Politikon

South African Journal of Political Studies

ISSN: 0258-9346 (Print) 1470-1014 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20

The Green Economy in South Africa: Global

Discourses and Local Politics

Carl Death

To cite this article: Carl Death (2014) The Green Economy in South Africa: Global Discourses
and Local Politics, Politikon, 41:1, 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/02589346.2014.885668

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2014.885668

Published online: 24 Feb 2014.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 5118

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 11 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpsa20
Politikon, 2014
Vol. 41, No. 1, 1–22, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2014.885668

The Green Economy in South Africa:

Global Discourses and Local Politics
CARL DEATH∗

ABSTRACT Global interest in the ‘green economy’ has heightened since 2008, and
this article contributes to these discussions by elaborating on (a) four alternative,
and sometimes competing, discourses of the green economy, and (b) the particular
politics of the green economy in South Africa. Most research on the green economy
tends to focus on European and North American countries, however in the context of
a changing global economy and the ‘rise of the South’ the politics of the green
economy in countries like South Africa is of increasing importance. South Africa
faces many challenges in pursuing a transition to a more sustainable
development path, yet has been cited as a global green economy leader. This
article argues that this is related to the particular discourse of ‘green growth’
which is dominant in South Africa, and proposes two significant lines of critique
of this discourse. The first cautions that commitment to the green economy may
not be particularly deep-rooted, sustained or coherent; and the second highlights
some of the more troubling political implications of the type of green growth
advocated, even if it were to be pursued with more determination. With this in
mind, it is important to consider whether transitions to a green economy might
produce new power relations of inequality and injustice, just as the industrial
revolution helped produce today’s deeply unequal world.

Now we must once more harness the expertise of our engineers and scientists—and the ambi-
tion of our entrepreneurs—to embrace a green revolution that will significantly change the
way we all live and work. ... The global environmental sector will be worth £4.3 trillion by
2015 and sustain tens of millions of jobs. So the countries and companies that develop the
technologies and services fastest will, as with the industrial revolution, reap the richest
rewards. (Gordon Brown, The Guardian [UK], 12 July 2009)

Introduction
At the ‘Rio+20’ Conference on Sustainable Development in June 2012 the ‘green
economy’ attracted much attention as the latest big idea in international environ-
mental politics. The official outcome text cautiously promoted it as ‘one of the
important tools available for achieving sustainable development’ (UN 2012,
56); others more enthusiastically asserted that ‘[w]hat is needed is the same
kind of initiative as shown by Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s’ (Barbier

# 2014 South African Association of Political Studies

C. DEATH

2010, 12). This invoked the prospect of a ‘Global Green New Deal’ as the next
stage of human progress, akin to the industrial revolution (UNEP 2009). While
most interest in the green economy has tended to be in the ‘developed’ countries
of the global North (Barry and Eckersley 2005; Eckersley 2004; Mol 2002; Mol
and Sonnenfeld 2000), in the context of a rapidly transforming global economy
and the ‘rise of the South’ (UNDP 2013) it is increasingly important to examine
the manner in which emerging economies such as South Africa are engaging
with the green economy discourse (Resnick, Tarp, and Thurlow 2012).
This article addresses South Africa’s high-profile engagement with the green
economy: surprisingly in 2012, one think-tank rated it first in the world for its per-
formance in leading on the green economy (Dual Citizen 2012, 5). A new member
of the BRICS (an association of five major emerging economies comprising
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and a host of several major inter-
national environmental conferences, South Africa has sought to project a brand
as global leaders when it comes to sustainable development and environmental
diplomacy (Death 2011). Yet South Africa falls well short of the widely accepted
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) definition of a green economy
as one which is ‘low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive’ (UNEP
2011, 16). It is a heavily coal- and mineral-dependent economy, with some of
the highest levels of social and economic inequality in the world (Resnick,
Tarp, and Thurlow 2012, 218). In 2010, South Africa emitted 9.2 tons of CO2
emissions (tCO2e) per capita, compared to 1.7 tCO2e in India, 2.2 tCO2e in
Brazil, 6.2 tCO2e in China, and 7.9 tCO2e in the UK (World Bank 2013). Even
South Africa’s own National Development Plan admits that ‘[s]ince the late
19th century, South Africa has exploited its mineral wealth with little or no
regard for the environment’ (RSA 2012, 37).
Given this apparent paradox—international recognition for its leadership, yet
not even coming close to fulfilling any of the criteria of a standard definition of
the green economy—this article seeks to disaggregate the idea of the green
economy, and explore what the invocation of the term in South Africa actually
means. It is possible to identify four discourses of the green economy: ‘green revo-
lution’, ‘green transformation’, ‘green growth’, and ‘green resilience’, and these
are addressed under separate headings later in the article. They are ideal types,
and real-world examples tend to be blurred and overlapping, but the exercise is
useful in terms of more clearly identifying some of the tensions and contradictions
within the apparent consensus on the importance of the green economy. It is poss-
ible to identify each of these discourses to some degree within South African invo-
cations of the green economy, but it is impossible to clearly identify a homogenous
‘South African’ position given the different agendas, actors, and emphases
involved. However, this article argues that the dominant discourse of the green
economy in South Africa is that of green growth. It is through focusing on
South Africa’s ‘brand’ as a rising power, with a youthful and energetic population
and a rich natural environment, and the country as the economic and political
‘gateway to Africa’, rather than its environmental and social contradictions, that
South Africa can be positioned as a global leader on the green economy.

2
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

The final section of this article presents two possible lines of critique of the
green economy in its South African manifestation. First, the overall commitment
to the green economy is rather shallow and incoherent, and it poses little potential
to drive sustained economic growth let alone genuinely transform the South
African development model. There is little sense in which this will become a
new ‘master narrative’ or organising concept for development in South Africa,
and this impression is heightened when contrasted with other potential ‘leaders’
of the green economy such as South Korea, Germany or China. Secondly, even
if this perception is proved wrong and South Africa does pursue a green
economy pathway in a significant and sustained manner, there are a number of
worrying implications and contradictions within the discourse which should
raise concerns about the political economy of such a route. Particular concerns
include the relentless focus on economic growth, despite continued high levels
of inequality in South Africa, and the commodification of nature through the
‘bio-economy’, including ‘payments for ecosystem services’ (PES), carbon
markets, the intensification of industrial agriculture and genetic modification.
That said, it is important not to make ‘the perfect the enemy of the good’, and
indeed the recent prominence of the language of the green economy has been wel-
comed by many environmentalists in South Africa (Kings 2013a). There is also
still some radical potential in the idea of the green economy which environmental
and social justice activists could appropriate, perhaps in combination with the con-
struction of a developmental state. In general, however, the power relations and
global political implications of these green economy discourses require closer
attention. As the Gordon Brown quote with which this article opened suggests,
and as has been reiterated by South African ministers and commentators (see
England 2011, 2; Spencer et al. 2010, 25), the green economy could reshape
global political economies in a manner akin to the European industrial revolution
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As such, it is important to consider
whether transitions to a green economy might produce new power relations of
inequality and injustice, just as the industrial revolution helped produce today’s
deeply unequal world.

