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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS
SERIES EDITORS:
MICHELLE EGAN · WILLIAM E. PATERSON · KOLJA RAUBE
Dynamics of EU
Renewable Energy
Policy Integration
Mariam Dekanozishvili
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
Series Editors
Michelle Egan, American University, Washington, USA
William E. Paterson, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
Kolja Raube, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union
Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave
Studies in European Union Politics publishes cutting edge research-driven
monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of
subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the
nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the
scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing
importance of the EU as a political, economic and social phenomenon. To
submit a proposal, please contact Senior Editor Ambra Finotello ambra.
finotello@palgrave.com. This series is indexed by Scopus.
Editorial Board
Laurie Buonanno (SUNY Buffalo State, USA)
Kenneth Dyson (Cardiff University, UK)
Brigid Laffan (European University Institute, Italy)
Claudio Radaelli (University College London, UK)
Mark Rhinard (Stockholm University, Sweden)
Ariadna Ripoll Servent (University of Bamberg, Germany)
Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
Claudia Sternberg (University College London, UK)
Nathalie Tocci (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy)
Dynamics of EU
Renewable Energy
Policy Integration
Coastal Carolina University
Conway, SC, USA
ISSN 2662-5873 ISSN 2662-5881 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
ISBN 978-3-031-20592-7 ISBN 978-3-031-20593-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20593-4
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Preface and Acknowledgments
Renewable energy policy is very timely topic in the European policy-

making as the European Union is facing an urgent need to eliminate its
dependence on imports of Russian fossil fuels before 2030 in the context
of Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine. Renewable energy is also a key
building block to accelerate the energy transition towards climate neutral
economy by 2050 and reach EU’s energy and climate objectives for 2050
and beyond. Therefore, integration of renewable energy policy is going to
preoccupy EU policymakers for the near future. The broad question that
this book aims to address—under what conditions, and how, integration
advances in EU’s energy policy domain—hopefully provides perceptive
insights into integration dynamics of the EU renewable energy policy.
Scholars and policymakers interested in the EU energy policy and the
intersection of European integration and public policy, I hope, find it
elucidating.
This book is based on the research I have carried out for my doctoral
thesis, which I defended in 2014 at the University of South Carolina. This
work was inspired by Professor Donald Puchala’s seminar on European
integration and greatly benefited from his comments and suggestions. I
also wish to extend my foremost gratitude to Harvey Starr, Robert Cox,
and Jonas Tallberg for their advice and thoughtful comments throughout
the project. As the research progressed from dissertation to a manuscript,
the EU commenced negotiations on the 2030 Climate and Energy
Framework and the revision of the 2009 renewable energy directive. The
v
vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
scope of this book widened accordingly to incorporate the EU’s latest

renewable energy directive (REDII).
I was fortunate to receive funding first from the Walker Institute of
International and Area Studies at the University of South Carolina for
the initial round of interviews in Brussels and several EU member states
and later from Coastal Carolina University’s Professional Enhancement
Grant to conduct additional interviews in Brussels regarding the 2018
Renewable Energy Directive. The time spent at Statoil’s Brussels office
in 2012 as a Summer Research Fellow was a valuable experience and
greatly contributed to the fruition of this project. For this experience,
I owe many thanks to Geir Westgaard and late Ambassador Konstantine
Zaldastanishvili.
I am also indebted to the dearest love of my friends and family. This
book would never materialize without their immense support. I would
like to express my deep love to Evgeny Anikin, Anna Keshelashvili,
Richard, Aidoo, George Robakidze, Nino Malashkhia, and Ketevan
Mgebrishvili. I am eternally grateful to my son, parents, and sister for
their unconditional love and care.
Finally, I owe my special appreciation to Laurie Buonanno who encour-
aged me to publish the manuscript and to the anonymous reviewer
provided by the publisher for his/her helpful and constructive comments.
Conway, USA Mariam Dekanozishvili

Contents
1 Introduction: EU Renewable Energy Policy in Context 1

1.1 Book’s Purpose and Contribution 1
1.2 EU Renewable Energy Policy in Context: Historical
and Institutional Background 5
1.3 Book Outline 7
References 8
2 Analytical Framework 11
2.1 Reconceptualizing European Integration: Vertical
and Horizontal Integration 11
2.2 3-D of European Integration: Structure, Agency,
Contingency 14
2.3 Causal Paths to European Integration 23
2.4 A Few Methodological Remarks 32
References 36
3 EU Energy Policymaking: Actors and Processes 43
3.1 Overview of Actors and Processes 43
3.2 Convergence of Preferences Among Key Member States 45
3.3 European Commission’s Supranational
Entrepreneurship 48
3.4 Transnational Interest Groups 51
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.5 Domain Specific Rules and Legal Basis 53

3.6 External Shocks 54
References 55
4 The Emergence of EU Renewable Energy Policy:
Unpacking Policymaking Dynamics of RES-E Directive 61
4.1 First Steps Towards EU Renewable Energy Policy 61
4.2 The European Commission as a Supranational Policy
Entrepreneur 64
4.3 Where Did Preferences of Key Member States Lie? 79
4.4 Transnational Interest Groups Consolidate, or not? 88
4.5 Rules: The Importance of Legal Basis and Pre-Existing
Rules 91
4.6 External Contingencies: Kyoto Protocol and Energy
Dependence in the Rear Mirror 93
4.7 RES-E: A Successful Instance of Integration? 94
References 96
5 Consolidation of EU Renewable Energy Policy:
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 101
5.1 Post-RES-E Challenges and Ambitions 101
Entrepreneur 104
5.3 Towards the Convergence of Member State Preferences 121
5.4 The Story of Transnational Interest Consolidation 133
5.5 Rules: The Importance of Legal Basis and Pre-Existing
Domain-Specific Rules 137
5.6 External Contingencies: After the Gas Dispute,
Awaiting the Copenhagen Conference 140
5.7 RED: Binding Ends, Flexible Means 144
References 147
6 Shaping EU Renewable Energy Policy Beyond 2020:
REDII 155
6.1 Post-RED Challenges and Ambitions 155
Entrepreneur 158
6.3 Preferences of Key Member States, Converging or Not? 179
6.4 What Happened to Transnational Interest Groups? 191
CONTENTS ix
6.5 Rules: Legal Basis for the REDII and Pre-existing

Domain-Specific Rules 195
6.6 External Contingencies: Paris Agreement, Financial
Crisis and Crisis in Ukraine 198
6.7 REDII: Taking Stock of Renewable Energy Policy
Integration 201
References 203
7 Dynamics of EU Energy Policy Integration: Insights
from EU’s Renewable Energy Policy 211
7.1 Taking Stock of EU Renewable Energy Policymaking:
RES-E, RED, and REDII in Comparative Perspective 211
7.2 Causal Path to Renewable Energy Policy Integration:
Structure, Agency, Contingency 219
7.3 Looking Ahead: Insights for Scholars and Policymakers 223
References 226
Appendix 229
Index 233
Abbreviations
ALTENER Program for the Promotion of Renewable Sources of Energy

in the European Community
BDEW German Association of Energy and Water Industries
BMU German Federal Ministry of Environment
BWE German Wind Power Association
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COP21 The 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
COP24 The 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
DG Directorate General
DOM Overseas Departments (France)
E3G A Climate Change Think Tank
EC European Communities
ECJ European Court of Justice
EDF Electricité de France
EEB European Environmental Bureau
EEG Renewable Energy Sources Act
EFET European Federation of Energy Traders
EP European Parliament
EPIA European Photovoltaic Industry Association
EREC European Renewable Energy Council
EREF European Renewable Energy Federation
ETS Emissions Trading System
EWEA European Wind Energy Association
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
FIT Feed-In-Tariff
GDF Gaz de France
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GOs Guarantees of Origin
IEA International Energy Agency
IEM Internal Energy Market
IFIEC Europe International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers
IPCCR Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
ITRE The European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research
and Energy
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MLG Multi-Level Governance
MSF Multiple Streams Framework
NECPs National Energy and Climate Plans
NFFO Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NREAPs National Renewable Energy Action Plans
PA Paris Agreement
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
R&D Research and Development
RED Renewable Energy Directive of 2009
REDII Renewable Energy Directive of 2018
RES Renewable Energy Sources
RES-C Renewable Energy Sources in Cooling
RES-E Renewable Energy Directive of 2001
RES-H Renewable Energy Sources in Heating
ROCs Renewable Obligation Certificates
SEA Single European Act
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TGC Tradable Green Certificates
TREC Tradable Green Electricity Certificates
UK United Kingdom
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: EU Renewable Energy Policy

in Context
1.1 Book’s Purpose and Contribution

A resilient Energy Union and a forward-looking climate change policy
are among European Union’s top priorities and high on the EU policy
agenda. The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine is elevating EU’s
energy security concerns and placing renewable energy policy in the
spotlight. Massive deployment of renewable energy is becoming essen-
tial for reducing dependence on the Russian energy supplies and for
achieving EU’s climate objectives for 2050 and beyond. The EU has long
harbored the ambition to become a global leader in the promotion and
development of renewable energy, steering the effort to combat climate
change, encourage the shift to a low-carbon economy, and stimulate high-
potential economic growth. Despite EU’s lack of formal legal competence
to act in the field of energy until the inclusion of the energy Article
194 in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the last three decades have witnessed
an increasing number of energy policy initiatives at the EU level. These
initiatives, including secondary legislation on the promotion of renewable
energy, are gradually bringing the nationally—dominated energy domain
into the EU’s legal remit. From the indicative targets of the early 2000s to
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Dekanozishvili, Dynamics of EU Renewable Energy Policy Integration,
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20593-4_1
2 M. DEKANOZISHVILI
the EU-level 32 percent binding target of renewables in energy consump-

tion under the current 2030 framework, the EU holds a checkered
report card of success for renewable energy policy integration. The recast
renewable energy directive of 2018 (REDII) marks the latest secondary
legislation in EU’s renewable policy saga. The REDII aims at keeping the
EU a global leader in renewables and, more broadly, helping the EU to
deliver on the Paris Agreement emissions reduction commitments. The
renewable energy policy saga will clearly continue. The revision of the
REDII is underway. The crisis in Ukraine adds urgency to ambitious
renewable energy objectives, presently 45 percent EU-wide renewables
target being in sight.
Against this backdrop, the book is a timely contribution as it seeks
to shed light on a broader question of under what conditions, and how,
European integration advances in the energy policy domain. To address
this question, the book explores the policymaking dynamics of the emer-
gence and development of EU renewable energy policy, and the driving
forces behind it. The study provides a comprehensive account of EU’s
renewable energy policy development as it traces the agenda-shaping,
policy formulation and decision-making phases of EU’s secondary legisla-
tion on renewable energy—that is the three successive directives of 2001
(RES-E), 2009 (RED), and 2018 (REDII). The book aims to assess inte-
gration outcomes of these three policymaking instances in the renewable
energy field from a comparative perspective focusing on two dimensions:
the nature and ambition level of the renewable energy targets, and the
harmonization of renewable energy support schemes.
While existing research has tended to think of integration as an ever-
ongoing progression of deepened cooperation and offered competing
accounts of this process (liberal intergovernmentalism or neofunction-
alism/supranationalism), the proposed book provides an innovative and
refreshing analytical framework, which incorporates structure, agency,
and external contingency to unveil the causal complexity of EU policy-
making and the European integration process. The research extrapolates
five causal factors from existing theories of European integration and EU
policymaking. It examines the interaction of the European Commission’s
supranational policy entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences among
the key member states, consolidation of transnational interest groups,
existing domain specific rules and legal basis, and external focusing events
in three energy policymaking instances (RES-E, RED, REDII). The
study advances a claim that integration in EU energy policy progresses
1 INTRODUCTION: EU RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY … 3
under the interplay of structure, agency, and external contingency.

