Great Power Competition as the New

Normal of China–US Relations Jinghao

Zhou
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Great Power
Competition as the
New Normal of
China–US Relations
Jinghao Zhou
 Great Power Competition as the New Normal
of China–US Relations

“Zhou highlights the many failures of the decades-old, Nixon-Kissinger engage-

ment approach to US-China relations. He rightly argues that facing up to the
rising competition with China is the only effective basis for a sound strategic
response. Zhou’s combination of deep familiarity with Chinese history and poli-
tics and a solid command of the theoretical and policy literature on China-U.S.
relations makes this an authoritative work for scholars and students and for
policy analysts alike. Clearly written and full of keen observations and sensible
judgments. A pleasure to read.”
—Shale Horowitz, Professor of Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA

“Professor Zhao’s book is an insightful and unique analysis of the great power
rivalry between the US and China. Contrary to the dominant views, the author
claims that strategic competition can be fundamentally beneficial for both coun-
tries. This book is a must-read for all scholars interested in the causes and
possible repercussions of the constantly recurring frictions between Washington
and Beijing.”
—Karol Zakowski, Associate Professor of International Relations & Political
Studies, University of Lodz, Poland

“Professor Zhou’s book represents a valuable contribution to the understanding

of one of the great challenges of the 21st Century. The US-China rivalry will be
the defining factor for the geopolitical landscape for decades to come. Redefining
engagement between Western countries and China as a non-zero-sum game
requires the global community to refocus its efforts on building a new governance
architecture for an equitable planet, halting and eventually reversing climate
change, addressing global risk scenarios, and avoiding nuclear war.”
—Ulf Henning Richter, CEO of CARBON10B X

“The author has produced a treatise that provides much-needed insights into the
increasingly complex relationship between the United States and China. Delving
deep into the intricacies of comparative political systems, intertwining nexus
of domestic policy imperatives and foreign policy targets, cultural DNA and
conflicting national interests, this book represents an outstanding, indispensable
disquisition few and far between in the existing literature of the field, a must-read
for experts and non-specialists alike. In today’s fast-changing global political land-
scape towards a multipolar world, Zhou’s book is timely and requisite reading
for all educated public and professional practitioners who have interest in the
fascinating discipline in view of the new realities of world politics and interna-
tional relations. While not claiming to provide specific policy recommendations,
the author has commendably succeeded in furnishing deep understanding, with
strong theoretical survey and empirical scrutiny, developed through the chapters
of this book, in great power competition within a global context for poli-
cymakers and consultants handling the intricate relations between China the
aspiring superpower and the United States of America, the incumbent.”
—Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Chinese Political
Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal and former
director of Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya,
Malaysia
 Jinghao Zhou

Great Power
Competition
as the New Normal
of China–US
Relations
Jinghao Zhou
Department of Asian Studies
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Geneva, NY, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-09412-5 ISBN 978-3-031-09413-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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This book is dedicated to my mother

Gao Jingjuan

with loving memory

August 2, 2022
 Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Marsh, the director of research at

the Joint Special Operations University, for inviting me to give a presenta-
tion at the Great Power Competition Forum: Compound Security Threat
hosted by Joint Special Operations University in November 2020. The
Forum inspired me to continue exploring this topic and motivated me to
draft this book.
I would like to thank anonymous reviewers for reading chapters,
making comments, and offering constructive suggestions which helped
me revise the entire manuscript based on their specific suggestions and
general advice.
I would like to thank Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and
Strategic Relations: An International Journal for granting me permission
to revise the article “Intention and Objectives of Chinese Foreign Policy:
A Perspective of Chinese Culture and History” and include the revised
article in this book.
My thanks also go to Dr. Anca Pusca, Executive Editor at Palgrave
Macmillan, for reading the book proposal and chapters and managing the
publishing process. My thanks extend to Ananda Kumar Mariappan and
Mahesh Meiyazhagan for managing production issues.
I especially thank my wife, Yi-Tung Wu, for her true care and selfless
support, which enabled me to concentrate on this work and complete it.
This scholarly work embodied her contributions.

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 U.S. Engagement Strategy Partially Failed 11
Development of China–U.S. Relations 12
Status of China–U.S. Relations 21
U.S. Engagement Strategy Failed Inevitably 29
Conclusion 40
3 Nature of the Great Power Competition 43
Conceptualization of the Great Power Competition 44
When Did the Great Power Competition Begin? 49
Who Triggered the Great Power Competition? 55
Objectives of the Great Power Competition 61
Roles of Other Players in the Great Power Competition 65
Implications of the Great Power Competition 69
Conclusion 74
4 Real Trap of China–U.S. Relations 77
Does the Thucydides Trap Apply to China–U.S. Relations? 78
Has the U.S. Fallen into the Kindleberger Trap
and the Kennedy Trap? 84
Economic Perspective Alone Cannot Fully Explain the Great
Power Competition 92
Conclusion 104

ix
x CONTENTS

5 Intention of Chinese Policymakers: Cultural Source

of the Great Power Competition 107
Roles of Chinese Culture in Making Foreign Policy 109
Characteristics of Chinese Culture and the Mindset
of Foreign Policymakers 116
Historical Memory and Chinese Diplomatic Objective 124
Conclusion 134
6 China’s Global Expansion and the International
Institution 137
The U.S.-Led International Institutions 138
Development of China’s Relations with the International
Institutions 142
China Challenges the International Institutions 147
China Pragmatically Uses the International Institutions 159
Conclusion 163
7 China’s Core Interests vs. American Vital Interests 165
China’s Core Interests Represent CCP’s Interests 166
American Vital Interests Reflect the Will of the American
People 172
The Cornerstone of American Vital Interests vs. China’s
Sharp Power 184
Conclusion 191
8 War Is Not Imminent During the Great Power
Competition 193
Will the First Shot Be Fire in the South China Sea? 194
Will the U.S. Clash with China Over the Taiwan Strait? 202
Can China Withstand War with the U.S.? 215
Conclusion 225
9 The Great Power Competition in the Post-Pandemic
Era 227
U.S. Administrations Made the Same Mistakes 228
Development Trend of the Great Power Competition 233
The Great Power Competition Will Strengthen Modern
Democracy 240
Totalitarian China Cannot Rule the World 248
Conclusion 258
 CONTENTS xi

Selected Readings 261

Index 275
 About the Author

Dr. Jinghao Zhou is an Associate Professor of Asian Studies at Hobart

and William Smith Colleges in New York. His research focuses on Chinese
ideology, politics, religions, and U.S.–China relations. He has his other
five books published, Why Is the China Model Losing Its Power? (2020),
Chinese vs. Western Perspectives: Understanding Contemporary China
(2014), China’s Peaceful Rise in a Global Context: A Domestic Aspect of
China’s Road Map to Democratization (2010), Remaking China’s Public
Philosophy and Chinese Women’s Liberation: The Volatile Mixing of Confu-
cianism, Marxism, and Feminism (2006), and Remaking China’s Public
Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century (2003). His forty-plus articles in
English appear in various journals and newspapers. He has also published
more than forty articles in Chinese journals and newspapers.

xiii
 Abbreviations

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area-Denial
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMF Asian Monetary Fund
APEC Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASB Air-Sea Battle
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS A security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States
BRI Belt Road Initiative
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCTV China Central Television
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus
FONA Freedom of Navigation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HGV Hypersonic Glide vehicle
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
JAM-GC Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
MFN Most Favored Nation
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSS National Security Strategy
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PNTR Permanent Normal Trade Relations
PPP Purchase Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
QUAD Quadruple Security Dialogue
ROC Republic of China
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SEC The Securities and Exchange Commission
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
STEM Science Technology Engineering Mathematics
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
TSMC Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNHRC UN Human Rights Council
US United States
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The relationship between China and the U.S. has nosedived to the lowest
point since Richard Nixon traveled to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and started the engagement process with the PRC in 1972. Now
China is powerful but is back in the arms of Russia. The U.S. engage-
ment strategy with China did not achieve the goal the U.S. expected in
the past fifty years. The Trump administration began to adopt a strategic
competition toward China. Joe Biden’s Interim National Security Strategy
Guidance (2021) ensured that the U.S. will strengthen its enduring
advantages to prevail in strategic competition with China. The 2022 U.S.
National Security Strategy still sees China’s threat as the top priority
among all other tasks although the U.S. faces great distractions due to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other domestic issues. It is expected that
Russia will become much weaker in the post-invasion of Ukraine. The
2021 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that about
90% of American adults consider China as a competitor or enemy and
support taking a tougher approach in bilateral relations. In China, anti-
U.S. nationalism has been on the rise since the trade war driven by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The General Secretary of the CCP Xi
Jinping points out that the biggest source of chaos in the present-day

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Zhou, Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–US
Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2_1
2 J. ZHOU

world is the U.S., and the U.S. is the biggest threat to China’s secu-
rity.1 At the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the
CCP (2021), Xi warned Westerners who try to block China’s rise will
hit a “Great Wall of steel.”2 He believes that anti-American sentiment
contributes to national unity and enhances the governance legitimacy of
the CCP. China is decisively moving in the opposite direction of the U.S.-
led international order. Xi has promised to restore China to its rightful
great power status by 2049—the 100th anniversary of the founding of
the PRC. The great power competition between China and the U.S. has
begun and become a new hegemonic narrative of academic debate in the
U.S. and China. Some scholars point out that the current China–U.S.
relations are entering a dangerous period.3
The Biden administration has acknowledged the renewed great power
competition between the U.S. and China while denying the concept of
Cold War 2.0. The 50-year history of China–U.S. relations has shown
that the great power competition has never stopped since the Cold War
because the CCP’s global ambition has been persistent since the establish-
ment of the PRC, although the PRC was not considered a great power
before 2008. The CCP has not disavowed the competition with the U.S.
while routinely calling on the U.S. to abandon a cold war mentality. All
of the major global powers care about the power balance and are destined
to compete to advance their international position through competition.
John Mearsheimer warns that it is almost certain to see great power
competition will be getting intensified and possibly lead to war between
the great powers in two decades. Most likely, the clash will be between
the U.S. and China.4 The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine will not
change the central theme of the twenty-first century—the great power
competition between China and the U.S. Instead, the U.S. has escalated

1 Quoted in Mark Moore, “Xi Jinping Calls US ‘Biggest Threat’ to China’s Security,”
New York Post, March 3, 2021.
2 习近平, “在庆祝中国共产党成立100周年大会上的讲话,” Xi Jinping, “Speech at the
Celebration of the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China,”
July 1, 2021.
3 Collins, Gabriel and Andrew S. Erickson, “U.S.–China Competition Enters the Decade
of Maximum Danger: Policy Ideas to Avoid Losing the 2020s,” Rice University’s Baker
Institute for Public Policy, December 2021.
4 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2014).
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

the tension between the U.S. and the CCP by overwhelmingly passing
the Assessing Xi’s Interference and Subversion Act on April 27, 2022,
on assessing how Xi Jinping intervened and obstructed U.S. sanctions
against Russia, which will require the State Department to submit an
initial report within 30 days of the bill’s enactment and every 90 days
thereafter.5 This is the first time that the U.S. Congress had a bill named
after Xi Jinping, the core leader of the CCP. The implications of the bill
will be far-reaching in China–U.S. relations. The newly released 2022
National Defense Strategy report further defines China as the most signif-
icant competitor indicating that tenser great power competition between
the U.S. and the PRC/CCP is ahead. Although Joe Biden and Xi Jinping
have had five talks since Biden took office, the tension between China
and the U.S. continues to grow increasingly. Nancy Pelosi’s possible trip
to Taiwan has further added fuel to the tension between the two coun-
tries. During the telephone talk between Biden and Xi on July 28, 2022,
Xi warned the U.S. not to play the fire in Taiwan. A PLA spokesman said
that the PLA will not sit idle and will take strong measures to respond
if Pelosi goes ahead with her visit. The U.S. will be responsible for all
of the serious consequences. Apparently, the tension between China and
the U.S. elevated to a new high level, although this was largely rhetoric
because China and U.S. military conflict will unlikely take place before
the 20th National Congress of the CCP and the U.S. midterm elections.
The top leader of the CCP has played a critical role in the change
in China–U.S. relations in the framework of Chinese communist poli-
tics. If the 18th Congress of the CCP in 2012 marked the beginning
of the Xi Jinping era, the 19th Congress of the CCP in October 2017
formerly proclaimed the Chinese developmental model—the socialism
with Chinese characteristics—entered into a new era and China will
become the global leader by 2045. Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th
party congress showed his worldview that the world was in the midst of
profound and complex changes moving in China’s favor and the Chinese
nation now stood tall and firm in the East. Xi believed that the path of
China’s development was not only different from Washington Consensus
but also was better than the Washington Consensus. He outlined the
two-stage plan of the global ambition: to reach the goal of socialist
modernization by 2035 and to become the global leader by 2045. Xi