A new idea?
Before examining the four discourses in more detail, it is important to discuss the
emergence of the broader idea of a ‘green economy’. This phrase was reinvigo-
rated in public policy discussions after 2008, when the UNEP (2009) launched
their Green Economy Initiative and other international institutions such as the
OECD (2011) and the World Bank (2012) enthusiastically promoted the idea,
in no small part in response to the global financial crisis. However, the idea has
much older origins. One of the most coherent articulations of the rising discipline
of environmental economics in the 1980s was the work of David Pearce and his
co-authors in their report for the UK government, Blueprint for a Green
Economy (Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier 1989). This became a series, with
volumes on topics like greening the world economy, measuring sustainable

3
C. DEATH

development, capturing environmental value, and the true cost of road transport
(Pearce 1993; Pearce and Barbier 2000). The central idea was, as Stern (2007)
was later to say with respect to climate change, that environmental degradation
was a ‘market failure’; a green economy would be one in which environmental
externalities would be fully accounted for (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Dryzek
2005). If the environment continued to be treated as a free resource, then it
would inevitably be depleted or polluted. For Pearce, the green economy meant
‘sustaining the overall stock of natural resources so that they are available for
the future, as well as for the present’ (Pearce 1993, 4– 5).
Such ideas received international support through the Brundtland Report’s
vision of sustainable development which relied upon objectives like ‘reviving
growth’ and ‘changing the quality of growth’ (World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development 1987). The Rio Declaration, the outcome text from the
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, included principles pro-
moting the internalisation of environmental costs (the ‘polluter pays’ principle)
and the use of economic instruments (Principle 16) as well as eliminating unsus-
tainable consumption and production (Principle 8) (see Death 2010; Dryzek
2005). In South Africa, these discourses were translated into the post-apartheid
constitution which recognised that ‘[e]veryone has the right to an environment
that is not harmful to their health or well-being’ (RSA 1996, 24a). The National
Environmental Management Act states in the preamble that ‘sustainable develop-
ment requires the integration of social, economic and environmental factors in the
planning, implementation and evaluation of decisions to ensure that development
serves present and future generations’ (RSA 1998, 2).
In some respects, it is striking how little the discourse has changed in the last 20
years. Two of Pearce’s original co-authors, Barbier and Markandya, recently pub-
lished A New Blueprint for a Green Economy (2013) in which they argue that the
message of 1989 is still relevant, and the threefold challenges of valuing the
environment, accounting for the environment, and incentives for environmental
improvement, are more urgent than ever. As Barbier explains elsewhere, ‘[w]e
use our natural capital, including ecosystems, because it is valuable, but we are
losing natural capital because it is free’ (2011, 234). A green economy would
be an economy in which natural resources and emissions would be costed accord-
ing to their impacts on society, and according to the ability of ecosystems to main-
tain their ‘services’ to the economy. Thus Barbier argues that ‘[e]nvironmental
valuation and accounting for natural capital depreciation must be fully integrated
into economic development policy and strategy’ (2011, 236).
If the arguments of the environmental economists have changed little since the
1980s, then the political and economic context of the early twenty-first century is
quite different. Two crises are crucial to understanding why the idea of the green
economy has returned to prominence: the climate crisis and the financial crisis.
The 2000s was the decade when climate change became a salient international
issue: the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, it was discussed at the UN Security
Council, and Nicholas Stern made the case for the economics of climate change
in as clear and compelling a manner as is possible: action later will be more

4
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

costly than action now (Stern 2007). Although the scale of the political response
has been woefully inadequate (especially after the disappointment of the Copen-
hagen climate conference in 2009), more time, money and diplomatic attention is
being slowly diverted to programmes of mitigation and adaptation around the
world.
Enthusiasm for a green economy would not have arisen, however, were it not
for the interlocking financial and economic crises which began in 2007 and
2008, and which rocked the US and European economies and then the rest of
the world (Tienhaara 2013). UNEP’s key report on the Global Green New Deal
begins by noting that ‘[t]he world today finds itself in the worst financial and econ-
omic crisis in generations’ (UNEP 2009, 1). These crises have re-legitimated the
idea of state intervention in the economy, and the need for economic planning and
targeted investments. The financial crisis was eagerly seized by environmentalists,
who saw the chance to promote a fundamental restructuring of the global economy
along greener lines, and also argued that investment in green technologies could
reignite global growth. According to UNEP,
[a]n investment of one percent of global GDP over the next two years could provide the criti-
cal mass of green infrastructure needed to seed a significant greening of the global economy
. . . We must not miss this chance to fundamentally shift the trajectory of human civilization.
(UNEP 2009, 1 – 4)
These twin crises mean that interest in the green economy is motivated by very
different concerns: some seek a transition to a more ecologically or social sus-
tainable future, whereas others see green investment as a tool to kick-start
economic growth. In international negotiations, the language of the green
economy has been usefully vague—much like the closely related concept of
sustainable development—enabling different actors and institutions to deploy
it in different ways. One example of this is the different definitions provided
by the UNEP and OECD. UNEP define the green economy as ‘one that
results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ (UNEP 2011, 16). In
contrast, for the OECD
[g]reen growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that
natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our
well-being relies. To do this it must catalyse investment and innovation which will underpin
sustained growth and give rise to new economic opportunities. (OECD 2011, 9)
As these two quotes suggest, there is no unanimously agreed definition of the
green economy: some emphasise equity and reducing risks, others economic
growth and innovation.
It is, therefore, possible to disaggregate the idea of the green economy, and
identify a number of discourses within it. Tienhaara (2013), for example, dis-
tinguishes between the ‘Green New Deal’, ‘Green Stimulus’, and ‘Green
Economy’ variants (an alternative mapping can be found in Bär, Jacob, and
Werland 2011). However, these terms tend to be deployed by different actors in

5
C. DEATH

different ways at different times, hence it is more useful to try to distinguish four
discourses of the green economy that often overlap in practice, but which rep-
resent clearly identifiable competing priorities when isolated. Here these are
termed the discourses of ‘green revolution’, ‘green transformation’, ‘green
growth’ and ‘green resilience’.

Four discourses of the green economy

Green revolution
The oldest discourse of the ‘green economy’ is the sense in which many environ-
mentalists in the 1960s and 1970s used it—a radical, revolutionary transformation
of economic (and hence social and political) relationships to bring them in line
with natural limits and ecological virtues (Bookchin 1980; Illich 1973; Schuma-
cher 1973). This is something quite different from the way in which Gordon
Brown invoked the comparison with the industrial revolution, or agricultural
scientists invoke the notion of a green revolution in crop production. Rather,
many deep ecologists, eco-socialists, eco-feminists, indigenous peoples and
others feel that a radical transformation of society is necessary to repair our
relationships with the natural world and each other. The ‘limits to growth’
(Meadows et al. 1972) proclaimed by environmentalists in the 1970s have inspired
a range of alternatives such as de-growth, steady-state economics, or prosperity
without growth (Barry 2012; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Fig 2007; Goodman
and Salleh 2013; Wapner 2014). These are not simply seen as necessary shifts,
but rather as positive, progressive opportunities for a better society. For Barry,
‘removing the imperative for orthodox economic growth would create more not
less options for human flourishing’ (2012, 278).
The idea that the economic system requires ‘greening’ in order to resolve con-
tradictions and end the systematic exploitation of nature has been a central tenet of
these traditions, and is now best encapsulated by Latin American calls for the
international community to respect the Rights of Mother Earth and to aim for
‘buen vivir’ rather than endless economic growth (Goodman and Salleh 2013;
McAfee 2013; McShane 2014; Stevenson 2013). This discourse was a prominent
strand of opposition to the consensual invocation of the green economy at the
Rio+20 conference, and was championed by both states such as Bolivia and by
indigenous peoples.
A ‘green economy’ in this discourse is, therefore, something very different from
our current economy, in terms of what we eat and how it is produced, the energy
we use, our transport systems, and so on. A transition to a green economy would
accordingly revolutionise many aspects of contemporary society, including patri-
archy, race-relations, the state and the state system, capitalism, and the aspects of
the Enlightenment thought that portray nature and society as separate and distinct.
In this respect, it can be differentiated from more reformist discourses of sustain-
able development.

