Constitutional Law I

Constitutional Law I - Pratham Gupta
Constitutional Law I – Case Briefs
Citizenship ............................................................................................................................................ 4
1. Sarbananda Sonowal v UOI .................................................................................................... 4
2. Assam Public Works v. Union of India ............................................................................... 4
Article 12 ............................................................................................................................................... 6
1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v Mohanlal (Commercial Nature) .................................... 6
2. Sukhdev Singh v Bhagat Ram (Created by a Statute - Termination) ................................. 6
3. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v International Airport Authority .............................................. 7
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi ............................................................................... 8
5. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (IICB) ............................ 9
6. Zee Telefilms v. Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) ........................................... 9
7. Case: Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra ......................................................................... 10
8. Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University ..................................................................................... 11
9. BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar ................................................................................. 12
Article 13 ............................................................................................................................................. 13
1. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Maharashtra ........................................................... 13
2. Ambica Mills v State of Gujarat......................................................................................... 13
3. Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v State of Madhya Pradesh ........................................................ 14
4. F.N. Balsara v State of Bombay ......................................................................................... 14
5. Basheshar Nath v. I.T. Commissioner .............................................................................. 15
Article 14 ............................................................................................................................................. 16
Reasonable Classification and its Application ............................................................................... 16
1. Anwar Ali Sarkar v State of West Bengal ............................................................................. 16
2. Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra .................................................................................... 16
3. Maganlal Chhaganlal Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ........................17
4. Kedarnath Bajoria v State of West Bengal ........................................................................ 18
5. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI ................................................................................................. 19
6. Rajbala v State of Haryana ................................................................................................ 20
Principles of Reasonableness, Non-Arbitrariness and Manifest Arbitrariness ............................ 22
1. Maneka Gandhi v UOI .......................................................................................................... 22
2. Joseph Shine v UOI ........................................................................................................... 23
3. Shayara Bano v UOI .......................................................................................................... 23
Gender ............................................................................................................................................. 24
1. Anuj Garg v Hotel Association of India ................................................................................ 24
2. Air India v. Nergesh Meerza .............................................................................................. 24
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3. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) ........................................... 25

4. Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya............................................................... 26
5. Colonel Nitisha v. Union of India ...................................................................................... 27
6. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India (UOI) .............................. 27
Reservation ..................................................................................................................................... 28
1. Indra Sawhney v UOI (commonly known as the Mandal Commission case) ..................... 28
2. M. Nagarajan v UOI........................................................................................................... 29
3. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India .......................................................................... 29
4. Ram Singh v. Union of India ............................................................................................. 30
5. Jarnail Singh v. Union of India ......................................................................................... 30
6. Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister ................................................................ 30
Article 19 ............................................................................................................................................. 32
1. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras .................................................................................... 32
2. Supdt. Central Prisons v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960) .............................................. 32
3. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) ........................................................................ 33
4. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 305) ............................................. 34
5. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India (1972) ....................................................................... 34
6. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram (1989) .................................................................................. 35
7. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) ........................................................................... 36
8. N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India (2018) ..................................................................... 36
9. Indibily Creative Pvt Ltd v. West Bengal (2019)............................................................... 37
Article 21 ............................................................................................................................................. 38
1. Reversal of AK Gopalan in Maneka Gandhi ......................................................................... 38
2. Olga Tellis v Municipal Corporation of Bombay (Right to livelihood and shelter) ......... 38
3. Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration (Right of individuals in detention and protection
homes) ......................................................................................................................................... 39
4. Francis Coralie Mullin v Delhi (Right to socialize) ...........................................................40
5. Puttuswamy v. Union of India .......................................................................................... 41
6. Bandhua Mukti Morcha .................................................................................................... 42
7. Hinsa Virodhak Sangh....................................................................................................... 43
Public Interest Litigation ................................................................................................................... 45
1. Balwant Singh Chaufal v State of Uttaranchal ..................................................................... 45
Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25 to 28) ................................................................................ 46
1. Commissioner v. Lakshmindra Swamiar ............................................................................. 46
2. Sardar Saifuddin v. State of Bombay ................................................................................ 46
3. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu ................................................................................... 47
4. N. Adithyan v. Travancore................................................................................................. 47
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5. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwara Avadhuta ........................................... 48

6. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India ....................................................................................... 48
Protection of Minorities and Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29 & 30) ........................... 49
1. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka ....................................................................... 49
2. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra............................................................................... 49
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Citizenship
1. Sarbananda Sonowal v UOI
Facts:
This case revolves around the issue of illegal migrants in the State of Assam. The Foreigners Act,
1946, and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, govern the determination of whether a person is
a foreigner or not. As of December 31, 2005, there were 14,947 pending cases before the Foreigners
Tribunals in Assam, and 29,429 individuals who arrived in Assam between January 1, 1966, and
March 24, 1971, were declared as foreigners.
Sarbananda Sonowal, the petitioner, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
against the Union of India and others. He sought to declare certain provisions of the Illegal Migrants
(Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, as unconstitutional and to apply the Foreigners Act, 1946,
and its rules to the State of Assam.
Judgment (Sonowal I):
The Court held that the authority concerned cannot nullify the directions of the Supreme Court in
Sonowal I through subordinate legislation, specifically by making the 1964 Order inapplicable to the
State of Assam. Such selective removal of the Order only for Assam was discriminatory and violated
Article 14 of the Constitution.
The provisions of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, and the Illegal
Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Rules, 1984, were declared unconstitutional and struck
down.
The writ petition was allowed, and the Court ordered the quashing of the Foreigners (Tribunal) for
Assam Order, 2006, and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Amendment Order, 2006. The respondents were
directed to implement the directions issued by the Court in Sonowal I within a reasonable time.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that when the parent Act remains in force and applicable,
the concerned authority cannot nullify the directions of the Supreme Court through subordinate
legislation. The 2006 Order appeared to be a cover-up for non-implementation of the Court's
directions in Sonowal I.
The Court ordered the Union of India to establish an adequate number of Tribunals under the 1964
Order to effectively handle cases of illegal migrants from Bangladesh or residing in Assam.
The Supreme Court held that the directions issued in Sonowal I did not serve the intended purpose
of the 1946 Act or the Citizenship Act, and the Central Government had the obligation to protect the
State of Assam in accordance with Article 355 of the Indian Constitution.
2. Assam Public Works v. Union of India
Background:
The Assam Public Works filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking the detection and
deportation of illegal immigrants in Assam. The case relates to the implementation of the National
Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam, which aims to identify individuals who are not Indian citizens
residing in the state.
Key Points:
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1. Assam Accord: The case is linked to the Assam Accord, a historic agreement signed in 1985 to
resolve the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The accord set March 24, 1971, as the cutoff
date for identifying illegal immigrants.
2. Section 6A: The terms of the Assam Accord were crystallized in Section 6A of the Citizenship Act,
which provided specific provisions for the detection and deportation of illegal immigrants in Assam.
3. National Register of Citizens (NRC): In order to implement the provisions of the Assam Accord,
rules were enacted under the Citizenship Act to establish an NRC at both the national level and in
Assam. The NRC is aimed at creating a comprehensive list of genuine Indian citizens residing in
Assam.
