Act,
60
1971. The reason being, the ambiguity and vagueness in the three parts that constitute the
definition under the Act. The legislators have knowingly or unknowingly left the onus to fill
the gaps of what constitutes scandalising the Court and what interferes or obstructs the
administration of justice on the Judiciary itself. This uncertainty and elasticity in the text of
the law has led to an abuse of the authority by the Courts as Contempt of Court has become a
mercurial jurisdiction over time giving sweeping discretionary powers to the courts as
evidenced by a plethora of judgements. Therefore, it is pertinent that the Courts have a
system of checks so that the Courts exercise restraint and approach the contempt cases
subjectively and not stifle the legitimate criticism of the Judiciary. 86
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASE LAWS AND LEGISLATIONS-

 Section 2(c), The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
86
Yashika Sharma & Arvind Sharma, The Need to Revisit Anachronistic Criminal Contempt Laws in India, Bar
and Bench (November 20, 22:30), https://www.barandbench.com/apprentice-lawyer/the-need-to-revisit-
anachronistic-criminal-contempt-laws-in-india.
61
 Section 12, The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
 Section 13, The Contempt of Court (Amendment) Act, 2006.
 U.P. Residential Employees Co-operative, House B. Society v. New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority, AIR 2003 SC 2723.
 H. Puninder v. K. K. Sethi, (1998) 8 SCC 640.
 State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohammad Yakub Khan, (1992) 4 SCC 167.
 R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171.
 Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, 5332 (NCE) of 1993.
 Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr vs State Of Gujarat & Ors, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
 LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagles Homes Pty Ltd, (1999) FCA 1213.
 Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr, AIR 1998 SC 1895.
 Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516.
 P.N. Duda vs V. P. Shiv Shankar & Others, 1988 AIR 1208.
 R. Rajagopal vs State Of T.N, 1995 AIR 264.
 Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain, No. 9 OF 2009.
 King v. Almon, 243 K.B. 1765.
 In Re: Arundhati Roy AIR 2002 SC 1375.
 Dr. D. C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India
 U.P Residential Cooperative Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority,
1990 AIR 1325.
 Queen v. Grey, 1900 2 Q.B. 36.
 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941).
 A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil NaduAIR 2011 SC 308.
 Ravi Karan Singh, Dispensation of Justice: Role and Accountability of Judges and
Advocates (2004).
 Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, AIR 2001 SC 2509.
 Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1974.
 J. R Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan, (2001) 6 SCC 735.
 Chunilal Basu & Anr. v. The Hon’Ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Calcutta, AIR
1972 Cal 470.
 Sanjay R. Kothari & Anr. v. South Mumbai Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, AIR
2003 Bom 15.
 Biji v. Registrar, High Court of Kerala, 2001 (3) KLT 99.
 Paras Saklecha v. Shri Justice A.M Khanwilkar, (2015) 6 SCC 1673.
62
 V. Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala & Anr Case, (2010) 2 SCC 455.
 GN Saibaba v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 566.
 Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1974 AC 273.
 Ram Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey, AIR 1971 All. 170.
 Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose, ILR 41 Cal. 173.
 Sarla Devi Bharat Kumar Rungta v. Bharat Kumar Shiv Prasad Rungta 1988 Cr. L.J. 558
(Bom.).
 Johnson v. Grant, (1923) SC 790.
 R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171.
 Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1990 SCC (4) 55.
 Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 287.
 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
 Amar Singh v. K.P. Geetakrishnan, (2011) 3. SCC 363
 King v. Almon, 243 K.B. 1765.
 McLeod v. St.Aubin, 1899 A.C. 549.
 Queen v. Grey, 1900 2 Q.B. 36.
JOURNAL ARTICLES, BLOGS AND BOOKS-