6
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Green transformation
The second discourse of the green economy is best encapsulated by the Brundtland
Report’s vision of sustainable development as a re-alignment of prevailing growth
models and development paths (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment 1987). The outcome document from the Rio + 20 conference, The
Future We Want, accordingly stated that its signatories ‘view the green
economy as a means to achieve sustainable development, which must remain
our overarching goal’ (UN 2012, III, 26). Such a discourse envisages a transform-
ation in current socio-economic and political systems, but the basic elements and
assumptions of this system will remain the same. Thus economic growth remains
the driver of progress, the environment is a resource for human development, and
states and the state system are the regulators and guarantors of development.
Transformation is accordingly presented as possible within the current global
system (i.e. a capitalist society of states) and achievable through existing insti-
tutions. Typical policies include Keynesian strategies of public investments and
fiscal stimulus, mobilised for ‘green’ ends: clean air and water and food, safe
and efficient public transport, tree-planting campaigns, and so on (Paterson
2009, 106). The International Labour Organisation have suggested that ‘a
greener economy could lead to net gains of up to 60 million jobs’ (ILO 2013,
xiv). This discourse explicitly invokes the historical precedent of Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1930s America, which included a public works pro-
grammes called the Civilian Conservation Corps that employed more than three
million young men between 1933 and 1942 to plant approximately two billion
trees and develop 800 new state parks into order to simultaneously tackle wide-
spread unemployment and land degradation (Tienhaara 2013, 4; UNEP 2009, 3).
There are some similarities between this discourse and the discourse of ‘green
growth’ (below) which also advocates the use of targeted investments in high tech
industries and ‘green jobs’, but the discourse of green transformation can be dis-
tinguished in terms of its explicit focus on social justice, equity and redistribution
(including intergenerationally): growth is a means rather than an end in this dis-
course. Thus relations between rich and poor and the global north and south
require transformation: UNEP urge that a ‘pro-poor orientation must be superim-
posed on any green economy initiative’ (2011, 20).

Green growth
The third discourse is that of green growth: green markets as an economic oppor-
tunity. As the World Bank report Inclusive Green Growth argues, the ‘current
system is inefficient, thereby offering opportunities for cleaner (and not necess-
arily slower) growth’ (World Bank 2012, 3; see also Resnick, Tarp, and
Thurlow 2012). In the context of the financial crisis and widespread recession,
new markets, sources of wealth and areas for innovation are required. Given the
concurrent increasing prices of raw materials and natural resources on the world
market—oil, gas, food stuffs, and land—as well as widely predicted shortages

7
C. DEATH

in resources like freshwater, many businesses have sensed there is money to be

made in ‘going green’ (Foresight 2011). Rising world populations, and rapidly
growing economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa, also seem to present
new markets, and even in older markets the niches for ‘organic’ and ‘green’ pro-
ducts are becoming increasingly commercially attractive (OECD 2011, 9). Carbon
markets create new opportunities for financial speculation, and developers of new
energy technologies seem to be perpetually on the cusp of the next big break-
through that will take humanity into the next stage of its development: post-
fossil fuels (DBSA 2011, 5). From this perspective, the green economy is a
good place to bet on future growth, profits, jobs and markets. According to
Barbier, if policies for a Global Green New Deal are pursued, ‘over the next
few years they will create millions of jobs, improve the livelihoods of the
world’s poor and channel investments into dynamic economic sectors’ (2010, 1).
The discourse of green growth thus represents a fundamental recasting of the
relationship between environmentalism and economics. Rather than a focus on
limits and scarcity, as in most environmental texts, the emphasis is on new
markets, new services, and new forms of consumption. As Paterson notes, this
reflects a broader trend in environmental governance away from ‘regulatory mech-
anisms designed to restrict certain forms of economic activity and toward the pro-
motion of a particular path of growth’ (2009, 115).

Green resilience
Finally, the fourth element of the discourse is essentially reactionary and cautious.
It is fundamentally an attempt to protect the status quo, and is thus the least radical
of the green economy discourses. That said, in the face of the two crises discussed
above—financial and environmental—achieving resilience is no small task (Barry
2012; UNEP 2009). Warnings of environmental scarcity, climate change, increas-
ing pollution, resource depletion and so on have convinced many that alternatives
need to be found in order simply to maintain the status quo. At some point, peak
oil will require a transition to electric cars or mass transit systems. Changing cli-
mates will require ‘climate smart’ agriculture, new crops and techniques, and
diversification of land holdings in order to protect farmers from the changes (Fore-
sight 2011; Stern 2007). Climate change scientists, for example, point out that ‘the
vulnerability of Southern African societies and ecosystems is extraordinary’
(Bauer and Scholz 2010, 85). Communities will need to think about how they
source their food and water, and might need to reconsider heavy dependence on
external sources of energy and raw materials.
Varied technologies, techniques, programmes and initiatives fall under the
‘green resilience’ discourse: these include climate adaptation schemes, flood
defences, insurance schemes, risk indexing, disaster relief plans, and attempts to
build self-sufficient local economies. As well as vulnerability to direct environ-
mental changes, disasters or scarcity, there is a risk posed by the political and
economic actions of others to respond to environmental challenges. Thus many
countries and markets are concerned about the threat of new forms of economic

8
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

protectionism, the loss of comparative advantage in sectors or markets as technol-

ogy changes, and new forms of governance and regulation.
The dominant note of caution within the ‘green resilience’ discourse is a key dis-
tinguishing feature from the more optimistic discourses of green growth and green
transformation. As such, it is also a reminder that despite the current enthusiasm and
high profile of the green economy concept, many still regard it with some scepticism
and trepidation. Many of those who have long been in favour of a green revolution,
for example, are rightly sceptical about the current popularity of discourses of green
growth. For many developing states—especially in Africa—there is also concern
about the implications of the green economy. These concerns surfaced during the
negotiations prior to the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in
Brazil in 2012. Here it was notable that many G77 countries, including China,
resisted too much emphasis being placed on the concept. One reason was the
threat of eco-tariffs on exports from the global South, with fears that the green
economy might be a form of ‘eco-protectionism’ whereby higher production stan-
dards could exclude emerging economies from developed markets (Bär, Jacob, and
Werland 2011; Khor 2011; UN 2012, III, 58 h). Another concern was that an overly
homogenous formulation of the green economy, which neglected the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities, would undermine existing commit-
ments to poverty alleviation and meeting basic needs in the global South
(Goodman and Salleh 2013; Khor 2011; Tienhaara 2013).
These debates at Rio+20 are an important reminder of the political differences
behind the consensus position that the green economy is a ‘good thing’. The four
discourses highlighted here are a useful way to disaggregate the green economy
debates, and they can also help explain how South Africa has been able to position
itself as a global green leader.