4. Supreme Court Monitoring: The Supreme Court, through a series of orders starting from 2013
(Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha case), has been actively overseeing the process of updating the NRC
in Assam.
5. Draft NRC and Exclusion: In July 2018, a draft version of the NRC was published, which excluded
approximately 40 lakh people from the list. These individuals were required to prove their
citizenship through a claims and objections process.
The case involves a complex legal and administrative process related to the identification of illegal
immigrants in Assam. The Supreme Court's monitoring and involvement in the NRC process
highlight the significance of the issue and the court's commitment to resolving it in accordance with
the Assam Accord.
While the court's judgment did not provide an extensive analysis of each specific article from 5 to 11
of the Constitution, it interpreted and applied the constitutional provisions related to citizenship in
the context of the NRC process in Assam. The objective was to ensure a fair and just determination
of citizenship while safeguarding the rights of genuine Indian citizens.
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Article 12
1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v Mohanlal (Commercial Nature)
Facts:
The case involved the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, which engaged in various commercial
functions aimed at earning profits through the sale of goods and services.
Key Points:
1) Inclusion as "Other Authorities":
a) The court determined that the Electricity Board fell within the purview of "other authorities"
due to a single significant structural characteristic: its creation by a statute.
b) The presence of this statutory creation rendered the Electricity Board subject to
constitutional scrutiny and obligations.
2) Irrelevance of Commercial Nature:
a) The court held that the nature of the activities, being commercial in nature, was not a decisive
factor in determining the application of constitutional principles.
b) Regardless of whether an entity engaged in commercial functions, as long as it possessed the
essential characteristic of being an "other authority" created by statute, it would fall within
the ambit of constitutional principles.
3) Application of Agency and Instrumentality Principle:
a) The court applied the agency and instrumentality principle to assess the nature and
functioning of the Electricity Board.
b) This principle established that an entity created by statute and functioning as an agency or
instrumentality of the state is subject to constitutional obligations and scrutiny.
Outcome:
The Rajasthan State Electricity Board's engagement in commercial activities did not exempt it from
constitutional scrutiny. The court affirmed that the key factor in determining its inclusion as an
"other authority" was its creation by statute. Consequently, the board was deemed subject to
constitutional principles and obligations. The court's application of the agency and instrumentality
principle further solidified its position. This ruling underscored the significance of statutory creation
as the defining characteristic for entities falling under the scope of constitutional scrutiny,
irrespective of their commercial nature.
2. Sukhdev Singh v Bhagat Ram (Created by a Statute - Termination)
Facts:
The case involved three statutory bodies: the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), the Oil and Natural
Gas Commission (ONGC), and the Finance Corporation. The question at hand was whether these
bodies could be considered as "authorities" and be subjected to constitutional principles.
Key Points:
1) Termination of Employees:
a) The LIC, ONGC, and Finance Corporation had exercised their powers conferred by their
respective statutes to terminate employees.
2) Consideration of Structural Features and Statutory Character:
a) The majority of the court focused on the structural features of the three bodies and their
statutory character in determining whether they fell within the definition of "authority" under
the Constitution.
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b) The presence of a statutory framework governing these bodies was considered as a significant
factor.
3) Application of Agency and Instrumentality Principle:
a) The court applied the agency and instrumentality principle to assess the nature and
functioning of the LIC, ONGC, and Finance Corporation.
b) The principle stated that entities receiving financial support from the government and subject
to an unusual degree of control by the government should be considered as instrumentalities
or agencies of the state, thereby making them subject to constitutional principles.
Outcome:
The court concluded that the LIC, ONGC, and Finance Corporation, being statutory bodies created
by statutes, could be classified as "authorities" under the Constitution. Their exercise of powers to
terminate employees was subject to constitutional scrutiny and obligations. The court's application
of the agency and instrumentality principle reinforced the understanding that entities receiving
financial support and being subject to significant government control should be regarded as
instrumentalities or agencies of the state.
3. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v International Airport Authority
Facts:
The case revolved around a tender floated by the International Airports Authority of India for the
operation of a "second class" restaurant and two snack bars at the Bombay International Airport.
The tender was awarded to the fourth respondent (R4) despite not fulfilling some of the tender
conditions, leading to a legal challenge.
Key Points:
1) Determination of "State" under Article 12:
a) The first issue to be addressed was whether the International Airport Authority qualified as
a "State" under the definition provided in Article 12 of the Constitution.
b) This determination was essential to establish the maintainability of the petition, as the
remedy for a violation of fundamental rights can be sought only against the State and not
private authorities.
2) Application of the Agency or Instrumentality Test:
a) The court relied on the agency or instrumentality test, which was inspired by Justice
Bhagwati's decision in the Bhagat Ram case, and applied a six-part test to determine whether
the International Airport Authority could be considered an agency or instrumentality of the
State.
3) Modes of Creation for a Corporation:
a) The court highlighted that a corporation like the International Airport Authority could be
established in two ways: either under a statute or incorporated under the Companies Act or
the Societies Registration Act.
4) Central Government Control:
a) Upon examining the International Airport Authority Act, 1971, the court concluded that the
central government exercised deep and pervasive control over the administrative affairs of
the respondent.
b) This led to the determination that the International Airport Authority fell within the ambit of
Article 12 of the Constitution and could be considered a State.
5) Five-Point Test by Justice P.N. Bhagwati:
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Justice P.N. Bhagwati formulated a five-point test to determine whether a body qualifies as an
agency or instrumentality of the state. The test includes the following factors:
a) Financial resources: The entire share capital is held by the government, making the state the
chief funding source.
b) Deep and pervasive control: The state exercises significant control over the body's
operations.
c) Governmental functions: The functions of the body have public importance or are of a
governmental character.
d) Transfer of government department: A department of the government is transferred to the
corporation.
e) Monopoly status: The body enjoys a "monopoly status" conferred or protected by the state.
Outcome:
The court determined that the International Airport Authority, being subject to deep and pervasive
control by the central government and satisfying the criteria set out in the five-point test, qualified
as an agency or instrumentality of the state. Consequently, it fell within the definition of "State"
under Article 12 of the Constitution, allowing the petition for violation of fundamental rights to be
maintained against the authority.
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi
Facts:
The case involved a society registered under the Societies Registration Act that operated a regional
engineering college. The question at hand was whether this society could be considered an
"authority" under the Constitution.
Key Points:
1) Application of Tests:
a) The court approved the tests established in the Ramana Dayaram Shetty case but held that
they were not conclusive or definitive. It emphasized that these tests should not be stretched
too far to include every autonomous entity within their scope.
2) Immateriality of Manner of Creation:
a) The court clarified that the manner of creation, whether under a statute or otherwise, was
immaterial in determining whether an entity qualifies as a "state" for constitutional purposes.
b) Merely because an entity is considered a "state" for certain parts of the Constitution does not
necessarily make it so for other provisions, such as Part XIV or any other specific provision.
3) Juristic Veil Principle:
a) The court introduced the concept of the juristic veil principle to support the agency or
instrumentality framework. It explained that this principle facilitated the re-emergence of a
narrow structuralist doctrine over time.
b) However, the court recognized that the existing tests did not fully align with the juristic veil
principle, necessitating the development of a narrower structural test based on functional,
financial, and administrative control.
