See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/257541825

Analyzing the Role of Social Norms in Tax Compliance Behavior

Article in Journal of Business Ethics · July 2012

DOI: 10.1007/s10551-012-1390-7

CITATIONS READS

159 2,534

3 authors:

Donna D. Bobek Amy M. Hageman

University of South Carolina Kansas State University
35 PUBLICATIONS 985 CITATIONS 35 PUBLICATIONS 1,050 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Charles F. Kelliher
University of Central Florida
19 PUBLICATIONS 222 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Amy M. Hageman on 31 January 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Analyzing the Role of Social Norms in Tax
Compliance Behavior

Donna D. Bobek, Amy M. Hageman &

Charles F. Kelliher

Journal of Business Ethics

ISSN 0167-4544
Volume 115
Number 3

J Bus Ethics (2013) 115:451-468

DOI 10.1007/s10551-012-1390-7

1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and
all rights are held exclusively by Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.. This e-offprint
is for personal use only and shall not be self-
archived in electronic repositories. If you wish
to self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.

1 23
 Author's personal copy
J Bus Ethics (2013) 115:451–468
DOI 10.1007/s10551-012-1390-7
Analyzing the Role of Social Norms in Tax Compliance Behavior
Donna D. Bobek • Amy M. Hageman •
Charles F. Kelliher
Received: 1 August 2011 / Accepted: 30 May 2012 / Published online: 2 August 2012
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract The purpose of this study is to explore with
more rigor and detail the role of social norms in tax
compliance. This study draws on Cialdini and Trost’s
(The Handbook of Social Psychology: Oxford University
Press, Boston, MA, 1998) taxonomy of social norms to
investigate with more specificity this potentially decisive
(Alm and McKee, Managerial and Decision Economics,
19:259–275, 1998) influence on tax compliance. We test
our research hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect
influences of social norms using a hypothetical compliance
scenario with 174 experienced taxpayers as participants.
Factor analysis of the social norm questions successfully
identified four distinct social norm constructs, in line with
Cialdini and Trost (1998). Results of the path analysis
show that individuals’ standards for behavior/ethical
beliefs (personal norms) as well as the expectations of
close others (subjective norms) directly influence tax
compliance decisions, whereas general societal expecta-
tions (injunctive norms) and other individuals’ actual
behavior (descriptive norms) have an indirect influence.
This shows that social norms have important direct as well
as indirect influences on tax compliance behavior. We also
investigate a number of attitudinal variables that may
be related to social norms and taxpayer compliance. The
D. D. Bobek (&)
C. F. Kelliher
Dixon School of Accounting, University of Central Florida,
P.O. Box 161400, Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA
e-mail: Donna.Bobek@bus.ucf.edu
C. F. Kelliher
e-mail: Charles.Kelliher@bus.ucf.edu
A. M. Hageman
Department of Accounting, Kansas State University,
109 Calvin Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506-0506, USA
e-mail: HagemanA@ksu.edu
results of this study further clarify the important role that
social norms have with regard to taxpayers’ compliance
behavior.
Keywords Tax compliance
Taxpayers
Social norms
Introduction
In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (the gov-
ernmental agency responsible for tax collection, IRS) estimates
that it loses over $450 billion annually due to taxpayer non-
compliance (www.irs.gov). The majority of this deficiency
is due to under-reporting of the individual income tax. While
the IRS expends significant resources on enforcement, it
acknowledges that increasing voluntary compliance is the key
to reducing the tax gap (US Department of the Treasury 2009).
Nevertheless, traditional economic models of compliance,
which primarily incorporate detection and enforcement vari-
ables (for a review see Andreoni et al. 1998), suggest that
compliance is much higher than would be expected based on
the current audit and penalty rates. Over a decade ago, Andreoni
et al. (1998) called for more research exploring the ‘‘diverse
psychological, moral and social influences’’ (p. 885) on com-
pliance behavior, to help explain and understand the current
higher-than-expected level of compliance. While researchers
have begun to answer this call (e.g., Alm et al. 1999; Bobek and
Hatfield 2003; Wenzel 2004, 2005; Bobek et al. 2007; Torgler
2007; Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008), the need for additional
research remains critical (Weisbach and Plesko 2007).
Accounting researchers studying non-economic influ-
ences on tax compliance have traditionally focused on
individual psychological variables such as moral beliefs
and attitudes (e.g., Reckers et al. 1994; Hanno and Violette
1996; Kaplan et al. 1997; Bobek and Hatfield 2003).
123
 Author's personal copy
452
Meanwhile, some economists have tried to control for the
influence of social norms in models of tax compliance
behavior (e.g., Alm et al. 1999; Pommerehne et al. 1994;
Scholz and Pinney 1995). However, these economic studies
do not specify precisely what these social norms are;
instead, they model a variable that affects compliance in a
manner consistent with a strong effect from a nebulous
outside social influence. Several recent studies have begun
to examine how social norms influence tax compliance
behavior (e.g., Wenzel 2004, 2005; Bobek et al. 2007;
Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008), but the need for additional
clarity remains. Further, Torgler (2002) argues, ‘‘when
working with social norms, we have the difficulty of
specifying their exact meaning’’ (p. 663).
In this study, we synthesize these prior findings by
drawing on social norms theory to clarify both the defini-
tion and the influence of social norms on tax compliance
behavior. Cialdini and Trost (1998, p. 152) characterize
social norms as ‘‘rules and standards that are understood by
members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social
behavior without the force of laws’’. They identify four
categories of influences encompassed in this definition:
general societal expectations of behavior (injunctive
norms), expectations of valued others for one’s own
behavior (subjective norms), one’s own expectations for
proper behavior/ethical beliefs (personal norms), and
standards that develop out of observation of others’
behavior (descriptive norms). Therefore, they include not
only outside social influences, but also an individual’s
personal moral (or ethical) beliefs in their definition of
social norms.1
Alm et al. (1999) concluded, in an experimental eco-
nomics setting, that social norms play a crucial role in
taxpayers’ compliance decisions, observing that when the
social norm tended toward non-compliance, compliance
dropped to almost zero. This finding suggests that, if social
norms are a dominant influence on the current level of
1
Other researchers have described social norms in a variety of
similar ways. For example, Hechter and Opp (2001) refer to two types
of definitions of social norms; oughtness norms or norms that entail
moral imperatives and behavioral regularities which are less
restrictive and are based on what is observed. From this perspective,
injunctive, subjective, and personal norms would all be viewed as
oughtness norms. Descriptive norms, on the other hand, are what is
observed: the behavioral regularity. Furthermore, Plant and Devine
(1998) refer to internal and external motivations to engage in
behavior. They refer to internal motivations as personal standards of
behavior or how one personally believes they should respond—a
concept very similar to Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) personal norm
construct. External motivations on the other hand are the commu-
nity’s ‘‘standards or guidelines’’ (p. 819) for proper behavior. This
concept is similar to Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) injunctive norm
construct. In this article, we choose to rely on Cialdini and Trost’s
(1998) taxonomy due to its comprehensive nature.
123
D. D. Bobek et al.
taxpayer compliance, maintenance and enhancement of
these norms is essential to a stable tax revenue source. In
this study, we extend prior research on social norms and tax
compliance by developing a comprehensive model of the
direct and indirect influences of social norms, and testing
this model using experienced taxpayers. We investigated
the effect of social norms using a hypothetical compliance
scenario with 174 experienced taxpayers as participants. As
detailed in Bobek et al. (2011),2 factor analysis of the
social norm questions successfully identified four distinct
social norm constructs, in line with Cialdini and Trost
(1998). All four social norm constructs were significantly
correlated with tax compliance decisions. Our results pro-
vide support for our predictions that the influence of social
norms is complex and the constructs themselves are
interrelated. Specifically, our final path analysis results
show that only individuals’ standards for one’s own
behavior (personal norms) and the perceptions of the
expectations of close others (subjective norms) directly
influenced tax compliance decisions. Perceptions of gen-
eral societal expectations (injunctive norms) and others’
actual behavior (descriptive norms) had only an indirect
influence on tax compliance behavior. Further, our results
show that social norms are more influential than any of the
additional control variables (e.g., detection risk, fairness
perceptions) included in the path analysis.
This article makes several contributions to the taxation
and ethics literature. First, we provide a comprehensive
review of prior research that has studied the influence of
social norms on tax compliance. Based on this review and
Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) social norms theory, we clarify
the role of social norms by developing a comprehensive
model of their influence on tax compliance behavior.
Second, we also consider how social norms influence each
other, thus modeling the indirect role that specific types of
social norms have on tax compliance behavior. While
personal norms appear to be a primary influence on com-
pliance intentions, we also demonstrate that each of the
other types of social norms are interrelated, and that each
of the social norm constructs provides opportunities to
influence tax compliance. Third, we also identify certain
attitudinal variables that are related to social norms; finding
that personal norms are strongly related to financial pres-
sure is of concern given the current uncertain economic
environment. Fourth, our results may be helpful to poli-
cymakers and tax researchers who are interested in
improving compliance. In particular, with this compre-
hensive model of social norms and attitudinal variables,
future researchers can assist policymakers by testing
2
Bobek et al. (2011) provide details regarding the scale development
of the social norm constructs and test other methodological issues.
They do not test hypotheses regarding social norms.
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms 453