 Yashika Sharma & Arvind Sharma, The Need to Revisit Anachronistic Criminal
Contempt Laws in India, Bar and Bench (November 20, 22:30),
https://www.barandbench.com/apprentice-lawyer/the-need-to-revisit-anachronistic-
criminal-contempt-laws-in-india.
 Role of Lawyers in a Developing Society, Andhra Law Times, 2007, Vol. 5, Journal
Section, pp. 14-16.
 UK Government, The Contempt of Court (2012) Law Commission Consultation Paper
No 209.
 K. Gururaja Chari, Advocacy & Professional Ethics (2013).
 K. Mony and K. Usha, Legal Drafting Conveyancing Professional Ethics and Advocacy
(2001).
63
Question 3: “A lawyer owes a duty to be fair not only to his client but also to the court as
well as to the opposite party in the conduct of the case.”
In light of the above statement, examine and critically evaluate the duties of a lawyer
towards the Court and the opposite party in light of their conduct and behaviour
towards the Court. Substantiate your opinions and views with relevant examples and
provide suggestions on what practices can be adopted to improve the Bar Bench
relationship?
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of our judicial system is the attainment of justice for all parties involved
in a case and the society at large. The Bar and the Bench are indispensable partners in the
achievement of this objective, with the judiciary at the top of a strong and vibrant bar and
complimented by it. Both are subordinate to and interrelated to one another in their respective
roles. In Calabar East Cooperative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd v. Ikot 87, the Court summed
the respective duty of the Bench and the Bar in administration of justice-
“The whole purpose of adjudication in our adversary system is for a party to explicitly
put his case across the table which will enable the opponent to respond appropriately to
that case he has fielded, and then the Judge, as an impartial umpire will adjudicate on the
issues in controversy. That and nothing more is the epitome of what justice or fair trial is
all about.”
The preservation of cordial relations between the Bar and the Bench necessitates respect and
understanding on both sides of the bar. The roles of attorneys and judges are supplementary
to one another. Thus, the principal duty of both the Bench and the Bar is to work diligently,
effectively, honestly and sincerely towards achieving justice in the polity.88
87
Calabar East Cooperative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd v. Ikot, (1999) 14 NWLR 225.
88
Mr. Justice Mirza Hameedullah Beg, Role of the Bench and the Bar, Allahabad High Court,
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.in/event/RoleoftheBenchandtheBarMHBeg.pdf.
64
DUTIES OF A LAWYER TOWARDS THE COURT-
 Act in a dignified manner
During the presentation of his case and also while acting before a court, an advocate should
act in a dignified manner. He should at all times conduct himself with self-respect. However,
whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judicial officer, the advocate
has a right and duty to submit his grievance to proper authorities.
 Respect the court
An advocate should always show respect towards the court. An advocate has to bear in mind
that the dignity and respect maintained towards judicial office is essential for the survival of a
free community.
In UP Sales Tax Service Association vs Taxation Bar Association 89, an advocate was carrying
a revolver along with him to the court. So, it was held by the Supreme Court that if an
advocate attends the court with firearms then it definitely against the dignity of the legal
profession
 Not communicate in private
An advocate should not communicate in private to a judge with regard to any matter pending
before the judge or any other judge. An advocate should not influence the decision of a court
in any matter using illegal or improper means such as coercion, bribe etc.90
 Refuse to act in an illegal manner towards the opposition
An advocate should refuse to act in an illegal or improper manner towards the opposing
counsel or the opposing parties. He shall also use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his
client from acting in any illegal, improper manner or use unfair practices in any mater
towards the judiciary, opposing counsel or the opposing parties.
89
UP Sales Tax Service Association vs Taxation Bar Association, 1954 AIR(SC) 10.
90
Rules of Professional Standards, The Bar Council of India,
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/professional-standards/rules-on-professional-standards/.
65
 Refuse to represent clients who insist on unfair means
An advocate shall refuse to represent any client who insists on using unfair or improper
means. An advocate shall excise his own judgment in such matters. He shall not blindly
follow the instructions of the client. He shall be dignified in use of his language in
correspondence and during arguments in court. He shall not scandalously damage the
reputation of the parties on false grounds during pleadings. He shall not use unparliamentary
language during arguments in the court.
 Appear in proper dress code
An advocate should appear in court at all times only in the dress prescribed under the Bar
Council of India Rules and his appearance should always be presentable.
 Refuse to appear in front of relations
An advocate should not enter appearance, act, plead or practice in any way before a judicial
authority if the sole or any member of the bench is related to the advocate as father,
grandfather, son, grandson, uncle, brother, nephew, first cousin, husband, wife, mother,
daughter, sister, aunt, niece, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, brother-in-law
daughter-in-law or sister-in-law.
In case of Satyendra Nararain Singh and Others vs Ram Nath Singh and Other 91, the Court
held that the advocate should not appear before his wife, who is the judge of the court. If he
appears before the court, to which his wife is presiding officer, it becomes his professional
misconduct. If he appears before the wife- judge it is the duty of the judge to raise the
objection. If she fails to object and accepts his appearance, then it becomes her judicial
misconduct.
 Not to wear bands or gowns in public places