4) Functional, Financial, and Administrative Control:
a) Applying the narrower structural test, the court considered factors such as sponsorship,
supervision, and financial support by the government.
b) Based on these considerations, the court held that the regional engineering college, being
sponsored, supervised, and financially supported by the government, qualified as an
"authority" under the Constitution.
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Outcome:
The court concluded that the society running the regional engineering college, being subject to
functional, financial, and administrative control by the government, fell within the definition of
"authority" under the Constitution. This categorization made the society subject to constitutional
principles and obligations.
5. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (IICB)
Facts:
In this case, the appellants filed a writ petition against their termination by the Council of Scientific
and Industrial Research (CSIR). The High Court refused to grant relief based on the Sabhajit Tewary
decision, which held that CSIR, being a non-statutory body registered under the Societies
Registration Act, did not fall within the definition of "State" and therefore could not be subject to
constitutional principles. However, this decision was later overruled.
Key Points:
1) Rejection of Sabhajit Tewary Decision:
a) The court criticized the poorly reasoned decision in Sabhajit Tewary and overruled it. The
Sabhajit Tewary decision had held that CSIR, as a non-statutory body, did not qualify as
"State" merely because of its legal form as a society registered under the Societies Registration
Act.
2) Narrowed Application of the Agency or Instrumentality Test:
a) The court referred to the Ajay Hasia case and narrowed the application of the agency or
instrumentality test. It stated that the body must be "financially, functionally, and
administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government" to qualify as an
agency or instrumentality of the State.
b) It clarified that the Ajay Hasia case did not provide an exhaustive list, and mere regulatory
control over the body would not suffice to classify it as an agency or instrumentality.
3) Dissenting Opinion:
a) One of the dissenting opinions in the case argued that simply being an agency or
instrumentality was not enough to consider an entity as the "State." According to this view,
the entity should have been created by a statute or under a statute to fall within the purview
of the definition.
4) Government Control and Establishment:
a) The court found that the CSIR was established by the government for the national interest of
economic welfare.
b) It noted that top executives, such as the Secretary and the governing body, were directly
appointed by the Prime Minister, who also served as the ex officio President of CSIR.
c) Additionally, it was observed that the central government provided 70% of the funds for
CSIR.
Outcome:
The court held that CSIR, based on the government's establishment, control, and financial support,
fell within the ambit of "other authorities" under Article 12 of the Constitution. As a result, CSIR was
considered a "state" against whom a writ could be issued, thereby subjecting it to constitutional
obligations and scrutiny.
6. Zee Telefilms v. Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI)
Issue:
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The main issue in this case was whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), a private
body, could be considered a "state" under Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby subjecting it to
constitutional obligations and making it amenable to writ jurisdiction.
Key Points:
1) Writ Petition Against BCCI:
a) Zee Telefilms filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against BCCI due to its
arbitrary refusal to deal with Zee Telefilms for the live broadcast of cricket games organized
by the Board.
2) Monopoly of BCCI and State Recognition:
a) The court acknowledged that BCCI enjoyed a virtual monopoly over cricket in India and had
widespread state recognition and patronage.
b) However, it noted that the state did not grant this monopoly to BCCI, nor did the state protect
such a monopoly through any statute.
c) It was found that BCCI was financially independent of the state, and the state did not hold
any share in the Board.
3) BCCI's Status as an Instrumentality of State:
a) The court emphasized that if the actions of the Board were not those of an authorized
representative of the state and the Board was not discharging state functions, it could not be
considered an instrumentality of the state.
b) In the absence of any authorization, a private body choosing to discharge functions or duties
that amount to public duties or state functions, not prohibited by law, would not
automatically make it an instrumentality of the state.
4) Distancing of State from Commercial Functions:
a) The majority held that the state was distancing itself from commercial functions, and
therefore, there was no need to provide an expansive definition for the "state."
5) Financial Support and Control:
a) The court recognized that even a private body could be treated as a "state" if there was
financial support coupled with an unusual degree of control over its management by the state.
6) Minority Opinion on Writ Jurisdiction:
a) The minority held that a writ could be maintainable against a private body if it worked for
public importance, was created by a statute, or fell within the definition of "state" under
Article 12. The nature of bodies may change over time.
7) BCCI's Functions as Public in Nature:
a) The minority opinion emphasized that BCCI's functions were of public importance as it
regulated the game of cricket in India and affected the rights of players and others. Therefore,
a writ petition was maintainable against BCCI.
Outcome:
The court concluded that BCCI, being a private body, did not fall within the definition of "state"
under Article 12 of the Constitution. It held that BCCI's actions were not those of an authorized
representative of the state, and it was not discharging state functions. As a result, the writ petition
against BCCI was not maintainable.
7. Case: Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
Issue:
The main issue in this case was whether administrative functions and procedural rules of courts
could be challenged on the grounds of violating fundamental rights.
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Key Points:
1. Challenge to Administrative Functions and Procedural Rules:
- The court acknowledged that administrative functions and procedural rules of courts could be
subject to challenge if they violated fundamental rights.
- It recognized that judicial actions in litigation only affect the parties involved and, therefore, open
themselves up for scrutiny on the ground of fundamental rights violation.
2. Limitations on Writ Jurisdiction:
- The court clarified that a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution shall not lie from the Supreme
Court to the High Court or from one High Court to another.
- It held that an order passed by a higher court cannot be heard or challenged by a lower court
through a writ petition.
3. Judicial Orders and Fundamental Rights:
- The court emphasized that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings
can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
- It distinguished between administrative functions and judicial actions, stating that judicial orders
are not subject to fundamental rights scrutiny.
4. Quasi-Judicial Bodies and Fundamental Rights:
- The court clarified that even a quasi-judicial body, which is a non-judicial body but can interpret
the law, does not infringe a fundamental right merely by misinterpreting a law.
- However, if a quasi-judicial body acts under an ultra vires law, outside its jurisdiction, ignores
mandatory procedural rules, or infringes principles of natural justice, thereby affecting a
fundamental right, its action can be quashed by the courts through a writ of certiorari or mandamus.
Outcome:
The court affirmed that while judicial orders in judicial proceedings do not violate fundamental
rights, administrative functions and procedural rules of courts can be subject to challenge if they
infringe fundamental rights. It clarified the limitations on writ jurisdiction and highlighted the
circumstances under which the actions of quasi-judicial bodies can be quashed for violating
fundamental rights.
8. Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University
Facts:
The appellant in this case was a lecturer in the respondent Deemed University, which had been
conferred the status of a deemed university by the University Grants Commission (UGC). The
respondent took disciplinary action against the appellant, leading to a writ being filed against it. The
decision in the writ petition was appealed.
Key Points:
1. Determining Factor for State Status:
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- The court stated that the determining factor for considering an institution as a "state" under
Article 12 of the Constitution would be the object of the institution and the activities it performs in
furtherance of that object.
- It emphasized that receiving public aid, being supervised by a regulatory body like the UGC, and
performing a public function were relevant considerations.
2. Writ Jurisdiction:
- The court held that a writ would lie against the institution in question because it received public
aid, was supervised by the UGC as a deemed university, and was involved in imparting education,
which was considered a public function.