Local politics: the green economy in South Africa

In many respects, South Africa is an unlikely candidate to be leading or advocating
a transition to a green economy. Around 77% of all energy needs in the country are
met by coal, and per capita CO2 emissions are inordinately high considering the
level of development (England 2011; ESKOM 2013). New coal-fired power
stations under construction in Medupi and Kusile will be the third and fourth
largest coal-fired power plants in the world, and Sasol’s Secunda plant is one of
the largest point sources of CO2 emissions anywhere on the planet (Resnick,
Tarp, and Thurlow 2012, 219; Yeld 2011). Yale’s 2012 Environmental Perform-
ance Index rates South Africa as 128 out of 131 countries, in the ‘weakest perfor-
mers’ category just above Kazakhstan and Iraq (EPI 2012). The Global Green
Economy Index ranked South Africa overall 21st out of 27 countries surveyed,
and the scores on indicators such as policy and clean-tech investment were in
the bottom quarter of the list (although on green tourism South Africa was
placed third out of 27) (Dual Citizen 2012).
Surprisingly, however, the same index reported that South Africa was first out of
the 27 countries listed (between them comprising over 90% of the global green

9
C. DEATH

economy) in terms of leadership performance on the green economy. South Africa

is also often cited as a country which has made strides towards putting the concept
into practice (Barbier 2010; ILO 2013, 17, 44). This reflects the prominence of
environmental issues—particularly climate change, but also conservation—in
South African foreign policy and ‘nation branding’ (Death 2011). It hosted the
2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development and the 2011
Durban COP17 climate change conference, and initiatives such as the Long-
Term Mitigation Scenario attracted a great deal of attention nationally and inter-
nationally (Raubenheimer 2011). Prior to the 2009 Copenhagen COP15 confer-
ence South Africa made a high-profile commitment to reduce national emissions
to 34% below business as usual levels by 2020 and 42% by 2025, dependent on
finance, technology and capacity-building support from industrialised countries
(Death 2011; Never 2012). This, if achieved, would enable South Africa’s emis-
sions ‘to peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for approximately a decade and
decline in absolute terms thereafter’ (RSA 2011a, 25), promising a significant
transformation of one of the most carbon intensive economies in the world.
South Africa responded to the world financial and economic crisis by launching
a $7.5 billion stimulus package, of which about 11%, or $0.8 billion, was allocated
to environment-related themes, such as railways, energy-efficient buildings, and
water and waste management (Barbier 2010, 4; UNEP 2013, 1). In May 2010,
the South African government hosted a Green Economy Summit, and in Novem-
ber 2011 Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel revealed the details of a
new green economic accord which aimed to create 300,000 ‘green jobs’ in the next
10 years. This is being funded in part through the Green Fund, which was set up
with R800 million and expanded by a further R300 million in the 2013 budget, to
‘provide catalytic finance to facilitate investment in green initiatives that will
support South Africa’s transition towards a green economy’ (Gordhan 2013;
Green Fund 2012). The initiative involves a number of targets (some of which
are repackaged older targets), including to install a million solar water heaters
by 2014/2015, the manufacturing of renewable energy plants, energy efficiency,
waste disposal and recycling, retrofitting buildings with low energy fittings,
water projects (including rainwater harvesting, upscaling the ‘Working for
Water’ programme, and comprehensive municipal water metering systems), a
national PES Programme, and expanding the biofuel industry (DBSA 2011;
RSA 2011b). Patel claimed that as part of South Africa’s New Growth Path,
‘[t]he green economy can create a large number of jobs, provide a spur for indus-
trialisation and help to create a sustainable future for this and the next generations’
(Parker 2011; see also Fine 2012).
Which of the green economy discourses identified above, then, is most domi-
nant in South Africa? In answering this question, it is important to note that it
is difficult to treat South Africa as a homogenous entity. This is both because
different state actors and institutions—individual politicians, different levels of
government (national, provincial and municipal, some with different parties and
factions in power), different ministries with different mandates and entrenched
interests—have different positions on the green economy, and also because the

10
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

green economy does not yet provide a fully coherent and developed government
commitment. There are accordingly different emphases and orientations in differ-
ent sites, even within the government, let alone within influential figures and sites
within civil society, academia, and the private sector.
Evidence of all four of the green economy discourses profiled above can be found
in South Africa. For example, some academics, activists and communities campaign
on behalf of a green revolution, and argue that a ‘just transition to a low carbon
economy’ could ‘contain the embryo of an alternative eco socialist social order’
(Cock 2012, 9). In contrast, within the government, the stated commitment to sustain-
able development and ‘green transformation’ is clear. In his State of the Nation
address on 14 February 2013, President Zuma declared that the National Develop-
ment Plan ‘is a roadmap to a South Africa where all will have water, electricity, sani-
tation, jobs, housing, public transport, adequate nutrition, education, social
protection, quality healthcare, recreation and a clean environment’ (Zuma 2013).
A more concrete example of the green transformation discourse can be seen in
public works programmes like the Working for Water scheme (and related pro-
grammes: Working for Woodlands, Working for Wetlands, Working on Fire).
Although these pre-exist the current enthusiasm for the green economy, they
have been promoted as model programmes by others and have received boosts
from the Green Fund in some cases (Hawn 2005; ILO 2013, 44; Resnick, Tarp,
and Thurlow 2012, 216). The largest programme, Working for Water, employs
approximately 20,000–25,000 people per year from the most remote rural
areas, of which 52% are women, to clear alien trees and plant species (Neely
2010). It deliberately targets the most vulnerable groups in society, with targets
of 60% women, 20% youth and 5% disabled (Musyoki 2012, 3). The stated
focus of the programme is ‘on job creation in support of an important ecosystem
service’ (Neely 2010, 875).
In a country facing particularly acute environmental and economic challenges
and risks, there are also many manifestations of the ‘green resilience’ discourse.
The South African 2011/2012 Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 points out that
there is a ‘growing threat of increasing “eco-protectionism” from advanced indus-
trial countries in the form of tariff and non-tariff measures such as carbon taxes
and restrictive standards’ (cited in DBSA 2011, 7). The 2011 White Paper on
Climate Change notes that
[e]ven under emission scenarios that are more conservative than current international emis-
sion trends, it has been predicted that by mid-century the South African coast will warm by
around 1 to 28C and the interior by around 2 to 38C. By 2100, warming is projected to reach
around 3 to 48C along the coast, and 6 to 78C in the interior. With such temperature
increases, life as we know it will change completely: parts of the country will be much
drier and increased evaporation will ensure an overall decrease in water availability.
(RSA 2011a, 9)
Accordingly, the paper states that the government of South Africa
[r]egards climate change as one of the greatest threats to sustainable development and
believes that climate change, if unmitigated, has the potential to undo or undermine many

11
C. DEATH

of the positive advances made in meeting South Africa’s own development goals and the
Millennium Development Goals. (RSA 2011a, 9)
However, the paper goes on to note that
although there will be costs associated with South Africa’s adaptation and GHG emission
reduction efforts, there will also be significant short and long-term social and economic
benefits, including improved international competitiveness, that will result from a transition
to a lower-carbon economy and society. (RSA 2011a, 10)
This suggests the power of the ‘green growth’ discourse, which is arguably the
most embedded and most widespread of the green economy discourses in South
Africa. Revealingly, the Green Economy Accord presented four principles for
the Green Economy: opportunity, innovation, responsibility and partnership
(RSA 2011b). That the first two are opportunity and innovation is no accident.
Its ‘key messages’ are that ‘climate change provides new prospects for economic
activity that were not previously pursued’, and ‘that the country can draw on its
technological, research and manufacturing base to generate new processes and
products’ (RSA 2011b, 1).
Green technology is an important plank of the green growth discourse. The
Development Bank of South Africa claims that ‘[p]rime examples of South
Africa’s technological innovation and leadership in support of the green
economy exist already, such as thin film solar photovoltaic modules and the
Joule (an electrical vehicle)’ (DBSA 2011, 5). Some new structures are being
created to stimulate these sorts of developments: in 2009 the energy regulator
announced renewable energy feed-in tariffs for a range of technologies, in
which independent power producers (IPPs) could generate electricity for the
grid. Three rounds of bids were scheduled, with the first round involving $5.4
billion worth of clean energy projects to generate 1400 MW of electricity. This
is hoped to produce 6925 MW of renewable electricity by 2020 (Reuters 2012).
The process has proved popular with local and international investors, and as
the first country in the world to propose a feed-in tariff for wind energy, the
South Africa example is being eagerly watched. Over the course of the first two
rounds, the price of renewables steadily dropped: during the first one ‘wind pro-
jects could provide electricity at R1.14 per kilowatt-hour, which dropped to 89c
per kilowatt-hour in the second window’ (Kings 2013b). The revised framework
is now termed renewable energy bids (REBID), in which contracts are auctioned
by the government and bid for by IPPs, and the current emphasis is on securing
local production of key parts. Funding for scaling up the renewable energy
sector is being mobilised through the South African Renewables Initiative, an
international partnership launched in 2011 by the government of South Africa
and Denmark, Germany, Norway, the UK and the European Investment Bank.
The green growth discourse is also manifested in an outward-looking, expansio-
nist mindset in which South Africa is positioned as a regional hub for the green
economy. The National Development Plan suggests that ‘South Africa should
invest in and help exploit the wide range of opportunities for low-carbon

