CRITIQUE OF J. S.

MILL’S DETERMINISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2021.

The positivist and utilitarianist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) treats of the freedom of the
will or free will mainly in his System of Logic (first published in 1843. See chapter 2 [Of Liberty
and Necessity, pages 417-425] of volume II, book VI [On the Logic of the Moral Sciences], of
the 1868 seventh edition, published by Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, London) and in his
An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (first published in 1865. See chapter 26,
On the Freedom of the Will, pages 548-590 of the 1867 third edition, published by Longmans,
Green, Reader, and Dyer, London). Although he also the author of a well-known book, On
Liberty (1859), he states at the very beginning of this work that “the subject of this essay is not
the so-called liberty of the will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of
philosophical necessity, but civil, or social liberty, the nature and limits of the power which can
be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”1 Although he makes many affirmations
of human free will or freedom in these above works, nevertheless, Mill’s views on free will are
to be placed in the camp of the determinists or necessitarians as a form of character-
determinism, as Frederick Copleston calls it, although Henry J. Koren describes Mill’s
determinism as a form of materialistic mechanical determinism, where “understanding and
willing are purely material processes subject to the same mechanical laws which govern the
whole cosmos”2 (it is to be remembered that probably the most famous determinist in the history
of early modern philosophy, the rationalist Baruch Spinoza, had made multiple affirmations of
human free will or human freedom, but in the final analysis, grounds these inconsistent and
contradictory affirmations in a rigid determinism or necessitarianism founded upon a monistic
metaphysical pantheism of the One Substance). In fact, in his System of Logic, Mill frankly
admits that “the question, whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human
actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy concerning the freedom of the will,
which, from at least as far back as the time of Pelagius, has divided both the philosophical and
religious world. The affirmative opinion is commonly called the doctrine of Necessity, as
asserting human volitions and actions to be necessary and inevitable. The negative maintains that
the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by antecedents, but determines itself…I have
already made it sufficient apparent that the former of these opinions is that which I consider the
true one.”3 As the sensist materialist Hobbes and the monistic pantheist Spinoza are placed in the
manuals of the history of philosophy in the camp of determinism or necessitarianism, so too does
Mill belong in the camp of the determinists or necessitarians, along with thinkers such as the
rationalist Leibniz (advocate of a rationalist psychological determinism), the sensist, pan-
phenomenalist Hume, the absolute idealist and pantheistic monist Hegel, the positivist Comte,
and the transcendental voluntarist-idealist Schopenhauer. B. A. G. Fuller notes that, for Mill,
“man, being a part of nature, is subject to her uniformities. His behavior proceeds according to
the law of causation. His acts are determined by the interaction of his character and his
environment. Knowing what a given individual is like, we can predict with reasonable certainty
what he will do in given circumstances. All our dealings with our fellows are based upon the

1
J. S. MILL, On Liberty, John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, London, 1859, p. 7.
2
H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1957, p. 239.
3
J. S. MILL, System of Logic, vol. 2, seventh edition, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, London, 1868, p. 417.

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assumption of human uniformities, just as our dealings with the physical world are based upon
the ‘axiom’ of the uniformity of nature as a whole. There is then as much necessity in human
behavior as there is in physical nature…We, like nature, act in an orderly and predictable way.
But the fact that we so behave does not deprive us of our feeling of liberty…”4 Copleston
explains that as Mill “believes that all volitions or acts of the will are caused, he embraces, to this
extent at least, what he calls the doctrine of philosophical necessity. By causation he understands
‘invariable, certain and unconditional sequence,5 a uniformity of order or sequence which
permits predictability. And it is this empiricist idea of causation which he applies to human
volitions and actions.

“The causes which are relevant in this context are motives and character. Hence the
doctrine of philosophical necessity means that, ‘given the motives which are present to an
individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner
in which he will act might be unerringly inferred.’6 It is scarcely necessary to say that Mill is
referring to predictability in principle. The less knowledge we have of a man’s character and of
the motives which present themselves to his mind with varying degrees of force, the less able are
we to predict his actions in practice.

“One obvious objection to this theory is that it presupposes either that a man’s character
is fixed from the start or that it is formed only by factors which lie outside his control. In point of
fact, however, Mill is quite prepared to admit that ‘our character is formed by us as well as for
us.’7 At the same time he adds, and indeed must add if he is to preserve consistency with his
premiss about causality, that the will to shape our character is formed for us. For example,
experience of painful consequences of the character which he already possesses, or some other
strong feeling, such as admiration, which has been aroused in him, may cause a man to desire to
change his character.