5 “U.S. House Passes the Axis Act Named After Xi Jinping,” NFSC News, May 1,
2022.
4 J. ZHOU

declared that “It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the
Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of
national rejuvenation. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to
center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”6 His speech
indicated that the CCP’s aim is not simply to make a world safe, rather,
the CCP seeks an international order in which China’s achievements as
a great power are not only recognized but also credited to its partic-
ular brand of socialism as a moral triumph both for socialism and for
the Chinese nation.7 His speech clearly expressed the CCP’s determina-
tion that China wanted to lead the reform of global governance and that
the China model should replace the Washington consensus. His speech
heralded greater assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. Now the world
is closely watching China where she is heading after the 20th National
Congress of the CCP.8
In November 2017, President Donald Trump paid a state visit to
Beijing. Chinese official media described Trump’s trip as a pilgrimage
to Xi Jinping, showing the U.S. respect and behaving well toward Xi
Jinping. The trip was a diplomatic triumph for Xi Jinping.9 In fact,
Donald Trump’s 2017 trip to Beijing was the turning point of the U.S.
foreign policy shift toward China. During the trip, Trump personally
experienced that China well planned to replace the U.S. global dominant
power based on his personal impression of Chinese officials’ confidence,
a long-term plan, and full-scale ambitions.10 His first-hand experience in
Beijing motivated him to understand that U.S. strategy toward China has
been flawed and his previous administrations and both democratic and
republican parties were misled by false theories and assumptions, such

6 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society

in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era,” Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, October 18, 2017.
7 Daniel Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on
Beijing’s Ambitions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 8, 2020.
8 Mathew P. Funaiole, “Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Speech Heralds Greater
Assertiveness in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 26, 2017.
9 “Chinese Media Hails Success of Trump’s ‘Pilgrimage’ to Beijing,” The Guardian,
November 9, 2017.
10 Herbert Raymond McMaster, Battleground: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2020).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

as “liberalism must-win” and “engagement policy serves American inter-

ests.” Guided by the engagement strategy, the U.S. helped China rebuild
a prosperous country, but China has turned against the U.S. and weak-
ened the U.S. international power. If the U.S. and its allies and partners
began to compete with China effectively by changing the engagement
strategy, it would be possible to turn what the CCP saw as a weakness
into strength.11 Although the Trump administration discovered China’s
global ambitions and started a new chapter of China–U.S. relations, it
did not offer theoretical explanations on why China persistently pursues
its global ambition and failed to form a consistent and workable strategy
toward the PRC. Rhetorically, the Biden administration continues the
strategic competition. Nevertheless, it has not demonstrated its readiness
in competing with China by adopting a tougher approach. The chaos of
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
have raised a legitimate question of whether the Biden administration is
capable of handling global power competitions.
China–U.S. relations remain the central issue of the global commu-
nity in the twenty-first century. The trajectory of the bilateral relations
will have a profound impact not only on the Asia–Pacific region but
also on the entire world. The current troubled relationship between the
two nations has created serious concerns in academia. Many ask the
same question: What went wrong with U.S. foreign policy? One of the
answers to the question is that all failures of U.S. foreign policy toward
China stem from that U.S. administrations and American politicians failed
to understand the nature of the CCP, so they did not understand the
necessity and urgency of competition with China. Consequently, they
failed to implement a workable strategy to deal with China’s challenge.
This book intends to explore the question from various perspectives by
discussing why the great power competition is the new normal of China–
U.S. relations and why it is urgent for the U.S. to compete with China
by reassessing and further understanding the nature of the CCP.
When one addresses the question of what went wrong with U.S.
foreign policy, how many years should one trace back? James B. Stein-
berg, former Deputy Secretary of State, suggests that it is appropriate
to address the question by tracing back 30 years (1990–2020) because
the Bush administration’s response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre

11 Ibid.
6 J. ZHOU

(1989) significantly shaped the course of China–U.S. relations.12 As

a matter of fact, the fundamental turning point of the U.S. strategic
approach toward the PRC started with Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972.
There would be no normalization and engagement with the PRC without
Nixon’s 1972 trip. Did American foreign policy toward China come with
any flaws between 1972 and 1989? The answer is positive. The “30-year
argument” argument is based on an assumption that America’s China
strategy was successful between 1972 and 1989. This book will argue
that the U.S. foreign policy toward China partially failed in its inception
according to the 50-year history of U.S. engagement with China. It is
time for the U.S. to compete with the CCP/PRC in order to maintain
global peace, preserve the free world, and secure U.S.’ global dominant
power. In 2022, the Biden administration released its official Indo-Pacific
strategy, which correctly warns that there is only a narrow window of time
for the U.S. and its allies to prevent China from transforming the region
into its own sphere of influence.
It should be noted that competing and engaging with China are not
exclusive but overlapped to a certain degree. The Biden administration
insists that the stiff competition between the U.S. and China does not
have to turn into a new Cold War which implies that America’s competi-
tion with China is limited to specific regions and specific areas. The U.S.
began to implement the engagement strategy with China after Richard
Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972 and gradually became a foundation of
U.S. policy. The term “strategic engagement” refers to a wide range of
practices and interactions in economic cooperation, public diplomacy,
cultural exchange, and military and foreign aid between China and the
U.S. The engagement strategy was originally designed as a partnership
with China to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War and to
help China promote economy and political liberalization and ultimately
merge into the U.S.-led international order as a responsible stakeholder.13
As a result, China has become powerful but goes the opposite direction
the U.S. expected. The engagement strategy fundamentally promoted

12 James B. Steinberg, “The Ernest May Memorial Lecture, U.S.–China Relations at a

Crossroad: Can History Guide the Path Forward,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.–China
Relations in the 21st Century, edited by Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington,
DC: The Aspen Institute, 2020).
13 Zoltan Feher, “The Rise and Fall of U.S. Engagement Toward China,” Center for
Strategic Studies, August 17, 2020.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

China’s rise. The Trump administration began to revisit and alter the
course of the engagement strategy. The great power competition is the
right strategy toward China to balance great powers in the Indo-Pacific
region and international relations. However, the strategic competition
does not suggest that the U.S. should abandon engagement with China
completely. Jeffrey Bader raised accurate questions: should such broad-
based interaction be continued in a new era of increasing rivalry, or should
it be abandoned or radically altered?14 It would greatly hurt the U.S. its
own vital interests if the U.S. totally abandoned cooperation with China
during the globalized era. Strategically, we should adopt both strategic
competition and “selective engagement” with China. By adopting selec-
tive engagement, the U.S. will be able to utilize the instruments of
national power to balance against China in order to preserve peace among
great powers and maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region
and the global community.15
There are two opposing viewpoints regarding the great power compe-
tition. Some argue that China and the U.S. should work together to
bring China–U.S. relations back to the normal track because U.S.–China
competition is a zero-sum game while others insist that it is time to
take a tougher approach to China by taking all necessary means because
a tougher strategy would serve U.S. national interests. This book will
challenge both viewpoints and argue that it is unrealistic to bring China–
U.S. relations back to the so-called normal track because the great power
competition will be a new normal of China–U.S. relations and the U.S.
will gain more from strategic competition than cooperation in the long
run. The strategic competition will not be all bad for China either.
The competition would create more incentive for Chinese companies to
compete with the U.S. because they do not have any other option, but
to develop their own capabilities under U.S. technology sanctions. The
strategic competition does not preclude working with China, but the
cooperation must go through the strategic competition. The book will
show that the strategy of “great power cooperation through competi-
tion” is more positive and constructive than the approaches of “peaceful
coexist” and “maximum pressure.”

14 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.–China Relations: Is It Time to End the Engagement?” Foreign

Policy at Brookings, 2018.
15 Maj Christy Jones, “Selective Engagement: A Strategy to Address a Rising China,”
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, August 2, 2021.
8 J. ZHOU

This book includes nine chapters. Chapter 2, U.S. Engagement

Strategy Partially Failed, will argue that the great power competition is
the result of the failures of the engagement policy through examining
the history of China–U.S. relations in the past 50 years, assessing the
current status of China–U.S. relations, and discussing in what sense the
engagement strategy failed. This chapter will find that it was the U.S. that
created its powerful competitor, but the U.S. did not take timely actions
to counter China’s challenges. The 50-year history of China–U.S. rela-
tions has proved that it is time for the U.S. to make adjustments to the
engagement strategy and compete with China if it wants to maintain its
global dominant power within the U.S.-led liberal international order.
Chapter 3, Nature of the Great Power Competition, will conceptualize
the term “great power competition” by examining the development of
the great power competition, discussing the objectives of the great power
competition, exploring the roles of other major players in the great power
competition, and analyzing the implications of the great power competi-
tion. This chapter will conclude that it is not the U.S. but China that initi-
ated the great power competition in order to establish a China-centered
global order. The great power competition is an inevitable historical event
in the twenty-first century, but unlike the Cold War, the U.S. is more
difficult to compete with China in the coming decades because China has
become more powerful after a five-decade-long preparation.
Chapter 4, Real Trap of China–U.S. Relations, will argue that the
prospect theory and the analogy of Thucydides’ Trap, the Kindleberger
Trap, and the Kennedy Trap are helpful in understanding international
relations, but they cannot fully explain the great power competition. To
fully assess the trajectory of China–U.S. relations, it is required to seri-
ously consider how other important factors, including the difference in
political systems between China and the U.S., the relationship between
cultural DNA and foreign policymakers, and the principle and goals of
foreign policy, influence China–U.S. relations. This chapter will focus on
explanations of how the differences between the two political systems
constitute real changes to China–U.S. relations.
Chapter 5, Intention of Chinese Policymakers: Cultural Source of the
Great Power Competition, will discuss the intention of Chinese foreign
policymakers, challenge the argument that the objective of Chinese
foreign policy is only to maintain domestic political stability, and argue
that Chinese foreign policy not only aims to maintain the one-party
system and domestic social stability but also wants to replace the U.S.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

power in the Asia–Pacific region and ultimately become the world’s top
superpower. The two objectives are the two sides of the same coin.
Chinese culture and memory of Chinese history are invisible but the
strong forces influence Chinese foreign policymakers, shape the inten-
tion of their global expansion, and drive Chinese leaders and the Chinese
nation to compete with the U.S.
Chapter 6, China’s Global Expansion and the International Institu-
tion, will discuss the basic issues of the current international order, review
the development of the relationship between China and the international
institutions, analyze how China challenges and uses the international insti-
tutions for its global expansion, and explore the consequences of China’s
challenges and the future of the international order. This chapter will
argue that the Chinese revisionism and provocative actions to alter the
U.S.-led international order are one of the major sources of the great
power competition. If the U.S. and its allies do not stand up to China’s
challenges, the CCP could be the terminator that put the U.S. global
dominance to an end in the future.
Chapter 7, China’s Core Interests vs. American Vital Interests, will
argue that China’s core interests and American vital interests fundamen-
tally conflict, and any expectation that wants to fundamentally improve
China–U.S. relations through engagement is a dead end. China’s core
interests represent the CCP’s interests, so overemphasizing the political
dimension of China’s core interests is partially responsible for the failures
of China’s foreign policy in addition to the CCP’s inaccurate vision of
international relations and misjudgment of China’s comprehensive power
because the free world will never accept the Chinese governance model of
totalitarianism. It is necessary for China to revisit the notion of China’s
core interests and modify it to avoid further deteriorating its relations
with the U.S. and other Western countries.
Chapter 8, War Is Not Imminent during the Great Power Compe-
tition, will argue that war is not imminent during the great power
competition from various perspectives after exploring the question of
whether China and the U.S. will clash over the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait. China’s challenges to the U.S. are real, and the
conflicts between the two countries have become inevitable and widening
far beyond the economic and trade areas. Although the future of the
great power competition remains uncertain, the great power competi-
tion does not necessarily lead to war if the U.S. takes serious actions and
10 J. ZHOU

fully prepares for a possible war with China by employing a workable

comprehensive plan to deter CCP’s global ambitions.
Chapter 9, Conclusion: The Great Power Competition in the Post-
Pandemic Era, will argue that the most important lesson the U.S. must
learn from the history of China–U.S. relations is to understand the nature
of the CCP. The ten U.S. administrations from the Nixon administration
to the Biden administration have implemented different foreign policies,
yet they have shared one similarity—they have held more or less false
understanding of the CCP and had unrealistic hope for the CCP, so they
believed their words but downplayed their deeds. The future of global
order will largely depend on how the U.S. responds to China’s challenges.
The U.S. is relatively declining but it will have a chance to turn it around
if the U.S. firmly implements the strategic competition approach.
This book does not intend to provide policy recommendations for
governments to consider, but by employing the power transition theory,
prospect theory, cultural approach, and analogies of traps, to refute the
argument that competition is not a strategy by explaining why the great
power competition is inevitable and why it is necessary to continuously
work with China in some areas through strategic competition in the era
of globalization. This book only provides one of the aspects of under-
standing the great power competition in a global context and aims to
motivate both the U.S. and China to revisit their foreign policy practice
and come up with a better foreign policy strategy for handling China–U.S.
relations.
 CHAPTER 2