12
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

energy from hydroelectric and other clean energy sources in southern Africa’
(RSA 2012, 22). With this in mind, the DBSA notes that ‘South Africa is well
positioned, based on the strength of its existing institutional platforms to
support, invest in and implement climate interventions across the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) region’ (DBSA 2011, 6). Such an
outlook explains, at least in part, South Africa’s presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, where a partnership is underway over the Grand Inga
dam, the world’s largest hydropower development. Renewable energy (especially
solar) and biofuels are seen as key areas in which South Africa could provide inter-
national leadership, as well as in ‘clean coal’ and other forms of mining. In the
words of Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry, it is possible to hear an
echo of Gordon Brown: ‘The next industrial, technological revolution is green
industrialisation. The last one was information and communications technology
and South Africa and Africa largely related to that as service providers for some-
body else’s product and technology’ (in England 2011, 2).
Overall, therefore, the dominant green economy discourse in South Africa is
that of green growth. Although the other three discourses can also be discerned,
the current emphasis on green growth is one reason why South Africa has been
able to position itself in a leadership position for the global green economy. Invok-
ing the discourse of green growth builds upon other elements of South African
national branding, such as a young and energetic population, rich natural
resources, and as a rising power and political and economic entry-point to the
rest of the African continent.

Two critiques of the South African green growth discourse

In some respects, this focus on the green economy has been welcomed by envir-
onmentalists and critical commentators within South Africa—many of whom have
often taken a nuanced inside –outside approach to engaging with the government
(see Death 2010, chapter six; Fig 2007; Kings 2013a; Parker 2011). However,
there are two important lines of critique of South Africa’s ‘green growth’ dis-
course. The first draws attention to its inconsistencies and limits, casting some
doubts on whether this is a coherent project which has the capacity to really
make much of an impact on the South African economy. The second line of cri-
tique suggests that, even if green growth was a consistent and determined project,
there are elements of it which are worrying from a political and ecological point of
view.

Is it for real?
It is easy to be cynical about government pronouncements and speeches, and it has
often been pointed out that the African National Congress (ANC) has a tendency
to ‘talk left, walk right’ (Bond 2006). However, the language of environmental
sustainability is far more prominent within South African government strategy
and policy-making than it was even a decade ago. For example, the

13
C. DEATH

macroeconomic strategies which dominated the government development policy

in the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s, the Growth, Employment and Redistri-
bution (GEAR) plan and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA),
made very little reference to environmental issues at all (Fig 2007, 234). Despite
this, there are some reasons to be cautious about the degree to which the green
economy is a coherent and determined political project in South Africa.
For example, the much-vaunted ‘green fiscal stimulus’ of US$7.5 billion
through infrastructure projects and other initiatives like the Green Fund, constitut-
ing 10.7% of the fiscal stimulus response to the global economic crisis, requires
some careful analysis and critical scrutiny (Barbier 2010, 4 –7; see also ILO
2013). Although the headline figure is significant, it should also be noted that
this the second lowest percentage devoted to green spending of the G20 countries,
and is rather put into context by the fact that South Korea has devoted US$36.3
billion over 2009 to 2012, around 3% of gross domestic product and an astonish-
ing 95% of all fiscal stimulus spending, through which it hopes to create at least
334,000 new jobs (Barbier 2010, 3–7; for a critique see Tienhaara 2013, 5). There
are some doubts, therefore, about the South African potential to create 300,000
‘green jobs’ with far smaller sums—and of course any such headline figure
must prompt questions about the type of jobs, the degree to which they constitute
‘decent work’ (ILO 2013), their sustainability, and the broader socio-economic
structure of rights and responsibilities within which such jobs exist, particularly
in South Africa’s ‘dual economy’ (Fine 2012; Mbeki 2003). Moreover, as many
have pointed out, several of the initiatives profiled under the green economy dis-
course are older commitments (such as to the roll-out of solar water heaters) that
have simply been repackaged (Parker 2011).
The fate of the carbon tax is another litmus test of commitments to the green
economy. This is scheduled to be introduced on 1 January 2015 and has been
subject to much debate and several key revisions (Resnick, Tarp, and Thurlow
2012, 220). The stated intention is to incentivise more environmentally respon-
sible behaviour: the National Treasury’s Carbon Tax Discussion Paper released
in May 2013 confirms that ‘[t]he primary objective of implementing carbon
taxes is to change future behaviour, rather than to raise revenue’ (National Treas-
ury 2013; see also RSA 2011a, 40). However, in response to concerns raised from
key sectors of the economy about the negative impacts on growth, the proposed
regulations (still under negotiation) make a number of compromises: the initial
rate of the tax will be low (R120 per tCO2e, increasing at 10% per annum for
the period 2015 –2020); there will be a tax-free threshold and additional relief
meaning the effective tax rate will range between R12 and R48 per tCO2e; and
certain sectors (such as agriculture, vehicles and waste) will be exempted
altogether (National Treasury 2013). It is, therefore, doubtful whether initiatives
like the carbon tax will pose much challenge to South Africa’s minerals –
energy complex (Fine 1997, 2012) or whether they can shift the country onto a
low-carbon development path (Resnick, Tarp, and Thurlow 2012, 219–220).
Furthermore, it is important to ask critical questions about the degree of embed-
ding of the green economy discourses across the country, and the capacity of

14
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

various ministries and provinces to implement their directives. As many commen-

tators have noted, there is a pervasive ‘implementation deficit’ (Oelofse et al.
2006, 62) when it comes to environmental policy in South Africa, and this is par-
ticularly true outside the big cities and the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal,
and the Western Cape. This lack of capacity, and the apparent inability in many
cases of state bodies to follow through on stated policies, represents a considerable
constraint on achieving sustained green growth (Evans 2010; Kraak 2011). This is
despite the fact there have been some interesting provincial and municipal-level
schemes and initiatives to encourage a green economy transition. A team of pro-
minent internationally recognised experts put together a proposal for a ‘Develop-
mental Green Economy’ in Gauteng in 2010, which presented a more
transformative vision of sustainable development and a ‘low carbon future’
(Spencer et al. 2010, 5). Limpopo produced a ‘Green Economy Plan’ in 2011,
focusing on the growth possibilities of sectors like biofuels and solar energy
(Musyoki 2012). KwaZulu-Natal has launched a ‘Green Growth’ website, and
has hosted two annual ‘Green Growth’ conferences in 2012 and 2013 (see
http://www.kzngreengrowth.co.za/), and the Western Cape has created a ‘Green-
Cape’ Sector Development Agency, which ‘was established to unlock the manu-
facturing and employment potential in the Green Economy in the Western Cape’
(see http://green-cape.co.za/about.php). At the municipal level, the City of Cape
Town is home to a number of programmes designed to showcase sustainability
and bring together public and private sector initiatives on climate change adap-
tation and mitigation (see Cartwright et al. 2012). Yet the scope and coherence
of these initiatives are extremely variable across the country, with some provinces
and municipalities barely acknowledging the existence of national green economy
priorities.
In general, the South African government has made a number of high-profile
and attention-grabbing statements on environmental and climate issues in the
past, and the green economy may well prove to be the latest manifestation of
this. The attraction of demonstrating leadership at big international conferences
such as Johannesburg, Copenhagen and Durban (Death 2011) has often proved
irresistible, but the depth of commitment to these initiatives from top politicians
is sometimes questionable and probably temporary. It seems likely that without
tangible pay-offs in terms of ‘green growth’ or ‘green jobs’ in the short to
medium term, the current enthusiasm for the green economy is likely to dwindle.