“It is true that when we yield, for example, to a stray temptation, we tend to think of
ourselves as capable of having acted differently. But, according to Mill, this does not mean that
we are actually aware or conscious that we could have acted in a different manner, all other
things being equal. We are not conscious of liberty of indifference in this sense. What we are
conscious of is that we could have acted differently if we had preferred to do so, that is, if the
desire not to act in the way in which we did act or to act in a different manner had been stronger
than the desire which, as a matter of fact, operated in us and caused our choice. We can say,
therefore, if we like, that Mill embraces a theory of character-determinism…If freedom is taken
to mean that when I am faced with alternative courses of action, I could make a different choice
from the one which I actually make, even though all factors, including character, desires and
motives, are assumed to be the same, it cannot be allowed that man is free. For freedom in this
sense would be incompatible with predictability in principle: it would follow that human actions
are uncaused and random events.”8

4
B. A. G. FULLER, A History of Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1957, pp. 401-402.
5
J. S. MILL, A System of Logic, II, p. 423 (10th edition, 1879).
6
Ibid., II, p. 422.
7
Ibid., II, p. 426.
8
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book III, vol. 8, Image Doubleday, New York, 1985, pp. 44-46.

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 Answers to Determinism9

9
William A. Wallace, O.P. explains that “the will is a free power in man, basically because it is the appetite that
follows reason. Because reason can see several alternatives equally feasible as means of reaching one end, the will
has freedom to elect from among them. Thus free will is an ability characterizing man in the voluntary activity of
choosing or not choosing a limited good when this is presented to him. Such voluntary activity is also called free
choice or free decision, from the Latin expression liberum arbitrium.
“Just as the object of the intellect is the true, so the object of the will is the good. Because of this the will can be
attracted to something only so far as it recognizes it to be good. A good that can satisfy only to a limited extent is
called a particular or finite good, whereas one that can satisfy in every conceivable aspect is called the universal or
supreme good. Now it is commonly held that the human will is strictly determined in its nature toward an object
recognized intellectually as the universal good. If this is so, then freedom of choice is exercised only with regard to
objects recognized as particular goods. A man is not determined to these because particular goods can be viewed in
two opposing ways: (1) they may be seen as good, i.e., according to the proportionate good they possess when
compared to the universal good; or (2) they may be seen as lacking in good, i.e., to the extent that they lack
goodness when measured against the universal good. Thus, any finite good can be considered under an aspect of
desirability or undesirability when compared to the universal good; as desirable, it can attract the will, as
undesirable, it cannot. Not being determined by such a good, the will remains radically free to choose it or reject it.”
(W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, Staten Island, New York, 1977, p. 78).
Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap. writes that “the doctrine opposed to free will is styled determinism. According to
this doctrine, the will is not intrinsically free, but is determined by the antecedent psychical and physical conditions
and causes to act as it does; it is necessitated in its volition.”(C. BITTLE, The Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956,
p. 381).
Explaining freedom in the strict sense, Bittle states: “In the strict sense, freedom means the absence of intrinsic
necessity or determination in the performance of an act. Something is ‘intrinsically necessary,’ when it is
determined by its very nature to be what it is and to act as it does. This type of ‘freedom’ applies to the will when we
speak of ‘free will,’ and we mean that the will is free from intrinsic necessity or determination in at least some of its
acts. Hence, when it is said that the will is ‘free,’ it is implied that the will is not necessitated by its nature to act in a
determined manner, but is capable of choice even when all the conditions for acting are present.”(C. N. BITTLE,
op. cit., p. 378).
Raymond J. Anable, S.J.’s Defense of Freedom of Choice. “Freedom of choice. N.B. This is the type of freedom
we shall vindicate for some of man’s (his deliberate) acts of will. This type of freedom means immunity from
internal coaction or restraint; and when we claim this freedom for man’s deliberate acts of will, we mean that this
faculty is of such a nature that even when it is proximately prepared for action, the will is such by its very nature that
it can act or not act, can act in this way or in that. The phrase ‘freedom of choice’ is an apt one, for it is the power of
a choosing faculty, the power to take a course of action or to refuse to take it, or to take one course of action rather
than another.
“Freedom of choice means that the will, even when proximately disposed for action, can choose either to act or
not to act. When is the will ‘proximately disposed for action’? As we saw in Chapter XI, the will can act only when
a good, apprehended by the intellect, is presented to it. Immediately following such an apprehended reasonable
good, there is an indeliberate, necessary (non-free) act of will, an act of inclination towards that object, if it is
apprehended as reasonable good, or an act of aversion from it, if it is apprehended as non-good, or evil. But, has the
will, besides these indeliberate acts which necessarily follow intellectual apprehension, another type of act in which
even in the presence of apprehended reasonable good, it is not determined or necessitated by its own internal nature?
It has such acts, and these are its deliberate acts.
“Let us examine this basic notion in a concrete case. You have $10,000, and a car salesman considers you a ready
prey. He talks to you about his latest streamlined model. On the supposition that you have no car, but that you are at
least faintly interested in having a car – and on the further supposition that you are reasonable – what is your psychic
state during and immediately after that sales-talk? The car is desirable, and almost irresistible, as you listen to the
salesman. That urge, or impulse, or strong inclination to buy, which you are conscious of, is an indeliberate, non-
free act of your will, a conscious inclination towards an intellectually apprehended good. You may, without second
thought, act impulsively and toss the agent your $10,000, as you drive away, even before the agent comes to the end
of his appealing sales-talk. But, if you are reasonable, you will never forget, even during the sales-talk, that you
cannot have the car and your $10,000. Now the car is apprehended as evil, or non-good, in the sense that its
acquisition means parting with your hard-earned money. And following that thought, you will be conscious of

