CASE: Villavicencio v. Lukban, G.R. No.

L-14639, March 25, 1919 (Grant)

Facts:

This case concerns the forced deportation of women from Manila to Davao, Mindanao, by Mayor Justo
Lukban to eradicate vice. Approximately 170 women were taken without their consent, with some
later marrying or disappearing. A habeas corpus application was filed, challenging their detention as
illegal. The Supreme Court ordered Lukban, Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, Governor Francisco
Sales, and landowner Feliciano Yñigo to produce the women in court. Despite some women returning
to Manila, the respondents failed to comply. The court issued a second order, directing the
respondents to produce the remaining women or provide valid reasons for non-compliance. Further
testimonies were taken, and by January 13, 1919, some women were returned to Manila voluntarily,
while others were brought back. The respondents explained their actions, stating that some women
chose to stay in Davao, some had already returned, and others could not be located. The case
involved legal arguments over jurisdiction and the legality of the women's detention.

Ruling:

that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2)
that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor
and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could
not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible
for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be
submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or
judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person
is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of
Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice
that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The
writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior
court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.
In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was
shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands;
it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and
then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress.
The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands.
Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a
common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may
have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes
providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
— and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change
their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did
not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely
and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of
any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action,
could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application
for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919 (denied)

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established
at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court
is called upon the decide.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by
said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure
of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was
termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation,
has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it
required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there
live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free,
and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with
many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as
surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon
the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro
must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is
no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction
must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all
convincing.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They
are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established
for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization
and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody
but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue.

Manotoc v. CA, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986 (denied)

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former corporation.

In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned
to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities.” The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking
to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as
well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to
travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the
Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him
for departure.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel

the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times
to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."

if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him
in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state.

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the
court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the
court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to
leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the
first place, if it were otherwise.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,
the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in
much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been
committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988 (denied)

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department
of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply
because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

For instance, the assailed department order in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon10 was not founded upon national security, public safety, or public health but on the state's
policy of affording protection to labor.11 The department order was deemed a valid restriction on the
right to travel.

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (Read also the dissents)
The right to travel, as a concept, was directly tackled in Marcos v. Manglapus,1 an early case decided
under the 1987 Constitution. It dealt specifically with the right of former President Marcos to return
to the Philippines. In resolving the case, this Court distinguished between the right to return to one's
country and the general right to travel. The right to return to one's country was treated separately
and deemed excluded from the constitutionally protected right to travel.2

Leave Division, OAS-OCA v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011

Records disclose that on July 10, 2009, the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), received respondent’s leave application for foreign
travel from September 11, 2009 to October 11, 2009. Respondent left for abroad without waiting for
the result of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor because
she was not cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme Court Certificate of
Clearance. Respondent reported back to work on October 19, 2009.

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated November 26, 2009, recommended the disapproval of
respondent’s leave application. It further advised that respondent be directed to make a written
explanation of her failure to secure authority to travel abroad in violation of OCA Circular No.
49-2003. On December 7, 2009, then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno approved the OCA
recommendation.

Accordingly, in a letter dated January 6, 2010, OCA Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches
informed respondent that her leave application was disapproved and her travel was considered
unauthorized. Respondent was likewise directed to explain within fifteen (15) days from notice her
failure to comply with the OCA circular.

In her Comment dated February 2, 2010, respondent admitted having travelled overseas without the
required travel authority. She explained that it was not her intention to violate the rules as she, in
fact, mailed her leave application which was approved by her superior, Judge Arlene Lirag-Palabrica,
as early as June 26, 2009. She honestly believed that her leave application would be eventually
approved by the Court.

The OCA, in its Report dated March 8, 2011, found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No.
49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority.

Hence, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent be deemed guilty for violation of OCA Circular No.
49-2003 and be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.

