Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

Mallari y Samar vs. People

Facts:

Naay mga baji nanggi away sa karaaoke bar

Gi respondiihan sa mga pulis

Ni sukol:

"WALA KAYO PAKIALAM SA AKIN HINDI AKO SASAMA SA INYO!" then she grabbed
PO2 Navarro (sic) uniform and repeatedly kicked him and slapped him on his face that
cause (sic) an injury to his person, and placed us to an embarrassing situation;

Charged: Direct Assault

Issue: WON appellant is guilty of Direct Assault. No . Only esistance or disobedience

under Article 151

Ruling:

Based on the circumstances, petitioner's resistance and use of force are not so serious
to be deemed as direct assault. While she exerted force, it is not dangerous, grave, or
severe enough to warrant the penalties attached to the crime.

In this case, petitioner is charged with the second mode of assault. Its elements are the
following:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.42
A police officer is an agent of a person in authority. 43 An agent of a person in authority is
one who, "by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay
leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority[.]" 44 Being a police
officer, PO2 Navarro is an agent of a person in authority.
Petitioner was also aware that PO2 Navarro was a police officer. He introduced himself
as one and was in his police uniform.1a₩phi1 He was performing his official duties as a
police officer when he was pacifying the melee, and right when petitioner attacked him.
Thus, the second, third, fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this
case.
However, the first element of the offense is not present.
To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force
against the agent of a person in authority must be serious.

Sidenotes:

In United States v. Gumban,45 this Court held that the amount of force employed against
agents of persons in authority spells the difference between direct assault and
resistance of disobedience:
In reaching this conclusion, we took into account the decision rendered by this court in
the case against Gelacio Tabiana and Canillas, in which it is said that the distinction
between an assault and a resistance to agents of authority lies largely in the amount of
the force employed in each case, and that a sudden blow given to a policeman while
engaged in effecting an arrest does not constitute that employment of force which is
punishable as assault. We have also considered the decision rendered by this court in
the case against Cipriano Agustin . . . in which it was also held that a blow upon a
policeman was not an aggression amounting to an assault. It must be remembered,
however, that in these two cases the crime involved was that of assault upon agents of
authority, in which the essential element is substantially the force employed. It is said in
these two cases that any force is not sufficient to constitute an assault[,] but that it is
necessary to consider the circumstances of each case to decide whether the force used
is, or is not, sufficient to constitute assault upon an agent of authority. 46 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

People of the Philippines vs. Julio Recto

G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001

• Julio Recto was convicted of multiple crimes, including direct assault and murder.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

• Charges against him were two counts of direct assault with frustrated murder for
shooting a barangay tanod and a barangay captain, direct assault with murder for killing
a barangay kagawad, and murder for the death of another individual.
• Recto pleaded not guilty to all charges but was eventually convicted and
sentenced by the trial court.
• The trial court found that Recto had fired at the barangay tanod and barangay
captain while they were performing their official duties.
• It ruled out treachery in the killing of one of the victims because there had been a
gun duel between him and Recto.
• However, it convicted Recto of murder for the killing of the barangay kagawad.
• Due to the imposition of the death penalty, the case was brought to the Supreme
Court for mandatory and automatic review.
• Recto claimed self-defense and defense of his relative, but failed to prove the
essential requisites of self-defense.
•

Ruling:

the trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide.

Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime
scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to
act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did
not amount to direct assault.3

Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival
Orbe — then a barangay captain, a person in authority 41 — amounted to qualified direct
assault, because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the
time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two
groups.

Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary
to bring about the death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being
fired at. Although appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony
by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that
felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed
attempted homicide.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex

crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should
be the penalty for the most serious crime — in this case qualified direct assault — the
same to be imposed in its maximum period. 45 The Indeterminate Sentence Law should
also be applied in this case.

Qualified Direct Assault with Murder

(Criminal Case No. 1972)
Section 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code states that "there is treachery when
the offender commits any of crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

In this case, appellant was out in the open during the entire span of time from the
heated discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the shooting of Macalipay.
At the time, his every action, which indicated the imminence of more violence, was
visible to them — to the victim and the latter's companions. Appellant was actually
vulnerable to any attack that they could have made at the time, had they chosen to. His
mode of attack was therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is
homicide, not murder.

Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance
of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.

Applying the provisions of Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty
for complex crimes), appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified
direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide,
which is the more serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period. This penalty
shall comprise the maximum of his indeterminate sentence, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed for homicide.

First, in Criminal Case No. 1970 (victim si Melchor) , appellant is hereby CONVICTED
of attempted homicide

the trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide.

Clearly, from his arrival at the scene of the crime to his departure therefrom, Melchor
was not engaged in the performance of his official duties. Neither was he attacked on
the occasion thereof.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime
scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to
act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did
not amount to direct assault.35

Second, in Criminal Case No. 1971( direct assault with murder) , appellant is hereby
CONVICTED of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide

Victim: Brgy. Captaion a person in authority

the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe — then a barangay
captain, a person in authority41 — amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was
attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting
to pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups.
A felony "is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." In this case, the nature of
the weapon used by appellant unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe.
However, like the wounds inflicted by the accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe
were not fatal.
As evidenced by the Medico-Legal Certificate 42 prepared by Dr. Ramon D. Villanueva of
the Romblon Provincial Hospital and the testimony given by Dr. Giovannie C. Fondevilla
of the same hospital, Orbe sustained several gunshot wounds in the vicinity of his right
elbow. Those injuries could not have caused his death. Moreover, according to Dr.
Fondevilla, no surgical intervention was required; only medication was given to him 43 to
prevent any secondary infection from setting in.44
Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary
to bring about the death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being
fired at. Although appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony
by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that
felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed
attempted homicide.
Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex
crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should
be the penalty for the most serious crime — in this case qualified direct assault — the
same to be imposed in its maximum period. 45 The Indeterminate Sentence Law should
also be applied in this case.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

Third, in Criminal Case No. 1972 (direct assault with murder), appellant is hereby
CONVICTED of qualified direct assault with homicide aggravated by the use of a
weapon and is sentenced

Victim: Antonio Macalipay (shot) a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his
duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.

— way treachery kay treachery was not sought after, it was due to the heated
discussion

In this case, appellant was out in the open during the entire span of time from the
heated discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the shooting of Macalipay.
At the time, his every action, which indicated the imminence of more violence, was
visible to them — to the victim and the latter's companions. Appellant was actually
vulnerable to any attack that they could have made at the time, had they chosen to. His
mode of attack was therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is
homicide, not murder.
Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance
of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.
Applying the provisions of Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty
for complex crimes), appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified
direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide,
which is the more serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period. This penalty
shall comprise the maximum of his indeterminate sentence, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed for homicide.

Fourth, in Criminal Case No. 1973, the trial court's judgment convicting appellant of
homicide is AFFIRMED.

========

People vs. Estonilo Sr.

FACTS:
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was
gunned down, he was with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio
Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they were working on the closing ceremonies
to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro and told him that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to
see Mayor Carlos, Sr.;

That when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of
a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that contained the names of the
governor, the congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero),
as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father why Cotero’s picture was so big
while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied
that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the answer angered
Mayor Carlos, Sr.

The following day, Floro was shot to death.1

ISSUES

(1) giving credence and weight to the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was
conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt based on the prosecution evidence.

— Pero ang point jud dre kay gi discuss ang Direct Assault.

RULING

In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that
there was direct assault just because Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies
that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro
was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arisesthe complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.

Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero, who
was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate.

UNSAY KONEK SA IJANG TRABAHO AS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR

Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

"it’s very important that your father is with us because a District Supervisor has a big
[role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who would become members of the
Board of Election Inspectors";

=============

Lydia Gelig vs. People of the Philippines

Lydia Gelig was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for committing the complex
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion.

Lydia confronted Gemma Micarsos, a fellow teacher, after learning that Gemma called
her son a "sissy" in class.

