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The Future of the Greek Economy:
Economic Development Through 2035

Panagiotis E. Petrakis
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GREEK
GROWTH UP TO 2030
The Future of
the Greek Economy
Panagiotis E. Petrakis · Pantelis C. Kostis ·
Kyriaki I. Kafka · Anna-Maria Kanzola
The Political Economy of Greek Growth up to 2030
Series Editor
Panagiotis E. Petrakis, Department of Economics, National and
Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
This book series analyzes the medium to long-term prospects of Greece’s
political economy by studying concepts such as sustainability, sustain-
able governance and political functioning, economic inclusivity, cultural
behaviors, and economic dynamic growth through an evolutionary
approach. This series also publishes policy-oriented books outlining steps
for increased economic growth and a sustainable future for the Greek
economy. This series stands out in that the books depict the condi-
tions that must prevail for the Greek economy to escape the economic
stagnation that has lingered from persistent economic recession.
Using Greece as a lens to discuss pressing questions, this series will
be of interest to economists interested in Eurozone policies, economic
growth, evolutionary economics, and more.
Panagiotis E. Petrakis · Pantelis C. Kostis ·
Kyriaki I. Kafka · Anna-Maria Kanzola
The Future
of the Greek Economy
Panagiotis E. Petrakis Pantelis C. Kostis
Department of Economics Department of Economics
National and Kapodistrian University National and Kapodistrian University
of Athens of Athens
Athens, Greece Athens, Greece
Kyriaki I. Kafka Anna-Maria Kanzola

Department of Economics Department of Economics
National and Kapodistrian University National and Kapodistrian University
of Athens of Athens
Athens, Greece Athens, Greece
ISSN 2662-7248 ISSN 2662-7256 (electronic)

The Political Economy of Greek Growth up to 2030
ISBN 978-3-031-26871-7 ISBN 978-3-031-26872-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26872-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Preface
The series of books with the general title of “The Political Economy
of Greek Growth up to 2030” analyze the medium- to long-term
prospects of the Greek reality—including the COVID-19 pandemic—in
view of the political economy. They combine the notions of sustain-
ability, sustainable governance and political operation, the inclusivity of
the economic system, and cultural behavior, with the requirements of
economic dynamic growth. The concurrent influence from those five
areas, through suitable structural reforms, is a necessary prerequisite to
change the production prototype of the Greek economy, which will
ensure a medium- and long-term economic development and growth.
This viewpoint has an evolutionary foundation. The view supported is
that conditions can be created for the Greek economy, after the 2008
depression, to avoid losing another decade due to COVID-19 and to
create the necessary conditions for a great growth transformation in the
future.
The target of this book series, presented in successive volumes, is
to assess the current situation of the Greek economy and detect future
potential for development and growth, particularly on a medium- to long-
term horizon. It represents the next step in a series of books: The Greek
Economy and the Crisis, Challenges and Responses, P. E. Petrakis (2011),
New York and Heidelberg, Springer; and A New Growth Model for the
Greek Economy, Requirements for the Long-Term Sustainability, P. E.
Petrakis (2016), New York, Palgrave Macmillan. These books marked
v
vi PREFACE
the conditions in which the Greek economy entered Great Depression

(2008–2018) and put forth initial thoughts on exiting the crisis. In this
current book series, conditions for the exit of the economy from the crisis
are analyzed, along with its entry into a new period of development and
growth.
Athens, Greece Panagiotis E. Petrakis

Pantelis C. Kostis
Kyriaki I. Kafka
Anna-Maria Kanzola
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the main collaborator Mrs. E. Giouli, as well

as the other collaborators in the office, who offered us the opportunity
to deal with the completion of our research. National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens offered its support. Our families offered us their
patience.
Panagiotis E. Petrakis
Pantelis C. Kostis
Kyriaki I. Kafka
Anna-Maria Kanzola
vii
Contents
Part I Alternative Futures Analysis

1 Setting the Scenery: Factors Affecting the Future 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Tales from the Past Shaping the Future: Theory,
Economic Crises, and Political Behaviors 5
1.2.1 Theory 5
1.2.2 The Recent Economic Crises and Political
Behaviors 6
1.3 Connecting the Present with the Future: The
Megatrends 9
1.4 Conclusions: Use of History, Scenario Building,
and Foresight 11
References 13
2 Building Scenarios: The Four Economic Scenarios
for Greek Alternative Economic Futures 17
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 Step-By-Step Scenario Building: Theoretical
and Practical Guide 19
2.3 The Oxford Global Economic Model (GEM)
and Details for the Scenarios’ Projections 24
2.4 The Two Versions of the Growth Scenario 27
ix
x CONTENTS
2.5 The Three Scenarios Left: The Unsustainable

Growth, the Transformation, and the Falldown 28
2.6 A Scenarios’ Summary and Some Insights 31
References 34
3 Scenarios and Contextual Factors: Addressing
the Implications 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Culture: An Indicator for the Future 38
3.3 Handling Uncertainty: Myopic or Forward-Looking
Expectations? 41
3.4 In Place of Conclusions: Is There a Prevailing
Scenario? 43
References 44
Part II The Past and the Present of the Greek economy

4 Sustainable Development 49
4.1 Introduction 49
4.2 The Evolution of Population and the Aging Problem 50
4.3 Environment Protection and the Ecological Footprint 54
4.4 Renewable Energy as a Source of Sustainable
Development 55
4.5 The Rich Natural Resources of Greece 57
References 58
5 Sustainable Governance 59
5.1 Introduction 59
5.2 The Evolution of Governance Indicators: Divergence
and Convergence During the Last Two Decades 60
5.3 The Improvement of Corruptions Perceptions
During the Crisis of 2008 64
5.4 The Recrudescence of Economic Freedom 66
5.5 Confronting Terrorism and Money Laundering 69
Reference 75
6 Inclusive Growth 77
6.1 Introduction 77
6.2 Labor Market Conditions and Inclusivity 78
6.3 Participating in Education and Educational Quality 85
CONTENTS xi
6.4 Personal Finance: Disposable Income and Household

Conditions 89
6.5 People at Risk of Poverty and Social Protection
Expenditure 90
6.6 Inequality, Material, and Social Deprivation
in the Greek Economy 95
6.7 Health, Infant Mortality, and Healthcare
Expenditure 96
References 98
7 Cultural Change and Development and Growth 99
7.1 Introduction 99
7.2 How Greeks Judge the Current Situation 100
7.3 Expectations about the Next 12 Months in the Greek
Economy 102
7.4 The Low Institutional Trust in the Greek Society 108
7.5 Insecurity Hypothesis and Post-Materialism 110
References 113
8 The Dynamism of the Economy 115
8.1 Introduction 115
8.2 The Output Gap of the Greek Economy 116
8.3 The External Sector: Exports, Imports, and Current
Account Balance 117
8.4 The Neuralgic Role of Consumption 119
8.5 Private vs. Public Investments and the FDIs 120
8.6 The Unsatisfactory Return of Savings 123
8.7 The Troubled Housing Market 125
8.8 PMI and Production in Manufacturing 126
8.9 Public Deficits, Debt, Revenues, and Expenditures
in the Greek economy 129
8.10 Labor Productivity Growth 132
Reference 132
xii CONTENTS
Part III Alternative Futures for Greece: The Five

Scenarios Under the Five Pillars of Economic
Development
9 Alternative Economic Futures and Sustainable
Development 135
9.2 Population Dynamics: The Aging Problem
in the Future 136
9.3 Environmental Issues as a Cornerstone 138
9.4 Renewable Energy Sources are the Key to Sustainable
Development 140
References 143
10 Sustainable Governance and Alternative Economic
Futures 145
10.2 The Future of the Greek Governance Indicators 146
10.3 Corruptions Perceptions: A Way to a “Cleaner”
Economy 151
10.4 Is There a Chance for a More Free Economy? 152
References 153
11 The Impact of Alternative Economic Futures
on Inclusive Growth 155
11.2 Labor Market Conditions and the Greek Economy
in the Future 156
11.3 Human Capital and Education: Qualitative
Characteristics 158
11.4 Household Conditions Under Different Scenarios 161
11.5 Poverty and Inequalities in the Greek Economy’s
Future 161
11.6 Inclusiveness and the Health of the Greeks 163
References 165
12 Cultural Change and Alternative Futures 167
12.2 How Are Greeks About to Judge Their Current
Situation in the Future 168
12.3 The Formation of Expectations in the Future 170
CONTENTS xiii
12.4 Trust in European and Government Institutions 172

References 175
13 The Dynamism of the Economy and the Alternative
Futures 177
13.2 How Far from the Potential Output Will the Greek
Economy Be in the Future? 178
13.3 The Greek External Sector in the Future 179
13.4 The Consumption-Based Greek Model 182
13.5 Investments as a Key for the Future Outcomes 183
13.6 The Future of Housing in the Greek Economy 184
13.7 Manufacturing Production and Challenges 185
13.8 Public Economics and Alternative Futures 186
13.9 Productivity up to 2035 189
References 190
Index 193
Introduction
The scope of the present book is to introduce the Political Economy of

Alternative Economic Futures, using as a case study the Greek economy.
We refer to this attempt as “political economy” since foresight and alter-
native futures analysis “bridges” microeconomics, macroeconomics, and
social and cultural aspects with the reality of human reactions under
uncertainty of what lies ahead. At the microeconomic level, the individu-
al’s need to predict the future arises from the desire for a better life. At the
macroeconomic level, the prediction of the future concerns the mapping
of the basic economic variables in order to speculate regarding economic,
social, and technological developments. Consequently, the analysis is
not restricted to the presentation of a series of forecasts for the Greek
economy up to 2035, but aims to develop a comprehensive framework of
its future.
The prediction of the alternative futures requires analytical capacity,
multidisciplinary outlook, and creativity in order to map the several plau-
sible developments at the social and economic level. To predict the future
developments in complex systems, we use scenario building exercises and
foresight because they address inherited uncertainties and allow for the
preparation of individuals and policymakers to achieve collective goals.
Foresight techniques are grounded in the collective need of human beings
to prepare for the future under the uncertainty of many alternatives due
to systematic and random shocks. In other words, foresight incorporates
the realization of past and present experiences along with anxiety and
xv
xvi INTRODUCTION
hopes for the course of the future. Scenarios do not describe certainties,
but possibilities regarding the future. Nevertheless, they have the ability
to influence the formation of expectations. That is why optimism must
be a component of scenario building, even in a relatively bleak future, to
avoid self-fulfilling prophecies and negative confirmation.
Scenarios in the present book do not only aim to predict the future
but are also heuristic tools for the preparation of society and political
systems to utilize resources if they want to achieve a sustainable future.
In that regard, we need to think “big”, covering a series of conceptual
spaces. Thus, there are five realms that compose our thinking regarding
alternative economic futures, which outline the political economy of
Greece. These are sustainable development; sustainable governance; inclu-
sive growth; evolution of human behaviors; and—last but probably first
in prioritization—dynamic growth and development. Hence, the realiza-
tion of alternative economic futures concerns the generation of scenarios
in each of these conceptual spaces.
Initially, we use a baseline scenario that describes the course of the
future economy—unless fundamental differentiating factors force another
series of developments—and modify its assumptions to produce four
scenarios. For the generated scenarios, we mark as key-factor uncertain-
ties climate change and the geopolitical landscape. We generate a growth
scenario, an unsustainable growth scenario, a transformation scenario, and
a downfall scenario based on the severity of the key uncertainty factors’
effects. Each scenario describes a different course of the future depending
on its individual hypotheses. Essentially, we generate a scenario matrix for
twenty-five realms because the four scenarios are analyzed with respect to
the five aforementioned realms.
To that end, the present book is organized into three parts. In Part I,
we develop the methodology used for scenario building and alternative
futures analysis. In Part II, we analyze the past and the present of the
Greek with respect to the five realms mentioned above. Lastly, in Part
III, we present the four alternative economic scenarios for Greece up to
2035 according to the above five realms.
Abbreviations
EU-27 European Union of 27 Members