1. Judges and court personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the
Office of the Court Administrator. The judge or court personnel must submit the following:

(b) For Court Personnel:

• application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating the purpose of the travel
abroad;

• application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably recommended by the
Presiding Judge or Executive Judge;

• clearance as to money and property accountability;

• clearance as to pending criminal and administrative case filed against him/her, if any;

• for court stenographer, clearance as to pending stenographic notes for transcription from his/her
court and from the Court of Appeals; and

• Supreme Court clearance.

2. Complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the Office of the Court
Administrator at least two weeks before the intended period. No action shall be taken on requests for
travel authority with incomplete requirements. Likewise, applications for travel abroad received less
than two weeks of the intended travel shall not be favorably acted upon.

It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly
restricts a citizen’s right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6 reads:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
[Emphases supplied]

Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizen’s constitutional right to travel. It is,
however, not the issue in this case. The only issue in this case is the non-compliance with the Court’s
rules and regulations. It should be noted that respondent, in her Comment, did not raise any
constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad
without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on
one’s constitutional right to travel.

Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom to move
from one place to another, as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional,
statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that "neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law."
As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and
travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be a disruption in the
administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel together,
despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said
reason, members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand their right to travel.

To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and the
society as well. In a situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice, litigants can get
disappointed and disheartened. If their expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their
own hands which results in public disorder undermining public safety. In this limited sense, it can
even be considered that the restriction or regulation of a court personnel’s right to travel is a concern
for public safety, one of the exceptions to the non-impairment of one’s constitutional right to travel.

Given the exacting standard expected from each individual called upon to serve in the Judiciary, it is
imperative that every court employee comply with the travel notification and authority requirements
as mandated by OCA Circular No. 49-2003. A court employee who plans to travel abroad must file his
leave application prior to his intended date of travel with sufficient time allotted for his application to
be processed and approved first by the Court. He cannot leave the country without his application
being approved, much less assume that his leave application would be favorably acted upon. In the
case at bench, respondent should have exercised prudence and asked for the status of her leave
application before leaving for abroad.

Genuino v. Delima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018

The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law.75 It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its
citizen. Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as maybe provided by law.

Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the
right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must
be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court80 providing for the impairment. The
requirement for a legislative enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the
person's right to travel by administrative officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the
guise of national security, public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle that ours
is a government of laws and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of law limiting the
enjoyment of liberty should be construed against the government and in favor of the individual.81

The necessity of a law before a curtailment in the freedom of movement may be permitted is
apparent in the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission. In particular, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, in his sponsorship speech, stated thus:

On Section 5, in the explanation on page 6 of the annotated provisions, it says that the
phrase "and changing the same" is taken from the 1935 version; that is, changing the
 abode. The addition of the phrase WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY LAW ensures that,
whether the rights be impaired on order of a court or without the order of a court, the
impairment must be in accordance with the prescriptions of law; that is, it is not left to
the discretion of any public officer.82
It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the
court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national
security, public safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on
the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in
a law. This is in deference to the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected
right and not simply a statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.

The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis

Guided by the foregoing disquisition, the Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from which
the DOJ believed its power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with, there is no law
particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the only ground of
the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the
preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee on the
complaint for electoral sabotage against them.89

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the
scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the
former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to
the agency's rule-making powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O.
No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.

Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must
derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied upon by the DOJ did not
pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the
existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of the questioned circular.

That DOJ Circular No. 41 was intended to aid the department in realizing its mandate only begs the
question. The purpose, no matter how commendable, will not obliterate the lack of authority of the
DOJ to issue the said issuance. Surely, the DOJ must have the best intentions in promulgating DOJ
Circular No. 41, but the end will not justify the means. To sacrifice individual liberties because of a
perceived good is disastrous to democracy.

The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not
necessary for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive
his presence or fails to submit countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately, he shall be
bound by the determination of the prosecutor on the presence of probable cause and he cannot claim
denial of due process.

The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular
No. 41 on the ground that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary
investigation of the complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under
E.O. No. 292. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to
embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement.

