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Digital Surveillance in
Southern Africa
Policies, Politics and
Practices
Allen Munoriyarwa · Admire Mare
Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa
Allen Munoriyarwa • Admire Mare
Digital Surveillance
in Southern Africa
Policies, Politics and Practices
Allen Munoriyarwa Admire Mare
Department of Communication Department of Communication
and Media and Media
University of Johannesburg University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa Johannesburg, South Africa
ISBN 978-3-031-16635-8 ISBN 978-3-031-16636-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16636-5
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Preface
Surveillance practices are increasingly becoming dynamic and pervasive,

spurred on by the ever-mutating changes in technological inventions at a
global level. The practice of surveillance has become embedded in our
everyday digital communications, public spaces, workplaces, cross-border
movements, financial transactions, logging transactions and many other
spaces on which citizens interact. What makes the case of southern African
region unique is not only the increasing pervasiveness of surveillance, but
the acute lack of transparency in the practice, the absence of necessary and
proportionate regulations and the politicized nature of surveillance in the
region. This is worrisome in a region where constitutionalism is sluggish,
democracy is decline and (semi) authoritarian tendencies are becoming
more entrenched. Democratization conflicts have also become normal-
ized, thereby enabling both democratic and authoritarian regimes to ratio-
nalize surveillance practices and cultures. These are the central arguments
that are sustained throughout the book.
In advancing these arguments, we have drawn on a number of manifest
cases from across the region in order to show how pervasive surveillance is
taking root in a region where digital authoritarianism is finding new evan-
gelists and disciples. These include how smart city initiatives touted as
transformational ‘developmental’ projects have become a means through
which agencies have siphoned data and amass records of our everyday
activities. We have also used, to buttress our arguments, the presumably
hidden and often politically motivated digital surveillance that took roots
in South Africa roughly between 2009 and 2018. In Zimbabwe, we have
v
vi PREFACE
explored the militarization of surveillance that has become normalized

since the November 2017 coup that dethroned Robert Mugabe and led to
the ascendancy of the military in politics, a serious violation of constitu-
tional provisions in itself. We have also explored more broadly the emerg-
ing practices of public space and communication surveillance in the region,
and the mainstreaming of surveillance through the biometrification of
everyday life. Our book shows that despite these panoptic interventions in
everyday life, situated actors in southern Africa are finding creative and
innovative ways to resist these encroaching practices.
So, what has gone wrong in the region? The absence of laws and regu-
lations that can neutralize, push back and police surveillance by state and
non-state actors. This can be through controlling, regulating and fencing
off certain spaces from the prying eyes of surveillers. We argue in this book
that this is an Achilles’ heel in southern Africa’s surveillance architecture.
This is a harbinger of dark times ahead. The surveillance futures are trou-
bled, if there are on concerted efforts amongst citizens, NGOs and CSOs,
activists and politicians to develop laws, regulations and monitory mecha-
nisms that govern the behaviours and practices of the surveillers.
Furthermore, it is imperative that surveillance practices in the region
adhere to standards set by various in United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Resolutions and other globally accepted standards of privacy.
In this book, we go beyond diagnosing the deep causes of this pervasive
practice of digital surveillance, the actors, their powers and their individual
or collective interests. We argue and propose the adoption of judicial over-
sight mechanisms and the removal of the military and political elites in
order to make surveillance a crime-fighting rather than a political practice.
In addition to this, we provide pointers to how in the not-so-distant
future, surveillance is likely to shape up. Among other developments, we
have noted the pervasive and unregulated trade in surveillance technolo-
gies as likely to pose challenges to all efforts for a human rights-based
practice. We postulate that data and digital justice are the core of creating
a privacy respecting society that puts the right to be forgotten, anonymity
and freedom of expression at the centre of its internet governance norms
and standards. Future developments to note also include the increasing
role of both Chinese and Western start-up technology companies and
their growing influence in the region. The growing influence of Chinese
technology companies like Huawei, CloudWalk and ZTE just to mention
a few should be understood within the context of the growing influence of
PREFACE vii
China itself in the region. The immediate danger is that some of the semi-
authoritarian regimes in the region might be persuaded to mimic Chinese
‘hard surveillance’ practices like the social credit system. The existence of
technology companies willing to provide the technological infrastructure,
Beijing approval and grants and loans from Chinese bank and the already-
absent rule-of-law-based surveillance practices in some countries of the
region make this danger very real. We also highlight that recent events
suggesting the fragmentation of the internet into multiple intranets, tech-
nical standards and norms have the potential to further entrench surveil-
lance practices and cultures. This is more evident in a case where countries
in the global South are forced to choose between Chinese and Western
versions of the internet. Whilst it is too early to theorize about the implica-
tions of the ‘splinternet’, it is not too far-fetched to postulate that some
authoritarian regimes in Africa will use this balkanization of the internet as
an opportunity to curtail inalienable rights and entrenching surveillance
into their telecommunications infrastructures.
Our book ends on a cautionary note where we problematize recent
developments in ‘sousveillance’, the splinternet as providing further impe-
tus to unregulated surveillance. The existential risks include the erosion of
the rights to privacy and the danger that political surveillance will lead to
the erosion of political rights like the right to free and fair election, to
choose political representatives and so forth. The danger is all too real in
countries where such rights have always been precarious and where sur-
veillance has often been politically instrumentalized.
We have written this book for the general reader interested more
broadly in surveillance studies: the academic researcher, the activist and
everyone with a deep appreciation of how surveillance practices are influ-
encing our daily lives and how they are closely linked not only to our
security but to our individual rights as well. Because of our intention to
engage with as many readers as we possibly can, we have attempted to be
simple and straightforward in our arguments. This book is one of the pio-
neer studies in the field of digital surveillance in southern Africa. This
makes it the more relevant and timeous.
Johannesburg, South Africa Allen Munoriyarwa

August 2022 Admire Mare
Acknowledgements
The first steps towards the writing of this book were taken between 31
October and 1 November 2019 with the organization of a two-day Digital
Surveillance Workshop at the University of Johannesburg. During the
workshop and the intense discussions that emerged from it, patterns and
trends emerged across the different countries represented on how digital
surveillance was shaping up in the region. It was from these discussions
that the authors hatched a plan to edit a timeous book of this nature.
COVID-19 came and disrupted the work. Instead of editing, we then
decided to author the book ourselves. Such a book could not have mate-
rialized without the help of many people who we wish to acknowledge.
We owe so much to the journalists and scholars who were part of this two-
day workshop, and from whose works we draw on. These include Dumisani
Dhlela from Zimbabwe, Ernesto Nhanale from Mozambique, Brenda
Zulu from Zambia, Frederico Links from Namibia, Arsene Tsungali from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Heidi Swart and Murray
Hunter from South Africa. This book draws on their research outputs
which we reference frequently. We are also indebted to the Media Policy
and Democracy Project (MPDP), a project whose principal investigator,
Professor Jane Duncan, allowed us to tap into the numerous journalistic
and research outputs which form the backbone of this book. It is impor-
tant for us to mention that without the MPDP, this book would not have
existed. One of the authors of this book, Dr Allen Munoriyarwa, was
given the privilege to coordinate the MPDP project. This presented an
opportunity to lay the foundations of this book. For this, we are indebted
to Professor Jane Duncan. In addition to the journalists who met for this
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
two-day conference, we would also like to acknowledge scholars who were

present at this workshop. These include the two authors—Dr Allen
Munoriyarwa and Professor Admire Mare—and Professors Jane Duncan
and Sarah Chiumbu. We are forever indebted to the intellectual debates
we had during this workshop which were very stimulating, and from which
this book benefitted. The book benefitted also from numerous workshops
where some of the chapters were presented. We are grateful to the orga-
nizers. One of the authors, Dr Allen Munoriyarwa, would like to acknowl-
edge the University of California-Irvine for the invitation and sponsorship
in January–February 2020 to present a paper, which ultimately became a
chapter in this book.
We also acknowledge the input made by the two anonymous reviewers
who provided insightful comments to our book proposal. In the same
vein, we appreciate the Palgrave Macmillan team of Shinko Mimura and
Esther Rani, who guided the effort from the start of this manuscript to its
eventual completion. The whole manuscript was expertly peer reviewed by
seasoned external reviewers; we would like to thank the external review
experts for their valuable comments and suggestions, which made this
book a success.
Finally, we thank our families and friends for their love and emotional
support. The support we got from our respective families is immense. This
was no easy walk, but you made it comfortable in many ways. Many thanks
go to Netsai, Iris, Jessy, Ruth, Paida, my friend Collen and my only sister
in Gauteng—sisi Thembi. I cannot exhaust them all. The little ones—
Tamiranashe, Nikita, Anesu, Tawananyasha and Rutendo—should be
thanked too. Many thanks to my mother, Lulu “Kahare”, for all the sup-
port. Admire Mare would like to dedicate this book to his late father,
Reuben Mare, who passed on in September 2021. Chirasha (WaMambo),
I am forever humbled by your selfless sacrifices. You nourished my insa-
tiable appetite for quality education with your timely payments of school
fees and tuition. He is also eternally indebted to his late grandmother,
Stella Tuge Charumbira Gomba, who provided an unshakable foundation
in his early childhood. For that, I am eternally grateful. Continue to rest
in power. Secondly, I would like to thank my wife (Evelyn Grace Chipo)
and son (Akudzweishe Darell) for their patience and presence in my life.
They are the reason why I write well into the wee hours. For Kuku, I do
this for your inheritance and more. To my mum (Daisy Mare) and siblings
(Douglas, Godfrey and Lynette), you continue to pat me on my back for
any small victory. My victory is always your victory.
Contents
1 Introduction:
Twists and Turns? From Analogue to Digital
Surveillance 1
2 The
Political Economy of Digital Surveillance: Actors,
Powers and Interests 53
3 Regulating and Legislating Surveillance 85
4 Public Space and Communication Surveillance113
5 Mainstreaming
Surveillance Through the Biometrification
of Everyday Life141
6 Quotidian Forms of Resistance to Surveillance157
7 Conclusions: The Bigger Picture of Surveillance Futures179
Appendices203
Index207
xi
About the Authors
Admire Mare is an associate professor in the Department of

Communication and Media at the University of Johannesburg, South
Africa. He was previously an associate professor and a deputy head in the
Department of Communication at the Namibia University of Science and
Technology, Windhoek. He is an African-based (digital) journalism and
media scholar with over 60 publications in the fields of journalism and
media studies, communication studies, digital anthropology, African stud-
ies, digital politics, digital diplomacy, journalism education, media and
conflict studies and sociology and social anthropology. His publications
have appeared in high-impact journals in both the global North and
South. His latest major publications include Participatory Journalism in
Africa Digital News Engagement and User Agency in the South (London,
2021, with Hayes Mawindi Mabweazara), Media, Conflict and
Peacebuilding in Africa: Empirical and Conceptual Considerations
(London, 2021, with Jacinta Maweu), Digital Surveillance in Southern
Africa: Policies, Politics and Practices (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming
with Allen Munoriyarwa) and Teaching and Learning with Digital
Technologies in Higher Education Institutions in Africa: Case Studies from
a Pandemic Context (London: Routledge, forthcoming, with Erisher
Woyo and Elina Amadhila). He also leads the international research proj-
ect ‘Social Media, Misinformation and Elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe’
(SoMeKeZi) funded by the Social Science Research Council (2019–2023).
xiii
xiv ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Allen Munoriyarwa is a senior research fellow in the Department of

Communication and Media at the University of Johannesburg, South
Africa. His research interests are in digital surveillance. He also lecturers in
the Department of Communication and Media in the same university. He
is currently coordinating research exploring the growth of digital surveil-
lance practices in southern Africa under the auspices of the Media Policy
and Democracy Project (MPDP)—a University of Johannesburg research
project. The MPDP project can be followed here: https://www.medi-
aanddemocracy.com/. Allen has also written widely on digital surveil-
lance. He has researched with organizations like Privacy International on
digital surveillance practices in the region. Some of his works on surveil-
lance can be found here. His publications have appeared in major global
journals including Journalism, Digital Journalism, Journalism Practice
and Security Dialogue. Allen has led numerous funded research projects,
including ‘The Impact of Covid-19 in Newsrooms Across Southern Africa’
(funded by the Social Science Research Council) and the ‘Impact of
Artificial Intelligence in Newsrooms’ (funded by the University of
Johannesburg Research Council). Allen is also a Canon Collins scholar.
He has written more than 40 times on journalism, media and surveillance
practices.
Abbreviations
ANC African National Congress

AR Affirmative Repositioning
AU African Union
CCP Communist Party of China
CDPA Cyber and Data Protection Act
CDSO Central Directorate for Special Operations
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation
CIOIW Chinese Information, Operations and Information Warfare
CIPESA The Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and
Southern Africa
CSOs Civil Society Organizations
EFF Economic Freedom Fighters
EFF NAMIBIA Economic Freedom Fighters Namibia Patriots
for Change
EPOCA Electronic and Postal Communications Act
GISW Global Information Society Watch
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICA Interception of Communications Act
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IGI Inspector General of Intelligence
IPID Independent Police Investigations Directory
ISPs Internet Service Providers
LPM Landless People’s Movement
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MI Military Intelligence
MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa
xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS
MPDP Media Policy and Democracy Project

MSS Ministry of State Security
N-ABIS Automated Biometric Identification System
NAMPOL Namibian Police Force
NGOs Non-governmental Organizations
NSA National Security Agency
PF Patriotic Front
PI Privacy International
PISI Police Internal Investigations Services
PLA Chinese People’s Liberation Army
POPIA Protection of Personal Information Act
POTRAZ Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe
PTA Postal and Telecommunication Act
RATSA Road and Traffic Safety Agency
RICA Communication-Related Information Act
SADC Southern Africa Development Community
SANDF South Africa National Defence Forces
SAPS South Africa Police Service
SAS Special Air Service
SI Statutory Instrument
SIP Special Intelligence Branch
SSA State Security Agency
SU Signals Unit
SWAPO South-West Africa Political Organization
SZI Smart Zambia Institute
TCRA Tanzania Communications and Regulatory Authority
UN United Nations
USAID United States Aid
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZHRF Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum
ZICTA Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority
ZIMRA Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
ZNDC Zambia National Data Centre
ZNDP Zambia National Development Plan
ZTE Zhongxing New Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd
List of Figures
Figs. 4.1
and 4.2 How Chinese public surveillance company technology
producers package fear and market insecurity in the South
African context to gain business from actors 118
Fig. 6.1 The bulk surveillance governance analysis scheme by Wetzling
and Vieth (2018) that can be adopted to govern surveillance in
the SADC region 160
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Twists and Turns?