- It cited the precedent set in the case of Zee Telefilms, where it was established that an aggrieved
party could seek remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution, which provides a broader
jurisdiction than Article 32.
3. Deemed University Status:
- The court held that once an institution is declared a "Deemed University," it would fall under the
definition of an "authority" under Article 12.
- The rationale behind this decision was that a deemed university carries out a public function of
imparting education and is subject to the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226.
Outcome:
The court ruled that a writ would lie against the deemed university in question as it received public
aid, was supervised by the UGC, and performed a public function of imparting education. The
institution was considered an "authority" under Article 12, making it subject to the writ jurisdiction
of High Courts under Article 226.
9. BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar
Background:
After the liberalization, BCCI emerged as the largest and richest sporting body in India and
worldwide. It exercises control over cricket associations at all levels and formulates rules and
regulations for the game in India. However, there are concerns about the lack of checks on BCCI,
leading to corruption and tarnishing the reputation of cricket. Arbitrary appointments and franchise
awards in the IPL and discriminatory allocation of funds to state governments were also reported.
Issue:
Whether BCCI qualifies as an instrumentality of the State under Article 12, thereby allowing the
invocation of Article 32 for fundamental rights violations.
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that BCCI is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32 for violation
of fundamental rights. Instead, it can be approached under Article 226 for violations of legal rights.
The Court acknowledged the public functions performed by BCCI but declined to classify it as a
'state' under Article 12, relying on the precedent set in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Union of India. This
decision was seen as a potential stepping stone for future arguments seeking to bring BCCI within
the ambit of 'State' under Article 12.
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Article 13
1. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Maharashtra
Facts:
The appellant was facing prosecution under a law that existed before the Constitution of India came
into force. However, after the Constitution came into effect, the law was declared void under Article
19(1)(a) as it violated the right to freedom of speech and expression.
Key Points:
1. Prospective Application: The court addressed the issue of whether Article 13(1) of the
Constitution, which renders any law inconsistent with fundamental rights void, could be applied
retrospectively or only prospectively. The court clarified that prospective application means that
a legal rule or decision applies only to future cases or events, while retrospective application
would affect past cases and potentially change legal rights and obligations.
2. Applicability of Article 13(1): The court held that Article 13(1) operates prospectively and does
not have retrospective effect. In this case, since the offense was committed before the
Constitution came into force, Article 13(1) could not be applied to the appellant. Therefore, the
proceedings against the appellant were not affected, and the prosecution could continue under
the law that was in existence at the time of the offense.
Outcome:
The court concluded that Article 13(1) could not be invoked in the appellant's case as the offense had
been committed prior to the enforcement of the Constitution. As a result, the proceedings against
the appellant were not affected, and the prosecution could proceed under the law that was applicable
at the time of the offense.
2. Ambica Mills v State of Gujarat
Facts:
The case pertains to the issue of whether a law that infringes upon the fundamental rights (FRs) of
citizens would also be considered void as regards non-citizens. It raises the question of the
applicability of such laws to non-citizens and their rights under the Constitution of India.
Key Points:
• The court held that a law that takes away or abridges the FRs of citizens would be void only to
the extent that it is inconsistent with the FRs conferred under Article 19 of the Constitution,
which are specifically available to citizens.
• The court emphasized that pre-constitutional laws, which violated Article 19, could still be
enforced against non-citizens since those laws did not infringe upon their fundamental rights.
• Similarly, the court reasoned that post-constitutional laws that violate Article 19 could also be
applied to non-citizens because they cannot seek protection under a law that was not enacted for
their benefit.
• The court raised the question of why pre-Constitution laws, which curtail the rights under Article
19, would remain operative for non-citizens, while post-Constitution laws with similar effects
would not be applicable to non-citizens.
• Therefore, the court concluded that a law is void only to the extent of its inconsistency with the
fundamental rights. If a law violates the FRs applicable to specific denominations or minorities,
it would not be void concerning other groups or individuals.
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Outcome:
The court held that a law infringing upon the fundamental rights of citizens would be void only to
the extent of its inconsistency with Article 19 of the Constitution. It clarified that such laws could
still be applied to non-citizens as they are not entitled to the protection of rights that do not pertain
to them.
3. Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v State of Madhya Pradesh
Facts:
The case involves a challenge to the validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act,
1947, which granted the Provincial Government a monopoly over the motor transport business in
the state. The petitioners contended that this law violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, which came into effect in 1950.
Key Points:
• The petitioners argued that the law establishing a government monopoly over the motor
transport business infringed upon their fundamental right to carry on trade or business under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
• The doctrine of eclipse was invoked, which states that any pre-constitutional law inconsistent
with fundamental rights is not null or void ab initio. Instead, it is overshadowed by the
fundamental right and can be rendered valid through a constitutional amendment that
removes the inconsistency.
• Following the decision in Ambica Mills, the doctrine of eclipse was held to apply to both pre-
constitutional and post-constitutional laws.
• It was noted that a post-Constitution law that is void due to its violation of fundamental rights
cannot be revived through a subsequent constitutional amendment. However, if the voidness
is due to a procedural lapse, it can be cured. Non-citizens are unable to take advantage of this
provision.
• Consistent with the principles outlined in the Keshavan Madhava Menon case, the law in
question became void only to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of
the Constitution, which confer fundamental rights on citizens. It did not become void
independently of the existence of the guaranteed rights under Part III.
Outcome:
The court declared that the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, to the extent of its
inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, was void. The law was deemed void only to
the extent of the inconsistency and was subject to the doctrine of eclipse. It was held that the law
became inconsistent with the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.
4. F.N. Balsara v State of Bombay
Facts:
Several sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act were challenged as being ultra vires the Constitution.
The court found that eight sections of the Act were in violation of constitutional provisions.
However, the question arose as to whether the entire Act should be declared void or if the valid
portions could be separated from the invalid ones.
Key Points:
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- The doctrine of severability was invoked, which states that if a part of an Act is found to be invalid,
but that part is severable from the rest of the Act, the valid portions may still remain in force.
- The court clarified two conditions for determining the severability of a statute:
(i) If the valid and invalid provisions are so intertwined that they cannot be separated, the
invalidity of a portion would result in the invalidity of the entire Act.
(ii) If, after removing the invalid portion from the statute, the remaining provisions cannot
be enforced without substantial alterations and modifications, the entire Act must be
struck down as void.
- The intention of the legislature is a crucial factor in determining the severability of valid and invalid
parts of a statute. The court considered whether the legislature would have enacted the valid
portions if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid.
Outcome:
The court held that the eight sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act that were found to be ultra vires
the Constitution would be declared void. However, the remaining provisions of the Act, which were
valid, were allowed to stand and remain operative. The court applied the doctrine of severability and
determined that the valid parts were separable from the invalid ones.
5. Basheshar Nath v. I.T. Commissioner
Facts:
The petitioner was fined by the Income Tax (IT) commissioner for unreported income. The
petitioner agreed to pay the fine imposed on him. However, later it was declared that the provision
under which the fine was imposed was unconstitutional.
Key Points:
- The doctrine of waiver or the waiver of rights is based on the principle that individuals have
the freedom to renounce or give up the enjoyment of rights conferred on them by the state.
- For a waiver to be valid, the individual must be aware of their rights, and the waiver must be
voluntary.