Table 1 Summary table of social norm constructs

Descriptive norms Injunctive norms Subjective norms Personal norms

Description What one perceives that other
people do in a given
situation. Watching others
provides information about
what is ‘‘normal’’ in a novel
or ambiguous situation
Social goal Effective action—the desire
being to be accurate in one’s
achieved by choices and behaviors
conforming
to norm
When will Most likely to use evidence of
they matter? others’ behavior to decide
most effective course of
action when the situation is
novel, ambiguous, or
uncertain, and especially
when the source of
reference is similar to us
Adapted from Bobek et al. (2007)
The perception of what most
people think others should
do in a given situation. They
specify what should be done
and are the moral rules of
the group
Building and maintaining
social relationships
They motivate behavior by
promising social rewards or
punishments. Need not be
expressed in order to direct
behavior. These norms are
more influential when they
are made salient
A person’s perception about
what those who are
important to him think he
should do in a given
situation. They are one’s
perceptions of the
injunctive norms held by
the people whose opinions
matter most
Building and maintaining
social relationships
When people are motivated to
comply with the norms of
‘‘referent’’ others
Self-based standards or
expectations for behavior
(i.e., what an individual
believes he/she should do)
in a given situation. These
standards arise from
internalized values
Managing self-concept
Enforced through the
anticipation of self-
enhancement or self-
deprecation (‘‘self-
reinforcing’’)

interventions (such as educational programs, media pro-
grams, advertising campaigns, or other measures) aimed
at changing social norms.3 Furthermore, because the
perceived detection risk is linked to both social norm
constructs as well as tax compliance itself, policymakers
may wish to consider how the perception that cheating is
widespread affects the justifiability of tax non-compliance.
Finally, this study also contributes to the social psychology
literature by explicitly considering the inter-relationships
among the norm constructs.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
the next section, theory and prior research are discussed
and our hypotheses are developed. Next, we discuss our
method for testing the hypotheses, and then report our
results. Finally, we draw conclusions and offer suggestions
for future research.
constrain social behavior without the force of law’’ (Cial-
dini and Trost 1998, p. 152). The four different social norm
constructs identified by Cialdini and Trost are injunctive
norms, descriptive norms, subjective norms, and personal
norms. As summarized in Table 1,4 Descriptive norms are
standards that develop out of observation of how others
actually behave in particular situations. Injunctive norms,
on the other hand, specify what should be done and are
therefore the moral rules of the group. Subjective norms
relate specifically to the expectations of important others
(e.g., family, friends, coworkers, and so forth). Finally,
personal norms are one’s own expectations for behavior,
which may arise in part from the internalization of
injunctive norms.5 Injunctive, subjective, and personal
norms all relate to the expectations of certain groups or
individuals, or, described another way, what one believes

Prior Research and Hypotheses Development
Theory of Social Norms
Social norms are defined as ‘‘rules and standards that are
understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or
3
In fact, Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate in the US, in
remarks made at the American Taxation Association Midyear
Meeting on March 4, 2011, indicated that her office is currently
considering an educational tour throughout the country in an effort to
improve voluntary compliance.
4
This table is adapted from a similar table presented in Bobek et al.
(2007) and is based on Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) extensive
discussion of social norm theory in the Handbook of Social
Psychology.
5
Personal norms are another term for personal ethical beliefs/moral
obligation, etc. There has been much prior research that has
investigated taxpayer ethics related to tax compliance (e.g., Reckers
et al. 1994; Kaplan et al. 1997; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). In this
study, we do not discuss or consider the underlying ethical theories
that relate to individuals’ ethical judgments, as this is not our focus.
We are keenly interested in how social norms (including personal
norms) affect taxpayer compliance because we believe that, while it
may be difficult to change someone’s ethical orientation or level of
moral development, researchers and policymakers may have an
opportunity to influence compliance through social norms.

123
 Author's personal copy
454
he/she ought to do in a given situation (Hechter and Opp
2001; Kallgren et al. 2000). Descriptive norms are merely
one’s perception of what others actually do.
In addition to refining these social norm constructs,
Cialdini and colleagues (e.g., Kallgren et al. 2000) also
emphasize that a particular social norm is unlikely to
influence an individual’s behavior unless it is salient (or
‘‘focal’’) at the time of the behavior. Social norms research
in social psychology has clearly established that social
norms guide action in ‘‘meaningful ways’’ (Schultz et al.
2007). This research has led to social norms marketing
campaigns designed to influence a variety of behaviors
including alcohol use among college students (e.g., Clapp
et al. 2003), environmental conservation (e.g., Goldstein
et al. 2008), and tobacco use among teenagers (e.g., Brown
and Moodie 2009). Despite the experimental evidence
showing the importance of social norms on behavior, the
success of these marketing campaigns has been mixed,
perhaps in part because they have focused on targeting the
wrong type of norms.6 These studies suggest that under-
standing the influence of social norms and the relationships
between these constructs is important for changing
behavior.
Prior Tax Research on Social Norms
While recent social psychology research has focused on
changing social norms to influence behavior, the trend in
prior tax compliance research has been on measuring social
norms as a way of explaining compliance behavior. Due in
part to a lack of precision in defining the social norm
constructs, this prior research leaves open questions
regarding the effect of social norms on tax compliance.
In Table 2, we chronologically summarize prior tax
compliance research that has included a ‘‘social norm’’
variable. As is evident from inspection of Table 2, while a
number of studies have considered the role of social norms
on tax compliance, none has done so in a comprehensive
manner. Further, many prior studies (e.g., Cowell 1990;
Porcano and Price 1993; Alm et al. 1999; Davis et al. 2003)
have used terms similar to ‘‘social norm’’ to mean one or
more of the social norm constructs discussed above,
without a precise definition of which type of norm is
actually affecting behavior. This is particularly true of
several instructive analytical studies. For example, Cowell
(1990) shows that a ‘‘social stigma’’ variable serves to
increase compliance as long as there is a reasonable level
of enforcement by the taxing authority. If enforcement
6
For example, Schultz et al. (2007) report that focusing attention on
descriptive norms (i.e., what others do) regarding average energy
usage, may actually increase energy usage of those with below
average usage. They show that adding a message focused on social
approval/disapproval (i.e., injunctive norm) eliminates this effect.
123
D. D. Bobek et al.
becomes increasingly lax, eventually cheating becomes so
lucrative that any one person is willing to suffer the social
stigma even if no one else cheats. Once one taxpayer
cheats, it causes an epidemic of cheating. The new equi-
librium is somewhat ‘‘sticky’’ and substantial efforts by the
taxing authority are required to improve compliance.
Davis et al. (2003) found a similar result and also point
out that compliance equilibriums are ‘‘sticky’’ in both
directions. Another analytical model, by Korobow et al.
(2007), showed that compliance behavior was also influ-
enced by communication among taxpayers. Specifically,
Korobow et al. (2007) found that when enforcement rates
are low, tax evasion actually increases when agents
(taxpayers) share information regarding their neighbors’
compliance decisions.
Porcano and Price (1993) found that survey respondents
were more likely to comply if a social sanction (cheaters
being publicized in the newspaper) supplemented
enforcement efforts and this effect increased as the likeli-
hood of being caught (the audit rate) increased. In an
experimental economics setting, Alm et al. (1999) found
that when the social norm (the results of a vote on the
enforcement regime) tended toward non-compliance,
almost all subjects cheated. However, when ‘‘cheap talk’’7
was allowed prior to voting, subjects generally voted in
favor of stronger enforcement mechanisms, which then led
to more compliance.
While the studies just discussed concentrate on external
societal influences, as depicted in Table 2, other studies
have focused on the personal and/or subjective norm con-
struct (e.g., Hanno and Violette 1996; Kaplan et al. 1997;
Bobek and Hatfield 2003). Hanno and Violette (1996) and
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) tested two different versions of
Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior. In both of
these studies, moral obligation (personal norms) and the
opinions of important others (subjective norms) influenced
compliance decisions. Kaplan et al. (1997) found that
moral development was significantly correlated with
compliance and influenced the effectiveness of educational
communications designed to improve compliance. The
results of Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) also suggest that
individual ethical beliefs (personal norms) are particularly
important, as they found that social (subjective) norms
directly influence ethical beliefs, which in turn affect
compliance behavior, but did not discover a direct rela-
tionship between subjective norms and tax compliance
7
Cheap talk refers to the ability of subjects to informally discuss
specific aspects of the experiment. It should be noted that most
experimental economics studies use neutral terminology. For exam-
ple, instead of words like ‘‘tax’’ and ‘‘audit’’ they use terms like ‘‘fee’’
and ‘‘check’’ (Alm et al. 1999). Thus, any effect from a social norm
construct arises from the experimental setting and not due to the
subjects tapping into their own social norms of tax compliance.
 Table 2 Summary of prior tax compliance research on social norms
Types of norm studied and description of variable

Study Type of analysis Social Descriptive Injunctive Subjective Personal norms Summary of findings
norm norms norms norms
construct
specified?
Role of Social Norms