From Analogue to Digital Surveillance
The talk of the existence of ‘Big Brother’ in the lives of ordinary people is
something that is often discussed in mainstream literature as a distant
occurrence. It is often associated with “the state and its agencies exspress-
ing their overreach tendencies through intelligence and policies strate-
gies” (Lyon & Murakami Wood, 2020). It is also presented in very abstract
terms in its manifestation and material consequences. It is framed as if it
only targsets terrorists or in lay man’s terms ‘the enemies of the state’. This
‘watching over’ of individuals and collectives is meant to control, disci-
pline and sort information and behaviours. It is synonymous with the
tracking and monitoring of the activities of what some loosely call ‘prob-
lematic elements’ in society. Such a stereotypical representation of surveil-
lance is problematic on many fronts. It simplifies a very complex societal
phenomenon with disproportionate consequences on individual and col-
lective rights. It obfuscates the invasive and intrusive nature of surveillance
in contemporary societies. It ignores the ‘everydayness’ of this unprece-
dented and pervasive ‘watching over’. It normalizes surveillance activities
of the state and corporate entities in an environment where the infrastruc-
ture for monitoring and tracking actors and actants in everyday life has
become pervasive and relatively cheaper to acquire and deploy. In most
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
A. Munoriyarwa, A. Mare, Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16636-5_1
2 A. MUNORIYARWA AND A. MARE
cases, the idea of the Fourth Industrial Revolution1 (4IR) is sold to many
of us in colourful and enticing ways. Unfortunately, what is obfuscated
from this technological solutionistic narrative is that automation, datafica-
tion of society and robotization of social processes unintentionally pro-
mote invasive surveillance practices and cultures. These surveillance
practices impact negatively on the enjoyment of the right to privacy as
enshrined in national constitutional, regional instruments and interna-
tional model laws.
Furthermore, the state is presented as justified in its acquisition, deploy-
ment and management of surveillance infrastructures. It is represented as
symbolized by the operations of men and women in dark suits and shades.
It is also associated with boots on the ground (physical surveillance).
Thus, surveillance is talked about in terms of national security, terrorism,
public order and central intelligence operations. These narratives resonate
with discourses about surveillance, which are largely rehearsed and uncriti-
cally deployed by the mainstream media, platform companies and opinion
leaders in society. Giant tech companies present themselves as ‘saviors’ and
‘solution finders’. Their products are marketed as ‘problem solvers’ with
innate power to solve societal challenges. Because of the apparent opaque-
ness and lack of transparency associated with surveillance in general, little
is known about the necessity, legality and proportionality of extant surveil-
lance laws in southern Africa.
Surveillance has become in a thorn in the flesh of most postcolonial
societies including those in the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC) region. This practice does not require a human to read the inter-
cepted communication, as any automated action of communications sur-
veillance represents an interference with the right to privacy. As
communications technologies developed, from the telegraph to fixed
landlines to mobile communications and the internet, human beings have
been given more control over who they can communicate with and the
method in which to do so. Surveillance technologies have become more
and more sophisticated, and capable of grabbing even more information
than ever before. The situation has further been complicated by the inces-
tuous relationship between most SADC countries and China. Russia,
Israel and Iran have also played an important role not only in terms of
1
The 4IR is characterized by a range of new technologies that are fusing the physical, digi-
tal and biological worlds, impacting all disciplines, economies and industries, and even chal-
lenging ideas about what it means to be human (Schwab, 2016).
1 INTRODUCTION: TWISTS AND TURNS? FROM ANALOGUE TO DIGITAL… 3
exporting their ideologies to the region but also selling their surveillance
technologies in return for lucrative mining deals. These countries have
also helped countries in the region to come up with draconian surveillance
laws under the guise of data protection, electronic transactions, cyber-
security and computer bills as well as intelligence laws. Significant litera-
ture (Duncan, 2014, 2016a, 2018, 2022; Roberts & Mohamed Ali, 2021;
Roberts et al., 2021; Hunter & Mare, 2020; Hunter, 2020; Munoriyarwa
& Chiumbu, 2022; Mare, 2015, 2016a, 2019) has begun to emerge in
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius highlighting the pernicious effect
of surveillance. Apart from media and policy reports (Links, 2018a; Privacy
International, 2015; Right2Know Campaign, 2015), there is a dearth of
evidence-based information on the state of (digital) surveillance in south-
ern Africa.
Edward Snowden’s disclosures about the extensive surveillance pro-
grammes of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United
Kingdom, revealed that intelligence agencies routinely gather vast amounts
of data about our activities (Wahl-Jorgensen et al., 2017). Snowden also
showed that surveillance occurred via the interception of data shared on
the internet, hacking into computer systems and compromising security
levels. It also entailed the bulk collection of everyone’s data as well as tar-
geted surveillance of governments, companies and civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) (Wahl Jorgensen et al., 2017). These disclosures indicated
that the intelligence agencies accessed information gathered by Facebook,
Google, Apple and other Big Tech companies (Fidler, 2015). Because of
its nefarious nature, citizens across the globe are increasingly coming to
accept the ubiquity and pervasiveness of surveillance as part and parcel of
everyday life (Bauman & Lyon, 2013). In the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, Snowden revelations and Pegasus spyware cases, it has
become evident that both democratic and non-democratic governments
often conduct surveillance on their citizens (Ekdale & Tully, 2019; Human
Rights Watch, 2014; Amnesty International, 2021). It is therefore unsur-
prising that most countries in southern Africa have joined the bandwagon
of imposing mandatory Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card registra-
tion regulations, and some are the in process of coming with up contro-
versial data protection and cyber-security bills. There is plausible suspicion
that the United States, which has its army base in Botswana, has assisted
the country to implement a sophisticated surveillance infrastructure. Be
that as it may, there are few empirical studies (see Hunter & Mare, 2020;
Chiumbu, 2022; Balule, 2022; Munoriyarwa, 2021; Munoriyarwa &

Chiumbu, 2022) on the laws that undergird surveillance practices and
cultures in the SADC region despite the availability of anecdotal evidence,
which shows that most countries are engaging in invasive surveillance
practices outside the remit of the law.
In an investigative report published by the French newspaper Le Monde2
in 2018, China, which also paid and built the computer network at the
African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, allegedly
inserted a backdoor that allowed it to transfer data (Dahir, 2018). Chinese
telecommunication companies (ZTE and Huawei) were implicated in this
spying scandal. The spy scandal was only discovered in January 2017 (five
years after the building was commissioned) when technicians noticed that
between midnight and 2 am every night, there was a peak in data usage
even though the building was empty. It was also discovered that AU’s
confidential data was being copied on to servers in Shanghai. This incident
further sheds light on the vulnerabilities inherent in digital communica-
tion technologies in the age of “surveillance society” (Lyon, 2001a) and
“surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019).
There have been disturbing media reports that WhatsApp (one of the
most popular mobile instant messaging app in southern Africa and the
global South) was targeted for surveillance purposes which further raise
concern about the safety of the data in the hands of global and local inter-
net intermediaries. Hackers were able to remotely install surveillance soft-
ware on phones and other devices using a major vulnerability in the
messaging app (Lee, 2019). The vulnerability allowed attackers to install
malicious code on iPhones and Android phones by ringing up a target
device. As Lee (2019) points out, the code could be transmitted even if
users did not answer their phones and a log of the call often disappeared.
The spyware was developed by NSO Group (an Israeli cybersecurity and
intelligence company). Interestingly, WhatsApp promotes itself as a
“secure” communications app because messages are end-to-end encrypted,
meaning they should only be displayed in a legible form on the sender or
recipient’s device (Lee, 2019). While the revelation is said to have enabled
the company to fix the flaw that allowed this attack to take place, WhatsApp
has not indicated whether the update removes any spyware that has already
infected a compromised device.
2
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis- abeba-le-siege-de-l-
union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html.
Definition of Surveillance
Surveillance means different things to different constituencies in society.
The term ‘surveiller’, which is borrowed from French, refers to the prac-
tice of ‘watch over’. Whilst so many scholars (Andrejevic, 2007; Monahan,
2010; Randy & Murakami Wood, 2012; Murakami Wood, 2013a) have
propounded several definitions, David Lyon, who is one of the foremost
thought leaders in surveillance studies in the global North, has advanced
much more nuanced ones. Lyon (2003, p. 14) defines surveillance as “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes
of influence, management, protection or direction”. It is important to
highlight the systematic and routine nature of surveillance regimes.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to emphasize that surveillance is deployed
for specific purposes including attempts at influencing, managing, control-
ling and predicting. It encapsulates physical (face-to-face encounters) and
digital forms (mediated arrangements dependent on a wide and ever-
growing range of information technologies). As Lyon (2010b) observes,
surveillance can entail benign routines such as watching to enhance the
care and safety of the watched (such as patrolling malls by the police) or it
can involve an effort to control those whose conduct is under suspicion
(e.g., police on a neighbourhood stakeout) and permit discriminatory
practices (social welfare beneficiaries). In the case of social welfare benefi-
ciaries where surveillance is concerned with “sorting people into catego-
ries, and assigning worth or risk, it can have devastating effects” on
citizens’ life-chances (Lyon, 2003). Surveillance3 encapsulates various
modes of categorization and social sorting, where discrimination and priv-
ilege are entrenched through the unplanned consequences of data gather-
ing and analysis (Lyon, 2001a, 2003). Though state surveillance is not
necessarily unlawful, it can be harmful when deployed in contexts of politi-
cal repression that limit or restrict individual rights and freedoms. There
can be legitimate justifications (such as in combatting threats to the public
order or to safety) for undertaking mass or targeted surveillance. In addi-
tion, surveillance activities need to conform to “necessity and
3
Surveillance refers to “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifi-
able or not, for the purpose of influencing or managing those whose data have been gar-
nered” (Lyon, 2001a, p. 1). At the core of this definition is the acknowledgement that
surveillance involves power. It involves the collection of information for the purposes of
“influencing or managing” some individual or group. Another important aspect is that sur-
veillance is relational, involving a power dynamic likely to unfold in complicated ways.
roportionality”, global standards which limit surveillance to circum-

p
stances that are “strictly and demonstrably necessary to achieve a legiti-
mate aim”.
Although historically associated with practices such as the scrutiniza-
tion of (terror or criminal) suspects, police wiretapping and foreign intel-
ligence gathering, this insidious phenomenon has since mutated into
various forms and shapes in contemporary society. For instance, the sys-
tematic and routine collection of personal information, tracking by cook-
ies online and archiving of digital footprints have seeped into our offline
and online as well as local and global existence. In other words, it is now
“an unavoidable feature of everyday life in contemporary societies” (Lyon,
2003, p. 14). That is why in this book we introduce the notion of ‘perva-
sive surveillance’ to account for the ever-changing dynamics in the process
of ‘watching over’ the Other. By ‘pervasive surveillance’, we refer to the
mundane, everydayness and fluid nature of ‘watching over’ the activities
and behaviours of human beings both online and offline. The point here
is to emphasize the breadth, fluidity and reach of surveillance capabilities
into our daily lives. Surveillance is now an inescapable part of our social
existence. Nowadays, besides the government, several other entities are
directly and indirectly involved in the collection of personal information.
These include platform companies, telecommunication companies, news
organizations, recruitment agencies, insurance companies, banking insti-
tutions, retail stores and travel agencies, just to name a few. In this case,
citizens, consumers, employees, immigrants, voters, prisoners, social wel-
fare beneficiaries, residents and so forth are constantly being watched
online and offline. The adoption of digital technologies has increased its
capacities, scope, speed, velocity and reach. It is clear from the foregoing
that data collection has become an integral part of public and private pol-
icy making in an increasingly “datafied” society (Hintz et al., 2018).
Scholars have theorized about the emergence of the ‘datafication’
(Taylor, 2017). This denotes a technological trend turning many aspects
of our life into data which is subsequently transferred into information
realized as a new form of value. Focusing on this process of datafication,
Couldry and Mejias (2019) argue that apps, platforms and smart objects
capture and translate our lives into data, and then extract information that
is fed into capitalist enterprises and sold back to us. In modern societies,
there are two kinds of data collection. These are private and public data
collection. Public data collection entails a situation where the government
and other public agencies are allowed to collect information such as birth
and death certificates, voter registration information, professional licences,

wages and compensation, criminal matters, civil matters, immigration,
health records and financial transactions. Private data collection is whereby
private companies and non-governmental organizations are involved in
the collection and processing of personal information. In contemporary
societies, private actors are increasingly overtaking the state as main collec-
tors, processors and archivers of personal information. This situation has
been made easier by the ownership, control and management of ‘critical
information infrastructure4’ (CII) by private sector. This infrastructure is
the nerve centre of financial systems, transportation systems, telecommu-
nications and military communications. Through the collection and pro-
cessing of personal data, private and public organizations are able to make
conclusions about peoples’ activities, including movement of that personal
information across borders without consent, and use for other purposes.
There is deep suspicion that public and private data collection are contrib-
uting immensely towards to normalization of ‘dataveillance’ (the practice
of monitoring and collecting online data as well as metadata). Deploying
the concept of ‘data colonialism’, Couldry and Mejias (2019) observe that
the historic appropriation of land, bodies and natural resources is mirrored
today in this new era of pervasive datafication.
The collection and analysis of information about populations con-
ducted as a part of surveillance is aimed at governing people’s activities
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2006, p. 3). As a social practice, it facilitates the
observation and tracking of people and objects, their labelling and subse-
quent organization, and the value judgements based on these orderings.
Writing about analogue (i.e., bureaucratic and electro-mechanical) and
digital surveillance, Graham and Murakami Wood (2003, p. 228) argue
that digital methods facilitate more pervasive surveillance in real time. For
Graham and Murakami Wood (2003), the digitization of surveillance
which is accompanied by automation shifts the role of human operators
during the process. Because of this process of automation, human discre-
tion is displaced by operators who merely programme, supervise and
maintain systems (Graham & Murakami Wood, 2003). Surveillance is also
defined as any observing, listening, monitoring or recording by a state or
4
It refers to those assets (online or offline), networks, systems, processes, information and
functions that are vital for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security,
economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would
have serious consequences.
its agents to track citizen’s movements, activities, conversations, commu-

nications or correspondence, including the recording of metadata (ibid.).
Surveillance is always a relationship of power in which the watcher covertly
gains advantage at the expense of the fundamental rights of those being
watched. The covert nature of surveillance and the imbalance of power
between the watcher and the watched provide significant opportunity for
the abuse of power with impunity.
The advent of computer databases, surveillance cameras and other
technological advances are said to have given rise to “new surveillance”5
(Marx, 2002) comprising “surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty & Ericson,
2000) which operate well beyond the confines of the central state. It is
important to note that physical surveillance predates the process of digiti-
zation. Although the processes of digitization and datafication have ampli-
fied surveillance practices and cultures, the idea of “watching over” has
always been part and parcel of human existence. As Lyon (2001a, p. 1)
observes, digitization has been accompanied by the emergence of “sur-
veillance society” which has seen surveillance proliferate beyond the
bureaucratic field to become a routine and mundane feature that is
“embedded in every aspect of life”. It has also been accompanied by both
quantitative (in terms of size, coverage, speed, intensity etc.) and qualita-
tive (breadth and depth) changes. It has brought information that is more
amenable to storage, transmission and computation, as well as algorithmic
surveillance (Introna & Murakami Wood, 2002). This ability to easily and
efficiently store, sort, classify, retrieve and match information in digital
systems becomes increasingly significant, amplifying the capacities of the
surveyor and the effect on the surveilled far beyond the potential of ana-
logue methods (Norris & Armstrong, 2002). As Loftus and Goold (2012,
p. 276) observe, “Whereas in the past the surveillance powers of the state
were directed only at particular individuals who were deemed to be at risk
or undeserving of trust, today it would seem that surveillance powers are
directed against everybody”. This denotes a form of indiscriminate sur-
veillance targeting almost everyone. Such mass surveillance capabilities
have been made possible by a wide range of digital technologies in opera-
tion these days.
5
This refers to “the use of technical means to extract or create personal data” (Marx,
2002, p. 12).
Historicizing Surveillance Regimes