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another urge, or indeliberate act of your will, an act of aversion: another necessary, non-free act of your will. Now,
as you intellectually ponder both sides of the ‘bargain,’ you are conscious of these conflicting acts of will. Now the
will must choose: this act of will is going to be ‘deliberate,’ for it follows intellectual deliberation, or the pondering
of the good and the non-good involved in your eventual choice. And this act of the will, we shall show, is free, i.e.,
even with this intellectually apprehended good before it, and hence, proximately disposed for action, there is nothing
in the nature of the will itself which makes it choose one of these alternatives rather than the other.
“…Antecedent Psychic Acts Necessary for an Act of Free Choice. Recall that an act of will is a conscious
inclination towards an intellectually apprehended good or a conscious aversion from an object intellectually
apprehended as evil. Hence, there is required: (1) Conscious attention for any act of will. (2) Deliberation for any
will-act of free choice. The object, we have seen, in itself has aspects of both good and non-good, but unless I
apprehend both of these aspects, there is no possibility of my choosing. Intellectual deliberation makes me aware of
the objective indifference of the particular good before me, or of at least some of the reasons for and against my
choosing this object. If the object is apprehended under one aspect only, v.g., as good, there follows, and must
follow, the indeliberate conscious inclination towards that object. Conversely, if the object is apprehended only
under the aspect of non-good, there is an indeliberate, necessary act of will-aversion from the object. Deliberation –
or the apprehension of both aspects – proximately prepares the will for its deliberate act. And this is only another
way of saying that this subsequent act of will is deliberate, in the sense that it follows mental deliberation…
“Evidence for Freedom of Deliberate Acts of Will…The Metaphysical Argument. This is an a priori argument,
but a cogent one, as indeed are all valid metaphysical arguments. We shall argue to the freedom of our rational
appetitive faculty from the nature of the will and its relation to intellectual deliberation.
“In intellectual apprehension I can and do become aware of the objective indifference, or the aspects of both
good and non-good in this particular object, course of action, etc. In other words, in any and every object which I
consider, I apprehend that this particular object is good, but not good in every respect, that its goodness is desirable,
but simultaneously that its goodness is limited, and hence, not compelling. To conclude from this that we must in
consequence have a faculty of free choice as the natural supplementary power of intellect, is a priori argument, if
you will, but it does show clearly why the rational appetitive faculty which we have, should be free in its deliberate
acts.
“It would be absurd to postulate a faculty which at one and the same time could have reasonable good for its
formal object, and still be free to choose or reject perfectly apprehended infinite (i.e., irresistible) good. But it is
equally absurd to maintain that our rational appetitive faculty should have to choose that good which here and now
we apprehend as non-good in one or many respects. Hence, the fact that our rational cognitive power shows us every
particular good as non-irresistible – simultaneously as good and non-good – is indicative both of the basic reason
for, and the ontological necessity of freedom for the will in its deliberate acts.
“Metaphysical Proof for the Freedom of Deliberate Acts of Will. If intellectual deliberation has any purpose
(ratio essendi), the will must have freedom of choice in its deliberate acts ; But, intellectual deliberation has
supreme purpose ; Therefore, the will has freedom of choice in its deliberate acts.
“Proof of the Minor: It is unquestioned and unquestionable that man acts as man – reasonably – only subsequent
to deliberation. Hence, deliberation has supreme purpose or significance in human life.
“Proof of the Major: In every act of deliberation I become aware of the objective indifference, or simultaneous
aspects of good and non-good, in this particular object. But the will, as a faculty whose formal object is rational
good, cannot be forced to choose what is presented to it as non-good. This would involve a contradiction in the
nature or being of the will itself.
“The contradiction in the nature of the will, if the will were not free in its deliberate acts, may be stated thus: a)
the will would be necessitated by a “good” which (as deliberation makes clear) is presented to it as non-
necessitating. Thus, if forced by its nature, v.g., to take the “good,” it would be forced by its nature to take what by
its very nature it must avert from: or, putting the same contradiction in still another way, b) the result of intellectual
deliberation is that the will is moved or pulled by its very nature in two ways
< ---------- and ---------- >
and this is as far as its nature itself takes it. Therefore, its nature cannot at the same time take it only one way
< ---------------
or
-------------- >