FDI Foreign Direct Investments
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEM Oxford Global Economic Model
GWh Gigawatt hours
HICP Harmonized Index Of Consumer Prices
M IMPORTS
PIAAC Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
TFP Total Factor Productivity
X Exports
xvii
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 What connects us with the future? (Source Authors’

creation. Note The consequences of past events,
the interpretation of past events in the present,
and the unavoidable forces of change—which are
dynamic in nature—contribute to the construction
of the future. In sum, the future is built from received
information, hopes, and speculation) 12
Fig. 2.1 The scenario matrix for the generated scenarios (Source
Authors’ creation. Note The four scenarios are placed
in the matrix depending on the critical uncertainty
events) 23
Fig. 2.2 Baseline Scenario—annual GDP growth rate projection
(Source Own calculations based on Global Economic
Model of Oxford Economics) 26
Fig. 2.3 Growth scenario—annual GDP growth rate projection
for Greece (2021–2035) (Source Own calculations based
on Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics) 28
Fig. 2.4 Growth scenario I—annual GDP growth rate projection
for Greece and EU (2021–2035) (Source Own
calculations based on Global Economic Model
of Oxford Economics) 29
Fig. 2.5 The unsustainable growth, transformation,
and Falldown scenarios for Greece (2021–2035) (Source
Own calculations based on Global Economic Model
xix
xx LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 2.6 The unsustainable growth, transformation, and Falldown

scenarios for selected EU countries (2021–2035)
(Source Own calculations based on Global Economic
Fig. 2.7 Real annual GDP growth rates per scenario in Greece
(2021–2035) (Source Own calculations based on Global
Economic Model of Oxford Economics) 34
Fig. 3.1 Complex dynamics, scenarios, and the future (Source
Authors’ creation. Note The future could meet
any of the four scenarios or fall in between some
of the scenarios. However, there is always the possibility
that it will not resemble any of the scenarios due
to unpredictable black-swan events) 43
Fig. 4.1 Life expectancy at birth (Source Eurostat [SDG_03_10
database]) 51
Fig. 4.2 Proportion of population aged 65 years and over (Source
United Nations [ISO 3166-1 numeric code 900
about Greece and 300 about World]) 52
Fig. 4.3 The Natural Balance in the Greek Society (1960–2020)
(persons) (Source Eurostat [demo_fmonth,
demo_magec] and own calculations. Note The natural
balance is calculated as the difference between births
and deaths each year) 53
Fig. 4.4 Population growth rate (%) (Source United
Nations—world population prospects 2022 revision) 53
Fig. 4.5 CO2 emissions (Source IEA—greenhouse gas emissions
from energy data explorer. Note Million tons of CO2
about Greece (left axis) and Million tons of CO2
about World [right axis]) 54
Fig. 4.6 Greenhouse gas emissions (1990 = 100) (Source
Eurostat (SDG_13_10). Note The indicator measures
total national emissions [from both ESD and ETS
sectors], including international aviation of the so-called
“Kyoto basket” of greenhouse gases, including
carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), nitrous oxide
(N2 O), and the so-called F-gases [hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6)] from all sectors of the GHG
emission inventories [including international aviation
and indirect CO2 ]) 55
Fig. 4.7 Renewable share in final energy consumption (%)
(Source IEA—renewables 2021 data explorer) 56
LIST OF FIGURES xxi
Fig. 4.8 Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) (Source

World Bank [NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS]. Note Total
natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural
gas rents, coal rents [hard and soft], mineral rents,
and forest rents) 57
Fig. 5.1 Voice and accountability index (Source World
Bank—World Governance Indicators) 61
Fig. 5.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
index (Source World Bank—World Governance Indicators) 61
Fig. 5.3 Government effectiveness index (Source World
Fig. 5.4 Regulatory quality index (Source World Bank—World
Governance Indicators) 63
Fig. 5.5 Rule of law index (Source World Bank—World
Governance Indicators) 63
Fig. 5.6 Control of corruption perceptions index (Source World
Fig. 5.7 Corruption Perceptions Index score (Source
Transparency International. Note 0 = highly corrupt,
100 = very clean. The Corruption Perceptions Index
[CPI] aggregates data from several different sources
that provide perceptions by business people and country
experts of the level of corruption in the public sector) 65
Fig. 5.8 Index of economic freedom (Source Heritage
Foundation—Index of Economic Freedom 2022. Note
According to the Heritage Foundation, economic
freedom is about much more than a business
environment in which entrepreneurship and prosperity
can flourish. With its far-reaching impacts on various
aspects of human development, economic freedom
empowers people, unleashes powerful forces of choice
and opportunity, nourishes other liberties, and improves
the overall quality of life) 66
xxii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 5.9 Property rights (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

of Economic Freedom 2022. Note According
to the Heritage Foundation, secure property rights give
citizens the confidence to undertake entrepreneurial
activity, save their income, and make long-term
plans because they know that their income, savings,
and property (both real and intellectual) are safe
from unfair expropriation or theft. Property rights are
a primary factor in capital accumulation for production
and investment) 67
Fig. 5.10 Judicial effectiveness (Source Heritage
Foundation—Index of Economic Freedom
2022. Note According to the Heritage Foundation,
judicial effectiveness requires efficient and fair judicial
systems to ensure that laws are fully respected
and that appropriate legal actions are taken against
violations) 68
Fig. 5.11 Government integrity (Source Heritage
in a world characterized by social and cultural
diversity, practices regarded as corrupt in one place
may reflect traditional interactions in another. The
systemic corruption of government institutions by such
practices as bribery, nepotism, cronyism, patronage,
embezzlement, and graft is of great concern) 69
Fig. 5.12 Tax burden (Source Heritage Foundation—Index
to the Heritage Foundation, a tax burden is a fiscal
burden imposed by Governments on economic
activity through taxation and borrowing. However,
governments permit individuals and businesses to keep
and manage a larger share of their income and wealth
for their benefit and maximize economic freedom) 70
LIST OF FIGURES xxiii
Fig. 5.13 Fiscal health (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

to the Heritage foundation, widening deficits
and a growing debt burden, which are direct
consequences of poor government budget management,
lead to the erosion of a country’s overall fiscal health.
Deviations from sound fiscal positions often disturb
macroeconomic stability, induce economic uncertainty,
and thus limit economic freedom) 71
Fig. 5.14 Business freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index
to the Heritage Foundation, business freedom is
an individual’s ability to establish and run an enterprise
without undue interference from the state) 71
Fig. 5.15 Labor freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index
to the Heritage Foundation, labor freedom is the ability
of individuals to find employment opportunities
and work) 72
Fig. 5.16 Monetary freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index
to the Heritage Foundation, monetary freedom requires
a stable currency and market-determined prices.
Whether acting as entrepreneurs or as consumers,
economically free people need a steady and reliable
currency as a medium of exchange, a unit of account,
and a store of value. Without monetary freedom,
creating long-term value or amassing capital is difficult) 72
Fig. 5.17 Trade freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index
to the Heritage Foundation, trade freedom is
about the degree to which government hinders
the free flow of foreign commerce and directly affects
individuals’ ability to pursue their economic goals
and maximize their productivity and well-being) 73
Fig. 5.18 Investment freedom (Source Heritage
a free and open investment environment provides
maximum entrepreneurial opportunities and incentives
for expanded economic activity, greater productivity,
and job creation) 73
xxiv LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 5.19 Financial freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

to the Heritage Foundation, financial freedom
is described as the case in which an accessible
and efficiently functioning formal financial system
ensures the availability of diversified savings, credit,
payment, and investment services to individuals
and businesses) 74
Fig. 5.20 Basel Institute AML index (Source Basel Institute
on Governance. Note 10 indicates the highest risk level.
The index provides risk scores covering five domains
that contribute to a high risk of ML/TF: Quality
of AML/CFT Framework, Bribery, and Corruption,
Financial Transparency and Standards, Public
Transparency and Accountability, and Legal and Political
Risks) 74
Fig. 6.1 Change in employment (% annual change) (Source
Editing data from the Global Economic Model
Fig. 6.2 Change in unemployment (% annual change) (Source
Fig. 6.3 Total employment (resident population—LFS)
(thousands of people) (Source Eurostat [LFSI_EMP_A]) 79
Fig. 6.4 Youth employment rate (%, 15–24 years) (Source
Eurostat [yth_empl_020]) 80
Fig. 6.5 Unemployment rate (% of the population in the labor
force) (Source Editing data from the Global Economic
Fig. 6.6 Earnings gross total (% annual change of quarterly
total, Gross—euro per employee) (Source Editing data
from the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics) 81
Fig. 6.7 Labor supply (% annual change) (Source Editing data
Fig. 6.8 Population of Working Age (% annual change) (Source
Fig. 6.9 Monthly minimum wages (euros) (Source Eurostat
[EARN_MW_CUR Database]) 83
Fig. 6.10 Average annual wages (In 2021 constant prices at 2021
USD PPPs) (Source OECD) 84
LIST OF FIGURES xxv
Fig. 6.11 Gender Employment Gap (Source Eurostat

[LFSI_EMP_A]. Note It is calculated as the difference
between the male and female participation
in employment as a percentage of the total population) 84
Fig. 6.12 Expected years of schooling (Source United
Nations—School register or school census
for enrollment data by age. UNPD population estimates
for the school-age population. Note Total number
of years of schooling that a person of a certain
age can expect to receive in the future, assuming
that the probability of his or her being enrolled
in school at any age is equal to the current enrollment
ratio for that age) 85
Fig. 6.13 Mean years of schooling (Source United
Nations—National population censuses, household,
or labor force surveys. Note Average number
of completed years of education of a country’s
population aged 25 years and older, excluding years
spent repeating individual grades) 86
Fig. 6.14 (a) Population by educational attainment level—Less
than primary, primary, and lower secondary
education (levels 0–2) (percentage %). (b) Population
by educational attainment level—Upper secondary,
post-secondary non-tertiary, and tertiary education
(levels 3–8) (percentage %) (Source Eurostat
[EDAT_LFSE_03]) 87
Fig. 6.15 PISA score in reading (Source OECD—Programme
for International Student Assessment’s [PISA]. Note
Reading performance, for PISA, measures the capacity
to understand, use and reflect on written texts in order
to achieve goals, develop knowledge and potential,
and participate in society. The mean score is the measure) 88
xxvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 6.16 PISA score in mathematics (Source OECD—Programme

for International Student Assessment’s (PISA). Note
Mathematical performance, for PISA, measures
the mathematical literacy of a 15-year-old to formulate,
employ, and interpret mathematics in a variety
of contexts to describe, predict, and explain phenomena,
recognizing the role that mathematics plays in the world.
The mean score is the measure. A mathematically
literate student recognizes the role that mathematics
plays in the world in order to make well-founded
judgments and decisions needed by constructive,
engaged, and reflective citizens) 88
Fig. 6.17 PISA Score in science (Source OECD - Programme
for International Student Assessment’s [PISA].
Note Scientific performance, for PISA, measures
the scientific literacy of a 15-year-old in the use
of scientific knowledge to identify questions, acquire
new knowledge, explain scientific phenomena, and draw
evidence-based conclusions about science-related issues.
The mean score is the measure) 89
Fig. 6.18 PIAAC literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving (Source
OECD—Programme for the International Assessment
of Adult Competencies—PIAAC. Note The Survey
of Adult Skills (PIAAC) assesses the proficiency
of adults in three information-processing skills essential
for full participation in the knowledge-based economies
and societies of the twenty-first century: literacy,
numeracy, and problem-solving in technology-rich
environments. These are competencies that are essential
for functioning in the modern world, for realizing
the myriad tasks adults must undertake in the various
life contexts) 90
Fig. 6.19 Index of using skills at work (2016) (Source
OECD—Programme for the International Assessment
of Adult Competencies—PIAAC. Note The Survey
of Adult Skills (PIAAC) includes detailed questions
about the frequency with which respondents perform
specific tasks in their jobs. Based on this information,
the survey measures the use of a wide range of skills,
including both information-processing skills, which are
also measured in the direct assessment, and generic
skills, for which only self-reported use at work is available) 91
LIST OF FIGURES xxvii
Fig. 6.20 Personal disposable income (euros) (Source Editing data