An advocate should not wear bands or gowns in public places other than in courts, except on
such ceremonial occasions and at such places as the Bar Council of India or as the court may
prescribe.
 Not represent establishments of which he is a member
91
Satyendra Nararain Singh and Others vs Ram Nath Singh and Other,
66
An advocate should not appear in or before any judicial authority, for or against any
establishment if he is a member of the management of the establishment. This rule does not
apply to a member appearing as “amicus curiae” or without a fee on behalf of the Bar
Council, Incorporated Law Society or a Bar Association.
 Not appear in matters of pecuniary interest
An advocate should not act or plead in any matter in which he has financial interests.
For instance, he should not act in a bankruptcy petition when he is also a creditor of the
bankrupt. He should also not accept a brief from a company of which he is a Director.
 Not stand as surety for client
An advocate should not stand as a surety, or certify the soundness of a surety that his client
requires for the purpose of any legal proceedings.
 An advocate should be tactful and straight forward in presenting the matters. His
argument should be pointed, clear precious and concise
 An Advocate should not mislead Court and shall not criticize the Judiciary with malice. 92
DUTIES OF A LAWYER TOWARDS THE CLIENT-
 Bound to accept briefs
An advocate is bound to accept any brief in the courts or tribunals or before any other
authority in or before which he proposes to practise. He should levy fees which is at par with
the fees collected by fellow advocates of his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case.
Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.
 Not withdraw from service
92
Daisy Jain, Relation between Bar and Bench : A Critique, iPleaders Blog (November 20, 22:30),
https://blog.ipleaders.in/relation-bar-bench-critique/#Suggestions_on_the_relation_between_bar_and_bench.
67
An advocate should not ordinarily withdraw from serving a client once he has agreed to serve
them. He can withdraw only if he has a sufficient cause and by giving reasonable and
sufficient notice to the client. Upon withdrawal, he shall refund such part of the fee that has
not accrued to the client.
 Not appear in matters where he himself is a witness
An advocate should not accept a brief or appear in a case in which he himself is a witness. If
he has a reason to believe that in due course of events he will be a witness, then he should not
continue to appear for the client. He should retire from the case without jeopardising his
client’s interests.
 Full and frank disclosure to client
An advocate should, at the commencement of his engagement and during the continuance
thereof, make all such full and frank disclosure to his client relating to his connection with
the parties and any interest in or about the controversy as are likely to affect his client’s
judgement in either engaging him or continuing the engagement.
 Uphold interest of the client
It shall be the duty of an advocate fearlessly to uphold the interests of his client by all fair and
honourable means. An advocate shall do so without regard to any unpleasant consequences to
himself or any other. He shall defend a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused. An advocate should always remember that his loyalty is
to the law, which requires that no man should be punished without adequate evidence.93
 Not suppress material or evidence
93
Sanjana Jain, Bar and Bench : The Everlasting Relation, iPleaders Blog (November 20, 22:30),
https://blog.ipleaders.in/bar-and-bench-the-everlasting-relation/#Bar_and_Bench_relation.
68
An advocate appearing for the prosecution of a criminal trial should conduct the proceedings
in a manner that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent. An advocate shall by no means
suppress any material or evidence, which shall prove the innocence of the accused.
 Not disclose the communications between client and himself
An advocate should not by any means, directly or indirectly, disclose the communications
made by his client to him. He also shall not disclose the advice given by him in the
proceedings. However, he is liable to disclose if it violates Section 126 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
 An advocate should not be a party to stir up or instigate litigation
An advocate should not act on the instructions of any person other than his client or the
client’s authorised agent.
 Not charge depending on success of matters
An advocate should not charge for his services depending on the success of the matter
undertaken. He also shall not charge for his services as a percentage of the amount or
property received after the success of the matter.
 Not receive interest in actionable claim
An advocate should not trade or agree to receive any share or interest in any actionable claim.
Nothing in this rule shall apply to stock, shares and debentures of government securities, or to
any instruments, which are, for the time being, by law or custom, negotiable or to any
mercantile document of title to goods.94
 Not bid or purchase property arising of legal proceeding
94
Id.
69
An advocate should not by any means bid for, or purchase, either in his own name or in any
other name, for his own benefit or for the benefit of any other person, any property sold in
any legal proceeding in which he was in any way professionally engaged. However, it does
not prevent an advocate from bidding for or purchasing for his client any property on behalf
of the client provided the Advocate is expressly authorised in writing in this behalf.
 Not bid or transfer property arising of legal proceeding
An advocate should not by any means bid in court auction or acquire by way of sale, gift,
exchange or any other mode of transfer (either in his own name or in any other name for his
own benefit or for the benefit of any other person), any property which is the subject matter
of any suit, appeal or other proceedings in which he is in any way professionally engaged.
 Not adjust fees against personal liability
An advocate should not adjust fee payable to him by his client against his own personal
liability to the client, which does not arise in the course of his employment as an advocate.
An advocate should not misuse or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by
his client.
 Keep proper accounts
An advocate should always keep accounts of the clients’ money entrusted to him. The
accounts should show the amounts received from the client or on his behalf. The account
should show along with the expenses incurred for him and the deductions made on account of
fees with respective dates and all other necessary particulars.
 Divert money from accounts
An advocate should mention in his accounts whether any monies received by him from the
client are on account of fees or expenses during the course of any proceeding or opinion. He
shall not divert any part of the amounts received for expenses as fees without written
instruction from the client.
 Intimate the client on amounts
70
Where any amount is received or given to him on behalf of his client, the advocate must
without any delay intimate the client of the fact of such receipt.
 Adjust fees after termination of proceedings
An advocate shall after the termination of proceedings, be at liberty to adjust the fees due to
him from the account of the client. The balance in the account can be the amount paid by the
client or an amount that has come in that proceeding. Any amount left after the deduction of
the fees and expenses from the account must be returned to the client.
 Provide copy of accounts
An advocate must provide the client with the copy of the client’s account maintained by him
on demand, provided that the necessary copying charge is paid. An advocate shall not enter
into arrangements whereby funds in his hands are converted into loans.
 Not lend money to his client
An advocate shall not lend money to his client for the purpose of any action or legal
proceedings in which he is engaged by such client. An advocate cannot be held guilty for a
breach of this rule, if in the course of a pending suit or proceeding, and without any
arrangement with the client in respect of the same, the advocate feels compelled by reason of
the rule of the Court to make a payment to the Court on account of the client for the progress
of the suit or proceeding.95
 Not appear for opposite parties
An advocate who has advised a party in connection with the institution of a suit, appeal or
other matter or has drawn pleadings, or acted for a party, shall not act, appear or plead for the
opposite party in the same matter.
DUTIES TO THE OPPOSITE PARTY-
95
Id.
71
The Supreme Court in P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Others 96, laid down that an advocate
should be fair not only towards his client but also towards the court as well as towards the
opposite party of the case. The process of administration of justice has to be kept clean and
uncorrupted.
 Not to negotiate directly with opposing party
An advocate shall not in any way communicate or negotiate or call for settlement upon the
subject matter of controversy with any party represented by an advocate except through the
advocate representing the parties.
 Carry out legitimate promises made
An advocate shall do his best to carry out all legitimate promises made to the opposite party
even though not reduced to writing or enforceable under the rules of the Court.
 A lawyer must not hinder an opposing party’s access to evidence, improperly influence
witnesses or employ obstructionist tactics during the discovery process.
 Since documents and other forms of evidence are essential to establish a legal claim or to
assert a defence, all parties to a legal matter have a right to obtain relevant evidence. As
such, the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit altering, concealing or destroying
evidence pertinent to the matter at hand.
 In addition to being contrary to a lawyer’s ethical obligations, destruction of evidence and