- The majority opinion in this case held that fundamental rights cannot be waived. The
Constitution has conferred fundamental rights not only for the benefit of individuals but also
to secure the larger interests of the community.
- The dissenting judge took a different view and opined that an individual could waive a
fundamental right if it was for their benefit, but they could not waive a right that was for the
benefit of the general public.
Outcome:
The court held that none of the fundamental rights could be waived by individuals. The majority
opinion emphasized that fundamental rights were not merely for individual benefit but also served
the larger interests of the community. Therefore, the petitioner could not waive the fundamental
right that was being violated by the unconstitutional provision.
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Article 14
Reasonable Classification and its Application
1. Anwar Ali Sarkar v State of West Bengal
Facts:
Anwar Ali Sarkar, a member of the Communist Party of India, was arrested for certain offenses. In
response to these offenses, the West Bengal government enacted the West Bengal Special Courts
Act, 1950, which established special courts specifically for trying cases involving members of the
Communist Party. Sarkar challenged the validity of this Act.
Issues:
1. Whether the establishment of special courts under the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950,
violated the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
2. Whether the Act made a reasonable classification of offenses that could be tried under the
special courts.
Ruling:
The court held that the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, was invalid.
Important Points:
1. The Act created a separate system of justice for certain offenses and created a distinction
between individuals subjected to a different procedure and standard of proof. This violated
the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
2. The Act lacked reasonable classification criteria for the offenses that would be subject to the
special courts. It provided no clear guidance or yardstick for distinguishing between the cases
tried under the Act and those outside its purview.
3. The object of speedier trial, while valid, was deemed too vague and uncertain as a criterion
for classification. The Act left the selection of offenses entirely to the discretion of the
Provincial Government, making it arbitrary.
4. The dissenting opinion acknowledged the possibility of reasonable classification based on
classes of cases rather than individual cases. However, the Act's references to "cases" or
"offenses" lacked reasonable classification criteria and were thus invalid.
Key Takeaways:
1. The Act violated the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 14
of the Constitution.
2. Legislation may create classifications, but such classifications must be reasonable and not
arbitrary.
3. The Act's lack of reasonable classification criteria rendered it invalid, as it provided no clear
distinction between the offenses tried under the Act and those outside its scope.
2. Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra
Facts:
The State of Saurashtra (now State of Gujarat) enacted the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures
Ordinance in 1948, which aimed to maintain public safety, order, and preserve peace within the
16
state. In 1949, amendments were introduced, including sections 9, 10, and 11, granting the
Saurashtra government the power to establish special courts through a notification in the official
gazette. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and the jurisdiction of the
special court on the grounds of discrimination under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance violated Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution.
2. Whether the establishment of special courts with different procedures in different areas was
valid under the police power of the State Government.
Ruling:
The court held the ordinance and the jurisdiction of the special court to be valid.
Important Points:
1. The Saurashtra government's reference to offenses of specific kinds (dacoity and murder)
committed in certain areas did not amount to discrimination. Differentiation does not
necessarily imply discrimination.
2. The power of the State Government to establish different courts with varying procedures in
different areas is a part of its police power. Such differentiation can lead to speedier trials and
is in accordance with the Constitution.
3. The preamble to the Act stated the policy objective of maintaining public order and public
safety, which further supported the validity of the case.
Key Takeaways:
1. Differentiation in the establishment of special courts based on specific offenses and areas
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. The power of the State Government to establish different courts with varying procedures in
different areas is considered part of its police power.
3. The existence of a stated policy objective in the preamble to the Act supports the validity of
such differentiation.
3. Maganlal Chhaganlal Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
Facts:
The Bombay legislation aimed to evict individuals from unauthorized occupation of public premises
through a summary procedure, which differed from the general law. The appellant challenged the
constitutionality of the legislation, arguing that it lacked sufficient guidelines for the selection of the
summary procedure.
Ruling:
The court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation.
Important Points:
1. Sufficient guidelines need to be provided, not necessarily in the empowering provision, but
from the Preamble and various provisions of the statute, to enable the administration to select
the summary procedure. This ensures compliance with the principles of Article 14, which
requires reasonable guidelines to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination.
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2. The court found that the statute clearly laid down the purpose of speedy eviction of
unauthorized occupants of government premises, providing adequate guidance to the
authorities vested with the power. This indicates the presence of a rational and legitimate
objective behind the law, which is crucial to satisfy the requirements of Article 14.
3. With the indication of the purpose in the statute, it was expected that the concerned officers
would utilize the prescribed procedures under the Acts instead of resorting to the time-
consuming process of the ordinary civil court. This underscores the importance of adhering
to the specific provisions and procedures outlined in the law to ensure fairness and efficiency,
in line with the principles of Article 14.
4. The court further emphasized that administrative officers do not operate in isolation but are
guided by the provisions of the statute. This highlights the significance of institutional
framework and adherence to the prescribed procedures, reinforcing the principles of equality
and non-arbitrariness under Article 14.
Key Takeaways:
The case establishes that for a law to be constitutional under Article 14:
1. Sufficient guidelines must be provided, even if not explicitly in the empowering provision, to
prevent arbitrariness and discrimination.
2. A rational and legitimate objective behind the law must be clearly stated.
3. Adherence to the prescribed procedures and provisions outlined in the law is essential.
4. Administrative officers are bound by the provisions of the statute and must act accordingly.
4. Kedarnath Bajoria v State of West Bengal
Facts:
An Act was amended in the State of West Bengal, and the Preamble of the amended Act explicitly
stated the purpose of providing for speedier trial and effective punishment for certain offenses listed
in the Schedule. The constitutionality of this legislation was challenged.
Ruling:
The court held the Act to be valid.
Important Points:
1. Unlike the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, the intent of the legislation could
be derived from the Preamble and Section 9 of the Act, providing clear guidance and purpose.
This adherence to providing clear intent and purpose is essential to satisfy the requirements
of Article 14.
2. The explicit mention of the purpose of providing speedier trial and effective punishment for
specific offenses in the Preamble demonstrated a legitimate objective behind the law. This
legitimate objective is necessary to avoid arbitrariness and discrimination, in accordance with
the principles of Article 14.
3. The court considered the presence of clear intent and purpose in the legislation as a
distinguishing factor from the Anwar Ali Sarkar case, where such clarity was lacking. This
highlights the importance of clarity and transparency in legislation to ensure fairness and
equality under Article 14.
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Key Takeaways:
1. The presence of explicit intent and purpose in legislation, as reflected in the Preamble and
relevant sections, is crucial for upholding the validity of the Act under Article 14. It helps in
ensuring transparency and fairness, preventing arbitrariness and discrimination.
2. The case underscores the significance of properly articulating the purpose and objectives of
legislation to align with the principles of equality and non-arbitrariness enshrined in Article
14.
5. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI
Facts: The case challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which
criminalized consensual same-sex relationships. The court examined whether this provision
violated the fundamental rights of the LGBT community.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of India, in a landmark judgment, decriminalized consensual same-sex
relationships by striking down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.
Important Points:
1. Justices Dipak Mishra and AM Khanwilkar held that denying the LGBT community its right
to privacy solely based on their minority status would be a violation of their fundamental
rights. They further opined that consensual carnal intercourse in private does not harm public
decency or morality, making Section 377 an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of
expression.