Comparative analysis of the three renewable energy directives shows that
policy outcomes advance integration when supranational entrepreneurs
successfully exploit existing domain-specific EU rules and policy windows
provided by the external shocks to push forward measures that extend
integration, and when the positions of the key member states converge to
ensure the permissive consensus in the Council. Thus, the study under-
scores the significance of external events, which can punctuate the policy
equilibrium if properly exploited by policy entrepreneurs.
The book contributes to existing scholarship by elucidating that it is
unproductive to pit various European integration theories against each
other. Policymaking dynamics can follow different causal paths. Instead,
a configurational approach is required. Such approach can synthesizes
existing theoretical perspectives and identify how the various factors, priv-
ileged by different theoretical perspectives, combine to explain progress
and stasis in European integration. The study, furthermore, demonstrates
that taking stock of policymaking instances that result, or fail to result, in
integration outcomes is as important for understanding European inte-
gration dynamics as the study of the so-called history-making decisions.
Hence, the research attempts to show that the synthesis of European inte-
gration and public policy literature can deliver useful insights and connect
the missing link between policy outputs and integration outcomes.
Additionally, the book proposes a modified conceptualization of inte-
gration based on two dimensions and evaluates policy outputs (directives)
across these two dimensions—vertical and horizontal integration. Policy
outputs feature advances in vertical integration when they extend institu-
tional powers, tasks, and competences of the EU, establish binding rules,
and impose obligations on member states. Horizontal integration occurs
when policy outputs instruct member states to harmonize and standardize
policy instruments, norms, laws, and practices across national boundaries,
thus creating conducive conditions for post-decision policy harmonization
across member states.
Enriched with elite interviews with the Brussels policy community and
drawing on existing research on EU’s renewable energy policy, as well as
primary sources, the book equips readers with a snapshot of EU renew-
able energy policy development through empirically rich, consistent, and
methodic presentation of three cases. Most importantly, the book features
the analysis of the latest EU renewable energy directive of 2018 that has
not yet been extensively addressed by existing works.
4 M. DEKANOZISHVILI
While the book relies on rich historical accounts of EU energy policy

development (e.g., Matláry, 1997; Buchan, 2009; Birchfiled & Duffield,
2011; Buchan & Malcolm, 2016; Rowlands, 2005; Solario & Jörgens,
2017), there is less literature yet that directly addresses EU’s secondary
legislation on renewable energy, particularly EU’s renewable energy direc-
tive of 2018. Although different in their empirical focus and/or analytical
framework from this book, existing studies on EU’s renewable energy
provide very useful insights and a solid foundation to build on. Solorio
and Jörgens’ (2017) stocktaking volume provides a comprehensive guide
to EU renewable energy policy and its implementation exploring the
policy changes at the national level and patterns of Europeanization
in response to EU-level decisions. Similarly, Jacobs (2012) and Wedel
(2016) tackle the question of how member states are encouraged to
implement policies for the promotion of renewable energy electricity and
how horizontal diffusion of RES support schemes take place across EU
member states. While all these works provide the reader with a compre-
hensive analysis of national support schemes and implementation process
of the 2009 renewable directive, the detailed analysis of agenda-setting,
policy formulation, and policy adoption stages of EU renewable energy
directives is beyond the scope of these insightful studies. This book, on
the other hand, focuses on the interaction of multiplicity of factors during
policy initiation, formulation and decision-making phases that lead, or
fail to lead, to integration in EU’s renewable energy policy domain. It
also purports to assess policy outcomes of renewable directives in terms
of advance in integration while previous studies evaluate similarities in
RES support schemes across EU member countries (Jacobs, 2012) or
implementation of the RED (Wedel, 2016).
This research is also indebted to studies that look at the process
of “communitarization” or “constitutionalization” of European energy
policies and factors that facilitate or impede this process (Birchfiled &
Duffield, 2011; Eberlein, 2012; Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Rietig,
2018; Boasson, 2019). At the same time, this study concurs with the
previous research that EU policymaking cannot be feasible without
considering the major member states’ domestically legitimized prefer-
ences (Bürgin, 2015; Pikšrytė & Mažylis, 2015) as European poli-
cymaking features a steady struggle between supranationalization and
re-nationalization tendencies (Tews, 2015).
Finally, this work is informed by European public policy scholarship
that explores agenda-shaping activities of various policy entrepreneurs
in EU’s energy policymaking process, be it the European Commission’s

entrepreneurship strategies, or role of civils society and business interest
groups in agenda-setting and defining the range of policy options for
EU’s energy and climate objectives (Tosun et al., 2015; Ydersbond,
2016; Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018). This research upholds the find-
ings of earlier studies that multilevel dynamics and interactions between
various actors pursuing different interests have been central in the renew-
able energy policy development (Ydersbond, 2016; Skjærseth et al., 2016;
Rietig, 2021).
Overall, this book finds itself at the intersection of European integra-
tion and public policy literature. It harnesses scholarship on European
integration and policymaking to uncover the dynamics of EU’s renew-
able energy policymaking and assess policy outcomes through examining
whether concrete objectives and measures contained in the adopted legis-
lation advance the degree of institutionalization or harmonization at the
EU level.
1.2 EU Renewable Energy Policy in Context:

Historical and Institutional Background
Until the mid-1990s, energy policy did not deserve much attention in
the European integration process. In 1968, the European Commission in
its “First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy” outlined an energy
policy and offered some specific measures to create a common market in
the energy sector. The Council of Ministers, however, could only agree
on very general principles (Black, 1977, p. 166). The 1980s and early
1990s also witnessed several failed attempts in the energy policy area.
The European Commission’s proposal to include an energy chapter in
the Maastricht Treaty was dropped as was a carbon/energy tax due to
strong opposition from the member states (Buchan, 2009). The idea of
an Internal Energy Market (IEM) was launched in the late 1980s and
the first electricity and gas market directives (the so-called “First Energy
Package”) appeared in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Since the mid-1990s,
the European Commission has proposed several important EU initiatives,
which contributed to strengthening of the supranational influence on
energy policy (Matláry, 1997). Community actors made the best use of
powers they possessed in related areas, especially in the internal market
and the environmental realms. The adoption of the Single European Act
6 M. DEKANOZISHVILI
(SEA) greatly facilitated the supranational entrepreneurship of Commu-

nity actors, especially the European Commission. The introduction of the
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the extension of the co-decision
procedure strengthened the European Parliament’s role and provided
supranational actors with favorable structural context for linking energy
issues to three general perspectives: the EU’s internal-market program
in which competition policy played a key role; the EU’s common envi-
ronmental policy; and energy security. Since then, an increasing number
of EU’s secondary legislation covering these various dimensions of the
common European energy policy began emerging. Due to member states’
divergent interests and preferences, however, the adopted legislation
often represented watered down versions of the Commission’s original
proposals.
In early 1990s, climate change occupied a center stage in EU’s agenda
(Skjærseth, 1994). This created a new momentum for the renewable
energy promotion, which was reframed as a means of addressing global
warming (Solorio & Bocquillon, 2017). The first notable program related
to RES promotion was the ALTNER program, which was adopted in
the aftermath of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and aimed at reducing
the CO2 emissions. As a result of fierce resistance from some member
states, the program was allocated less funding than originally proposed
and comprised only an indicative target of 8 percent of RES in EU energy
consumption by 2025 (Solorio & Bocquillon, 2017). Despite modest
results, the renewable energy has begun to feature on EU’s policy agenda.
This led to the first RES-E directive in 2001. The RES-E was adopted
after several years of negotiations and set an overall EU-level target of
22 percent electricity from renewables by 2010. The target, however, was
only indicative, not binding. As reader will see in Chapter 4, the direc-
tive also failed to harmonize the RES support instruments (Toke, 2008;
Lauber & Schenner, 2011).
Since the mid-2000s, the efforts towards common energy policy,
including RES policy, became more intense and politicized. The idea
of a common energy policy was approved at the informal Hampton
Court Summit of the European Council in October 2005 under the
UK’s Presidency. The disruption of gas supplies to the EU resulting
from Russia-Ukraine dispute over gas prices served as a wake-up call
for the EU to take more decisive steps (Interview with the European
Commission Official, 2012). The European Commission, at the invitation
of the Council, prepared a Green Paper that outlined a comprehen-

sive general strategy for obtaining “sustainable, competitive, and secure
energy” (European Commission, 2006). The Green Paper set the ground
for a policy process that culminated with the prominent 20/20/20
strategy with three ambitious goals: reducing greenhouse gas emissions by
20 percent, increasing the share of the renewable energy by 20 percent,
and reducing overall energy use in the EU by 20 percent. The Euro-
pean Commission followed up with the “Energy and Climate Package”
presenting concrete measures for achieving these goals. In line with the
20/20/20 strategy, the European Commission tabled a new directive—
the RED—on the promotion of the renewable energy, which introduced
significant changes. The RED introduced 20 percent RES target at the
EU level, as well as binding national targets. The directive widened the
scope of the policy by including RES in heating, cooling, and transport
sectors (Wettestad et al., 2012, p. 72).
Since the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy acquired an explicit legal basis
with Article 194 TFEU, and energy policy was brought under the shared
competence. Although this development has allegedly promised a supra-
national turn in EU’s energy policy, the policy remains contested both at
the EU and national level. The negotiations over the 2030 climate and
energy targets and the subsequent discussions of the REDII are symp-
tomatic of the contested interests and overlapping authorities. What is
evident is that renewable energy policy lately has been and will certainly
continue to preoccupy the minds of EU policymakers. In the wake
of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the renewable energy is acquiring
unprecedented urgency as the European policymakers are busy figuring
out strategies for reducing EU’s energy dependence and accelerating
green transition towards meeting the European Green Deal objectives for
2050 and beyond.
1.3 Book Outline

The next chapter sets the books’ analytical framework and describes the
method. The framework synthesizes insights from European integration
and public policy literature to understand under what conditions and
how European integration occurs in the EU’s energy policy domain.
The chapter also offers a modified conceptualization of integration.
The chapter contends that instead of juxtaposing competing variables,
8 M. DEKANOZISHVILI
a comprehensive analytical framework should bring together structure,

agency, and external contingency.
Chapter 3 lays out policy processes and actors involved in the EU
energy policymaking underpinned by the intricate interaction of supra-
national policy entrepreneurs, transnational interest groups, national
policy preferences, existing domain-specific EU rules and legal basis, and
focusing events that define the integration outcome of a particular poli-
cymaking instance. This chapter elaborates on the causal factors that are
constitutive elements of the intergovernmental, supranational, and punc-
tuated equilibrium paths to policy outcomes presented in the analytical
framework.
The next three chapters trace the agenda-shaping, formulation, and
adoption of the RES-E, the RED and the REDII, which constitute the
landmark policymaking instances in consolidating EU renewable energy
policy. All three chapters examine the five causal factors to expound the
causal mechanism behind policy outcomes that advanced (or failed to
advance) renewable energy policy integration. Each chapter also assesses
the policy outcome brought by the respective directives in terms of the
degree of institutionalization (vertical integration) and harmonization of
RES support schemes (horizontal integration).
The concluding chapter summarizes the key findings from the three
case studies in comparative perspective and analyzes the results in light
of the book’s analytical framework. It also discusses the implications of
the findings for understanding the dynamics of EU energy policymaking.
Lastly, the chapter offers a reflective section on integration dynamics of
EU’s energy policymaking for policymakers who are preoccupied with
revising the REDII and shaping EU’s renewable energy policy for the
future.
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CHAPTER 2
Analytical Framework
2.1 Reconceptualizing European Integration:

Vertical and Horizontal Integration
The principal problem in European integration studies is the lack of a
generally accepted definition of the concept of European integration.
Some scholars define integration as a process of political integration, the
end-result of which is a new political community (Haas, 1958, p. 16). For
other writers, integration is a process through which supranational gover-
nance—the competence of the European Community to make binding
rules in a specific policy domain—develops (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet,
1998, p. 1).
Conversely, some scholars defined integration as a condition, which
is achieved when a group of people within a territory attain depend-
able expectations of peaceful change and cease to prepare for war against
each other (Deutsch, 1957, p. 16). Lately, scholars prefer to envisage
integration as a process of Europeanization. Europeanization denotes a
process of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and ways of doing
things (Radaelli, 2000). All these definitions are certainly useful, however,
lack precision (see Radaelli & Exadaktylos, 2010). Conceptualizing inte-
gration as a process, a constantly changing moving target, may prevent
scholars from catching any meaningful snapshot of integration and pose
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Dekanozishvili, Dynamics of EU Renewable Energy Policy Integration,
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20593-4_2
a serious methodological problem for explaining social change. On the