Cowell (1990) Analytical No Model included a ‘‘social stigma’’ variable that increased
compliance. Relied on a reasonable level of enforcement.
Compliance equilibrium ‘‘sticky’’
Porcano and Price Experimental—178 US No A ‘‘social stigma’’ variable was used. The possibility of tax
(1993) taxpayers evaders’ names being reported in the newspaper
significantly increased compliance
Hanno and Violette Experimental—73 continuing Yes Expectations 2 items (fulfill duty Both social norms variables influenced compliance, personal
(1996) education students of family as citizen and fulfill norms more important
members moral and ethical
influenced obligations)
compliance
Alm et al. (1999) Experimental Yes Results of a vote on When the results of the vote tended toward non-compliance,
economics—151 enforcement almost all subjects cheated. Allowing ‘‘cheap talk’’ prior to
undergraduate students level voting improved social norms and increased compliance.
Experiment was conducted using neutral (i.e., non-tax)
terminology
Davis et al. (2003) Analytical No Model including ‘‘social norm’’ variable increased
compliance. Compliance equilibriums are sticky in both
directions
Bobek and Hatfield Experimental—108 students Yes Opinion of 1 item (I think it Both subjective norms and moral obligation (i.e., personal
(2003) and 70 adults important would be morally norms) influenced compliance
others wrong to …)
Wenzel (2004) Experimental—1,306 Yes 3-Item scale 3-Item scale Both social norm constructs influenced compliance.
Australian taxpayers However, personal norms were more important and the
effect of injunctive norms was mediated by how strongly
Author's personal copy

subjects’ identified with ‘‘being Australian’’

Wenzel (2005) Experimental—1,036 Yes 3-Item scale 3-Item scale Longitudinal study showed that both social norm constructs
Australian taxpayers affect compliance, however injunctive norms are partially
mediated by personal norms
Bobek et al. (2007) Experimental—76 students Yes Factor Factor scores of Factor scores Factor scores of 6-item Cross-country differences in compliance explained by
from Australia, 54 (45) scores of 3-item scale of 6-item scale (combined with injunctive, subjective, and personal norms. However, were
taxpayers from the US 2-item scale subjective norms) not able to tease out separate constructs for subjective and
(Singapore) scale (combined personal norms
with
personal
norms)
Korobow et al. (2007) Analytical No When enforcement rates are low, knowledge of neighbors’
compliance decisions decreases compliance
Blanthorne and Kaplan Experimental—355 US Yes Factor scores Factor scores Subjective norms influenced underreporting ethics (i.e.,
(2008) taxpayers of 3-item of 5-item scale personal norms), but not compliance. Underreporting
scale ethics affected compliance
455

123
 Author's personal copy
456
decisions. None of these particular studies examined the
relationship between broader social norms (injunctive and
descriptive) and tax compliance.
Finally, several recent studies have explored whether per-
sonal norms and broader social norms influence tax compli-
ance behavior. Wenzel (2004) studied the influence of both
injunctive norms and personal norms. In his study, conducted
in Australia, personal norms were more important than
injunctive norms. In addition, the importance of injunctive
norms was mediated by how strongly the respondents iden-
tified with ‘‘being Australian.’’ In a follow-up longitudinal
study of Australian citizens, Wenzel (2005) established that
personal and injunctive norms influenced tax compliance
behavior, but that the influence of injunctive norms was par-
tially mediated by the effect of personal norms. Finally, Bobek
et al. (2007) demonstrated that differences in social norms
partially explain cross-country differences in tax compliance
intentions. Their study also established that the social norms of
‘‘close others’’ (both the individual moral beliefs and the
norms of important others) played the most important role in
explaining tax compliance intentions. However, they were not
able to tease out separate constructs for personal and sub-
jective norms.
Nearly, all prior tax research that has included a social norm
construct has identified a significant influence on tax com-
pliance from these constructs. However, there has been a lack
of specificity regarding the identity, emergence, and trans-
mission of these norms. Alm and McKee (1998, p. 270)
concluded that ‘‘social norms play an important, perhaps a
decisive role in tax compliance.’’ Furthermore, Wenzel (2004,
p. 215) suggested that greater refinement of the social norm
constructs and their role on tax compliance behavior was
needed to understand their potentially ‘‘substantial impact.’’
Hypotheses Development
We begin our hypotheses development with the theoretical
premise that the larger influences the smaller. In other
words, general societal norms may exert influence on one’s
own personal norms; however, at any given point in time it
is implausible that the influence goes in the opposite
direction. With that in mind, the following discussion
provides theoretical justification for our hypotheses about
the inter-relationships between the different social norm
constructs. Figure 1 depicts our complete model and
summarizes our hypotheses.
Descriptive norms arise from observing individuals’
behavior in specific situations. Conformity to descriptive
norms is more likely when individuals desire to behave
‘‘correctly’’ in a novel situation. On the other hand, injunctive
norms refer to general societal expectations of appropriate
behavior; conforming to injunctive norms typically arises out
of a desire to build social relationships and achieve social
123
D. D. Bobek et al.
rewards. Thus, when individuals are faced with a new,
ambiguous situation, they are likely to observe the actions of
others in the same situation to help make an ‘‘accurate’’
decision. Over time, these societal actions may become
socially sanctioned behaviors (Cialdini and Trost 1998; see
also Crandall 1988). Furthermore, taxpayer descriptive norms
may also influence subjective norms. Just as societal actions in
general (such as the proportion of the population that wears a
seat belt, or that properly reports all cash earnings) are likely to
influence injunctive norms, these same actions are also likely
to influence perceptions of what one’s family or friends
believe one ‘‘should’’ do in a situation. Using the same rea-
soning, it is likely that descriptive norms could influence one’s
personal norms as well. Further, Hechter and Opp (2001)
suggest that oughtness norms (like injunctive, subjective, and
personal norms) often emerge from behavioral regularities
(i.e., descriptive norms). Thus our first hypothesis predicts:
H1 Taxpayers’ descriptive norms toward tax compliance
will influence their injunctive, subjective, and personal
norms toward tax compliance.
Injunctive norms may also exert influence on subjective
and personal norms. In fact, subjective norms may be viewed
as a narrower category of injunctive norms. Thus, the
injunctive norms of society toward tax compliance behavior
may influence the expectations of close friends or family
members, particularly if these referents have similar opinions
to society at large. Injunctive norms may also influence per-
sonal norms. According to Schwartz (1977), individuals
develop their self-based standards of behavior (personal
norms) from the societal expectations of behavior that are
gleaned through social interactions (injunctive norms). Indi-
viduals may initially follow injunctive norms to avoid social
stigma, but over time, may continue to follow such norms for
internal reasons, such as enhancing their self-image. This
leads to the second hypothesis:
H2 Taxpayers’ injunctive norms toward tax compliance
will influence their subjective and personal norms toward
tax compliance.
Finally, subjective norms may also influence personal
norms. Just as individuals may internalize societal values in
forming their personal standards of acceptable behavior,
they may also internalize the values of close others. Indi-
viduals that are surrounded by family members and friends
who support taxpayer compliance are also more likely to
exhibit ethical beliefs that support this behavior (e.g.,
Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008). We therefore predict that:
H3 Taxpayers’ subjective norms toward tax compliance
will influence their personal norms toward tax compliance.
The extent to which each of the different social norm
constructs directly influence tax compliance decisions
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms
H5
H1
H2
Descriptive H1 Injunctive
Norms Norms
H1
H2
Fig. 1 Hypothesized relationships. Dashed lined arrows represent alternative hypotheses
remains an open question. In one viewpoint, tax compli-
ance is at least initially, a private, unobservable action and
thus could be immune to direct outside social influence.
Some social psychologists (e.g., Schwartz 1977) posit that
personal norms are the only type of norm that directly
influences behavior. Further, Cialdini and Trost (1998) note
that some researchers have found less conformity with
injunctive and descriptive social norms when behavior was
private as opposed to publicly observed. Alternatively,
Cialdini and colleagues (e.g., Cialdini and Trost 1998;
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) argue that different types of
norms may be mutually activated in a situation. Thus, other
types of social norms may influence behavior beyond
personal norms. Despite the relatively private nature of tax
compliance behavior, it is possible that these other norm
constructs are also influential.
An additional argument in favor of multiple norms influ-
encing tax compliance behavior relates to the uniqueness of
the tax compliance setting. Taxpayers and policymakers alike
view the ‘‘fairness’’ of the tax system as extremely important
(see Slemrod and Bakija 2008). One facet of tax fairness is the
desire for oneself and others to pay their ‘‘fair share’’ of taxes.
There are two avenues toward achieving this fair distribution
of tax burdens. First is the structure of the tax system itself,
which few citizens can directly influence; second, however, is
one’s own level of compliance with the system. This is one
way in which social norms are likely to be important to tax-
payers’ compliance decisions. If taxpayers believe ‘‘every-
body cheats’’ (descriptive norms), society thinks it is ‘‘okay to
cheat’’ (injunctive norms), and/or their friends/family think it
is ‘‘okay to cheat’’ (subjective norms), then they are not only
more likely to cheat, but are also more likely to believe it is
okay to cheat (personal norms). As detailed earlier, the con-
clusion of prior tax research is that one or more of the above
social norm constructs are indeed related to tax compliance. It
is not clear from prior tax research, or from prior social
457
Subjective
Norms
H5
H3
H5 Tax Compliance
Intentions
Personal H4, H5
Norms
H5
psychology research (which has primarily focused on obser-
vable, rather than un-observable behavior) which of these
constructs is most important with regard to tax compliance.
Based on this discussion, we present two alternative
hypotheses regarding the influence of the different types of
social norms on tax compliance decisions. Our fourth
hypothesis predicts that only personal norms will directly
influence tax compliance decisions, while our fifth
hypothesis predicts that each of the social norm constructs
identified by Cialdini and Trost (1998) will influence
individuals’ tax compliance decisions:
H4 Taxpayers’ personal norms toward tax compliance
will directly influence their tax compliance decisions; the
relationship between tax compliance and subjective norms,
injunctive norms, and descriptive norms toward tax com-
pliance will only be indirect (through personal norms).
H5 Taxpayers’ personal norms, subjective norms, injunc-
tive norms, and descriptive norms toward tax compliance will
directly influence their tax compliance decisions.
Research Methods
Participants
Experienced taxpayers were used for this study. Partici-
pants were obtained by having students, in exchange for
extra credit, recruit subjects who were ‘‘non-accounting
students at least 25 years old that are US citizens or resi-
dents that have filed a federal income tax return.’’8 This
8
Two instructors of an introductory accounting course at a large
southeastern university in the spring and summer of 2008 offered
extra credit to their students for providing the names, mailing address,
and email addresses of eligible participants that had expressed an
interest in participating in the study. Each student could provide no
123
 Author's personal copy
458
recruiting technique resulted in 470 potential participants.
Participants completed the study questionnaire either in
online or hard copy format (the questionnaires contained
identical content and participants were randomly assigned
to one of the two format conditions).9 Of the 470 potential
participants, 223 individuals responded and the responses
of 218 individuals met the study’s criteria. This resulted in
a response rate of 47 %. However, as our study’s hypoth-
eses were tested using path analysis, the elimination of
subjects with missing data values was necessary (Schu-
macker and Lomax 2004). Participants that neglected to
respond to at least one of the questionnaire items were
eliminated from the final sample, resulting in a useable
sample of 174 responses (usable response rate of 37 %).
Table 3 reports the sample demographics and compares
the sample to the national population. Our sample was
older (70 % between the ages of 45 and 64) and included
more females (57 %) than males. Participants also had
higher income and were better educated than the national
population. The majority of participants (68 %) did not
prepare their own tax returns.
Experimental Task and Procedures
Participants responded to a hypothetical tax compliance
dilemma in this study. The dilemma was adapted from
Kaplan et al. (1997) and Bobek and Hatfield (2003), who
used a similar scenario. To increase participants’ ability to
relate to the hypothetical taxpayer and reduce the ‘‘better
than average’’ effect that individuals often exhibit when
evaluating a comparison target (Alicke et al. 1995), the
scenario included additional contextual details. The text of
this tax compliance dilemma is presented in the Appendix.
After reviewing the hypothetical tax compliance sce-
nario, participants then answered items regarding what they
and others would do if they were in a similar position. They
next responded to items measuring their social norms of
tax compliance (including personal, subjective, injunctive,
and descriptive norms) for the specific scenario. Partici-
pants also responded to items measuring their general
social norms of compliance for the four types of social
norms, as well as items measuring their general attitudes
and perceived fairness of income tax. Finally, we included
Footnote 8 continued
more than two names and if more than one name was provided the
individuals were required to be from different households. We
emphasized that the responses were confidential, and that the par-
ticipants would never be associated with the study or have individual
responses reported. The extra credit points awarded to students were
tied to their identification of eligible participants, rather than to par-
ticipants’ actual completion of the study.
9
A copy of the questionnaire can be made available by contacting
the authors.
123
D. D. Bobek et al.
items assessing demographic information (e.g., age,
income, education, political philosophy, etc.).
Measurement of Variables
The primary dependent variable is tax compliance intentions,
measured as the response to, ‘‘Do you think that if you were in a
similar situation as Larry [the hypothetical actor in the sce-
nario], YOU would deduct the ADDITIONAL $2,000?’’
Participants responded using a 7-point Likert-type scale,
ranging from ‘‘7 = very unlikely’’ to ‘‘1 = very likely,’’ such
that higher values indicated greater compliance. The mean
(standard deviation) of this response was 5.11 (2.17), indicat-
ing that most participants believed that they would be some-
what likely to comply with the tax law (and were somewhat
unlikely to deduct the additional automobile expense).10 This
measure concerns participants’ evaluation of a hypothetical
dilemma and thus is a measure of their compliance intentions.
Concerns that behavioral intentions might not map directly to
taxpayers’ actual behavior in a situation are partially mitigated
by the fact that a joint investigation of actual and hypothetical
tax evaders (Webley et al. 2001) indicated that both groups had
similar attitudes and motivations.
Multiple items were designed to measure each of the four
types of social norms of tax compliance. The response scale
for the majority of these items was a 7-point Likert-type scale,
and each category included items measuring the norms of tax
compliance in general and toward the specific hypothetical tax
scenario. Items were coded with higher values indicating more
favorable norms toward tax compliance.
In addition to demographic items, participants respon-
ded to items measuring individual differences in attitudes
and perceptions that may also be related to tax compliance
intentions and are common to other tax compliance studies.
For example, we included items measuring the perceived
probability of detection to control for differences in par-
ticipants’ perceptions regarding the opportunity to be non-
compliant (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield 2003; Blanthorne and
Kaplan 2008), and a measure of risk aversion to control for
their likelihood of taking advantage of the opportunity
(e.g., Christensen and Hite 1997). We measured inclusive
identification, as this variable was found to be related to the
influence of the injunctive norms of Australians (Wenzel
2004). We also included items measuring participants’
perceptions of the fairness of the income tax system, and
10
By comparison, participants viewed that ‘‘Larry’’ (the hypothetical
taxpayer in the scenario) would be slightly unlikely to comply (mean
of 3.29), as would the average taxpayer (mean 3.03). Thus,
participants were significantly more likely to believe that they would
be more compliant than would other taxpayers (p \ .001). Further-
more, 47 % of participants indicated that it was ‘‘very unlikely’’ that
they would take the additional deduction, indicating that the
remaining half of participants might not be completely compliant.
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms 459