in Southern Africa
Before we can unpack the contemporary institutional sites of surveillance,

it is worth reflecting on the brief history and dynamics of colonial and
post-colonial surveillance regimes in southern Africa. The term ‘southern
Africa’ is used in this book to refer to countries that make up the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Although our case stud-
ies are drawn from a selected sample of countries in the SADC region, we
do not intend to generalize our findings beyond these case nations. In this
book, our case nations include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eswatini, Lesotho, Zambia,
Malawi and Botswana. In her classical book, Dark Matters, Browne (2015)
shows that contemporary tech-enabled surveillance practices are an exten-
sion of the long history of policing black bodies from slavery onward.
Consequently, surveillance practices in Africa have a long and winding
history (Kwet, 2020). Whilst digitization and the rapid mass permeation
of digital technologies have expanded the reach and breadth of surveil-
lance, the evolution of surveillance regimes cannot be disassociated from
the brutal history of slave trade, colonialism and apartheid in southern
Africa. As Kwet (2020) observes, “European conquerors marshaled sur-
veillance as a means to control people of colour”. Colonial powers used
surveillance to enable extraction of taxes and to monitor the struggle for
independence (Roberts et al., 2021). In colonial Africa, surveillance
regimes manifested itself through the imposition of passes. In the absence
of advanced technologies, colonial administrators resorted to barbaric
techniques. In order to ensure reliable surveillance markers, colonial
administrators used hot irons, needles and Indian ink to write on the skin
of Africans and livestock (Kwet, 2020). They used these technologies to
brand Africans and livestock with unique symbols also listed in paper reg-
isters (Roberts et al., 2021). Through this skin branding system, marks on
Africans or (allegedly) stolen animals could then be checked against a
paper register of symbols (like a phone book) distributed to local officials
(Kwet, 2020). To make the system more robust, various white authorities
marked the skin of workers and livestock with symbols registered in paper
databases. The skin branding system served as an identity verification
mechanism. Using this skin branding system, colonial administrators were
able “to track and control the movements, settlements, and labour of
Africans” (Kwet, 2020).
The surveillance regimes later evolved with the roll out of the pass sys-
tem. Through the pass system, colonizers, capitalists and business elite in
colonial Africa were able to remotely to police the movements of African
workers. In some areas, statutes on the books were too difficult or impos-
sible to enforce. The pass system was used for segregation, labour control,
and punishment (Kwet, 2020). Besides skin branding system, fingerprint-
ing was also introduced in order to simplify and the pass system at the
beginning of the twentieth century (Kwet, 2020). The introduction of
fingerprinting was the first attempt at institutionalizing the biometric
technology in colonial Africa (see Chap. 5, for a more nuanced take on
this subject). Together with the pass laws, the fingerprinting system was
adapted to local conditions (Kwet, 2020). During the colonial and apart-
heid eras, white elites in the public and private sector administered a dys-
topian surveillance state which brutalized and humiliated Africans for
centuries. Colonial powers collaborated with local elites on projects of
mass surveillance. Unlike other southern African countries, there was an
attempt by the National Party in apartheid South Africa to implement an
“all-seeing surveillance system” (Kwet, 2020). This panoptic system was
aimed at imposing a regime of fixed racial classification and keeping
detailed records about the African population. Built around the state-
mining industrial complex, the closed compound was designed to facili-
tate the panoptic surveillance of workers (Kwet, 2020). At the core of this
surveillance regime were technologies such as skin branding, fingerprint-
ing, photography and computer automation.
Surveillance regimes in Africa were always devised in collaboration with
foreign colonizers, imperialists, intellectuals, and profit-seeking capitalists
(Kwet, 2020). The trend has continued in postcolonial southern Africa,
with big technology companies and foreign powers such as United States,
Israeli, China, Russia and others playing a pivotal role. In South Africa, the
legal apparatus of race-based surveillance was only temporarily abolished
at the dawn of democracy in 1994 (Kwet, 2020; Duncan, 2018). However,
there is ample evidence that surveillance continued unabated in post-
apartheid South Africa (Duncan, 2018, 2022). This legacy of surveillance
was inherited by most postcolonial governments and used the system to
surveil ‘new’ surveillant subjects. In some cases, the system was repro-
duced as it is while in other cases the system was modified and refined to
meet the shifting targets of surveillance. The new targets of surveillance
included human rights lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, opposition
politicians, social activists and business competitors (see Mare, 2016a;

Munoriyarwa & Chiumbu, 2022). In postcolonial southern Africa, sur-
veillance technologies and regimes have also evolved alongside complex
shifts in power, culture, and the political economy (Kwet, 2020). For
instance, analogue surveillance has been digitalized and automated, mak-
ing mass surveillance cheaper, easier and possible.
The role of colonial powers in the erection of surveillance regimes has
remained stagnant. Superpowers such as Russia, China, the United States,
Germany, Britain and France have continued to play an instrumental role
in both the manufacturing and exportation of surveillance technologies to
countries in the global South. For instance, the United States and China
have intensified their roles in the implementation of surveillance infra-
structures. With the United States and China engaged in the technologi-
cal race, they have looked to Africa for the market of their surveillance
products. US and Chinese corporations colonized the digital ecosystem at
the levels of hardware and software. Companies such as Huawei, Google,
Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter and TikTok have perfected the art of
surveillance capitalism. Thus, China and the United States have imposed
surveillance through the internet via their control of the digital ecosystem
(Kwet, 2019). Chinese telecommunications giants such as Huawei have
also penetrated the digital ecosystem in ways that have laid a strong foun-
dation for surveillance architecture. The increased prominence of Chinese
state-linked telecommunications companies in many African markets—
often apparently acting as technical implementers for national government
telecommunications and interceptions programmes—has sparked addi-
tional concerns about the geo-politics of digital surveillance. Research
suggests a rapid expansion in the sale of new surveillance technologies to
African countries by companies from the United States, China, Europe
and Israel (Duncan, 2018; Feldstein, 2019; Jili, 2020; Amnesty
International, 2021; Roberts et al., 2021). Through centralized owner-
ship and control of the digital ecosystem, the United States and China
have created a new form of structural power, commonly known as ‘digital
colonialism’.6 These ‘digital colonizers’ enjoy surveillance monopoly in
the digital sphere. As ‘digital colonies’, countries in southern Africa suffer
from data exploitation and user behaviour surveillance on a massive scale.
6
This refers to colonial practices and cultures in the digital space, where Big Tech corpora-
tions from the global North exploit resources from the Global South in ways that mimic
traditional colonialism.
Through catchphrases such as the 4IR, southern African countries are

increasingly entrenching their digital existence and footprints into the
‘dragnet’ characterized by Big Data, Artificial Intelligence7 (AI), 3D tech-
nology and cloud computing. This has opened the floodgates of mass
surveillance in southern Africa.
This ‘surveillance race’ pitting different superpowers has spawned the
production and deployment of AI surveillance tools. As net importers of
these technologies, countries in southern Africa are already implementing
facial recognition systems, safe city projects, cloud computing infrastruc-
tures and smart policing initiatives (Mudongo, 2021). Private companies
have joined the fray, thereby creating interesting dynamics in the surveil-
lance ecosystem. Through public-private partnerships (PPPs) between
state and technology companies, several countries in southern Africa have
embraced smart city/safe city initiatives (see Chap. 3). These initiatives are
often presented as public safety initiatives meant to enhance security in
public areas. Concerns have been raised about the lack of transparency by
private companies doing business with states to supply AI surveillance
tools (Mudongo, 2021). Human rights defenders have warned that the
entrance of private companies into the AI surveillance market could result
in a situation where violations of user privacy and data exploitation are
normalized. There are fears that such surveillance tools could be used to
achieve political agendas or to silence critics. This is partly because AI sys-
tems are currently developed through invasive techniques to collect peo-
ple’s personal data (Mudongo, 2021). Even more worrisome is the fact
that available AI systems have the capabilities of collecting tons of data as
well as deploying invasive surveillance techniques to utilize personal data
which benefits private companies (ibid.). Primitive data accumulation has
been identified as a key challenge associated with surveillance capitalism
(Zuboff, 2019). Louder concerns related to privacy and human rights
violations have begun to clog the public sphere. Data justice CSOs have
argued that AI systems have the potential to cause harms in the absence of
strong data protection and protection of personal information frameworks.
7
AI is a set of theories, approaches, methods and applications—such as machine learning,
deep learning and neural networks—increasingly used in many aspects of computing and
everyday life.
Metamorphosis and Shifts in Institutional Sites

of Surveillance in Southern Africa
Surveillance has spilled out of its old nation-state containers to become a

feature of everyday life, at work, at home, at play, on the move (Lyon,
2021a). As a historically, spatially and culturally situated phenomenon
(Murakami Wood, 2013a), surveillance goes beyond the stable, contained
and traceable spaces. In a fact, countless agencies and institutions are now
able to trace and track mundane activities for a plethora of purposes (Lyon,
2021a). Unlike during the heydays of the ‘Big Brother’ concept, where
analogue surveillance involved tracking manually human beings and files
in order to categorize and make decisions, in the digital age, this has
changed dramatically. As Lyon (2021a) puts it, abstract data can be
manipulated to produce profiles and risk categories in a liquid, networked
system. The rationale for both digital and analogue surveillance remains
the same: “to plan, predict and prevent by classifying and assessing those
risk files” (Lyon, 2021a). Various elements have entered the surveillance
ecosystem. These include speed, velocity, mobility and big data.
Surveillance is now designed to arrive ahead of the event. In a networked
word, “surveillance ebbs and flows through space” (Lyon, 2021a).
Noteworthy to emphasize that it moves in multi-directional ways.
Given the dizzying range and breath-taking developmental pace of new
and ever-mutating surveillance technologies and their “creeping” func-
tions as they become integrated into assemblages, the range and preva-
lence of surveillance practices has become far reaching and limitless
(Murakami Wood 2012; Lyon, 2018; Duncan, 2014). Although surveil-
lance is old as humanity, the institutional sites and places through which it
is conducted have multiplied over the years. It has gone beyond the mili-
tary, the nation-state, the workplace and policing. It has permeated peo-
ple’s daily social lives in ways that was never imagined in the past. Lyon
(2018) even talks of ‘everyday surveillance’ to highlight the pervasiveness
and everydayness of this phenomenon. Cognizant of these twists and
turns in the institutional sites of surveillance, Lyon (2018, p. 40) adds the
sphere of consumption as another veritable site. In this context, consump-
tion here encapsulates the use of radio-frequency identification and cus-
tomer loyalty card programmes. The use of analytics and metrics especially
on social media platforms and websites has allowed for granular
measurement of readers and users’ media consumption habits and

behaviours (Moyo et al., 2019). As part of ‘surveillance capitalism’
(Zuboff, 2019), users of social media platforms and websites are con-
stantly monitored by cookies.
The shift from public to private spheres in surveillance studies high-
lights the importance of consumption as a productive site. Lyon (2003)
talks of “surveillance as social sorting”8 to foreground this shift in surveil-
lance studies. Thus, Lyon builds on the notion of the “panoptic sort” as
theorized by Gandy (1993). Focusing on consumer surveillance, Gandy
(1993) demonstrates how the deployment of database marketing pro-
duces discriminatory practices that lead to inclusionary and exclusionary
tendencies. Data about transactions is used both to target persons for fur-
ther advertising and to dismiss consumers who are of little value to com-
panies. This represents one of the most routine and fastest growing
domains in which the details of people’s practices are discretely collected,
analysed and then acted upon. In line with the business model of the inter-
net and social media companies, data is collected, analysed and then deci-
sions are made (Zuboff, 2019). This highlights the shift of surveillance
from largely public spheres to what is often conceptualized as private
spheres. The blurring of the private and public spheres has meant that
surveillance has become more mundane and normal. Whilst the addition
of consumption as another site of surveillance might sound pedestrian, it
is important to highlight that surveillance as a set of processes is not lim-
ited to the state (through men and women in black suits and dark shades)
watching the citizenry; it is equally at home in traditionally private spheres
(Lyon, 2021a). It is everywhere. It flows in a capillary fashion.
Realizing the twists and turns in the institutional sites of surveillance,
we deploy the term ‘pervasive surveillance’ to denote the mundane, ubiq-
uity, everydayness and fluidity of ‘watching over’ the activities and behav-
iours of actors and actants both online and offline. Thus, contemporary
forms of surveillance know no boundaries. It is slippery and constantly
being liquefied as technologies to continue to evolve. In such a context,
“many people have become resigned to a world where they cannot have a
reasonable expectation of surveillance” (Duncan, 2022). Whilst analogue
surveillance remains the dominant form of collecting and monitoring the
8
To consider surveillance as social sorting is to focus on the social and economic categories
and the computer codes by which personal data is organized with a view to influencing and
managing people and populations.
activities of the surveilled, governments in southern Africa are investing in

digital variants of surveillance (see Chaps. 2, 4 and 5). Furthermore, by
deploying the moniker of ‘pervasive surveillance’, we do not intend to be
alarmists or to engender an atmosphere of fear. Rather, we seek to high-
light the far-reaching reach, course and consequences of surveillance in an
environment where data protection frameworks are generally weak. We
also seek to raise awareness about the insidious consequences of normal-
izing surveillance.
Democratization Conflicts,9 Surveillance States10

and the Chilling Effects in Southern Africa
It is impossible to talk about pervasive surveillance in southern Africa

without paying special attention to the interlocking nature of democrati-
zation conflicts, authoritarian creep, contentious politics, retooling of sur-
veillance infrastructures as well as the shrinking democratic space. Thus,
reductions in democratic freedoms and shrinking civic space have spawned
significant investments in surveillance infrastructures (Freedom House,
2021; CIVICUS, 2020). Most of the surveillance tools are used to disci-
pline social activists, journalists, human rights lawyers, opposition politi-
cians and trade unionists. As democratization conflicts continue to fester
in the underbelly of postcolonial and post-apartheid societies in southern
Africa, the default settings of most political regimes have been to expand
their surveillance capabilities. Unfortunately, this is happening in political
contexts with weak legal and regulatory oversight, poor institutional pro-
tections and where levels of awareness about privacy rights and surveil-
lance practices are lowest. The expansion of the technical means to conduct
mass surveillance alongside the contraction of democratic space has raised
concerns about what Freedom House (2018) has called a descent into
‘digital authoritarianism’. This authoritarian creep has been accompanied
by internet shutdowns (Zimbabwe and Eswatini), promulgation of draco-
nian surveillance laws (Tanzania, the DRC, Zimbabwe and Angola), calls
for the regulation of social media (Namibia, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania
9
This refers to conflicts that accompany and are triggered by democratic transformations
like constitutional, social protests, factionalism, accountability and electoral issues.
10
This is a state that sees surveillance as the solution to complex social issues. It collects
information on everyone, without regards to innocence or guilt, and pretends it is not
surveillance.
and Lesotho, Zimbabwe), and imposition of mandatory SIM card regis-