other hand, if scholars only study the integration outcomes of the major
intergovernmental bargaining episodes, they are going to miss some
important aspects since a great deal occurs around and between these
grand bargains. Treaty reforms do not emerge from thin air; rather they
are reflections of prior trends and complex day-to-day machinery (Maurer
et al., 2003, p. 58). The EU policymaking is a continuous process of
building on, refining, and extending existing policies (Stone Sweet et al.,
2001, p. 78). Therefore, a comprehensive account of European integra-
tion should include not only the study of the so-called history-making
intergovernmental decisions, but also the in-between dynamics that lead
to non-treaty-based changes reflected in the secondary legislation. Hence,
taking stock of instances of policy-making that results in successful, or not
so successful, integration outcomes is equally important.
To provide more precise conceptualization of European integration,
this book views European integration as a complex process, which results
in varying integration outcomes in terms of the degree of institution-
alization (vertical integration) or level of harmonization across national
boundaries (horizontal integration) at a specific time in history. The inter-
play of various causal factors defines varying patterns of vertical and
horizontal integration. Changes in these dimensions mark integration
success or failure. Thus, integration can experience retraction, extension
or remain steady from ‘t’ to ‘t + 1’ time.
Vertical integration (degree of institutionalization) refers to the exten-
sion of EU tasks into new policy issues, and an increase in the authority
for supranational institutions to allocate values1 (see Schmitter, 2004,
p. 54; Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2006, pp. 74–75). In EU’s day-
to-day activities, these are achieved by the adoption of EU’s secondary
legislation (directives or regulations) that brings new issues under the
EU’s legal remit, creates binding rules and organizations at the EU level,
grants new institutional powers to the Community, or imposes obligations
on member states. Policy-making outcome features advance in vertical
1 Schmitter (2004) uses the term “scope” to denote expansion/contraction of the types
of issue to be resolved jointly at the EU level and employs term “level” to denote increased
authority for regional institutions. Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) use the term
“sectoral integration” or “broadening” that refers to a process whereby new policy areas
are regulated at the EU level and the term” vertical integration” or “deepening” refers
to transfer of competencies to the EU.
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 13
integration when the Commission or the European Parliament gain new

rights or roles, when new EU-level institutions are created, and binding
legal rules, principles, and methods are extended. However, one must
avoid the pitfall of assuming that all binding rules advance integration to
the same extent. While certain binding rules promote vertical integration
by imposing obligations and constraints on member states, others clearly
do not. The adoption of targets, which is used to quantify the level of
progress towards certain policy objectives, often imposes obligations on
member states and equips EU institutions with monitoring powers, thus
advancing the vertical integration.
Horizontal integration 2 (harmonization level) refers to the transna-
tional harmonization and standardization of diverse national laws, prac-
tices, and norms so that internal market can function effectively for the
benefit of all (see Puchala, 1975). In practice, this is achieved through
the EU’s secondary legislation instructing member states to harmo-
nize and standardize policy instruments, norms, and laws across national
borders. Policy-making outcome features advance in horizontal inte-
gration when an adjustment of differences and inconsistencies among
different, methods, procedures, schedules, specifications, or systems
occurs to make them uniform or mutually compatible across EU member
states. In general, harmonization attempts are often resisted by member
states because they require various adaptations, adjustments of domestic
laws, regulations, and practices that can be costly to implement domes-
tically due to policy or institutional misfit between the prescribed EU
model and the domestic rules (Heritier et al., 1996; Schmidt, 2001;
Börzel, 2003). Therefore, not all policymaking outcomes result in harmo-
nization. At times, the EU attempts to prescribe or impose a concrete
model, or policy instrument, to create a level playing field across member
states (e.g., attempts to introduce harmonized renewable energy support
schemes). At other times, the EU encourages regulatory competition
leaving member states with enough flexibility and discretion.
Integration outcomes of policy-making instances vary in both dimen-
sions: vertical and horizontal integration. However, they do not neces-
sarily co-vary. Change in vertical integration, does not imply parallel
change in horizontal integration and vice versa.
2 The meaning of horizontal integration here should not be confused with Schim-
melfennig and Rittberger’s (2006) use of “horizontal integration” which refers to the
extension of the EU acquis beyond the EU’s borders (“widening”).
2.2 3-D of European Integration:

Structure, Agency, Contingency
The interaction between national, European, and global forces is
shaping the integration process. Integration simultaneously international-
izes domestic politics and domesticates international politics. Integration
is a dynamic process of a sophisticated accommodation of national inter-
ests via the construction of governance regimes and the consolidation
of supranational policy. The actors involved in the process operate with
different expectations and interests. A well-known and long-standing
debate between structure-based or agency-based approaches has not been
alien to the European integration literature.
Actor or agency-based explanations emphasize the role of rational and
instrumental governments and view integration as a process in which
governments define a series of underlying objectives and preferences.
Liberal intergovernmentalism views EU integration as the product of
the interests of sovereign member state governments and the majority
coalitions of these governments within the EU Council. Member state
preferences are seen as issue-specific, shaped through bargaining with
main societal interest groups, such as economically dominant national
industries (e.g. national energy producers). EU policy outcomes are
seen as the product of intergovernmental bargaining processes, leaving
scant room for autonomous supranational institutions to influence poli-
cymaking significantly (Moravcsik, 1998). Liberal intergovernmentalism
explains integration based on preference formation (why governments
desire certain outcomes), preference distribution (which governments
have the most influence on decision-making), and preference configu-
ration (which alignment of member state preferences can best explain
the policy and institutional outcome) (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). As noted
by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006), the degree to which govern-
ments favor the delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions
depends on the value they place on the issues and substantive outcomes.
“The higher the gains of a cooperative agreement for a government,
and the higher the risk of non-compliance by other governments, the
higher its readiness to cede competencies to the EU” (Schimmelfennig &
Rittberger, 2006, p. 83). Integration outcome reflects bargained agree-
ments concerning cooperation and choice of institutions in which to
embed them (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001). In
Moravcsik’s three-stage model, the outcome of the negotiation and the
distribution of benefit is determined by the bargaining power of the

parties, which depends on the relative value provided by a party to the
particular agreement as compared with the best results of alternative poli-
cies; in other words, the bargaining power arises from the asymmetry
of the member states’ preference intensity (Pikšrytė & Mažylis, 2015).
The most powerful member states have more discretion to shape the EU
policies by uploading their national interests to the international level,
imposing their preferences on the relatively less powerful member states
which can be viewed as EU policy downloaders (Pikšrytė & Mažylis,
2015).
Liberal intergovernmentalism found popularity in the European energy
policy literature. For some time, the common rules in the energy policy
domain were predominantly defined through voluntary and horizontal
cooperation between EU member states (Egenhofer & Behrens, 2011).
Member states were reluctant to delegate decision-making powers to
the European Commission (Pointvogl, 2009; Youngs, 2009). Propo-
nents of this approach would expect the dominant/large member states
to be influential, energy policy to be a strong national domain, and
security of energy supply to be crucial in national policies (Duffield &
Westphal, 2011). Buchan (2009) looked at the development of Euro-
pean energy policy as a constant struggle in which member states play
their own games when trying to reach ambitious climate and energy
goals set by the European institutions. Without taking into consideration
the voice of the major member states, EU policymaking simply might
not be feasible (Tosun et al., 2015, p. 7). The EU’s energy policy is
expected to be a policy domain where member states try to retain as much
sovereignty as possible to protect their own interests, especially if large
industries in the member states are endangered (Ydersbond, 2016). There
is a permanent tension between the policy harmonization requirements
of an integrated market, on one hand, and the discretion of member
states to develop policies according to domestically legitimized prefer-
ences, on the other (Tews, 2015). In their study of RES-E directive,
Pikšrytė and Mažylis (2015) show how the strong opposition of member
states to the Commission’s original proposal on pan-European support
scheme with Guarantees of Origin as a major instrument compelled the
Commission to abandon the idea of the EU-level support scheme for
renewables. As authors argue, their findings verify the assumptions of
liberal governmentalism that the negotiation’s results mainly depend on
asymmetric bargaining power and the most powerful Member States’
preferences determined by their national specifics, support schemes and

other domestic factors (Pikšrytė & Mažylis, 2015). More recent studies
show that the member state governments have influenced the Commis-
sion’s agenda-shaping activities since the Commission anticipated member
states opposition to its plans (Bürgin, 2015, p. 699). Other works have
explored constraining weight of a strong coalition of government leaders
in the European Council on the policy formulation process of the 2020
Energy and Climate Policy framework in the European Commission
(Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014).
On the other end of the theoretical spectrum, structure-based
approaches contend that social action is occurring in institutionally
constrained arenas. In the European integration context. such structures
could be the existing EU rules, institutional balances, and functional-
economic interdependencies—the so-called issue-linkages (Haas, 1958,
1961; Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter 2003; Stone Sweet et al., 2001).
Contrary to liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational approaches to
European integration assert that institutions play an important role in
how policy objectives are translated into political outcomes. Institu-
tions provide constraints and opportunity structures for strategic actors
to achieve their goals. Their preferences are shaped by evolving struc-
tures, norms, and rules of the EU. Collective actions are not merely
the aggregation of individual preference and preferences are subject to
change (Niemann, 2006). Supranational institutions are key sponsors
of further integration. They develop strategies to accomplish the twin
goals of deeper integration in an expanding range of sectors and the
increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level. As Lind-
berg suggests, lack of agreement between governments may lead to
an expanded role for the central institutions; in other words, member
states may delegate difficult collective action problems (Lindberg, 1963).
“Supranationalism explains European integration as a progressive, self-
reinforcing process of institutionalization. Once supranational organiza-
tions and rules are in place, however, integration produces unintended
and unanticipated consequences, and escapes the exclusive control of the
states” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 75). The logic of supranational insti-
tutionalization unfolds when the convergence of transnational society,
supranational organizations and rules gradually but inevitably reduce the
capacity of member states to control outcomes (Sandholtz & Stone
Sweet, 1998). An important condition for expanding supranational
authority is prior institutional commitments. Institutional and policy
change become ‘path-dependent’ as actors define their preferences within

the context provided by supranational institutions, based upon what has
occurred in the past (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000; Peters et al., 2005;
Bulmer, 2009). Member state positions are shaped by long-term institu-
tional feedback mechanisms of the organizational fields operative within
a certain area (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013, p. 14). An expansion of
the tasks or autonomy of supranational organizations creates opportuni-
ties for political action. Supranationalists’ expectations differ substantially
from intergovernmentlists’ predictions: states do not remain the dominant
actors, rather supranational entrepreneurs, such as the European Commis-
sion, have the capacity to strengthen supranational rules and expand their
powers (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998).
Supranationalism gained foothold in the EU energy policy literature
since early 2000s. Scholars looked at EU energy policy through the lenses
of European integration and concluded that it was increasingly drive
by supranational factors (see Eising, 2002; Eikeland, 2011). Birchfield
and Duffield (2011) looked at the process of EU energy policy “com-
munitarization” and factors that promoted or impeded this process in
general. Whilst member states retain significant sovereignty, the Commis-
sion has achieved since 2006 creeping competencies in the internal, and
to a lesser extent external, dimensions of EU energy policy (Maltby,
2013). Focusing on gas, Maltby (2013) claims that from mid-2000s,
the Commission contributed to a shift in political norms, successfully
framing import dependency as a problem requiring an EU-level solu-
tion, based on the institution’s pre-existing preferences for a diversified
energy supply and internal energy market. Boasson and Wettestad (2013)
argue that the distribution of power between member states and EU
institutions varies between issues areas as “each field will create differing
institutional feedback mechanisms that over time will shape the steering
method and competence distribution of EU policies” (p. 14). Though,
it is easy to discern the significant number of instruments that the
EU possesses for attaining its energy policy triangle objectives. Bürgin’s
study of the 2030 EU Climate and Energy framework shows that even
individual Commissioners may influence the policymaking process. His
case study demonstrates that the margin of a commissioner’s agency
increases in absence of a commonly shared reform imperative and in the
case of heterogeneous or ambivalent positions in the Council (Bürgin,
2015). More recent studies have also focused on the Commission’s policy
entrepreneurship in EU energy policy. As the sole initiator of new poli-