falsifying evidence are criminal offenses, usually labelled “obstruction of justice.”
 Lawyers may not counsel witnesses to testify falsely. However, a lawyer may coach a
witness with regard to effective courtroom testimony, suggest choice of words and
generally rehearse testimony with a witness prior to his appearance in court. Lawyers are
likewise not permitted to offer inducements to witnesses regarding their testimony.
However, paying a witness’s expenses or compensating an expert witness are not
considered improper inducements, and may be offered.
96
P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Others, AIR 1998 SC 283.
72
 Lawyers also have the general duty not to make false statements of law or material fact to
any third party, including opposing counsel. At the same time, though, there is no duty to
inform the opposing party of relevant facts of which they may be unaware. Likewise,
leeway is afforded to a lawyer engaging in negotiations with the opposing party, in which
complete candour is not expected. Statements concerning a party’s negotiating goals, or
its willingness to compromise are thus not considered statements of material fact, and the
duty not to mislead may not apply to them. So, for example, a statement that “my client
won’t settle for less than $1,000,000” is not necessarily unethical, even if false.
SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE BAR BENCH RELATIONSHIP-
The Supreme Court in P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Others97 laid down that in the
administration of justice, the Bar and the Bench play a vital role in being the two most
important organs; they share a common duty in ensuring that justice is administered properly
and effectively. Given the fact that both are national assets of our nation, they must therefore
coordinate and work cooperatively with one another, as well as stay cautious together, in
order to safeguard judicial independence.
It is critical for the productive discharge of the court’s duties that the high level of optimism,
prestige, and dignity that they have admired throughout their careers be sustained and not
weakened in any manner.98 Whether it is judges or lawyers, they bear the main duty of
administering and maintaining the public’s trust in the courts. A few suggestions to strength
the Bar-Bench relationship would include-
 Briefings of judges and advocates are scheduled at regular intervals to strengthen the
relationship between the Bar and the Bench. During these sessions, the problems of the
opposing sides can be discussed, and the differences can be resolved through discussion.
 The Bar should consider building a ‘citizens lawyer’ initiative within each Bar
Association to encourage lawyers to stay engaged with community needs and movements.
It should involve young lawyers in such initiatives to raise the consciousness and
97
P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Others, AIR 1998 SC 283.
98
Hon. Justice Chinwe Iyizoba Jca, The Bar-Bench Relationship: Maintaining the Balance (Perspective from the
Bench), https://nji.gov.ng/images/Workshop_Papers/2016/Refresher_Magistrates/s01a.pdf.
73
sensibilities of the Bar. There are so many areas where the Bar must guide the
Government in formulating appropriate policies.
 The regulatory functions of the Bar need greater visibility for adoption of stringent
disciplinary norms and proactive measures. t must be under full-timers with prescribed
minimum years of practice qualification to ensure that these wings are manned or advised
by wisdom and experience.
 We must have an academy for judges and lawyers along the lines of the National Judicial
Academy to offer focused short duration courses on new developments in law, refresher
courses, use of technology to increase efficiencies and more.
CONCLUSION-
An independent and fearless Bar is not preferred over an independent Bench, similarly, an
independent Bench is also not preferred over an independent and fearless Bar. A reputed and
unbiased judiciary, as well as a powerful bar, are required to maintain the system of
democracy and independence under the rule of law in the country.99
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASE LAWS-
99
Malcolm Katrak & Bahraiz Irani, Battle of the Bar and the Bench: Critical Analysis of the Powers of the High
Court and the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961, Amity International Journal of Juridical
Sciences Vol. 5, 2019 pp 61-74.
74
 Calabar East Cooperative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd v. Ikot, (1999) 14 NWLR 225.
 UP Sales Tax Service Association vs Taxation Bar Association, 1954 AIR(SC) 10.
 P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Others, AIR 1998 SC 283.
 Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 1974.
 State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohammad Yakub Khan, (1992) 4 SCC 167.
 Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516.
JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BLOGS-