trations (Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique). Most of
these countries are at different stages of promulgating data protection,
cybercrimes and protection of personal information laws (for a more
detailed exposition see Chap. 3).
As discussed earlier, democratization conflicts have affected almost all
SADC countries. For instance, countries such as Eswatini, Malawi,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, South Africa and Lesotho have suffered
from recurrent accountability conflicts in the form of service delivery pro-
tests. Most of these protests have been caused by corruption, unemploy-
ment, rising cost of living and education, gender-based violence, influx of
immigrants, bad governance, human rights abuses and poverty (Mare,
2016a; Wasserman & Garman, 2012). Youth unemployment and hope-
lessness has been identified as one of key triggers of protests. As Wasserman
and Garman (2014) observe, these protests can be viewed as a revolt
against governments that are increasingly seen as uncaring and not listen-
ing. In authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Eswatini
accountability, constitutional and electoral conflicts have been spurred by
disputed elections, poor service delivery, deteriorating economic situation
and worsening human rights record. It is arguable that these conflicts have
led some unprincipled members of the security services to rely on surveil-
lance to monitor the activities of the ring leaders.
Using national security justifications, countries such as Zimbabwe,
Eswatini, Angola and Mozambique have resorted to deploying surveil-
lance technologies to control and discipline ‘problematic’ citizens (Mare,
2019; Tendi, 2016). This has not precluded the region from joining the
surveillance bandwagon. Several factors have been flagged as drivers of
this surveillance creep. In Zambia, the authoritarian turn became much
more pronounced during the tenure of Edgar Lungu. Besides arresting
opposition politicians, activists and musicians on flimsy charges, Lungu’s
government came up with a raft of cyber-security and crimes legislation
meant to stifle freedom of expression and assembly. Those who suffered at
the hands of Edgar Lungu include Hakainde Hichilema, Pilato, Laura
Miti and Bornwell Mwewa. He even arrested a 15-year-old boy for a
defamatory post on Facebook. Lungu was eventually defeated by opposi-
tion leader, Hakainde Hichilema in August 2021, which paved the way for
the change in governance systems. Despite his reformist posture, it remains
to be seen whether President Hichilema will be able to undo the legislative
and regulatory damage caused by his predecessor. Deep Packet Inspection
software has been detected in Zambia, which was also identified as a major
regional surveillance hub in documents leaked by former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2014). Leaked emails from the Italian sur-
veillance firm Hacking Team also revealed that the company might have
sold its sophisticated spyware known as Remote Control System (RCS) to
the Zambian authorities. Recent studies (Munoriyarwa & Chiumbu,
2022; Chiumbu, 2022; Phiri & Zorro, 2021) on smart cities project in
Zambia have flagged China’s influence in the emerging digital surveillance
cultures and practices.
Namibia has continued to consolidate its democratic institutions under
the leadership of President Hage Geingob in the past few years. There are,
however, concerns that the president and the South-West Africa Political
Organization (SWAPO) have become increasingly intolerant to divergent
political views. Facing challenges from youthful parties such as Affirmative
Repositioning (AR), Landless People’s Movement (LPM), Economic
Freedom Fighters Namibia (EFF-Namibia) and Independent Patriots for
Change (IPC), researchers have pointed out that the Government of
Namibia has begun to flex its surveillance muscles in order to monitor the
activities of opposition politicians, activists and journalists (Mare, 2019).
Calls for the regulation of social media have grown louder as the ruling
party feels the heat from restless unemployed youths. Endemic factional-
ism within SWAPO have also justified the need to ‘watch over’ comrades.
Sporadic protests such as #ShutItAllDown and #FeesMustFall have also
put the government on high alert. The United Kingdom has exported
highly invasive international mobile subscriber identity catchers (IMSI-
catcher) to Namibia (Links, 2018a). Mandatory SIM card registration was
implemented in 2022 in Namibia. In Botswana, cases of surveillance have
graced national and regional media following the ouster of Ian Seretse
Khama. The fall out between him and current President Masisi has threat-
ened to destabilize the country. After the arrest of Isaac Kgosi, the former
Director of Security Services (DISS) at the airport, he threatened to stage
a coup. It is believed that Mr Kgosi is aligned to President Khama’s fac-
tion. It is possible that surveillance is being used for factional purposes as
well as monitoring opposition parties.
Similar trends have been reported in Eswatini, Lesotho and Malawi.
The two small kingdoms (Lesotho and Eswatini) are believed to have also
acquired surveillance technologies to deal with their own peculiar politi-
cal, social and economic problems. Both countries have encountered a
series of social protests against the rule by Kings. In Eswatini, protestors
have been killed and shot at by the security forces for demanding the res-
ignation of King Mswati. Opposition leaders, activists, journalists and
trade unions have been on the receiving end of the repressive state appa-
ratuses of the Eswatini. Fragile political arrangements in Lesotho have
rendered coups normal as politicians jostle for power. Protests and frac-
tious political coalitions have struggled to keep the country together. Like
her neighbours, Malawi was in a dire situation during the reign of Peter
Mutharika who was defeated by President Lazarus Chakwera. Authoritarian
tendencies led to a sustained cycle of protests in major cities and towns.
Opposition politicians, academics, human rights lawyers and activists have
been targeted for surveillance purposes. The two Lusophone countries in
SADC—Angola and Mozambique—have their own dynamics. Unlike
other southern Africa countries, Mozambique is the only a terrorist target.
Whereas Mozambique has justified its acquisition of surveillance technol-
ogies to fight terrorism in Northern parts of the country, Angola has done
so to quell social protests, factionalism and national security challenges.
Media reports have alleged that the Mozambican government engages in
monitoring of e-mails and internet traffic of members of opposition politi-
cal parties, and with capacity and support from the state of China.
As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, disputed elections, the resurgence of
the now rebranded Citizens Coalition for Change (formerly Movement
for Democratic Change [MDC] Alliance), militarization of politics and
fear of the return of the Generation-40 (G-40) splinter group from
ZANU-PF have rendered surveillance the weapon of last resort. Despite
limited government interference on the internet market, communication
surveillance has been happening for a long time in Zimbabwe (Mare,
2016a; Karekwaivanane & Msonza, 2021). Media reports suggest that it
is occurring secretly based on the leaked emails and WhatsApp chats of
Elizabeth Macheka, Tendai Biti and the late Morgan Tsvangirai during the
tenure of government of national unity (2009–2013). Furthermore,
research (Tendi, 2016; Media Democracy & Policy Project, 2019;
Munoriyarwa, 2021) suggests that surveillance has been used in the suc-
cession and factional battles which rocked the Zimbabwe African National
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the run up to the party’s 2014
National Congress. The battles claimed the scalp of Vice-President Joice
Mujuru and a few former liberation war stalwarts. As Tendi (2016, p. 20)
argues, “invisible or seemingly ‘non-existent’ high-tech surveillance, tak-
ing the form of electronic bugs, hidden cameras, phone monitoring tech-
nology, voice cloning software, and drone cameras were apparently central
to Military Intelligence’s (MI) surveillance strategies”. The country has

passed both legislation and statutory instruments to rationalize the spying
activities. It is generally believed that the country has already set up a
Monitoring of Interception of Communications Centre (MICC) as part
of the Interception of Communications Act (ICA) of 2007. The Act
empowers the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the Commissioner
of Police and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to spy on citizens’ mobile
phones and e-mails. Section 9 of the Act also imposes intermediary liabil-
ity on mobile operators and internet service providers (ISPs) compelling
them to install the hardware and software required for the state to carry
out surveillance. Before amendment, the minister had the power to issue
interception warrants without consulting an oversight body. Nowadays,
the minister is expected to consult with the Cyber Security Committee
(Committee). The amendment allows the minister to issue a provisional
warrant whilst waiting to consult with the Committee. In December
2021, Zimbabwe gazetted the Cyber and Data Protection Act (CDPA)
after a series of many false starts. The final Act started its journey under the
titles like the Computer and Cyber Crimes Bill and Data Protection Bill in
2013 until it muted into Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill in 2019.
Throughout this bumpy road, it maintained its quest to pursue what Saki
(2022: n.p) calls a “cyber-securitisation discourse with feigned economic-
commercialisation interest and minimum human rights protection”. It
also criminalizes the production and circulation of false and misleading
information on digital platforms.
South Africa has not escaped the surveillance ‘dragnet’ (Duncan,
2014). Whilst on paper the country does not face the scale of terrorist
threats encountered elsewhere yet it has among the most advanced sur-
veillance capabilities in the region (Roberts et al., 2021). The country is
not only a net importer of surveillance technologies but also a major
exporter (Mare, 2016a). High incidences of social protests and xenopho-
bic attacks against foreign nationals suggest that the temptation is there
for less principled members of the security apparatus to abuse the state’s
surveillance capabilities to advantage the faction currently in control of the
ruling African National Congress (ANC) and disadvantage their perceived
detractors (Duncan, 2014). Under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, surveil-
lance was also used against political enemies within the African National
Congress (ANC) (Duncan, 2014). Some of the leading figures in the
Scorpions had their phone calls listened to while they were finalizing cor-
ruption charges against Jacob Zuma during his ascendency to the
presidency. This constituted mass surveillance practices in contravention

of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-related Information Act (RICA) of 2002 which regulates
targeted surveillance. Concerns around the abuse of national intelligence
structures for factional purposes forced President Cyril Ramaphosa to
appoint a High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency (SSA)
and Related Matters in 2017. This is because there were leaked emails of
their meeting. Besides targeting opposition politicians and members of the
ANC, Duncan (2014) observes that the state could easily misuse its sur-
veillance capabilities to harass investigative journalists and expose their
confidential sources of information, especially if they threaten ruling inter-
ests. Not only journalists have been targeted for state surveillance, but
trade unionists have not been spared either, with media reports indicating
that state intelligence officers were spying on senior National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) officials as well as attempting to
recruit some of their members work as spies (Mail and Guardian, 2013).
Surveillance has begun to replace censorship as the weapon of choice
for both democratic and non-democratic regimes intent on silencing and
intimidating critical voices (Lyon, 2001a). It undermines critical and
investigative reporting, which requires confidential communication with
sources and, occasionally, the anonymity of authors (York, 2014). Some
governments have been implicated in the processes of spying on journal-
ists’ emails to identify confidential sources, tracking journalists via their
mobile phones and hacking journalists’ computers and infecting them
with malware (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Dencik, 2015). Intrusive
surveillance makes it difficult for the media to challenge powerful institu-
tions, bear witness and represent the public interest. As York (2014)
observes, surveillance does not only impede journalists’ ability to do their
work but also endangers the safety of their news sources. This breeds a
culture of “chilling effect”, which has been defined as the idea that laws,
regulations or state surveillance can deter people from exercising their
freedoms (Penney, 2017). Writing about concerns about state surveil-
lance and data gathering by private companies, Solove (2006, p. 487)
argues that these practices can create an atmosphere of “risk” and
self-censorship.
The impact of surveillance is hugely felt by vulnerable constituencies in
society. These include activists, human rights lawyers, opposition politi-
cians, trade unionists and academics. State surveillance has led to changes
in journalistic sourcing strategies, as well as cutting away at the ability of

government officials to remain anonymous in their interactions with the
press, as any interaction—any email, any phone call—risks leaving a digital
trace that could subsequently be used against them (Human Rights Watch,
2014). These concerns are serious in the context of ubiquitous surveil-
lance, especially in settings where mandatory Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) card registrations have been legislated. This puts journalists and
their potential news sources in a quandary given the potential vulnerabili-
ties associated with accessing metadata11 and contents of communication
without warrants. The danger with metadata is that it allows the surveiller
to map their networks and activities, making journalists think twice before
communicating with sources. A study conducted by the Human Rights
Watch (2014) found that news sources are substantially less willing to be
in contact with the press, even regarding unclassified matters or personal
opinions.
Several studies have suggested that covert forms of repression can result
in challengers substituting violent behaviour for non-violent activity
(Davenport, 2005; Lichbach, 1987). As surveillance increases the cost of
action to social movement actors, it can contribute to the decline of orga-
nizations and movements (Tarrow, 1998, pp. 147–148). Linking behav-
ioural changes to the suppression of free speech, Greenwald (2014,
pp. 177–178) argues that “mass surveillance kills dissent in a deeper and
more important place as well: in the mind”. Repression including surveil-
lance may also turn dissidents underground (away from more public,
restricted spaces toward more private ‘free’ spaces), or alternatively away
from overt collective forms of resistance12 towards more covert, individu-
alistic forms of resistance (Davenport, 2005). As Della Porta (1995) notes,
while individuals are concerned to participate, surveillance also threatens
the bonds between organizations in networks. Surveillance forecloses
political opportunities in several ways (Starr et al., 2008). One of the ways
11
Metadata can include the length of phone calls, the phone numbers of the caller and the
recipient, the serial numbers of the devices used and sometimes the locations of those who
made the call. It consists of information about who phone users call, when they call and for
how long.
12
Resistance can take many forms. It incorporates varying notions of action, interaction,
opposition, awareness and power. It has four consistent properties: its interactional nature,
the central role of power, how the concept of resistance is socially constructed and the com-
plex nature of resistance.
in which surveillance changes the climate is that it creates an atmosphere

of threat, which intimidates participants and would-be participants. Thus,
surveillance has a powerful intimidating effect.
COVID-19-Related Surveillance
Besides democratization conflicts, terrorism, crime, immigration and
national security concerns, it is important to tease out the role of pandem-
ics in the normalization of surveillance regimes in southern Africa. The
trend towards what Lyon (2002) refers to as “everyday surveillance” was
escalated during the on-going COVID-19 global pandemic. The
COVID-19 pandemic, which was first detected in Wuhan, China, in
December 2019, has disrupted our everyday lives. It has brought with it
practices such as lockdowns, self-isolation, wearing of face masks and
quarantine. Southern Africa has not escaped this phenomenon.
Governments have put in place measures to increase public health surveil-
lance, in some cases, without the necessary and proportionate legal frame-
works to safeguard citizens’ data and personal information. Theorizing
about the normalization of surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic,
Lyon (2021a) has coined the term ‘pandemic surveillance’. The term
refers to “a situation where governments and private actors are allowed to
monitor and surveil the spread of the virus and to make sure citizens fol-
low the measures they put in place” (Lyon, 2021a: n.p). It manifests itself
in different forms and shapes depending on contextual peculiarities. As a
result, several governments and private actors have been able to mobilize
massive and unprecedented quantum of public health data to contain and
combat the virus. The SADC region has witnessed the unprecedented
acquisition and deployment of surveillance technologies like contact-trac-
ing apps, facial recognition, filling in of public registers and population
tracking. Whilst there are tangible benefits associated with pandemic sur-
veillance, it is noteworthy to foreground the unintended consequences of
such practices. This is very important in context where data protection
laws are weak and at worst non-existent as well as oversight systems are
compromised. Most surveillance programmes put in place in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic in southern Africa violated privacy protections
as enshrined in national constitutions. They also contradicted an ethics of
care as evidenced African philosophical underpinnings such as ubuntu. In
the age of data deluge, pandemic surveillance has been critiqued for
violating the basics of ‘data justice’. This refers to “fairness in the way
people are made visible, represented and treated as a result of their pro-
duction of digital data—is necessary to determine ethical paths through a
datafying world” (Taylor, 2017, p. 1).
The magnitude of the COVID-19-related surveillance expansion in
southern Africa will take a long time to quantify but there is anecdotal
evidence which suggests that most governments have upped their ante in
terms of collecting and processing personal information related to the
public health disaster over the last three years. For instance, in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic, some governments in southern Africa used AI
powered by data science and machine learning in public health manage-
ment and public policy to model and predict outbreaks and COVID-19
spread and help with contact tracing (Mudongo, 2021). Some of the
southern African governments are increasingly adopting measures that
could lead to violations of human rights. This raises the challenge of pre-
serving and upholding both individual and collective rights (Mudongo,
2021). Without adequate safeguards on data protection and protection of
personal information, it is arguable that citizens’ data and personal infor-
mation collected as part of the COVID-19 pandemic could be abused by
governments and private companies for political and economic gains.
Cases abound where some of the public registers have been sold to adver-
tising agencies. It is within this context that Lyon (2021a, n.p) questions
whether this new culture of pandemic surveillance will become a perma-
nent feature of post-pandemic societies? If so, this will undoubtedly have
long term effects on social inequalities and human freedoms.
Theorizing Surveillance
In view of the expanding range and diversity of surveillance sites, we jet-
tison the deployment of grand theories in favour of an eclectic approach
that emphasizes structuration (structure and agency). Such an approach
allows us to analyse the causes, the courses, political economy, resistance
and the consequences of surveillance. We acknowledge that surveillance
processes are more complex, ambiguous and open-ended than the panop-
ticon allows. We go beyond the notion of ‘Big brother’ by underscoring
post-panoptic theories of surveillance. Drawing inspiration from Giddens
(1984), we posit that there is structuration between socio-technical sur-
veillance systems and surveillant subjects. Our argument is that
socio-technical surveillance systems are also affected by people complying

