CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2 London, 2010

Consultation workshop report

Executive summary

The workshop harnessed the views of the wider industry and other stakeholders on the
issues of flood risk to critical infrastructure. Several different exercises were undertaken
and managed by the project team to ascertain:

 the current involvement on the issue across different sectors

 interdependencies between different sectors and different assets
 immediate actions required by each sector to overcome issues identified
 barriers to collaboration between different stakeholders and approaches to overcome
these barriers.

There were several learning points from the workshop as follows:

 it was agreed that physical resilience, such as the use of temporary or demountable
barriers, should be considered as a separate aspect to organisational resilience, which
would be achieved through business continuity and contingency planning.
Organisational resilience also includes the resilience of staff and operatives, which are
vital for the effective operation of critical infrastructure assets
 individual sectors are at different stages of developing and adopting strategies for
flood risk management of critical infrastructure assets. Many sectors have already
identified their sites most at risk from flooding, some have undertaken a cost-benefit
analysis and other organisations in the water sector are now involved in the process of
selecting appropriate measures to improve resilience and resistance
 flood risk assessments have for the most part been undertaken by individual operators
acting alone. An exception to this is the energy networks industry – members of the
Energy Networks Association (ENA) Task Group have undertaken flood risk
assessment work covering the energy transmission industry. To date this work has
covered flood risk assessments of electricity transmission sites, with further work
planned for gas transmission sites. No such work has been undertaken in a co-
ordinated manner for electricity or gas generation sites. It was recognised within the
energy sector as a whole that greater engagement is required between energy
generation and energy transmission organisations, and in particular between the
Energy Networks Association and the Association of Electricity Producers
 co-ordination and collaboration between sectors in the development of strategies and
approaches to improve flood resilience and resistance could be improved. Co-
ordination to date has occurred via local and regional resilience forums, as well as in
the development of strategic flood risk assessments (SFRA), catchment flood
management plans (CFMP), and surface water management plans (SWMP)
 fragmented governance is a significant barrier to collaboration between sectors. Co-
ordination and leadership, (potentially from the newly formed natural hazards team
within the Cabinet Office) to align the policies and approaches of different sector
regulators (Ofwat, Ofgem, Ofcom, and ORR) could prove beneficial
 there is a deficiency of resources (funding, skills, people), as well as a shortage of
political and public will, inhibiting many infrastructure asset owners from adopting
good practice. Investment decisions are based largely on commercial aims and
consumer pressure

2 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

  it is important to ensure that the Floods and Water Management Bill contains
provisions that help knowledge and information sharing, and is focused particularly
on overcoming any barriers that arise through commercial and national security
sensitivities.

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 3

 Background

The workshop formed part of the overall consultation process for CIRIA research project
RP913 Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, which took place in March and
April 2009.

The workshop brought together a cross-section of stakeholders from the identified target
audience to focus thinking prior to their submission of formal responses to an online
questionnaire survey (which closed on 22 April 2009). Analysis of the feedback from the
online questionnaire survey will form a separate output to the project. Further information
on the project, including the intended target audience, can be found on the project
webpage of the CIRIA website: <www.ciria.org>.

THE CHALLENGE
The management of infrastructure assets, flood risk, and flood incidents are high on the
collective agenda in the UK following the loss of essential services, such as electricity,
transport, water and communications during recent flooding incidents, particularly in the
summer of 2007. The subsequent socio-economic disruption shows that in major
emergencies the direct effects of critical infrastructure failure can be severe.

WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES
“Critical” asset owners and managers convened to promote collaboration and consensus-
building between the different disciplines and sectors within the industry. The specific
objectives of the workshop were to:

 identify the issues and constraints currently preventing the achievement of the Pitt
recommendations (ie identify “where we are now”, and “where we want to be”)
 identify interdependencies between critical assets
 identify organisational approaches and experiences, and potential cross-sector
engagement opportunities.