 Mr. Justice Mirza Hameedullah Beg, Role of the Bench and the Bar, Allahabad High
Court, http://www.allahabadhighcourt.in/event/RoleoftheBenchandtheBarMHBeg.pdf.
 Rules of Professional Standards, The Bar Council of India,
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/professional-standards/rules-on-professional-
standards/.
 Daisy Jain, Relation between Bar and Bench : A Critique, iPleaders Blog (November 20,
22:30),
https://blog.ipleaders.in/relation-bar-bench-critique/#Suggestions_on_the_relation_betwe
en_bar_and_bench.
 Sanjana Jain, Bar and Bench : The Everlasting Relation, iPleaders Blog (November 20,
22:30),
https://blog.ipleaders.in/bar-and-bench-the-everlasting-relation/#Bar_and_Bench_relation
.
 Hon. Justice Chinwe Iyizoba Jca, The Bar-Bench Relationship: Maintaining the Balance,
https://nji.gov.ng/images/Workshop_Papers/2016/Refresher_Magistrates/s01a.pdf.
 Malcolm Katrak & Bahraiz Irani, Battle of the Bar and the Bench: Critical Analysis of the
Powers of the High Court and the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961,
Amity International Journal of Juridical Sciences Vol. 5, 2019 pp 61-74.
 Role of Lawyers in a Developing Society, Andhra Law Times, 2007, Vol. 5, Journal
Section, pp. 14-16.
 The Legal Profession: A Critique, Indian Journal of Contemporary Law, 1998, Vol. II,
pp. 101-102
 The Legal Profession in India and Its Social Responsibilities, Indian Bar Review, 1969,
Vol. 6.
BOOKS-
 B. K. Goswami, Legal Profession and its Ethics (1995).
75
 P. Ramanatha Aiyer, Legal & Professional Ethics (2003).
 Q. B. Reddy, Practical Advocacy of Law (2002).
 Raju Ramchandran, Professional Ethics for Lawyers: Changing Profession, Changing
Ethics (2014).
 Ravi Karan Singh, Dispensation of Justice: Role and Accountability of Judges and
Advocates (2004).
~ THE END~
76