2. Justice Nariman argued that since the rationale for Section 377, rooted in Victorian morality,
was no longer valid, there was no justification for its continuation. He considered the
provision to be manifestly arbitrary.
3. Justice Chandrachud emphasized that the law must not only avoid discrimination against
same-sex relationships but also take affirmative steps to ensure equal protection and grant
the LGBTQ community equal citizenship. He criticized the limitations of the classification
test, highlighting that it prioritizes form over substance. He also argued that terms like
"natural" and "unnatural" lack an intelligible differentia and cannot justify criminalizing
behavior without sufficient justification.
4. Justice Indu Malhotra noted that Section 377 indirectly discriminated against the LGBTQ
community based on their sexual orientation. She explained that when legislation
discriminates based on an intrinsic and core trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable
classification. She further highlighted the anti-stereotyping principle, which recognizes the
harmful impact of stereotyping and the need to dismantle such discriminatory norms.
5. The court held that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code violated the principle of equal
protection under Article 14. It was noted that the provision treated individuals engaged in
same-sex relationships differently from those engaged in heterosexual relationships, leading
to discrimination based on sexual orientation. The court emphasized that classification based
on sexual orientation alone could not form a reasonable classification under Article 14.
Key Takeaways:
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1. The court recognized that criminalizing consensual same-sex relationships under Section 377
violated the fundamental rights of the LGBTQ community, including their right to privacy
and freedom of expression.
2. The judgment emphasized the importance of constitutional morality over societal or public
morality, asserting that discrimination and harassment of the LGBTQ community must be
addressed.
3. The ruling acknowledged the need to go beyond formal classifications and consider the
substantive content of liberty and equality, challenging traditional notions of morality and
stereotypes.
4. The decision marked a significant milestone in advancing LGBTQ rights in India and
recognized the principle of equal citizenship for all, irrespective of sexual orientation.
6. Rajbala v State of Haryana
Facts:
The case pertains to the Haryana Panchayati Raj Amendment Act, which introduced three
requirements for individuals to become members of the Panchayat: 1) passing grade 10, 2) having
no outstanding dues or debts in local cooperative banks, and 3) possessing a functional toilet in their
house. The constitutionality of this law was challenged on the grounds that it created an
unreasonable classification with no nexus to the objective of the Act.
Ruling: The court upheld the constitutionality of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Amendment Act.
Important Points:
1. The court analyzed the Act from the perspective of Article 14, which guarantees the right to
equality before the law and prohibits arbitrary discrimination.
2. The court examined each requirement imposed by the Act and assessed whether it was
reasonable and had a rational nexus to the objective of the Act.
3. The court held that the requirement of passing grade 10 was justified as education plays a
vital role in enabling individuals to differentiate between good and bad, and it contributes to
better administration. This requirement was seen as a reasonable criterion that serves a
legitimate purpose.
4. The court also recognized the connection between financial stability and the ability to contest
elections. Considering elections as a costly affair, the court opined that individuals with debts
would likely be averse to contesting elections. Therefore, the requirement of having no
outstanding dues or debts was deemed reasonable.
5. The court viewed the criterion of possessing a functional toilet as an effort to promote the
mission of a hygienic country. It did not perceive this requirement as unreasonable,
indicating that it aligned with the objective of the Act and served a legitimate purpose.
6. It is important to note that while the court found the requirements reasonable and in line
with the objectives of the Act, critics have raised concerns about potential exclusionary effects
and an elitist approach.
Key Takeaways:
20
1. The court examined the requirements of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Amendment Act in light
of Article 14, assessing whether they were reasonable, non-discriminatory, and had a rational
nexus to the objective of the Act.
2. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, emphasizing the legitimate objectives
behind the requirements, such as promoting education, ensuring financial stability, and
advancing hygiene.
3. However, the judgment has been subject to criticism due to concerns about potential
exclusionary effects and an elitist approach.
21
Principles of Reasonableness, Non-Arbitrariness and Manifest Arbitrariness

1. Maneka Gandhi v UOI
Facts:
The petitioner's passport was impounded by the Government of India in the "public interest," which
prevented her from traveling abroad. She filed a writ petition, alleging a violation of Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of India delivered a significant judgment affirming the interconnectedness of
Articles 14, 19, and 21 and emphasizing the importance of fair, just, and reasonable procedure.
Important Points:
1. The court held that Articles 14, 19, and 21 are interrelated and should be read together. Any
provision or action must pass the tests of fairness, justice, and reasonableness, along with the
tests of arbitrariness and unreasonable classification. A provision would be deemed arbitrary
if it is not fair, just, and reasonable.
2. Although Article 21 mentions "procedure established by law," the court clarified that such a
procedure must not be arbitrary or irrational. It recognized that the right to personal liberty
under Article 21 includes both procedural and substantive aspects and stressed the need for
a fair, just, and reasonable procedure.
3. The court considered Sections 10(3)(c) and 10(5), which allowed the impounding of
passports, as administrative orders that could be challenged on grounds of being
unreasonable, mala fide, denial of natural justice, and ultra vires (beyond the scope of
authority). It emphasized that the principle of natural justice, including the right to be heard,
is inherent in the concept of personal liberty under Article 21.
4. Regarding the violation of Article 14, the court held that the guidance provided by the phrase
"in the interests of the general public" was sufficient to prevent arbitrary and unguided
exercise of power. It deemed the section to be in line with the reasonable restrictions provided
in Article 19.
5. The court interpreted Article 19 broadly, recognizing the right to freedom of movement,
including the right to travel abroad. It stated that while this right is not absolute and can be
restricted by law, such restrictions must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, and comply with the
principles of fairness and justice.
Key Takeaways:
1. The judgment highlighted the inseparable nature of Articles 14, 19, and 21, emphasizing the
need for fairness, justice, and reasonableness in procedures and actions.
2. It recognized the right to personal liberty under Article 21 as encompassing both procedural
and substantive aspects, requiring a fair, just, and reasonable procedure.
3. The court stressed the importance of natural justice in matters affecting personal liberty,
stating that the principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) is inherent in Article 21.
4. The phrase "in the interests of the general public" provided sufficient guidance to prevent
arbitrary exercise of power and aligned with the reasonable restrictions mentioned in Article
19.
22
2. Joseph Shine v UOI

Facts: The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC), which dealt with adultery. The section did not allow a wife to file charges against her husband
for committing adultery, and it did not cover cases where a husband had sexual relations with an
unmarried woman.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of India declared Section 497 of the IPC to be unconstitutional, citing violations
of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Important Points:
1. The court noted that Section 497 did not grant the wife any right to prosecute her husband
for adultery. The section solely focused on penalizing men who engaged in sexual relations
with married women without the consent or connivance of their husbands.
2. While the section was purportedly intended to protect women and the sanctity of marriage,
the court observed that it did not fulfil this objective. It highlighted that the men who
committed adultery with unmarried women equally harmed the institution of marriage, yet
they were not penalized under the section.
3. The court held that Section 497 violated the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of
the Constitution. It found the provision to be discriminatory against men and treating women
as objects, as it treated married women as the property of their husbands and deprived them
of agency and autonomy over their own bodies.