Fig. 6.21 Distribution of population aged 18 and over (Source
Eurostat [ilc_lvhl11]) 92
Fig. 6.22 People living in households with very low work intensity
(percentage of the total population aged less than 60)
(Source Eurostat [ilc_lvhl13]) 93
Fig. 6.23 At-risk-of-poverty rate (percentage of the total
population) (Source Eurostat [ILC_PEPS01]) 93
Fig. 6.24 Impact of social transfers (excluding pensions)
on poverty reduction (percentage of the total
population) (Source Eurostat [TESPM050]) 94
Fig. 6.25 Social protection expenditure (euro per inhabitant
[at constant 2010 prices]) (Source Eurostat
[SPR_EXP_SUM]) 94
Fig. 6.26 Income quintile share ratio S80/S20 for disposable
income (ratio) (Source Eurostat [ILC_DI11]) 95
Fig. 6.27 Material and social deprivation (percentage of employed
persons 16 years or over) (Source Eurostat [ilc_mdsd01]) 96
Fig. 6.28 Infant mortality, deaths per 1000 live births (Source
World Bank) 97
Fig. 6.29 Healthcare expenditure (euro per inhabitant) (Source
Eurostat [HLTH_SHA11_HF]) 97
Fig. 7.1 Judge the current situation in your country as good (%
of the population) (Source Standard Eurobarometer.
Note Those responding “very good” or “rather good”,
while the rest possible responses are “rather bad”
and “very bad”) 101
Fig. 7.2 Judge the current situation in your national economy
as good (% of the population) (Source Standard
Eurobarometer. Note Those responding “very good”
or “rather good”, while the rest possible responses are
“rather bad” and “very bad”) 101
Fig. 7.3 Judge the financial situation of your household as good
(% of the population) (Source Standard Eurobarometer.
Fig. 7.4 What do you think are the two most important issues
facing (OUR COUNTRY) now? (Source Standard
Eurobarometer) 103
xxviii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 7.5 Consumers surveys—financial situation over the next 12

months (Source Eurostat—Business and consumer survey) 104
Fig. 7.6 General economic situation over the next 12 months
(Source Eurostat—Business and consumer survey) 105
Fig. 7.7 Price trends over the next 12 months (Source
Eurostat—Business and consumer survey) 105
Fig. 7.8 Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months
(Source Eurostat—Business and consumer survey) 106
Fig. 7.9 Major purchases over the next 12 months (Source
Fig. 7.10 Savings over the next 12 months (Source
Fig. 7.11 Trust in political parties (% of the population that tends
to trust) (Source Standard Eurobarometer) 108
Fig. 7.12 Trust in national government (% of the population
that tends to trust) (Source Standard Eurobarometer) 109
Fig. 7.13 Trust in national parliament (% of the population
Fig. 7.14 Trust in the European commission (% of the population
Fig. 7.15 What is your opinion on EMU with one single currency,
the euro (% of the population that answer “for”) (Source
Standard Eurobarometer) 111
Fig. 8.1 Output gap as a percentage of potential output (%)
(Source Editing data from the Global Economic Model
Fig. 8.2 Exports of goods and services (% GDP) (Source Editing
data from the Global Economic Model of Oxford
Economics) 117
Fig. 8.3 Imports of goods and services (% GDP) (Source Editing
Economics) 118
Fig. 8.4 Current account balance of payments (share of GDP)
Fig. 8.5 Private consumption annual rate of change (%) (Source
Fig. 8.6 Public consumption annual rate of change (%) (Source
LIST OF FIGURES xxix
Fig. 8.7 Domestic motor vehicle sales (2005 = 100) (Source

Bank of Greece (Bulleting of Conjunctural Indicators) 120
Fig. 8.8 Total investments rate of change (%) (Source Editing
Economics) 121
Fig. 8.9 Private investments rate of change (%) (Source Editing
Economics) 122
Fig. 8.10 Capital goods (2015 = 100) (Source Bank of Greece
[Bulleting of Conjunctural Indicators]) 122
Fig. 8.11 Foreign direct investment in cement production
in Greece, inward, the share of GDP (Source Editing
Economics) 123
Fig. 8.12 Total deposits and repos (million Euros) (Source Bank
of Greece) 124
Fig. 8.13 Deposits of non-financial institutions (million Euros)
(Source Bank of Greece) 124
Fig. 8.14 Deposits of households and private non-profit
institutions (million Euros) (Source Bank of Greece) 125
Fig. 8.15 House price index (2015 = 100) (Source Editing data
Fig. 8.16 PMI manufacturing (Source IHS Markit, Bank of Greece
[Bulleting of Conjunctural Indicators]) 127
Fig. 8.17 Electricity generation (2015 = 100) (Source Bank
of Greece [Bulleting of Conjunctural Indicators]) 128
Fig. 8.18 Cement production (volume in tons) (Source Bank
of Greece [Bulleting of Conjunctural Indicators]) 128
Fig. 8.19 Government balance, Maastricht definition (share
of GDP) (Source Editing data from the Global
Fig. 8.20 Government primary balance (share of GDP) (Source
Fig. 8.21 Gross government debt Maastricht definition (share
of GDP) (Source Editing data from the Global
Fig. 8.22 Government revenue (% GDP) (Source Editing data
Fig. 8.23 Government expenditures (% GDP) (Source Editing data
xxx LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 8.24 Labor productivity growth (GDP per hour worked)

(Source OECD) 132
Fig. 9.1 Population (2020–2035) (millions) (Source Editing data
Fig. 9.2 Population 65+ (2020–2035) (millions) (Source Editing
Economics) 138
Fig. 9.3 Carbon dioxide emissions (2020–2035) (tones millions)
Fig. 9.4 Carbon emissions (2020–2035) (tones millions)
Fig. 9.5 Household energy consumption (2020–2035) (GWh)
Fig. 9.6 Industry energy consumption (2020–2035) (GWh)
Fig. 9.7 Renewable electricity output, the share of total (%)
Fig. 9.8 Total electricity output from renewable sources (GWh)
Fig. 10.1 Voice and Accountability—5 Scenarios (2020–2035)
(Source World Bank—World Governance Indicators,
Global Economic Model—Oxford Economics, and own
calculations) 147
Fig. 10.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism—5
Scenarios (2020–2035) (Source World Bank—World
Governance Indicators, Global Economic
Model—Oxford Economics, and own calculations) 147
Fig. 10.3 Government Effectiveness—5 Scenarios (2020–2035)
calculations) 148
Fig. 10.4 Regulatory Quality—5 Scenarios (2020–2035) (Source
World Bank—World Governance Indicators, Global
Economic Model—Oxford Economics, and own
calculations) 149
LIST OF FIGURES xxxi
Fig. 10.5 Rule of Law—5 Scenarios (2020–2035) (Source World

Bank—World Governance Indicators, Global Economic
Model—Oxford Economics, and own calculations) 150
Fig. 10.6 Control of Corruption—5 Scenarios (2020–2035)
calculations) 150
Fig. 10.7 Corruption Perceptions Index—5 Scenarios
(2020–2035) (Source Transparency International,
calculations. Note 0 = highly corrupt, 100 = very clean) 152
Fig. 10.8 Index of Economic Freedom—5 Scenarios (Source The
Heritage Foundation, Global Economic Model—Oxford
Economics, and own calculations) 153
Fig. 11.1 Employment (2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source Own
calculations based on the Global Economic Model
Fig. 11.2 Unemployment rate (2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source
Own calculations based on the Global Economic Model
Fig. 11.3 Earnings Gross Total, Gross - euro per employee
(2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source Own calculations
based on the Global Economic Model of Oxford
Economics) 158
Fig. 11.4 Labor Supply (2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source Own
Fig. 11.5 Expected years of schooling (years) (2020–2035)—5
scenarios (Source United Nations and own calculations
Economics) 160
Fig. 11.6 Mean years of schooling (years) (2020–2035)—5
scenarios (Source United Nations and own calculations
Economics) 160
Fig. 11.7 Personal Disposable income, euros (2020–2035)—5
scenarios (Source Own calculations based on the Global
Fig. 11.8 Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion
(percentage of the total population) (2020–2035)—5
scenarios (Source Eurostat and own calculations based
on the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics) 162
xxxii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 11.9 Income Quintile Share Ratio S80/S20 for Disposable

Income (ratio) (2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source
Eurostat and own calculations based on the Global
Fig. 11.10 Social Protection Expenditure, Euro per inhabitant,
at constant 2010 prices (2020–2035)—5 scenarios
(Source Eurostat and own calculations based
Fig. 11.11 Infant mortality, Deaths per 1000 live births
(2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source World Bank and own
Fig. 11.12 Health care expenditure (euro per inhabitant)
(2020–2035)—5 scenarios (Source Eurostat and own
Fig. 12.1 Judge Current Situation in your country as good (%
of the population) (Source Standard Eurobarometer
and own calculations based on the Global Economic
Model of Oxford Economics. Note Those responding
“very good” or “rather good”, while the rest possible
responses are “rather bad” and “very bad”) 169
Fig. 12.2 Judge the current situation in your national
economy as good (% of the population) (Source
Standard Eurobarometer and own calculations based
on the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics.
Fig. 12.3 Judge the financial situation of your household as good
(% of the population) (Source Standard Eurobarometer
Model of Oxford Economics. Note Those responding
“very good” or “rather good”, while the rest possible
responses are “rather bad” and “very bad”) 170
Fig. 12.4 General economic situation over the next 12
months (Source Eurostat and own calculations based
Fig. 12.5 Price trends over the next 12 months (Source Eurostat
LIST OF FIGURES xxxiii
Fig. 12.6 Trust in National Parliament (% of the population

that tends to trust) (Source Standard Eurobarometer
Fig. 12.7 Trust in National Government (% of the population
Fig. 12.8 Trust in political parties (% of the population that tends
to trust) (Source Standard Eurobarometer and own
Fig. 12.9 What is your opinion on EMU with one single currency,
the euro (% of the population that answer “for”) (Source
Standard Eurobarometer and own calculations based
Fig. 12.10 Trust in the European Commission (% of the population
Fig. 13.1 Output gap as a percentage of potential output (%)
(Source Own calculations based on the Global Economic
Fig. 13.2 Exports of Goods and Services (bn euros) (Source Own
Fig. 13.3 Imports of Goods and Services (bn euros) (Source Own
Fig. 13.4 Current account balance of payments (share of GDP)
(Source Own calculations based on the Global Economic
Fig. 13.5 Private Consumption (bn euros) (Source Own
Fig. 13.6 Total Investments (bn euros) (Source Own calculations
Economics) 184
Fig. 13.7 House Price Index (2015 = 100) (Source Own
xxxiv LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 13.8 GDP in Manufacturing (bn euros) (Source Own

Fig. 13.9 Government balance, Maastricht definition (share
of GDP) (Source Own calculations based on the Global
Fig. 13.10 Government primary balance (share of GDP) (Source
Own calculations based on the Global Economic Model
Fig. 13.11 Gross government debt Maastricht definition (share
of GDP) (Source Own calculations based on the Global
Fig. 13.12 Government Expenditures (% GDP) (Source Own
Fig. 13.13 GDP per hour worked (Source Own calculations based
List of Tables
Table 2.1 The economic measures used for the scenarios’ projections 25
Table 2.2 Specific hypotheses of the first version of the Growth
Scenario 27
Table 2.3 Specific hypotheses for the unsustainable growth,
transformation, and Falldown scenarios 30
Table 2.4 Hypotheses of each scenario 33
xxxv
PART I
Alternative Futures Analysis
In Part I of the present book, we introduce the reader to the method-

ology used for scenario building and alternative futures analysis. First,
we discuss how historical path-dependence and the presence of mega-
trends “shape” the future (Chapter 1). We use a multidirectional approach
through pastcasting and backcasting to highlight how the past, the
present, and the future are connected through history and the dynamic
presence of economic, social, and political megatrends. Second, we
explore the “art” of forecasting, which is a combination of analytical skills,
creativity, and a multidisciplinary outlook (Chapter 2). Essentially, we
provide a step-by-step guide for scenario building analysis and generate
the four possible scenarios for Greece in the next decade. Third, we high-
light the importance of a series of contextual or “swinging” factors for the
future (Chapter 3). Such factors concern the social and political settings,
cultural values, and the effects of irreducible uncertainty. The analysis of
the swinging factors is crucial because it facilitates speculation regarding
which scenario is more likely to prevail.1
1 Let it be noted that the chapters from Part I draw from the following: (i) Alternative
Futures of Capitalist Economy by Petrakis, P.E. and Kanzola, A.-M. which was presented
in the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, July
2-5, 2021; (ii) Environmental Behavioral Perceptions on Alternative Economic Futures by
Kanzola, A.-M, Papaioannou, K., and Petrakis, P.E. which was presented and awarded in
the 16th Academy of Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Knowledge Conference, June 28–
30, 2022; and (iii) The Political Economy of Alternative Economic Futures by Petrakis
E.P. in The Routledge Handbook of Comparative Economic Systems, Dallago, B. &
Casagrande, S. (Eds.), forthcoming.
CHAPTER 1
Setting the Scenery: Factors Affecting