Dissent:

Respectfully, I disagree. In my view, the phrase "as may be provided by law" should not be literally
interpreted to mean statutory law. Its usage should depend upon the context in which it is written.
As used in the Constitution, the word "law" does not only refer to statutes but embraces the
Constitution itself.

The term "law" in Article III, Section 6 can refer to the Constitution itself. This can be understood by
examining this Court's power to regulate foreign travel of court personnel and the nature and
functions of bail.

The power of this Court to regulate the foreign travel of court personnel does not emanate from
statutory law, nor is it based on national security, public safety, or public health considerations.
Rather, it is an inherent power flowing from Article III, Section 5(6) of the Constitution, which grants
this Court the power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.

Courts have the jurisdiction to determine whether a person should be admitted to bail. This
jurisdiction springs from the Constitution itself, which imposes limitations on the right to bail.
However, the discretion of courts is not restricted to the question of whether bail should be granted
to an accused as Courts have the inherent power "to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines."16 Regional Trial Courts, in particular, are empowered to issue hold departure orders
in criminal cases falling within their exclusive jurisdiction.17 Persons admitted to bail are required to
seek permission before travelling abroad.18

Similar to the power of this Court to control foreign travel of court personnel, the power to restrict
the travel of persons admitted to bail is neither based on a legislative enactment nor founded upon
national security, public safety, or public health considerations. The power of courts to restrict the
travel of persons on bail is deemed a necessary consequence of the conditions imposed in a bail bond

Moreover, the power of courts to restrict the travel of persons out on bail is an incident of its power
to grant or deny bail. As explained in Santiago v. Vasquez:25
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent
powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to
protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a
fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the
court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular
circumstances.
 Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even
made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to
pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the
Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and
in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our
preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of the
respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

The Department of Justice is neither empowered by a specific law nor does it possess the inherent
power to restrict the right to travel of persons under criminal investigation through the issuance of
hold departure orders, watchlist orders, and allow departure orders. Its mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987 to "[investigate the commission of crimes [and] prosecute offenders"27
cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include the power to curtail a person's right to travel.
Furthermore, Department Order No. 41, series of 2010 cannot be likened to the power of the courts
to restrict the travel of persons on bail as the latter presupposes that the accused was arrested by
virtue of a valid warrant and placed under the court's jurisdiction. For these reasons, Department of
Justice Circular No. 41, series of 2010, is unconstitutional.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 201

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of

young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (b) fail to
pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no
reasonable relation to their purpose. They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
community.

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing
of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to
achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV
s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other
viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and
education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is
too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional, as it deprives the minors their right to travel.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. Liberty
- a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion and the right of citizens to be free to
use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best
pursue the ends of life.

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State
may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the
limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to
afford special protection to children.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government
units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe
such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty
to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents
have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603
provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel.
 The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive
as those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such
as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates
and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their
affairs concerning the right to vote, the right to execute contracts, and the right to
engage in gainful employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by
law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their
parents. These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the
minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the State's
general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on
the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to
adults.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies. This
Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for
them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. It
is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so
as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors,
recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and
guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive

by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in
groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children
roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of
minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect,
 abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their
development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to
put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal
activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure
that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activity.

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to
their police power under the general welfare clause. In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate
concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if
the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least
restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict
scrutiny test.

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the
strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance
has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three
which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of
accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines.

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

Issue:

WON the issuance of the postage stamp violates the constitutional guarantee of the separation of
church and government.

Ruling:

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears
from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's
complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"

It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by
the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate
to mere incidental results not contemplated.

examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the
conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion
to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing
and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists
which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
 Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Facts

In a case involving court interpreter Soledad Escritor, a complaint was filed alleging she was living
with a man outside of marriage, tarnishing the court's image. Escritor, a Jehovah's Witness, explained
that their arrangement was in line with their religious beliefs, supported by a declaration approved by
their congregation. Despite this, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended finding Escritor
guilty of immorality, emphasizing that adherence to moral standards is crucial for court personnel.