Table 3 Sample demographics First, we generated a sample of 36 scale items based on an

Sample (n = 174) a
2007 National population b extensive literature search of prior tax compliance studies
that had measured social norms. We categorized these
Age items in terms of the four types of social norms from the
Under 25 = 0 % 20–24 = 10 % Cialdini and Trost (1998) framework. The scale was
25–44 = 22 % 25–44 = 38.5 % refined by using reliability analysis and factor analysis
45–64 = 70 % 45–64 = 34.5 % (principal components analysis with Promax rotation) to
65? = 8 % 65? = 17 % eliminate items with low item-to-total correlations or low
Family income item loadings. Table 4 reports the results of the final factor
\$25,000 = 3 % \$25,000 = 17 % analysis, including the item loadings for each of the mea-
$25,000–$49,999 = 15 % $25,000–$49,999 = 24 % sures included in the final scales. For the analysis of the
$50,001–$74,999 = 19 % $50,000–$74,999 = 20.5 % effect of social norms on tax compliance behavior, these
$75,000–$99,999 = 22 % $75,000–$99,999 = 14.5 % four correlated factor scores for each participant were
Over $100,000 = 41 % Over $100,000 = 24 % retained as independent variables.
Gender
Male = 43 % Male = 49 % Correlation Analysis
Female = 57 % Female = 51 %
Education Table 5 reports descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix
Did not complete Did not complete for the dependent variable, social norm variables, and the
High school = 0.5 % High school = 16 % additional attitudinal and demographic variables. All four of
High school graduate = 6 % High school graduate = 30 % the social norm constructs are strongly correlated with tax
Some college = 29 % Some college = 27 % compliance intentions, as taxpayers with stronger social
College graduate = 38 % College graduate = 27 % norms are more likely to report that they would comply (all
Post-graduate study = 26.5 % Post-graduate study = 10 %
p \ .001). Furthermore, all of the social norm constructs are
Prepare Your Own Tax Return?
highly correlated with each other (again, all p \ .001).
Yes = 32 %
Several other interesting findings emerge from the cor-
relation analysis. First, none of the demographic variables
No = 68 %
is significantly correlated with tax compliance intentions.
a
Numbers are expressed as a percentage of the total sample of However, in addition to social norms, tax compliance
respondents providing information for each demographic question
b
intentions are also correlated with fairness perceptions,
US Census Bureau: Age represents percentage of adults over age 19
in each category; family income numbers represent the percentage of
perceived probability of disallowance, attitude toward
families in each category; education numbers represents percentage of additional money, familiarity with the deduction, and risk
persons over 25 in each category preferences. These variables are also strongly correlated
with many of the social norm constructs; furthermore, the
their attitude toward additional money, as similar variables perception of the overall audit rate is also strongly corre-
were significantly related to tax compliance intentions in lated with injunctive norms. We include the effects of the
prior research (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield 2003). Finally, we non-social norms variables as control variables in the
also measured how often participants had taken a deduction model used to test the hypothesized relationships.
for automobile expenses. We included this variable
because, based on social norm theory, descriptive norms Hypothesis Testing with Path Analysis—Effect
may be particularly salient when faced with an unfamiliar of Social Norms
or novel situation (see Table 1). Refer to the Appendix for
a discussion of the measurement of these individual and Our study’s hypotheses predict that social norms will have
attitudinal control variables. a direct and indirect relationship on tax compliance
intentions. We therefore study both the relationships
among the social norm constructs as well as the effect of
Results these constructs on tax compliance behavior. We use path
analysis to test the relationships among these constructs.
Social Norm Scale Path analysis is a modeling technique that simultaneously
estimates multiple regression equations; it is an extension
Our construction of a scale for assessing taxpayer social of multivariate regression that allows for the simul-
norms followed the guidelines of Mason and Levy (2001) taneous testing of any number of independent and depen-
and is described in greater detail in Bobek et al. (2011). dent variables. However, the hypothesized relationships