“Yet, subsequent to deliberation, in this life, every good presented to the will (either because of its contingent,
finite nature, or because of our imperfect cognition of it), is simultaneously presented as non-good. Therefore, the

4
only purpose of deliberation must be to present to the will a good which, as simultaneously non-good, cannot
compel a faculty whose formal object is rational good.
“Hence, in a particular will act, subsequent to deliberation, the ‘determinatio ad unum’ (the determination to do
A rather than not to do A), cannot have been made by the object as presented by the intellect, nor by the nature of
the will as such.
“Then, ‘I,’ de-facto freely choose or make this determination rather than that one. And since ‘I’ do this through
my faculty which seeks rational good, we refer this freedom to the will itself.”(R. J. ANABLE, Philosophical
Psychology, Fordham University Press-Declan X. McMullen Co., New York, 1952, pp. 193-195, 197-199, 203-
204).
Defenses of Free Will by Gardeil, O.P. and Royce, S.J.: H. D. Gardeil, O.P.’s Defense of Free Will: “a) The
Requirements of Morality. – No free will, no morality! It would be easy to elaborate on this theme, which, so far as
it goes, does constitute a most valuable argument. But whatever else may be said on this score, St. Thomas has given
us the wholesum and substance of it in the following terse rejoinder: ‘I answer that man has free will: otherwise
counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.’(Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 83, a. 1, c.). To this, nothing material could be added.
“b) The Nature of the Free Act. – The pivotal argument for free will, however, the one that stays all others, is
based on the nature of the free act itself. Admittedly, it is conscious experience that reveals this act to us, but only
when this experience is put through the crucible of metaphysical analysis does the testimony of consciousness
become a decisive argument. Hence, also, the custom of referring to the present argument as the metaphysical proof,
or the proof from the nature of the will.
“For the basic explanation of the free act St. Thomas always appeals to the rational nature of man, particularly
and more directly to his faculty of judgment. Some beings act without the power of judgment; others, through the
intervention of a judgment. If the judgment is instinctive, not resulting from rational insight, as in the case of brute
animals, then there can be no freedom in the act. But if, as in the case of man, the judgment derives from
deliberation and comparison instituted by reason, then the ensuing act is a product of free will. This power of free
determination is possible because in contingent matters, in judgments that are not intrinsically necessary, reason may
take any of several opposite courses. Since human actions have to do with particular matters, and since these matters
as performable are contingent realities, man’s reason can form various practical judgments concerning them, none of
the judgments being determined or necessary. In short, the freedom of man’s will is a necessary consequence of his
rational nature. St. Thomas presents the argument as follows: ‘Man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive
power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But, because this judgment in the case of some
particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from
free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow
opposite courses…Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason
may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that
man have free will.’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1).
“With respect to the subject or agent, therefore, freedom has its source in reason; with respect to the object, it lies
in the contingent or particular nature of the goods confronting the agent. In terms of the object we may, as St.
Thomas often does, state the argument of free will as follows: In face of contingent or particular goods the will
remains free; only the absolute or universal good necessarily moves it. These two proofs, moreover, the one from the
object and the other from the rational nature of man, are complementary, since the human or free act is the product
of the reciprocal application of intellect and will.
“As for the experience or consciousness of freedom which is often invoked as an argument for free will, this
refers specifically to the awareness of the nonnecessary character of the judgments on which my eventual decision
rests. I may judge that a given means would be effective for the attainment of an end in view, and so I decide upon
it; but at the same time I am aware that the reason or motive which prompts me to act is not irresistible, or
compulsive. The good with which I am confronted is a contingent or particular good; therefore my choice cannot but
be free. In a word, my consciousness of being a free agent is the consciousness of having a reason which judges and
evaluates; it is not the feeling of an instinctive impulse coming, so to speak, from nowhere, as it is so often
imagined.
“c) Exercise and Specification. The indetermination of the will may be approached from yet another point of
view. We say that an act is free when it is not caused by a good that necessarily moves the will. But this absence of
predetermination in the will may result from two sources, from the order of exercise and from the order of
specification.