U.S. Engagement Strategy Partially Failed

China and the U.S. are the two great powers in the world and share
common interests in implementing nuclear nonproliferation, controlling
diseases, lifting the population out of poverty, improving environmental
protection, and winning the war on terror. It is almost impossible for
the international community to decide on major global issues without
China’s participation. It is a futile effort for the U.S. to block China’s
rise during the era of globalization. However, it is a misconception that
a stable relationship between China and the U.S. is only based on the
two nations’ common interests. Mutual unfavorable interests also play
a role in maintaining stable China–U.S. relations. The importance of
China–U.S. relations lies mainly in their conflicting interests rather than
shared ones.1 This argument implies that the great power competition
could contribute to stabilizing China–U.S. relations. After the Trump
administration shifted U.S. security strategy from engagement to compe-
tition toward China, many expected China–U.S. relations to return to
a normal track in the post-Trump era. However, competition between
the two countries is getting fiercer under the Biden administration while
the areas of cooperation are narrowing. President Joe Biden and the
General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping had virtual talks in November

1 Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-US Relations,” The Chinese Journal of

International Politics, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 263–292.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Zhou, Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–US
Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2_2
12 J. ZHOU

2021, March 2022, and July 2022, attempting to manage the complex
nature of the great power competition but apparently, they touched on
the common concerns from different perspectives. The future of China–
U.S. relations is still uncertain. Where are China–U.S. relations heading?
Has the engagement approach failed completely? What should be the
main theme of China–U.S. relations, competition, or engagement in
the coming decades? U.S. officials publicly admitted that the attempt to
socialize China into Western values has failed.2 Kurt Campbell, the U.S.
coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, has
made it clear that “The period that was broadly described as engage-
ment has come to an end.”3 To understand why it is necessary to change
U.S. engagement strategy, and why the great power competition is a new
normal of China–U.S. relations while continuing to work with China in
some areas, it is required to examine the history of China–U.S. relations,
assess the current status of China–U.S. relations, and discuss in what sense
the engagement strategy failed. This chapter will argue that the great
power competition is the result of the failures of the engagement policy.
In the past, it was the U.S. that created its powerful competitor, but the
U.S. did not take timely actions to counter China’s challenges. The 50-
year history of China–U.S. relations has proved that it is time for the U.S.
to make adjustments to the engagement strategy and compete with China
if it wants to maintain its global dominant power based on Western liberal
values.

Development of China–U.S. Relations

Since the American ship Empress of China arrived in China in 1784, China
began to have direct relations with the U.S. Within the last over 200
hundred years, the Chinese political system has fundamentally changed
twice through great political revolutions: the Revolution of 1911 which
established the first nation-state, the Republic of China (ROC), and the

2 Jonathan Holslag, “Self-Betrayal: How the West Failed to Respond to China’s Rise,”
International Spectator, May 21, 2021. Also see Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Com-
petition Without Catastrophe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5 (2019), pp. 96–110. Kurt
Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order,” Foreign Affairs,
January 12, 2021. Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, “The U.S.-China Confrontation Is
Not Another Cold War,” The Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
3 “Biden’s Asia Czar Kurt Campbell Says Era of Engagement with Xi’s China Is Over,”
The Straits Times, May 21, 2021.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 13

Communist Revolution of 1949 which established the PRC. Accordingly,

China–U.S. relations have experienced extraordinary historical changes
over the last two centuries.
The relationship between the two countries from its incept to 1911
can be characterized as unequal relationships mainly due to asymmet-
rical power. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was full of energy at its
inception but gradually became stagnant and corrupt. At the begin-
ning of the Qing dynasty, national comprehensive power was strong, the
political system was relatively transparent, and the national living stan-
dard increased. In the second half of the Qing dynasty, the government
became very corrupted and triggered many internal rebellions, such as
the Taiping Rebellion in 1850 and the Boxer Uprising in 1899, which
resulted in domestic chaos. China lost its military capability in fighting
against foreign invasions because of corruption, opium addiction, and
the lack of advanced technology. China lost the two Opium Wars in
1839 and 1857, respectively, and lost the first Sino-Japan war in 1895.
Consequently, China ceded its land, Hong Kong and Macau, to Western
powers, and signed many unequal treaties with Western countries, such as
the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the Sino-Portuguese Treaty (1887), and
the Boxer Protocol (1901). China and the Chinese people were humil-
iated by the Western societies for a century, starting with the defeat of
the First Opium War with the UK in 1842. China gradually became a
semi-colony of Western powers, particularly the eight Western powers,
including Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, Germany, France, Italy,
Japan, Russia, and the U.S. Under the pressures of Western powers, the
Chinese government was forced to sign over 700 unequal treaties with
Western governments and agreed to cede its lands, open fourteen ports
to Western countries, and pay a huge indemnity to the Western countries,
which deepened China’s poverty. Theoretically, China was a sovereign
country at that time, but the government was a puppet of Western powers
and was almost incapable of making any independent decisions in foreign
affairs. The U.S. had privileges in China’s territory and the U.S. officials
were even exempted from any punishment after killing Chinese citizens
in China. When the U.S. enjoyed its privileges on Chinese land, the U.S.
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, signed by Presi-
dent Chester Arthur, to suspend Chinese immigrants, excluding Chinese
“skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining” from
entering the U.S. for ten years. When the Act expired in 1892, U.S.
Congress extended it for another ten years in the form of the Geary Act,
14 J. ZHOU

but there was no significant change until the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1965, which opened the door to a new stereotype of Chinese
as a model minority. The U.S. did not offer an apology until the U.S.
Congress issued an apology for the Chinese Exclusion in 2012.4
In the ROC from 1912 to October 1949, the two countries tried
to develop mutual friendly relations largely due to the common polit-
ical goal of the anti-Chinese communist movement. Sun Yat-sen was the
leader of the Revolution of 1911 and became the first president of the
ROC. He received a Western education and organized the Tong Meng
Hui, the former Nationalist Party. In his search for a new China, he was
deeply influenced by Western cultures and become the most Western-
ized Chinese leader in Chinese history. Although Sun was neither a great
strategist nor a profound ideologist, he was the first politician in modern
Chinese history to advocate democratic principles, arguing that it was
not enough to acknowledge the sovereignty of the country because the
success of the revolution could not be attained without a democracy.5
All his political efforts were made to establish a capitalist-based country.
However, the Revolution of 1911 was not a bourgeois revolution because
most of its revolutionaries were high-ranking officials, landowners, mili-
tary officers of the Qing, heads of secret societies, and armed bands.6
Thus, the nature of the nationalist government is not democratic, though
the form of the government was based on the Three People’s Principles
(三民主义, The Principle of Nationalism, Democracy, and the Livelihood
of the People). To get support from the CCP and the Soviet Union, the
first socialist country in the world, and the majority of the Chinese people,
Sun developed the policy of accommodating the CCP and worked with
the Russian government. Sun’s policy was not successful, so he stepped
down from his presidency in 1912. On March 12, 1925, Sun died of liver
cancer, and his will, stated on his deathbed, was that since the revolution
was not successful, comrades must keep going on.
Sun’s successor Jiang Jieshi (in old Chinese pronunciation, Chiang
Kai-shek) departed away from Sun’s pro-Russian communist stance by

4 Moni Basu “In Rare Apology, House Regrets Exclusionary Laws Targeting Chinese,”
CNN , December 16, 2012.
5 A James Gregor, Marxism, China & Development: Reflections on Theory and Reality
(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p. 233.
6 Jonathan Spence, Chinese Roundabout: Essays in History and Culture (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 269.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 15

suppressing the Chinese communist movement. After settling the central

nationalist government in Nanjing in 1927, Jiang started to implement
pro-U.S. foreign policy, because Jiang viewed communism as the biggest
enemy to his regime and believed that the nationalist government could
not make peace with the international community without eliminating
the domestic communist movement. His foreign policy agenda was in
line with Western powers, especially the interests of the U.S. in Asia.
The U.S. regarded the Chinese nationalist government as its ally and
invested enormous financial and military resources to support the nation-
alist government and troops. Supported by the U.S., the nationalist
government launched three civil wars against the Chinese communist
troops, trying to eradicate the communists.
Unexpectedly, the Sino-Japan War interrupted the intentions of Jiang’s
nationalist government. The CCP took the opportunity of the war with
Japan in eight years to develop its military troops in remote regions under
the slogan of “united Jiang and anti-Japan.” The CCP’s strategy worked
well and built up 1.3 million troops at the end of the second Sino-Japan
war (1937–1945). Although the U.S. and the nationalist government
persistently implemented the policy of the anti-CCP to consolidate the
Jiang regime, the nationalist government eventually lost the popular
support from the majority of the Chinese people in part because Jiang’s
policy was out of touch with reality while the Chinese people gravely
suffered from civil wars and external aggressions. As a result, military
power began to shift in the CCP’s favor. Accordingly, the U.S. began
to implement new policies to balance the Nationalist Party and the CCP
to ensure the future of American interest in Asia in the post-Jiang era.
Finally, the nationalist government was defeated by the CCP troops and
withdrew from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. Taipei has become the
capital of the ROC but continued to represent the government of China
in the United Nations until 1971. After Jiang passed away in 1975, his son
Jiang Jingguo began to gradually reform the Taiwanese political system
and put the Taiwanese authoritarian regime to an end by lifting martial
law in July of 1987. Since then, Taiwan has continued to strengthen its
relations with the U.S. based on the principle of the Six Assurances of
1982 and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 in the framework of U.S.
ambiguous strategy toward the Taiwan Strait, which made the triangle
relations more complicated.
After World War II, the world entered into the Cold War era, and
the conflict between the capitalist and socialist societies, represented by
16 J. ZHOU

Western societies led by the U.S. and the socialist camp led by the
Soviet Union, increasingly intensified. Once the CCP came to power in
1949, the relationship between the two countries began an era of overall
confrontation, which lasted for more than 20 years until the historical
turning point—the U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972.
Since the establishment of the PRC, China–U.S. relations have gone
through different stages from tense confrontation to a “complex mix
of intensifying diplomacy, growing international rivalry, and [becoming]
increasingly intertwined.”7 Most of the time under the Mao regime,
China–U.S. relations were not only about the bilateral relationship but
were also affected by third-party factors. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam War were the main factors contributing
to China–U.S. relations from the 1950s to the 1970s.8 The relationship
between China and the U.S. was significantly influenced by Sino-Soviet
relations and U.S.–Soviet relations during this period. The PRC was a
follower of the Soviet Union before China split with the Soviet Union
in the 1960s due to ideological and political conflicts between the two
largest communist parties. Both parties claimed that they represented true
Marxism and were a well-deserved leader of the global communist move-
ment, but both of them imposed threats to the free world. This explained
why McCarthyism spread across the U.S. in the 1950s and the U.S.
government tried to eliminate the communist movement by launching
ideological campaigns against communist countries including the PRC.
In 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, attempting to
unite South Korea and North Korea. In response to the Soviet-backed
North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United Nations Security
Council convened and passed the UNSC Resolution 82 to condemn the
Soviet Union and North Korea. The Korean War officially broke out in
November 1950, after the U.S. along with other Western countries sent
military troops to Korea with the authorization from United Nations
Security Council. According to the Chinese government, to prevent the
war from coming into newborn China, the Chinese government sent
more than one million troops across the Yalu River to help North Korea,