4 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

2.1 PRESENTATIONS FROM THE PROJECT TEAM

2.1.1 Introduction to the project

Ben Kidd, CIRIA, provided a brief introduction to the project covering the following:

 background, development and aims of the project

 project objectives
 project team
 interactions with other projects/initiatives
 objectives of the workshop.

This presentation can be accessed on the project page of the CIRIA website
<www.ciria.org>.

2.1.2 Research contractor presentation

Will McBain, Arup, outlined the issues facing the industry. Environment Agency flood
maps were used to highlight that 10 per cent of the developed area within the UK is at risk
from flooding (from fluvial and coastal sources). There is also further risk of flooding from
other sources including surface water and groundwater flooding, which raises the risk to
the UK’s critical infrastructure. Previous flood events, such as the impacts on critical
infrastructure during the extensive summer 2007 flooding were provided together with
recommendations 51 and 52, from the Pitt Review of the summer 2007 floods, to highlight
the importance of the need for cross-sector co-ordination and collaboration.

The presentation covered the concepts and principles relating to flood risk management
and infrastructure asset management, which can be used to aid the improvement of flood
resilience and resistance of critical infrastructure. These include:

 a “systems” approach to consideration of critical assets, whereby people, organisations

and infrastructure can each be considered as being within systems that depend on
each other
 the flood risk management hierarchy (assess, avoid, substitute, control, mitigate) and
the catchment/strategic approach to flood risk management, as presented in Planning
Policy Statement 25 (PPS25) for the development of new infrastructure, but can also be
applied to existing infrastructure
 two types of resilience were outlined: the ability to recover (ie to return to normal
operation following a shock), and the ability to adapt to incremental change (eg
changes in climate). Definitions for flood resistance, flood resilience, and flood
repairable were provided from the CLG publication “Improving the Flood
Performance of New Buildings” (2007).
 mitigation and adaptation to climate change through the use of United Kingdom
Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) scenarios, with precautionary allowances made
where appropriate in design standards. Revised UK climate projections are to be
published in 2009
 assessing and screening risk to critical infrastructure and prioritising investment in
resilience measures through the use of a cost-benefit analysis framework, such as the
risk matrix developed by Ofwat for the water industry. This assesses risk via assessment
of hazard probability against service consequences.

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 5

 The presentation highlighted the importance of cross-sector collaboration and co-
ordination due to the extensive interdependencies between infrastructure assets, for
example, the dependence of wastewater treatment plants on energy supplies. These
dependencies were further investigated later in the workshop.

2.2 SESSION 1 – “STATE OF PLAY”

2.2.1 Objective of Session 1

The overall objective of Session 1 was to ascertain the current state of play for each
represented sector with regards to the resilience and resistance measures implemented,
both physically (eg temporary and demountable barriers) and managerially (eg
infrastructure asset management processes/procedures).

Delegates were split into the following groups, as outlined in Annex A:

Group 1 – Water
Group 2 – Energy
Group 3 – Transport
Group 4 – Regulators/policy
Group 5 – Telecoms
Group 6 – Community services

Groups were provided with pre-prepared flipchart sheets with the following headings:

 measures currently implemented

 measures not currently implemented but planned for implementation within the next
12 months
 measures not currently implemented nor planned for use in the immediate future
(within the next 12 months).

Delegates were then asked to suggest and discuss within their groups potential measures,
both physical and managerial, and provide feedback on the flipcharts.

2.2.2 Session 1 feedback

2.2.2.1 Water sector (group 1)

Points raised:

 several water companies have completed assessments of their assets/sites at risk from
flooding, primarily using the methods outlined in PPS25, and using the Environment
Agency flood maps
 in some instances, water companies have moved on from this stage to the point of
identifying potential solutions to improve resilience, however there is uncertainty over
what design standards should be adopted
 less work has been done on the implementation of resilience and resistance measures,
however those present at the workshop expressed a clear preference for fixed,
permanent solutions over other measures such as temporary or demountable defences

6 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

  the group expressed the need for guidance on how to approach designing for
exceedance, as well as factoring in climate change mitigation measures
 the water industry is well advanced in its approach to the flood risk management as
well as collaboration with several other stakeholders, particularly through the
development of strategic flood risk assessments (SFRAs) with local authorities and local
resilience forums (LRFs). These SFRAs, which are either well-advanced or already
completed for several different catchments, could be used to inform resilience
strategies for all critical infrastructure within a particular area.