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 “For example, there may be two or more different means of arriving at a given end, say two different roads
leading to a town I want to visit. Since there is nothing in the nature of things that compels me to take one road to
the exclusion of the other, I am free to choose between them. This freedom to choose one thing over another means
that my act is free in the order of specification. But even if we suppose there is only one road, I am still free, since
my visiting the town, which necessarily requires taking the only road, is a particular good, and so does not present
itself as absolutely necessary. Consequently my will remains free to decide to go or not to go. And this power to will
or not to will is called freedom of exercise.
“It scarcely needs mentioning, moreover, that both the freedom of exercise and specification rest on the
contingent or particular character of the goods in question. From the standpoint of the agent, however, freedom of
exercise is more basic, as even without the other it is enough to guarantee freedom. But when freedom of exercise is
lacking, no free will is possible at all; whereas when specification is not free but self-imposed and necessary, as in
the case of only one means being available, the will is still free, not to choose between means, but to act or not to
act.
“d) Election (Choice) and the Practical Judgment. – As was noted earlier in examining the various steps of the
free act, intellect and will work conjointly in producing it. This reciprocal movement or determination reaches a
decisive stage at the last practical judgment. Suppose that having experienced a wish for something, I decide to
pursue it (intentio finis). Several means being available, I deliberate about them. Sooner or later I must decide upon
one. How is this final decision made? It is made by the will, but only after the intellect has judged that this particular
means should be chosen. Through the last practical judgment (judicium practicum) of the intellect, I determine the
means to be adopted, and through an act of the will I choose it (electio). In this process the judgment of the intellect
and the choice of the will are applied concurrently. Which of the two, it may be asked, is the determining factor?
The answer is that both are determining but from different points of view. In the order of specification, I have
chosen because I have judged; in the order of exercise, I have judged because I have chosen. These two steps, choice
and practical judgment, are distinct; yet it is important to bear in mind that one determines the other, each in its own
order. The free act, therefore, proceeds from intellect and will together. Since in the last analysis, however, the final
decision is made by the will through the act of choice, we say that freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as
its cause: radix libertatis sicut subjectum est voluntas, sed sicut causa est ratio. (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 17, a. 1,
ad 2).”(H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 [Psychology], B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1959, pp. 212-216).
James E. Royce, S.J.’s Defense of Free Will: “Proofs of Freedom: Freedom from External Necessity. That the
will is not subjected to coercion by an external efficient cause hardly needs proof. The act of the will is by its very
nature an inclination, and coercion means that one is made to act contrary to his inclination. A forced act of will is a
contradiction. The only thing which can move the will to act is a motive, and motive is not an efficient cause. The
will cannot be forced to elicit its own act (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, a. 82, a. 1).
“Freedom from Internal Necessity. The real problem is the elimination of psychological determinism, or
necessitation by the very motives which the intellect presents to the will. Ordinarily three proofs are given. The first
is by far the most important, for it flows from an analysis of the relation of intellect and will, and the role of the
indifferent judgment in the act of choice. Properly understood, it automatically answers most objections against
moderate indeterminism.
“1. From Indifferent Judgments (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1 ; De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1). Will is
determined only to the extent that intellect determines it ; But intellect does not determine will with regard to the
finite goods seen as finite ; Therefore will is not determined with regard to finite goods seen as such.
“The major premise of this proof flows from the fact that will follows intellect: appetition follows cognition, and
the inclination of the will must correspond to the intellectual judgments which elicit it.
“The minor premise simply examines the nature of the intellectual judgments which the will follows. Finite
goods are seen as not good in every respect, and therefore rejectable. Since the intellect is capable of knowing the
universal good, it recognizes any particular good as contingent or non-necessitating. I can have adequate reason
(even God himself as now known) for doing something, but the reason does not tell me that I cannot do otherwise.
Therefore I am free to determine whether or not I shall act because of this motive.
“This indifferent or undetermined judgment regarding eligible goods is sometimes called changeable, but this is
misleading. It suggests that the judgment is a determining motive right now, but that upon further information the
judgment might change. This theory does not escape psychological determinism, for it could be argued that the
further information then determines. Rather, right here and now with the information available I know that this good
is nonnecessary, and that another alternative is possible. Again, the judgment is not free (active), since the intellect