123
 Author's personal copy
460 D. D. Bobek et al.

Table 4 Factor analysis results

Statement descriptiona Mean Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
response loading loading loading loading

How much of a moral obligation…do you 5.79 .716

feel to be completely honest…
I think it is acceptable to overstate tax 5.44 .758
deductions…(R)
Would you feel guilty if you took the 5.51 .888
additional $2,000 deduction?
Would you feel ashamed if you took the 5.17 .892
additional $2,000 deduction?
Would you feel justified in taking the 4.91 .809
additional $2,000 deduction? (R)
Would you feel pleased in taking the 5.23 .823
additional $2,000 deduction? (R)
Most people you know (would 4.47 .915
disapprove)
Your co-workers (would disapprove) 4.32 .835
Your family (would disapprove) 5.03 .901
Your friends (would disapprove) 4.58 .941
Your significant other (would disapprove) 5.26 .824
Most people would feel guilty if they took 3.74 .882
the additional $2,000 deduction
Most people would feel ashamed if they 3.52 .894
took the additional $2,000 deduction
Most people would be afraid they would 4.47 .717
get caught…(R)
…What percentage of taxpayers at your 7.35 (37 %) .741
income level deliberately pay less…(R)
…What percentage of US taxpayers at 8.14 (29 %) .727
your income level carelessly, but
unknowingly pay less…(R)
…What percentage of taxpayers at your 6.24 (48 %) .822
income level…would take the
additional deduction…(R)
…What percentage of the additional 6.30 (46 %) .689
$2,000…is the closest to the amount the
average US taxpayer would deduct? (R)
Percentage of variance explained 46 % 10 % 9% 7%
Factor description Personal norms Subjective norms Injunctive norms Descriptive norms
Factor loadings are Promax rotation scores
a
The personal, subjective, and injunctive social norm items were assessed on a 1–7 Likert-type scale. Descriptive norm items were assessed on a
1–11 Likert-type scale. Items were coded so that higher values indicated more favorable social norms toward tax compliance

depicted in Fig. 1 reflect a fully saturated model (i.e., a
theoretical model in which all paths are specified; see
Schumacker and Lomax 2004). Thus, to test the relation-
ships with path analysis, we also considered the influence
of the non-social norms variables that emerged as impor-
tant in the correlation analysis. To develop a more parsi-
monious final model, we culled statistically insignificant
paths pertaining to these control variables. Figure 2 and
Table 6 depict the final path analysis model with social
norms, tax compliance intentions, and the control variables.
Fit indices show that our model is a good fit for the
data.11
To further assess the overall fit of our final model, we
compare the fit of our final model with a ‘‘naı̈ve’’ model that
11
While the overall model v2 statistic is statistically significant, the
ratio of the v2 statistic to the degrees of freedom is 1.82, less than the
recommended 2.0 ceiling. The model’s comparative fit index (CFI) of
.964 exceeds the recommended cut-off of .90, and the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.069 is below the
recommended threshold of .08.

123
 Table 5 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Role of Social Norms

Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1.Tax compliance 2.89 2.17 1

intentions
2. Personal normsa 0 1 0.703 1
3. Subjective normsa 0 1 0.536 0.586 1
4. Injunctive normsa 0 1 0.335 0.485 0.452 1
5. Descriptive normsa 0 1 0.334 0.341 0.436 0.378 1
6. Unfair 14.47 4.91 20.200 20.18 -0.111 20.198 20.297 1
7. Disallowance 5.3 1.91 0.391 0.408 0.216 0.335 0.243 -0.080 1
8. Political 3.69 1.29 -0.119 -0.117 -0.020 -0.012 0.044 -0.086 0.057 1
9. Inclusive 12.96 2.06 -0.056 0.105 0.058 0.114 0.092 -0.043 0.049 -0.100 1
10. Money 2.11 1.58 20.51 20.633 20.352 20.254 20.268 0.200 20.281 0.129 -0.004 1
11. Familiarity 2.71 2.29 -0.136 20.231 0.046 -0.050 -0.109 0.179 0.021 -0.057 0.021 0.146 1
12. Risk 7.95 2.99 0.175 0.303 0.174 0.080 0.151 0.057 0.136 0.037 0.163 20.164 20.225 1
13. Age 48.87 11.46 0.112 0.129 0.096 0.012 0.132 -0.046 0.185 -0.145 0.082 -0.107 0.083 0.006 1
14. Gender 1.57 0.5 -0.095 -0.026 -0.110 0.068 -0.058 0.048 0.102 0.278 -0.060 0.185 -0.037 0.101 20.234 1
15. Income 3.83 1.21 0.050 -0.051 0.004 -0.074 0.102 -0.050 -0.018 -0.137 0.244 0.034 0.262 0.041 0.252 -0.129 1
16. Education 3.84 0.9 0.024 0.079 0.079 0.103 0.134 -0.091 0.065 -0.127 0.052 0.029 0.097 -0.012 0.096 -0.079 0.366 1
17. Return 1.68 0.47 -0.083 0.002 -0.033 -0.019 0.030 0.115 0.040 0.122 0.002 0.139 0.030 -0.029 0.061 0.176 0.043 -0.060 1
18. Audit 18.95 18.64 -0.096 0.041 -0.004 0.170 -0.092 0.028 0.128 0.148 0.158 0.013 -0.101 0.139 20.239 0.336 20.197 20.294 0.192
Author's personal copy

Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 7 = ‘‘very unlikely’’ and 1 = ‘‘very likely’’ participants would evade taxes (cheat) by taking the additional deduction. Unfair is the sum of
three questions measuring perceived unfairness with higher values indicating more perceived unfairness (scale ranging from 3–21). Disallowance measures participants’ perceived likelihood of disallowance, and is
measured on a 1–7 scale with higher values indicating greater risk of detection. Political measures participants’ self-reported political philosophy, ranging from very conservative to very liberal (1–7 scale). Inclusive is
the sum of two measures of identification with the American community, with higher values indicating greater identification (2–14 scale). Money measures participants’ attitude toward having the additional money even
if it was illegal, measured on a 1–7 scale. Familiarity measures how often participants have deducted automobile expenses, ranging from never to very often (1–7 scale). Risk measures participants’ risk preferences
(1–11 scale), with higher values representing greater risk aversion. Age measures participants’ age in years. Gender is coded as ‘‘1’’ if male and ‘‘2’’ if female. Income is measured on a 1–5 scale, with higher values
representing greater income. Education is measured on a scale with five options, with higher values representing more education. Return is coded as ‘‘1’’ if participants prepared their last income tax return themselves
and ‘‘2’’ otherwise. Audit measures participants’ perception of the overall audit rate for individual income tax returns
a
Social norms factors are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis described in Table 4. Factor scores are standardized with a mean (standard deviation) of 0 (1)
Bolded correlations are significant at p \ .05
461

123
 Author's personal copy
462 D. D. Bobek et al.

Table 6 Path analysis results

Endogenous (dependent) variable Path Standardized T statistic
path coefficient

Descriptive norms (R2 of .1368) Unfairness ? descriptive norms -.280 -4.10

Probability of disallowance ? descriptive norms .221 3.19
Injunctive norms (R2 of .2444) Descriptive norms ? injunctive norms (H1) .336 5.18
Overall audit rate ? injunctive norms .171 2.59
Probability of disallowance ? injunctive norms .229 3.40
Subjective norms (R2 of .2903) Descriptive norms ? subjective norms (H1) .308 4.58
Injunctive norms ? subjective norms (H2) .337 5.05
Personal norms (R2 of .6075) Descriptive norms ? personal norms (H1) -.050 -0.92
Injunctive norms ? personal norms (H2) .197 3.46
Subjective norms ? personal norms (H3) .338 6.02
Probability of disallowance ? personal norms .172 3.23
Risk aversion ? personal norms .129 2.60
Familiarity ? personal norms -.137 -2.76
Attitude toward additional money ? personal norms -.424 -8.62
Tax compliance (R2 of .5077) Descriptive norms ? tax compliance (H5) .062 1.00
Injunctive norms ? tax compliance (H5) -.096 -1.47
Subjective norms ? tax compliance (H5) .204 3.05
Personal norms ? tax compliance (H4, H5) .543 8.89
Probability of disallowance ? tax compliance .143 2.38
Note: T statistics 1.96 (2.58) or over are statistically significant at p \ .05 (.01)

H5: -.096 ns

Overall Audit .171*** Injunctive H2: .337*** Subjective

Rate Norms Norms

H5: .204***

.229***
H3: .338***
H1: .308*** Tax Compliance
Intentions
H1: .336*** H2: .197***

Personal H4, H5: .543***

Norms
-.280*** Descriptive
Unfairness
Norms H1: -.05 ns

.172***

.221***

*, p < .10, **, p < .05, ***, p< .01, ns= not significant
all tests two-tailed .129** -.137*** -.424***

Model Fit Statistics Probability of

Disallowance
Model Chi Square = 38.322 (df=21), ratio 1.82,
p = .0118
Attitude toward
Comparative FIT Index (CFI) = .964 Risk Aversion Familiarity
Additional Money
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) = .069

Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = .967

.143**
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .929

H5: 062 ns

Fig. 2 Test of hypothesized relationships

123
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms
assumes only direct paths between the social norm constructs
and the tax compliance intentions. When we perform a path
analysis on this naı̈ve model (the same as our theoretical
model but with no paths between any of the social norm
variables), the model fit is substantially worse than the model
fit of our theoretical model as reported in Fig. 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that descriptive norms will have a
direct influence on injunctive norms, subjective norms, and
personal norms. Two of these three relationships are sup-
ported by the path analysis. The direct path from descrip-
tive norms to injunctive norms is statistically significant
(p \ .001) and strong (standardized path coefficient of
.336). The path from descriptive norms to subjective norms
is statistically significant (p \ .001) and strong (standard-
ized path coefficient of .308) as well. However, the path
from descriptive norms to personal norms is not statisti-
cally significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 posits that injunctive norms will influence
subjective norms and personal norms. This hypothesis is
supported, as the direct path from injunctive norms to each
of these constructs is positive and statistically significant
(p \ .001). However, the standardized path coefficient is
larger in magnitude for the path between injunctive norms and
subjective norms (standardized path coefficient of .337) than
the path between injunctive norms and personal norms
(standardized path coefficient of .197). Hypothesis 3 addres-
ses whether subjective norms influence personal norms. The
path from subjective norms to personal norms is positive and
statistically significant (p \ .001, standardized path coeffi-
cient = .338), thus supporting Hypothesis 3.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 offer alternative predictions for the
effect of social norms on tax compliance decisions.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that because tax compliance is lar-
gely a private decision, personal norms will be the only
social norm construct to directly influence tax compliance.
Alternatively, Hypothesis 5 predicts that each social norm
construct may be mutually activated in a tax compliance
situation and directly influence the tax compliance deci-
sion. In the preceding correlation analysis, all four social
norm constructs demonstrated a strong, positive correlation
with tax compliance behavior (all correlations [.33,
p \ .001). However, when also considering the relation-
ships among the social norm constructs themselves, a more
complex relationship emerges.
Neither the direct path between injunctive norms and tax
compliance behavior nor between descriptive norms and
tax compliance behavior is statistically significant. This
indicates that the relationship between injunctive/descrip-
tive norms and tax compliance behavior is fully mediated
by their relationship with the other social norm constructs.
However, the path between subjective norms and tax
compliance (standardized path coefficient = .204, p \
.001) and personal norms and tax compliance (standardized
463
path coefficient = .543, p \ .001) are each strongly sig-
nificant, indicating that favorable subjective norms and
personal norms both directly improve taxpayer compliance.
Thus, Hypotheses 4 and 5 are each partially supported,
indicating that while tax compliance is largely a private
decision, the standards and approval of close family and
friends remain important.
Control Variables
In addition to the hypothesized relationships, several inter-
esting results emerge from the attitudinal control variables.
First, several of the attitudinal variables demonstrated a sta-
tistically significant influence on descriptive and injunctive
norms. The path between perceptions of the overall audit rate
and injunctive norms (standardized path coefficient = .171,
p \ .001) was positive and significant, as a perception of a
higher actual IRS audit rate led to more favorable perceptions
of societal expectations. Similarly, those that perceived higher
degrees of unfairness in the tax system had less favorable
descriptive norms toward compliance (standardized path
coefficient = -.280, p \ .001). Perceived probability of
disallowance affected both descriptive norms (standardized
path coefficient = .221, p \ .001) and injunctive norms
(standardized path coefficient = .229, p \ .001). This rela-
tionship indicates that if participants viewed that they would
be able to ‘‘get away with’’ cheating on their tax return if
audited, they had less favorable social norms toward com-
pliance. Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) proposed a similar
relationship, and predicted that those with a greater opportu-
nity to cheat would have less favorable social norms toward
complying. While a significant relationship did not emerge in
their study, our results indicate that a perception that one can
get away with cheating has a stronger influence on norms than
simply having the opportunity to cheat.
Second, several attitudinal variables also influenced per-
sonal norms, including risk aversion (standardized path
coefficient = .129, p \ .05), perceived probability of disal-
lowance (standardized path coefficient = .172, p \ .001),
attitude toward additional money (standardized path coeffi-
cient = -.424, p \ .001), and familiarity with the deduction
(standardized path coefficient = -.137, p \ .001). Taxpay-
ers that were more risk averse and viewed the probability of
disallowance as higher had more favorable personal norms of
tax compliance. However, taxpayers that were more likely to
agree that they would really enjoy reducing their tax bill by
$500, regardless of whether it was legal or not (attitude toward
additional money), as well as taxpayers that had past experi-
ences in taking automobile deductions (familiarity) had less
favorable personal norms. This influence of attitude toward
additional money indicates that individuals’ financial situa-
tion may play an important role in determining their internal
standards of appropriate tax compliance behavior. The
123
 Author's personal copy
464 D. D. Bobek et al.

negative path from familiarity (i.e., prior experiences in taking Table 7 Compliers versus non-compliers
a similar deduction) to personal norms indicates that taxpay- Variable Tax compliance
ers’ experience may have reduced the stigma they might
otherwise feel toward a more ‘‘generic’’ illegal behavior, and Compliers Non-compliers
(n = 82) (n = 92)
may be an indication that they were not entirely compliant in
the past.12 Collectively, these results also indicate that social Tax compliance intentions 3.42 (1.68)*** 7.00 (.00)
norms are at least partially contextually based. Personal norms .5409 (.70)*** -.5252 (.97)
Finally, as shown in Fig. 2, the path analysis results Subjective norms .4533 (.77)*** -.4356 (1.01)
show that the four social norm constructs have a strong Injunctive norms .2802 (1.03)*** -.2707 (.91)
direct or indirect influence on tax compliance behavior. Descriptive norms .3162 (.96)*** -.2483 (.96)
Based on the standardized path coefficients, strong per- Unfair 13.49 (5.25)** 15.34 (4.44)
sonal norms toward tax compliance are the most influential Disallowance 5.87 (1.76)*** 4.79 (1.91)
factor on tax compliance decisions. In the path analysis, the Money 1.46 (.97)*** 2.70 (1.79)
only attitudinal variable to directly affect tax compliance Familiarity 5.68 (2.04)** 4.95 (2.46)
decisions was perceived probability of disallowance Risk 8.43 (3.12)** 7.52 (2.82)
(standardized path coefficient = .143, p \ .05); personal Audit 17.26 (17.30) 20.46 (19.72)
norms were more than three times more influential than this
Note: All variables are described in Table 5. Dichotomous groups are
attitudinal variable, and subjective norms were more created based on median-splitting the tax compliance intentions var-
influential as well. Similarly, the relationships between the iable. Each column displays mean (standard deviations) for each
social norm constructs were much stronger than the rela- group
tionships between social norms and attitudinal variables. * Difference is significant at \ p = .10
Together, these results establish the robustness of our ** Difference is significant at \ p = .05
comprehensive social norm model for explaining tax *** Difference is significant at \ p = .01
compliance intentions.13

Additional Analysis
We performed two additional analyses to further investi-
gate our results. First, following Hanno and Violette
(1996), we examine the characteristics of taxpayers with
12
Supplemental tests indicate that descriptive norms were not more
influential for taxpayers with less familiarity with taking business
deductions for automobile expenses. However, descriptive norms
were less (more) influential for older (younger) taxpayers, providing
some evidence that descriptive norms are more likely to be referenced
in novel situations.
13
In supplemental analysis, we consider taxpayers’ perceptions of
the likelihood of compliance of Larry (the hypothetical actor in the
scenario) and the average taxpayer. These alternative path analysis
models produce similar results, with the exception of several factors.
First, personal norms and taxpayers’ perceived detection risk have no
influence on Larry or the average taxpayer’s perceived compliance.
Second, descriptive norms directly influence Larry and the average
taxpayer’s perceived compliance, while injunctive norms also directly
influence the perceived tax compliance of the average taxpayer. These
results suggest that, not surprisingly, personal norms only directly
influence one’s own actions, whereas descriptive norms have a
stronger influence on what people think that other people would do in
a situation. These findings provide additional construct validity
regarding the study’s social norm variables. Theoretically, personal
norms should only be related to one’s own behavior, while descriptive
and injunctive norms directly relate to what one thinks the average
taxpayer will do.
high and low levels of compliance by comparing the social
norms and attitudinal measures of these two groups. We
split the respondents into two groups based on the median
level of compliance (6.0 on a 7-point scale) and then cal-
culated the mean (standard deviation) level of social norms
and attitudinal variables for those in the ‘‘high compliance’’
and ‘‘low compliance’’ groups (see Table 7). Confirming
the results of our path analysis, the largest differences
between compliers and non-compliers are due to different
levels of social norms.
Second, in untabulated analyses, we find that individuals
with more favorable social norms (all four types) toward
compliance are less likely to view the tax system as unfair,
and are less likely to enjoy additional money even if it were
illegal. Further, those with more favorable personal and
subjective norms are more risk averse and those with more
favorable injunctive and descriptive norms are more likely
to think the probability of audit is high. Demographic
factors (e.g., education, age, income, etc.) were not related
to social norms or tax compliance, with the exception that
those with more favorable descriptive norms tend to be
more educated.
Limitations
The results of this study should be interpreted in light of the
study’s potential limitations. First, as this research dealt
with a type of illegal behavior, it is possible that