the Future
1.1 Introduction
The future is a fluid state which is constructed by the past, the present,
and the expectations—and hopes—for what lies ahead. Thus, history
is important. The importance of history has been acknowledged since
ancient times. In his play “Antiope”, Euripides, the famous ancient
tragedian of Classical Athens, expresses the opinion that “happy [is]
the man who has gained knowledge through inquiry” (Ôλβιoς Óστις
τÁς ƒστoρ…ας eσχε μ£θησιν). In addition, according to the Italian
This chapter draws from the following: (i) Alternative futures of capitalist
economy by Petrakis, P. E., & Kanzola, A.-M. which was presented in the 33rd
annual meeting of the society for the advancement of socio-economics, July
2–5, 2021; (ii) Environmental behavioral perceptions on alternative economic
futures by Kanzola, A.-M., Papaioannou, K., & Petrakis, P. E. which was
presented and awarded in the 16th academy of innovation, entrepreneurship,
and knowledge conference, June 28–30, 2022; and (iii) The political economy of
alternative economic futures by Petrakis E. P. in The Routledge Handbook of
comparative economic systems, Dallago, B., & Casagrande, S. (Eds.),
forthcoming.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2023
P. E. Petrakis et al., The Future of the Greek Economy,
The Political Economy of Greek Growth up to 2030,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26872-4_1
4 P. E. PETRAKIS ET AL.
philosopher Benedetto Croce (1923/2007), “all history is contemporary

history” (storia contemporanea) because through historical events we can
interpret, at some point, the present.
In essence, to understand how the future may evolve, it is necessary
to understand how we arrived at the present (Bradfield et al., 2016),
because historical analysis brings about causality dynamics. In that regard,
a greater emphasis on history can enhance the efficiency of scenario
building by highlighting the causality of future change (Bradfield et al.,
2016). However, the relationship between the past, the present, and the
future is complex. History often offers insights into the future, but it can
also mislead planners since past trends and dynamics wane (Schoemaker,
2020). The main question that arises is: how much should we focus on
the past when trying to predict the (short) future? Let it be noted that we
use the adjective “short” because, contrary to scenario building exercises,
in historical terms, ten years is a very small timeframe.
In the present chapter, we aim to answer this question by focusing
on recent economic and political historical events and trends that will
shape the future. This is necessary in order to meet one of the most diffi-
cult challenges in predicting the future, which is to design efficient and
insightful scenarios for future-fit policies. Moreover, scenario building and
foresight are interdisciplinary tasks combining the three main characteris-
tics of the future to which we have alluded: history, present events, and
key uncertainty factors.
The current chapter provides a comprehensive examination of the
significance of history in scenario building, which serves as a means for
forecasting the future. Given that history connects the past with the
present, we focus on the recent historical events that shaped the economic
future for the next ten years (Sect. 1.2). The connectors of the present
with the future are the several economic and social drivers in the form
of megatrends—which, in many cases, are being accelerated by economic
shocks. Hence, we explore how such drivers generate new realities in the
economic, social, and political realms (Sect. 1.3). Following this reasoning
process, we are able to answer the question posed regarding which
historical events are essential when envisioning the future (Sect. 1.4).
1 SETTING THE SCENERY: FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE 5
1.2 Tales from the Past Shaping the Future:

Theory, Economic Crises, and Political Behaviors
As stated earlier, it is essential to understand the relationship between the
past, the present, and the future with respect to scenario building. To
that end, the present part is divided into two sub-sections, where Sub-
Sect. 1.2.1 concerns a critical literature review on the subject and Sub-
Sect. 1.2.2 discusses the importance of the three most recent economic
crises and the role of political and social behaviors in shaping the future.
1.2.1 Theory
Scenario building and foresight, in general, concentrate on the predic-
tion of the future which—unavoidably—originates in the past, meaning
that we are unable to imagine the future without invoking past occur-
rences (Bendor et al., 2021). Scenarios are heuristic narratives exploring
plausible alternatives of the future and, methodologically, they rely on the
same techniques that historians use when writing about the past (Staley,
2002). Thus, historians and scenario planners can learn from each other
(Schoemaker, 2020).
One of the most difficult challenges to overcome in predicting
the future is designing efficient and insightful scenarios. To that end,
according to Deal et al. (2017), scenario planners should not only focus
on forecasting—which concerns the exploration of future possibilities
(Bendor et al., 2021)—but also on three other properties. These prop-
erties are (a) recasting, which is the ability to analyze a situation from a
point in time in the past to the current condition; (b) pastcasting, which
is the ability to analyze a situation from the current condition to a point
in time in the past; and (c) backcasting, which is the ability to analyze a
situation from a point in time in the future to the current condition (Deal
et al., 2017). Such a multidirectional approach, (Deal et al., 2017), corre-
sponds to the nature of scenario building which is an interdisciplinary task
that combines history, present events, and key uncertainty factors.
According to Bendor et al. (2021), there are three main reasons for
incorporating historical analysis into scenario building: first, for the illu-
mination of the relationships between the past and the future; second,
as a means to challenge deterministic perceptions of the past as a single,
linear, inevitable set of events; third, as a way of enriching the futuring
processes by enriching their timeframe.
In essence, we can examine history during the primary stages of

scenario building exercises where we are just “setting the scenery” and
trying to locate the predetermined elements1 (Wack, 1985) of the future.
Discussing the past and why the expectations of contemporary people
were not born out in the past, provides the following information: first,
we receive insights into the impact of social values and collective needs
that affect human behavior and expectations; second, we understand the
reasons why some expectations did not come true; third, we are able
to evaluate the ways in which a “surprise” impacts expectations and
consider how to mitigate them. Such conclusions relate to the fact that
humans make decisions using predictions that are subjective and origi-
nate from their past experiences (Pillin, 2020). Nevertheless, we should
use “learning from the past” in a balanced way, employing creative imag-
ination and with due consideration of how the future may differ from the
past (Bradfield et al., 2016).
1.2.2 The Recent Economic Crises and Political Behaviors

Economic crises affect economic organizations and the growth rate of
economies. The severity, periodicity, and extent of their consequences
affect future prospects of economic growth and individual and social well-
being. Broadly, economic shocks reshape the expectations of individuals,
which eventually lead them to modify their goals and, in turn, drasti-
cally reshape the future. A severe economic shock could lead to a shift
from post-materialism to materialism, meaning that society is backlashing
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Such an outcome is mainly attributed to the
inefficiency of formal institutions in adapting and providing sustainable
solutions during a shock.
On the other hand, the effects of cultural backlash have negative
implications, marking an era of political change and offsetting important
post-materialistic goals such as sustainability.2 In parallel, policymakers
and formal institutions are unable to generate social trust, exacerbating
the social trend and leading to an increase in uncertainty. Under such
1 For a step-by-step guide to scenario building and the use of the terms mentioned in
the present chapter, please refer to Chapter 2 of this book.
2 For example, the rise of populism may limit progressive change in conservation gover-
nance, leading to a decline in biological diversity accompanied by a worsening of climate
change (Manfredo et al., 2017).
complex conditions, the future seems extremely uncertain due to the

increased level of interconnections and the powerful forces inducing
change (Wilikinson et al., 2013). Hence, economic crises affect the
mapping of the future and constitute phenomena worth examining. By
and large, economic shocks are drivers for change and generators of
uncertainty affecting future prospects.
As of today, global economies are experiencing the effects of three
back-to-back crises: The Great Recession of 2008; the coronavirus disease
2019, and the energy crisis of 2022, due to the geopolitical tensions in
Eastern Europe when Russia invaded Ukraine. Each of the three crises
has certain unique characteristics but they share in common their severe
impact on the global economy due to the increased level of intercon-
nections. In addition to their socio-economic impact, in the long term,
they will affect the ideological basis for policymaking. Therefore, they are
decisive factors when we attempt to predict the future.
The Great Recession of 2008 occurred in the financial sector and was
characterized by a sharp decline in economic activity, resulting in high
levels of unemployment (Atkinson et al., 2013; Papapetrou & Tsala-
porta, 2021). As a result, the Great Recession of 2008 led to an increase
in economic and job uncertainty (Born et al., 2017). To mitigate the
crisis, governments used quantitative easing and made significant struc-
tural changes for the consolidation of the banking system (Arslan &
Upper, 2018; Cortes et al., 2022; Danielsson, 2015). Nevertheless, in
terms of policymaking, there was an underestimation in the realization
of bank risk, the effect of which was more severe for the Eurozone due
to its structural characteristics (Petrakis et al., 2013). The severity of the
economic decline and the rise of economic uncertainty favored support
for populist parties3 (Gozgor, 2022) offsetting progressive change.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, the global economy
experienced the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, emerging at
the end of January 2020, in the form of a public health crisis. One of
the most significant aspects of the COVID-19 is the fact that employ-
ment and economic activity collapsed in a very short period of time
(mere weeks) and this impacted every individual around the globe regard-
less of social class (Scanni, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic caused a
3 In general, populism is triggered by crises (and triggers crises itself), but it does not
appear in all economic and political settings, making predictions for the future extremely
difficult (European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2019).
sudden halt of economic activity, impacting both the demand and supply
side (Novy & Jary, 2021). Governmental response was inclusive and
concerned (a) social distancing measures and the support of the health
system, (b) unconventional economic policies characterized by state inter-
vention and fiscal stimulus packages (IMF, 2021), and (c) central banks’
intervention in cooperation with governments to stabilize the financial
markets (IMF, 2020).
Regarding policymaking, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the
fact that unconventional economic policies should be added to the policy
toolkit of the central banks (Bernanke, 2020). An important consequence
of the COVID-19 pandemic was the increase in existential uncertainty
paired with economic and job uncertainty (Petrakis, 2020), as well as
the increased levels of governmental debt, which poses structural ques-
tions in terms of the organization of global economies (Beetsma, 2022;
Regling, 2022). In parallel, the COVID-19 pandemic increased social
costs (Pereznieto & Oehler, 2021) due to the increased inequality at a
global level (Sidik, 2022; Stiglitz, 2022) and the effects on entrepreneur-
ship and the labor market (Yeyati & Filippini, 2021). In addition, it
demonstrated the importance of robust and resilient institutions.
On the other hand, the energy crisis of 20224 is the latest and most
severe in a series of cyclical energy shortages of the last 50 years. Broadly,
energy crises are cyclical events that emerge as a result of regional short-
ages, armed conflicts, and market manipulation (Coyle & Simmons,
2014). The economic consequences of an energy crisis negatively impact
all macroeconomic variables due to the vital role of energy in economic
processes (Kilian, 2008).
The energy crisis of 2022 differs from past energy crises because it
emerged in the middle of a perfect storm as the global economy is
trying to get back on track and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Regarding Europe—which does not possess energy alternatives (Ghilès,
2022)—the geopolitical conflict in Eastern Europe brought to the fore
the negative implications of an extremely interconnected world that was
dependent on Russia’s energy supply lines. The governmental response to
mitigating the energy crisis concerned the shift back to coal (Frost, 2022).
4 It should be noted that this chapter was authored in the middle of October 2022,
when the long-term consequences and geopolitical developments were, yet, uncertain and
in progress. For this reason, we identify the geopolitical landscape as one of the key-factor
uncertainties in Chapter 2.
However, such a shift in energy supply will undermine efforts to miti-

gate climate change, which is a top priority for social well-being globally.
In addition, the geopolitical conflict resulted in geopolitical, existential,
climate, and policy uncertainties (Anayi et al., 2022; Nygaard, 2022),
which are going to impact and shape the mapping of the future.
Hitherto, we have discussed the main characteristics of the three
back-to-back crises, but we have not focused on their main implica-
tions for the future. First, the three aforementioned crises bequeathed
severe and different levels of uncertainty to the global economy, which
significantly impacts economic activity (Bloom, 2014). Second, the three
crises impacted consumers’ behavior and expectations, making them more
shortsighted as individuals tend to panic (Loxton et al., 2020). Following
the increased demand and the inflation caused by the expansionary poli-
cies and the energy crisis, supply did not meet the increased demand
(Canuto, 2022). Third, economic shocks and crises test the resilience of
formal institutions and governments, and in case the latter fail to miti-
gate them, economic shocks undermine societal trust and disorganize
the system (Algan et al., 2017). In addition, as stated earlier, crisis-
driven economic insecurity is a substantial driver of populism and political
distrust (Algan et al., 2017). In sum, the consequences of the three
economic crises extend into the realms of economic, social, and political
life, literally “shaping” human behavior and, hence, the future.
1.3 Connecting the Present

with the Future: The Megatrends
The analysis of megatrends is one of the most important tools used
in foresight because they provide information regarding the present
(Malik & Janowska, 2018). In essence, we use them as “starting points”
to define the most important drivers for change in the present (Slaughter,
1993). By the term “megatrends”, we refer to those powerful and inter-
connected forces that transform society and shape the future (Naisbitt,
1988). Many megatrends manifest within society as a result of technolog-
ical change, social, political, and economic tendencies (Jeflea et al., 2021).
Let it be noted that megatrends occur all at once and are heavily intercon-
nected. Hence, each megatrend is connected to all of the aforementioned
realms. Megatrends are of an economic, social, and political nature (Retief
et al., 2016; Watson, 2010). The most important megatrends concern
the transforming role of technology, the climate crisis, economic multi-

polarity, demographical changes, changing human behaviors that allot a
central place to individual empowerment, and the macro-socio-economic
goal of embracing sustainability (Kanzola et al., 2022; Petrakis & Kanzola,
2021).
Technological change exerts effects at a microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic levels. These effects are both positive and negative. For example,
new technologies make access to information easier than ever, but they
generate information anxiety and might lead to adverse selection (Watson,
2010). Additionally, new technologies alter the nature of occupations,
generating job uncertainty and challenging the labor market’s resilience.
In the political realm, big tech companies act as perfect monopolists with
growing economic power over information at a time when the protec-
tion of personal information and intellectual rights is important for the
maintenance of entrepreneurship (Petrakis & Kanzola, 2022). Moreover,
social media platforms, in light of individual empowerment, can be used
to manipulate public opinion and political agendas, making the role of
governmental and formal institutions more complex.
Economic multipolarity, as a result of geopolitical and economic
tensions, highlights de-globalization trends and the vulnerability of inter-
connected economies. Such tendencies are accompanied by power-shifts
and population transfers, which in turn reinforce urbanization and the
weakening of the primary sector of economic activity. Regarding demo-
graphical changes, we should also note that in advanced economies, the
population is aging, generating several economic and social problems.
Finally, climate change affects all aspects of natural, social, political, and
economic life and it requires drastic, efficient, and sustainable measures
for its mitigation. However, one of the most significant challenges in the
mitigation of climate change is to properly mobilize individuals, govern-
ments, and societies (Kanzola et al., 2022). Broadly, climate change has
the following consequences: loss of biodiversity; decline of individuals’
quality of life; water shortages; destruction of infrastructures; increase in
poverty; armed conflicts for the control of non-renewable resources, and
others (Artuso & Guijt, 2020). Given the importance of climate change
for the future of our species, it is the catalyst in the game and the second
of the key-factor uncertainties when we try to imagine the future.5
5 Please refer to Chapter 2.

