Thomson's view in the text people and their bodies is that people are their bodies: "The simplest

view of
what people are in that they are their bodies" (Thomson 1987, 155). Thomson explains that this view is an
attractive view due to its simplicity. Thomson uses many cases of body switching in order to present that
the physical thesis is valid. In doing so, the pure psychological criterion for body-switching was
developed. The pure psychological criterion for body-switching states that transplanting a person's
psychology is necessary and sufficient for that person to switch bodies (Thomson 1987, 159).

However, for Thomson to exemplify that we are our bodies, a case must be made to
demonstrate that the pure psychological criterion for body-switching is flawed. Thomson presents
Brown-Robinson case four: Robinson's brain is reprogrammed with Brown's psychology, and
concurrently, Dickenson's brain is also reprogrammed, resulting in two survivors who are psychologically
connected with Brown in his unconscious time (Thomson 1987, 163-164).

The two following premises can be deconstructed from Thomson's argument. Firstly, The pure
psychological criterion for body-switching states that transplanting a person's psychology is necessary and
sufficient for that person to switch bodies (Thomson, 1987,164). Secondly, The scenario of
Brown-Case-Four, where two survivors are psychologically connected with Brown at his becoming
unconscious time (Thomson 1987, 164). (Thomson, 1987, 164).

The premise above supports Thomson's first consequence, which states that the pure
psychological criterion for body switching is false (Thomson 1898, 164). The pure psychological criterion
suggests that to transplant someone's psychology; they should switch bodies (Thomson 1987,159).
However, in the scenario of Brown-Case-Four, two individuals can have the same psychology but not be
the same person, which contradicts the pure psychological criterion. Brown-Case-Four demonstrates that
determining body-switching requires more than the criterion, as it overlooks the possibility of multiple
individuals having the same psychology.

In conclusion, evaluations of multiple body-switching cases allowed Thomson to claim

that "all simply are our bodies" (Thomson 1987, 155). The use of brown robinson and Dickinson's cases
in Brown-Case-Four led to the conclusion that the pure psychological criterion for body-switching is
false. The first consequence (Thomson 1987, 164) challenges the view that psychological connectedness
solely determines body-switching and questions the true mark of personal identity (Thomson 1987, 160).
The ramifications of this argument play an essential role in discovering personal identity and the
importance of the human body in defining individuals.
Reference:
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "On being and saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright." 1987.