with, negotiating or resisting surveillance. It is important to theorize the
various ways that surveillant subjects participate in surveillance as well as
teasing out the relations between surveillance processes and the surveilled.
Furthermore, subjects often actively participate in their own surveillance
and encourage the implementation of the surveillance systems brought to
bear upon them. This also chimes with Giddens’ (1985) ‘dialectic of con-
trol’ which underscores the inter-relational conception of power, empha-
sizing the roles of both dominant and subjected actors to the normalization
of control. For Giddens, “all forms of dependence offer some resources
whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their
superiors” (Giddens, 1985, p. 16).
Surveillance studies can be situated within two broad theoretical frame-
works: the panopticon and assemblage. Panopticon theories focus on the
“few watching the many”, as evidenced by the Bentham, Orwell and
Foucault’s panopticon theories. This strand of theorization views surveil-
lance as generally more powerful as a form of social control than outright
repression, because it makes social control less visible. It makes people
internalize acceptable conduct and regulate their own behaviour rather
than having the state or some other external force doing so. These repre-
sentations of surveillance tend to reinforce the ‘Big Brother’ stereotype,
neglecting a more nuanced understanding of the role of human agency. In
fact, several critiques have shown that we need to move beyond the idea of
‘Big Brother’ (Bakir, 2015; Boyne, 2000; Haggerty & Ericson 2000;
Haggerty, 2006). As Mathiesen (1997, p. 207) observes, this Foucauldian
view fails to acknowledge the rise of the spectacle in mass mediated societ-
ies where the many watch the few (symbolized by “synopticism”). Theories
of assemblage which borrow heavily from Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000)
postulation foreground the various in which the ‘many are watching the
few’. These theories deploy concepts such as “sousveillance”, “veillance”
(mutual watching) (Mann, 2013), “dataveillance” (the practice of moni-
toring and collecting online data as well as metadata) and “liquid surveil-
lance” (Lyon, 2010b). Liquid surveillance denotes contemporary “regimes
of in/visibility and is characterized by data-flows, mutating surveillance
agencies and the targeting and sorting of everyone” (Lyon, 2010b,
p. 325). The notion of liquid surveillance borrows heavily from Bauman’s
(2000) notion of ‘liquid modernity’.
Panoptic Theories of Surveillance

It is important to note that the idea of Big Brother can be traced to the
writings of Orwell (1949). According to Orwell (1949), citizens are mon-
itored in their homes by a telescreen, a device which both projects’ images
and records behaviour in its field of vision. He saw ‘thought police’ as
coordinating this extensive monitoring effort by operating as agents of a
centralized totalitarian state. For him, surveillance was used primarily to
maintain social order and conformity (Orwell, 1949). Although Foucault
(1979) extends Orwell’s theoretical cloth, it is noteworthy to highlight
that his views regulate the behaviour of individuals in the social body. This
is done by regulating the organization of space, of time and people’s activ-
ity and behaviour. He identifies disciplinary institutions such as prisons,
hospitals, asylum, schools and army barracks. He was concerned with
explicating how surveillance and power are distributed in modern society.
This led him to theorize that surveillance is conducted by the few on the
many, with the many unaware or unsure of this surveillance and thus
driven to self-monitor and modify their behaviour (Foucault, 1979).
Thus, surveillance means that someone “is seen, but he does not see; he is
the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault
1979, p. 200). Panopticon highlights the exercise of power through self-
discipline, self-reflection and training of one’s soul under the eye of
authority.
Because of his deterministic theorization, Foucault is seen as denying
the existence of human agency and resistance to surveillance practices.
This is because panopticism is characterized by immobility through enclo-
sure, isolation and disciplinary practices. Subjects of panopticism are
viewed as limited agents overwhelmed by surrounding structural pressures
and determinations. However, Lyon (1994) argues that a structuralist
reading of Discipline and Punish, which obfuscates the role of human
agency in panopticon societies, is rather misplaced. He proposes that
Discipline and Punish must be read as a voluntaristic rather than determin-
istic. Critics (such as Bauman, 2000; Boyne, 2000) of the panopticon
metaphor of surveillance argue that instead of immobility, isolation and
enclosure envisaged by Foucault, modern surveillance societies are charac-
terized by mobility and the permeability of boundaries as citizens come
and go at will. Citizens cannot be held in place long enough for the pan-
optic mechanism of ‘being seen without being able to see’ to work
its magic.
Adding their voice to the critiques which have been levelled against
Foucauldian theorization, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) argue that the
deployment of the panopticon metaphor is not suitable for analysing sur-
veillance in the information society, because surveillance would no longer
serve the single coherent purpose of control. Haggerty argues that the
panopticon directs scholarly attention to a select group of surveillance
attributes while neglecting “a host of other key qualities and processes of
surveillance that fall outside of the panoptic framework” (2006, p. 23).
There are two problems with the Foucauldian literature outlined earlier.
First, surveillance subjects are portrayed as “passive” subjects or “docile
bodies”, rather than social agents who may negotiate, modify, evade or
deny surveillance practices (Coleman & McCahill, 2011b). Second,
Foucauldian accounts of “the movement of panoptic principles into new
settings [are] often presented as entirely frictionless” and lacking any
“sense of a surveillance politics” (Haggerty, 2006, p. 34). Haggerty goes
further with this same criticism stating that “the panoptic model does not
contain an image of resistance” (2006, p. 36).
Post-Panoptic Theories of Surveillance

Consistent with post-modernist theories, assemblage theories view sur-
veillance as diffuse, pervasive and deeply embedded in all social relations
and formations. Post-panoptic approaches focus on the shortcomings of
panoptic theories to explain contemporary practices (Haggerty & Ericson,
2000; Mathiesen 1997; Marx, 2002; Caluya, 2010). Simon (2004) argues
that Foucault’s over-emphasis on the state as the agent of surveillance
appears too restricted in a society where both state and non-state institu-
tions are involved in massive efforts to monitor different populations.
Unlike modernist theories of surveillance which are largely structuralist
and deterministic, thereby affording little space for human agency to resist
repression, enclosure and total institutions, post-modernist surveillance
scholars (Lyon, 2006; Murakami Wood, 2012; Haggerty, 2006) question
the analytical relevance and power of the panopticon metaphor.
In what has been termed the ‘Deleuzian turn’ in surveillance studies,
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) propose the notion of “surveillant assem-
blages” as a break from Foucault’s panopticism. Centralized panoptic con-
trol is less an issue than polycentric networks of surveillance, within which
personal data flow relatively free (Boyne, 2000). This suggests the liquid-
ity of surveillance, societies which abound with surveillance—formless and
diffuse—“liquid surveillance” (Lyon, 2010b). In this ‘surveillant assem-

blage’, surveillance is a dispersed and rhizomatic phenomenon, being con-
ducted by an unrelated multiplicity of groups and practices. It draws
attention to processes of information extraction in late modernity, the rhi-
zomatic expansion of surveillance and non-disciplinary forms of
surveillance.
In the same vein, Braman (2006) points out that the traditional notion
of panopticon-style surveillance has been replaced by the “panspectron”,
in which information is gathered about everything, all the time. Other
scholars (Bogard, 2006; Clarke, 1988; Albrechtslund, 2008) have coined
various terms to account for the shift from traditional panoptic approaches
to surveillance towards post-modernist theorization. For instance, Clarke
(1988, p. 2) coined the term ‘dataveillance’ to denote the “systematic
monitoring of people’s actions or communications through the applica-
tion of information technology”. Bogard (2006) propounds the notion of
as “hyper-surveillance” in line with the Baudrillardian vision of simulated
surveillance. He views the future as characterized by surveillance without
limits, which aspires not only to see everything, but to do so in advance.
Bogard connects this with the desire for control as the long-term goal of
many technologies, insisting that simulation’s seductive claim is that “any
image is observable, that any event is programmable, and thus, in a sense,
foreseeable” (2006, p. 16).
To make sense of the complicated post-Snowden condition of mutual
watching, Bakir (2015) introduces the concept ‘veillant panoptic assem-
blage’ as a new way of foregrounding resistive possibilities to surveillance.
Given the various types of veillance possible (including not just surveil-
lance but also sousveillance,13 counter-veillance, univeillance and equiveil-
lance), ‘veillant panoptic assemblage’ suggests that resistance to surveillance
may be attempted in different ways. Bakir (2015) demonstrates that flows
of watching and monitoring are multidirectional: they may comprise citi-
zens monitoring themselves and others (including powerholders), retail
and communications companies monitoring customers and the state mon-
itoring everybody. Third, that resistance to surveillance is mostly about
personal ‘protection measures’ that makes the individual feel better but
13
Sousveillance is ‘watching from below,’ a form of inverse surveillance in which people
monitor the surveillors. It includes citizen video, watchdog web sites or the monitoring of
authorities (corporations, military and government). It also embraces the idea of transpar-
ency as an antidote to concentrated power in the hands of surveillers.
are likely not much more ‘secure’. More important, ‘protection’ from the
‘surveillance threat’ is often understood as a series of measures undertaken
by individuals, hiding the collective possibility for resistance (Fernandez &
Huey, 2009).
Resisting Surveillance: Everyday Forms of Resistance

Resistance to surveillance refers to “any active behaviour or interest groups
that oppose the collection and processing of personal data, either through
the micro-practices of everyday resistance to defeat a given application or
through political challenges to wider power relations contest the surveil-
lance regime per se” (Coleman & McCahill, 2011b, p. 147). Practices of
resistance can be developed through activities which uncover the flaws and
limitations of surveillance, practices which allow individuals to evade sur-
veillance and practices which allow individuals to subvert the surveillance
technologies for other purposes (Geesin, 2012). This can also be done
through subverting surveillance technologies’ intended use. In short, sur-
veillance technologies are often détourned where individuals re-appropriate
the technologies to either suit their own purposes or, more significantly, as
a subversive method of turning the surveillance practices’ backs upon
those wielding control (Geesin, 2012).
Mann (2013) proposed the concept of sousveillance to analyse the vari-
ous ways individuals resist surveillance. He discusses two types of sousveil-
lance: hierarchical and personal. Hierarchical sousveillance involves
recording surveillance systems, proponents of surveillance and authority
figures to uncover the panopticon and ‘increase the equality’ between sur-
veillee and surveiller (Marx, 2003). It also encapsulates sousveillant indi-
viduals using tools (such as camera-phones) to observe organizational
observers, enhancing people’s ability to access and collect data about their
surveillance in order to neutralize it, and to act as a consciousness-raising
force to the surveillance society. Activists use technologies such as video
recording against the surveillance authority, photographing police offi-
cers, photographing government officials and beaming satellite shots of
security forces harassing protestors. Personal sousveillance denotes the
recording of an activity by a person who is party to that activity, from first-
person perspectives, without necessarily involving political agendas (Mann,
2004). This includes the use of social media, whereby people curate and
create content, thereby revealing their lives, thoughts and feelings.
There is a debate amongst scholars (Gilliom, 2001; Gilliom & Monahan,

2012; Handler, 1992; Marx, 2003) on the efficacy and relevance of every-
day forms of resistance regarding social and political struggles. Scholars
(Gilliom, 2001; Gilliom & Monahan 2012; Martin et al., 2009) point out
that everyday resistance represents one of the most fruitful dynamics in
understanding the politics of ‘movements’ of staggering proportions.
Gilliom (2001) argues that these practices of everyday resistance mobi-
lized a trenchant critique of the compelled visibility of surveillance. Thus,
the critiques of surveillance are found in the actions of evasion, in the
practices of trickery, in the tactics of masking—these actions simultane-
ously critique the goals and policies of the surveillance system. As Gilliom
and Monahan (2012) observe, the central motif of everyday resistance
practices is that they are unorganized, not explicitly tied to broader ideo-
logical critiques and originate from the direct concerns of everyday life.
On the other hand, Handler (1992) argues that the focus on practices
of everyday resistance glorifies petty acts of individualistic crime and devi-
ance and saps attention from the important work of more public and orga-
nized groups and movements. Handler (1992) argues that progressive
scholars should focus on learning about potentials for strong, public,
transformative movements and eschew the celebration of often petty,
unthinking, individualistic moments of everyday resistance.
The dearth of conventional collective action among the subaltern
groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the global South, “together
with a disillusionment with dominant socialist parties, pushed many radi-
cal observers to ‘discover’ and highlight different types of activism, how-
ever small-scale, local or even individualistic” (Bayat, 2009, p. 43). A
heavy focus on grandiose movements of collective action has sapped atten-
tion from examining the “more enduring, everyday forms of resistance
constantly present in the behaviours, traditions and consciousness of the
subordinate” (Haynes & Prakash, 1991). Subaltern scholars (see Scott,
1976, Bayat, 2009) have directed our attention to small-scale and quiet
encroachment into daily life. Scott’s theory of micro-politics and everyday
resistance borrows heavily from post-structuralist writings, especially
Foucault’s ‘decentred’ notion of power, and neo-Gramscian ‘politics of
culture’ (hegemony). Scott propounded his theory on the bedrock of the
Foucauldian idea that ‘wherever there is power there is resistance’ (1979,
p. 95). Despite popularizing the idea of ‘panopticism’, Foucault acknowl-
edges that there is a symbiotic relationship between forms of resistance
and control. Unlike Foucault who under-theorized resistance by
over-
emphasizing pervasive constraints and their changing logics over
time, Scott’s theory foregrounds small-scale, everyday, tiny activities that
human agents could afford to articulate given their political constraints.
Instead of revolutionary social and political change, everyday forms of
(surveillance) resistance acknowledges that the ‘local’ and individual
should be recognized as a significant site of struggle as well as a unit of
analysis. It posits that organized collective action against surveillance may
not be possible everywhere, and thus alternative forms of struggles must
be discovered and acknowledged (Bayat, 2009, p. 48). This approach
expands the domain of politics to the realm of everyday life (to what Scott
(1976) calls the ‘infrapolitics of the powerless’) beyond formal organiza-
tions (like civil society organizations and social movements) and collective
mobilizations (visible protests and marches).
Methodological Approach
Our book relies on a qualitative research methodology. Unlike quantita-
tive research, the advantage of qualitative research methodology is that it
allows one to understand social phenomena from the perspective of social
actors, to retrieve experiences from the past and to gain insight into the
everyday practices of social actors (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). It starts
from the assumption that in studying people, researchers are examining a
creative process whereby humans produce and maintain forms of life, soci-
ety and systems of meaning. It puts emphasis on ‘thick descriptions’
(Geertz, 1973), which are the detailed description of the phenomenon
under study. As Bryman (1988, p. 63) observes:
This emphasis on description entails attending to mundane detail; the appar-