7 Carin Zissis and Christopher Alessi, “U.S Relations With China (1949–present),”
Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-relations-china-1949---pre
sent/p17698.
8 Baijia Zhang, “Understanding Changes in Sino-U.S. Relations From A Historical
Perspective,” China International Strategy Review, Vol. 2 (2020), pp. 1–13.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 17

fighting against UN military forces until a cease-fire was agreed on July

27, 1953. The Pentagon estimated that during the war, China had lost
about 400,000 soldiers and the U.S. had lost 54,260 Americans.9 About
245 thousand civilians were killed on the South Korean side and about
282 thousand on the North Korean side during the war. After the Korean
War, both China and the U.S. claimed that they won the war. China used
the narrative of the war to promote Chinese nationalism against the U.S.
and it continues to do it today. The Chinese film “The Battle at Lake
Changjin,” produced by China in 2021, is a typical example of CCP’s
propaganda. American movie “Battle of Jangsari” (2019) has offered a
different version of the Korean War by praising the spirit of American
heroes. After the Korean War, the U.S. continued to fear communism
spreading from Asia to the West, so the U.S. launched the Vietnam War
in 1955, the longest war with a foreign country in American history.
China did not officially announce sending its troops to Vietnam, but
it supported the Vietnamese militarily and financially against American
troops until the war officially ended on April 30, 1975. Due to the U.S.’
efforts to resist the communist China for twenty years from 1949 to 1970,
China was “in” but not really “of” the world,10 and China’s roles in
the international society were marginalized. China mainly had diplomatic
relations with socialist countries and African countries in the first 20-year
of the PRC. Under these circumstances, China did not have any other
choice, but to implement the self-reliance policy to sustain its economy
and maintain social stability, so Chinese nationalism became extremely
strong and the Chinese government took a hostile stance toward Western
powers, especially the U.S. Mao mobilized anti-American imperialism to
consolidate its regime at home and promoted nonaligned movements
against the U.S. abroad. Chinese nationalism has been the source of the
CCP’s legitimacy and the bargaining chips for negotiating with the West.
When the U.S. realized that stable China–U.S. relations would be good
for both countries, it made necessary efforts to improve its relations with
the PRC. The U.S. felt more urgent to work with the PRC after the

9 Michael Hickey, The Korea War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950–1953
(London: John Murray, 1999); CBS Staff, “How Many Americans Died in Korea?” CBS
News, June 5, 2000.
10 Lowell Dittmer, “China’s Search for Its Pace in The World,” in Contemporary Chinese
Politics in Historical Perspective, edited by Brantly Womack (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
18 J. ZHOU

Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President John F. Kennedy attempted to

change U.S. foreign policy toward China as he shared the similarities
between his idea and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.”11 In 1963, Roger Hilsman, assistant secretary of
state, claimed that the U.S. was in favor of keeping the “door open”
to China if China gave up its vicious hatred of the U.S.12 Due to various
unexpected events, such as Kennedy’s assassination, the Vietnam War, and
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the process of the normalization of
China–U.S. relations was interrupted. After Richard Nixon became pres-
ident in 1969, he immediately declared that “The policy of this country
at this time will be to continue to oppose communist China’s admission
to the United Nations,”13 but he soon changed his policy toward China
after Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China via Pakistan in 1971. When
Kissinger was in Beijing, he made arrangements with China for Nixon to
officially visit China. On July 15, 1971, Richard Nixon announced that he
accepted China’s invitation to visit China in 1972. In October 1971, the
United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which stated
that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and replaced the
ROC with the PRC as a permanent member of the Security Council of the
United Nations. Yet, the U.S. expressed its stance on the Taiwan issue in
vague language, which left room for both sides to interpret the one-China
policy and created a potential conflict in the future. In the following year
1972, Nixon made the historical trip to Beijing, and he was the first U.S.
president to visit communist China, shook hands with Mao Zedong in
the Forbidden City, and signed the Shanghai Communique on February
28, 1972. The Shanghai Communique expressed that it was the common
interest of the U.S. and China to work toward the normalization of their
relations, although the diplomatic relations were not officially established
until 1979. The Shanghai Communique also asserted that both sides of
the U.S. and China should not seek hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region.
The Shanghai Communique was a historic landmark of China–U.S. rela-
tions and brought unprecedented peace and development not only to

11 Shia-ling Liu, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Communist China in the 1970’s: The Misad-
ventures of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter (Taipei: Kuang Lu Publishing Company,
1988), p. 3.
12 Quoted in Kwan Ha Yim, ed., China and the U.S. 1964–72 (New York: Facts on
File, 1975), p. 3.
13 Ibid., p. 181.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 19

China and the U.S. but also to the Pacific region. To implement the
Shanghai Communique, China and the U.S. established liaison offices in
both countries.
In 1975, Gerald Ford visited the PRC and reaffirmed the U.S.
interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. After difficult negotia-
tions with China for four years, the Carter administration finally accepted
China’s three “non-negotiable conditions” of normalization: “Termina-
tion of the United States-Republic of China defense treaty, the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with the government in Beijing instead
of with Taipei, and withdrawal of the United States military forces from
Taiwan.”14 Since then, the relationship between China and the U.S. has
officially normalized but also created some potential problems for both
sides to deal with. From the American viewpoint, the U.S. made a huge
compromise to meet China’s three non-negotiable conditions that broke
the balance of the triangle relations between the U.S. and the PRC and
the ROC, so U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 to
protect the significant U.S. security and commercial interest in Taiwan.
The Act provided a framework for the U.S. to continue developing rela-
tions with Taiwan and set forth the U.S. institute in Taiwan to directly
handle U.S.–Taiwan relations. Three years later, the Reagan administra-
tion accepted the Six Assurances proposed by the Taiwanese government
and informed the U.S. Congress in July 1982. The Six Assurances are
six key foreign policy principles toward Taiwan, clarified the previous
documents, and reassured the U.S. would continue to support Taiwan
in various ways even if it discontinued its official relations with Taiwan.
Therefore, in an American view, the integrated foundation of U.S. Taiwan
policy is not only one document, but the three historical documents, The
Shanghai Communique (1972), the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and
the Six Assurances (1982). The three documents constitute the guiding
principles in regulating the triangle relations and today they are still valid
to U.S. foreign policymakers.
In 1979, Deng Xiaoping had a state visit to the U.S. and speeded
up the process of engagement and cooperation between the two coun-
tries. China–U.S. relations during the ten years between 1979 and 1989
developed smoothly largely due to Deng’s “low profile” foreign policy,

14 Shia-ling Liu, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Communist China in the 1970’s, the Misad-
ventures of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter (Taipei: Kuan Lu Publishing, 1988),
pp. 31–32.
20 J. ZHOU

American wishful intention and market demand. After Deng implemented

the reform and open-up policy, the Chinese economy kept the fastest
growth rate in the subsequent three decades. China improved the living
standard of the Chinese people and began to accept Western cultures.
When Chinese people became rich, they began to demand democracy
and freedom. In the spring of 1989, hundreds of thousands of people
marched on the street in Beijing to protest corruption and demand
democracy for 54 days. The massive protests imposed serious challenges
to the CCP, and the CCP clearly saw a great political threat derived
from the implementation of the economic reform and open-door policy.
Thus, Deng was determined to adhere to his communist belief to keep
the one-party system: limiting the reform movement to the economic
area and suppressing political liberalization. Deng ordered the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to crack down on the demonstration by killing
many innocent people, known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre of
1989. According to newly released UK documents, the PLA killed at
least 10,000 protesters during the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989.15 The
U.S. and its allies immediately put sanctions on Beijing in response to the
Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989.
Facing the mountain pressures from the West, Chinese leaders
appeared anxious to assure smooth China–U.S. relations. Both sides put
the normalized relations between the two nations on the top priority
of their foreign policy agenda. The relationship between the two coun-
tries gradually came back onto a normal track after Deng re-affirmed
that China would continue to carry out the reform and open-up policy
during his south investigation tour to Shenzhen in 1992. The Bush
Administration spent its four years from 1989 to 1992, attempting to
maintain China–U.S. relations and implement the engagement policy
with China regardless of mounting congressional opposition. Former
President Clinton also came to favor a policy of engagement with
the “One-China policy” and divorced U.S. trade from China’s human
rights violations, although a group of conservative members of Congress
felt that Clinton’s policy of “strategic engagement” betrayed American
interests in the growing threat of China.16

15 “Tiananmen Square Protest Death Toll Was 10,000,” BBC News, December 23,
2017.
16 William Callahan, “How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of
Being a Rising Power,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 31 (2005), p. 705.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 21

Status of China–U.S. Relations

The status of the China–U.S. relationship has changed from time to time
driven by domestic politics and global great power competition. China
and the U.S. had an unequal relationship before the ROC, a friendly
relationship during the ROC, and a confrontational relationship in the
first 20-year of the PRC. After Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972, China–
U.S. relations began a transition from confrontation to normalization
and engagement. Before the September 11 attacks, the U.S. had both
positive and uneasy relations with China. Sometimes, China–U.S. rela-
tions were very shaky due to disruptive incidents that contributed to the
instability of China–U.S. relations, such as the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait
Crisis. When Taiwan was under the Lee Teng-hui administration, China
believed Taiwan was moving away from the one-China policy, so China
launched a series of missiles in the waters surrounding Taiwan between
July 1995 and March 1996, attempting to warn Lee and influence the
1996 presidential election of Taiwan. Bill Clinton deployed a carrier battle
group to international waters near Taiwan and stopped China’s military
threat to the regional instability.17 On May 7, 1999, NATO bombed
the PRC’s embassy in Belgrade because allegedly the U.S. discovered
that the embassy was used to transmit Yugoslav army communications.
The incident triggered Chinese protests surrounding the U.S. embassies
in China. The Chinese government issued a statement condemning the
U.S.’ “barbarian act.”18 Another incident was the collision between a
U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese naval F-8 fighter over
the South China Sea in April 2001. After the colliding incident, the U.S.
plane made an emergency landing on the Hainan Island, and 24 crew
members of the U.S. plane were detained by the PLA. Although the U.S.
and China disagreed on the cause of the incident, the crew members were
released after Washington issued an “apology.” According to a Congres-
sional Report, this incident “is the third in a series of major troubling
difficulties since the mid-1990s that could have serious implications for

17 Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Forgotten Showdown Between
China and America,” The National Interest, March 10, 2017.
18 Quoted in Andrew Glass, “Bill Clinton Apologizes to Jiang Zemin for NATO
Bombing, May 14, 1999,” Politico, May 14, 2013.
22 J. ZHOU

U.S.–PRC relations.”19 All these incidents created difficult moments for

the two nations to make a compromise.
The September 11 attacks blurred the ideological distinctions between
the democratic U.S. and the communist China, as the U.S. needed
China’s help in the global war on terror. Under these circumstances, the
two countries deepened further cooperation in economy, trade, educa-
tion, culture, and military, so the U.S. relatively spent less effort in
countering China’s rise before 2010 while investing enormous financial
and human resources in Iraq and Afghanistan, which greatly helped speed
up China’s rise because China could have less international disruption
but focus on the development of the Chinese economy to modernize its
country. As a result, the two countries went in two opposite directions.
On the one hand, the U.S. deployed its troops to Afghanistan and the
Middle East for the 20-year war until the Biden administration brought
America’s longest war to an end in August 2021. According to researchers
at Brown University, “the U.S. has spent $5.8 trillion on the war in
Afghanistan and other conflicts stemming from September 11, 2001.”20
This figure does not include funds that the government is required to
spend on lifetime care for American veterans of this war and the interest
payments on money borrowed to fund the war. In addition, 243,000
people have died as a direct result of this war. More importantly, the war
disrupted the American domestic agenda and diverted U.S. attention to
China’s rise and challenges. On the other hand, the 10-year period was
indeed China’s best opportunity to renovate its nation and catch up with
developed countries. China’s comprehensive power reached a new height
and China became the second world’s largest economy in 2010. China’s
total GDP jumped from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to 17.7 trillion in 2021.
While the U.S. was fighting wars, China was busy developing its economy
and building up military power. China grew into a global power as the
U.S. was in the quagmire of the war.21 The U.S. made a huge mistake
to focus on the war on terror. The U.S.’ mistake was a huge geopolitical