Ethics Internal Sanjana Karnavat

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Ethics Internal Sanjana Karnavat

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SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, PUNE

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

I. COMPOTENT I- CASE ANALYSIS 4-38

1. Re: Arundhati Roy 4

2. A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu 8

4. Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat 18

5. Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal 22

6. Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry 25

7. Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar 28

8. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 31

9. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP 34

10. Noratanmal Chouraria v. M R Murli & Anr. 37

II. COMPOTENT II- ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS 39-41

1. Problem I- In the Books of Sinha Enterprises 39

III. COMPONENT III- CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 42-76

2. Prepare a research article on the contemporary development of the 51

1. In Re: Arundhati Roy

CITATION: AIR 2002 SC 1375

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. The Constitution of India

ii. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

CITATION: AIR 2011 SC 308

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

CITATION: (2009) 8 SCC 106

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. Advocates Act, 1961

iii. Constitution of India

Professional misconduct vis-à-vis Criminal Contempt of Court-

Role of the Media:

CITATION: (2009) 11 SCC 678

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971

CITATION: AIR 2014 SC 850

FACTS OF THE CASE

It is a suo motu contempt proceedings initiated against Advocate on Record (AOR),

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. Order IV, Supreme Court Rules, 1966- Registration as Advocate on Record

CITATION: AIR 2001 SC 2509

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

- Whether bribing the judge is considered as a professional misconduct under section 35 of

i. The Advocates Act, 1961

CITATION: (2014) 9 SCC 203

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ii. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

CITATION: AIR 2003 SC 73

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

i. The Constitution of India

CITATION: AIR 2016 SC 3302

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL.

FACTS OF THE CASE

ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE

- Court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory power of Bar Council on conviction of an advocate

CITATION: AIR 2004 SC 2440

FACTS OF THE CASE