ently superficial, trivia and minutiae of everyday life are worthy of examina-
tion because of their capacity to help us understand what is going on in a
particular context and to provide clues and pointers to other layers of reality.
In order to answer the main research questions, we relied on primary

and secondary data collection instruments. To demonstrate this, the book
draws empirical evidence from case studies of analogue and digital surveil-
lance practices manifesting themselves in the different countries of south-
ern Africa. Drawing on more than seven years of in-depth field research,
document analysis, interviews, archival data, newspaper reports and per-
spicacious on-site observations, the book endeavours to map the
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York, und die Dame in Schwarz, mit den Brillanten, ist die Tochter
eines Weizenexporteurs en gros und Enkelin eines Auswanderers ...
Zwischendeckpassagiers — tjawoll! Wenn die Herrschaften unter
sich bleiben wollen, dann müssen sie wirklich die rote Schnur
ziehen!“
Ungeduldig, mit brennenden, trockenen Augen und zerbissenen
Lippen stand Karla König auf. Sie war wie im Fieber. Um keinen
Preis durfte jemand aus der Gesellschaft sie noch sehen. Noch
einmal ertrug sie die spöttischen oder kalten Blicke dieser Menschen
nicht.
„Nun ... wie war’s?“
Altmann verstummte, als er ihr blasses, gleichsam zerknittertes
Gesicht erblickte. Das kostbare Kleid schleifte über den Boden, der
Umhang glitt von den wie eingeschrumpften Schultern.
„Was ist denn geschehen, Karla? ... So rede doch!“
„Blamiert habe ich mich — weiter ist nichts geschehen.“
„Du siehst, Karla, ich wollte dich selbst begleiten.“
Aber sie zuckte die Achseln:
„Ach, du ...!“
Es gab ihm einen Stich. So wenig bedeutete er ihr? So völlig
gleichmütig ging sie über ihn hinweg?
„Ja ... warum hast du dich nicht zusammengenommen?“
Seine Stimme klang härter, als er wollte.
Aber dann sah er ihren Umhang auf dem Boden liegen, die
Schleppe war am Ende eingerissen, als wäre sie beim hastigen
Aussteigen am Wagentritt hängen geblieben.
„Die guten Sachen! ... So paß doch auf! ...“
Karla warf sich in den nächsten Sessel.
„Die guten Sachen? ... Meinetwegen sollen sie in Fetzen gehn.
Es sind ja doch nur Lumpen. Jawohl! Lumpen! Ach, du glaubst
vielleicht, weil das Kleid fünfhundert Mark kostet, bin ich gut
angezogen? Gott bewahre! ... Ich hatte ja Goldschuhe an und weiße,
lange Handschuhe! Denke doch — mein Verbrechen! Ausgelacht
haben sie mich! Erst ausgestellt, wie in einem Panoptikum, und dann
ausgelacht!“
Sie schlug die Hände vors Gesicht und blieb regungslos sitzen.
Sie wartete. Jetzt mußte ihr Mann kommen, mußte den Arm um sie
legen, sie trösten und sagen, daß sie heimfahren wollten. Lange saß
sie ganz still, begriff nicht, daß es so lange währte, bis das geschah,
worauf sie wartete.
Altmanns Schritte schlugen an ihr Ohr, langsam, gewichtig. Er
räusperte sich, blieb stehen.
„Ja ... na und dann?“
„Dann? ... Dann bin ich stecken geblieben und habe getan, als ob
ich ohnmächtig wurde ... d a s w a r d a n n !“
Sie riß ihr kleines Taschentuch aus dem Ausschnitt, ballte es
zusammen und warf es zornig auf den Tisch.
„Stecken geblieben ...? Wenn ich dich begleitet hätte, wäre das
nicht geschehen, sage ich ...“
„So? Warum wäre das nicht geschehen?“
„Weil du dich nicht so verlassen gefühlt hättest, weil ...“
„So, glaubst du wirklich? ... Und ich sage dir, es wäre noch
schlimmer geworden. Sie hätten dich mit mir zusammengesperrt und
hätten über deinen Frack gelacht! Ja ... das hätten sie ... denn du
siehst wie ein Schulmeister aus, meint Russel, in deinem
Hochzeitsfrack!“
„So? Meint er das? ... Nun, da ich nicht mit war, konnte mein
Frack nicht an deinem Durchfall schuld sein.“
Karla fühlte, daß sich etwas Häßliches zwischen ihnen erhob. Ein
unsichtbares schwarzes Ungetüm, das mit Tatzen nach ihnen
schlug, sie aufeinanderhetzte. Sie brach aus, ohne Zusammenhang,
leidenschaftlich:
„Ich bleibe hier nicht — um keinen Preis bleibe ich! Geh zu
Russel ... er soll den Vertrag lösen. Es kann ihm ja auch nichts an
mir liegen ... er wird froh sein ...“
„So? ... Und die Vorschüsse ...?“
Altmann stand mit hinter dem Rücken verschränkten Armen vor
ihr. Sein Gesicht drückte leise Genugtuung und Überlegenheit aus.
„Also du willst mir nicht helfen ... willst nicht ...“
Ihre Augen sprühten, ihre Lippen bebten.
„D u hast mich nach Amerika geschleppt ... D u ! ... Ich wollte nicht
... Ich wollte bei meinem Kinde bleiben. Aber das war dir ganz egal,
was mit dem Kinde geschah! Du hattest ja deine Schwestern ...
Deine Schwestern sind dazu da, sich um das Kind zu kümmern ...
Ich muß Geld ...“
Sie brach plötzlich ab, denn Altmann hatte sich über sie gebeugt,
sehr bleich im Gesicht, und hatte mit heftigem Druck ihre Hand
ergriffen.
„Sprich nur zu Ende ... bitte ... lege dir keinen Zwang auf. Wer da
alles aus dir herausredet, das weiß ich nicht. Aber zu so etwas
kommt es wohl, wenn der Mann seine Frau über sich
hinauswachsen läßt. Das heißt — du bist noch nicht
hinausgewachsen ... lange nicht. Denn das ‚viele Geld‘, das du
verdienst — ist weniger wert als meine kleinen Gagen in den letzten
Jahren. Von denen sparte ich mir noch etwas — ja, das tat ich —
sonst hätte ich dich ja gar nicht heiraten können. Was besitzen wir,
seitdem du verdienst? — — Schulden. So ist es. Glaubst du, Russel
läßt dich gehen, solange du ihm noch einen Dollar abzusingen hast?
Eher läßt er dich zehnmal durchfallen, als daß er dich gehen läßt!
Ein Durchfall ist unter Umständen auch eine Sensation, wenn man
ihn geschickt ausnutzt. Denn was du in der Kehle hast, weiß er so
gut wie ich! Aber du bist unbeherrscht — und darauf rechnet er. Ich
bin ihm unbequem, und er möchte mich los sein! Darum sucht er
mich klein zu machen in deinen Augen! Tu ihm nur den Gefallen und
falle ihm drauf rein — bitte. Mir brauchst du ein einziges Wort
zusagen — mit dem nächsten Schiff bin ich wieder in Europa. Dann
balge du dich mit ihm herum! Versuche es, von ihm loszukommen.
Er wird dich schon zu halten verstehn. Ich weiß jetzt Bescheid über
ihn! Du bist nicht die einzige. Wenn du nicht den Stoff in dir hast,
eine allererste zu werden, wertvoll genug bist du, daß er dich bis
aufs Letzte auspumpt! Geh morgen zu ihm hin und verlange
dreitausend Dollar Vorschuß. Er wird sie dir geben. Auch
fünftausend. Je mehr, desto besser! Desto sicherer bist du ihm. Oder
willst du durchbrennen — willst du steckbrieflich verfolgt werden? ...
Mein liebes Kind ... zieh dir einen Leinwandrock an, braune Stiefel
und grüne Handschuhe — und diese selbe Gesellschaft, die dich
heute ausgelacht hat, brüllt dir zu — wenn du einen Namen hast!
Den Namen aber geben dir nicht deine Kleider, sondern den gibt dir
deine Selbständigkeit Russel gegenüber. Zeige ihm, daß du ihn nicht
brauchst, dann wird er Angst haben, dich zu verlieren. So. Und nun
wirtschafte weiter nach eigenem Ermessen. Meine Sachen sind
rasch gepackt ...“
„Ernst!“
Sie hielt ihn am Arm zurück. Sie küßte den alten graukarierten
Stoff, sie streichelte ihm das Gesicht mit ihrer tränenfeuchten Hand.
Sie murmelte:
„Nicht böse sein ... ich bin so dumm ... so schrecklich nervös bin
ich ... Pass’ auf, wenn ich ruhiger werde ... es ist wahr, du mußt
immer mit mir gehen ... immer ... dann kann ich dir gleich alles sagen
... Du bist immer so gut zu mir gewesen ... Du wirst mir raten ...
Gewiß wäre das heute nicht passiert, wenn du dagewesen wärst ...
gewiß nicht ... Und nie nehme ich mehr einen Vorschuß ... nie! ...
Überhaupt will ich das Geld gar nicht mehr sehn ... Du gibst mir ein
Taschengeld wie früher ... ich brauche ja nichts ... nicht wahr? Ein
paar Handschuhe vielleicht ... Schleier trage ich ja nicht ... und mal
was Süßes ... oder eine Kleinigkeit für Schmerzchen ... so wonnige
Babysachen haben sie hier ...“
Altmann drückte ihren hübschen, dunklen Kopf an sich. Wie ein
ungebärdiges Kind war sie. Wild und zügellos, und im
Handumdrehen wieder gut und lenksam. Er wollte ja auch wirklich
nur ihr Bestes — in ihrem gemeinsamen Interesse! Sie dachte an ein
Röckchen für das Kind, er dachte an des Kindes Zukunft.
Es war zwei Uhr nachts, als Karla wie gerädert ihr Bett aufsuchte.
Ihr Mann hatte ihr versprochen, über den gestrigen Abend mit
Russel zu sprechen.
„Lieber, guter Ernst“, flüsterte sie und schlief, seine Hand gegen
die Brust gedrückt, ein — sorglos wie ein Kind, dem man seine Unart
verziehen hat.
* *
*
John Russel machte nicht viele Worte.