2.2.2.2 Energy sector (group 2)

Points raised:

 the Energy Networks Association (ENA) has been co-ordinating work with its members
to identify sites most at risk from flooding, and member organisations have
undertaken an audit of these sites
 such work has yet to be undertaken in a co-ordinated manner on the energy
generation side of the sector
 the Association of Electricity Providers (AEP) is not currently involved extensively with
the work being undertaken by the ENA or its members
 the energy sector could be sub-divided into two further sectors, for electricity and gas.
Each would then have further sub-divisions for both distribution/transmission and
generation.

2.2.2.3 Transport sector (group 3)

Points raised:

 the transport sector is generally well advanced in its knowledge and management of
existing infrastructure assets, with work currently being undertaken to transfer asset
data from historic paper records onto integrated GIS systems. This work is being
undertaken by several organisations including Highways Agency, Network Rail and
London Underground
 for adopting physical measures, general consensus was that the transport sector is not
in favour of use of temporary or demountable barriers, so they have neither been
implemented nor are planned for the future
 current physical measures implemented, and those planned for future adoption, are
the incorporation of flood resistant measures. Flood resilient measures will then be
considered as extra measures
 the organisations represented have well developed management processes and
procedures for the management of their infrastructure assets. These include routine
maintenance of assets (including drainage assets) and the development of whole-life
cost-benefit tools to aid investment decisions (using integrated GIS systems)
 the sector as a whole is giving consideration to how best to use UKCIP climate change
scenarios and how these could be used within risk assessment frameworks and
included in design specifications.

2.2.2.4 Regulators/policy (group 4)

Given the uniqueness of the group, and due to the fact that the represented
organisations/departments were not infrastructure asset owners, the group were asked to

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 7

 provide feedback on the current (and future) regulatory and legislative framework. The
following points were raised:

 within the next 12 months new guidance will be released on flood risk assessments for
critical infrastructure, as well as appropriate protection/resilience standards to be
adopted across industry
 the new guidance will be assessed by a cross-party scrutiny committee before release.
This scrutiny committee will be tasked with monitoring and challenging progress
made in the implementation of the Pitt Review recommendations
 the Environment Agency will be publishing a 20 year strategy document in 2009,
which will cover the issue of flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure
 the Floods and Water Management Bill is currently under development and is likely to
contain aspects relating to flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure. It is
also hoped that it will provide a framework for the facilitation of knowledge and
information sharing, particularly regarding sharing of flood maps
 a new National Flood Forecasting Centre will be opened in Farringdon, which it is
hoped will provide better information for emergency planners within critical
infrastructure asset owner organisations
 the Environment Agency is currently developing targeted flood warning systems for
utilities companies
 new UKCIP climate projection scenarios are expected to be released later in 2009
 Defra, CLG and the Environment Agency are co-ordinating the development of
several initiatives including river basin management plans, catchment flood
management plans, and surface water management plans. These are being developed
through partnerships between local authorities, utilities companies and other relevant
stakeholders
 the newly-formed natural hazards team within the Cabinet Office will be managing the
development of sector resilience plans, as outlined in the Pitt Review
recommendations, as well as helping to develop acceptable industry standards for
protection and resilience.

