Lecture Notes:
What are Fallacies?
o Errors in arguments which renders it invalid/unsound, etc.
o Two Classes of Fallacy:
Formal Fallacy
The error in the argument consists in a faulty logical structure (i.e. the prob-
lem is with the actual 'logical architecture' of the argument - how the argu-
ment is designed in terms of the move from the premises to the conclusion)
(the architectural move from premises to argument)
Informal Fallacy
Errors in arguments that consist in a variety of bad rhetorical moves by the
speaker (next week) (errors in communicating the argument itself)
o (Formal Fallacy: Patterns of argument whose reasoning makes purely logical mis-
takes)
o With formal fallacies - if one commits such an error, it immediately constitutes, from
the deductive reasoning perspective, an invalid argument. (each type of fallacy con-
stitutes an invalid argument)
o 5 classes of formal fallacies:
Formal Fallacies (I): Affirming the Consequent
o Standard two-step argument structure to show the form of this structure:
1. P -> Q
2. Q
3. Therefore, P.
P serves as the antecedent of the material condition (the 'if' part of the
clause)
Q serves as the consequence of the material implication clause (the 'then'
part of the sentence)
Fallacy is present in the affirmation of the consequence (Q).
1. IF Nikki Minaj is a woman (P) THEN Nikki Minaj is a human being (Q)
2. Nicki Minaj is a human being (Q)
C. Therefore, Nicki Minaj is a woman (P)
Not all human beings are women.
1. IF Paul is a philosopher, THEN Paul is wise
2. Paul is wise
3. Therefore, Paul is a philosopher
Not all wise people are philosophers.
(prima facie) This looks like a valid (and sound) argument, but it is in fact an
invalid argument.
The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. (There is a
possibility for the premises to be true and the conclusion false)
Affirming the Consequent VS Modus Ponens (I)
o Two similar looking arguments
o Affirming the Consequent is the fallacious version of Modus Ponens
o Modes Ponens is a valid argument form:
1. P -> Q
2. P
3. Therefore, Q
Formal Fallacies (II): Denying the Antecedent
1. P -> Q
2. ~ P
C. Therefore, ~ Q
Start with P implies Q
Negating proposition P ('it is not the case that P is true) - the denial of the
antecedent itself
Conclusion is therefore the negation of the consequence
1. IF Kim Kardashian is not married to Kanye West (P), THEN she supports Donald
Trump (Q)
2. Kim Kardashian is married to Kanye West (~ P)
C. Therefore, Kim Kardashian does not support Donald Trump (~ Q)
Kim Kardashian can support Donald Trump even when she is not married to
Kanye West
1. IF it is raining, then there are clouds
2. It is not raining
C. Therefore, there are no clouds
There can be clouds when it's not raining - therefore, the conclusion does
not follow the premises.
Again, This looks like a valid (and sound) argument, but it is in fact an in-
valid argument.
The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. (The rela-
tionship between the premises and the conclusion in this particular context
is not one of truth preservation)
Denying the Antecedent VS Modus Tollens (II)
o Two similar looking arguments
o Denying the Antecedent is the fallacious version of Modus Tollens
o Modes Ponens is a valid argument form:
1. P -> Q
2. ~ Q
3. Therefore, ~ P
Formal Fallacy (III): The Naturalistic Fallacy
o An interesting one because it is not as universally deemed fallacious in the way that
(I) and (II) is. - because it is subject to challenge from philosophers on the extent to
its fallaciousness
o Origins: in the landmark work of British empiricism by David Hume during the Scot-
tish Enlightenment. David Hume both in the treaties of human nature and his inquiry
concerning human understanding:
o Famously argued that one cannot derive an 'ought' obligation or a normative expres-
sion, from an 'is' statement of descriptive fact.
o Argued that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' (derived = logically descended)
o The fact that something 'is' such-and-so, argued Hume, is insufficient as a reason for
thinking that one 'ought' to act in such-and-such way.
o Hume: one cannot establish a normative (or prescriptive) claim from a purely de-
scriptive claim
These are two very logically distinct world and one cannot come from the other
1. The British Monarchy exists
C. Therefore, the British monarchy should be retained.
This one-step simple argument:
Premise 1 is a descriptive proposition and premise 2 is a normative
proposition but because there is this gap that cannot be bridged
between the two - means that premise 1 can be true but not neces-
sarily the conclusion.
Formal Fallacy (IV): The Base Rate Fallacy
o Occurs in arguments typically/commonly involving racial or gender stereotypes
o Note: not like an informal fallacy, because not a poor rhetorical move - but based
what the faulty logical architecture, the shaky ground upon which the formal struc-
ture of the argument is built.
In an ordinary discourse example:
1. Most women like shopping
2. Few non-women enjoy shopping
3. Tonie likes shopping
C. Therefore, Tonie is a woman
Clearly all true premises but false conclusion. No inherit relationship
between the premises and the conclusion
Formal Fallacy (V): The Fallacy of Composition
o Usually a fallacy which rears its head in technical discourses in metaphysics, particu-
larly in the branch of metaphysics called mereology - concerned with the metaphys-
ics of parts and the metaphysics of wholes - (the nitty gritty onto logical issues about
what makes objects the kinds of objects that they are and the relationship between
the parts of the object and the whole of the object itself)
o This fallacy involves making erroneous claims about a whole on the basis of claims
about parts of that whole.
1. This wheel is made of rubber
2. This wheel is part of Sandi's bicycle
3. Therefore, Sandi's bicycle is made of rubber
Just because some of the parts of the bicycle is made of rubber, this
does not mean the bicycle itself is made of rubber.
1. Mental states are indivisible
2. Mental states comprise the mind
C. Therefore, the mind itself is indivisible
An actual example from Descartes' meditations - when he's trying to
prove on of the arguments for substance dualism (the radical separa-
tion between mental substance and physical substance)
Just because parts of the mind is indivisible, this does not mean that
the whole of the mind itself is indivisible.
Just because you make a claim about a part, this does not mean that the whole is
just simply an aggregate of those parts themselves. This is precisely what leads
philosophers like Aristotle to say that the whole is more than some of its parts.