cies, what the Commission links together in its drafting of legislative
proposals may have significant effect on outcomes (Skjærseth et al., 2016).
The Commission can act as an entrepreneurial leader. It can use its
resources to formulate and frame policy ideas, mobilize support, forming
transnational policy networks, and craft consensus through utilizing issue-
linkages and synergies to the advantage of all parties (Skjærseth et al.,
2016; Skjærseth, 2017; Boasson, 2019). Skjærseth et al. (2016) demon-
strates in his study of the 2020 Energy and Climate package, how the
Commission successfully exploited issue linkages and synergies between
climate and energy policies—to reduce air pollution, create green jobs and
stimulate technological innovation—while ignoring potential trade-offs to
facilitate the adoption of the package. Boasson (2019) sheds light on how
constitutionalization of EU state aid law gave the European Commis-
sion increased leverage over EU’s renewable energy policy development.
The CJEU and the Commissions’ Directorate-General for Competition
(DG Comp) have played important roles in the emergence of stronger
EU steering of renewable energy support schemes after 2014, which
have been long resisted by powerful member states such as Germany.
With the introduction of the new guidelines on state aid for environ-
mental protection and energy, the Commission increased its authority
over development of renewables support schemes across Europe. Consti-
tutionalization, coupled with the policy entrepreneurship of Commission
officials, can account for the shift in EU steering in 2014 (Boasson, 2019,
see also Rusche, 2015). When it comes to the strategic use of decision-
making procedures, Commission officials can exploit open policy windows
and perform venue shopping. Commission officials strategically assessed
that their favored support schemes were more likely to be accepted in the
revision of state aid guidelines than in the revised RED (Boasson, 2019).
Overall, these studies have demonstrated how the European Commis-
sion can strategically engage and influence the policymaking process as
a supranational entrepreneur with its own interests based on normative
beliefs and perspectives about policy priorities (Rietig, 2018).
An attempt to bridge the gap between the intergovernmentalists and
the supranationalists with respect to main drivers of European integration,
multi-level governance approach assumes that “various institutions inter-
penetrate in a complex and messy, but creative, conglomerate” (Wincott,
2002). Multi-level governance approach, or rather a family thereof, is also
on the institutional side, but rooted in public policy analysis, governance
studies, and organizational theory (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The core
assumption of this approach is that political authority and policymaking
influence is dispersed across multiple levels—sub-national, national, and
supranational (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). It underscores the role for
individuals and interest groups. Multi-level governance approaches, like
supranational perspective, underline autonomous role of EU institutions
as policy entrepreneurs, especially the European Commission. The Euro-
pean Commission may use different strategies, such as establishing policy
networks, linking policy issues, creating synergies, or excluding contro-
versial issues to push forward the policy proposal (Wettestad et al., 2012,
p. 82; Skjærseth, 2017, 2021). Thus, the policies that are created at the
European level result from the interaction between different actors at
different levels of governance. The policymaking process is influenced
by different “games” played between member states and the European
Union, between different institutions of the EU, and between different
Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission involved in a certain
area. Interactions between the Commission and interest groups from
national and/or pan-European level adds another layer to the multi-level
governance (Richardson, 1996; Matláry, 1997). The European institu-
tions often financially support the interest groups to garner support for
their policy proposals (Cram, 1997). Interest groups, such as industries,
mobilize directly at the EU level and interact with governmental orga-
nizations at national and European level in conjunction (Eising, 2004,
p. 212). In essence, multi-level governance approaches view the initiation
and adoption of EU energy policies as a result of complex bargaining at
multiple governance level that include EU institutions, non-state actors
and member state governments (Skjærseth et al., 2016).
The emphasis on policy entrepreneurship and governance networks
made multi-level governance approaches a popular tool for understanding
the EU policies, including the energy policy. There are contributions
that aim at theorizing the mechanisms of EU energy and climate poli-
cymaking while taking into account agenda-shaping complexity in the
EU (e.g., Boasson & Wettestad, 2013). Tosun et al. (2015) provides
insights into the role of various EU institutions in agenda setting, shaping,
and exclusion. While scholars in this strand of literature acknowledge
the role of member states, the Commission is viewed as the primary
policy entrepreneur, equipped with existing legal instruments to pursue
agenda setting and shaping. Knodt et al. (2020) analysis of the adop-
tion of the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union in 2018
shows a successful entrepreneurial role of the Commission, especially in

those questions where it was backed by the European Parliament. Interest
groups also come into the limelight of MLG literature. Lindberg et al.
(2019) explore policies and policy preferences of key industry actors in
the ongoing energy transition at the EU level through policy mix perspec-
tive, highlighting the interplay of different policies and the contested and
messy nature of policy process with different actors pursuing different
interests. Ydersbond (2016) evaluates the influence of a broad variety of
actors, including incumbent industry actors, progressive energy compa-
nies and environmental NGOs on the 2030 energy and climate targets
through the lenses of advocacy coalition framework. Her findings confirm
the Commission’s importance as an agenda setter, and the final policy
outcome is viewed as negotiated compromise between advocacy coali-
tions at various levels. Yet another study of the EU 2030 energy and
climate framework by Fitch-Roy and Fairbrass (2018) focuses on the role
of interest organizations in the process of renewable energy target-setting.
Tradeoffs that environmental NGOs were facing during the simulta-
neous reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and renewable
energy targets for 2030 is presented as one of the explanations for a
relatively weaker renewable energy targets for 2030 compared to the
predecessor 2020 framework (Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018). This study
also makes an important contribution to an infamous multiple streams
framework (MSF) within the governance-oriented approaches. MSF has
been particularly useful in explaining policy processes in the EU. Relying
on earlier works (e.g., Kingdon, 1984), there has been an upsurge of
works using MSF to analyze EU energy policymaking (Herweg, 2017;
Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018; Herweg & Zahariadis, 2018; Rietig, 2021).
These studies are underpinned by the common assumption of MSF
that skilled policy entrepreneurs, such as the European Commission,
can exploit opportunities of policy windows across several governance
levels and strategically utilize multiple policy venues via multilevel venue
shopping. Policy entrepreneurs are key to the coupling of the three
streams of ‘policy’, ‘problem’ and ‘politics.’ By packaging problems and
presenting acceptable solutions during the windows of opportunity policy
entrepreneurs are capable of inducing change in the agenda (Fitch-Roy &
Fairbrass, 2018). Reitig (2021) presents a compelling analysis of the 2009
RED and the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework in which he under-
lines the interdependences between international climate governance and
European climate and energy policy. The study shows how the policy
problems of energy security, economic development and climate change

opened two cross-level policy windows for agenda coupling on the EU
level that were exploited by the European Commission as key policy
entrepreneur, ultimately resulting in decision coupling and renewable
energy policies (Rietig, 2021).
Thus, integration theories have been looking for causes of inte-
gration either in purposive behavior of dominant and powerful states
and their strategic interaction (liberal intergovernmentalism), or self-
reinforcing dynamic of integration sponsored by supranational rules and
entrepreneurs and facilitated by transnational societal interest groups
(supranational and governance-based approaches). What has been missing
from these approaches is the specific and clear discussion of the impact
of external contingencies on the EU policymaking. Liberal intergovern-
mentalism does not explicitly examine how external shocks may affect the
positions of member states, and to what extent preferences reflect exoge-
nous conditions. And even when it does, liberal intergovernmentalism
only accounts for long-standing remote structural factors (i.e., interna-
tional economic competition) rather than the effects of proximate external
events or shocks. Even if liberal intergovernmentalism is right to assume
that preferences of member states are heavily weighted toward preserving
sovereignty, increasing levels of sensitivity and vulnerability caused by
external shocks, especially those that have direct electoral implications
(e.g., energy disruptions) can propel the willingness of governments of
the member states to delegate powers to the Community. Governments
do care about an efficient response to external crisis due to their short-
term decision horizons determined by electoral constraints. So, their
preferences might shift towards an EU-level solutions. Besides, govern-
ments can scapegoat the EU for unpopular measures and justify the
costs of domestic adjustment. Governance-oriented and supranational
approaches would also benefit from a better understanding of the effects
of external contingencies. The EU institutions and policies may be under-
mined, strengthened, or changed due to external developments. Actions
adopted by other countries or environmental regimes may equip the EU
actors to use external contingencies strategically to increase their influence
on internal processes within the EU (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013, p. 8).
Nowhere is the adage that “crisis spells opportunity” more applicable
than in the case of European energy policy domain. External shocks are
those events and forces—contingency frameworks—that can affect sensi-
tivity (how quickly changes in one country bring costly changes in another
and how costly are these changes) and vulnerability (the country’s ability
to offset these costly effects by making policy changes), increase opportu-
nity costs, change the range of available options and alternative actions
(Keohane & Nye, 2000). The EU, being predominantly an import-
dependent region for energy, is vulnerable to events affecting supply
and energy prices in the international energy markets. External contin-
gencies may affect political priority accorded to energy issues within the
EU and hence how policies are initiated and adopted (Skjærseth et al.,
2016). External shocks can shift national preferences by pushing member
states to reassess, reevaluate and redefine courses of action and provide
the window of opportunity for institutional actors to advance collec-
tive interests. External shocks can exacerbate vulnerability and induce
regional cooperation. When member states realize advantages of collec-
tive power vis-à-vis their suppliers, they become more willing to cooperate
and coordinate their actions on the EU level. Alternatively, higher levels
of interdependence within the Union can raise the opportunity costs of
non-cooperation. Besides, the EU and its member states strive to harmo-
nize international commitments on the global arena to create level-playing
field for their industries in international markets (Skjærseth et al., 2016).
Thus, external contingencies would be likely to affect EU energy policies
through external events and international commitments.
Indeed, increasing number of contributions successfully account for
the role of exogenous shocks and international commitments that provide
moments of openness through ‘critical junctures’ and windows of oppor-
tunity for rapid policy change in EU energy and climate policies (Buchan,
2009; Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Skjærseth et al., 2016; Rietig, 2018;
Solorio & Bocquillon, 2017; Saurugger & Terpan, 2020; Schoenefeld &
Knodt, 2021; Skjærseth, 2021). EU energy policy, especially the energy
security dimension, is driven by external events (Buchan, 2009). EU’s
commitment to international climate leadership has been the driving
factor for RES-E directive that represented the first steps in the estab-
lishment of an innovative regulatory framework for RES promotion in
the early 2000s. On the other hand, the economic crisis created an unfa-
vorable context for RES that some governments and incumbent energy
industries exploited to reclaim control over national energy mixes and
reverse renewable energy policy support in the post-2020 framework
(Solorio & Bocquillon, 2017). Rietig (2018) examines how interna-
tional climate negotiations and EU’s ambition to play a leadership role in
them, together with favorable economic climate between 2005 and 2008,
contributed to the window of opportunity for the adoption of the RED

(see also Walker & Biedenkopf, 2018). Skjærseth (2021) explains how the
Paris Agreement provided an enabling context for higher EU ambitions
for energy and climate targets and how Corona-induced recession has
been used by the EU as an opportunity to strengthen the European Green
Deal. Saurugger and Terpan (2020) explore how changes in the inter-
national context and evolving configuration of actors have contributed
to the hardening of the governance in EU’s renewable energy field.
Mounting international pressure to act and EU’s ambition for climate
leadership are among the key reasons why the EU continued to look for
ways to make the post-2020 renewable energy governance as binding as
possible despite challenging domestic political and legal backdrops. EU
ambitions to lead international climate negotiations fostered the urge
to negotiate a new framework with a view to 2030, thus providing
the general rhythm and pressure for renewable energy policy activity
(Schoenefeld & Knodt, 2021).
2.3 Causal Paths to European Integration

While scholars have consistently been admitting the complex nature,
various phases or faces of European integration, the ‘either-or’ approach
seemed to be the dominant State of the Art. The complex interdepen-
dencies that feature in EU policymaking renders singular explanations
inadequate. As Schimmelfennig and Rittberger argue, “a combination of
the factors and conditions postulated by different theories of integration
may be necessary to account for phenomena of sectoral, vertical, and
horizontal integration” (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2006, p. 92).
A few studies successfully endeavored to combine different theoretical
approaches to explain a complex EU energy policymaking (Bürgin, 2015;
Wedel, 2016; Ydersbond, 2016; Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Skjærseth
et al., 2016; Skjærseth, 2021). Bürgin (2015) in his analysis of the
2020 Climate and Energy Package drafting integrated the constraints set
by key member states, ideational factors, and the individual activism of
the Commission president as explanatory factors. Boasson and Wettestad
(2013) bring together the role of industry, policy interaction, and external
environment to examine the central dynamics in the emergence and
development of EU climate informed by theoretical approaches of liberal
intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance, and new institutionalism.
Wedel (2016) incorporates the triad of theoretical approaches—Euro-

peanization, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Public Policy-Analysis in
his study of implementation of renewable energy policies in EU member
states. He concludes that the implementation of polices for the promo-
tion of renewable energy electricity (RES-E) in the member states of
the European Union is fundamentally instigated by supranational renew-
able energy measures leading to some degree of vertical Europeanization,
but predominantly influenced by national preferences determined by geo-
political and energy-specific economic interests. Implementation of RES
policies are exposed to incremental European inter-state competition
leading to horizontal adaptation pressure (Wedel, 2016). Schoenefeld and
Knodt (2021) find that the effects of softening and hardening law and
governance are likely to emerge at the interstitials of various causal factors,
both at home and abroad, including evolving international context,
climate change negotiations, relative strength of the member states, the
Commission, and the Parliament. The above contributions demonstrate
the need for a multi-causal explanation of EU energy policymaking. Inte-
gration in the European Union cannot be understood by limiting it to
a mono-causal explanation, multiple theories and factors are needed to
create a coherent approach (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68).
This book takes a stance that the EU policy development process is
characterized by equifinality. Multiple causal paths may lead to integra-
tion outcome (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004, p. 11). Instead of solely relying
on structural determinism or agency-centered voluntarism as singular
explanations, the book aims at exploring the conjunction of structural,
agency-driven, and external contingency-induced causal factors that lead
to integration outcome. Hence, this study contributes to existing schol-
arship by elucidating that it is unproductive to pit various European
integration theories against each other. Instead of assessing the rela-
tive importance of a single variable or claiming the preeminence of one
theory over the other, this book seeks to synthesize existing theoretical
approaches and identify how the factors, privileged by different theoret-
ical perspectives, combine in explaining progress and stasis in European
integration. For that purpose, I develop and evaluate a set of proposi-
tions that rest on contending liberal intergovernmental and supranational
approaches to European integration. These propositions correspond to
different paths to policy outcome. I also propose an alternative “punc-
tuated equilibrium” path that brings together structure, agency, and
external contingency. The next sections outline the causal paths informed
by rich theory backdrop.
2.3.1 Liberal Intergovernmental Path to Integration Outcome:

Convergence of Preferences
and a Lowest-Common-Denominator Outcome
According to liberal intergovernmental approach, the decisions on
common policies on the EU level are preceded by preference forma-
tion domestically. Preferences emerge from a process of domestic polit-
ical conflict in which issue-specific sectoral interests (usually dominant
economic interests), policy adjustment costs, and sometimes geopolitical
concerns play an important role (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning, 2009;
Pikšrytė & Mažylis, 2015; Wedel, 2016). Hence, the decision to integrate
energy policy should be preceded by preference formation in member
states in accordance with the interests of their economically dominant
national industries (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013) and by the overt failure
of unilateral policies to achieve regulatory or other kinds of objectives.
EU-level negotiations focus primarily on the distribution of benefits,
and outcomes are shaped by the relative power of governments and the
intensity of their preferences. The configurations of domestically deter-
mined national preferences define a “bargaining space” of potentially
ratifiable agreements (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). Governments will reject
agreements that would leave them worse off than unilateral policies.
Those who gain the most economically compromise the most on the
margin to realize it. Those who gain the least with the highest costs of
adaptation impose conditions during the negotiation. Governments often
dispute the scope of common policy, precise nature of policy coordina-
tion and harmonization, degree of institutional delegation, and associated
side payments. Member states will resist policy proposals tabled by the
European Commission when these policy initiatives entail considerable
costs of adjustments, and different prospects of gaining or losing material
benefits. Member states are likely to support energy policy outcomes that
can enhance their global economic competitiveness, and unlikely to favor
measures that could undermine global competitiveness of certain indus-
tries (Knill, 2005 cited in Boasson & Wettestad, 2013). Member state’s
preference intensity, whether in favor or against the proposal, dictates the
relative value each member state places on an agreement, which in turn
determines the respective willingness or unwillingness to make conces-

sions. The agreement on policymaking outcomes which lead to more
policy integration at the EU level and delegate more competences or
tasks to the EU institutions takes place when they are pareto-improving
compared to unilateral alternatives of dominant member states.
Policymaking outcomes that lead to more integration, thus, depend
on the convergence of preferences of the key member states. Even when
decisions are adopted under a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) proce-
dure, the key member states will be able to impose conditions or build
blocking coalitions (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014). In addition, suprana-
tional entrepreneurs (e.g., the Commission) may pursue the path of least
resistance during the policy the initiation and formulation phases when
they anticipate opposition from the powerful member states and tailor
and revise proposals to fit those preferences (Bürgin, 2015). Based on
the above discussion, the liberal intergovernmental path to policymaking
outcome can be translated into the following propositions:
Proposition 1 (LI) EU Policymaking outcomes that advance integration

result when the preferences of the key member states with strong bargaining
positions converge in favor of the proposed policy/measure which extends the
degree of institutionalization (vertical integration) or level of harmoniza-
tion (horizontal integration).
Proposition 2 (LI) Convergence of preferences among the key member states

with the strongest bargaining positions determines the extent of integra-
tion brought by the policymaking outcome, which are usually lowest common
denominator outcomes.
2.3.2 Supranational Path to Integration Outcome: Supranational

Entrepreneurship, Transnational Interests, and Existing EU
Rules
Supranational approaches contend that transnational interests, the
capacity of supranational organizations to pursue integrative agendas, and
the structure of domain-specific EU rules bind together within complex
systems of mutual interdependence and determine the course of European
integration (Stone Sweet et al., 2001).
The European Commission, as a supranational policy entrepreneur,
can exercise leadership in different ways. The Commission can define
problems, set the agenda, advance proposals, mediate to reach a compro-

mise and facilitate an agreement, mobilize transnational interest groups,
and frame issues in a politically appealing manner (Lindberg & Schein-
gold, 1970; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Sandholtz & Zysman,
1989; Daviter, 2007). Policy entrepreneurs are skillful in getting others
to cooperate, maneuvering around more powerful actors, and building
coalitions (Fligstein, 2001, p. 107). They can read political and policy
landscapes, spot opportunities and forge important connections between
actors. Policy entrepreneurs are also able to adapt and compromise. They
can exploit policy windows by bargaining, venue-shopping, strategic use
of information and decision-making procedures, linking issues and giving
concessions to maximize their influence (Kingdon, 1993; Skjærseth et al.,
2016; Boasson & Huitema, 2017). All these strategies aim at challenging
obstacles created by the distribution of formal authority and changing the
boundaries of institutional authority (Boasson & Huitema, 2017).
In the policy initiation phase, the European Commission has consid-
erable influence over legislative outcomes since its authority to initiate
proposals allows the Commission to set the Council’s agenda. Successful
agenda-setting requires a policy entrepreneur who raises the awareness of
a problem by defining and framing a problem (Tallberg, 2003; Daviter,
2007). From all the options that would generate QMV support in the
Council, the Commission can choose its pet proposal, usually the one that
advances integration, either vertical or horizontal, or both. The Commis-
sion’s role as the institutionalized initiator of policy is reinforced by the
importance of cognitive arguments and the complexity pertinent to highly
technical issues. Due to its technical expertise and ability to strategi-
cally use information and decision-making procedures, the Commission
is usually in a position to decide which ideas or interests will feed into the
policy process from the outset (Hix, 2005, p. 227). Thus, the Commis-
sion is central to deciding which topic appears on the agenda and how
the issue is going to be framed.
In the decision-making phase, the European Commission may resort to
“splitting the difference” strategy among the member states by exploiting
issue-linkages and upgrading the common interests to facilitate an agree-
ment. The Commission may frame issues in a way that augments necessity,
urgency, and compulsion to highlight issue salience and translate pressures
into a compromise deal (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 57; Skjærseth
et al., 2016). The Commission can also mobilize transnational interests in
support of its policy proposal. Proximity and expertise with the EU legal
and administrative procedures grants the European Commission compar-

ative advantage in designing solutions and inventing institutional options
for policy issues.
Thus, the European Commission can exert independent influence on
policy outcomes through agenda setting due to privileged access to infor-
mation and ideas, through mediating due to recognized neutrality and
issue-framing skills, through mobilizing support due to privileged posi-
tion in transnational society. As Niemann and Schmitter (2009, p. 56)
argue, an issue’s failure to climb up the policy agenda may be precisely
due to failure of supranational entrepreneurs to arouse interest, mobilize
support, or convincingly claim authority.
The purposive actions of supranational agency are enabled and
constrained by discretion determined by existing rule structures. Rules
establish institutional context in which actor’s interests and strategies take
place. Rules can produce the so-called “structure-induced equilibrium”
by ruling some alternatives as permissible or impermissible and by struc-
turing the voting and veto power in the decision-making process (Pollack,
2004, 2005). The system of rules can constrain as well as empower
actors. For instance, QMV reduces power disparities between member
states, widens the range of possible winning coalitions, increases agenda-
setting power of supranational entrepreneurs, and enhances chances for a
compromise. Domain-specific rules affect the competence and authority
that involved actors have over policy outcomes, and the degree of pres-
sure an actor can exert on policymaking process (Hall & Taylor, 1996).
Later policy decisions will be conditioned by earlier ones creating the
so-called path-dependency (Pierson, 1996). The former EU policy deci-
sions will shape actors’ interest perception in new issue-areas (Fligstein,
2008). Pre-existing distribution of competence within the policy field
can have an impact on whether the policy outcomes end up central-
ized or not (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013, p. 14). Thus, the pre-existing
rules and policies in the EU’s renewable energy field may affect the
competence distribution in the new policy measures. To understand how
agency exercises power, one must appreciate the institutional setting in
which the agency operates. It is the combination of both - agency and
structure—that defines a policy outcome.
Activation of transnational interests and their organization at the
EU level is another constitutive element of the supranational path to
policy outcome. Increasing transnational activity creates room for a more
prominent role for supranational actors, like the European Commission.
Transnational interest groups may form coalitions to direct their demands

to supranational institutions. There is a pervasively symbiotic relation-
ship between the European Commission and transnational groups. The
Commission has an interest in co-opting industry-specific elites into the
policymaking process to help draft new and assess existing legislation. The
Commission is both a receptive institution while at the same time adept
at using interest groups strategically for constructing constellations of
supportive stakeholders in a policy domain (Mazey & Richardson, 2001).
The more integration advances in a policy domain, the more transna-
tional interest groups find that it is in their interest to be consulted and
have a political voice in Brussels. The incentive structure for transna-
tional interest groups is twofold: either to stop EU policies/measures that
could have an adverse effect on their interests or exploit the opportu-
nity for shaping the new EU policies to their advantage vis-à-vis other
interest groups which or less able to mobilize the necessary resources
(Mazey & Richardson, 2001). Better organized and consolidated transna-
tional interest groups will be more successful at influence the policy
outcomes (Ydersbond, 2016; Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018). Besides, EU
policies may become “locked in” as transnational interest groups adapt
to and develop vested interest in the continuation of specific EU policies.
In response to the EU policies, they might have already made certain
investments or undergone technological change (Pierson, 1996).
Thus, the supranational path to policy outcomes depends on the ability
and willingness of supranational entrepreneurs to exploit existing EU
rules in a policy domain, and the presence of supportive transnational
interests at the EU level. Based on the above discussion, the suprana-
tional path to policymaking outcome can be translated into the following
propositions:
Proposition 1 (S) EU Policymaking outcomes that advance integration
result when supranational entrepreneurs, supported by consolidated transna-
tional interest groups, are successful in exploiting existing domain-specific
EU rules to propose policy/measure which extends the degree of institu-
tionalization (vertical integration) or level of harmonization (horizontal
integration).
Proposition 2 (S) The degree of success of supranational entrepreneurs,
the domain-specific EU rules, and the consolidation level of transnational
interest groups at the EU level determine the extent of integration brought
by a policy outcome.
2.3.3 Punctuated Equilibrium Path to Policy Outcomes: Integration

as a “Window of Opportunity” Outcome
The EU is a complex system of multi-level governance sensitive to
attention punctuations (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 2015, p. 43), and
energy policy filed represents a policy domain that is sensitive to focusing
events and entails urgency and controversy. The “punctuated equilibrium
path” to policy outcomes borrows the central element of the punctuated
equilibrium perspective on policy agenda that the policy agenda shows
stability or incremental change but also major shifts in attention that
spark policy change. The ongoing competition for attention is driven not
only by actors’ preferences and strategies but also by the flow of new
and alarming information that requires an urgent response and forces
policymakers to make choices about priorities (Jones & Baumgartner,
2005). Jolts to the policy process, in the form of external shocks, such
as ‘focusing events’, including a crisis, bring about shifts in authority,
or the mobilization of new interests to an issue (Pralle, 2006, p. 989).
Changes in policy can emerge after ‘critical junctures,’ or ‘periods of
contingency’, during which the usual constraints on action are lifted
or eased (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 7). Sometimes these periods
of contingency can be rooted in more distant and indeterminate struc-
tural conditions but exacerbated by a focusing event with punctuating
effect on the system. In the European integration context, external shocks
may aggravate extra-regional dependence. Member states, and the region
as a whole, can find themselves subjected to asymmetric constraints by
actors outside the region and increasingly compelled to adopt common
policies at the EU level. Competition on world markets can sometimes
create pressures for integration from above the nation-state. Asymmetric
dependencies and competitiveness pressures can raise the demand for
multilateral approaches, and open new opportunities for supranational
entrepreneurs to expand the competencies and the role of the EU in
external negotiations (Sbragia, 1998). External shocks may reveal defi-
ciencies of unilateral policies and the need for and expedience of policy
coordination. External shocks can produce changes in the relative costs
of doing things, call for adaptation, and provoke a search for organiza-
tional alternatives (North, 1995). Member state governments can become
more receptive to European level solutions as they feel domestic pres-
sure to respond to external shocks in a timely manner, especially if the
crisis has a direct and severe impact on domestic constituencies. Member
states may become more amenable to European solutions, especially those