Lydia slapped and pushed Gemma, causing her to fall and hit a wall divider.
As a result, Gemma suffered a contusion and later experienced abdominal pains and
bleeding, leading to an incomplete abortion.

Charge: Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion

RTC: Guilty
CA: Slight Physical Injury Only

Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when,

instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight
with Lydia.

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion
since there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of
the incident
Issues
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred
in finding that the petitioner is liable for
Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to
Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of arresto menor minimum of
ten days.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred

in finding that the petitioner can be
convicted of Slight Physical Injuries
under the information charging her for
Direct Assault with Unintentional
Abortion.12

Ruling:

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.15

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance
of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking
after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused
Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of
Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then
proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in
Gemma’s fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
pertinent portion of the provision reads as fo
llows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be
deemed as such. –
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional
duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority.
(As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).16
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently
overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could
not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at
the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person
by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades,
Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify
Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, 17 but Lydia refused and
instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person.
Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a
wall divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.

There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by
Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the
medical certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was
presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the
document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17,
1981 incident.18 It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she
was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s
abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the
assault on Gemma’s abortion.

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
direct assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
₱1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays
hands upon a person in authority.19 Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since she
is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she
laid her hands on a person in authority.1avvphi
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

=====================

People of the Philippines vs. Breis

Facts:

• Regie Breis and Gary Yumol were charged with possession of marijuana.
• They appealed their conviction, arguing that the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) did not comply with the proper procedure for seizure and custody of
drugs.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
• The Supreme Court upheld the decision.

ISSUE:

WON the appellants are guilty beyod reasonable doubt.

Yes

Ang pinaka issue nga gi discuss dre in relation sa lesson kay ang Resistance

Ruling:

The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and attempting to flee constitutes
resistance defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Cjode (RPC). 54 Before a
person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in
authority, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the
person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person
who is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.55redarclaw

He announced his identity as such agent to appellants. It may even be gleaned that
knowing that IO1 Mangili was a PDEA agent was precisely the cause of the attempted
flight of appellants.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when
not serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not
direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. 58 This is because the gravity of the
disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the
circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

the transgression, rather than the source of the order disobeyed. 59 The pushing of IO1
Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be considered direct assault, but is resistance
nonetheless.

Sidenotes:

The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or abusive acts of agents of persons in
authority. In Chan Fook,60 the Court quoted Groizard:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power can not be
said to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and
establishes his powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided for.

The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed. If they go
beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may
resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be
coextensive with the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to repel
the aggression.

The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and the excess in the functions of
an office, are the sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far as it is
necessary for the defense of the persons or their rights in the manner provided for in
article 8 of the Penal Code.61

=========================

Sydeco vs. People of the Philippines

But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches 30 to
be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.

Facts:
• Petitioner Edmund Sydeco was charged with drunk driving and resisting arrest.
• On June 11, 2006, Sydeco was driving a red Ford Ranger pick-up when he was
stopped by police officers at a checkpoint in Manila.
• The officers claimed that they smelled alcohol on Sydeco and noticed that his
vehicle was swerving.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

• They asked him to step out of the vehicle, but Sydeco refused and insisted on a
plain view search.
• This led to a confrontation between Sydeco and the police officers, resulting in
his arrest.

P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his
head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka
pang sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and
pushed him into the police mobile car,

Charges:
Drunk Driving
Resistance

ISSUE:

I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties

by the police officers; and- ma overcome rani ug mge evidence sa defense kay
presumption raman
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey
Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the Court

Meritorious

RULING

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off
between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s
refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his
insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order.28
He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would
make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down,
committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of
criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full
stop when so required to stop.
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151
of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in
authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely
petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches 30 to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.

Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-
manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a
vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable
suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as
a "stop and frisk" action.

As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out
of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention
toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a
tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their
duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him,
pointed a gun and punched him on the face.

None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation
aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested
for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to
subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their
authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr.
Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries.

The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at
every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as
to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila,
testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court,
in its decision, merely stated:
Direct Assault | Resistance or Disobedience

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE.
Petitioner is hereby acquitted