Philosophy of Space and Time: the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence Adam Caulton, TT2018

Topic 4: Leibniz on Individual Substances

‘[T]he content of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that
if one understands perfectly the concept of the subject, he will know that the predicate
appertains to it also. This being so, we are able to say that this is the nature of an
individual substance or of a complete being, namely, to afford a conception so complete
that the concept shall be sufficient for the understanding of it and for the deduction of all
predicates of which the substance is or may become the subject.’ (Discourse on
Metaphysics, §VIII)

Does it follow from Leibniz’s doctrine of individual substances that you could not have
been anything other than a Physics & Philosophy student? What reasons might one have
to believe Leibniz’s doctrine? Are those reasons compelling?

Core reading
• Leibniz, G. W., Discourse on Metaphysics, §§8-13. [You can find the Discourse in: (1)
Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Essays, translated and edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel
Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); and (2) Leibniz, G. W., Discourse on Metaphysics
and Other Essays, translated and edited by Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991); and (3) online at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/
assets/pdfs/leibniz1686d.pdf.]
• Adams, R., Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, (OUP, 1994), Ch. 2 (‘The Logic of
Counterfactual Nonidentity’).
• Broad, C. D., Leibniz: An Introduction, (CUP, 1975), §§2.3-2.5.
• Look, B. C., ‘Leibniz's Modal Metaphysics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2013/entries/leibniz-modal/>, §3 (‘Leibnizian Essentialism’).

Further reading (with specific reference to David Lewis’s “counterpart theory”)

• Cover, J. A. & Hawthorne, J., ‘Leibnizian Essentialism, Transworld Identity, and
Counterparts’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1992), pp. 425-444.
• Nason, J. W., ‘Leibniz and the Logical Argument for Individual Substances’ Mind 51
(1942), pp. 201-222.
• Weatherson, B., ‘David Lewis’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2016/entries/david-lewis/>, §6.4 (‘Counterparts or Double Lives?’).
• Mondadori, F., ‘Reference, Essentialism, and Modality in Leibniz's Metaphysics’, Studia
Leibnitiana 5 (1973), pp. 74-101.
• Hunter, G., ‘Leibniz and the "Super-Essentialist" Misunderstanding’, Studia Leibnitiana
13, (1981), pp. 123-132.