A new ‘green capitalism’?

The second line of critique considers the possibility that the green economy might
plausibly presage a genuine shift in the shape and structure of contemporary capit-
alism. As Paterson notes, ‘[w]hile efforts to govern global environmental pro-
blems started out as attempts to regulate the side-effects of existing forms of
capitalist development, they have increasingly been organised to channel capital-
ism in novel directions’ (2009, 99). It is possible to see an emerging ‘bio-
economy’ in South Africa centred on the promotion of new energy and

15
C. DEATH

communication technologies, commercial and genetically modified agriculture,

and big infrastructure projects like the Gautrain, new nuclear power plants, the
second phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, and the Grand Inga Dam
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Such developments present a
number of potentially worrying political and ecological implications, including
the commodification of the environment and the promotion of a model of econ-
omic growth which has failed to fundamentally redress social exclusion and
poverty in the country.
One of the means by which the ‘green growth’ discourse promises continual
growth is through the commodification of ecosystems services and the financiali-
sation of natural resources (Goodman and Salleh 2013; McAfee 2013; Paterson
2014; Tienhaara 2013, 7). South Africa has been actively exploring schemes for
PES as well as the possibility for income from carbon credit schemes like
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)
through the Kyoto process. For many environmental critics, however, this
involves attempts to price things—clean air, landscapes, ancient forests,
species-life—that simply should not be reduced to monetary value (McAfee
2013). For Cock, it ‘represents an attempt by capital to effect the last enclosure
of the commons—that of Nature itself’ (2012, 1–2). As Dryzek observes, ‘no
matter how attractive economic prescriptions may be in instrumental terms,
even to committed environmentalists, they help constitute a discourse, and a
world, which those according higher priority to citizenship, democratic and eco-
logical values find unattractive’ (2005, 140). The implications here are that poten-
tially any development which can show it is ‘cost-effective’, or which can provide
ecosystem services with technological replacements, can legitimately proceed
irrespective of the beauty or cultural value of the environment to be transformed.
Moreover, the greed and instability associated with financial markets in recent
years might give some pause for concern about rushing headlong into the financia-
lisation of our ecological life-support systems (Fine 2012, 557; Goodman and
Salleh 2013).
The commodification of the environment through such schemes, together with
big infrastructure projects, commercial agriculture and genetic modification, all
encapsulate a belief in an era of bigger, better, faster economic growth—at best
climate-proofed and low carbon, with growth decoupled from resource consump-
tion. Yet the assumption remains that economic growth is necessary to create full
employment, tackle poverty and reduce inequality. Yet it remains the case that
economic growth in many parts of the world (including South Africa) has not
always brought alleviations in poverty, but has rather often driven further econ-
omic and social inequality. Although South Africa is classed by the World
Bank as an ‘upper middle income’ country, and is Africa’s largest economy by
quite some margin, it is also characterised by what ex-President Thabo Mbeki
described in 2003 as a ‘dual economy’: ‘one is modern and relatively well devel-
oped. The other is characterised by underdevelopment and an entrenched crisis of
poverty’ (Mbeki 2003). More unequal societies—even when wealthier—tend to
experience a range of social problems from high levels of crime, to diseases of

16
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

affluence, psychological problems rooted in shame and alienation, not to mention

environmental degradation (UNDP 2013, 3; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). A green
economy strategy which simply seeks to reboot hyper-growth after the financial
crisis is not one which progressive activists should necessarily welcome.

A green state in South Africa?

Rather than entirely reject the notion of a green economy, however, environmental
and social justice activists might rather seek to promote discourses of green trans-
formation, green resilience, and even green revolution in South Africa. This would
entail challenging the belief that economic growth is the answer to the financial
and environmental crises, and expressing caution regarding the headlong commo-
dification of the environment through PES, carbon credits, and intellectual prop-
erty rights. The crucial question here is how to build social forces and political
structures which are able to produce a green economy which prioritises social
welfare, tackles poverty and exclusion, and defends non-monetary ways of
valuing the natural environment. Here it is useful to link the idea of the green
economy to another recently revived concept: that of the developmental state.
Prevailing attitudes to development and economic orthodoxy have shifted
somewhat since the unrestrained neoliberal enthusiasm of the 1990s (UNDP
2013, 4). The prospect of state regulation of the economy and a more intervention-
ist development policy has gained legitimacy since the global financial and econ-
omic crises. Moreover, in development circles, it is explicitly acknowledged that
the ‘rise of the South’ has been on the back of strong developmental states in
Brazil, India, China and elsewhere (Khor 2011, 79; UNDP 2013). In South
Africa, the concept of the developmental state has been central to the ANC’s pol-
itical project at least since the Polokwane Conference in 2007, and was reflected in
the appointment of Trevor Manuel as National Planning Minister by President
Zuma after the May 2009 election (Fine 2012; Kraak 2011, 355; Turok 2011)
and in the National Development Plan (RSA 2012).
The literature on developmental states has tended to neglect the environmental
dimension, as noted by Peter Evans. He observes that ‘the environmental degra-
dation associated with twentieth century developmental states has not been
counted against them’ (Evans 2010, 53). However, ‘in an era when many
growth strategies carry with them environmental degradation and the threat of
ecological collapse, the strategy that flows from the construction of a twenty-
first century developmental state has a light ecological footprint’ (Evans 2010,
52). This is also conveyed by Omano Edigheji’s vision of a developmental state
that would promote green industries, technologies and products (2010, 29).
One of the challenges for theorists, activists and politicians is how to ensure that
states are able to shape and regulate emerging green economies in ways which are
socially equitable, economically secure, and ecologically sustainable. In this task,
states require a diverse range of allies, including political parties, social move-
ments, civil society, as well as parts of the corporate sector. Indeed, it might be
better to think of this as the other way around: the twenty-first century ‘green

17
C. DEATH

state’ will be built (if at all) through pressure from social forces (Barry and Eck-
ersley 2005; Dryzek et al. 2002; Eckersley 2004). One section of the National
Development Plan accepts that
[i]n many respects, South Africa has an active and vocal citizenry, but an unintended
outcome of government actions has been to reduce the incentive for citizens to be direct par-
ticipants in their own development ... Robust public discourse and a culture of peaceful
protest will contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges facing communities
and reinforce accountability among elected officials. (RSA 2012, 27)
The conclusion to the Climate Change White Paper in 2011 is revealing, however:
‘Realising this commitment will require sustained effort and cooperation from all
spheres of government, the private sector and civil society formations, and ulti-
mately will depend on decisions by individual citizens to embrace climate-
friendly lifestyles and habits’ (RSA 2011a, 48). Acknowledging the central role
of social forces in driving change is not the same as placing ultimate responsibility
on the decisions of individual citizens to adopt climate-friendly lifestyles and con-
sumption patterns.
Achieving an economy which is low carbon, less resource intensive and socially
inclusive will require large-scale structural changes in South Africa, including a
direct challenge to the minerals – energy complex, substantial support for
cleaner industries and rural development, and far more dramatic progress in over-
coming a combination of apartheid and neoliberal legacies in education, housing
and public transport. The three specific environmental measures listed in the
National Development Plan—an environmental management framework to
ensure that developments which ‘have serious environmental or social effects
need to be offset by support for improvements in related areas’ (RSA 2012,
38); a target for increasing protected areas; and a set of indicators and reports
for natural resources—seem to be at best a minor distraction, and at worst a
signal that government still tends to see environmental issues from a ‘preserva-
tionist’ perspective which fails to challenge the broader model of socio-economic
development. None of these measures demonstrate a vision of enlisting social
movement pressure to help build a state that can govern in a manner which is econ-
omically radical, ecologically sustainable, and democratically pluralist.