19 Shirley A. Kan, et, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments
and Policy Implications,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress, 2001.
20 Deirdre Shesgreen, “War Rarely Goes as Planned: New Report Tallies Trillions US
Spent in Afghanistan,” USA Today, September 1, 2021.
21 Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy
(New York: PublicAffairs), 2020.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 23

gift to China. The game changed after a ten-year war on terror. China
began to challenge the U.S. global leadership. Elizabeth Economy has
observed that “Beijing began to question the value of engagement as
defined largely by the United States as early as 2008. The global financial
crisis and seeming collapse of the U.S. economy marked a turning point
for many Chinese, who no longer considered the United States’ system
as worthy of emulation.”22
When the U.S. reached the basic goal of the war on terror and saw the
shift of global power in China’s favor, it began to shift its national security
strategy to the Pivot to Asia by gradually withdrawing its military troops
from Iraq and Afghanistan. As early as 2011, former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton pointed out that the Asia–Pacific region was eager for
American leadership and business more than any time in modern history
and she promised that the U.S. will “lock in a substantially increased
investment –diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia–
Pacific region.”23 According to her, the U.S. will take six key lines of
action: strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening working rela-
tionships with emerging powers, including China, engaging with regional
multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-
based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. The
U.S. also announced that it would deploy about 60% of its navy force
in the Asia–Pacific region and deploy littoral combat ships to Singapore,
station American military troops in Australia, and increase U.S. opera-
tional access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Clinton
believed that the “Pivot to Asia” policy would affect every country and
corner of the Asia–Pacific region by using any necessary means, including
deploying the highest-ranking officials, development experts, interagency
teams, and permanent assets.24
The Pivot to Asia policy has helped to maintain regional stability by
checking and balancing regional powers, especially countering China’s
fast military build-up. The region has become a key driver of global
economy, trade, and politics as it spans two oceans, the Pacific and the
Indian oceans, which are increasingly linked by global shipping, making

22 Elizabeth Economy, “Reimagining Engagement,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.-

China Relations in the 21st Century, edited by Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price
(Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute, 2020), pp. 41–52.
23 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011.
24 Ibid.
24 J. ZHOU

the strategic location critical for the U.S. and the global community.
About half the world’s population lives in the Asia–Pacific and many of the
world’s major economies are located in this area. Some major U.S. allies
are also located in this region, including Japan, South Korea, Australia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. The region will most likely become the
center of the global market in the near future. The Obama administra-
tion believed that it is necessary to implement the Pivot to Asia to balance
global power and maintain regional peace and development. The major
purpose for the U.S. to return to the Asia–Pacific region is not to contain
China’s rise, but to balance the power between China and the U.S. and
other Asian countries, while China believes that the Pivot to Asia is about
China. Objectively, the Pivot to Asia has intensified the mistrust between
China and the U.S.25 Both Chinese and American military strategists
are formulating detailed plans on how to win potential conflicts in the
region.26
As China increasingly expanded its global influence, it began to debate
on whether it should shift from the low profile strategy to a new strategy
of striving for achievement and then to “show more efficiency in shaping
a favorable environment for China’s national rejuvenation.”27 When Xi
Jinping came to power in 2012, many IR scholars around the world
predicted Xi would not depart away from Deng’s low profile foreign
policy but expected him to further open and reform toward domestic
political liberalization and international democracy. Western societies put
great hope him at that time.28 Nine years after his governance, all posi-
tive views of him have proved to be false and all of the expectations are
wishful thinking. The U.S. and the West expected a Chinese version of
Mihail Gorbachev to be the top leader of China, but it did not happen.
Xi’s worldview is rooted in classic Marxism and Maoism and believes that
the communist empire will eventually prevail and Western hegemony will

25 Hugh White, “America’s China Dilemma,” Lowy Institute for International Policy,
December 12, 2012.
26 David C. Gompert, and Terrence K. Kelly, “U.S., China and an Unthinkable War,
Both Have Planned for a Conflict They Hope to Avoid,” Los Angeles Times, August 26,
2013.
27 Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” The
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153–184.
28 Jinghao Zhou, “Xi Won’t Change,” The National Interest, March 26, 2013.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 25

come to an end.29 Xi has pointed out that the East is on the rise while the
West declining when he assessed the global power structure. Both time
and momentum are on China’s side.30 He encourages young Chinese
can “stand tall and feel proud” when they go abroad.31 To reach his
communist goal, he has mobilized a massive movement to promote the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation—China Dream: to become a well-
off society by 2021 and fulfill the goal of the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation by 2049. His foreign policy goal is clear—to become the
regional power as a springboard and replace U.S. global position even-
tually. Xi’s China dream fundamentally conflicts with the international
order and confronts American vital interests. This is one of the reasons
explaining why China–U.S. relations have entered a dangerous period.
Under the Obama administration, although China and the U.S. agreed
to use an ambiguous term—neither-friend-nor-enemy—for describing the
status of China–U.S. relations, the Obama administration continued to
claim that China–U.S. bilateral relations are the world’s most impor-
tant after China became the world’s third-largest economy in 2008.32
During Obama’s four-day state visit to China in November 2009, China
and the U.S. signed a joint statement and reached an agreement to
advance China–U.S. relations in the new era. The Joint Press Statement,
signed by the U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu
Jintao, agreed to continue to adopt a strategic and long-term perspec-
tive, increase dialogue exchanges and cooperation, and work together to
build a positive and cooperative China–U.S. relationship for the twenty-
first century. They reaffirmed that “the China–U.S. relationship is very
important. To preserve and promote the growth of this relationship is

29 Jeffrey A. Bader, “How Xi Jinping Sees the World…and Why,” Foreign Policy at
Brookings, 2016. Robert D. Blackwill, and Curt M. Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global
Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful But Exposed Leader,” Council on Foreign
Relations, February 2016, p. 16.
30 “陈一新传达研讨班精神: ‘东升西降’是趋势 发展态势对我有利,” Chen Yixin
Conveyed the Spirit of the Seminar: ‘East Rises and West Falls’ Is the Trend, the
Development Trend is Good for us,” https://finance.sina.com.cn/china/2021-01-15/
doc-ikftssan6460145.shtml.
31 William Zheng, “China’s Officials Play Up ‘Rise of the East, Decline of the West,’”
South China Morning Post, March 9, 2021.
32 Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-US Relations,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 3 (2010), p. 270.
26 J. ZHOU

a shared responsibility for both China and the U.S.”33 Some scholars
suggested that the China–U.S. relationship at that time was a superfi-
cial one because there were many serious conflicts and many potential
crises between the two countries behind scenes. Nevertheless, this super-
ficial relationship was better than antagonistic attitudes toward each other.
The U.S. kept the rosy superficial relations with China until the Trump
administration.
Driven by “a judgment that the past trajectory of the bilateral relation-
ship favored China and disadvantaged the U.S. in a long-run competition
for global leadership,” the Trump administration began to change its
course in China–U.S. relations.34 The Trump administration viewed
China as a strategic competitor as it believed that China challenged
the U.S. global leadership and wanted to rewrite the U.S.-led interna-
tional order.35 U.S. official reports, including the 2017 National Security
Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 National
Military Strategy, have made it clear that China challenges American
power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security
and prosperity. China is “a strategic competitor” and both “China and
Russia are now undermining the international order.”36 According to
RAND’s report, a growing range of threats to the postwar international
order is from aggressive revisionist powers.37 China represents the world’s
largest revisionist power. Although it is still debatable whether China is
the enemy of the U.S., it is safe to say that the biggest challenge to the
U.S. is China. A report released by the U.S. Study Center at the Univer-
sity of Sydney in Australia, warns that the U.S. military is no longer the
primary force in Asia, and it would fail to defend its allies because the
current Chinese military force could destroy U.S. bases in the region

33 The White House, “Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu of
China,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009.
34 David Dollar, Ryan Hass, and Jeffrey Bader, “Assessing U.S.-China Relations 2 Years
Into the Trump Presidency,” Brookings, January 15, 2019.
35 Baijia Zhang, “Understanding Changes in Sino-U.S. Relations From A Historical
Perspective,” China International Strategy Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2020), p. 3.
36 “The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America of 2018”.
37 Michael Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos,
Understanding the Current International Order (RAND Cooperation, 2016), pp. 1–61.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 27

within hours.38 The 2020 U.S. Strategic Approach to the PRC points
out that China poses serious challenges to U.S. interests, including chal-
lenges to the U.S. economy, values, and military. According to the 2020
Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, Military and Secu-
rity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the PLA’s
objective is to become a world-class military by the end of 2049.39 It
can be argued that Trump’s Asia policy is a continuation of the “Asia
Pivot,” but Trump’s approach is broader and confrontational and includes
significant military and security components as well.40
More importantly, the Trump administration believed that the U.S.
and Chinese aspirations are fundamentally incompatible without overlap-
ping interests. Some even advocate confrontation with Beijing although
they did not go that far to advocate total or substantial disengage-
ment from China.41 Under the Trump administration, the two govern-
ments almost totally cut off official U.S.–China communications and
embraced competitive—even hostile—rhetoric from both the Chinese
Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Department of State.42
The relationship between China and the U.S. has hit even a lower
point since Biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the U.S. in
January 2021, although Joe Biden seriously attacked Trump’s China
policy when he ran his presidential campaign. At his first press confer-
ence in March of 2021, Biden said that China wants to “become the
leading country in the world, the wealthiest country in the world, and
the most powerful country in the world.” He promised that China’s goal
is “not going to happen on my watch.”43 The Biden administration has

38 Brad Ledon, “China Could Overwhelm US Military in Asia in Hours, Australian

Report Says,” CNN, August 20, 2019.
39 “Trump Administration, U.S. Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic of
China,” May 20, 2020.
40 Premesha Saha, “From ‘Pivot to Asia’ to Trump’s ARIA: What Drives the US’
Current Asia Policy?” ORF Occasional Paper, February 2020.
41 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-China Relations: Is It Time to End the Engagement,” Foreign
Policy at Brookings, September 2018.
42 Tiffany Barron, Rorry Daniels, M. Patrick Hulme, Daniel Jasper, Craig Kafura and
Kacie Miura, “Engagement Revisited: Progress Made and Lessons Learned From the
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy,
2021.
43 “President Joe Biden First White House Press Conference Transcript March 25,”
March 2021.
28 J. ZHOU

extended tariff exclusion on Chinese medical products, sanctioned China

over alleged Xinjiang human rights violation, blacklisted more than 20
Chinese companies including Huawei, pledged to strengthen alliance to
counter China’s rise, U.S. Senate passed the Innovation and Competition
Act of 2021 to compete with China, and the U.S. announced diplomats
officials to boycott Beijing Olympics.44 In addition, the U.S. had joint
military excises with Japan, Australia, India, and European countries in
international waters near the South China Sea and Taiwan.
Although American politics is deeply divided, the majority of repub-
licans and democrats have unfavorable views of China. The 2021 U.S.
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance signed by Joe Biden reflects
U.S. public opinions and claims that China has rapidly become more
assertive and “is the only competitor potentially capable of combining
its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”45 Mean-
while, the Biden administration has tried to maintain China–U.S. relations
at a manageable level. U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan asserted
that the stiff competition between China and the U.S. does not have
to turn into a new cold war.46 Nevertheless, more and more Americans
believe the eventual conflict between the two nations is inevitable despite
the promise of a peaceful rise made by the CCP.47 The current China–
U.S. relations are moving ever closer to a new cold war. The Ukraine and
Russia war once again clearly shows China’s pro-Russia and anti-America
stance. It would continue to hurt U.S. global power if the U.S. continued
the previous engagement policy regardless of its good intention.

