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A Comparison Between Routine Construction and Post
A Comparison Between Routine Construction and Post
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Suzanne Wilkinson
Massey University
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Legislation that applies to routine construction provides for the safe development of infrastructure, capital
improvements and land use, ensuring preservation and environmental protection, however there is often little
provision in legislation to facilitate reconstruction projects. Much existing legislation was not drafted to cope
with an emergency situation and was not developed to operate under the conditions that will inevitably prevail
in the aftermath of a severe disaster. If well articulated and implemented, the regulations should not only
provide an effective means of reducing and containing vulnerabilities (disaster mitigation), but also a means of
facilitating reconstruction projects.
The purpose of this work is to examine how reconstruction differs from routine construction, focussing on the
interrelated reconstruction challenges of allocation of responsibility for coordination, scarcity of resources and
the application of legislation and regulations that were written for routine construction rather than post-disaster
reconstruction.
Case studies of reconstruction following recent small scale disasters in New Zealand are presented to support
the points raised. Extrapolation of the main issues to larger scale disasters identifies some significant challenges
which, if not addressed in advance, are likely to hinder the reconstruction process.
The paper concludes that whilst routine construction processes have proved adequate for small-scale disasters,
the greater degree of coordination required for programmes of reconstruction following a larger disaster has not
been adequately addressed in policy and legislation.
INTRODUCTION
Disaster management and the need to develop a resilient community capable of recovering
from disasters is of increasing concern in many countries. The recovery process may present
an opportunity for improvement in the functioning of the community, so that risks from
future events can be reduced while the community becomes more resilient. The effectiveness
of the process will depend on how much planning has been carried out and what
contingencies are put in place prior to the disaster.
In preparation for disasters there is often an emphasis on readiness and response, with poor
understanding and little consideration given to the implications of recovery (Angus 2005).
Experience has shown that recovery is often carried out by modifying routine construction
processes on an ad hoc basis following a disaster. Whilst this can work reasonably well for
small scale disasters, the effectiveness of reconstruction could be improved by modifying the
legislative and regulatory framework in advance of a disaster. For larger scale disasters there
is a greater imperative to have appropriate systems in place in advance, to allow effective
coordination and delivery of reconstruction works.
Recovery is defined as “the coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate,
medium and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a disaster” (MCDEM
2005). Recovery requires a concerted approach that will support the foundations of
To ensure robustness in the process, the rational starting point is the setting up of an
institutional infrastructure for emergency management, which will formulate public policies
for mitigation, response and recovery (Comerio 2004). These recovery policies should then
be integrated into other emergency management areas as well as policies of sustainability and
community capacity building (Coghlan 2004). The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management (MCDEM) in New Zealand encourages a holistic approach to the issue of
recovery planning and believes this will be most effective if it is integrated with the
remaining 3Rs of reduction, readiness and response (MCDEM, 2005a).
New Zealand’s recovery planning and management arrangements are contained in the
National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy (MCDEM, 2004). Recovery is
delivered through a continuum of central, regional, community and personal structures
(Angus, 2004).
Unless provision is made for recovery in regulations and legislation that apply to routine
construction, then the coordination and management of a major programme of reconstruction
could become cumbersome and inefficient. For example it is unlikely that coordinating
authorities and regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of work, due to
shortfalls in experienced personnel.
Recovery costs are estimated at $160-180million for the rural sector and $120million for
roads and council infrastructure. In addition $29.5 million and $3.5 million will be required
to stop future flooding of the lower Manawatu and Rangitikei rivers respectively.
A source of frustration for utility companies in the Manawatu flood event according to AELG
(2005) was the time taken to develop an understanding with the Regional Council about
emergency actions that would cover all situations under the Resource Management Act,
rather than require a formal process for each activity. A particular issue arose when the
Regional Council initially required that slip material should be disposed of in a designated
landfill; subsequently they allowed a more pragmatic approach which meant that slip material
could be moved and redeposited locally.