„Ich weiß ... ich weiß ... Sie hat keine Routine für Amerika ...
macht nichts! Die will ich ihr schon geben. Wenn sie in drei Jahren
wieder bei Astrongs singt, wird das anders gehen. Schade, so frisch
wird die Stimme dann nicht mehr sein. Well, es gibt Leute, die das
Obst erst dann essen, wenn es überreif ist.“
„Na, erlauben Sie ... in drei Jahren wird meine Frau nicht ...“
John Russel kniff seine glänzenden Raubvogelaugen zusammen:
„Wissen Sie, was eine Tournee heißt von San Franzisko nach
Montevideo?“
Es erging Altmann wie vor wenigen Wochen Karla: der Boden
des hellen Zimmers schien unter ihm zu wanken. Aber er verstand
es, sich zu beherrschen. Schließlich hatte er diesem Manne Gewalt
über Karla gegeben. Daran, eine Tournee einzuteilen, hatte er nicht
gedacht.
„Es wird eine ganz interessante Reise für Sie werden, Mister ...
Herr ... Altmann. Übrigens hier sind die fünfzig Dollars von gestern
abend ... wie ... ich soll sie auf Ihr Konto buchen? ... Es eilt mir nicht
... Sie wünschen es ausdrücklich? ... Well ...“
ie Zofe der Nordeni war Pariserin. Ihre Vergangenheit war
einfach. Als kleine „Grisette“ hatte sie tagsüber die großen
Hutschachteln von Reboux ausgetragen und am Abend die
lärmenden Vergnügungen der Künstlerkolonie von Montmartre
geteilt. Ihre Sprache hatte sich an den feingespitzten Dialogen der
Kunstjünger geformt. Sie schrieb Kärtchen, die stilistisch einer Gräfin
Beausac zur Ehre gereicht hätten, wenn auch in der
Rechtschreibung einer Wäscherin.
Munter lächelnd packte sie mit ihren zugespitzten feinen Händen
die kostbaren Roben ihrer Gebieterin ein und aus, hütete den mit
Similisteinen untermischten Schmuck, badete, salbte, strählte die
überreifen Reize der Nordeni und wußte bestimmt, daß sie selbst
einst noch weit kostbarere Kleider, noch weit strahlenderen Schmuck
ihr eigen nennen würde.
Diese Gewißheit aber behielt sie für sich. War bescheiden,
aufmerksam und lieh ihrer Herrin außer dem Geschick ihrer Hände
auch die belustigenden Wendungen ihres Geistes und einen
sicheren, nie versagenden Geschmack.
Eines Tages fragte Karla, ob Mariette ihr während der langen
Fahrten im Pullmann-Car französischen Unterricht geben wollte?
Madame Nordeni gestattete es gnädigst. Sie war überhaupt so
liebenswürdig, wie es ihr Bewußtsein, der „Star“ der Gesellschaft zu
sein, nur immer zuließ. Ihre anfängliche Bängnis, Karla könnte ihr als
ernste Konkurrentin an die Seite gesetzt werden, verlor sich nach
dem Konzert bei Astrongs völlig. So beschloß sie, in Karla nicht
mehr zu sehen als eine junge „Aushilfe“, die dann zu singen hatte,
wenn sie selbst müde war, nicht disponiert oder aber John Russel
ärgern wollte. Zu Altmann war sie freundlich.
Altmann, an die unverwickelte Psychologie seiner deutschen
Provinzkolleginnen gewöhnt, war der überlegenen Art der Nordeni
nicht gewachsen.
Bald zeigte er sich beflissen höflich, ja zuvorkommend, bald
schroff und abweisend. Sie schien das erstere nicht zu bemerken,
das zweite mit sanftem Lächeln zu übergehen. Sie sagte gern: „Was
macht unsere Kleine?“ und erteilte Karla öfters gute Ratschläge —
durch ihren Mann.
Es kam vor, daß Altmann sagte: „Du, Kind, die Nordeni
behauptet ...“
Karla hielt sich die Ohren zu.
„Ach du, mit deiner Nordeni ...“
Sie meinte nichts damit. Aber ihm war etwas unangenehm dabei.
Nach der sechsten Stunde drückte Altmann der kleinen Pariserin
einen Dollar in die Hand. Er war dabei ein bißchen verlegen, denn —
ein Honorar war es nicht, und der Lehrerin seiner Frau ein Trinkgeld
geben ...
Noch verlegener wurde er, als sie es nicht annahm. Sie schüttelte
lächelnd den Kopf mit dem hochtoupierten, rötlichen Haar und sagte
etwas von „grand plaisir“. Aber weil er in seinem Ungeschick nicht
nachgeben wollte, fuhr sie mit ihrem hübschen Zeigefinger
streichelnd über seine Hand und lächelte ihn bittend an.
Ihm stieg das Blut in die Schläfen. Immer noch hielt er den Dollar
vor sich hin, und obwohl gerade der Kellner durchkam und es ein
leichtes gewesen wäre, ihm den Dollar zuzuwerfen, so konnte er
sich doch nicht dazu entschließen, drehte das Geldstück hin und her
und versenkte es schließlich doch in die Westentasche.
Die Gesellschaft reiste lange, lange Tage zusammen. Aber
trotzdem sie scheinbar ganz aufeinander angewiesen war, kam es
zu keinem rechten Zusammenschluß. Die Nordeni legte gern große
Entfernungen zwischen sich und die anderen, weil es die einzige
Möglichkeit für sie war, ihre erste Stellung zu betonen. Der erste
Tenor war ein fetter Amerikaner, dem eine Partien-Presse einige
Rollen eingepaukt hatte, die er in deutscher Sprache singen mußte.
Er kannte keine Indisposition, keine Angst und keine Stimmung.
Wenn er den Mund auftat, rollten die Töne aus seiner Kehle,
seelenlos und vollendet. Er hatte keinen Ehrgeiz und war nie müde.
John Russel schätzte ihn sehr. Seine einzige Leidenschaft war —
essen. Er verfraß sein ganzes, nicht unbedeutendes Gehalt. Es
hieß, daß er seinen Magen einem medizinischen Institut in Boston
vermacht hatte. Er bildete sich viel mehr auf seinen Magen als auf
seine Stimme ein. John Russel dachte daran, ihn für eine
Varietébühne zu verwenden, wenn er einmal die Stimme verlor ...
John Russel war immer weitblickend.
Der genialste der Gesellschaft war zweifellos der erste
Kapellmeister, ein Mann, der irgendeiner dunklen Geschichte wegen
ausgewandert war. John Russel hatte ihn zufällig in einer
Hafenkneipe entdeckt. Er besaß die grenzenlose Überhebung derer,
die nichts zu verlieren haben, und behandelte die „Stars“ der
Operngesellschaft nicht anders als ehedem seine Kneipenmusiker.
Das Orchester vergötterte, der Chor fürchtete, die Solisten haßten
ihn. Er war unverwundbar und unbestechlich, auch dann, wenn er
sich den Bestechungsversuch selbst gefallen ließ.
Was und wen er in Europa zurückgelassen, erfuhr nie jemand,
und sein Besitztum bestand auch nach zweijähriger Tätigkeit bei
John Russel nur in einem gefüllten Handkoffer. So gänzlich er in
seinem Beruf auch aufging — körperlich schien er immer auf dem
Sprunge zu sein. Nicht einmal einen schriftlichen Vertrag hatte er
machen wollen. Handschlag — und „so lange es ihm paßte!“ Das
gab ihm seine Machtstellung auch John Russel gegenüber. Auf
äußerliche Distanz hielt er nichts. Während der Reisen setzte er sich
am liebsten unter die Choristinnen und riß boshafte, derbe Witze. An
spielfreien Abenden saß er bis tief in die Nacht vor stets erneuten
Strohhalmen, durch die er die stärksten und gewagtesten eiskalten
Mischungen einsog. Seinen wirklichen Namen kannte niemand, und
den angenommenen hatte sich kaum jemand gemerkt.
Nicht mal John Russel. Er war einfach der Kapellmeister, und als
die Nordeni ihn einmal halb anulkend „Kapelle“ nannte, blieb ihm der
Spitzname. Der ihm unterstellte zweite Dirigent war der „Herr
Kapellmeister“ — er war: „Kapelle“. Für das Orchester, die Solisten
und den Chor. Ein neu engagierter Sänger sagte, als er das erstemal
von ihm sprach: „Herr Kapellmeister Kapelle ...“ Auch auf dem
Theaterzettel blieb seine Anonymität gewahrt: „Am Pult: der erste
Dirigent“. John Russel hatte was übrig für eine gewisse Romantik.
Sie ließ sich meist mehr oder minder umsetzen ...
Kapelle haßte übrigens die Nordeni, weil sie ihm immer ihre
hochnäsigsten Blicke herunterwarf, wenn sie zu spät einsetzte.
Immerhin mußte er sie ihrer auf solchen Reisen schätzenswerten
Routine wegen schonen. Er begnügte sich damit, ein paar
Taktstöcke beim Schlagen gegen das Pult zu zerbrechen. Im
Zwischenakt aber stürzte er in die Garderobe: „Ich erwürge dich ...“
Er schimpfte unflätig, während sie noch Puder auflegte oder
Lippenrot.
Um ihn zu versöhnen, schickte sie ihm am nächsten Morgen ein
paar Flaschen Wein. Er kam dann torkelnd, mit verglasten Augen,
zur Probe, und sie höhnte lachend: „Einen feinen Kapellmeister
haben wir!“ Saß er aber erst auf seinem Hocker und hob er den
Taktstock — dann verging ihr das Lachen. Nicht die leiseste
Schwankung! Wie aus Eisen war sein Arm! Er machte keinen
Unterschied zwischen Vorstellung und Probe. Er gab sich immer
ganz. Restlos.
„Wenn er das Saufen lassen wollte, würde ich ihn zum ersten
Dirigenten der Welt machen“, sagte John Russel.
Aber diese Worte machten auf Kapelle wenig Eindruck. Vielleicht
sogar einen entgegengesetzten, als sie sollten.
Kapelle fand Besseres auf dem Grunde seines Glases, als ihm
ein Weltruhm geben konnte — er fand Vergessen. Denn selbst um
den Preis eines Weltruhmes hätte er europäischen Boden nicht
mehr betreten. Aber das brauchte er den Leuten nicht auf die Nase
zu binden ... Das ging sie nichts an ... gar nichts ging sie das an ...!
Karla zitterte vor dem Augenblick, da sie auf der ersten Probe
seinem Taktstock gegenüberstehen würde. Mariette hatte ihr
pantomimisch die erschreckendsten Dinge mitgeteilt.
Monsieur Kapelle war un homme terrible! Er hatte gewiß einen
Mord auf dem Gewissen ... hatte sicher une pauvre femme erwürgt!
Und hatte fliehen müssen vor dem Gesetz ... „Oh le méchant homme
...!“
Das war immer der Schluß. Karla hatte ihren Mann gebeten, er
möchte sich mit ihm ein bißchen anbiedern. Aber Altmann hatte
gesagt:
„Da müßte ich stundenlang mit ihm trinken, liebes Kind ... Du
weißt, das vertrage ich nicht. Im Übrigen halte ich ihn für sachlich.
Sachliche Menschen brauchst Du nicht zu fürchten ...“
Niemals war es Karla so aufgefallen wie jetzt, daß Altmann
nüchtern war ... so schrecklich nüchtern.
„Hast du dir denn niemals einen Spitz angetrunken, Ernst?“
Alle Schelmerei lag in ihrem Blick, alle Teufelchen einer jungen
Frauenseele, die in ihrem Manne einen Gespielen wecken will.
„Nein, Karla — nie!“
„Ja, aber ... warum denn? ... Es ist doch so nett einmal ...“
„Es ist vieles nett, was man nachher abzubüßen hat. Und nichts
ist gefährlicher, als wenn man die Herrschaft über sich verliert ...“
„Und du hast nie die Herrschaft über dich verloren, Ernst ... nie?“
Es klang beinahe etwas wie Bedauern aus ihrer Stimme. — — —
In San Franzisko hatte sie ihre erste Probe mit Orchester, als
Agathe. Nach ihrer Arie klopfte Kapelle ab.
„Hören Sie mal ... wollen Sie das ... ich meine, für mich ... wollen
Sie das nochmal singen ... m i r vorsingen ...?“
Die knorrige, heisere Stimme klang fast scheu und bittend.
Sie nickte. Das Herz klopfte ihr bis zum Halse. Nie hatte ihr
jemand so zugehört. Nie ... Alwin Maurer vielleicht ... aber was
verstand der? Sie sang schöner, weihevoller noch als das erste Mal,
in flutendem, gleitendem Wohllaut. Als sie geendet hatte, klopfte er
ein zweites Mal ab und legte den Taktstock hin.
„So, Herrschaften, das andere übernimmt dann wohl für heute
Kollege Schädlowski.“
„Aber ja, gewiß ... selbstverständlich ... bitt’ schön.“
Herr Kapellmeister Schädlowski — ein hocheleganter
Österreicher, mit schrägem Scheitel und engen Offiziersärmeln,
schwang sich über die Rampe ins Orchester hinunter. Er war
außerordentlich gewandt, dirigierte mit kokettem Heben des kleinen
Fingers und betrachtete die Soubrette jedes Theaters als sein ihm
nicht zu bestreitendes Eigentum. Er brachte künstlerisch nie
ernstzunehmende Vorstellungen heraus — alles war nur halb
studiert und das meiste geschludert. Doch hatte er Schwung und
verstand es, einen Walzer zu bringen. Seine Lieblingsoper war der
Gounod’sche Faust.
Karla stand mitten auf der Riesenbühne und schlang die Hände
ineinander. Es fiel ihr ein, wie Alwin gesagt hatte: „Mach’ Schluß,
Junge ... was Besseres kommt nicht nach ...“
Ob der Mann da unten, mit den verkniffenen Zügen und dem
struppigen, grauen Haar um den Riesenschädel, es auch so gemeint
hatte? ... Sie lächelte verträumt, hätte dem Gefürchteten gern ein
gutes Wort hinuntergerufen, denn gar zu eilig, gar zu ungeschickt
balgte er sich mit seinem Mantel herum, der ihm nicht auf den
Schultern halten wollte ... Seine großen Füße in den klobigen
Stiefeln blieben an den Pultbeinen hängen.
Er schimpfte was vor sich hin, stolperte die erste Stufe hinunter.
In dem kurzen Gang, der das Orchester mit dem Stimmzimmer
verband, stieß er auf Altmann.
Kapelle blieb stehen und rückte an seinem Hut.
„Sie ... ist das Ihre Frau, die da oben die Agathe singt, ja? ... Na,
dann packen Sie sie ein und fahren Sie dahin zurück, wo Sie
hergekommen sind. Was soll die Frau hier? Die Ochsen verstehen ja
doch nichts ... Passen Sie auf ... das Klima dort unten ... passen Sie
auf, sage ich Ihnen!“
Wieder rückte er an seinem Hut und stolperte weiter.
Abends saß er, verkniffener denn je, an seinem Dirigentenpult.
Die „Agathe“ bot den Amerikanern keine Gelegenheit zu lärmenden
Huldigungen, aber die große Arie verlangten sie zweimal. Es war
noch nie vorgekommen, daß Kapelle sich zu einer Wiederholung
verstanden hatte. Diesmal gab er selbst das Zeichen dazu. Aber er
dirigierte kaum noch. Nur seine linke Hand gab dem Orchester
leisen Halt.
So wundervoll war Karla noch nie begleitet, nie so liebevoll
gestützt worden. Ein heißes Dankgefühl quoll in ihrem Herzen für
den Mann auf, der ihr so viel Freude gab an ihrem Singen, der ihrer
Stimme Flügel lieh.
Als der Beifall auf sie herabtoste und sie aus dem ersten Rausch
erwachte, zeigte sie wieder und immer wieder hinunter ins
Orchester. Das Publikum legte es als eine in Amerika ungewohnte
Bescheidenheit aus und verstärkte seinen Beifall.
Karla gefiel ungemein. Sie war so ganz anders als all die Divas,
die sich im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte vorgestellt hatten. Ihre
herbe Frische, ihre Einfachheit, der warme, natürliche Fluß ihrer
schönen Stimme übten einen nicht wiederzugebenden Zauber auf
diese Virtuosenmätzchen gewöhnten Arbeitsmenschen aus. Es
geschah das Unerhörte, nie Dagewesene, daß das Publikum nach
Schluß der Vorstellung auf seinen Sitzen blieb und abermals die
Agathenarie verlangte.
Diese deutscheste Musik, die je auf einer Opernbühne gesungen
wurde, hatte in diesem Publikum, das zumeist aus Deutschen oder
deutschen Abkömmlingen bestand, ein machtvolles Erinnern an die
erste, halb vergessene Heimat geweckt.
Vor dem herabgelassenen Vorhang, in weißem Gewand, sang
Karla die süße, schlichte Weise, und das Publikum hörte stehend zu,
wie es in der alten Heimat der Volkshymne zu lauschen pflegte.
Altmann lehnte an einer Logenwand, nahe am Ausgang. Auch er
war ergriffen.
Eine ihm neue, tiefe Sehnsucht erfüllte ihn, Karla in seine Arme
zu schließen, sie vor den Blicken der Menge zu verbergen, die
Herrenrecht hatte über sie von dem Augenblick an, da sie sich ihr
gegenüberstellte. Etwas unsagbar Rührendes ging von ihr aus.
Wenn er jetzt könnte — wie diese so neue erregte Stimmung es
von ihm verlangte und wie der verkniffene, häßliche Kapellmeister es
ihm zugerufen — wenn er sie aufpacken und mit ihr zurückreisen
könnte in die Heimat ...! Ein ganz kurzer, stummer Applaus riß ihn
zur Wirklichkeit zurück. Karla stand regungslos vor dem roten
Samtvorhang. Irgendeine Hand zog sie zurück in das Dunkel der
halb abgeräumten Bühne. Die Nordeni, gelblich blaß unter dem
aufdringlichen Glanz ihres prahlerischen Schmuckes, schlug mit
dem Fächer gegen seinen Arm:
„Nett ... unsere Kleine, nicht wahr? Gar nicht zu glauben, wie
sentimental die Yankees manchmal sind. Na ... allerdings im Süden
verlangen sie andere Kost. Grüßen Sie die Kleine ... geben Sie ihr
einen Kuß von mir ...“
Karla stand noch immer auf der Bühne, als Kapelle in Mantel und
Hut heraufkam. Sie ging auf ihn zu, hob die gefalteten Hände, ihre
Augen strahlten wie große Sterne aus ihrem bewegten, blassen
Gesicht.
„Lieber ... lieber ...“
Sie wollte ihm danken, aber vor seinem unwirschen
Gesichtsausdruck versagten ihr die Worte.
„Ja ... schon gut ... ich weiß ... wir werden uns einarbeiten ... Aber
lassen Sie das, dieses ... Herunterzeigen auf mich. Kann ich nicht
ausstehn. Widerlich. An den Dirigenten darf man nicht erinnern ...
Das Werk ... nicht wahr ... immer nur das Werk! Wenn man Sie
beklatscht ... dann müssen Sie ja leider auf der Bühne danken ... das
ist nicht anders ... schlimm genug. In Bayreuth ...“
Er brach unvermittelt ab. Seine Augen blickten starr. Er rückte an
seinem Hut und stolperte mit Füßen, die einander zu überschlagen
schienen, hastig an ihr vorbei.
n Los Angeles kam Altmann dazu, wie John Russel in
Hemdärmeln im Maschinenraum die Schrauben der
Versenkungsmaschinerien nachprüfte und ölte.
Ohne Altmann zu beachten, fuhr er in seiner Beschäftigung fort,
ergriff dann eine Axt und zimmerte aus einem kurzen Holzstamme
eine Stufe zurecht, die er mit großer Sachkenntnis dem letzten allzu
hohen Treppenabsatz angliederte.
„Well, Mister Altmann ... Sie wünschen?“ ...
Doch ließ er sich nicht stören, und obwohl ihm der Schweiß in
den Kragen lief und sein feines Batisthemd von Öl- und Rußflecken
strotzte, zwängte er ruhig mit der umgekehrten Axt das Brett
zwischen die Seitenteile der Treppe.
„Ich wollte nur melden, daß meine Frau heute unpäßlich ist und
nicht singen kann.“
John Russel schlug gleichmütig einen Nagel ein.
„Soll ich einen Doktor schicken?“
„Nein ... sie braucht nur Ruhe ... Einen, zwei Tage Ruhe.“
John Russel verzog den Mund.
„Ich brauche auch Ruhe ... habe noch nichts im Magen. Sitze seit
sechs Uhr früh in dem Kasten ...“
„Wo sind denn Ihre Leute?“
„Meine Leute? Ich hab’ keine. Meine Leute sind meine zehn
Finger, die streiken wenigstens nicht. Vor zwei Jahren habe ich hier
einem verdammten Nigger meine Faust in den Magen gejagt, weil er
angesoffen auf die Bühne kam zur letzten Vorstellung. Heute wollen
sich die Kerls rächen! Verlangen den doppelten Lohn. Da kennen sie
John Russel und seine zehn Finger aber schlecht!“
Altmann sah auf seinen Rock, auf seine gepflegten,
arbeitsentwöhnten Finger.
„Wenn ich Ihnen helfen kann“, brabbelte er lau.
„Well ... lassen Sie mal die Dekorationen vom Schnürboden
herunter. Wir wollen sie nachher feucht abreiben ...“
„Ja ...“
Noch einen Augenblick zögerte Altmann. Dann warf er
entschlossen seinen Rock ab.
„Ja, aber nun, Herr Russel ... wie ist es denn mit meiner Frau?“
„Kann sie wirklich nicht singen?“
„Nein.“
„Well. Dann wird die Wegler sie vertreten. Sie hat die Partie
studiert.“
„Die Wegler? Das ist doch nicht Ihr Ernst?“
„Doch ... doch ...“
Die Wegler war eine bessere Choristin, eine hübsche,
braunhaarige junge Frau, die von weitem sogar eine gewisse
Ähnlichkeit mit Karla hatte.
„Aber ... das geht doch nicht ...“
John Russel zuckte die Achseln und rührte eine graue Farbe an.
„Alles geht ... Das sehen Sie doch an mir.“
„Wer wird denn die Anzeige machen? Am besten, ich fahre zu
den Zeitungen ...“
John Russel holte aus der Westentasche ein Stück Kaugummi
und schob es unter die Kinnlade.
„Well, Mister Altmann, wenn die Zeitungen ein Wort darüber
bringen, ziehe ich Ihnen die gesamte Einnahme des bereits
ausverkauften Hauses von der Gage ab.“
Kein Muskel in seinem Gesicht bewegte sich; langsam und sehr
aufmerksam führte er den Pinsel mit der grauen Farbe über das
helle Holz der Stufe.
„Sie können doch nicht die Stimme meiner Frau diskredieren
wollen?“
„God bless me, Herr Altmann ... Das glauben Sie doch selbst
nicht! Die Wegler ist sehr brav, und die Leute hier verstehen nichts.
Wenn ich ein Känguruh abrichte und es ihnen vorsetze ... glauben
sie, das Känguruh ist die Karla König. Alles Suggestion, mein Lieber
... Das einzige, was keine Suggestion ist — sind die Dollars!“
Altmann kam erst spät am Nachmittag ins Hotel, mit notdürftig
gewaschenen Händen, verstaubt, verschwitzt, einen Riß in der
Bügelfalte seines Beinkleides.
Karla lag mit wütendem Kopfschmerz auf dem Bett.
„Wo warst du denn so lange?“
Altmann gab ihr in kurzen Worten seine Unterredung mit Russel
wieder.
Karla sprang auf die Beine.
„Das geht nicht, Ernst ... ich werde singen.“
„Du wirst nicht singen ... Soll der Kerl nur seinen Blödsinn
durchsetzen. Du wirst nicht singen. Ich erlaube es nicht. Unter
keinen Umständen.“
Karla ging aufgeregt im Zimmer hin und her.
„Aber mir ist doch schon viel besser ... viel, viel besser ...“
Sie konnte und wollte es nicht glauben, daß sie so leicht zu
ersetzen war, hatte anfänglich ihr körperliches Unbehagen
aufgebauscht — Altmann sollte sehen, eine wie große „Nummer“ sie
jetzt war, und was Russel angeben würde, wenn es hieß, daß sie
nicht auftreten könnte ... Aber mittlerweile waren die Kopfschmerzen
wirklich ärger — aus dem halben Spiel war Ernst geworden.
Er wußte sich keinen Rat. Lief auf den breiten Hotelgang hinaus,
klopfte bei der Nordeni an.
Sie lag in einer rosa Wolke auf dem Ruhebett und polierte ihre
Nägel, während Mariette mit geschickten Fingern eine der
wundervollen Theaterperrücken der Nordeni auf einem Stock
auffrischte.
„Wie nett, lieber Altmann ... daß Sie mich besuchen! Wollen Sie
eine Tasse Tee mit mir trinken?“
Altmann dankte kurz. Er nahm die Hände der Nordeni in die
seinen. Er sprach erregt und dringlich.
„Liebste, Beste — meine Frau ist sehr elend heute ... wollen Sie
nicht an ihrer Stelle singen ...?“
Er hätte diese Zumutung in New York oder Chicago gewiß nicht
an sie gerichtet. Aber in Los Angeles ...!
„Denken Sie, Russel will die Wegler singen lassen ... das geht
doch nicht ... das müssen Sie als Künstlerin zugeben ... das geht
nicht!“
Madame Nordeni lächelte liebenswürdig.
„Aber wieso denn, lieber Freund? ... Die Wegler ist sehr nett ...
ich meine, natürlich nicht für Chicago oder New York ... aber für hier?
Sie übernahm einmal von heute auf morgen die Gräfin im Figaro ...
reizend ... reizend, sage ich Ihnen! Seien Sie nur ganz ruhig .. sie
wird das schon ganz nett machen! Ich freue mich nur auf das
Gesicht von Kapelle, wenn statt Ihrer Frau die Wegler da oben
steht!“
„Verzeihen Sie, meine Frau ist krank ...“
Altmann fühlte, wie der Ärger ihn übermannte. Aber sie sah ihm
nach, mit kokettem Augenaufschlag.
Eigentlich gefiel er ihr. Sie hatte etwas übrig für „tragische
Masken“. Und es war nett, daß er sich so für seine Frau einsetzte.
Die König war doch gut dran. Brauchte nur zu singen, überließ alles
andere ihrem Mann! Führte eigentlich immer so „ein Stückchen zu
Hause“ mit sich herum, hatte immer eine Veste, an der sie sich
ausweinen und auslachen konnte.
Die Nordeni verschränkte die Arme unter dem Kopf und starrte
durch das Fenster in den grauen Himmel.
Manchmal versuchte sie an ihre Kindheit zurückzudenken, an
ihre Jugend ... aber es war alles so lange her ... und ihr Leben war
so wild bewegt gewesen. Männer hatten es gelenkt nach dem
Ermessen ihrer flüchtigen Laune. Schlug es gut für sie aus, waren
sie nicht mehr da, um sich daran zu erfreuen, — nicht gut, so
kehrten sie ihr den Rücken, noch ehe sie verantwortlich gemacht
werden konnten.
Bezahlte Dienerinnen waren ihre Vertrauten. Die Vertrauten ihrer
absterbenden Jugend, ihrer kurzen Abenteuer. Wenn die Tür sich
hinter ihnen schloß, verrieten sie sie an die besser Zahlende oder
nahmen ihr den Mann weg, der ihr gehörte. Auch das hatte sie
erlebt. Und hatte immer nur neue Länder zwischen ihre
Leidensstationen zu setzen gewußt, hatte sich immer nur durch
ihren prahlerischen Schmuck und das hochnasige Lächeln, durch
ein paar spitze, helle Töne und eine dreiste Routine auf ihrer Höhe
zu halten verstanden. Wie lange noch ...? Und was dann ...?
„Mariette,“ rief sie, wie ein Kind, das sich plötzlich im Dunkel
fürchtet, „Mariette.“ ...
Aber sie war allein in dem großen, kahlen, weiß angestrichenen
Hotelzimmer. Sie überhörte das Klopfen an der Tür und schrie auf,
als sie plötzlich einen Neger vor sich sah. Der Neger zeigte lachend
seine gelbe Zahntastatur und stellte ein hübsches Lackbrett mit dem
Nachmittagstee auf den kleinen Bambustisch neben dem Ruhebett.
— — — Altmann fand Mariette um Karla beschäftigt. Zierlich,
unhörbar huschte sie durchs Zimmer, rang das Wasser aus den
Tüchern, senkte kleine Eisstücke in die bereitete Limonade. Altmann
suchte sein bißchen Schul- und Bühnenfranzösisch zusammen, um
ihr zu danken. Sie wurde rot und lächelte. Karla lag im Bett mit
geschlossenen Augen und roten Wangen.
Altmann streichelte Karlas Hand. Er merkte es kaum, daß
Mariette klingelte, Tee bestellte und ein Tischchen deckte. Aber als
sie ihn mit einem stillen Zeichen rief, da sah er, daß Eier und ein
kaltes Huhn mit angerichtet waren, und so merkte er es auch erst,
daß er seit dem ersten Frühstück nichts zu sich genommen hatte.
„Das wußte ich doch“, sagte Mariette.
Sie bediente ihn mit feiner, lautloser Grazie. Er war ja doch der
einzige „Herr“ von der ganzen Gesellschaft, und er hatte so viel
„charme“, wenn er lächelte. Sie war es gewöhnt, den Männern
dienstbar zu sein, die sich ihres Gefallens erfreuten. Es war nichts
Besonderes dabei für sie. Aber er wurde fast verlegen, und wenn
ihre Händchen wie kleine weiße Vögel über die Gegenstände
huschten, dann blickte er geflissentlich zum Fenster hinaus, als
wollte er das bunte Treiben der Straße heraufziehen in den stillen
Dämmer des Zimmers und es zwischen sich und die so aufdringlich
emsigen kleinen Hände schieben ...
Um sechs kam der Theaterdiener. Ob denn Frau König wirklich
nicht singen würde? Karla war gerade eingeschlafen; Altmann
kämpfte mit sich, ob er sie wecken sollte. Aber es war ihm etwas
Peinliches daran. Wenn er nichts anderes tun konnte in dieser Zeit,
so mußte er wenigstens auf ihre Gesundheit bedacht sein.
„Sagen Sie, meine Frau ist nicht imstande.“
Mochte die Wegler singen ... es würden sich schon Mittel und
Wege finden lassen, das Publikum zu verständigen, wenn sie die
falsche Karla König auspfiffen.
Aber sie pfiffen sie gar nicht aus. Nur sehr lau war der Abend.
Nach den Aktschlüssen gab es immerhin zwei, drei Hervorrufe, die
der Gesamtleistung galten. Als aber Karla König am übernächsten
Tage auftrat, da empfing sie ohrenbetäubendes Johlen und Pfeifen.
Schlüssel, Papierknäuel flogen um ihren Kopf ... Sie stand da —
zitternd, bleich, mit großen erschreckten Augen. Das Orchester
brach ab. Kapelle schrie zu ihr hinauf:
„Nicht abgehen ... nicht abgehen!“ ...
John Russel hielt die Vorhangschnur.
„Vorhang herunter“, rief Altmann, der bis in die Lippen weiß war.
„So lassen Sie doch den Vorhang herunter ...“
„Jawohl, damit mir die Kerls die Bühne in Klump schlagen?!“ ...
Die Mitglieder waren zusammengelaufen und scharten sich
bleich und erregt um John Russel.

Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa Policies Politics and Practices Allen Munoriyarwa Full Chapter

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Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa Policies Politics and Practices Allen Munoriyarwa Full Chapter

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Digital Surveillance in Southern Africa:

Policies, Politics and Practices Allen

ISBN 978-3-031-16635-8 ISBN 978-3-031-16636-5 (eBook)

Cover pattern: Maram_shutterstock.com

Surveillance practices are increasingly becoming dynamic and pervasive,

explored the militarization of surveillance that has become normalized

Johannesburg, South Africa Allen Munoriyarwa

two-day conference, we would also like to acknowledge scholars who were

3 Regulating and Legislating Surveillance 85

4 Public Space and Communication Surveillance113

6 Quotidian Forms of Resistance to Surveillance157

7 Conclusions: The Bigger Picture of Surveillance Futures179

Admire Mare is an associate professor in the Department of

Allen Munoriyarwa is a senior research fellow in the Department of

ANC African National Congress

MPDP Media Policy and Democracy Project

Introduction: Twists and Turns?

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Chiumbu, 2022; Balule, 2022; Munoriyarwa, 2021; Munoriyarwa &

­roportionality”, global standards which limit surveillance to circum-

and death certificates, voter registration information, professional licences,

its agents to track citizen’s movements, activities, conversations, commu-

Historicizing Surveillance Regimes

Before we can unpack the contemporary institutional sites of surveillance,

politicians, social activists and business competitors (see Mare, 2016a;

Through catchphrases such as the 4IR, southern African countries are

Metamorphosis and Shifts in Institutional Sites

Surveillance has spilled out of its old nation-state containers to become a

measurement of readers and users’ media consumption habits and

activities of the surveilled, governments in southern Africa are investing in

Democratization Conflicts,9 Surveillance States10

It is impossible to talk about pervasive surveillance in southern Africa

and Lesotho, Zimbabwe), and imposition of mandatory SIM card regis-

to Military Intelligence’s (MI) surveillance strategies”. The country has

presidency. This constituted mass surveillance practices in contravention

in journalistic sourcing strategies, as well as cutting away at the ability of

in which surveillance changes the climate is that it creates an atmosphere

socio-­technical surveillance systems are also affected by people complying

Panoptic Theories of Surveillance

Post-Panoptic Theories of Surveillance

diffuse—“liquid surveillance” (Lyon, 2010b). In this ‘surveillant assem-

Resisting Surveillance: Everyday Forms of Resistance

There is a debate amongst scholars (Gilliom, 2001; Gilliom & Monahan,

This emphasis on description entails attending to mundane detail; the appar-

In order to answer the main research questions, we relied on primary

John Russel machte nicht viele Worte.

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Johannesburg, South Africa Allen Munoriyarwa

3 Regulating and Legislating Surveillance 85

4 Public Space and Communication Surveillance113

6 Quotidian Forms of Resistance to Surveillance157

7 Conclusions: The Bigger Picture of Surveillance Futures179

roportionality”, global standards which limit surveillance to circum-

socio-technical surveillance systems are also affected by people complying