Issue

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct." To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether or not
respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

The first major step towards separation in Virginia was the adoption of the following provision in the
Bill of Rights of the state's first constitution:

That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the
mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other

In Re Letter of Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Valenciano lodged complaints against the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall
of Justice, alleging violations of the constitutional provision on separation of Church and State.
Despite his concerns, investigations revealed that the masses did not significantly disrupt court
operations or favor Catholic litigants. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended dismissing
Valenciano's complaints, noting that the principle of separation of Church and State should be
interpreted with benevolent neutrality, accommodating religious practices within reasonable limits.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE AS WELL AS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY
FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM
OF RELIGION.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer of
Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice
or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.

The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and
State
The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system,
whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of
religion.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in
the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during
noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being
distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no
detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest
compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures
may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply
means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor
an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand,
is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with
the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled,
merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their religion.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First,
there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary
employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on
their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third,
no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive
use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions

Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of
any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-Catholics is no
reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without
regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is
emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be
without discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip
service.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same
for others.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra.

Facts

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as
follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious group "Iglesia ni Cristo," resigned from the Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union due to his religious beliefs. The union, citing a closed shop provision in their
agreement, sought his dismissal from the Elizalde Rope Factory. Victoriano filed a lawsuit to prevent
his dismissal, arguing that Republic Act No. 3350, which exempted members of religious sects
prohibiting union affiliation from such agreements, protected his right to resign from the union. The
Court upheld Victoriano's right, ruling that the Act did not violate the Constitution and affirmed his
employment.

Issue

Is the law exempting members of certain religious sects from joining labor unions constitutional?

Ruling:

The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the
stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.

In Aglipay v. Ruiz , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded
from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to
a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of
constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to
violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or
holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to
the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of
livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the
state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and
regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. More so now in the 1973 Constitution
where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and
regulate the relation between workers and employers.

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain
citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption
from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects
that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious
exercise be preferentially aided.

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the
constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that
burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so
deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. In
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects, it
leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic
Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided
for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding
the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is
determined by its provisions, not by its silence ; and, second, the fact that the law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional.

It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain
members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than
help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread
to other workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and
philosophic objections.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a
labor — union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal
that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.

"Compelling state interest" refers to a legal standard used to determine when a government interest
is so significant that it outweighs individual rights. In the context of constitutional law, particularly in
cases involving the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the government must demonstrate that
its interest is compelling in order to justify a law or action that infringes upon a fundamental right,
such as freedom of religion.

To meet the compelling state interest standard, the government must show that its interest is of the
highest order, such as protecting public health or safety, or preserving the integrity of the legal
system. The government must also demonstrate that there is no less restrictive way to achieve its
goals. If the government cannot meet this standard, the law or action in question may be deemed
unconstitutional.

Second, the court asks: "(i)s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement
of religious liberty?" In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for
the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk
if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted. The person claiming religious freedom, on the other hand, will
endeavor to show that the interest is not legitimate or that the purpose, although legitimate, is not
compelling compared to infringement of religious liberty. This step involves balancing, i.e., weighing
the interest of the state against religious liberty to determine which is more compelling under the
particular set of facts. The greater the state's interests, the more central the religious belief would
have to be to overcome it. In assessing the state interest, the court will have to determine the
importance of the secular interest and the extent to which that interest will be impaired by an
exemption for the religious practice. Should the court find the interest truly compelling, there will be
no requirement that the state diminish the effectiveness of its regulation by granting the exemption.