44 “US-China Relations in the Biden Era: A Timeline,” China Briefing, December 8,

2021.
45 Joseph Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House,
March 2021.
46 Kirsty Needham, “Rivalry with China in Pacific Need Not Lead to New Cold War,
Says U.S. Security Advisor,” Reuters, November 11, 2021.
47 Susan Lawrence, and Thomas Lum, “U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues: CRS
Report for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 2011.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 29

U.S. Engagement Strategy Failed Inevitably

Regardless of how U.S.–China relations are defined, the reality is that
the relationship between China and the U.S. has reached the lowest
point since the U.S. normalized its relations with China in 1979. China’s
global ambition is determined and unstoppable. In the U.S. a perceiv-
able mood of frustration and disappointment with China is pervasive.48
Why did China–U.S. relations turn around a circle from confrontation to
engagement and from the engagement to the overall competition? There
are various explanations for the question: The confrontation is unavoid-
able during the power transition between the rising power and dominant
power; the shrinking national power gap between the two nations has
created the anxieties of Americans about the rising power; the ideological
and political differences have fueled the confrontation; and the mutual
unfavorable perceptions have influenced two countries’ foreign policy.
Also, both countries have focused on the domestic forces “that might
have made mutual accommodation difficult and they have emphasized
each side’s judgment of the other’s intentions which could escalate the
tension between the two nations.”49 Many observers believe that the rela-
tionship between the two countries has been permanently damaged over
the past decade.50 All these explanations are helpful in addressing the
question of what went wrong with U.S. foreign policy toward China, but
it is still necessary further understand why the U.S. engagement strategy
failed to reach its intended goal. There has been a bipartisan consensus
that the assumptions of the U.S. engagement policy with China were
flawed and the U.S. failed to reach the expected goals. If this argument
is valid, in what sense did the engagement policy fail? Did the policy fail
from the outset?
First, it was the U.S. that made an initial move to change its relations
with the PRC in 1972. The U.S. decided to open itself to China, not the

48 Barry Naughton, “A Perspective on Chinese Economics: What Have We Learned?

What Did We Fail to Anticipate?” in Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American
Relations, edited by Anne F. Thurston (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).
49 James B. Steinberg, “What Went Wrong? U.S.-China Relations from Tiananmen to
Trump,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3 (2019/2020), pp. 119–133.
50 Baijia Zhang, “Understanding Changes in Sino-U.S. Relations From a Historical
Perspective,” China International Strategy Review, Vol 2, pp. 1–13.
30 J. ZHOU

other way around.51 The Nixon trip to Beijing was the historical water-
shed of China–U.S. relations. In the historical context, it is necessary and
wise for the Nixon administration to begin the transition to implementa-
tion of engagement policy with China in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon
suggested that the U.S. needed to look beyond Vietnam and argued that
“We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of
nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbors. The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our aim,
to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change.”52
His initial move met the common national interest of China and the U.S.
when the two countries worked together against the Soviet Union in
the 1970s because both countries had strategic reasons to justify Nixon’s
historic trip. After the Vietnam War broke out in 1955, the U.S. was
the main supporter of South Vietnam while China and the Soviet Union
were the main supporters of North Vietnam. The 16-year war significantly
weakened the U.S. power in the Cold War and needed to get out of the
war to strengthen its global power by defusing the confrontation with
China. At that time, China split with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s,
had the Treasure Island Self-defense War with the Soviet Union in 1969,
and a military standoff between the two countries over a thousand-mile
border. The Soviet Union even intended to destroy China with nuclear
weapons. Under these circumstances, the U.S. believed that it was an
opportunity for the U.S. to work with China against the Soviet Union
in order to win the Cold War. In this sense, Nixon foresaw America’s
“Pivot to the Asia–Pacific more than 40 years before it occurred.”53 At
that time, China also felt it urgent to improve China–U.S. relations to
survive in the international society. David Barboza, the special assistant
to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and a member of the dele-
gation of Kissinger’s secret trip to China in 1971, believes that the trip
was “the most consequential foreign policy event of the Nixon presidency
and one of a handful of geopolitical earthquakes in the last half of the
twentieth century, which made an arrangement of Nixon’s trip to Beijing

51 Jonathan Holslag, “Self-Betrayal: How the West Failed to Respond to China’s Rise,”
International Spectator, May 21, 2021.
52 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs, October 1967.
53 Francis P. Sempa, “Richard Nixon’s Asian Prophecy,” The Diplomat, December 20,
2019.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 31

and changed the great power competition between the Washington and
Moscow and Beijing that enabled the U.S. to be capable of acting boldly
on the world stage.”54 In this sense, Nixon’s original intention of the trip
was to work with China to counter the common enemy of the former
Soviet Union. To be sure, his trip produced positive outcome that not
only changed the U.S., China, and the world but also laid the framework
for normalizing China–U.S. relations, which allowed both China and the
U.S. to develop steadily in the following years.
Second, Nixon’s dramatic policy shift paved a way for his successors
to implement a comprehensive engagement strategy because three objec-
tives were behind his policy shift: The U.S. believed that the new policy
would help to open the Chinese market to the U.S., bring great benefits
and choices to the Chinese people, and shape China’s future by helping
China’s political liberalization through accepting the international order
and norms.55 The three objectives were supported by the two assump-
tions: A stable and prosperous China would serve the interests of the
U.S., but a weak and insecure China is likely to pose risks to the U.S.
and its allies. The U.S. should welcome a prosperous China rather than
resist China’s rise. The second part of the assumption is that if China
becomes more prosperous, it will increasingly share American values and
move closer to the current international order.56 The Nixon adminis-
tration did not have a chance to develop a comprehensive engagement
strategy and implement it even though the administration had its objec-
tives. After the U.S. changed its course of China–U.S. relations under
the Trump administration, the first part of America’s assumption is still
valid, but today’s reality seems farther away from the second part of
the assumption. The direction of China’s development has completely
deviated from the track the U.S. expected. China has not committed to

54 David Barboza, “Winston Lord on the Geopolitical Earthquake’s of Kissinger’s Secret

Visit,” The Wire China, July 11, 2021.
55 Deborah McCarthy, “Us-China Economic Relations: From Engagement to Compe-
tition,” in Great Power Competition and The Rising US-China Rivalry, edited by Bart
Gaens and Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2020), p.182.
56 See Hugh White, “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,”
Lowy Institute, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/lowy_institute_extract_-_
the_china_choice.pdf; and Charles L. Glaser, “Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,”
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School, Policy Brief,
2015).
32 J. ZHOU

reforming the political system leading toward the post-war liberal inter-
national order, nor has China followed the international order even in
the trade areas. China’s economic development has directly advanced
China’s science, technology, and military modernization, and increased
Chinese positions in the international system. All of these have empow-
ered China to challenge the American global dominant position. Not
only did China fail to accept universal values at home and the status
quo abroad, but it also became more ambitious when it was on the
rise. However, it is not because the second core assumption is wrong
but because China’s prosperous economy does not automatically produce
the country’s democratization. The engagement policy neither created
“a Chinese commitment to the U.S.-dominated liberal order,” nor did
change the Chinese political system and bring China closer to democra-
tization. In this sense, the engagement is dead.57 The U.S. should not
have such an assumption in the first place. Elizabeth Economy put it
in this way: “engagement has failed only if we believe a set of mistaken
assumptions: that the United States had the power to determine how
China would turn out, [and] that China and Chinese society have not
been positively affected by the country’s integration into the international
community.”58
Third, the U.S. overestimated its influence on China’s political liber-
alization and was too slow to understand the trajectory of China’s rise
while the CCP steered China’s development in the opposite direction the
U.S. expected. Although the U.S. correctly assumed that marketization
and institutional reform would generate China’s great potential and move
closer to Western democracy, they were unable to foresee that the changes
helped China become an economic superpower quickly. The U.S. is too
slow to understand China’s turn away from the market-oriented reform
and returned to classic Maoism. The U.S. underestimated the role and
importance of the demographic dividend, failed to foresee the significant
impetus of the high-tech revolution to China’s rise, and failed to under-
stand the considerable negative impact of China’s global expansion on

57 Orville Schell, “The Death of Engagement The Policy of “Engagement” Has Defined
U.S.-China Relations for Almost a Half Century: It Didn’t Have to End This Way,” The
Wire China, June 7, 2020.
58 Elizabeth Economy, “Reimagining Engagement,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.-
China Relations in the 21st Century, edited by Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price
(Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2020).
Another random document with
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folded it, put it in its envelope, and fastened a look that a basilisk
might have envied, on her companion.
Glancing up from her novel with a frank fearless countenance, she
encountered Miss Fane’s cold gray eyes critically surveying her, over
the top of her tortoiseshell pince-nez. To describe Miss Fane more
particularly, she was a prim, dignified, elderly lady, seated bolt
upright on the most uncompromising chair in the room. She had well-
cut aristocratic features; a high arrogant-looking nose; rather a
spiteful mouth; iron-gray sausage curls, carefully arranged on either
temple, and surmounted by a sensibly sedate cap. A very handsome
brown silk dress, as stiff as herself, completed her costume.
Not being overburdened with this world’s goods, owing to the
failure of a bank in which most of her fortune had been invested, she
had accepted a very handsome allowance and the post of chaperon
to her nephew’s ward. If she could have had this immense increase
to her income without the ward, so much the better; girls were not to
her taste, but though narrow-minded, frigid, and intensely selfish,
she was strictly conscientious, according to her lights, and was
thoroughly prepared to do her duty by her young companion.
“Alice,” she said, glancing from Alice to the note she held in her
hand, and then back again with an air of hesitation, “I have just
heard from my nephew, your guardian, you know. He expects to
leave India immediately; and if the Euphrates stops here for coaling,
he says he will come and look us up. Would you like to read his
letter? Perhaps I ought not to show it to you; but it will give you some
idea of the kind of young man he is.”
“Thank you,” replied his ward, stretching out a slim ready hand; “if
you really think I may, Miss Fane,” she added interrogatively,
whereupon Miss Fane handed her her nephew’s effusion, which ran
as follows:
“Cheetapore.
“My dear Aunt Mary,
“I got your last letter all right. I did not answer it at once as I
had nothing to say, and am no scribe at the best of times. I
 quite agree with you, that you had much better take entire
charge of Miss Saville now she has left school; but why not
have kept her there another year or two? Your suggestion is
excellent, and you will make a much more fitting guardian
than my unworthy self. I do not know what on earth I should
have done with her if you had not come to the rescue. I
cannot imagine what possessed my father to leave me, of all
people, guardian to a girl. Of course I shall look after her
money affairs, etc., but I hope you will take her off my hands
completely. No doubt she will marry soon, as you say she is
pretty, and if the parti is anything like a decent fellow, and
comes up to the mark in the way of settlements, you may take
my consent for granted—I shall say: ‘Bless you, my children,’
with unmixed satisfaction. I am bringing you some shawls,
curios, etc., to make amends for my shortcomings as a
correspondent. We sail from Bombay on the twenty-second,
and if we coal at Malta I shall look you up. What in the world
took you there? It strikes me you are becoming a regular
‘globetrotter’ in your old age.
“Your affectionate Nephew,
“R. M. Fairfax.”
“What a funny letter, or note rather!” exclaimed Alice; “only two
sides of the paper. The Fifth Hussars have a very pretty crest; and
what a good hand he writes! He certainly seems very anxious to get
rid of me, does he not, Miss Fane? I am afraid I am a great infliction,”
she added, colouring, “but I will do my best to trouble him as little as
possible.”
“I will make you a much more suitable guardian,” returned Miss
Fane complacently. “I do not know what my brother-in-law could
have been dreaming about when he made his will. Poor man! he
naturally thought he had yet many years to live, and never
contemplated your having such a preposterously young guardian.
Reginald cares for nothing beyond his profession—horses, racing,
and men’s society. My brother-in-law spoiled him as a boy, and
allowed him his own way completely, though I believe he was a good
son and very much attached to his father. Greville was a weak-
minded man,” she pursued, shaking her head reflectively, “governed
first by his wife and then by his son. Reginald has always been his
own master, and is headstrong and overbearing to the last degree.”
“You don’t like him, Miss Fane?” inquired Alice, slightly raising her
eyebrows.
“Ah well!” hesitatingly, “I don’t exactly say that; I have seen so little
of him since he was a boy; and then he was, without exception, the
most troublesome, mischievous, impudent urchin I ever came
across; always in trouble, falling out of trees, or downstairs, or off his
pony, playing practical jokes, fighting the gardener’s big boys, riding
his father’s hunters on the sly. He kept everyone in hot water. I spent
six months at Looton, and added six years to my life,” concluded
Miss Fane, nodding her head with much solemnity.
The truth was, Miss Fane had gone to Looton on a very long visit,
with the intention of remaining permanently as virtual mistress. Her
easy-going brother-in-law would have made no objection, but her
impish nephew immediately saw through her object, and made her
life unbearable. His practical jokes were chiefly at her expense, and
the way in which he teased her beloved poodle was simply
intolerable. She had to give up her intention of remaining, and leave
what she had fully intended to have been a most luxurious home.
This she had never forgotten, nor forgiven; her feelings on the
subject had been stifled, but they smouldered. She never cared for
her nephew—never would; he was far too like his mother—her
handsome stepsister—whom she had detested with all her heart.
Nevertheless, she found it to her advantage to be on apparently
good terms with her liberal and wealthy relative, who had not the
remotest idea of the real feelings his aunt secretly cherished towards
him.