2.2.2.5 Telecoms sector (group 5)

Points raised:

 the group was small and effectively consisted of only one representative from the
sector. This highlighted the lack of current engagement of the telecoms sector with
other sectors present
 BT has around 7000 to 8000 sites such as telephone exchanges that may be at risk.
About 500 BT assets are known to be in the floodplain. These are commonly situated
in the centre of towns. The telecoms sector has legacy infrastructure in a similar way to
the transport sector
 some of the identified at-risk assets already have back-up facilities including a power
generator
 BT is starting the process of the assessment of flood risk and mitigation for their asset
portfolio. However, due to the expenditure required to assess all of the identified at-
risk sites and later improve their resilience to flooding, a commercial decision may be
made that it is not cost-effective to spend the money undertaking this work
 data protection is an issue in the sector, with the sharing of information and
knowledge restricted by commercial sensitivities and guardedness between individual
organisations.

8 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

2.2.2.6 Community services sector (group 6)

The community services sector group included representatives from local authorities and
other public bodies. The following points were raised:

 temporary barriers have been used in Bradford where at-risk populations (vulnerable
people) have been identified. Temporary barriers were also used in Hull at the A&E
hospital during the 2007 flooding event
 engagement utility operators and organisations from other sectors is primarily
through local resilience forums and regional continuity planning
 permanent floodwalls/embankments are already used, for example, in Hull to mitigate
against tidal risk on the bank of Humber
 whole-life cost-benefit analysis of available measures has been undertaken, linked to
the Defra-managed local government performance framework indicator NI 188
“Planning to adapt to climate change”
 it was stressed that from a community perspective the perceived and actual risk can be
quite different
 flood risk assessments have been undertaken for all sources of flooding including
pluvial flooding, with work underway to develop surface water management plans
 local authority drainage departments and/or highway departments liaise with
emergency planning departments on this issue, and emergency response plans are in
place. In Barnsley emergency response plans have been developed specifically for
flooding
 local authorities carry out regular capital maintenance of the drainage assets that they
own, for example, the de-silting of culverts and drains. Several local authorities,
including City of Bradford MDC, have orders to manage and encourage riparian
owners to maintain their drainage assets.

2.3 SESSION 2 – “INTERDEPENDENCIES”

2.3.1 Objective of Session 2

The objective of the second session of the workshop was to identify where
interdependencies exist between different critical infrastructure assets, by identifying
vulnerable components of individual assets and their functional dependencies upon other
assets. It was hoped that this information could then be used to prioritise the criticality of
particular assets to support investment decisions.

Delegates were mixed into cross-sector groups and were provided with plans of a
hypothetical scenario of a flood event in a town with the following neighbouring assets:

 water treatment works

 railway station
 telephone exchange
 hospital
 broadband antennae
 power station
 electricity substation
 supermarket
 fire station.

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 9

 Each group was asked to list the vulnerable components for each of these assets and then
to list the other assets that they depend upon to function. Groups were then provided with
a matrix that the interdependencies could be listed and scored upon.

2.3.2 Session 2 feedback

Detailed feedback from Session 2 is given in Annex B. Points arising from the exercise
were as follows:

 many assets had common vulnerable components such as mechanical and electrical
(M&E) equipment, communication and IT systems, chemical and fuel stores, and
transport infrastructure (including access)
 staff/operatives were considered to be both vulnerable components of assets, as well as
crucial to the functional dependency of the asset. It was suggested that the resilience of
staff should be considered in relation to the availability of alternative working locations
should their primary location become inundated
 there was general consensus across the groups that the priority asset services that are
relied upon the most by other assets were:
1(=) Energy
1(=) Communications and IT systems
3 Transport
4 Water (for drinking, sanitation and other uses eg cooling)
 it was suggested that as well as there being interdependencies between differing assets
or sectors, there were also interdependencies within sectors. For example, IT systems
using broadband and internet rely on the operation of telecommunication lines.
Another example is that of energy generation, which also depends on energy
 the interdependencies outlined by delegates are those that occur within the first few
days following a flood event occurring (as in the flood scenario provided to delegates).
However it was agreed that further dependencies would arise after this point, such as
greater dependency on water and on governmental control and co-ordination
(particularly in large flood events).

2.4 SESSION 3 – “SATISFYING PITT”

2.4.1 Objective of Session 3

The objective of this session was for each sector to agree the actions required to ensure that
critical services remain in operation during floods through the implementation adoption of
sector resilience plans.