1.4 Conclusions: Use of History,

Scenario Building, and Foresight
At the beginning of this chapter, we questioned how much we could rely
on the past to predict the future. Of course, by “relying on the past”
we mean the study of the past and the consequences it bequeaths to the
future. The answer to this question depends on the nature of past events
because their severity and periodicity are going to determine the range
and impact of their consequences. For instance, in Sub-Sect. 1.2.2 we
discussed the main characteristics of the three back-to-back crises because
they are going to have long-term effects at microeconomic and macroe-
conomic levels. The main reason for this lies in the fact that they occurred
after the Great Moderation period of the 1980s, which was characterized
by macroeconomic stability and prosperity. After a long period of stability,
three significant fluctuations reshape human behavior. Having said that,
the three almost simultaneous crises that were characterized by high and
different degrees of uncertainty, are going to change the way we think
about the future, our expectations and hopes. In parallel, the accelerated
global trends—discussed in Sect. 1.3—already present as of the begin-
ning of the 2000s, are drivers for change. Some of these drivers, such as
climate change, are extremely forceful and bequeath ever higher uncer-
tainty to the system. Hence, to build realistic and efficient scenarios for
the future, the futurist should account for historical path-dependence,
social behaviors, and the presence of megatrends. Figure 1.1 summarizes
the aforementioned points.
12
P. E. PETRAKIS ET AL.
Fig. 1.1 What connects us with the future? (Source Authors’ creation. Note The consequences of past events, the
interpretation of past events in the present, and the unavoidable forces of change—which are dynamic in nature—
contribute to the construction of the future. In sum, the future is built from received information, hopes, and speculation)
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A Carbonaria italiana, dirigida pelo mystico republicano Mazzini,
alargando os seus ramos por toda a Europa, para fundar a republica
universal e redemptora, infiltrara-se entre nós tambem com a sua
alta-venda ou choça-mãe d’onde dependiam as vendas ou choças
filiaes e as barracas. Em Coimbra havia a choça de Kossuth, o
hungaro. (M. Carvalho, Hist. contemp.) N’esta maçonaria novissima
alistavam-se os moços, e d’ahi saía a direcção politica, republicana
e democratica.
N’este estado veiu a Regeneração encontrar os elementos
desordenados e fracos dos revolucionarios portuguezes; e os laivos
de socialismo que n’elles havia fizeram com que ella em grande
parte absorvesse a cauda moça do partido setembrista, já tambem
eivada de doutrinas ou sentimentos cosmopolitas e philantropicos.
Das vendas carbonarias passou então o foco da agitação
revolucionaria para as sociedades operarias. Fundou-se em Lisboa
o Centro-promotor. «As idéas societarias que desde 48 tinham ido
calando no coração dos desvalidos da fortuna» inspiravam ao
mesmo tempo os typographos que se faziam litteratos-politicos
(Vieira-da-Silva, Albuquerque, etc.), os engenheiros mais ou menos
socialistas (Rolla, Latino, Brandão), e os antigos setembristas que
viam a urgencia de infiltrar idéas e sangue novo no partido. Ao
theatro romantico de Mendes-Leal, heroes panta-façudos, homens-
de-ferro com uma linguagem de medos, substituiu-se um outro
genero: eram os homens ou as mulheres de marmore, dramas
satanicos mostrando ao povo a corrupção dos ricos; eram as peças
operarias, inspiradas pelas obras de Sand e Eugenio-Sue, em que o
homem de trabalho apparecia heroe, luctando com energia e talento
contra os crimes e preconceitos de uma sociedade madrasta.
Desgarrados, sem cohesão nem consistencia todos estes
elementos revolucionarios, a Regeneração tendia a inclinar todos os
dias mais no sentido revolucionario, á imagem do que succedia por
toda a Europa latina.
Rodrigo, que a principio se apoiara no grupo setembrista da
Revolução, foi pouco a pouco bolinando tanto no sentido opposto,
que a presidencia official do partido passou de Saldanha para
Terceira (no gabinete de 59). Já em 54 D. João de Azevedo escrevia
de Lisboa a José Passos: «Conte que antes de pouco tempo muitas
notabilidades do partido cabralista hão-de obter graças e mercês,
porque a estrategia de Rodrigo está hoje posta n’isso.» (Carta, na
corr. autogr. dos Passos) Assim tinha de ser. Que era a
Regeneração, senão o utilitarismo cabralista sem doutrina? Que fôra
o cabralismo, senão uma regeneração sem dinheiro nem
scepticismo, só com doutrina e violencias? 48 levantara uma
labareda, mas o incendio apagou-se rapido. A Polonia, a Italia, a
Hungria ficaram quaes se achavam antes; a França restaurou o
papa em Roma, e tolerou em Milão o austriaco. Depois dos dias de
junho em que o socialismo de Paris foi esmagado, viera Napoleão III
pôr um freio ás temeridades revolucionarias.
O romantismo politico, a que nós estudámos as duas faces
successivas (1826-1838, Palmella, Herculano), finara-se de todo
com uma revolução em que já entravam elementos de diversa
origem.
O que caracterisa esse periodo é a grandeza generosa das
aspirações, combinada com a indeterminação das idéas, um
vago idealismo ou antes sentimentalismo que envolve e
abraça, sem dar por isso, as maiores contradicções praticas
e se lança no caminho das mais perigosas aventuras com um
sorriso de confiança ingenua e quasi infantil. Este
phenomeno de uma revolução sem pensamento explica-se
pelas condições particulares do meio em que se
desenvolveu.
Era em primeiro lugar um individualismo sentimental, ao
mesmo tempo cheio de reivindicações e de effusões e que
pretendia corrigir o egoismo das reclamações do direito
individual com os preceitos moraes e poeticos da
fraternidade.—Em segundo lugar, a attitude
determinadamente hostil das monarchias constitucionaes
dominadas pela alta burguezia ávida e agiota, tornava-lhes
imminente a queda sem que se podesse dizer que essa
queda implicava uma verdadeira revolução porque as classes
contra ellas insurgidas não tinham principalmente em vista
destruir, no seu principio, o regimen existente, mas pelo
contrario, entrar n’elle, apossar-se d’elle, alargando-o (pelo
suffragio) até ás proporções da nova democracia.—Em
terceiro lugar, finalmente a attitude das classes operarias
vinha lançar no meio d’esta confusão intellectual e politica
mais um elemento de perturbação, e o mais formidavel de
todos. O Socialismo, tão mal comprehendido pelos seus
adversarios, como mal definido pelos seus partidarios, foi
transformado n’um monstro, o famoso espectro vermelho; e o
terror abria caminho a uma reacção tão geral e irresistivel
que arrastou comsigo não só o Socialismo, não só a
Republica, mas ainda o proprio regimen liberal e todas as
garantias legaes tão custosamente conquistadas.
O drama romantico veiu a dar por toda a parte n’uma
conclusão tragica. A Hungria foi esmagada, esmagadas a
Italia, a Rumania, a Polonia. Na Alemanha, na Austria, o
cezarismo dissolve os parlamentos nacionaes, rasga as
constituições que o susto lhe fizera jurar no primeiro
momento de surpreza e estabelece solidamente e por muitos
annos o regimen militar. Em França, d’onde partira o impulso
revolucionario, o Socialismo, tornado a execração de todos
os partidos, cae exangue nas barricadas de junho, e o
movimento reaccionario, uma vez lançado, não pára sem ter
destruido a republica, as garantias liberaes constitucionaes,
humilhado a democracia, e sobre todas estas ruinas
estabelecido o imperio conservador, ao mesmo tempo rural,
militar, bancario e clerical.
Taes foram os resultados da evolução romantica. Mas a
geração que a preparou e a consummou não podia prever
taes resultados. A sua confiança era tão longa, como vastas
as suas aspirações: e se aquella era infundada, estas eram
generosas e alevantadas. Talvez nunca a historia registrasse
uma tão completa catastrophe, saída d’um tal concurso de
bellos sentimentos, de elevados intuitos, de personalidades
brilhantes e heroicas. Os promotores e fautores d’aquelle
movimento, os Lamartine, Ledru Rollin, Arago, Luis Blanc,
Proudhon, Raspail, Mazzini, Garibaldi, Manin, Gagern,
Rosetti, Bem, Kossuth, e todos os que indirectamente o
prepararam, oradores, pensadores, poetas, Lammenais,
Michelet, Quinet, Hugo, Sand, Sue, Leroux, Mickiewicz,
Gioberti, Manzoni, Cantu, Mamiani, Feuerbach, Heine,
formam uma pleiade incomparavel pelo talento e pelo
caracter; e não admira que, apezar do vago e do incoherente
das suas doutrinas, dominassem tão completamente o
espirito da geração que atraz d’elles se lançou fanatisada no
caminho de inevitavel desastre. (A. de Quental, Lopez de
Mendonça, no Operario.)
Em Portugal, varias causas concorriam para que a revolução de
48 não chegasse a nascer. Era o cançasso dos partidos, era a
miseria da nação, era a influencia de Rodrigo, epilogo sceptico da
historia liberal. Era tambem a circumstancia de que dos dois motivos
do 48 europeu, o democratico já entre nós fôra ensaiado e ficara
desacreditado em 36; e o socialista não tinha classes operarias
fabrís bastante numerosas para o fazerem vingar. Em vez de uma
revolução, tivemos uma Regeneração a que os revolucionarios
como José-Estevão, Lopes-de-Mendonça etc., adheriram, conforme
sabemos. Mas quando todos esses viram o partido novo tornar-se
cada dia mais velho; quando assistiram ao accordo de
Regeneradores e Historicos a favor das irmans-da-Caridade, que
era a questão ardente, separaram-se, para fundar o Futuro, jornal,
partido das aspirações vagas de um romantismo serodio cujo chefe
era José-Estevão. A ausencia de numerosas classes operarias
principalmente impedira antes a revolução, e impedia agora o nova
partido de ganhar estabilidade. E como não chegou a haver lucta,
não houve motivo para repressões: e como uma das causas da paz
era a fraqueza, manteve-se a liberdade por não haver interesses
nem motivos fortes em conflicto.
Opportunamente morreu o tribuno (nov. 4 de 62) que durante a
vida não cessara de praticar nobres actos inopportunos. Como typo
e symbolo de uma geração que nunca chegou a ter voz, passou
para o tumulo deixando os companheiros dispersos, entregues á
desillusão, absorvidos pelos seus trabalhos profissionaes. Ao Futuro
succedeu ainda a Politica-liberal; á Patriotica, o club do Pateo-do-
Salema, d’onde saíu ainda a força bastante para em janeiro de 68
derrubar os conservadores do governo.
Veiu logo a revolução de Hespanha complicar a situação com
esperanças republicanas e intrigas ibericas; veiu depois a guerra do
Paraguay seccar a fonte dos ingressos de dinheiro do Brazil: tudo
isto declarou em crise o resto das antigas esperanças.
Debandaram todos, cada qual para seu lado. Os excentricos
ficaram esperando pela republica doirada; os praticos, ou se
alliaram aos conservadores, ou se congregaram em reformismo
opportunista. E as velhas idéas societarias? Tambem a iniciação do
fomento influiu sobre ellas; mas a dureza do regime capitalista da
burguezia, em vez de lhes fazer como a politica realista fazia aos
romanticos: em vez de as reduzir a um pó de chimeras, obrigou-as a
declararem-se em partido dos pobres contra os ricos, n’uma guerra
de classes, anachronica de certo, mas ameaçadora. A Hespanha
teve Carthagena, a França teve ainda a Communa de 71: nós
tivemos umas gréves apenas, por não possuirmos sufficiente
industria fabril.
Tal foi o caracter que o Socialismo tomou, sob o influxo do
Utilitarismo, sem que se veja ainda que outro e melhor o espera.
Dissipadas as chimeras, conquistadas as garantias individuaes,
conferida ao povo uma soberania negada ao throno: crê alguem que
tudo está feito? Espera alguem que esse povo, soberano e mendigo
ao mesmo tempo, não reclamará uma revisão da legislação
economica? Perigosa teima será negal-o, porque as revoluções
inevitaveis, se se não consummarem de cima para baixo, dar-se-
hão ao inverso, de baixo para cima—como a labareda que sóbe
crepitante!
4.—D. PEDRO V
Esquecemos, n’estes successivos relances, o throno. E entretanto