The third, the "compelling state interest" test was employed by the Court to determine whether the
exemption provided by Republic Act No. 3350 was not unconstitutional. It upheld the exemption,
stating that there was no "compelling state interest" to strike it down. However, after careful
consideration of the Sherbert case from which Victoriano borrowed this test, the inevitable conclusion
is that the "compelling state interest" test was not appropriate and could not find application in the
Victoriano case. In Sherbert, appellant Sherbert invoked religious freedom in seeking exemption from
the provisions of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act which disqualified her from
claiming unemployment benefits. It was the appellees, members of the South Carolina Employment
Commission, a government agency, who propounded the state interest to justify overriding
Sherbert's claim of religious freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court, considering Sherbert's and the
Commission's arguments, found that the state interest was not sufficiently compelling to prevail over
Sherbert's free exercise claim. This situation did not obtain in the Victoriano case where it was the
government itself, through Congress, which provided the exemption in Republic Act No. 3350 to allow
Victoriano's exercise of religion. Thus, the government could not argue against the exemption on the
basis of a compelling state interest as it would be arguing against itself; while Victoriano would not
seek exemption from the questioned law to allow the free exercose of religion as the law in fact
provides such an exemption. In sum, although Victoriano involved a religious belief and conduct, it
did not involve a free exercise issue where the Free Exercise Clause is invoked to exempt him from
the burden imposed by a law on his religious freedom.

Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981

This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc
City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the
celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the
parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.

The case revolves around the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer for the annual
feast day celebration, with a dispute arising over the custody of the image between the parish priest
and a layman designated by the barangay council. Resolution No. 5 of the council revived the
traditional celebration and included acquiring the image and constructing a waiting shed as projects,
funded by selling tickets and donations. Resolution No. 6 designated a councilman as caretaker of the
image, to be kept in his residence and made available to the church during the feast day celebration.
The resolutions were ratified by the barangay assembly, and funds were raised through solicitations
and donations. The image was temporarily placed in the church for worship during the fiesta mass,
but the parish priest refused to return it, leading to legal actions. The lower court upheld the
resolutions' validity, which the appellants challenged, arguing that the council was not properly
constituted.

Issue:

WON the resolutions issued by the brgy. council is violative of the establishment clause of the
constitution.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions
that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2],
Article VIII, Constitution).
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply
means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor
an official religion.

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly
establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the
benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic
religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's
wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced
that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeña the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta
was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the
mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives
of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall
any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement
would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family
desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore
that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and
Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in
the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the
use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or
indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the
parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing
contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San
Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña
claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the
right to determine who should have custody thereof.

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action
would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its
private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting
Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

In Re Letter of Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Valenciano lodged complaints against the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall
of Justice, alleging violations of the constitutional provision on separation of Church and State.
Despite his concerns, investigations revealed that the masses did not significantly disrupt court
operations or favor Catholic litigants. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended dismissing
Valenciano's complaints, noting that the principle of separation of Church and State should be
interpreted with benevolent neutrality, accommodating religious practices within reasonable limits.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, Specifically
the establishment clause.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer of
Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice
or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.

The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and
State

The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system,
whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of
religion.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in
the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during
noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being
distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no
detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest
compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures
may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply
means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor
an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand,
is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with
the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled,
merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their religion.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First,
there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary
employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on
their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third,
no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive
use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of
any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-Catholics is no
reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without
regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is
emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be
without discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip
service.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same
for others.

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

This case revolves around the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) attempt to limit expressions
made by citizens, who are not candidates, during elections. The controversy began when petitioners
posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod,
one opposing the Reproductive Health Law and the other classifying candidates as either "Team
Buhay" or "Team Patay" based on their stance on the law. The COMELEC ordered the removal of the
tarpaulins for being oversized, sparking a legal challenge.

The key issue is whether COMELEC has the authority to restrict such expressions made by citizens.
The petitioners argue that their right to expression should not be unreasonably restricted, even
during elections. They contend that the tarpaulins were not sponsored by any candidate and that the
classifications were based on the candidates' votes on the RH Law, not on their candidacy.

On the other hand, COMELEC asserts its mandate to regulate election propaganda, citing a resolution
specifying the size requirements for campaign materials. They argue that the tarpaulins, being
election propaganda, are subject to regulation.