123
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms
respondents did not report their level of tax compliance
intentions honestly. Furthermore, they reported their per-
ceptions of the various social norms of tax compliance and
thus some bias could be introduced. However, we also
measured participants’ propensity to overclaim to control
for potential social desirability bias (Randall and Fernandes
1991). Overclaiming did not affect the results for our study,
and it therefore is unlikely that the interpretation of the
results suffers from extensive social desirability bias.14
Furthermore, as part of an initial pilot test, we asked
respondents if they felt like could ‘‘answer the questions in
the questionnaire truthfully (e.g., did you feel like your
identity was sufficiently protected?)’’. All but one respon-
dent responded ‘‘yes.’’
Second, generalization of results should be done with
caution, as subjects were not obtained through a random
sampling method and thus may not be representative of the
population at large. In addition, due to their willingness to
participate in the study, participants may have been more
cooperative than the average person. As our study exam-
ined the interrelationships between social norms and tax
compliance, though, results are unlikely to be affected by
this limitation. Our taxpayer sample was also more likely
to be female, slightly older, better educated, and had a
higher income than the US national population. However,
as higher income taxpayers may have more opportunities to
cheat, understanding the factors influencing their tax
compliance behavior is important.
Conclusions and Future Research
The purpose of this study was to clarify the influence of
social norms on taxpayer compliance. By drawing on
Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) taxonomy of social norms, we
provide more specificity to what is meant when researchers
attribute an effect to ‘‘social norms.’’ We synthesized the
findings of prior research with respect to this taxonomy and
developed a comprehensive model that examined the direct
and indirect influences of the social norm constructs on tax
compliance behavior. In all, our study examines the influ-
ence of social norms on tax compliance with greater depth
and specificity than prior research.
14
Overclaiming is a measure of social desirability bias that assesses
participants’ propensity to claim knowledge of false items. We used
the 10-item overclaiming scale developed by Randall and Fernandes
(1991), in which participants indicated their familiarity with 25 items
(such as music, movies, etc.)—with 15 real items and 10 fake items.
The overclaiming scale only includes responses to the 10 fake items.
While participants displayed some degree of overclaiming (knowl-
edge of the fake items), inclusion of the overclaiming scale did not
change any of the reported results. Thus, results did not appear to
suffer from social desirability bias. For more details see Bobek et al.
(2011).
465
We tested our research hypotheses by obtaining
responses from experienced taxpayers regarding a hypo-
thetical compliance dilemma. Our factor analysis results
identified the four distinct social norm constructs consistent
with Cialdini and Trost’s (1998) taxonomy: personal,
subjective, injunctive, and descriptive. While all four of
these social norm constructs were significantly correlated
with tax compliance behavior, path analysis indicated that
only subjective norms and personal norms directly affected
taxpayers’ compliance intentions. Descriptive and injunc-
tive norms were related to subjective and/or personal
norms; however, they did not have a direct effect on tax
compliance intentions.
Thus, we conclude that in a setting where cheating is
possible, personal and societal norms do indeed play a
‘‘decisive role in tax compliance’’ (Alm and McKee 1998).
Based on the results of our comprehensive model, we also
conclude that personal norms play a much stronger role
than any other type of social norm, potentially because in
the US, tax returns and compliance decisions are not shared
with the public. However, subjective norms still had a
strong, direct influence, clarifying the finding of Bobek
et al. (2007). Moreover, injunctive norms, while not
directly affecting tax compliance, demonstrated a strong
influence on both personal and subjective norms; in turn,
descriptive norms shaped both injunctive and subjective
norms. We also identify a number of attitudinal variables
(e.g., fairness, risk preferences) that are related to social
norms and help clarify the factors that influence social
norms.
Our results also show that enforcement variables are
directly related to tax compliance intentions and three of
the four social norms constructs. The fact that enforcement
variables are related to the social norms constructs is
consistent with both the findings of analytical research
(e.g., Cowell 1990 and Davis et al. 2003) and tax morale
studies (e.g., Torgler 2001, 2007). Analytical studies sug-
gest that favorable social norms (particularly descriptive
norms) are dependent upon a reasonable level of enforce-
ment and the tax morale literature has identified a negative
relationship between tax morale and the shadow economy.
Furthermore, while actual audit rates for individual tax
returns in the United States are somewhere around 1 %
(www.irs.gov, 2011), our study participants perceived that,
on average, 19 % of all returns are audited—thus esti-
mating the overall audit rate at nearly 2,000 % higher than
it actually is.15 This suggests that a significant portion of
US tax revenue (all revenue not subject to third party
15
There is also a significant difference (p \ .001) between genders
in audit rate perceptions. Male participants on average believed the
audit rate is around 12 %, while female participants thought it was
more than twice that much at almost 25 %.
123
 Author's personal copy
466
informational reporting) is dependent upon both a false
sense of the audit rate and positive social norms toward
compliance. Understanding how external actions can
influence social norms may be critical to increasing and
maintaining compliance levels and reducing the tax gap.
Thus, we believe that this study provides a springboard for
future tax researchers to experiment with ways to improve
compliance norms and thereby improve tax compliance
behavior. The fact that social norms are such a strong influence
on tax compliance suggests that changing these norms is a
fruitful avenue to pursue for increasing tax compliance. This is
echoed by Alm and Torgler (2011), who discuss the impor-
tance of ethics to tax compliance and identify three different
paradigms for increasing tax compliance. In addition to the
traditional enforcement paradigm (higher audit and penalty
rates) and a service paradigm (simplifying the tax system,
improving taxpayer education and taxpayer assistance), they
also emphasize the importance of a trust paradigm which they
argue is an ‘‘essential but largely neglected strategy’’ (p. 647).
They describe a trust paradigm as a ‘‘governmental-induced
change in the culture of paying taxes’’ (p. 647). The specific
activities they recommend are consistent with a strategy that
targets social norms. For example they recommend using the
‘‘mass media to reinforce tax compliance as the ethical form of
behavior’’ and ‘‘enlisting other organizations to promote
compliance, so that it is seen … that paying taxes is the
accepted and ethical pattern of behavior [emphasis added]’’
(p. 647). Further, they recommend that the government ‘‘avoid
leading individuals to think cheating is ‘okay’’’ and argue that
a tax amnesty program is an example of sending a wrong
message to taxpayers. Moreover, educational and media
programs designed to strengthen social norms and tax com-
pliance behavior are likely to be more cost effective than
enforcement variables, as hiring additional IRS auditors,
lawyers and judges to increase tax compliance is expensive.
While the usefulness of moral suasion (such as governmental
moral or normative appeals) on tax compliance remains an
open question (e.g., Torgler 2004; Hasseldine et al. 2007), as
does the usefulness of moral appeals compared to educational
campaigns or increased penalties (e.g., Sanders et al. 2008),
we feel that the comprehensive picture provided by our study
on the role of social norms on tax compliance may enable
researchers to reexamine the effectiveness of moral suasion
and other governmental tactics.
Future researchers may also wish to examine how social
norms are affected by specific governmental actions or policy.
Taxpayers may have a positive view of some ‘‘good’’ gov-
ernment programs (e.g., interstate highways, public trans-
portation, national parks, and public health and food safety)
compared to other ‘‘bad’’ government programs that are often
characterized by waste, fraud, and inefficiencies. These per-
ceptions, too, may affect social norms and tax compliance
behavior. Similarly, all taxes are not viewed the same by
123
D. D. Bobek et al.
taxpayers and this may affect the likelihood that they pay the
tax. Some may be perceived to be ‘‘good’’ taxes (e.g., income
taxes) while others may be perceived to be ‘‘bad’’ taxes (e.g.,
sales tax on internet purchases in the US). Future research
should also consider different types of taxes (e.g., sales and
use taxes, gift taxes), different tax laws with different pro-
pensities to cheat (e.g., earned income credit, home office
deduction), and examine broader samples.
Acknowledgments We thank participants at the 2010 AAA Annual
Meeting, 2010 ABO Research Conference and workshop participants
at the University of Central Florida and Kansas State University for
their helpful comments. We are also very grateful for the helpful
feedback from Robin Roberts, Michael Roberts (discussant at the
AAA Annual Meeting), Alisa Brink (discussant at the ABO Research
Conference), Tanya Benford and two anonymous reviewers; and for
the assistance of Jillian Phillips and Marcye Hampton in the collec-
tion of the experimental data.
Appendix
Text of Experimental Scenario
Larry Brown is a 40-year-old married father of two boys.
He has his own small business and his wife, Laura, works
part-time. In addition to working in his business, he is the
coach for his son’s Little League baseball team.
Larry prepares his own income tax return. Larry uses his
personal automobile for both business and personal rea-
sons. The tax laws provide that automobile expenses are
deductible to the extent the automobile is used for business.
In preparing his income tax return, Larry determines that
the automobile was used 60 % for business. However,
Larry also calculates if he FALSELY claimed it was used
80 % for business, his deduction would increase by $2,000,
and he would save $500 in taxes.
Measurement of Individual and Attitudinal Control
Variables
Perceived probability of detection was measured with
several different items. Two of the responses were on a
7-point Likert scale with 1 = very unlikely and 7 = very
likely. The items were: ‘‘If you claimed the ADDITIONAL
$2,000 deduction in automobile expenses, how likely do
you think it would be that you would be audited by the
IRS?’’(mean response of 3.91), and ‘‘If you claimed the