2.4.2 Session 3 feedback

2.4.2.1 Water sector (group 1)

Actions agreed by the group:

 as an industry, the water sector has been looking to solve the issues associated with
flood risk as individual organisations within the OFWAT framework, focusing on
individual assets. There may be a need to consider network resilience and
interdependencies, within the context of an analysis of wider threats

10 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

  it was suggested that existing collaborative arrangements for strategic flood risk
assessments (SFRAs) could be used as the basis for future collaborative working, using
collective funding
 in terms of appropriate resistance and resilience measures, it was generally agreed by
the group that the use of sandbags should be avoided, and temporary resilience and
resistance solutions should ideally only be used to manage residual risks, if fixed,
permanent solutions are viable.

2.4.2.2 Energy sector (group 2)

Actions agreed by the group:

 greater communication and co-ordination is required between the AEP and the ENA,
to co-ordinate the activities of the sector
 it was suggested that Ofgem could have greater involvement in this co-ordination akin
to the role Ofwat has adopted for the water sector developing a framework for
assessment and prioritisation of sites at risk from flooding
 improved communication is required between organisations within the sector, from
both the generation and distribution/transmission side.

2.4.2.3 Transport (group 3)

Actions agreed by the group:

 the transport sector will continue with its well developed processes and procedures for
maintenance and management of infrastructure assets, with continued cost-effective
risk-based maintenance
 resilience to flooding (and other hazards) will be an important consideration in the
design phase for new transport infrastructure development (eg CrossRail). However
this becomes more difficult for existing legacy infrastructure
 as a sector, there is greater focus on increased collection of information on drainage
assets and drainage capacity
 the sector does not at present have any formal recovery time objectives, which may be
given consideration in the future.

2.4.3.4 Regulators/policy (group 4)

Actions agreed by the group:

 use of temporary and demountable barriers should not be required for all new
developments because better options are likely to be available through the PPS25 flood
risk management hierarchy. However, it was recognised that these measures are
invaluable for protection of existing infrastructure
 clarity is required, particularly on standards and guidance, from regulators
 better data is required, such as updated flood risk maps, to inform flood risk
assessments
 better cross-sector collaboration and sharing of information is required.

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 11

2.4.3.5 Telecoms (group 5)

Actions agreed by the group:

 post-flood recording needs to be improved, and the impacts of previous flood events
need to be analysed to inform whole-life cost-benefit analyses. Also, the inherent costs
of not implementing measures need to be known
 cost-benefit analyses and development of a business case for increased expenditure on
identification of risk and implementation of resilience measures will need to be
undertaken urgently to raise the profile of the risk involved and to obtain board level
involvement (ensuring approval for increased expenditure on resilience measures)
 the sector as a whole will be required to give greater consideration to the effects of
climate change and potential mitigation measures.

2.4.3.6 Community services (group 6)

Actions agreed by the group:

 uncertainty around funding should be removed. Central government funding is very

reactive at present and from several different government departments
 feedback is required from government departments following submission of post-flood
reports, including an assessment of how useful the information has been and also
details of how the information has been used
 research is required into what measures are appropriate for particular scenarios and
guidance on how best to deploy such measures
 the profile of the issues associated with flooding should be raised. It was suggested that
existing channels could be used to disseminate information, such as by getting
involved with communities, teachers and elected members etc.

2.5 SESSION 4 – “CROSS-SECTOR CO-ORDINATION”

2.5.1 Objective of Session 4

The objective of this session was for cross-sector groups to identify the main barriers
currently inhibiting collaboration between sectors. Groups were then asked to propose
ways that these barriers could be overcome to achieve better collaboration.

2.5.2 Session 4 feedback

The barriers to collaboration identified by delegates, along with proposed approaches to

overcome these barriers, are outlined in Annex C.