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cannot help but know what it knows. But what is known in this instance is that this act is choosable but rejectable;
therefore the ultimate practical judgment to choose or reject it is determinable (passive) by the will.
“2. From Direct Experience. …the act of choice seems to be as much a matter of phenomenological observation
as any other psychological fact. Choices and decisions are as much a part of everyday experience as perceptions,
images, or thinking. The capacity for freedom may be a matter of inference, but the experience of choice is an
empirical datum to be observed and analyzed; the only alternative is the theory that this experience is a universal
mass illusion, which in turn becomes a fact which must be explained. Whatever metaphysical implications are
involved in its explanation, the fact seems inescapable.
“Before choice, I am conscious of the alternatives before me, and that I see them as non-necessitating. The whole
process of deliberation is nonsense if the decision is already determined.
“During choice, I am conscious that I actively determine the course to be taken. This experience of the actual
domination we exercise over the act of choice has been called by psychologists ‘the active interposition of the ego.’
Although not open to quantitative measurement (Cf. R. C. McCARTHY, S.J., The Measurement of Conation,
Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1926), what we experience here is not a mere lack of necessitation or an
ignorance of motivating factors, but a positive exertion of influence on the part of the self…
“After choice, we experience remorse, self-approval, and other evidences of a sense of responsibility. We are
oftern clearly aware of the difference between hitting a person accidentally and deliberately. No matter how sorry
we feel over the former, we do not feel responsible or guilty, as we would in the latter instance. We are quite
conscious of whether or not the act flowed from a deliberate choice on our part, and this is reflected in such
expressions as ‘I decided,’ ‘I made up my mind,’ ‘I made a choice,’ or ‘I yielded.’
“3. From Moral and Legal Obligation. Those who admit moral obligation or legal responsibility must logically
admit that man is not completely the victim of determining forces. If a person cannot do otherwise, it is absurd to
hold him responsible for what happens. Obligation involves both the possibility of my doing something and the fact
that I am not forced to do it. Our entire legal system and administration of justice rests on this foundation. There
would be no point in an elaborate trial to ascertain whether or not the alleged murderer were sane unless there was a
difference between the normal man who can exercise free choice and the person in whom some abnormality
prevents this. The same argument holds for the notion of merit and reward. Why praise a man for doing something
unless he could have done otherwise?…”(J. E. ROYCE, S.J., Man and His Nature, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961,
pp. 204-207).
Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M., Cap.’s Critiques of Various Kinds of Determinism: “1. Unconsciousness of Freedom.
“John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) voices an objection against the freedom of the will on psychological grounds. He
contends that we cannot be conscious of this freedom. To be conscious that we are free in our volition, it would be
required, before we act, that we be conscious of the fact that we could really act otherwise than we do.
Consciousness, however, Mill claims, merely tells us what we actually do or feel; it never tells us what we are
capable of doing. In other words, we are conscious of the act of willing, but not of the power of willing; hence, it is
impossible to know whether the power is free or determined.
“We admit that the power of the will as such is not an object of direct consciousness. Mill, however, failed to
note that every act of volition involves the actuation of the power of the will, the fieri or developmental process of
the volitional act itself.
“In the developmental process of many volitional acts, I am conscious that they are elicited by motives, but the
motives do not determine and necessitate the acts; I myself determine the acts. I clearly perceive that I have here a
motive plus something else which makes the impulse of the motive effective; the act of the will is thus eventually
determined, not by the motive, but by the will itself. An analysis of the act of volition shows that two factors are
required: an impulse flowing from the motive which elicits, but does not compel, me to act; and a positive consent of
my will, supplementing the deficiency of the objective motive. At times, therefore, I observe that I consent to the
impulse originating from the motive, and at other times I observe that I withhold my consent to the impulse
originating from the motive; whether the act of volition is set or not set, thus depends on the active interposition of
my Ego and not merely on the presentation of the motive. So long as the process and fieri of volition is protracted
and not completed, the final decision to act or not to act, to act this way or that way, rests in my power of
determination. The will, therefore, is the master of its own determinations; and as such it is free, because the
consent, as I know from my internal experience, is a freely exercised act of the will. The experiments of Ach and
others, mentioned in the preceding chapter, have definitely revealed the Ego-in-Action in every deliberate decision.
“2. Illusion.
“Determinists frequently assert that our conviction of the freedom of the will is but an illusion based upon an
ignorance of the causes which produce the acts of the will. Since we are not conscious of the underlying causes