The road funding authority, Transfund, should ideally become involved as early as possible
following a disaster since Transfund has direct access to government funds. However this
was not the case following the Manawatu floods and it is likely that more could have been
done to secure certainty over funding in the early stages of recovery which would have
helped with the physical works prioritisation process.
Recovery at Matata relied heavily on Central Government funding since the local council had
a small number of rate payers and insufficient funds to cover the recovery costs itself.
Funding took some time to come through whilst government requested and were awaiting
details of the costs. This frustrated the local population.
Overall there was little difference between the routine construction process and the
reconstruction process, due to the fact that the disasters were of a relatively small scale. The
parties normally involved during routine construction projects were also involved during the
reconstruction and using existing relationships eased the process. During the initial recovery
stage local contractors volunteered their time, but this needed careful management. National
scale contractors were a valuable source of resources, since they were able to use their
networks to mobilise resources from the whole country.
‘repair, reconstruct or relocate buildings – obtaining fast-track building and other consents,
sufficient builders and materials, coordinating skilled trades and their work standards’
This is a very challenging responsibility for the task force to take on and does not appear to
concur with what has happened in practice following recent disasters.
Reconstruction resources
The processing of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction and recovery after
an event has been identified as a potential bottleneck. Access to normal resource levels will
be unlikely and inevitably there will be shortages of qualified people to handle impact
assessments and consent processing. A more flexible approach to the standard consent
process would be necessary to expedite the process and help cope with the high volume of
consent applications after a major disaster.
In terms of overall human resources Page (2004) suggests that the construction industry
could cope effectively with a medium sized disaster if the base work load was at an average
level, but a large scale disaster coinciding with a high base load could require up to 180,000
additional construction industry workers (this is based on an event causing $10billion worth
of damage in the Wellington region and with a base work load 7% higher than current
levels). Hopkins, (2004) in a similar study estimates a combined resource requirement for
reinstatement to be about $7.73 billion. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management
Plan, due to come into force in July 2006, acknowledges New Zealand may need to mobilise
all nationally available resources because it has finite capacity and capability for response
and recovery.
The new Building Act (2004) requires that Territorial Authorities must not grant building
consents on land subjected to natural hazards unless they can be protected from the hazard
and, where waivers are granted, it requires that notices be placed on the land to indicate the
risk of natural hazards they are exposed to. Implementing this Act will have far reaching
implications on insurance claims as the Earthquake Commission Act indicates that the EQC
is not liable to settle any claim where there is an identified large risk. Current revisions to the
mapping of vulnerable natural disaster zones may prevent existing properties from being
compensated at all.
The CDEM Act is the only piece of legislation that requires specific identification of hazards
by councils. However, the scope of this identification is limited to the hazards already
identified through the Resource Management Act (RMA) process and for which building
works have been undertaken in hazard zones. Hazard identification can only be inferred from
other pieces of legislation such as the Building Act and RMA where in the course of
discharging council duties, information concerning natural hazards is deemed collected.
CONCLUSION
The task of reconstruction after a major event can be an onerous challenge. It requires
deliberate and coordinated efforts of all stakeholders for effective and efficient recovery of
the affected community. The paper has shown that the issues surrounding the implementation
of the pieces of legislation concerning reconstruction after a major disaster are complex and
interrelated. Though the existing regulatory framework seems to point to the right direction,
more issues have to be addressed in practice.
Legislation cannot be used for purposes other than those for which it is intended and there
appears to be little provision in several areas of legislation for post-disaster situations. These
polices need to be revised before hand as hasty revisions during the course of reconstruction
works do not provide the best solution to major disaster problems.
Should the routine regulatory and legislative processes be followed after a major disaster it is
unlikely that regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of work.
The conflicts in the interpretation of the different pieces of legislation need to be harmonised,
whilst the roles and responsibilities of the various CDEM agencies and other stakeholders
need to be made clear. The apparent division between those who, in practice, take
responsibility for reconstruction and those who set policy and legislation create barriers that
need to be overcome. Failing this, implementation of reconstruction works will be
cumbersome in the event of a major disaster.