About a week later the Euphrates came into Malta, late one
evening. Miss Fane and the Lee-Dormers were dining at the
Governor’s; Alice, not being “out,” had tea solus at home.
 Time hung heavily on her hands; her book was stupid, she was
not in the humour for music, and it was too early to go to bed.
Opening the window, she stepped out on the balcony that ran all
round the house and overlooked the courtyard. Here she remained
for a long time, her chin resting on her hand, indulging in a day-
dream—“in maiden meditation, fancy free.” The air was laden with
the perfume of twenty different flowers; but the fragrant orange-trees
in their tubs down below overpowered all.
“How delicious!” said Alice to herself, sniffing the air. “If I am ever
married—which is not very likely—I shall have a wreath of real
orange-blossoms, always supposing I can get them.”
Presently she turned her attention to the stars, and endeavoured
to make out some of the constellations, not very successfully, it must
be confessed. She listened to the distant driving through Valetta.
“Belated sightseers returning to their steamers,” she thought.
Just then a carriage drove rapidly into their quiet street, and
seemed to stop close by.
“It can’t be Miss Fane come home already; they are barely at
coffee yet,” she mentally remarked, as she settled herself for another
reverie.
After a while, feeling rather chilly, she pushed open the window
and stepped back into the sitting-room. For a moment the light
dazzled her eyes. That moment past, what was her amazement to
find a handsome young man, in undress cavalry uniform, standing
on the rug with his back to the fire!
The surprise was apparently mutual. However, he at once came
forward and said:
“Miss Saville, I am sure. The servant said my aunt was out, but
that you were at home. As the room was empty, I concluded you had
gone to bed.”
“When did you arrive?” she asked, offering her hand.
“We came in about two hours ago, and are going to coal all night
—a most detestable but necessary performance.”
 “Have you been here long?” was her next question, as she seated
herself near the table.
“About twenty minutes. I have been enjoying this English-looking
fire immensely. You must have found it rather chilly in the verandah, I
should say.”
A thought flitted through his mind—“Was there a Romeo to this
lovely Juliet?” He looked down at her with a quick keen glance. No;
the idea was absurd.
“What were you doing out there this cool evening?” he added.
“Nothing,” she replied shyly. She could not bring herself to tell this
brilliant stranger that she had been simply star-gazing.
“A regular bread-and-butter miss,” he thought, as he pulled his
moustache with a leisurely patronising look.
Bread-and-butter or not, she was an extremely pretty girl, and his
ward. The idea tickled him immensely. He put his hand before his
mouth to conceal an involuntary smile.
“Vernon or Harcourt would give a good deal to be in my shoes, I
fancy,” he said to himself, as he took a seat at the opposite side of
the table from his charge.
Alice having mastered her first astonishment, felt that it behoved
her to make some attempt at conversation, and to endeavour to
entertain this unexpected guest, pending Miss Fane’s return. She
offered him refreshments, coffee, etc., which he declined, having
dined previously to coming on shore. With small-talk, Maltese curios,
and the never-failing topic—weather, she managed to while away the
time. At first her voice was very low, as it always was when she was
nervous or embarrassed, but she soon recovered herself, and
played the part of hostess in a manner that astonished the man who,
half-an-hour before, had called her (mentally) “a bread-and-butter
miss.” Seven years on the Continent had given her at least easy
polished manners. She had none of the gaucherie so common to an
English girl of her own age, brought up exclusively at home. It
seemed to her that Sir Reginald was shy!—he sat opposite to her
playing with a paperknife, and by no means properly supporting his
share of the conversation. Her good-natured efforts amused him
prodigiously. He was sufficiently sharp to see that she thought him
bashful and diffident, whereas he was only lazy; he preferred to
allow ladies, whenever they were good enough to talk to him, to
carry on the most of the conversation, a few monosyllables, and his
eloquent dark eyes, contributing his share. Poor deluded Alice! she
little knew that the apparently diffident young man was the life and
soul of his mess, and that shyness was unknown to him (except by
name) since he had been out of his nurse’s arms.
Conversation presently became somewhat brisker; they
exchanged experiences of Germany and India. They discussed
books, horses, and music, and at the end of an hour Alice felt as if
she had known him for at least a year. Certainly they had made as
much progress in each other’s confidence as if they had gone
through a London season together, when a few brief utterances are
gasped between the pauses in a waltz, or whispered on the stairs, or
interrupted by some spoil-sport in the Row.
As for Reginald, he not only felt completely at home, but, what was
worse, most thoroughly bewitched.
“I’m never going to be so mad as to lose my head about this
grown-up child, am I?” he indignantly asked himself. “I who have
hitherto been invulnerable, as far as the tender passion is
concerned. No! not likely. If I can’t face a pretty girl without
immediately feeling smitten, the sooner I renounce the whole sex the
better.”
Whilst he was thinking thus, he was to all appearance immersed in
a series of views of Rome and Florence, and listening to a
description of palaces, churches, and tombs.
There was not the slightest soupçon of a flirtation between this
couple. Sir Reginald talked to his ward as he would to his
grandmother, and there was a look in her clear deep gray eyes that
would have abashed the most thorough-paced male flirt in
Christendom—which he was very far from being—a look half of
childish innocence, half of newly-awakened maiden dignity—
 Standing where the rivers meet,
Womanhood and childhood sweet.

Miss Fane duly returned, and accorded her nephew a warm

welcome and a kiss, which he very reluctantly received, for she had
also a moustache! She treated him besides to a most recherché little
supper, and at twelve o’clock he took his departure, faithfully
promising to look them out a suitable house in London, and with an
uneasy conviction that he had met his fate.

I need scarcely tell the astute reader that the acquaintance thus
formed shortly ripened into something else: a few dances—a few
rides in the Row—a water-party—the Cup-day at Ascot—finally a
moonlight picnic, and the thing was settled.
Before the end of the season the following announcement
appeared in The Times:
“On the 25th inst., at St. George’s, Hanover Square, by the
Lord Bishop of Bermuda, assisted by the Rev. H. Fane, Sir
Reginald Mostyn Fairfax, Bart., Captain Fifth Hussars, of
Looton Park, Bordershire, to Alice Eveleen, only child of the
late Major-General Saville.”
Sir Reginald expressed his intention of retiring, much to the
disgust of his brother-officers, who said they thought Fairfax was the
last man who would have married and left them. “You of all people
too! After the way you used to be down on other fellows who fell in
love, or got married—it’s perfectly shameful! You were actually the
means of nipping several very promising affairs in the bud, and now
you are going to get married yourself. What excuse have you to
make?” cried an indignant hussar.
“I say,” replied Sir Reginald complacently, “‘that he jests at scars
who never felt a wound.’ That was my case. Now I’m a reformed
character.”
 But when at the drawing-room, the opera, and elsewhere, the Fifth
saw the future Lady Fairfax, even the most hardened bachelor
among them frankly admitted that “Rex,” as they called him, had a
very fair excuse.
After their honeymoon the Fairfaxes went down to Looton, where
they were considered the handsomest and happiest couple within
three counties.
 CHAPTER III.
LOOTON PARK.

Looton is a large, ugly, uncomfortable old place, similar to

hundreds of others scattered over the British isles. No one knows
exactly when it was built, but everyone is aware that it is surrounded
by the very best land in Bordershire. The house stands in a large
well-timbered park, and is approached by two avenues from opposite
directions.
Seated at the library-table, with his elbows well squared, a young
man of about one-and-twenty is dashing off a letter. He is Geoffrey
Saville, first cousin to Lady Fairfax, and has lately joined the Fifth
Hussars—so lately that he is still doing riding-school, from which a
fortnight’s visit to Looton has afforded him temporary emancipation.
He is a slim, bright-eyed, loose-limbed boy, with small impudent
hazel eyes, an aristocratic nose, and light-brown hair, of which one
utterly unreasonable lock always sticks up on the top of his head,
cut, and comb, and oil as he will. He is possessed of the highest of
spirits, the best of appetites, and unlimited assurance. He is gay,
gentlemanly, and generous, and swears by his new cousin, but old
friend, Sir Reginald Fairfax.
Here is his letter:
“My dear Nobbs,
“I promised to send you a line to let you know how I was
getting on. Rex and Alice make no end of a good host and
hostess; the feeding is superior, and as to horses, I am ‘all
found.’ Rex mounts me as he mounts himself, and I take it out
of his cattle fairly.
“We have had two or three good runs with the R. B. H. and
Overstones, especially last Tuesday; found at Heplow—(you
don’t know where that is, but never mind)—and ran to
Clumber, a distance of eight miles as the crow flies, with only
one slight check. The pace was prime, the grief awful. The
fields were large and airy, but some of the fences, notably the
bullfinches, were real raspers. The finish was highly select—
Alice, Reginald, two cavalry men, a parson, the huntsman,
and yours obediently. Alice goes like a bird; and in a neat
double-breasted brown habit and pot-hat to match, and
mounted on a clipping bay thoroughbred, looks very ‘fit’
indeed. Rex pilots her, and they make a very fair average
example of the field. You know what a customer he is. She
follows him as if she had a spare neck in her pocket, and
charges wood and water as boldly as he does himself.
“Talking of water, there is a brute of a river here, called the
Swale, which winds about in the most mysterious manner.
You come across it when you least expect it. I have already
been in twice! I paid my second visit last Friday. I was
steaming along close to the pack, when what should I see in
front of me but this sneak of a river. I rammed in the spurs,
and thundered down to it as hard as I could go, but I had
already bucketed the old horse too freely: he bore down as if
he meant business, stopped short, and shot me over his head
into about seven feet of muddy water. I’ll leave you to imagine
the figure I was when I picked myself out!
“I created a fine sensation all along the Queen’s highway
en route home. Alice and Reginald have never stopped
chaffing me ever since. You ask me how he plays the rôle of
married man? Capitally, my dear fellow; and as to your unkind
insinuation that I must be rather in the way, considering they
are so recently married, you never were more mistaken in
your life. They are not a bit a spooney couple; at least I never
see any billing or cooing, thank goodness, and I favour them
with a good deal of my society; but anyone can see with half
an eye that each thinks the other perfection, and that they suit
down to the ground. He has got a fortnight’s domestic
privilege leave to go and see poor Maitland of the Blues, who
is dying at Cannes; they were great chums always, and at
Eton together. Meanwhile I remain here and help old Miss
Fane (a bitter specimen of the unappropriated blessing) to
take care of the fair châtelaine; and as I am to exercise the
hunters, and have the run of the stable, I am promising myself
five days a week between the two packs, and the very cream
of hunting. I wish you would go to Thomas and hurry him with
my tops, and run me in for another fortnight’s leave, as
enclosed. If the chief looks grumpy, say I have broken my
collarbone. I’ll do as much for you another time.
“Yours in clover,
“Geoffrey Saville.”
 CHAPTER IV.
A PRACTICAL JOKE.