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which determine the will to act, we have the feeling of freedom in our acts; in reality, however, all acts of the will
are determined.
“In answer to this objection, we assert, first of all, that an appeal to ignorance is the worst sort of argument
anyone can advance. Determinists labor under this ignorance as well as the libertarians. The determinists have no
more right to suppose that the unknown causes of our voluntary acts are necessary in their operation than that they
are free; we simply could not know whether the will is free or determined under any circumstances.
“Secondly, this assertion of the determinists contradicts the experience of consciousness, and consciousness is
the ultimate source of knowledge in this matter. Our experience tells us that the ignorance of the cause of actions
occurring within us does not necessarily induce in us the conviction that this cause is free. On the contrary, when we
act on a momentary impulse and without reflection, not knowing why we act, then we are convinced that our act was
involuntary, unfree, and irresponsible. On the other hand, when we reflect upon a project with careful deliberation,
consider all its advantages and disadvantages, investigate the various means at our disposal, lay out a plan in all its
details, weigh all the motives for and against a course of action – in a word, when our knowledge is at its best – then
it is that the conviction of the freedom of the will and of its choice is greatest. It is, therefore, the incontrovertible
testimony of our consciousness that our conviction of freedom is not based on the illusion of ignorance but on the
certainty of knowledge.
“It is true, of course, that subconscious motives often influence the will. A mental act or attitude frequently brings
about the performance of an external act contrary to our resolutions. If we bear in mind, however, the conditions
required for the free exercise of the will, as stated in the first section of this chapter, it will readily be observed that
one or the other of these conditions has not been verified. No libertarian claims that all acts of the will under all
circumstances are free, but borderline cases do not invalidate the instances where the requisite conditions are clearly
perceived by consciousness to have been verified for the free exercise of the will. While many cases will always
remain doubtful, many cases of the free exercise of the will must be allowed by an unbiased observer.
“It is the verdict of our consciousness that the will is free in many of its acts. This verdict must be accepted as
true; otherwise the truth-value of our consciousness is destroyed, and skepticism is the inevitable result.
“3. The Strongest Motive.
“It is a stock argument of determinists that the strongest motive always does and always must prevail, so that the
will is intrinsically determined to yield to the strongest motive; the will, therefore, is not free in its choice.
“The objection is invalid. Since the will is an appetency and as such can strive only for what is perceived to be
good, it is obvious that the motives draw the will in proportion to the amount of value they contain. Slight values
influence the will slightly, great values influence it greatly. It is but natural, therefore, that the will, under ordinary
and normal circumstances, should and does strive for the greater value contained in the proposed motives. It would
indeed be most unusual, if this were not the case.
“The argument of the opponents, however, to be valid, must prove that man, under all conditions, is necessitated
to choose what is intellectually apprehended as possessing the greatest objective attractiveness for the will.
“It will not do to assert, as the philosopher Bain apparently asserts, that the strongest motive is the one which
actually prevails. He is guilty of a begging of the question. Certainly, the motive which is willed is the one which
prevails, and in a sense this motive is the strongest. This only means that the motive which prevails actually prevails,
but does not settle the question whether the will is determined or free in making a particular motive prevail.
“The only legitimate meaning which can be attached to the statement that ‘the strongest motive always prevails
and must prevail’ is the deterministic meaning that the objectively strongest motive must prevail; the will must
necessarily follow the motive containing, among other motives present, the more preferable good considered by the
intellect as such.
“J. Stuart Mill interprets the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which is most pleasurable, because it is the more
preferable good. He contends that the will is constrained to accept this motive and yield to it. We claim that personal
experience disproves this contention. It is not true that we always choose the course of action which is most
pleasurable. Every decent person not infrequently resists temptations, recognized to be most pleasurable, for the
sake of an ideal or from a sense of duty, conscious of the fact that yielding to the temptation would be easy and
offering resistance to it is most difficult. Soldiers and martyrs prefer death to the violation of their duty, even when
excruciating agony accompanies the performance of their duty. To uphold an ideal and to fulfill one’s duty under
such conditions is indeed the stronger motive, but only because the will makes it so; it is not more pleasurable in
itself.
“Most determinists interpret the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which, among others present before the mind,
represents the greatest good or value, without specifying whether or not it be the most pleasurable; such an object or
experience, presented as a motive, is the more preferable and as such forces the will into acceptance. The point at