most affected by the external shock, less capable of responding, and
with the highest cost. In addition, the need for unpopular measures
and consequently the temptation of governments to blame the EU for
unpopular measures may grow during the contingency periods. Hence,
the EU solutions may serve as convenient scapegoats for member state
governments.
Similarly, supranational entrepreneurs can grab the window of oppor-
tunity generated by the external contingency and convince member states
that existing measures or rules in the given policy domain need clarifica-
tion and/or extension to adapt to the novel situation (Kingdon, 1995;
Heritier, 1997; Mazey & Richardson, 2001). External shocks provide
an opportunity for a supranational policy entrepreneur to develop new
frames for pushing “pet proposals” on the agenda and new ways of
interpreting old political problems (Kingdon, 1984). A supranational
entrepreneur may suddenly claim jurisdiction over an issue previously
decided at the national level. External shocks may amplify agenda-setting
power of supranational entrepreneurs by providing an opportunity to re-
label and re-contextualize issues to embed them in a different choice
situation and overcome resistance or deadlock (Baumgartner & Jones,
1993). External shocks punctuate a previously stable situation, and if
exploited successfully by supranational entrepreneurs, can be conducive
to policy outcomes that advance integration.
EU’s energy policy is the policy domain which is greatly impacted by
external events, such as energy supply crisis, global climate summits, or
armed conflicts within and between states (see Boasson & Wettestad,
2013; Herweg, 2015; Skjærseth et al., 2016; Rietig, 2018; Solorio &
Bocquillon, 2017; Saurugger & Terpan, 2020; Schoenefeld & Knodt,
2021; Skjærseth, 2021). As Tosun et al. (2015) argue, energy issues
are expected to reach the EU policy agenda when there is a specific
‘triggering’ or ‘focusing’ event. Focusing on the effect of the Ukraine
Crisis of 2014, Szulecki et al. (2016) also contend that the EU Energy
Union merges the regulatory legacies of existing legislation and political
institutions with the impact of external events.
Thus, the “punctuated equilibrium” path to policy outcomes synthe-
sizes the elements of the European integration and public policy
approaches and incorporates external contingency into the analysis.
This path focuses on the conjunction of external contingency (external
shocks/focusing events), structure (domain-specific EU rules) and agency
(supranational entrepreneurs and member states’ preferences). Policy

outcomes will be shaped by the punctuating impact of external shocks that
shift key member states’ preferences towards common European solu-
tions and provide windows of opportunity for supranational entrepreneurs
(e.g., the European Commission) to exploit existing domain-specific rules
to advance integration. Based on the above discussion, the “punctuated
equilibrium” path to policymaking outcome can be translated into the
following propositions:
Proposition 1 (PE) EU Policymaking outcomes that advance integration
result when supranational entrepreneurs are successful in exploiting existing
domain-specific EU rules and policy windows provided by the external shocks
to propose policy/measure which extends policy integration, permitted by the
convergence of the preferences of the key member states in favor of the proposed
policy/measure.
Proposition 2 (PE) Punctuating impact of external shocks, leading to shifts
in convergence of key member state preferences towards common European
solutions, and the success of supranational entrepreneurship, determine the
extent of integration brought by a policy outcome.
2.4 A Few Methodological Remarks

The primary goal of this book is to uncover causal paths to integra-
tion outcome and examine how various causal factors come together to
produce this outcome, which may vary along two dimensions degree of
institutionalization (vertical integration) and harmonization level (hori-
zontal integration). Addressing the book’s question “under what condi-
tions European integration succeeds in the EU’s energy domain and how”
calls for causal recipes (Ragin, 2008) and understanding causal mech-
anisms behind these alternative paths to integration. The book builds
on previous contributions to synthesize insights from different theoret-
ical approaches in the European integration and governance literature
to examine the policymaking process and outcomes of EU’s succes-
sive renewable energy directives—the RES-E, the RED, and the REDII.
This is what George and Bennett (2005, p. 233) call typological theo-
rizing: “development of contingent generalizations about combinations
or configurations of variables that constitute theoretical types.” These
causal variables or factors are derived from alternative paths discussed in
the previous section.
Comparative case-study method is well-suited for synthesizing different

theoretical frameworks and uncovering the causal mechanisms leading
to successful, or unsuccessful, integration outcomes in the three poli-
cymaking episodes under observation. George and Bennett (2005,
p. 67) consider this method “structured” and “focused” since researcher
approaches each instance of a historical episode (case) with the same
set of research objectives to ensure standardized data collection and
enable systematic comparison while dealing with only specific facets of the
selected cases. The three cases under examination—the RES-E, the RED,
and the REDII—constitute the EU’s secondary legislation in the renew-
able energy field. Therefore, these three cases fully grasp the EU renew-
able energy policy development process. The book employs three well-
known comparative case-study techniques: theoretical pluralism, process
tracing, and pattern matching. Theoretical pluralism implies incorpo-
rating different theories to explain an outcome, while observations are
theory-driven (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 111). The case-study narra-
tives in this book are structured along the detailed investigation of the
five causal factors—supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of key
member state preferences, transnational interests, existing domain-specific
rules and legal basis, and external focusing events, intricate interplay of
which leads to a particular outcome. The narrative focuses on two main
aspects of the RES directives: the nature of RES targets, and the RES
support systems. The case studies engage readers in process-tracing, which
is a systematic within-case analysis aimed at uncovering the associations
between causes and outcomes (Mahoney, 2003, p. 363). Hence, each
case study is presented as an analytical narrative aimed at identifying the
conjunction of causal factors—the causal paths—to integration outcome
in the EU renewable energy policy domain. The study also employs
pattern-matching, which entails systematic comparison of mechanisms
across selected cases (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 181–200).
When discussing the preferences of key member states, the book
focuses on four countries: Germany, France, the UK, and Poland. The
choice of these four countries was informed by theoretical reasoning
(liberal intergovernmntalism expects the most powerful countries to
matter the most in negotiations). These four countries are largest member
states with the most powerful positions in the EU. In addition, these
countries played a crucial role in the EU renewable energy policy
development, whether as frontrunners or laggards. Besides, to have a
representative sample of both western and eastern countries, as well as
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square block of snow was placed on the stone, and, as the hot
smoke circled round it, the seal-skin saucer caught the water that
dripped from the edge. They had no vessel for boiling; what they did
not eat raw they baked upon a hot stone. A solitary coil of walrus-
line, fastened to a movable lance-head (noon-ghak), with the well-
worn and well-soaked clothes on their backs, completed the
inventory of their effects.”
The Eskimos entertained Dr. Kane and his companions with a
choral performance, singing their rude, monotonous song of “Amna
Ayah” till the unfortunate white men were almost maddened by the
discord. They improvised, moreover, a special chant in their honour,
which they repeated with great gravity of utterance, invariably
concluding with the sonorous and complimentary refrain of “Nalegak!
nalegak! nalegak-soak!”—“Captain! captain! great captain!” The
chant ran as follows:—
Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah!

[Listen]
In the early spring the Eskimos resume their hunting expeditions,
and their snow-covered huts are transformed into scenes of the
liveliest activity. Stacks of jointed meat, chiefly walrus, are piled upon
the ice-foot; the women stretch the hide for sole-leather, and the men
collect a store of harpoon-lines for the winter. Tusky walrus heads
stare at the spectacle from the snowbank, where they are stowed for
their ivory; the dogs are tethered to the ice; and the children, each
one armed with the curved rib of some big walrus or seal, play ball
and bat among the snow-drifts.
The quantity of walrus meat which the Eskimos accumulate
during a season of plenty should certainly raise them above all risk
of winter want; but other causes than improvidence render their
supplies scanty. They are never idle; they hunt incessantly without
the loss of a day. When the storms prevent the use of the sledge,
they occupy themselves in stowing away the spoils of previous
hunts. For this purpose they dig a pit either on the mainland, or,
which is preferred, on an island inaccessible to foxes, and the jointed
meat is stacked inside, and covered with heavy stones.
The true explanation of the scarcity from which these people so
frequently suffer is the excessive consumption in which they indulge
during the summer season. By their ancient laws all share in
common; and since they migrate in numbers when their necessities
press them, the tax on each separate settlement is excessive. The
quantity which the members of a family consume seems excessive
to a stranger; yet it is not the result of inconsiderate gluttony, but due
to their peculiarities of life and organization. In active exercise, and
under the influence of exposure to a severe temperature, the waste
of carbon must be enormous.
When in-doors, and at rest, engaged upon their ivory harness-
rings, fowl-nets, or other household gear, they eat, as many eat in
more civilized lands, for mere animal enjoyment, and to pass away
the time. But when engaged in the chase, they take but one meal a
day, and that not until the day’s labour is ended. They go out upon
the ice without breakfast, and seldom eat anything until their return.
Dr. Kane estimates the average ration of an Eskimo in a season of
plenty at eight to ten pounds of meat a day, with soup and water to
the extent of half a gallon. Such an allowance might almost have
satisfied the appetite of Gargantua!
Dr. Hayes, in the course of his adventurous Arctic boat-journey,

held much intercourse with the Eskimos, and his impressions, on the
whole, would seem to have been highly favourable.
His sketch of a couple whom he met in the neighbourhood of the
Eskimo colony of Netlik is very amusing.
He describes them as a most unhuman-looking pair. Everything
on and about them told of the battle they fought so gallantly and
patiently with the elements. From head to foot they were invested in
a coat of ice and snow. Shapeless lumps of whiteness, they
resembled the snow-kings or statues which boys delight in making,
except that they possessed the faculty of motion. Their long, heavy
fox-skin coats, reaching nearly to the knees, and surmounted by a
hood, covering, like a round lump, all of the head but the face, the
bear-skin pantaloons and boots and mittens were saturated with
snow. Their long, black hair, which fell from beneath their hoods over
their eyes and cheeks, their eyelashes, the few hairs growing upon
their chins, the rim of fur around their faces, all glittered with white
frost—the frozen moisture of their breath. Each carried in his right
hand a whip, and in his left a lump of frozen meat and blubber. The
meat they flung down on the floor of Dr. Hayes’ hut; then, without
pausing for an invitation, they thrust their whipstocks under the
rafters, and divesting themselves of their mittens and outer
garments, hung them thereon. Underneath their frosty coats they
wore a warm, close shirt of bird-skins.
In the same bold explorer’s narrative of his voyage of discovery in
1860, two other Eskimos figure very conspicuously; and one of
these, named Hans, would seem to have been a very fair type of the
Eskimo character. Hans, we may observe, had originally served in
Dr. Kane’s expedition, and had then gained the confidence of Dr.
Hayes; so that when the latter undertook his own memorable
voyage, he became anxious to secure the Eskimo’s services.
When his ship had crossed Melville Bay, and lay in the grim
shadows of Cape York, Dr. Hayes bethought himself of the Eskimo
hunter. He remembered to have heard that Hans had fallen in love,
and taken a wife, and repaired, with her at his side, to share the
fortunes of the wild Eskimos who inhabit the remote northern shores
of Baffin Bay.
But Dr. Hayes felt confident that the hunter, having known
something of the superior comfort and happiness of the social life of
civilization, would soon weary of his voluntary banishment, and of
the penury and hardships of the existence of the Eskimo nomads.
He made up his mind that Hans would return to Cape York, and
there take up his residence, in the hope of being picked up by some
passing ship.
So Dr. Hayes stood close in-shore, to find that his conjectures
were completely realized. As he sailed along the coast he
discovered a group of human beings eagerly endeavouring by signs
and gestures to attract attention. Heaving the schooner to, he and
his second in command, Mr. Sountag, went ashore in a boat, and
there was Hans! The Eskimo recognized both of them immediately,
and called them by name.
DR. HAYES FALLS IN WITH HANS THE HUNTER.