The case raises important questions about the extent of free speech during elections and the balance
between regulating election propaganda and protecting the fundamental right to expression.

Issue:

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]

WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

Ruling:

At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. This takes many forms.
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

There are two aspects of this provision. The first is the none stablishment clause. Second is the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship.

The second aspect is a tissue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious
make such act immune from any secular regulation. The religious also have a secular existence. They
exist within a society that is regulated by law.

The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to
religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that "the views and position of the
petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its
Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings.

This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when:
(1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious
doctrine of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the
message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the
ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under
"Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the
expression on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful,
the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations

Commission cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin
does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as
enumerated in the Austrian Case such as "proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.

The petitioners, linked to the Catholic Church, argued that their actions, like putting up a tarpaulin
about the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, were based on their faith and should be protected.
However, the court disagreed, saying not all acts by religious people are above the law. While
individuals have the right to express their beliefs, they must also follow the law.

The court mentioned a case where Jehovah's Witnesses were allowed to skip the flag ceremony due
to their beliefs, showing a balance between religious practices and the law. It also discussed
"benevolent neutrality," which accommodates religion under certain conditions to support religious
exercise.
The court concluded that the tarpaulin was not protected as a religious expression but as a political
one, as it identified candidates based on their RH Law stance. The court emphasized that the
tarpaulin did not convey Catholic doctrine and that religious beliefs are not binding on the court.

The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for
public office.Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and
party-list organizations.

They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties.
It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.

Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This
can often be expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point
dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that
they have basis, or that they have been expressed in good taste.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of

expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause
debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences. Certainly,
provocative messages do matter for the elections.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that
tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political
parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected
as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by
petitioners deserves our protection.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994

This case involves a group of elderly men who formed a civic organization to serve their religious
community. They solicited contributions for renovating a chapel without the required permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. Despite their good intentions, they were charged
with violating Presidential Decree No. 1564, the Solicitation Permit Law.

The lower court found the petitioners guilty but recommended a pardon due to their good faith. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision but increased the penalty. The petitioner argues
that Presidential Decree No. 1564 should not apply to solicitations for religious purposes, citing the
strict construction of penal laws and the right to freedom of religion.

The issue at hand is whether solicitations for religious purposes fall under the scope of Presidential
Decree No. 1564. The law requires permits for solicitations for charitable or public welfare purposes.
The petitioner contends that since the law does not expressly mention religious purposes, it should
not apply to such solicitations.

Issue:
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed
in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.

Ruling:

The supreme court Granted the petition and set aside the decision of the RTC.

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since
religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose"
is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no
religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for
there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. Although
the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes
matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable
purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or
where the distinction has been done away with by statute. The word "charitable," therefore, like most
other words, is capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses
from taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal
law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so
exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that
the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to
solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise"
of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or
more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not
involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or
interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in
the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

Concurrence J Mendoza
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of
fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are
usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against
fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to
lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license
fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because
that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that
religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other
uses of public parks and streets. To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be
avoided.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines.

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

Issue:

WON the issuance of the postage stamp violates the constitutional Prohibition against appropriating
public funds for sectarian purpose.
Ruling:

Again, in Aglipay, the issuing and selling of postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it violated the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any church. In
ruling that there was no such violation, the Court held:

It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.
We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had
in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose
of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous
to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have
been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936,
made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the
revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states
that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSC, G.R. No. L-15045, January 20, 1961

- The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through counsel, filed a request with the Social Security
Commission seeking exemption for Catholic Charities and other religious and charitable institutions
operated by the Archbishop from the coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, known as the
Social Security Law of 1954.

- The request was based on the argument that the Act is a labor law that only covers businesses and
activities organized for profit, and thus should not apply to religious and charitable institutions.

Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been
for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that
the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted
for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees
- The Social Security Commission denied the request, stating that the coverage of the law extends to
all kinds of employment except those expressly excluded.