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issue is this: Is the will compelled to choose the motive which the intellect proposes to it as possessing the greatest
value or attractiveness among conflicting motives, so that this particular motive has objective preference, considered
independently of any action of the will? Or on the contrary, can the will confer subjective preference on any of the
motives presented, irrespective of their objective merits, thereby making an objectively weaker motive the
strongest? In the former alternative the objectively ‘strongest’ motive prevails under all conditions, and the will is
determined in its volition; in the second alternative the will itself determines which motive shall prevail, and it
cannot be said to be determined in its volition by the (objectively) ‘strongest’ motive.
“Of course, the will in choosing always prefers one motive to another and thereby shows that this one pleases it
more than the others; but does this preference of the will correspond to the preceding judgment of the intellect as to
preferableness? If man can act in opposition to this judgment of the intellect and can prefer the weaker motive, then
he determines himself and is independent of the strength or weakness of the motives proposed by the intellect.
Herein lies the crux of the problem of free will.
“Ordinarily, the will accepts the side proposed as the better or the best; but not always. If it were really true that
the will always and necessarily prefers that which the intellect perceives to be better or best, how then can it happen
that we frequently deplore after our decision that we have ‘acted against our better judgment,’ that we have ‘acted
foolishly,’ having carelessly or obstinately disregarded what we knew to be the better or best course of action? In
many instances we act contrary to our own interests, simply because we so desire, knowing full well that we are
harming ourselves by acting according to the whim of our will rather than according to the objective merits of the
motives as recognized by the intellect.
“It is not the objectively strongest motive which prevails against the will and determines it to act; it is the act of
the will which determines which motive shall be the strongest and shall actually prevail.
“4. Influence of Character.
“Some determinists, among them Schopenhauer, Wundt, Sidgwick, and others, impugn the freedom of the will
on the grounds that every act of man is determined by his character and by the motives which influence the will at
any particular moment. Oddly enough, some of these philosophers and psychologists are reluctant to discard the
concept of man’s responsibility for his actions; they attempt to reconcile responsibility and the determinacy of
character by pointing out that ‘character’ is to a very great extent the result of man’s own actions and habits.
“Character, we admit, undoubtedly exerts a great influence on the decisions of our will. Knowing the character of
a person often enables us to predict with probability how such a person will act in a given set of circumstances.
However, we are not determined entirely in our will acts by the inherited and acquired dispositions of character.
“Here again we must appeal to personal experience. We are conscious of the weakness and faultiness of
character, of the pressure of long-standing acquired habits, of the frequency of yielding to urgent passions; but we
are also conscious that we can, though no doubt with difficulty, resist the impulses which storm the citadel of the
will. Many a drunkard and drug addict has succeeded, perhaps after frequent relapses, in conquering his reigning
passion by a persistent struggle of his will.
“It is futile for the opponents to speak of ‘responsibility’ by stating that a person’s character is the result of his
own actions and habits. If the will is not free but determined, then all the actions and habits which contribute to the
formation of character are also determined. Man cannot be held responsible for something he is incapable of doing
or avoiding. Responsibility presupposes the freedom of the will.
“5. The Principle of Causality.
“Many determinists find the freedom of the will ‘inconceivable’ and ‘unintelligible’ because, in their opinion, a
free act of the will would be an effect without a cause. They contend that a free act would violate the Principle of
Causality.
“In answer to this argument, we deny emphatically the supposition that an act of the will, merely because it is a
free act, is an effect without a cause. The Principle of Causality is a metaphysical principle, and it is immediately
evident. It states that where there is an effect there must of necessity be a cause which produces this effect; that is to
say, everything which receives being and existence must receive this being and existence from something or
somebody, because a nonexistent being cannot give being and existence to itself.
“We admit the validity of the Principle of Causality in the case of the free act of the will as an effect. A double
cause is active in its production: a moral cause, namely, the motive; and an efficient cause, namely, the Ego using
the will as power. Hence, opponents are wrong when they assert that a free act of the will violates the Principle of
Causality.
“The Principle of Causality demands that every effect must necessarily have a cause; but whether this cause acts
in a free or in a determined manner, lies outside the purview of the principle. So long as there is an efficient cause
for the effect produced, the principle is satisfied. In order that their objection be valid, determinists would have to

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prove that the Principle of Causality demands that every effect must be produced by a necessary and not by a free
cause. They arbitrarily change the meaning of the axiom that ‘Every effect must necessarily have a cause’ into the
axiom that ‘Every effect must have a necessarily acting cause.’ The latter axiom, however, involves an unwarranted
assumption which amounts to a begging of the question, because the postulate of a necessarily acting cause is the
very point at issue.”(C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 391-398).

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