We may adopt the remainder of Dr. Hayes’ interesting little
episode, because it illustrates the ingrained selfishness, or self-
concentration, of the Eskimo character.
Hans had deteriorated greatly during his residence with the wild
Eskimos, and he had sunk to their level of filthy ugliness. He was
accompanied by his wife, who carried her first-born in a hood upon
her back; his wife’s brother, a quick-eyed boy of twelve years; and
his wife’s mother, “an ancient dame with voluble and flippant
tongue.” They were all attired in the usual Eskimo dress of skins;
objects of interest and curiosity, but not “things of beauty.”
Hans led his visitors, over rough rocks and through deep drifts of
snow, to his rude hut, which stood on the cold hill-top, about two
hundred feet above the sea-level. An excellent position for a “look-
out,” but as inconvenient for a hunter as can well be imagined. Here
he had watched and waited for many a dreary month; surveying the
sea day after day, in the faint hope of discovering some European
vessel. But none came; summer passed into winter, and winter
lengthened into summer; and still Hans watched and waited,
yearning after his southern home and the friends of his youth.
His tent—for it was rather a tent than a hut—was made of seal-
skins, and its capacity was scarcely sufficient to accommodate his
little family.
Dr. Hayes asked him if he would accompany the expedition.
“Yes.”
Would he take his wife and baby?
“Yes.”
Would he go without them?
“Yes.”
This last answer reveals the curious unimpressionableness of the
Eskimo, who endures with calmness, nay, even with indifference,
those partings which try the heartstrings of the European. It is,
perhaps, a result of the constant warfare he maintains against an
uncongenial and austere Nature that he comes to regard himself as
his first and chief, as almost his only concern. So long as his wife
and children surround him, he shows no evident want of affection;
but he has no objection to part from them, if the separation will prove
to his individual interest.
As Dr. Hayes had no leisure to examine critically into the state of
his mind, and as he cherished a conviction that the permanent
separation of husband and wife was to be regarded as a painful
event, he determined on giving the Eskimo mother the benefit of this
conventional suspicion. Both husband and wife, therefore, were
carried on board the schooner, as well as their baby, their tent, and
all their household goods. The bright-eyed boy and the ancient dame
cried to accompany them; but Dr. Hayes had no further room, and
was compelled to leave them to the care of their tribe, who, about
twenty in number, had discovered the schooner, and with a merry
shout had come across the hill. After bestowing upon them some
useful gifts, Dr. Hayes returned to his vessel.
He adds that Hans was the only unconcerned person in the party.
At a later period the thought crossed his commander’s mind that he
would by no means have been displeased had wife and child been
left to the charity of their savage kin: while Dr. Hayes had abundant
reason, during the course of the expedition, to wish that he had left
the selfish and indolent Eskimo to linger in his seal-skin tent among
the hills and rocks of Cape York.
The same traveller describes the hunting equipment of a party of

Eskimos setting out in pursuit of bears.
First, the dogs. These were picketed, each team separately, on a
convenient area of level ground; and on the approach of Dr. Hayes
and his companions they sprang up from the knotted heap, in which
they had been lying through the night, with a wild, fierce yell, which
died away into a low whine and impatient snarl. They evidently were
hungry, and their masters seemed desirous of feeding them; for,
going to their sledges, each one brought up a flat piece of something
which looked singularly like plate-iron, but, upon examination, was
found to be walrus-hide, three-quarters of an inch thick, and frozen
intensely hard. Throwing it upon the snow a few feet in advance of
their respective teams, they drew their knives from their capacious
boots, and attempted to cut up the skin; but its hardness defied all
their efforts, and Dr. Hayes had to fetch hatchet and saw before the
work of division could be completed.
During the few minutes thus occupied, the dogs had become
almost frantic. They endeavoured to break loose; pulling on their
traces, running back and springing forward, straining and choking
themselves until their eyes shot fire, and the foam flew from their
mouths. The sight of food had stimulated their wolfish passions, and
they seemed ready to eat each other. Not a moment passed that two
or more of them were not flying at each other’s throats, and,
grappling together, rolled, and tossed, and tumbled over the snow.
The Eskimos looked on apparently unconcerned, except when
there appeared a risk of one of the dogs being injured, and then they
secured a temporary calm by uttering an angry nasal “Ay! Ay!”
When at length the food was thrown, the dogs uttered a greedy
scream, which was followed by a moment’s silence while the pieces
were falling, then by a scuffle, and the hard, frozen chunks had
vanished. How they were swallowed, or how they were digested,
was, to the spectator, inexplicable! Enough to say that “the jaws of
darkness did devour them up,” and calm instantaneously succeeded
to the storm.
The Eskimo dog is of medium size, and squarely built; in fact, he
is a reclaimed wolf, and exhibits that variety of colour which, after a
few generations, generally characterizes tame animals. Gray, which
is often seen, was probably at one time the predominating colour.
Some of the dogs are black, with white breasts; some are wholly
white; others are reddish or yellowish; but, indeed, almost every
shade may be seen amongst them. Their skin is covered with a
coarse, compact fur, and is much valued by the natives for the
purposes of clothing. In the form of the animals the variety is
considerable; but the general characters would seem to be a pointed
nose, short ears, a cowardly, treacherous eye, and a hanging tail.
But exceptions occasionally occur, and one figures in Dr. Hayes’
narrative under the name of Toodlamik, or, more briefly, Toodla.
He differed from his kind in having a more compact head, a less
pointed nose, an eye denoting affection and reliance, and an erect,
bold, fearless carriage. Dr. Hayes, however, expresses some doubt
as to his purity of blood. From the beginning to the end of the cruise
he was master of all the dogs that were brought to the ship. In this
connection it is worthy of remark, that in every pack one dog
invariably attains the mastership of the whole—a kind of major-
generalship; and in each team, one who is master of his comrades, a
general of brigade. Once master, always master; but the post of
honour is gained at the cost of many a lame leg and ghastly wound,
and is held only by doing daily battle against all comers. These could
easily gain the ascendancy in every case, but for their own petty
jealousies, which often prevent their union for such a purpose. If a
combination, however, does happen to be brought about, and the
leader is hopelessly beaten, he is never worth anything afterward;
his spirit is completely prostrated, the poor fellow pines away, and
dies at last of a broken heart.
ESKIMO DOGS.
Toodla, says Dr. Hayes, was a character in his way. He was a
tyrant of no mean pretension. Apparently he thought it his special
duty to attack every dog, great or small, that was added to the pack:
if the animal was a large one, in order, probably, that he might at
once be forced to feel that he had a master; if a small one, in order
that the others might hold him in the greater awe. It was sometimes
quite amusing to see him set off in pursuit of a strange dog, his head
erect, his tail curled gracefully over his back; slowly and deliberately
he went straight at his mark, with the confident, defiant air of one
who recognizes the power and importance of his office. Leagues and
conspiracies were not unfrequently formed against him, induced, no
doubt, by a feeling of despair; but he always succeeded in
overthrowing them,—not, it is true, without occasional assistance
from “without;” for the sailors, who petted him greatly, would
sometimes take his part when the struggle was manifestly unequal.
But we must leave the dogs, and turn to the sledge.

This was, in very truth, an ingenious specimen of native
mechanical skill. It was made wholly of bone and leather. The
runners, which were square behind and rounded upward in front,
and about five feet long, seven inches high, and three-fourths of an
inch thick, were slabs of bone; not solid, but made up of a number of
pieces of various shapes and sizes, dexterously fitted and tightly
lashed together. Some of these were not larger than one’s two
fingers; some were three or four inches square; others were as large
as one’s hand, and triangular in shape; others, again, were several
inches in length, and two or three in breadth. They all fitted into their
several places as exactly as the blocks of a Chinese puzzle. Near
their margins ran rows of little holes, and through these strings of
seal-skin were inserted, by which the blocks were fastened together,
until the whole was as firm as a board.
The marvel of the thing is that all these pieces are flattened and
cut into the required shape, not with nicely contrived instruments and
tools, but with stones. The labour must be immense. The grinding
needed to make a single runner must be the work of months. The
construction of an entirely new sledge would probably occupy the
lifetime of a generation; and hence a vehicle of this kind becomes a
family heirloom, and is handed down from father to son, and son to
grandson, and is constantly undergoing repair and restoration; a new
piece here, another there, until as little remains of the original
structure as of the sailor’s old knife, when it had had a new blade
and a new handle! The origin of some of the Eskimo sledges is lost
in the mists of a remote antiquity.
The runners are usually shod with ivory from the tusk of the
walrus. The said ivory had likewise been ground flat, and its corners
made square, with stones; and it was fastened to the runner by a
string looped through two counter-sunk holes. The pieces of which it
was composed were numerous; but the surface was wonderfully
uniform, and as smooth as glass.
The runners stood about fourteen inches apart, and were
fastened together by bones, tightly lashed to them; the bones used
being the femur of the bear, the antlers of the reindeer, and the ribs
of the narwhal. Two walrus-ribs, lashed one to the after-end of each
runner, served as upstanders, and were braced by a piece of
reindeer antler, secured across the top.
Having thus disposed of the team and the sledge, we now come
to the equipment.
First, one of the Eskimo hunters spread a piece of seal-skin over
the sledge, fastening it securely by little strings attached to its
margin. On this he placed a small piece of walrus-skin, as a
provision for the dogs; a piece of blubber for fuel; and of meat for his
own lunch. During his absence he would cook no food, but he would
want water; and therefore he carried his kotluk, or lamp—namely, a
small stone dish; a lump of mannek or dried moss, designed for the
wick; and some willow-blossoms (na-owinals) for tinder. To ignite the
tinder, he had a piece of iron-stone and a small sharp fragment of
flint.
ESKIMO SLEDGE AND TEAM.
We may follow him on his route, and ascertain the use he makes
of these appliances. When he grows thirsty, he halts; scrapes away
the snow until he lays bare the solid ice beneath; and painfully
scoops in it a small cavity. Next, he fetches a block of fresh-water ice
from a neighbouring berg, lights his lamp, and, using the blubber for
fuel, proceeds to place the block on the edge of the cavity. As it
slowly thaws, the water trickles down into the hole; and when the
Eskimo thinks the quantity collected is sufficient to quench his thirst,
he removes the rude apparatus, and, stooping down, drinks the soot-
stained fluid. If he feels hungry, he breaks off a few chips from his
lump of frozen walrus-beef, cuts a few slices from the blubber, and
enjoys his unsatisfactory meal. The inhabitant of the Arctic desert
knows nothing of epicurean tastes; and if he did, he has no means of
gratifying them.
To return to the equipment. The hunter carried with him an extra
pair of boots, another of dog-skin stockings, and another of mittens,
to be used in case he should be unfortunate enough to get on thin
ice, and the ice should break through.
The entire equipment being placed upon the sledge, he threw
over them a piece of bear-skin, which was doubled, so that, when
opened, it would be large enough to wrap about his body and protect
it from the snow, if he wished to lie down and rest. Then he drew
forth a long line, fastened an end of it through a hole in the fore part
of one of the runners, ran it across diagonally to the opposite runner,
passed it through a hole there, and so continued, to and fro, from
side to side, until he reached the other end of the sledge. There he
made fast the line, and thus the cargo was secured against all risk of
loss from an upset. Next he hung to one upstander a coil of heavy
line, and to the other a lighter coil, tying them fast with a small string.
The former was his harpoon-line for catching walrus; the latter, for
catching seal. His harpoon staff was made from the tusk of the
narwhal; measured five feet in length, and two inches in diameter at
one end, tapering to a point at the other.
All being ready, the team, consisting of seven dogs, was brought
up. The harness was of a very primitive description. It consisted of
two doubled strips of bear-skin, one of which was placed on either
side of the animal’s body, the two being fastened together on the top
of the neck and at the breast, so as to form a collar. Thence they
passed inside of the dog’s fore legs and up along his flanks to the
tail, where the four ends meeting together were attached to a trace
eighteen feet in length.
The trace was connected with the sledge by a line four feet long,
of which one end was attached to each runner. And to the middle of
the line a stout string was fastened, running-through bone rings at
the ends of the traces, and secured by a slip-knot, easily untied—an
arrangement designed with the view of ensuring safety in bear-
hunting. The bear is hotly pursued until the sledge arrives within
about fifty yards; the hunter then leans forward and slips the knot;
the dogs, set loose from the sledge, quickly bring the brute to bay. If
the knot gets fouled, serious accidents are not unlikely to occur. The
hunter vainly endeavours to extricate it, and before he can draw his
knife to cut it—supposing he is fortunate enough to have such an
instrument—man, and dogs, and sledge are all among the bear’s
legs, in a huddled and tangled heap, and at the mercy of the
enraged monster.
The dogs were cold, and eager to start. In a moment they were
yoked to the sledge; the hunter with his right hand threw out the coils
of his long whip-lash, with his left he seized an upstander, and
propelling the sledge a few paces, he uttered at the same moment
the shrill starting-cry, “Ka! ka!—ka! ka!” which sent the dogs in a
bound to their places, and away they dashed over the rugged ice.
The hunter skilfully guided his sledge among the hummocks,
moderating the impetuosity of his team with the nasal “Ay! ay!” which
they perfectly understand. On reaching the smooth ice, he dropped
upon the sledge, allowed his whip-lash to trail after him on the snow,
shouted “Ka! ka!—ka! ka!” to his savage team, and disappeared in
as wild a gallop as ever was taken by the demon huntsman of
German legend!
It does not appear that the Eskimos have magistrates or laws, yet
the utmost good order prevails in their communities, and quarrels are
rare. When these do occur, one or other of the dissatisfied parties
collects his little store, and migrates to a different settlement. The
constitution of their society is rightly described as patriarchal, but the
ruler does not seem to be elected: he attains his post by proving his
possession of superior strength, address, and courage. As soon as
his physical powers give way, or old age enfeebles his mind, he
deposes himself, takes his seat in the oomiak, or woman’s boat, and
is relegated by common consent to female companionship. Like all
savage tribes, the Eskimos have their mystery-men, or angekoks,
who resort to the usual deceptions to acquire and retain supremacy,
swallowing knives, resorting to ventriloquial artifices, and conversing
in a mysterious jargon, unintelligible to “the common herd.” They
profess to hold intercourse with certain potent spirits, and to employ
their agency in rewarding or punishing their dupes; and even the
influence of the Christian missionaries has hardly rooted out the
belief in the superstitions originated and fostered by these men.
Notwithstanding the hard conditions of their life, and the
dreariness of the region which they inhabit, the Eskimos are a
cheerful people. They are keenly sensible of the charms of music,
though their own vocalization is inconceivably melancholy; and they
are partial to many rude pastimes, mostly of a gymnastic character.
Their good nature has been praised by many travellers; but they
show the usual inhumanity of the savage towards the aged and
infirm. Weakness is no title to the sympathy of the Eskimo; he
respects strength, but he utterly disregards and cruelly oppresses
the feeble. He is ungrateful towards his benefactors, and in his
intercourse with strangers his fidelity can be relied upon only so long
as he knows that any breach of faith will be severely punished. He
does not steal from his own people, and “Tiglikpok,” “he is a thief,” is
a reproach among the Eskimos as among ourselves; but no shame
attaches to him if he robs the white man, though the latter may have
loaded him with favours.
If we add that they display a strong affection for their children,
and that the children are singularly docile and obedient to their
parents, we shall have said enough to assist the reader in forming an
accurate conception of the characteristics of the inhabitants of the
Eskimo Land.
CHAPTER VIII.
LAPLAND AND THE LAPPS.
apland, or the Land of the Lapps, which the Lapps themselves