ADDITIONAL $2,000 deduction and were audited by the
IRS, how likely is it the deduction would be disallowed?’’
(mean response of 5.30). We also measured participants’
perceptions of the percentage of taxpayers who ‘‘DO
FUDGE on their taxes’’ that are caught by the IRS; this
item was measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 %
(1) to 100 % (11) (average response of 3.58 out of 11,
 Author's personal copy
Role of Social Norms
corresponding to *25 %). Finally, we also measured
participants’ perceptions of the percentage chance that their
most recent federal income tax return would be audited
(average response of 14 %) and their perceptions of the
percentage of all returns audited annually (average
response of 19 %).
Including all items on a scale together did not result in a
sufficient level of scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of
0.388). Factor analysis indicated two distinct constructs:
the general probability of being audited, and whether
participants would be able to ‘‘get away’’ with cheating
(disallowance). As ‘‘overall audit rate’’ and ‘‘perceived
likelihood of disallowance’’ had the highest item loadings
on the rotated factors, these variables were retained for
additional analysis.
Risk aversion was measured on an 11-point Likert scale
as, ‘‘If you want to claim a deduction, but the tax law is
unclear, how CERTAIN (as a percentage) would you want
to be that the IRS would allow the deduction before you
would deduct it?’’ with 1 = 0 % and 11 = 100 % (mean
response of 7.95).
Inclusive identification (sense of pride in the American
community) was measured with two items; each item used
a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = do not agree at all and
7 = agree completely: ‘‘Being a member of the American
community is important to me’’ (mean response of 6.56)
and ‘‘I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the
American community’’ (mean response of 6.40). When
including these two items together on a scale, Cronbach’s
alpha is 0.885; thus, the sum of these two items was used in
the analyses.
Fairness was originally measured with six items, coded
with higher values indicating greater degrees of perceived
unfairness: ‘‘1. Federal income taxes are fair to people in
my particular income situation,’’ ‘‘2. Federal income tax
laws are fair to most people,’’ ‘‘3. Compared to other
people like me, I pay more than my fair share of taxes,’’ ‘‘4.
I think that the interest of people in my income group are
well represented when Congress considers tax law chan-
ges,’’ ‘‘5. I think the federal income tax system benefits the
rich and is unfair to the working man and woman,’’ and ‘‘6.
Many people fudge on their taxes because they think the
tax laws are unfair to them.’’ However, including all six
fairness items on a scale does not result in acceptable scale
validity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68). Reliability analysis
indicates that only items 1, 2, and 4 should be included in
the scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). Thus, the fairness
variable used in the analyses was the sum of the responses
to these three items.
Attitude toward additional money was measured on a
7-point Likert scale as the response to, ‘‘I would really
enjoy reducing my tax bill by $500, regardless of whether
467
it was illegal or not,’’ with 1 = strongly disagree and
7 = strongly agree (mean response of 2.11).
Familiarity (how often participants had taken an auto-
mobile deduction in the past) was measured on a 7-point
Likert scale with 1 = never and 7 = very often (mean
response of 2.71).
References
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55, 179–211.
Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D., Yurak, T. J., &
Vredenburg, D. S. (1995). Personal contact, individuation, and
the better-than-average effect. Interpersonal Relations and
Group Processes, 68(5), 804–825.
Alm, J., McClelland, G., & Schulze, W. (1999). Changing the social
norm of tax compliance by voting. KYKLOS, 52(2), 141–171.
Alm, J., & McKee, M. (1998). Extending the lessons of laboratory
experiments on tax compliance to managerial and decision
economics. Managerial and Decision Economics, 19, 259–275.
Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2011). Do ethics matter: Tax compliance and
morality. Journal of Business Ethics, 101, 635–651.
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance.
Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2), 818–860.
Blanthorne, C., & Kaplan, S. (2008). An egocentric model of the
relations among the opportunity to underreport, social norms,
ethical beliefs, and underreporting behavior. Accounting, Orga-
nizations and Society, 33(7/8), 684–703.
Bobek, D., & Hatfield, R. (2003). An investigation of the theory of
planned behavior and the role of moral obligation in tax
compliance. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 15, 13–38.
Bobek, D. D., Hageman, A. M., & Kelliher, C. F. (2011). The social
norms of tax compliance: Scale development, social desirability
and presentation effects. Advances in Accounting Behavioral
Research, 15, 37–66.
Bobek, D. D., Roberts, R. W., & Sweeney, J. T. (2007). The social
norms of tax compliance: Evidence from Australia, Singapore,
and the United States. Journal of Business Ethics, 74(1), 49–64.
Brown, A., & Moodie, C. (2009). The influence of tobacco marketing
on adolescent smoking intentions via normative beliefs. Health
Education Research, 24(4), 721–733.
Christensen, A. L., & Hite, P. A. (1997). A study of the effect of
taxpayer risk perceptions on ambiguous compliance decisions.
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 19(1), 1–18.
Cialdini, R., & Goldstein, N. (2004). Social influence: Compliance
and conformity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591–621.
Cialdini, R., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms,
conformity, and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. Boston:
Oxford University Press.
Clapp, J., Lange, J., Russell, C., Shillington, A., & Voas, R. (2003). A
failed norms social marketing campaign. Journal of Studies on
Alcohol, 64, 409–414.
Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the Government. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Crandall, C. (1988). Social contagion of binge eating. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 588–598.
Davis, J., Hecht, G., & Perkins, J. (2003). Social behaviors,
enforcement, and tax compliance dynamics. The Accounting
Review, 78(1), 39–69.
123
 Author's personal copy
468
Goldstein, N., Cialdini, R., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a
viewpoint: Using social norms to motivate environmental
conservation in hotels. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(3),
472–482.
Hanno, D. M., & Violette, G. R. (1996). An analysis of moral and
social influences on taxpayer behavior. Behavioral Research in
Accounting, 8, 57–75.
Hasseldine, J., Hite, P., James, S., & Toumi, M. (2007). Persuasive
communications: Tax compliance enforcement strategies for
sole proprietors. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(1),
171–194.
Hechter, M., & Opp, K. (Eds.). (2001). Social Norms. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Henderson, B., & Kaplan, S. (2005). An examination of the role of
ethics in tax compliance decisions. Journal of the American
Taxation Association, 27(1), 39–72.
Kallgren, C., Reno, R., & Cialdini, R. (2000). A focus theory of
normative conduct: When norms do and do not affect behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(8), 1002–1012.
Kaplan, S., Newberry, K., & Reckers, P. M. (1997). The effect of
moral reasoning and educational communications on tax evasion
intentions. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 19(2),
38–54.
Korobow, A., Johnson, C., & Axtell, R. (2007). An agent-based
model of tax compliance with social networks. National Tax
Journal, 60(3), 589–604.
Mason, J. D., & Levy, L. G. (2001). The use of the latent construct
method in behavioral accounting research: The measurement of
client advocacy. Advances in Taxation, 13, 123–139.
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation
to respond without prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75(3), 811–832.
Pommerehne, W., Hart, A., & Frey, B. (1994). Tax morale, tax
evasion, and the choice of tax policy instruments in different
political systems. Public Finance, 49(Supplement), 52–69.
Porcano, T., & Price, C. (1993). The effects of social stigmatization
on tax evasion. Advances in Taxation, 5, 197–217.
Randall, D. M., & Fernandes, M. (1991). The social desirability
response bias in ethics research. Journal of Business Ethics,
10(11), 805–817.
Reckers, P. M. J., Sanders, D. L., & Roark, S. J. (1994). The influence
of ethical attitudes on taxpayer compliance. National Tax
Journal, 47(4), 825–836.
123
View publication stats
D. D. Bobek et al.
Sanders, D. L., Reckers, P. M. J., & Iyer, G. S. (2008). Influence of
accountability and penalty awareness on tax compliance. Journal
of the American Taxation Association, 30(2), 1–20.
Scholz, J., & Pinney, N. (1995). Duty, fear, and tax compliance: The
heuristic basis of citizenship behavior. American Journal of
Political Science, 39(2), 490–512.
Schultz, P., Nolan, J., Cialdini, R., Goldstein, N., & Griskevicius, V.
(2007). The constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power
of social norms. Psychological Science, 18(5), 429–434.
Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (2004). A beginner’s guide to
structural equation modeling. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influence on altruism. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 10, pp. 221–279). New York: Academic Press.
Slemrod, J., & Bakija, J. (2008). Taxing ourselves: A citizen’s guide
to the debate over taxes (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Torgler, B. (2001). Is tax evasion never justifiable? Journal of Public
Finance and Public Choice, XIX, 143–168.
Torgler, B. (2002). Speaking to theorists and searching for facts: Tax
morale and tax compliance in experiments. Journal of Economic
Surveys, 16(5), 657–683.
Torgler, B. (2004). Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy?
Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland.
Economics of Governance, 5, 235–253.
Torgler, B. (2007). Tax compliance and tax morale. Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
US Department of Treasury. (2009). Update on reducing the tax gap and
improving voluntary compliance (July 8). http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf. Accessed 27
July 2011.
Webley, P., Cole, M., & Eidjar, O. (2001). The prediction of self-reported
and hypothetical tax-evasion: Evidence from England France, and
Norway. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22, 141–155.
Weisbach, D. A., & Plesko, G. A. (2007). A legal perspective on
unanswered questions in tax research. The Journal of the
American Taxation Association, 29(2), 107–113.
Wenzel, M. (2004). An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 25, 213–228.
Wenzel, M. (2005). Motivation or rationalization? Causal relations
between ethics, norms, and tax compliance. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 26, 491–508.