The barriers determined to be of most significance were as follows:

 lack of understanding between different sectors: the proposed sector resilience plans
could highlight the main issues being faced by all sectors and these could be collated
into a high-level document circulated in an open forum by central government
 lack of information and knowledge sharing due to financial disincentives and
commercial sensitivities: a framework or memorandum of understanding could be
developed and greater use made of existing local and regional resilience forums. The
release of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat-managed national resilience extranet was
mentioned and it is hoped that this will help knowledge and information sharing

12 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

 between Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Further
information can be obtained from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat website:
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/ccs.aspx>.
 inconsistencies in regulation across different sectors: it was generally agreed that the
current regulatory framework for the management of infrastructure assets is
fragmented. It was suggested that the newly-formed natural hazards team of the
Cabinet Office could co-ordinate and align the work undertaken by different sector
regulators (Ofwat, Ofgem, Ofcom) to achieve a consistent approach and a national
view of resilience.

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 13

Annex A Delegate list

Tables (mixed
Tables (sector groups)
Forename Surname Organisation groups) Sessions
Sessions 1 and 3
2 and 4

David Anderson Network Rail 3 Transport A

Richard Ashley Pennine Water Group 1 Water D

Steve Baldrance BT 5 Telecoms A

Steve Ball Homes & Communities Agency 6 Community services C

Mat Barber Civil Contingencies Secretariat 4 Regulators/policy A

Beth Bear Institution of Civil Engineers 4 Regulators/policy D

Barnsley Metropolitan Borough

Derek Bell 6 Community services B
Council

Layla Branicki Warwick University 5 Telecoms D

Philip Charles CIRIA 6 Community services F

Chris Chiverrell CIRIA 3 Transport C

Emma Culleton United Utilities 1 Water B

Gordon Davies Environment Agency 4 Regulators/policy E

Mary Dhonau National Flood Forum 6 Community services A

John Dora Network Rail 3 Transport F

Manuela Escarameia HR Wallingford Ltd 1 Water A

Ian Folkard RWE npower 2 Energy E

URS Corporation (representing

David Funchall 3 Transport B
Highways Agency)

David Gibson Hull City Council 6 Community services C

Dave Hart Environment Agency 1 Water D

Mike Johnson DCLG 4 Regulators/policy B

Peter Jones Welsh Assembly Government 4 Regulators/policy C

Keith Jones University of Greenwich 6 Community services E

Ben Kidd CIRIA 2 Energy B

Russell Knight BAA 3 Transport C

Association of Electricity
Andy Limbrick 2 Energy C
Providers

Shanti Majithia National Grid 2 Energy F

Will McBain Arup 1 Water A

Brian McGinnity London Underground 3 Transport E

Association of Drainage
Ian Moodie 4 Regulators/policy E
Authorities

Jim Moriarty London Underground 3 Transport A

David Murphy Environment Agency 4 Regulators/policy C

John Newman BERR 4 Regulators/policy B

Mick O’Malley Three Valleys Water 1 Water C

14 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

 Delegate list (contd)

Tables (mixed
Tables (sector groups)
Forename Surname Organisation groups) Sessions
Sessions 1 and 3
2 and 4

Mike Powell City of Bradford MDC 6 Community services F

Matthias Retter Arup 5 Telecoms E

Santhi Santhalingam Highways Agency 3 Transport B

Paul Shaffer CIRIA Chair

Tim Spink Mott MacDonald 3 Transport D

Claire Sunshine Environment Agency 6 Community services B

Paul Swift Mouchel 1 Water E

Tyne and Wear Emergency

David Turnbull 6 Community services B
Planning Unit

Gary Tustin Environment Agency 1 Water F

Britt Warg GeoDesign Barriers Ltd 2 Energy D

Ron Whitehead Flood Protection Association 6 Community services D

David Wilkes Arup 4 Regulators/policy D

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 15

Annex B Session 2 feedback

Asset vulnerability and interdependencies

Asset Vulnerable components Functional dependencies

Water treatment works Pumps Power supply

Sand filters Water
Chemical stores Telecoms
Control room Transport and access
Telemetry systems
Screen filters and valves
M&E equipment
Staff/operatives
Transport vans etc
Supply pipes