4. The court criticized the gender stereotypes inherent in the section and concluded that it
constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The provision allowed only the man
to be prosecuted and excluded the wife from having any power to prosecute, reflecting
disparate attitudes towards male and female infidelity.
Key Takeaways:
1. The Supreme Court declared Section 497 of the IPC unconstitutional, as it violated the right
to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. The court criticized the provision for treating married women as the victims and men as
offenders, perpetuating gender stereotypes and denying women agency and autonomy.
3. The judgment emphasized the importance of gender equality and non-discrimination in
matters relating to personal relationships and sexual autonomy.
3. Shayara Bano v UOI
Facts: The case dealt with the practice of Triple Talaq (instant divorce) under Muslim personal law.
The petitioner challenged the validity of Triple Talaq on the grounds of being manifestly arbitrary
and violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of India, through a majority decision, struck down the practice of Triple Talaq
as unconstitutional.
23
Important Points:
1. The majority judges, Justice Nariman and Justice Lalit, held that Triple Talaq is manifestly
arbitrary and goes against the principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution. They reasoned that arbitrary actions by the State, including the recognition of
Triple Talaq by the 1937 Act, deny equal protection of the law.
2. Justice Kurian Joseph, another member of the majority, opined that Triple Talaq is bad in
theology and, therefore, bad in law.
3. The court concluded that the practice of Triple Talaq, which allowed a Muslim man to
arbitrarily and whimsically break marital ties, violated the principles of equality and non-
arbitrariness guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Gender
1. Anuj Garg v Hotel Association of India
Facts:
Anuj Garg challenged the constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, which
prohibited women and men below the age of 25 from working in any part of premises that served
liquor or intoxicating drugs. The case raised concerns about the discriminatory nature of the law
and its impact on employment opportunities.
Key Points:
1. Strict Scrutiny: The court emphasized that laws claiming "protective discrimination" should
undergo strict scrutiny. Such legislation should not only be tested based on its proposed aims
but also its implications and effects. Interference with personal freedom must be justified in
principle and proportionate in measure, requiring a compelling state interest.
2. Limiting Employment Opportunities: The court recognized that the restriction imposed by
Section 30 would limit the employment opportunities of young graduates who had invested
significant time, money, and effort in obtaining degrees or diplomas in hotel management.
The law, intended to protect women under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, ended up
victimizing its subjects through "romantic paternalism."
3. Eliminating Unequal Consequences: Instead of an outright prohibition on women being
employed in bars, the court held that the state should focus on eliminating the unequal
consequences of sex differences. The law was deemed to be an unjustifiable infringement on
personal freedom and equal employment opportunities.
2. Air India v. Nergesh Meerza
Facts:
The dispute revolved around the retirement regulations imposed by Air India on its air hostesses
(AHs). According to these regulations, AHs were required to retire upon reaching 35 years of age,
upon marrying within the first four years of service, or upon their first pregnancy, whichever
occurred earlier. The petitioner challenged these regulations on various grounds.
Held:
The Supreme Court considered the following arguments and made the following rulings:
24
1. Discrimination on the Ground of Sex: It was argued that the retirement regulations
discriminated against AHs based solely on their sex, as male members of the crew, specifically
Assistant Flight Pursers (AFPs), did not have comparable retirement prescriptions. The court
acknowledged that there were differences in the nature of work, qualifications, promotional
avenues, and salary between AHs and AFPs. It held that the retirement regulations did not violate
Article 14 of the Constitution, as reasonable classification based on these differences is
permissible.
2. Differential Treatment: It was pointed out that AHs serving in the UK sector had more favorable
retirement conditions compared to those serving in other sectors. The court considered this
differential treatment to be a result of compliance with UK laws and considered it as a fortuitous
circumstance rather than intentional discrimination.
3. Retirement on Marriage and Pregnancy: The court ruled that retirement on marriage within the
first four years of service was a reasonable condition, as it promoted family planning and the
health of women. However, retirement upon the first pregnancy was deemed arbitrary and
unreasonable, as it lowered the status of women and was an affront to womanhood. Similarly,
the court held that retirement at 35 years of age was arbitrary, as there was no genuine reason
why women could not continue to serve beyond that age, especially considering advancements
in medical technology.
4. Excessive Delegation of Powers: The court found Regulation 47, which empowered the Managing
Director to extend service up to 45 years of age subject to medical fitness, to be violative of Article
14. It held that the regulation suffered from excessive delegation and arbitrariness.
3. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018)
Facts:
The petitioners challenged the practice followed at the Sabarimala temple in Kerala, which barred
the entry of women between the ages of 10 and 50 (menstruating age) into the temple premises. The
petitioners argued that this practice violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 25, 26,
and 51A(e) of the Indian Constitution.
1. Article 14: Guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It
prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including sex.
2. Article 15: Prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
It empowers the state to make special provisions for women and children.
3. Article 25: Ensures the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and
propagate religion. It also protects the rights of religious denominations to manage their own
affairs.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of prohibiting the entry of women of menstruating age
into the Sabarimala temple violated the constitutional provisions mentioned above. The court made
the following key observations:
1. Equality and Non-Discrimination: The court reiterated that Article 14 guarantees the right to
equality, and any practice that discriminates against women solely on the basis of biological factors
violates this right. It emphasized that biological differences cannot be a ground for denying women
equal access to religious places.
2. Freedom of Religion: While acknowledging the significance of religious freedom under Article 25,
the court held that religious practices cannot justify the infringement of the fundamental rights of
25
individuals. It emphasized that religious practices should not be discriminatory or restrict the rights
of individuals, particularly women.
3. Gender Justice: The court recognized that the prohibition on women's entry into the Sabarimala
temple perpetuated gender stereotypes and hindered gender justice. It emphasized that
constitutional values of dignity, liberty, and equality should prevail over age-old customs that
discriminate against women.
4. Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya
Facts:
In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, the issue concerned the grant of
Permanent Commission (PC) to women officers in the Indian Army. Initially, women officers were
inducted under the Women Special Entry Scheme (WSES) for a period of 5 years, which was later
extended for an additional 5 years. They were then given the option to join the Short Service
Commission (SSC) with a tenure of 14 years. However, the Delhi High Court, in a previous ruling in
2010, held that women officers, except in Combat Arms, should be offered the option of Permanent
Commission on par with their male counterparts.
Arguments and Rulings:
The Supreme Court held:
1. Assumptions Based on Gender Stereotypes: The union argued that women officers may face
challenges related to pregnancy, motherhood, and the impact on their soldier's life. The court
observed that these assumptions were based on gender stereotypes, assuming that domestic
responsibilities solely rested with women and perpetuating the notion that women were the
"weaker sex."
2. Burden on Women Officers: The arguments regarding "unit dynamics" and moderation of
behavior in the presence of women officers placed an undue burden on women. The court held
that such arguments should not hinder the granting of Permanent Commission to women
officers.
3. Three-Stage Assessment: The government agreed to a three-stage assessment for granting
Permanent Commission to women officers, as per the Delhi High Court's order.
Rulings on Conditions for Grant of Permanent Commission:
The court laid down the following conditions in relation to the notification issued on February 15th,
2019, allowing female officers to be granted Permanent Commission through SSC:
1. Implementation of Delhi High Court's order.
2. All female officers in SSC are eligible for Permanent Commission, regardless of their years
of service.