Conclusion
Rather than accept the vague and consensual truism that a green economy is an
important factor in meeting the challenges of the coming century, this article
has suggested we should disaggregate the concept in order to reveal sometimes
overlapping and sometimes competing discourses of green revolution, green trans-
formation, green growth and green resilience. In the South African context, the
discourse of green growth is dominant, which explains why a country whose
economy is far from being ‘low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive’
(UNEP 2011, 16) has been able to position itself as a global leader on the green

18
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

economy. Discourses of resilience, transformation and even revolution do exist,

and they could be strengthened by environmental and social justice campaigners.
One observation that emerges from this discussion of the green economy in
South Africa is the central position of the state. To a degree that is more pro-
nounced than in some other G20 economies, the green economy in South
Africa is clearly regarded as a state-project, driven by and largely funded by the
government. The Financial Times reported in 2011 that ‘[t]he growth path has
been controversial in some parts of the corporate sector, because it envisages an
increased level of state intervention’ (England 2011, 2). This raises two crucial
sets of questions: first, can and will the state manage the green economy initiative
in a sustained, coherent and thorough-going manner? As yet there is little sign that
there is sufficient will or capacity to radically transform the South African
economy in a more environmentally sustainable direction. Second, and more fun-
damentally, is a set of questions about what such a transformation might mean pol-
itically if it were to be pursued. Given the failure of economic growth in South
Africa to substantially impact on unemployment and poverty levels for many in
the last 20 years, might a more transformative or revolutionary outlook facilitate
some consideration of how a ‘steady-state economy’ could deliver ‘prosperity
without growth’ (Barry 2012)? How will a green economy, which of necessity
will involve the pricing of environmental externalities, be regulated and
managed to ensure that commodification does not lead to a society which
knows the price of everything and the value of nothing? And how will such a
developmental state, with the capacity to regulate the green economy effectively,
relate to a democratic civil society in which protest and dissent are not crimina-
lised but valued?
The quote from Gordon Brown with which this paper opened explicitly com-
pares the transition to a ‘green economy’ to the industrial revolution. Similarly,
the 2013 UNDP Human Development Report also opens by reflecting on the
‘rise of the South’ in comparison to the industrial revolution.
The rise of the South is unprecedented in its speed and scale. Never in history have the living
conditions and prospects of so many people changed so dramatically and so fast. Great
Britain, where the Industrial Revolution originated, took 150 years to double output per
capita; the United States, which industrialized later, took 50 years. Both countries had a
population below 10 million when they began to industrialize. In contrast, the current econ-
omic takeoffs in China and India began with about 1 billion people in each country and
doubled output per capita in less than 20 years—an economic force affecting a hundred
times as many people as the Industrial Revolution did. (UNDP 2013, 11)
The idea of the green economy is currently at the heart of debates about the ways
in which the world is changing quite dramatically and fundamentally. It is almost a
truism that in the ‘carbon-constrained’ and ‘climate-changed’ world of the near
future (Barry 2012), any economy will need to be ‘greener’ than it is now.
Those which fail to transform are in for a bumpy ride. This is true for South
Africa as for everywhere else, but in South Africa many of these contradictions
and challenges are particularly acute.

19
C. DEATH

Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University, for
hosting me as a visiting researcher in February 2013, and to the University
Research Fund, Aberystwyth University, for funding the research on which this
article was based. The generous hospitality of Andy and Rebecca in Cape Town
was tremendously appreciated. The comments of the editors and anonymous
reviewers significantly helped improve this article.

Note
∗
Politics, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. Email: carl.death@manchester.ac.uk

References
Bär, H., K. Jacob, and S. Werland. 2011. Green Economy Discourses in the Run-up to Rio 2012. Environmental
Policy Research Centre research paper. Berlin: Freie Universität.
Barbier, E. B. 2010. “Global Governance: The G20 and a Global Green New Deal.” Economics: The E-journal 4
(2): 1 –32.
Barbier, E. B. 2011. “The Policy Challenges for Green Economy and Sustainable Economic Development.”
Natural Resources Forum 35 (3): 233–245.
Barbier, E., and A. Markandya. 2013. A New Blueprint for a Green Economy. Abingdon: Earthscan.
Barry, J. 2012. The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability: Human Flourishing in a Climate-Changed,
Carbon-Constrained World. Oxford: OUP.
Barry, J., and R. Eckersley, eds. 2005. The State and the Global Ecological Crisis. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bauer, S., and I. Scholz. 2010. “Adaptation to Climate Change in Southern Africa: New Boundaries for Sustain-
able Development.” Climate and Development 2: 83–93.
Bookchin, M. 1980. Toward an Ecological Society. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
Bond, P. 2006. Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms. Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press.
Cartwright, A., S. Parnell, G. Oelofse, and S. Ward, eds. 2012. Climate Change at the City Scale: Impacts, Miti-
gation and Adaptation in Cape Town. Abingdon: Routledge.
Clapp, J., and P. Dauvergne. 2005. Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cock, J. 2012. “The “Green Economy”: A “Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing” or an Alternative Development Path in
South Africa?” Paper presented at the International Sociological Association conference, Buenos Aires,
August 1 –4.
DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa). 2011. Programmes in Support of Transitioning South Africa to a
Green Economy. Johannesburg: DBSA.
Death, Carl. 2010. Governing Sustainable Development: Partnerships, Protests and Power at the World Summit.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Death, Carl. 2011. “Leading By Example: South African Foreign Policy and Global Environmental Politics.”
International Relations 25 (4): 453–476.
Dryzek, J. S. 2005. The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses. Oxford: OUP.
Dryzek, J. S., C. Hunold, D. Schlosberg, D. Downes, and H. K. Hernes. 2002. “The Environmental Transform-
ation of the State: The USA, Norway, Germany and the UK.” Political Studies 50 (4): 659– 682.
Dual Citizen. 2012. The Global Green Economy Index. Washington, DC: Dual Citizen.
Eckersley, R. 2004. The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Edigheji, O. 2010. “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges.”
In Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges, edited by O.
Edigheji, 1– 33. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
England, A. 2011. “Bid to Wean Country off Coal.” Financial Times (UK), December 2.
EPI. 2012. “Environmental Performance Index.” Yale University. Accessed October 8. http://epi.yale.edu/
epi2012/rankings
ESKOM. 2013. “Coal Power.” Accessed October 11. http://www.eskom.co.za/c/article/200/coal-power/