Issue

Whether religious and charitable institutions operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
are exempt from the coverage of the Social Security Law.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Social Security Commission's denial of the request for exemption.
The Court held that the definition of "employer" in the Social Security Law is sufficiently
comprehensive to include religious and charitable institutions not organized for profit. The law's
purpose is to establish a social security system suitable to the needs of the people and to provide
protection to employees against disability, sickness, old age, and death. The Court also rejected the
argument that the law violates the constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds to
support priests, noting that the funds contributed to the system are not public funds but belong to
the members and are held in trust by the government.

Rationale:

- The definition of "employer" in the law includes any person or entity that uses the services of
another person under its orders, except the government. This definition is sufficiently broad to
include religious and charitable institutions.

- The purpose of the Social Security Law is to provide protection to employees, which is in line with
the constitutional mandate to promote social justice and ensure the well-being of all people.

- The funds contributed to the system are not public funds but belong to the members, and their
payment as benefits does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds to
support priests.

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006 (resolution)

In a case involving court interpreter Soledad Escritor, a complaint was filed alleging she was living
with a man outside of marriage, tarnishing the court's image. Escritor, a Jehovah's Witness, explained
that their arrangement was in line with their religious beliefs, supported by a declaration approved by
their congregation. Despite this, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended finding Escritor
guilty of immorality, emphasizing that adherence to moral standards is crucial for court personnel.

Issue

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct." To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether or not
respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

Ruling

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."

Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits religion will be challenged as
unconstitutional, either because it violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or
both. This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist approach or the benevolent neutrality
or accommodationist approach.

At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation
approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim
comes before it. This is an erroneous reading of the framework which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio
seems to entertain. Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view
religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is
precisely the purpose of the test—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden
religious exercise. Thus, under the framework, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view, as
proposed by Mr. Justice Carpio, for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of
the Constitution. As stated in the Decision:

xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of
judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state
interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set
a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay
down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not
only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional
history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from
which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this
approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small- not
only for a majority, however large but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.

(3) Accommodation under the Religion Clauses

A free exercise claim could result to three kinds of accommodation: (a) those which are found to be
constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; (b) those which are
discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted
by the Establishment Clause; and (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.

Mandatory accommodation results when the Court finds that accommodation is required by the Free
Exercise Clause, i.e, when the Court itself carves out an exemption. This accommodation occurs
when all three conditions of the compelling interest test are met, i.e, a statute or government action
has burdened claimant’s free exercise of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the
religious belief; the state has failed to demonstrate a particularly important or compelling
governmental goal in preventing an exemption; and that the state has failed to demonstrate that it
used the least restrictive means. In these cases, the Court finds that the injury to religious
conscience is so great and the advancement of public purposes is incomparable that only indifference
or hostility could explain a refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the state’s objective could be served
as well or almost as well by granting an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are burdened by
the regulation, the Court must grant the exemption. The Yoder case is an example where the Court
held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of the Amish who objected to enrolling
their children in high school as required by law. The Sherbert case is another example where the
Court held that the state unemployment compensation plan must accommodate the religious
convictions of Sherbert.

In permissive accommodation, the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to,
accommodate religious interests. The U.S. Walz case illustrates this situation where the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of tax exemption given by New York to church properties,
but did not rule that the state was required to provide tax exemptions. The Court declared that "(t)he
limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Other examples are Zorach v. Clauson,
allowing released time in public schools and Marsh v. Chambers, allowing payment of legislative
chaplains from public funds. Parenthetically, the Court in Smith has ruled that this is the only
accommodation allowed by the Religion Clauses.

Finally, when the Court finds no basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the
legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it results to a
prohibited accommodation. In this case, the Court finds that establishment concerns prevail over
potential accommodation interests. To say that there are valid exemptions buttressed by the Free
Exercise Clause does not mean that all claims for free exercise exemptions are valid. An example
where accommodation was prohibited is McCollum v. Board of Education, where the Court ruled
against optional religious instruction in the public school premises.

Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the question now remains as to
how the Court should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent
neutrality-accommodation approach.

Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First Amendment is that freedom
to carry out one’s duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace
of legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against
discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state
interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In
the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

In Re Letter of Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 (accommodation is benevolent

neutrality)
Valenciano lodged complaints against the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall
of Justice, alleging violations of the constitutional provision on separation of Church and State.
Despite his concerns, investigations revealed that the masses did not significantly disrupt court
operations or favor Catholic litigants. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended dismissing
Valenciano's complaints, noting that the principle of separation of Church and State should be
interpreted with benevolent neutrality, accommodating religious practices within reasonable limits.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH, does no it constitute
benevolent neutrality of the state.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer of
Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice
or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.

The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and
State

The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system,
whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of
religion.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in
the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during
noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being
distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no
detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest
compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures
may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply
means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor
an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand,
is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with
the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled,
merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their religion.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First,
there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary
employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on
their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third,
no government funds are being spent because the lightings and air conditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been
converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive
use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions

Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of
any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-Catholics is no
reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without
regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is
emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall be
without discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip
service.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same
for others.

Fonacier v. CA, G.R. No. L-5917, January 28, 1955

The case involved a dispute within the Iglesia Filipina Independiente over its leadership and property.
Mons. Fonacier, elected as Supreme Bishop, faced removal by Bishop Manuel Aguilar and the church
council. The Asemblea Magna elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca as his successor, but Fonacier
refused to step down, leading to a split in the church. Fonacier claimed he hadn't been properly
removed and recognized Juan Jamias as his successor. The court declared Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as
the legitimate Supreme Bishop and ordered Fonacier to account for church properties. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision, which Fonacier appealed. The Supreme Court declined to review
factual findings, focusing on legal issues and church constitution compliance.

Take for instance the question relative to the authority of the civil courts to review or revise an action
of decree of the ecclesiastical courts or authorities concerning which the Court of Appeals upheld the
power of the civil courts to look into the propriety of the decree of ouster because of the plea of
respondent that it was not issued in accordance with the procedure laid down in the constitution of
the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. The Court of Appeals entertained the view that since it is claimed
that the ouster was made by an unauthorized person, or in a manner contrary to the constitution of
the church, and that the ousted bishops were not given notice of the charges against them nor were
they afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts, have jurisdiction to review the action
regarding said ouster citing in support of its view some authorities from Vol. 45 of the American
Jurisprudence which we believe to be pertinent and decisive of the issue under consideration (45 Am.
Jur. pp. 751-754). And, for the purposes of this decision, it is enough for us to quote the following as
a representative authority: "Where, however, a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the
law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the
civil courts. * * * In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire into
the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected
their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the
church. Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be
heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property right is involved."

The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because petitioner, as Supreme Bishop,
could act alone pursuant to the constitution of the church wherein it is provided that the Supreme
Bishop is the supreme head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full powers to
impose the penalties of dismissal, confinement in the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer, etc. which,
without contravening the penal laws of the constituted government, can be imposed upon the
bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the intervention of the Supreme Council,
cannot be entertained in the light of the very provisions of the constitution of the church, it appearing
that the alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the constitution is not all-embracing but limited
and, in any event, the final action shall be taken by the Supreme Council. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of the constitution of the church are quoted hereunder for ready reference:

As a corollary to the above findings, the Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Council and the
Asemblea Magna that met on January 21, and January 22, 1946 respectively, were legally constituted
and that the forced resignation and ouster of petitioner taken therein and the designation of Bishop
Bayaca as Supreme Bishop, conducted on January 22, 1946, are valid. These findings, which involve
questions of fact, cannot now be looked into, and, therefore, should be affirmed.

"The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and abandonment of faith or
abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church having reference to the power of excluding from the
church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts." (45 Am. Jur., 748-752, 755.) To this we agree.