Railway line and station Track Power (for M&E equipment)

M&E equipment including power Communications (internal and
transmission external)
Lighting Transport and access
Signals, fire alarms and telemetry Water
systems
Bridges, embankment, cuttings etc
Oil interceptors
Passengers
Trains

Telephone exchange Back-up generators Power

All equipment at low level Communications
Diesel supply storage Transport
People Access
Access Water
Radio/mobile
IT software
Cables entry

Hospital People – staff and patients Power (mains and standby)

Equipment Water
Building services Communications
Access Transport
Supplies Emergency services
A&E theatres Staff
Chemical and fuel stores Food
Stores of medicine
Back-up systems and generators

16 CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2

 Session 2 feedback (contd)

Asset vulnerability and interdependencies

Asset Vulnerable components Functional dependencies

Broadband antennae Transmitters Power

Cables Mains on standby (fuel stores)
IT software
Control systems (switch gear)
The structure

Power station Generation equipment Power

Cables People
Power supplies Access
Staff and operatives Communications and IT
systemsWater
Control room equipment
Transport
Fuel stores
Transport for fuel
Comms to link to grid
Cooling system
Waste removal
Security systems

Electricity substation Back-up generators Power

Cables, transformers and other Communications
equipment
Transport and access
Access
Security (many are unmanned)

Supermarket Equipment (tills, fridges, freezers) Power

Power supply (lights) Access (transport)
Supply chain (transport) Water
Access for staff/customers People
IT systems
Security

Fire station Vehicles IT and telecom systems

Equipment Transport and access (highways)
Staff Power and fuel stores
Multi-agency control centre Staff
IT and telecom systems
Access

Flood resilience and resistance for critical infrastructure, 2010 17

Annex C Session 4 feedback
Barriers to collaboration and potential approaches to overcome barriers
Barriers to collaboration
Lack of information sharing
and communication due to
financial disincentives or
commercial sensitivities
Inconsistent data collection
formats inhibiting data sharing
Lack of overlap/
understanding of other sectors
Lack of funding/resources and
clashes in business planning
and funding cycles of different
organisations/
sectors/regulators
Inconsistencies in regulation
across sectors – fragmented
governance
Pressure from
customers/shareholders
Differing/competing priorities
Lack of engagement with
communities resulting in lack
of transparency and trust
Professional skills gap
Lack of guidance
Liabilities/litigation/increased
terrorism risk
Government and delivery
bodies working in silos (also
intra-organisational silos)
18
Suggested approach to overcome barrier
 framework (or memorandum of understanding) for information
sharing, including development of shared terminology
 more generic disclosures (situation based)
 greater use of local resilience forums and regional resilience forums
 use and development of Civil Contingencies Secretariat resilience
extranet.
 consistency of data formats required
 formal, structured guidance on the type of information required,
who will be using the data, and how it will be used (to overcome
confidentiality issues).
 government to identify and help cross-sectoral information
exchange based upon completed sector resilience plans
 high-level document published in open forum outlining what each
sector is doing on this issue and the particular issues faced by
each.
 long-term vision and planning required
 greater co-ordination between regulators, particularly between
Ofgem, Ofwat, Ofcom, and ORR
 prioritisation of funding required
 investigating the potential for public private partnership (PPP)
funding.
 Cabinet Office to better align regulatory constraints/targets and
statutory obligations.
 raise awareness of business risks/benefits.
 compelling long-term vision for UK plc’s critical infrastructure.
 engage with community representatives on local resilience forums
 shared national view on resilience required
 local stakeholder meetings on specific site problems/issues.
 funding, training, taught courses in partnership with academic
institutions.
 develop new good practice guidance on methodologies, standards
required.
 government to underwrite the risks.
 Cabinet Office to co-ordinate
 change internal culture.
CIRIA C688/Supporting document 2