em Portugal nunca deixou de haver monarcha. Depois de D. Maria
ii, matrona antiga coroada, veiu o rei-artista, cezar sem amor á
guerra; depois D. Pedro v; por fim o rei actual. O seu finado irmão
era um romantico posthumo. Contava dezoito annos quando subiu
ao throno (n. 16 de set. de 37; r. 55) e com um temperamento
observador, grave, desde creança o foram impressionando os
episodios deploraveis da historia d’esse tempo. Tem o leitor
presente a memoria de D. Duarte, o infeliz rei, tão sabio, tão bom,
tão cheio de terrores e de escrupulos? Foi como elle D. Pedro v
«esse pobre rapaz» que o destino condemnara a ser principe. Já
não estava nos usos consultar bruxas e adivinhos, mas o rei tinha
em si o feitio de espirito que pede milagres. Considerava-se
predestinado, ao inverso de D. Sebastião, para um fim breve e
funebre; via-se coberto de terra, mettido n’uma cova, imagem viva
da morte, fatalidade ambulante movido por uma sina triste. Era uma
saudade, a sua alma; e o coração, batendo, parecia-lhe um dobre
de finados! Saudade de uma honra esquecida, dobres pela morte de
um povo desditoso? Symbolo de uma nação cadaver, considerava-
se, elle rei, minado por todas as pestes. Roía o um remorso
inconsciente que o fazia apparecer bisonho e triste, com um sorriso
doentio na face, a mudez nos labios, no olhar o quer que é de
somnambulo. Interpretando os acasos com o seu fado, explicando
tudo pela sua sina, achava em si a causa de muitas desgraças.
Quando o patriarcha voltava de o baptisar, partiram-se-lhe as rodas
da carruagem e caíu ... Aos dez annos, já o principe tinha pesadelos
que o faziam scismar: uma grande aguia negra tomava-o nas
garras, levantava-o ao ar, deixando-o caír e despedaçar-se ... A
aguia tornava a subir levando para os ares o mano Luiz ... Tinha
então dez annos e contava os terrores ao seu mestre. (Bastos,
Mem. bio. de D. Pedro V) Depois chegou a crer que matava o que
tocasse. O general Loureiro morrera de apoplexia? porque elle o
affligira com certos ditos. D. Carlos de Mascarenhas morrera?
porque elle o obrigara a um passeio excessivo. E o Curso-superior,
o filho do seu amor ás lettras, era baptisado com o cadaver de D.
José d’Almada, com a loucura de Lopez de Mendonça! (Andrade
Ferreira, Vida, etc.) Tragica figura de um rei que se acredita a má
sina do seu povo! Não seria ella o summario de uma historia
miseravel, o symbolo de uma nação pobre, o espectro de um povo
caduco? Não viria como resultado de trinta annos de miseria,
lentamente cristolisados n’um cerebro impressionavel, definir com o
seu genio a epocha?
Se ás superstições funebres se póde achar esta razão de
psychologia historica, não é mistér appellar para tão longe quando
se observa o outro lado do seu caracter. Com olhos de pessimista, e
esses eram os bons olhos para vêr Portugal, tinha em tanta conta os
que o rodeavam, cria tanto n’elles, que mandou pôr á porta do seu
palacio uma caixa-verde, cuja chave guardava, para que o seu povo
podesse falar-lhe com franqueza, queixar-se, accusar os crimes dos
governantes. Singular modo de conceber o seu papel de rei de uma
nação livre, parlamentar! Os ministros que não escarneciam d’elle,
principiavam a temel-o; outros a odial-o. O povo começava a amar a
bondade e a justiça de um rei tão triste. Já corria de bocca em
bocca a lenda do novo monarcha: um infeliz! E o amor não era feito
de esperanças, mas de presentimentos funebres e de uma
consciencia certa da fatalidade commum do povo e do rei. «Se elle
podesse!» Mas entre elle e o povo simples havia de permeio os
politicos.—«Como o rei é justo, bom e nobre! Nem quer que lhe
beijem a mão, nem que dobrem o joelho, nem quer matar um só
criminoso, o santo! Se não fossem os politicos!» E esta corrente de
intimidade entre o povo e o rei cresceu a ponto de se chegarem a
formular votos pelo absolutismo. (Th. Braga, Hist. do rom.) A alma
espontanea dos povos latinos, idealistas, sem os calculos, as
reservas, os planos de outras raças, só acclama os factos simples: é
inaccessivel ás fórmulas. Quem no meio-dia quizer ser grande, seja
forte, seja rei: Pombal, D. Miguel, Saldanha ainda, ou seja um bom
pae, um bom protector do povo!
Como o seria porém D. Pedro v, se se acreditava marcado por
uma estrella funesta; se, fumando como um estudante o seu cigarro,
ouvia a licção do seu mestre Herculano, licção em que ás fórmulas
liberaes-romanticas se juntava o ensino de uma reprovação
universal—dos politicos, um bando; do povo, um desgraçado? As
fórmulas sabias murchariam a flor da ambição, se ella viesse a
desabrochar, porque as jeremiadas do propheta enraizavam na
alma do rei o seu pessimismo. Como que abdicava, instruindo-se; e,
em vez de se entregar ao officio proprio do seu posto, velava as
noites a estudar, os dias passava-os aferindo a realidade por uma
historia vista com oculos de metaphisicas nebulosas, de idealismos
mysticos. Parecia um monge somnambulo; mas a mocidade, a
virtude estampada no seu rosto, ganhavam um encanto de
melancholia com essa perda das noites veladas. O dia, a luz do sol,
a realidade, os homens, tudo então se lhe affigurava um sonho:
pesadelo triste, a sua má sina! Quando não era funebre, era ironico,
epigrammatico: o seu reino parecia-lhe o peior da Europa. Lera o
livro de About La Grèce contemporaine, e annotando-o, poz no
titulo: La Grèce—et Portugal.
Ora Portugal já por fórma alguma era como a Grecia
contemporanea. Fôra-o sem duvida, mas desde que o espirito
pratico vencera em 51, conquistando a si o primeiro dos palikaras
portuguezes, Saldanha, todas as ambições nacionaes estavam
tornados para uma Beocia antiga, farta de cearas. O genio do rei
não chegava a conceber um ideal tão mesquinho, e só via o
passado, com os olhos cégos para o futuro iniciado. Elle era o fim
de uma historia, o epilogo summario de um tomo, inserido por erro
depois das primeiras paginas do livro seguinte. Por isso lhe
chamámos posthumo. Considerava-se a si um nuncio da morte e via
moribundo o seu povo. Estimaria que o caminho de ferro se fizesse
com inglezes «para metter sangue novo nas veias d’esta raça
atrophiada». Como se sabe, os operarios cruzam com as
camponezas e o caminho de ferro ia atravessar o reino em dois
sentidos. Singulares, dramaticas deviam ter sido as conversas entre
o mystico principe e o Salamanca, o aventureiro audaz das
novissimas emprezas que se propuzera regenerar Portugal. O
embaixador que as ouviu, apresentando ao rei antigo o moderno
barão da industria e do banco, dizia que para descrever bem a
acena «seria necessario la pluma de un Cervantes.» Salamanca,
soccarron, affectando gravidade na sua face castelhana, como um
Gil-Blaz, ouvia D. Pedro que queria lucir-se. O picaro confessava a
sua ignorancia: nem era philosopho, nem sabio! um homem-de-
negocios, senhor! E D. Pedro V contava-lhe a nossa pobreza, a
incapacidade de sustentarmos caminhos de ferro, filiando estas
opiniões tristes no quadro lugubre da decadencia das raças latinas.
Saindo, o emprezario sagaz, que estudando um doente vira um
homem, disse para o embaixador companheiro: «Deus nos livre de
que este rei tivesse os meios e o valor das suas convicções.»
De casa do filho, foram ambos a casa do pae. Que mudança!
Tambem Salamanca era artista, tambem apaixonado pelo bric-à-
brac, derradeira poesia dos scepticos; tambem sybarita, viveur
aristocratico, distincto, palaciano. «Parecian hechos el uno para el
otro». Viram os museus, commentaram as faianças, os charões, as
porcellanas, os quadros, rindos como gréculos. O pensamento de
ambos, inconscientemente, nadava na expressão classica do papa
da Renascença: Quod commoda da Deus nobis hœc otia, Christi!
«Quedaran encantados.» E para rematar a amisade, o rei D.
Fernando fazia indirectamente a apologia dos povos latinos,
confessando o seu desamor pelos inglezes que maltratava. (V.
Desp. de Pastor Dias, 10 dez. 59 ap. Rios, Mision) Triste engano do
acaso, que invertera o lugar proprio das pessoas. O pae devia ser o
rei; o filho o principe que, sem os cuidados do throno, acaso teria
tido, no Portugal novissimo, o papel de D. Henrique no de Aviz—o
papel de um iniciador na sciencia!
Quem se não lembra de ter visto o rei, attento como um discipulo,
a ouvir nas salas do seu Curso as lições dos professores, com o
aspecto grave, a mão cofiando o pequeno bigode, denunciando a
actividade do seu cerebro? Porque lhe não concedia a sorte viver a
vida para onde o seu genio o chamava? Porque a sua sina era
perdida e uma estrella má o condemnava a elle a reinar, e ao reino a
padecer as consequencias de um destino cruel. A bofetada que a
França nos deu, vindo buscar armada ao Tejo o negreiro apresado
em Africa, arroxeou-lhe a face, e o rei chorou afflicto. Veiu uma
epidemia de cholera em 56; outra de febre-amarella em 57; veiu a
irritação cruel das irmans-da-Caridade. As desgraças, os embaraços
teciam a rede de malhas cerradas em que se lhe afogava a
existencia; sem lhe occultar, mostrando-lhe sempre, fatidica, a
estrella má do seu destino.
Quando um sceptico tem superstições—contradicção só aparente,
e de resto vulgar, do espirito humano—não reage, obedece; não
resiste, cae. Quando ellas atacam um mystico, fortalecem-no com
uma coragem transcendente. D’ahi veem os monges heroicos,
stylitas e outros. A alma de um santo que havia em D. Pedro V,
retemperada pelo estoicismo aprendido nas licções de sua nobre
mãe, mostrou-se quando Lisboa dizimada o via passar nas ruas,
visitando os enfermos, caminhando para os fócos do contagio, como
um Isaac para o sacrificio biblico. O amor do povo tornou-se então
uma paixão; e corriam as anedoctas com que a imaginação popular
cristallisa os heroes. Mandara a um medico medroso descalçar a
luva para tomar o pulso ao enfermo. E se Portugal já tivera em D.
Sebastião um rei Arthur, não é verdade que se formava uma lenda,
diversa sem ser menos bella: a lenda da santa rainha de Hungria,
ou do rei santo de França? Nas pestes milanezas, o Borromeu
ganhou a canonisação; nas de Lisboa, D. Pedro V foi canonisado
pelo povo. E quando, quatro annos depois, morreu, na aureola da
caridade o povo engastou palmas de martyrio.
Nas angustias d’esses dias afflictivos, o moço, infeliz rei achar-se
hia bem, sem o crer, sem o pensar, sem o sentir. Assim a cevadilha
só floresce nos terrenos da malaria. Assim os maus só crescem no
seio da pravidade. Tambem os temperamentos funebres, com o
espirito feito de presagios, se prazem no seio das desgraças. Ellas
vêem como confirmação dos presagios. E nada aflige mais o
homem do que a duvida, quando o que o rodeia não obedece ao
que pensa, ou ao que sente. Como não viria a peste, se a estrella
do rei era mortal? Cumpria-se o fado da sua existencia. Os
presagios não mentiam; o seu coração falava verdade. E esta
affirmação externa do seu sentimento intimo, afogava-o mais, cada
vez mais, nas suas superstições funestas, no seu pessimismo
ingenito.
Em taes momentos, os temperamentos como o de D. Pedro V
raras vezes caem: quasi involuntariamente requintam. Formula-se
então em doutrina o que era apprehensão. O acaso, segredo ou
mysterio do Universo, torna-se Providencia; e, quando se é christão,
por via de regra, entra-se nos moldes conhecidos, que tantos
mysticos formularam, desde Alexandria até Manreza. A religião arde
como chamma a que se dá, em novo combustivel, a somma de
apprehensões coordenadas. Era D. Pedro V christão? ou apenas
deista á moda romantica, isto é, reconhecendo no christianismo a
mais pura fórma de deismo até hoje concebida? Não sei. As licções
de Herculano, os livros modernos da sua leitura deviam ter abalado
a sua orthodoxia; mas os espiritos romanticos, na inconsistencia das
doutrinas, na poesia dos sentimentos, conservavam sempre aberta
a porta para o arrependimento. E tantos foram os que, penitentes,
se curvaram beijando a terra: tantos, tão dignos, tão nobres,
obedecendo tão espontanea e sinceramente, que hesitamos em
dizer se o rei teria ou não sido um d’esses.
A occasião levava a um tal fim a vida moral de D. Pedro v,
quando o casamento (18 de maio de 58) trouxe para o seu lado uma
rainha piedosa, candida, pura, como anjo que vinha, entoando os
canticos da Egreja, acompanhal-o a bem morrer, ou mostrar-lhe,
apparição fugitiva, vaporosa Beatriz de religioso encanto, o paraiso
que o esperava depois da selva escura da existencia terrestre.
Tinha vinte e um annos Dona Estephania, (n. 15 julho 37) quando
casou com o rei que contava edade egual. Eram duas creanças?
Não; apesar dos annos. Porque a elle a imaginação tinha-lhe feito
viver já uma longa existencia de pensamentos, presagios e
angustias; e a rainha desde creança vasara toda a sua bondade
angelica nos moldes da devoção catholica. Apesar dos annos, pois,
eram ambos, em moços, como se já fossem velhos; e a edade
juntava ao encanto d’esse par tão nobre, tão cheio de sympathia.
Ella tinha retratada a candura da sua alma na suave expressão de
um rosto meigo; e o rei, no aspecto carregado, mostrava a força do
seu caracter, a tristeza do seu espirito. Um presentimento tragico
assaltava quem os via passar nas ruas da cidade: nenhum dos dois
parecia bem d’este mundo—elle uma victima expiatoria, ella um anjo
custodio!
A devoção da rainha e a superstição do rei davam de si uma
authoridade espontanea á primeira no espirito do segundo. Era
então o tempo em que a questão das irmans-da-Caridade,
complicada com a politica, se tornara um espinho irritante; e a
rainha devota e o rei funebre começavam a ser accusados de
clericaes e ultramontanos. Com effeito, nenhum dos dois fôra feito
para o throno. Tinham demasiada virtude, ambos, para reinar em
qualquer dos nações latinas, sobretudo em Portugal. A sua
sinceridade não era comprehendida, e arriscava-os a soffrer as
consequencias de uma politica desalmada.
D. Estephania morreu a tempo (julho de 59), antes que se
desmanchasse ás mãos duras de quem não tinha coração para a
amar, a cristallisação poetica formada no espirito do povo sensivel
com a sua formosura angelica, com a sua devoção ingenua, com a
sua caridade fervente. Morreu, e ainda bem! É como quando no
meio da charneca desolada e secca, fatigado, o viandante depara
com um puro arroyo cristallino, e bebe: assim nos acontece a nós
deparando com um typo de candura e poesia na vasta charneca de
urzes d’esta historia. Que importa morrer? Mais vale que o arroyo
logo se perca, sorvído por alguma fenda ... Se corresse e seguisse
atravez do chão empoeirado, não é verdade que as suas aguas se
haviam de sujar, misturando-se com as gredas do solo e as folhas
podres das urzes?
Mas o pobre rei, mais a sua sina fatal, quando se viu só, depois
dos breves mezes de casado, mais se enraizou ainda nos seus
presagios. Era a morte, elle que matava tudo o que tocava. Via-se já
nos ares arrebatado pelo aguia negra dos seus pesadelos. Sentia
sobre si o peso de muitas vidas ceifadas; e, chorando, lamentava o
seu triste isolamento. Não estaria cumprido ainda o seu fado? Que
novas desgraças havia de causar? Quando lhe seria dado terminar
o seu desterro d’este mundo, para ir n’um céu, visto em sonhos,
sentar-se ao lado do anjo que para lá fugira? Como uma pomba
branca voando breve no horisonte da sua vida, tocando-lhe com a
aza a face a dispertal-o dos seus sonhos tristes, assim passara a
idolatrada rainha, assim fugira, assim desapparecera no seu vôo. De
longe, accenava-lhe agora. Era a Beatriz dos seus pensamentos
mysticos: não uma Laura de amores humanos.
Assim um novo motivo de tristeza se juntava aos anteriores;
assim tudo ganhava um caracter fatidico para o espirito do rei. A
fatalidade estava n’elle, e não nas cousas. Quando um relampago
azulado illumina a noite, tudo nos apparece azul. Caía triste o
outomno de 61: havia dois annos que D. Estephania morrera,
quando o rei e os principes foram a Villa Viçosa caçar, e voltaram de
lá envenenados pelos miasmas de um charco dos jardins. Eloquente
symbolo, porque os miasmas do charco portuguez eram o veneno
que o rei tragara no berço e lhe fizera da vida uma enfermidade
chronica.
As mortes galoparam rapidas como na ballada de Burger. Caíu
primeiro o joven infante D. Fernando, e o rei tinha a certeza de
morrer tambem. Já no leito ardia com febre delirante. Em frente do
palacio, fundeada no rio, a corveta Estephania de espaço a espaço
soltava um tiro—como o bater do relogio lugubre da morte. E esses
tiros ouvia-os o rei, chamavam-no, excitavam-no, davam-lhe os
desejos de acabar por uma vez com a vida miseravel, para ir
abraçar no céu a Beatriz do seu delirio. Se a voz dos anjos podesse
ser o troar dos canhões, não era ella que o chamava? Talvez;
porque os tiros chegavam á camara do rei, já brandos, como um
ecco, um murmurio, e vinham do navio que tivera o nome d’ella—
Estephania! Seguidos, constantes, infalliveis como um destino,
repetiam-se; e o delirio do rei, interpretava-os: eram vozes! A sua
vista conturbada já perdera a noção da realidade; e vivo ainda, já se
julgava transportado ás regiões sonhadas n’uma longa existencia de
vinte annos ...
Dizem que na agonia murmurava os threnos de Dante:
Per me si vá nella citá dolente ...