call Sameanda or Somellada, forms the north and north-
eastern portions of the Scandinavian peninsula, and is divided
between Sweden and Russia. Norwegian Lapland includes the
provinces of Norrland and Finmark; Swedish, of North and South
Bothnia; and Russian, of Kola and Kemi. The last-named has an
area of 11,300 square miles, with a population of 9000; Swedish
Lapland, an area of 50,600 square miles, with 4000 inhabitants; and
Norwegian, an area of 26,500 square miles, with a population of
5000. We are here referring to the number of true Lapps; in each
division the population would be largely increased if we included
Finns, Russians, Swedes, Norwegians.
Lapland, for nine months in the year, is blighted by the rigour of a
winter climate. The summer months, when the sun does not set for
several weeks, are July and August; and these are preceded by a
brief spring, and followed by even a briefer autumn. Cereals do not
thrive higher than the sixty-sixth parallel, with the exception of barley,
which is cultivated as far north as the seventieth. The greater part of
the country comes within that wooded zone which we described in
an earlier chapter, and the forests, consisting of birch, pine, fir, and
alder, spread over a very extensive area. On the mosses and lichens
which grow abundantly in their shelter, are fed the immense herds of
reindeer which constitute the principal wealth of the inhabitants.
The Lapps may almost be regarded as a nation of Lilliputians.
Their men seldom exceed five feet in height, while the majority are
some inches below that very moderate stature; and the women are
even shorter. They are, however, a robust race, with muscular limbs,
and unusual girth of body, the circumference of their chest being
nearly equal to their height. Their complexion is dark, tawny, or
copper-coloured; their dark, piercing, deep-sunken eyes are set very
wide apart, so as to communicate a peculiar character to the
physiognomy. The wild, strange effect is further increased by the
unkempt masses of dark, lank, straight hair which droop on either
side of the whiskerless, beardless face. The cheek-bones are
prominent, like those of a Celtic Highlander; the nose is flat; the
mouth wide, with thin compressed lips. It may be supposed that the
Lapps, from these indications, are not models of masculine or
feminine beauty; and Dr. Clarke asserts that, when aged, many of
them, if exposed in a menagerie, might be mistaken for the long-lost
transitional form intermediate between man and ape. And, certainly,
there is something repulsive in the constant blinking of eyes
rendered sore by the pungent smoke of their huts, or the white glare
of the snow, as well as in the expression of obstinacy and low
cunning which one reads in every feature.
An aristocrat might be proud of their small and finely-shaped
hands; but their arms, like their legs, are disproportionately short,
clumsy, and thick. Clumsy, we mean, in shape; certainly not in
movement, for the extraordinary flexibility of their limbs is one of the
traits by which a Lapp is easily distinguished.
Of the dress of the Lapps it is needless to say much. In winter it
consists of bears’ skins, in which both male and female wrap
themselves up, with the fur outward. In summer the men wear a sort
of tunic, the poesk, made of coarse light-coloured woollen cloth,
depending to the knee, but bound about the waist with a belt or
girdle. Their head-gear consists of a kind of fez, made of wool, and
adorned with a red worsted band round the rim, and a bright red
tassel. Their boots or shoes are cut from the raw skin of the reindeer,
with the hair outwards, and they are peaked in shape. They are thin,
and they have no lining; but the Lapp defends his feet and ankles
from the cold by stuffing the vacant space of the boot with the broad
leaves of the Carex vesicaria, or Cyperus grass, which he cuts in
summer, rubs in his hands, and dries before using. The female
costume resembles that of the males, but their girdles are gayer with
rings and chains.
The Lapps are a superstitious race. Like all the Norse tribes, they
believe in witchcraft; and of old the Lapland witches had a reputation
which extended to England, for being able to ward off rain or
disperse storms. The English seamen trading to Archangel
frequently visited their coast in order to buy a favourable wind.
Many of the Lapps claim the ability to foretell future events, and
fall, or pretend to fall, into a trance or ecstasy, during which they see
visions, utter prophecies, and unlock the secrets of those who trust
to their divination. They also read the fortunes of inquiring dupes by
means of a cup of liquor, or by the vulgarest jargon of palmistry.
Superstition is the daughter of Ignorance. It is also the sister of Fear,
for the superstitious are invariably prone to see supernatural signs
and wonders in the appearances of the heavens, or to hear
unearthly voices borne upon the midnight wind, and in everything
they cannot understand to imagine the presence of some
antagonistic power. As the American natives were panic-stricken at
the occurrence of an eclipse, so the Lapps are filled with dread when
the sky glows with the coruscations of the aurora.
These superstitions prevail in spite of the exertions of priests and
schoolmasters. They are nourished in secret even when they are not
openly proclaimed; and the Lapp, after listening devoutly to the
harangue of his pastor, will return home to offer homage to his
saidas, or wooden idols; to cower at the name of Trolls, the evil spirit
of the forest; and to be deluded by the artifices of any so-called witch
or fortune-teller.
There are Lapps, and Lapps; each, according to the region he
inhabits, bearing his distinctive characteristics, and preserving his
individual habits. Thus, there are the Fjälllappars, or Mountain
Lapps; the Skogslappars, or Wood Lapps; and the Fisherlapps.
From the nature of the country the reader will expect, and will be
right in expecting, that the Fjälllappars form the most numerous
section. They are the nomads of Lapland, and their mode of life is
entirely pastoral. As the Arabs with their flocks move from one oasis
to another, or the Tartars with their cattle, so the Lapps migrate from
place to place, compelled by the necessity of finding sustenance for
their herds of reindeer. The mosses and lichens on which these
animals feed are soon exhausted, and some time elapses before the
half-frozen soil replaces them. The same cause operates to prevent
the Lapps from assembling in large communities. Seldom more than
three, four, or five families encamp in the same neighbourhood.
It will not be supposed that the temporary abode of a nomad
exhibits any architectural completeness. Their tuguria, or huts, are of
the rudest construction. They raise a conical framework, composed
of the flexible stems of trees, and this they cover with a coarse kind
of canvas, and in winter with the skins of reindeer and other animals.
No doorway is required, and egress and ingress are provided for by
turning up a portion of the canvas at the bottom, so as to form a
triangular gap; and the portion so turned up is let down again at
night. In the centre of the interior some large stones are piled
together for a fireplace, and a square opening in the roof above
carries off the smoke, and lets in the light and air—not to say rain,
snow, and fog, when these prevail.
The tent or hut we have described generally measures about six
feet in diameter, and eighteen to twenty in circumference. It does not
exceed ten feet in height. There is no floor, but the ground is covered
with reindeer skins, and upon these the inhabitants sit or crouch by
day, and huddle themselves up at night. The household utensils,
implements, and weapons are suspended from the sides of the hut;
and the clothing of the family, no very extensive stock, is preserved
in a chest.
On a shelf or platform, raised high above the reach of dogs and
wolves, between two neighbouring trees, the Lapp keeps his store of
dried reindeer flesh, and cheese, and curds; for his diet is as plain as
his general habit of living. His herd of reindeer he puts up at night, or
when they are required for milking, in a large enclosure, about four
hundred to five hundred feet in circuit, formed by a barrier of posts
and stumps of trees, supporting a row of horizontal poles. Against
the latter birch poles and branches of trees are placed diagonally,
forming a kind of abattis, which is found to be a sufficient security
against the attacks of wolves.
It is said that the milking of a herd of reindeer affords a lively and
picturesque spectacle. When they have been driven within the area,
and all the outlets closed, a Lapp, selecting a long cord or thong,

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Dynamics of EU Renewable Energy

Policy Integration Mariam

ISSN 2662-5873 ISSN 2662-5881 (electronic)

Cover illustration: Magic Lens/Shutterstock

Renewable energy policy is very timely topic in the European policy-

scope of this book widened accordingly to incorporate the EU’s latest

Conway, USA Mariam Dekanozishvili

1 Introduction: EU Renewable Energy Policy in Context 1

3.5 Domain Specific Rules and Legal Basis 53

6.5 Rules: Legal Basis for the REDII and Pre-existing

ALTENER Program for the Promotion of Renewable Sources of Energy

Introduction: EU Renewable Energy Policy

1.1 Book’s Purpose and Contribution

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

the EU-level 32 percent binding target of renewables in energy consump-

under the interplay of structure, agency, and external contingency.

While the book relies on rich historical accounts of EU energy policy

in EU’s energy policymaking process, be it the European Commission’s

1.2 EU Renewable Energy Policy in Context:

(SEA) greatly facilitated the supranational entrepreneurship of Commu-

of the Council, prepared a Green Paper that outlined a comprehen-

1.3 Book Outline

a comprehensive analytical framework should bring together structure,

Boasson, E. L., & Wettestad, J. (2013). EU climate policy: Industry, policy

Jevnaker (Eds.), Linking EU climate and energy policies: Decision-making,

2.1 Reconceptualizing European Integration:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

a serious methodological problem for explaining social change. On the

integration when the Commission or the European Parliament gain new

2.2 3-D of European Integration:

distribution of benefit is determined by the bargaining power of the

preferences determined by their national specifics, support schemes and

change become ‘path-dependent’ as actors define their preferences within

entrepreneurship in EU energy policy. As the sole initiator of new poli-

shows a successful entrepreneurial role of the Commission, especially in

problems of energy security, economic development and climate change

contributed to the window of opportunity for the adoption of the RED

2.3 Causal Paths to European Integration

Wedel (2016) incorporates the triad of theoretical approaches—Euro-

2.3.1 Liberal Intergovernmental Path to Integration Outcome:

determines the respective willingness or unwillingness to make conces-

Proposition 1 (LI) EU Policymaking outcomes that advance integration

Proposition 2 (LI) Convergence of preferences among the key member states

2.3.2 Supranational Path to Integration Outcome: Supranational

problems, set the agenda, advance proposals, mediate to reach a compro-

and administrative procedures grants the European Commission compar-

Transnational interest groups may form coalitions to direct their demands

2.3.3 Punctuated Equilibrium Path to Policy Outcomes: Integration

states may become more amenable to European solutions, especially those

(supranational entrepreneurs and member states’ preferences). Policy

2.4 A Few Methodological Remarks

Comparative case-study method is well-suited for synthesizing different

Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah! Am-na-yah!

Dr. Hayes, in the course of his adventurous Arctic boat-journey,

DR. HAYES FALLS IN WITH HANS THE HUNTER.

The same traveller describes the hunting equipment of a party of

But we must leave the dogs, and turn to the sledge.

apland, or the Land of the Lapps, which the Lapps themselves

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