20
 POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES

Evans, P. B. 2010. “Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State: Potentials and Pitfalls.” In Constructing
a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges, edited by O. Edigheji, 37–
58. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Fig, D. 2007. “Technological Choices in South Africa: Ecology, Democracy and Development.” In State of the
Nation: South Africa 2007, edited by S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel, R. Southall, and J. Lutchman, 226–244. Cape
Town: HSRC Press.
Fine, B. 1997. South Africa’s Political Economy: From Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation. London:
Hurst.
Fine, B. 2012. “Assessing South Africa’s New Growth Path: Framework for Change?” Review of African Politi-
cal Economy 39 (134): 551 –568.
Foresight. 2011. The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability. London:
The Government Office for Science.
Goodman, J., and A. Salleh. 2013. “The “Green Economy”: Class Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony.” Globa-
lizations 10 (3): 411–424.
Gordhan, P. 2013. Budget Speech. Minister of Finance, February 27. Cape Town: Parliament of RSA.
Green Fund. 2012. “About the Green Fund.” Accessed October 10. http://www.sagreenfund.org.za/Pages/About.
aspx
Hawn, A. 2005. “South Africa Puts the Unemployed to Work, Restoring Land and Water.” New York Times (US),
July 26.
Illich, I. 1973. Tools for Conviviality. New York: Harper & Row.
ILO. 2013. Sustainable Development, Decent Work and Green Jobs. Geneva: ILO.
Khor, M. 2011. “Challenges of the Green Economy Concept and Policies in the Context of Sustainable Devel-
opment, Poverty and Equity.” In The Transition to a Green Economy: Benefits, Challenges and Risks
from a Sustainable Development Perspective, edited by UN-DESA, 69–97. New York: UN-DESA,
UNEP, UNCTAD.
Kings, S. 2013a. “Green Growth Could Give SA Competitive Advantage.” Mail & Guardian (SA), February 13.
Kings, S. 2013b. “SA’s Renewable Energy Sector a Beacon in Africa.” Mail & Guardian, February 20.
Kraak, A. 2011. “Horizontal Coordination, Government Performance and National Planning: The Possibilities and
Limits of the South African State.” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 38 (3): 343–365.
Mbeki, T. 2003. State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, Houses of Parlia-
ment, Cape Town, February 14.
McAfee, K. 2013. “Green Economy and Green Grabbing: Discourses and Resistances.” Paper delivered at the
2013 ISA annual convention, San Francisco, April 3 –6.
McShane, K. 2014. “Ecocentrism.” In Critical Environmental Politics, edited by C. Death, 83–90. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. W. Behrens III. 1972. The Limits to Growth. New York:
New American Library.
Mol, A. P. J. 2002. “Ecological Modernization and the Global Economy.” Global Environmental Politics 2 (2):
92– 115.
Mol, A. P. J., and D. A. Sonnenfeld. 2000. “Ecological Modernisation Around the World: An Introduction.”
Environmental Politics 9 (1): 1 –14.
Musyoki, A. 2012. “The Emerging Policy for Green Economy and Social Development in Limpopo, South
Africa.” UNRISD and Friedrich Ebert Siftung occasional paper, Geneva, June 8.
National Treasury. 2013. “Press Release: Carbon Tax Discussion Paper for Public Comment.” Pretoria, May 2.
Neely, A. H. 2010. ““Blame it on the Weeds”: Politics, Poverty, and Ecology in the New South Africa.” Journal
of Southern African Studies 36 (4): 869– 887.
Never, B. 2012. “Collective Learning Through Climate Knowledge Systems: The Case of South Africa.” Poli-
tikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 39 (2): 231– 256.
OECD. 2011. Towards Green Growth. Paris: OECD.
Oelofse, C., D. Scott, G. Oelofse, and J. Houghton. 2006. “Shifts Within Ecological Modernization Within South
Africa: Deliberation, Innovation and Institutional Opportunities.” Local Environment 11 (1): 61– 78.
Parker, F. 2011. “SA’s New Green Economy Accord Met with Skepticism.” Mail & Guardian (SA), November 17.
Paterson, M. 2009. “Global Governance for Sustainable Capitalism? The Political Economy of Global Environ-
mental Governance.” In Governing Sustainability, edited by W. N. Adger and A. Jordan, 99– 122. Cam-
bridge: CUP.
Paterson, M. 2014. “Commodification.” In Critical Environmental Politics, edited by C. Death, 53– 62. Abing-
don: Routledge.
Pearce, D. 1993. Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan.
Pearce, D., and E. B. Barbier. 2000. Blueprint for a Sustainable Economy. London: Earthscan.

21
C. DEATH

Pearce, D., A. Markandya, and E. B. Barbier. 1989. Blueprint for a Green Economy. London: Earthscan.
Raubenheimer, S. 2011. Facing Climate Change: Building South Africa’s Strategy. Cape Town: IDASA.
Resnick, D., F. Tarp, and J. Thurlow. 2012. “The Political Economy of Green Growth: Cases from Southern
Africa.” Public Administration and Development 32 (3): 215–228.
Reuters. 2012. “S. Africa Okays $5.4 bln in Clean Energy Projects.” Reuters, October 29.
RSA. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Cape Town: Parliament of RSA.
RSA. 1998. National Environmental Management Act. Cape Town: Parliament of RSA.
RSA. 2011a. National Climate Change Response White Paper. October. Pretoria: RSA.
RSA. 2011b. Green Economy Accord. November. Pretoria: RSA.
RSA. 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future—Make It Work. Pretoria: National Planning
Commission.
Schumacher, E. F. 1973. Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered. New York: Harper and
Row.
Spencer, F., M. Swilling, D. Everatt, M. Muller, J. Schulschenk, J. du Toit, R. Meyer, and W. Pierce. 2010. A
Strategy for a Developmental Green Economy for Gauteng, Preliminary Report. Draft. Johannesburg:
Gauteng Province Department of Economic Development.
Stern, N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge: CUP.
Stevenson, H. 2013. “Representing Green Radicalism: The Limits of State-Based Representation in Global
Climate Governance.” Review of International Studies 40 (1): 177– 201. doi: 10.1017/S0260210513000077
Tienhaara, K. 2013. “Varieties of Green Capitalism: Economy and Environment in the Wake of the Global Finan-
cial Crisis.” Environmental Politics 1 –18. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2013.821828
Turok, B. 2011. Development in a Divided Country: Understanding the ANC Today. Auckland Park: Jacana.
UN. 2012. “The Future We Want.” Outcome Text of the UN conference on sustainable development, Rio de
Janeiro, June 20– 22. Accessed April 26. http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html
UNDP. 2013. Human Development Report 2013. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World.
New York: UNDP.
UNEP. 2009. Global Green New Deal. Nairobi: UNEP.
UNEP. 2011. Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, Green
Economy Report. Nairobi: UNEP.
UNEP. 2013. Green Economy Modelling Report of South Africa: Focus on Natural Resource Management, Agri-
culture, Transport and Energy Sectors. Nairobi: UNEP and DEA.
Wapner, P. 2014. “Sacrifice.” In Critical Environmental Politics, edited by C. Death, 208–217. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Wilkinson, R., and K. Pickett. 2010. The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone. London: Penguin.
World Bank. 2012. Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
World Bank. 2013. “Data: CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons Per Capita).” Accessed October 10. http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC
World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford: OUP.
Yeld, J. 2011. “Fall in Line on Climate Change, Sasol told.” IOL (SA), November 11.
Zuma, J. G. 2013. State of the Nation Address By His Excellency Jacob G Zuma, President of the Republic of
South Africa on the occasion of the Joint Sitting Of Parliament, Cape Town, February 10.

22