Per me si vá n’ell’ eterno dolore ...
No largo do palacio o povo espesso, na sua afflicção, dividia-se

entre as lagrimas e as coleras. Era um espectaculo antigo, como
quando outr’ora, nos seus pequenos reinos, os reis eram paes,
protectores, quasi idolos. A um povo desgraçado, a desgraça do rei
apparecia como symbolo dos proprios infortunios; e a crueldade de
uma estrella funesta tinha o condão de ferir ainda a alma de uma
gente já descrente e scepticamente regenerada; tinha uma virtude
que decerto não teria tido o talento, a audacia, a ambição de um rei
heroe. A morte no paço era symbolica, e a turba obedecia
inconscientemente a um d’esses movimentos de psychologia
collectiva, tão mysteriosos ainda. A morte no paço era o symbolo da
morte no reino, e por isso, repetimos, na sua afflicção, o povo
dividia-se entre as lagrimas e a colera. Os olhos choravam a sorte
do rei, a sorte de todos! e o sangue pulava nas veias contra os réus
do assassinato—do rei? da nação? Envenenadores, salteadores,
burlões, homicidas!
Quando finalmente se soube que D. Pedro v tinha expirado (11 de
novembro de 1861), o clamor das coleras reunidas soltou-se,
extravagante, absurdo, cruel, mas inconscientemente justo, como é
sempre o povo em massa. O symbolo do Juizo-de-Deus, grosseira
expressão de um mysterio de electricidade popular, via-se no calor
com que pelas ruas, n’essas noites attribuladas, a turba corria
proclamando a sentença final de uma historia miseravel. Partiam ás
pedradas as vidraças dos palacios dos grandes, pediam as vidas
dos ministros, tombavam da sua carruagem e deixavam por morto
na estrada o typo dos amoucos do palacio. Todos eram réus.
Tinham envenenado o rei! Tinham envenenado tudo! Tinham
roubado, tinham vendido, tinham retalhado o povo, o reino, a
fazenda, e a nossa miseria era a consequencia dos seus crimes.
Agora este queria para si a corôa, aquelle queria vender-nos a
Castella: queriam todos a desgraça do povo. Havia ahi partidos?
Não; esse clamor provocado pela morte do rei martyr era uma
condemnação total, universal, espontanea! Era um ultimo adeus ao
ultimo dos reis amados, um dissolver da monarchia, em lagrimas
tristes, soluçadas!
Objectarão os homens seccos que umas companhias de tropa
bastaram para emmudecer as vozes desvairadas da turba. É
verdade. Nem de outro modo podia ser. As revoluções não saem
dos tumulos. As covas provocam lagrimas e arrancar de cabellos.
Mas o que á historia importa agora, não é a força d’essas turbas
afflictas, pois sabemos todos por que vias a nação chegara a sentir
cravada em si a estrella fatidica do rei; pois sabemos todos que
pessimismo intimo, que desesperança absoluta, que vaga tristeza,
que anemia organica, a historia de meio seculo nos trouxera. Não é
pois uma força que todos sabemos extincta, é o caracter do
protesto, é a natureza dos clamores condemnando a côrte e o
governo na sua totalidade, os partidos, os estadistas e a historia: é
esse caracter singular que tem para nós uma gravidade reveladora
...
As companhias de tropa acalmaram a turba; e quando se fez o
enterro, só já se ouvia o sussurro languido dos soluços. Cem mil
pessoas estavam nas ruas. Tambem o azul do céu de Lisboa
entristecera, tambem se cobrira de dó n’esse dia nublado e triste;
tambem chorava lagrimas, ennegrecendo com chuva o basalto das
calçadas. «Deus mandou a chuva, para até as pedras vestir de
luto!» diziam mulheres carpindo. E todos ouviam os soluços
murmurar, como se ouve o bater das azas quando passa nos ares
um bando. Eram esperanças, aladas, brancas, fugindo tambem,
voando!
NOTAS DE RODAPÉ:
[41] V. Hist. de Port. (3.ª ed.) ii, pag. 42-5.