Sir Reginald left for Cannes the end of November, intending to

spend a week there, and to be home, of course, long before
Christmas. Meanwhile, a plot he little dreamt of had been hatched for
his benefit. A storm was brewing; in fact, a regular cyclone
threatened his domestic atmosphere.
When he was in India with the Fifth Hussars, among his few lady
acquaintances outside the regiment there was one who had taken an
immense fancy to him—a fancy he by no means reciprocated. She
was the daughter of an old Commissariat officer, who had survived
to enjoy his off-reckonings and settled down at Cheetapore. “After
thirty-eight years of India, he could not stand England,” he said; “one
winter there would finish him.”
Miss Mason had been already four seasons on the plains. The
climate was beginning to tarnish her beauty—the dark Italian style,
her friends declared. Her foes, on the other hand, did not scruple to
accuse her of “four annas in the rupee”—native blood, in fact. She
was, nevertheless, one of the belles of the station. Time was flying,
as I have said before, her good looks were waning, and she was
becoming extremely anxious to be settled. Fully determined to marry
well, thoroughly bold and unscrupulous, and believing firmly in
Thackeray’s dictum, “that any woman who has not positively a hump
can marry any man she pleases,” she looked about her, to see
whom she would have.
One of the Fifth Hussars for choice; they were mostly well-born,
and all rich. After some hesitation, she made up her mind that
Captain Fairfax (as he then was) was perhaps the most desirable of
the lot. A future baronet, of distinguished appearance, young, rich,
and extremely popular, what more could she wish for? Not much,
indeed.
But he rarely mixed in ladies’ society; and there was a certain
hauteur about him—a kind of “touch-me-not” air—that inclined her to
think he might give her some trouble. But then he was worth it. How
good-looking he was—his keen dark eyes, regular features, and
thick moustache, together with his slight well-knit figure, quite fulfilled
her beau-ideal of a handsome, gallant hussar.
So she prepared to lay siege to him, and at once commenced to
bring her heavy guns into action. But it was in vain—all in vain. It
was useless to waylay him in the ride of a morning; with a hurried
bow he cantered on. It was equally futile to get a friendly chaperon to
escort her to cavalry parades on Wednesday mornings, for after drill
he invariably went off to stables. Polo, at which he was a great
performer, was also a blank, as whenever it was over, instead of
lounging and talking to the lady spectators, he mounted his hack and
disappeared. At the races she was more successful, and began to
think she was making way at last. The Hussars had a tent, and,
being one of the hosts, Sir Reginald was brought in contact with her
repeatedly. But what she attributed to special attention was merely
the courtesy with which he treated all the sex.
At balls she danced with him several times; but she could see that
he much preferred dancing to talking, and grudged every moment
that she wasted in conversation. However, “Rome was not built in a
day.” “Patience,” she thought, “and I shall be Lady Fairfax yet. He is
no flirt, and does not devote himself to any lady here, married or
single. All this is a point in my favour,” she reflected. “He only wants
drawing out; he is reserved and cold, but never fear, I shall thaw
him.” She invited him repeatedly to her father’s house, invitations
which he steadily and politely declined, and still not discouraged,
made a point of stopping and accosting him wherever they met, were
it on the road, coming out of church, or at the band. She
endeavoured to arrange playful bets on trifling subjects, and made
frequent allusions to the language of flowers; forced button-holes on
him, and finally calling him to her carriage as he was riding past at
the band, one evening—it was dark, and he fondly hoped to
disappear unnoticed—she entreated him to dismount and have a
chat.
“I cannot—very many thanks—as this is guest-night, and I have
some fellows coming to dinner, and it is now”—looking at his watch
—“a quarter to seven.”
“And what of that?” she returned playfully; “surely you can spare
me a few minutes?”
Dead silence, during which her victim was revolving in his brain his
chances of escape.
“Have you any sisters, Captain Fairfax?” she inquired, apropos of
nothing.
“No; I wish I had.”
“You would be very fond of them, I am sure”—effusively.
“I daresay I would.”
“Ah!” she exclaimed, leaning over and patting his horse’s back
caressingly, and looking up into his face with her bold black eyes
—“ah, Captain Fairfax, how I should like to be your sister!”
With an imperceptible shudder he replied in his most frosty tone:
“You do me far too much honour, Miss Mason.”
“Not at all,” she said impressively; “nothing is too good for you, in
my opinion.”
“You are very kind to say so, I am sure,” he replied, much
embarrassed. “I must really be off,” gathering up his reins.
“Stay, stay—one second,” she entreated. “You remember the
cracker we pulled together at the General’s on Monday, and I would
not show you the motto? I was ashamed.”
“No doubt you were; some wretched, vulgar rubbish”—preparing
to depart.
“No, no, not that,” she cried eagerly, “only—only—you will
understand all when I give it to you—when I give it to you, you
understand. I know you will not think it either wretched or vulgar
when you read it. Do not look at it till you get home and are quite—
quite alone,” she added, pressing an envelope into his most reluctant
hand.
“All right,” he replied, taking off his hat and rapidly riding away,
only too glad to escape.
In the privacy of his own room he opened the mysterious
envelope, and held its contents—a narrow slip of paper—to the
lamp. It ran as follows:

My hand, my heart, my life, are thine;

Thy hand, thy heart, thy life, are mine.

“Not that I know of,” he exclaimed fiercely, and colouring to the

roots of his hair. “The woman must be insane,” he muttered, tearing
the motto into fragments and scattering them on the floor. “She could
not really think I cared two straws about her. If it is a joke, as of
course it is,” he proceeded, “it is by no means a nice one, or one that
a thoroughly lady-like girl would ever dream of practising. If she were
my sister,” he continued, with a grim smile, “I would give her a piece
of my mind that would astonish her weak nerves. God forbid she was
any relation to me!” he added fervently. “I’ll give her an uncommonly
wide berth for the future.”
This mental resolve of his was most rigidly carried out. He avoided
Miss Mason in an unmistakable manner, and held aloof from society
on her account. It took her some time to realise this painful fact, but
when she did grasp it her whole soul rose in arms; and hearing
about the same period a remark he had made about her—viz. “that
she might be considered a fine-looking woman, but was not at all his
style, and that he thought her awfully bad form.” This, though
breathed in confidence over a midnight cheroot, en route from a
dance where Miss Mason had been making herself more than
usually conspicuous—came round to her ears, and acted like a
match in gunpowder, oil in flame. The most venomous hatred took
the place of her former admiration, and an insatiate craving for
revenge filled her fair bosom—a revenge she fully determined to
gratify on the earliest possible occasion.
Time went on, the Hussars left for England, and the wedding of
Alice and Reginald found its way into the Home News. “Now,”
thought she, “I will have my innings. I will drop a shell into his camp
that will astonish him, to say the least of it, and I’ll light the match at
once.”

Miss Mason’s dearest friend and inveterate ally was spending the
day with her. It was October, and although the hot weather was a
thing of the past, yet it was still warm, and occasionally muggy. Tiffin
concluded, the two ladies retired, Indian fashion, to Miss Mason’s
room, and there donned cool white dressing-gowns, and subsided
into long cane-lounges. For some time the monotonous creaking of
the punkah-rope alone broke the silence.
Presently Miss Mason said: “Harriet Chambers, I have been a
good friend to you. Have I not stood by you through thick and thin,
and helped you out of one or two nasty scrapes?”
“You have indeed, dear Charlotte,” replied Mrs. Chambers in
grateful accents, and with a visibly heightened colour.
“Well now, I want you to do something for me—only a trifle after
all, but still I would rather trust you than anyone.”
“What can I do? Whatever it is, I shall be only too glad,” returned
Mrs. Chambers effusively.
“Well, my dear, I’ll soon tell you. You recollect Captain Fairfax of
the Hussars?”
“Yes, of course I do; a dark young man, who won the Arconum
cup, and spent all his time out shikarring.”
“Exactly! but he found time enough to be very rude to me and I
wish to pay him off somehow.”
 “But what did he do?” asked Mrs. Chambers, her curiosity
aroused.
“Never mind what he did—he treated me shamefully, cruelly,
abominably,” returned Miss Mason with venomous empressement
and a noble indifference to facts.
“Well, at any rate, he has left the country now,” put in Mrs.
Chambers soothingly.
“But a letter can always reach him. I know his address at home.
He is just married, and I was thinking of giving them a little bone of
contention to amuse themselves with—something to ruffle up the
dead, flat monotony of the honeymoon. For instance, a sham
marriage certificate would give her a good fright.”
“Oh! but, my dear Charlotte,” gasped her friend, raising herself to a
sitting posture, “you are joking. You would not think of such a thing.”
“Would I not?” replied Charlotte, with an unpleasant laugh and
shake of her head. “I have thought of it, and, what is more, I mean to
do it.”
“But you might cause fearful mischief; and, besides, I am sure it’s
forgery,” Mrs. Chambers added with an awe-struck voice.
“Not a bit of it,” said Miss Mason lightly. “I have laid all my plans.
Listen,” she continued, sitting up. “Oh, bother these mosquitoes,”
waving her handkerchief to and fro. “Now attend to me. You know
the clerk of All Saints’, a stupid, drunken old wretch, who would sell
his soul for ten rupees. I have bribed him to let me have the church
register and a lot of spare printed copies of certificates—blank forms,
you know. I pretend I want to look out something for a friend. He
brought the register here this morning, and I am to have it ready for
him when he calls after dark; for, although there are very few
weddings—more’s the pity—and no one troubles about the register
at All Saints’, yet such books are not supposed to go travelling about
in this style. Here it is,” and from beneath the mattress of her bed
she produced a thick calf-bound volume. “Here are the printed
forms,” she continued, getting up and busying herself arranging a
writing-table, which she pushed towards her friend, whose eyes
followed her movements in dumb amazement. “Now,” she said,
“Harriet, you are to copy a certificate of marriage on one of these
blank strips, do you see.”
“I!” cried Mrs. Chambers. “Good heavens, Charlotte, you are out of
your mind! It would be downright forgery. You are mad to think of it.”
“Forgery! Folly—it’s only a joke. After the first glance, no woman in
her senses would see it in any other light. It’s a joke, I tell you—a
joke, and I know,” she added, looking her friend straight in the face,
“that for several reasons you will not refuse me.”
“Oh, but really—really,” faltered her victim.
“Yes, but really you will do it. Do you think I would ask you to do
anything that was not right—that was illegal? Come, come, Harriet,
here is a chair. You imitate writing so splendidly, you will have to
oblige me, and I’ll give you my gold swami earrings into the bargain,
besides all the good offices I have already done for you.”
Finding herself in the presence of a vigorous will, Mrs. Chambers,
who was weak-minded and indolent, eventually succumbed, and
very reluctantly settled to her task. The last marriage certificate was
used as a copy, and splendidly imitated by Mrs. Chambers; the
name of Reginald Fairfax was substituted for the man, and Fanny
Cole for the spinster. The witnesses’ and the clergyman’s signatures
were added. The only name that was really forged was the
clergyman’s: “A correct copy of certificate of marriage as signed and
attested by me.—Hugh Parry.”
This was a facsimile; the remaining part of the certificate was in a
round clerkly hand, as if copied by that functionary. It was finished,
and, villanous document as it was, was in every respect to all
appearance an authorised and legal copy of a certificate of marriage.
Miss Mason having quieted her friend’s scruples by assuring her
over and over again that it was “only a joke,” and having refreshed
her with five-o’clock tea and half a brandy-and-soda, and sworn her
to profoundest secrecy, dismissed her tool with much affectionate
demonstration. She then locked up the book and papers and went
for a drive, with the calm conviction that she had done a good
afternoon’s work. The following day an anonymous letter containing
the mock certificate was despatched to Lady Fairfax.
I should here mention that when the old clerk called for the register
and his ten rupees, and got them, he hastened to the Bazaar and
laid in a fine supply of arrack, which he conveyed to his solitary “go
down.” His orgie was on such an extensive scale that when he upset
a lighted kerosine lamp he was perfectly incapable of stirring or
extinguishing it, so he and his house and the marriage register were
all consumed together. This occurrence was related to Miss Mason a
few evenings afterwards at the band, as one of the items of local
“gup;” also that the church register was missing—had recently and
mysteriously disappeared; and that the general belief was that the
defunct clerk had made away with it.
Miss Mason received the intelligence as a polite but totally
disinterested listener; but as she rolled along the dusty roads in her
carriage, on her way home, she thought all the time of her little joke
and its probable consequences.
“‘Sweet is revenge, especially to women.’ I forget who wrote that;
but it’s true,” she murmured. “Mine is even more complete than I had
expected. Mr. Parry is dead; the clerk and the register burnt; the
witnesses, John and Jane Fox, gone to Australia nearly two years
ago. Clear yourself if you can, Sir Reginald Fairfax; I’ll not help you;
and I think you will find that I have given you a difficult task.”
Such were Miss Mason’s reflections, and her amiability for the
next two or three days was as surprising as it was unbounded.
Occasionally she would lean back in her low capacious Singapore
chair, drop her book in her lap, and indulge in a long and evidently
delightful reverie, bewildering her foolish old father by sundry fits of
wholly unexplained suppressed laughter.
“What ails you, Charlotte, my girl? What’s the matter?” he asked
once, somewhat timidly.
“Oh, nothing. Nothing that would interest you, daddy; only a little
bit of a practical joke that I have played on somebody.”
 CHAPTER V.
THE THUNDERBOLT.

Alice, Miss Fane, and Geoffrey were seated at the breakfast-table

one drizzling December morning. The post had just come in.
Geoffrey, having unlocked the bag, was distributing the letters.
“One for you, Miss Fane; looks like a bill,” said he mischievously.
“Two young-lady letters for you, Alice, and one from Fairfax, of
course. I wonder he does not write thrice a day, and telegraph at
intervals: ‘How are you, my darling? Are you thinking of me, my
treasure?’ What will you give for it? It’s a pretty thick one,” feeling it
critically. “See what it is to be a bride,” and he chanted:

“They were never weary; they seemed each day

Fresh ecstasy to imbibe;
And they gazed in each other’s eyes in a way
That I really can’t describe.
And once it was my lot to see
What shocked my sensitive taste:
They were sitting as close as wax, and he
Had his arm about her waist.”

“That you never did, you rude boy. Here, give me my letter at
once, sir!” cried Alice, half rising.
“Madam, take it. You need not be blushing like that; it makes me
quite hot to look at you. After all, you never did shock my sensitive
taste as yet, and I hope you never will. Now for the newspapers,”
diving again into the bag. “Halloa! here’s another letter, Alice—from
India, I declare, and a good fat one too. Who is your correspondent