IV
CONCLUSÕES
1.—AS QUESTÕES CONSTITUCIONAES
Com o finado rei desappareceram as irmans-da-Caridade. O

successor expulsou-as, liberalmente, sempre em nome da
liberdade! e seccas as lagrimas, esquecido o passado, rasgados os
crepes, tambem o throno se entregou nos braços da Regeneração.
Na côrte onde reinara o mysticismo devoto, reinava agora
catholicamente ao lado do monarcha, por esposa, a filha do rei
excommungado da Italia: sempre fieis á religião! N’um systema de
fórmulas, mais do que nunca vasias da realidade, liberalismo,
catholicismo, que são? Hypocrisias inconscientes de quem não tem
na alma a força, nem na mente a capacidade de conceber e
defender idéas. Velhos bordões rhetoricos, politicos, ou como
escoras de madeira carunchosa, pintada para illudir, aguentando o
edificio desconjuntado.
Em 68, como já vimos, houve a sombra de uma revolução contra
a sombra de uma tyrannia. Embuçada logo ao nascer pelo duque
d’Avila, veiu com o tempo achar no bispo de Vizeu o seu definidor.
Singular povo! singular revolução! Já se pensou bem no valor
psychologico d’esse movimento? Que reclamava, que promettia,
que applaudia? Negação tudo.
Nem uma só palavra affirmativa. «Moralidade, economias!» Esse
programma patenteava o vasio, porque nenhum partido jámais
prégou a corrupção nem o desperdicio. Mas praticavam-nos ambos,
os regeneradores? Era pois uma questão de homens, nada mais.
Não paremos, comtudo, aqui. O pessimismo constitucional do
caracter portuguez via tambem no Bispo outra cousa: um bota-
abaixo! Os derrocadores foram os unicos homens acclamados pelo
povo, desde que em 1820 se declarou a crise: por esta razão
simples de o povo ter a consciencia da podridão universal. Além
d’estas negações que havia? No Porto, uns mercieiros lesados pelo
imposto do consumo, que se cotisaram para fazer arruaças; em
Lisboa uns conspiradores platonicos que, apesar de já terem
distribuido entre si os cargos da republica, se declararam satisfeitos
com a quéda da Regeneração. O duque d’Avila preenchia bem o
lugar de porta-voz da revolução! N’esta éra nova iniciada, o duque
tornou-se a bomba-de-choque para amortecer a violencia das
transições.
Veio a revolução de Hespanha complicar as cousas de um modo
subito; veiu a guerra brazileira, baixando o cambio, seccar o rio de
dinheiro que annualmente vasava no Thesouro para o alimentar a
elle e nos sustentar a nós. Aggravaram-se as cousas, cresceram os
perigos: a nação pedia um demolidor! Bota-abaixo! Mas como
ninguem sabia que pôr em lugar do existente, o sentimento
acclamador do Bispo era uma gritaria van de gente possidonea, e
consolava os conservadores vingados. Demolir é facil, mais duro o
construir. Derrubar paredes arruinadas, qualquer hombro o póde;
mas levantar novos muros com os materiaes velhos, ninguem. E
que nova materia-prima existia? Nenhuma. Homens? Zero. Idéas?
Menos. O fundo do sacco das fórmulas liberaes era pó. Nós
tinhamos já vasado tudo; e depois de tudo isso já Rodrigo,
mostrando o avesso com uma careta, como um arlequim n’um
tablado de feira, viera dizer, «meus senhores, peça nova!»
Agora os discipulos, seguindo o mestre, voltavam. Pois que
querem? Falta ainda alguma cousa á Liberdade? Pois ha, devéras,
omissão? Querem reformados os Pares? Porque não? Suffragio
universal? Tambem. E viu-se os conservadores fazerem o que a
revolução não fizera; viu-se alargar o direito de suffragio, sem que
longas, prévias campanhas o exigissem. E ninguem o exigia, porque
já passara o tempo em que se esperava nas alterações de fórmulas.
E fizeram-no os conservadores, porque tinham visto em França
Napoleão dar-se bem com isso; e sabiam que quantos mais
camponios votassem, maior seria o poder formal—e positivo, pois
fórmulas, apparencias são tudo—de cada um dos barões ruraes, de
cada um dos senhores da finança que nas cidades compram a
dinheiro os votos da plebe. Desde que no espirito d’essas plebes a
loucura setembrista se acabara, que perigo havia em lhes dar a
soberania? Nenhum, de facto; só a vantagem de bater o inimigo
reformista com as suas armas, e consagrar mais uma conquista da
liberdade.
Este facto curioso mostra ao critico uma das feições da apathica
physionomia nacional. O leitor sabe que 33 não saíu do sangue da
nação, como um 89. Foi uma conquista á mão-armada, que
substituiu a classe governativa do reino. No decurso da historia que
narrámos, o facto da separação do governo e do povo cresceu com
o descredito do primeiro e com a miseria do segundo, até que
Rodrigo veiu confessar que «comprando-se feitos deputados e
casas» era tudo uma comedia; até que o povo, percebendo-o, poz
de banda o bacamarte de guerrilheiro, deitando-se á enxada e
esperando em casa o politico, para lhe pedir estradas, isenções de
recruta, e uns cobres pelo dia perdido com a Urna. Consummado
este accordo tacito, houve logo paz e liberdade. Os politicos
bulharam de palavras: já não havia guerrilhas; e o povo deixou fazer
leis sobre leis em Lisboa, sem dar por isso. Cada qual vive como
gosta, e Portugal é verdadeiramente agora aquelle torrão de
assucar de que falava o corregedor de Vizeu. Falstaff e Prudhomme
fazem bem as suas digestões, e consideram este canto occidental
do mundo o modêlo das nações livres.
E é, com effeito, é. Como não haveria liberdade, se não ha
opiniões divergentes? Viu-se já tamanha paz? tão grande accordo?
Nem póde deixar de haver paz, concordia, liberdade, entre todos os
portuguezes, desde que todos elles, como uma boa população de
provincianos, chegando ao cumulo da sabedoria salomonica—
Vanitas vanitatum! descobriram que no mundo ha só dois homens,
Quixote e Sancho, e que só o segundo é credor de applauso.
Opiniões, partidos, paixões, esperanças? Fumo, meus amigos.
Nobreza, justiça, virtude, heroismo? Poesia! Espantado com a
nossa liberdade, dizia-me alguem uma vez, perante a sala das
côrtes: «Veinte padres, amigo mio! veinte curas ... y todos liberales!»
Com effeito, n’este «jardim da Europa á beira-mar plantado», até o
clero, combatente em França, na Belgica, na Allemanha, é liberal.
«Todos liberales!» Alguns extasiam-se com isto; outros, sem
patriotismo nenhum, acham que esta liberdade prova um
entorpecimento deploravel da intelligencia e do caracter. São modos
de vêr differentes.
O leitor já sabe que as populações, indifferentes, alheias ao
governo do paiz, só reclamam que elle lhes dê obras-publicas e lhes
torne o mais doce possivel o recrutamento. Enriquecendo, pouco se
lhes dá o resto. Nas aldeias são politicos os empregados, nas
cidades os bachareis: por toda a parte os que vivem ou aspiram a
viver do Thesouro. Os trabalhadores, os rendeiros, os pequenos
proprietarios «não querem saber d’isso» e no fundo,
instinctivamente, desprezam o politico pela razão simples de o
verem depender d’elle para os votos. Desprezam, mas não lhes
passa pela cabeça o supprimil-o. Para que? Isso não rende; e
entretanto arderia a ceara. Até ahi chega o instincto, e instrucção
não têem nenhuma.
Mas não é raro, antes commum, e n’um sentido até normal,
verem-se populações, embora soberanas de direito, viverem
passivamente sob o governo de minorias, ou aristocraticas ou
burguezas, a que a riqueza ou a illustração dão a força. Commum é
tambem que n’essas classes directoras exista a consciencia do
facto, e por systema ou interesse se procure manter esse estado
social: foi o pensamento do doutrinarismo em França, na Hespanha,
e foi até entre nós a idéa dos cabralistas. Mas desde que a
democracia vaga e sentimental de 48 destruiu similhante plano,
condemnando o machiavelismo liberal dos seus authores, o facto,
embora contestado, manteve-se por outras fórmas em toda a parte
onde essas classes directoras tinham, com a consciencia da sua
força, a illustração bastante para governar. D’ahi saíu o cezarismo
francez. Ora o triste em Portugal, e acaso o primeiro motivo da
physionomia singular da nação, é a ignorancia, ou, peior ainda, a
sciencia desordenada nas classes medias. Todos sabem de que
genero é a educação secundaria; todos sabem o que é a instrucção
superior, em tudo o que não diz respeito ás profissões technicas
(medicina, engenharia, etc.) cuja importancia é para o nosso caso
subalterna. Com tal ensino se cria em Coimbra um viveiro de
estadistas que annualmente cáem sobre Lisboa pedindo fama e
empregos. O proprietario é em geral illetrado, o capitalista é
brazileiro. A fortuna dos ricos, a sorte dos pobres, vão pois guiados
por uma cousa peior ainda do que a ignorancia—a sciencia falsa,
pedante sempre.
Que alguem se atreva a dizer a sombra de uma verdade e será
condemnado. Que alguem se lembre de bolir n’um qualquer dos
idolos do tempo, e será apedrejado—liberalmente! Por isso a
liberdade que provém da apathia parece ao critico o symptoma do
contrario da vida: da verdadeira liberdade forte, independente, na
concorrencia de opiniões conscientes e sábias. Por isso nós
apresentamos caracteres singulares. Leiam-se os jornaes, ouçam-
se os discursos. Ninguem fala mais de papo, desculpem a
expressão. De quê? De tudo. Os Pico-de-Mirandola, senhores de si,
anafados, satisfeitos, sempre na rua, sempre verbosos, com as
cabecinhas álerta, a resposta prompta, a fórmula breve, um andar
miudinho de pedante, um livrinho azul debaixo do braço se não são
janotas, nos miolos a consciencia do seu saber, da verdade
definitiva da «sciencia moderna», uma grande prosapia ingenua,
uma grande segurança e entono: os Pico-de-Mirandola, que sejam
conservadores ou demagogos, deputados da direita ou rabiscadores
de jornaes esquerdos, têem uma physionomia commum. A patria
são elles; a sciencia sabem-na toda, a moderna. Sómente uns
acham que é moderna a que já governa, outros fossil a de hoje: só
verdadeira a de ámanhan, quando elles derem a lei!
Pêccos fructos de uma arvore contaminada, se dão um passo
cáem. Um dos phenomenos curiosos em Portugal é o devorar dos
homens pelo governo. Hoje sobem, ámanhan somem-se, corridos,
desprezados. Porque? porque a arvore, secca, apenas tem vida
para reconhecer o seu definhar, para desprezar os que no seu
pedantismo ingenuo, mais ainda do que na sua corrupção,
successivamente se lhe seguram aos ramos. Outro phenomeno é a
facilidade com que a opinião muda n’essas classes directoras da
sociedade portugueza. Como um catavento, sobre um pião giratorio,
batido, movido pela brisa leve, assim anda o juizo dos homens
graves. Se lhes falta o alicerce do saber, e mais ainda o alicerce
social de raizes lançadas pelo meio das classes vivas da sociedade!
Se são um rifacimento, uma superfetação politica em um povo que

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The Future of the Greek Economy:

Economic Development Through 2035

Kyriaki I. Kafka Anna-Maria Kanzola

ISSN 2662-7248 ISSN 2662-7256 (electronic)

Cover illustration: © Tetra Images

the conditions in which the Greek economy entered Great Depression

Athens, Greece Panagiotis E. Petrakis

We would like to thank the main collaborator Mrs. E. Giouli, as well

Part I Alternative Futures Analysis

2.5 The Three Scenarios Left: The Unsustainable

Part II The Past and the Present of the Greek economy

6.4 Personal Finance: Disposable Income and Household

Part III Alternative Futures for Greece: The Five

12.4 Trust in European and Government Institutions 172

The scope of the present book is to introduce the Political Economy of

EU-27 European Union of 27 Members

Fig. 1.1 What connects us with the future? (Source Authors’

Fig. 2.6 The unsustainable growth, transformation, and Falldown

Fig. 4.8 Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) (Source

Fig. 5.9 Property rights (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

Fig. 5.13 Fiscal health (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

Fig. 5.19 Financial freedom (Source Heritage Foundation—Index

Fig. 6.11 Gender Employment Gap (Source Eurostat

Fig. 6.16 PISA score in mathematics (Source OECD—Programme

Fig. 6.20 Personal disposable income (euros) (Source Editing data

Fig. 7.5 Consumers surveys—financial situation over the next 12

Fig. 8.7 Domestic motor vehicle sales (2005 = 100) (Source

Fig. 8.24 Labor productivity growth (GDP per hour worked)

Fig. 10.5 Rule of Law—5 Scenarios (2020–2035) (Source World

Fig. 11.9 Income Quintile Share Ratio S80/S20 for Disposable

Fig. 12.6 Trust in National Parliament (% of the population

Fig. 13.8 GDP in Manufacturing (bn euros) (Source Own

Alternative Futures Analysis

In Part I of the present book, we introduce the reader to the method-

Setting the Scenery: Factors Affecting

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

philosopher Benedetto Croce (1923/2007), “all history is contemporary

1.2 Tales from the Past Shaping the Future:

In essence, we can examine history during the primary stages of

1.2.2 The Recent Economic Crises and Political Behaviors

complex conditions, the future seems extremely uncertain due to the

However, such a shift in energy supply will undermine efforts to miti-

1.3 Connecting the Present

the transforming role of technology, the climate crisis, economic multi-

5 Please refer to Chapter 2.

1.4 Conclusions: Use of History,

Esquecemos, n’estes successivos relances, o throno. E entretanto

Per me si vá nella citá dolente ...

No largo do palacio o povo espesso, na sua afflicção, dividia-se

[41] V. Hist. de Port. (3.ª ed.) ii, pag. 42-5.

Com o finado rei desappareceram as irmans-da-Caridade. O

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