3. Female officers should have the same options of specialization as their male counterparts.
4. All consequential perks, including pension, promotion, and financial incentives, should be
granted to female officers granted Permanent Commission through SSC.
5. Certain expressions in the notification, such as "in various staff appointments only" and "on
staff appointments only," should not be enforced regarding the Permanent Commission of
female officers.
6. Benefits of continuing in service until attaining pensionable service should apply to all SSC
female officers.
7. The plaintiff (Secretary, Ministry of Defence) should take necessary steps for the compliance
of the Supreme Court's decision within 3 months of the pronouncement of the judgment.
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5. Colonel Nitisha v. Union of India

Facts:
In the case of Lt. Colonel Nitisha v. Union of India, the issue at hand was the criteria for granting
Permanent Commissions (PC) to women officers in the Indian Army. The criteria included scoring
higher than the lowest-scoring male officer who had previously been awarded a PC, considering
Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) in the grading, and meeting certain medical requirements.
These criteria resulted in women officers being ineligible for PCs for many years. The petitioners
contended that these seemingly neutral criteria indirectly discriminated against women officers.
Legal Principles Applied:
1. Formal Equality vs. Substantive Equality: The court distinguished between formal equality
and substantive equality. Formal equality treats everyone alike, irrespective of their
circumstances, while substantive equality requires a deeper understanding of equality and
discrimination. Indirect discrimination can occur when an action has a disproportionate
impact on a particular community, even if it appears neutral and treats all individuals equally.
2. Indirect Discrimination:
i. Discrimination can result from not only intentional acts but also unconscious biases and
existing structures that perpetuate an unjust status quo.
ii. Indirect discrimination occurs when there is an effect of unfair treatment, regardless of
intent.
iii. Statistical evidence can be used to establish indirect discrimination.
iv. The court suggested adopting the two-step test from Fraser v Canada to assess indirect
discrimination: (i) whether there is a disproportionate effect on a particular group, and
(ii) whether the law reinforces, perpetuates, or exacerbates disadvantage.
Held:
Applying the test for indirect discrimination, the court found that the parameters used for granting
PCs to women officers were discriminatory on several counts. The court made the following key
observations:
1. Benchmarking against Lowest Scoring Male Officers: The practice of benchmarking women
officers against the lowest-scoring male officer was struck down as discriminatory. The court
held that as long as women officers attain a 60% grade, they should be granted PCs.
2. Fitness Assessment: The court directed that fitness assessment for granting PCs should be based
on the scores attained at the time of 10 or 14 years in service, rather than considering medical
requirements that disproportionately affected women officers.
3. ACRs: The court acknowledged that ACRs had not been diligently prepared for women officers
and directed that ACRs should be evaluated keeping this fact in mind.
6. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India (UOI)
Facts:
The petitioners, representing the transgender community, highlighted the pervasive discrimination
faced by transgender individuals in various aspects of their lives, such as accessing public facilities,
self-identification, and vulnerability to sexual assault. The writ petition sought a legal declaration
recognizing the right of transgender persons to choose a gender identity different from the one
27
assigned to them at birth. The non-recognition of their gender identity was argued to be a violation
of their rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
Held:
The Supreme Court made the following key findings and rulings:
1. Equality and Non-Discrimination: Article 14 of the Constitution applies to all "persons" and
guarantees equal legal protection to everyone, regardless of their gender. The court held that it
imposes a positive obligation on the state to ensure equal protection for transgender individuals.
2. Protection of Gender Identity: The court recognized that both biological and gender aspects of sex
are protected by Articles 14-16 of the Constitution. It acknowledged that the transgender community
has been systematically denied rights.
Reservation
1. Indra Sawhney v UOI (commonly known as the Mandal Commission case)
Facts: The case pertained to the extension of reservation to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in
central government jobs. The Union Government issued an Office Memorandum (OM) based on the
recommendations of the Mandal Commission, providing for reservation in central jobs for OBCs
and other economically weaker sections. The validity of these reservations was challenged.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of India rendered a significant judgment in the Indra Sawhney case, addressing
various aspects related to reservations.
Important Points:
1. The court held that caste cannot be the sole basis for reservations, but it may be a dominant
factor as castes constitute social classes in India. Article 16(4) of the Constitution aims at
identifying socially and educationally backward classes rather than individuals.
2. The court ruled that the "creamy layer" (economically and educationally well-off individuals
among the OBCs) should be excluded from the OBC reservation list. However, the creamy
layer concept does not apply to Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) as they face
substantial marginalization regardless of economic status.
3. Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but should be interpreted to balance the
various provisions. The total reservation quota should generally not exceed 50%, except in
exceptional circumstances. Reservations based solely on economic criteria, without
considering social and educational backwardness, are not permissible under Article 16(1).
4. The court upheld the concept of horizontal reservation, which provides reservation for
specific disadvantaged groups such as children of veterans in the armed forces, disabled
persons, widows, unmarried women, and people from rural areas, as provided under Article
15(3).
Key Takeaways:
1. The judgment in the Indra Sawhney case reaffirmed the constitutional validity of reservations
for OBCs in central government jobs.
2. It introduced the concept of the creamy layer, excluding economically and educationally well-
off individuals from the benefit of OBC reservations.
28
3. The court emphasized that reservations should strike a balance between the promotion of
social justice and ensuring that the overall reservation quota does not exceed 50%, except in
exceptional cases.
4. The ruling validated horizontal reservation while striking down the provision of reservations
based solely on economic criteria without considering social and educational backwardness.
2. M. Nagarajan v UOI
Background:
The case challenged the validity of amendments to the Indian Constitution, including Arts 16(4-A),
16(4-B), and the proviso to Art 335, which introduced reservation in promotion for SC/ST categories
along with consequential seniority, carry forward of backlog vacancies, and relaxation of qualifying
conditions.
Key Points:
1. Compelling Necessity: The court held that in order to provide reservation for promotion
under Article 16, the State must demonstrate compelling necessity based on data pertaining
to backwardness, lack of representation in services, and overall efficiency. The court upheld
the amendments, stating that the "catch-up rule" and "consequential seniority" are part of
service jurisprudence and do not undermine the core value of equality.
2. Carry Forward of Backlog Vacancies: The court addressed the issue of the roster system,
whereby vacancies from previous years are retained and filled by members of the respective
reserved categories. It clarified that the carry forward rule does not violate the 50% ceiling on
reservations and that a distinction should be made between current vacancies and carry
forward vacancies. The court emphasized the need for periodic reviews to prevent posts from
being carried forward indefinitely.
3. Creamy Layer Principle: The court recognized the application of the creamy layer principle
in providing reservation in promotions. It highlighted the importance of excluding socially
and economically advanced individuals within the reserved categories to ensure that the
benefits of reservation reach the most disadvantaged sections. This principle aimed to
prevent the perpetuation of social inequalities within the SC/ST communities.
4. Departure from Indra Sawhney: The court's ruling in this case diverged from the decision in
Indra Sawhney (also known as the Mandal Commission case). While the Indra Sawhney case
upheld reservations based on caste, the M. Nagarajan case emphasized the need for
compelling necessity, data-driven backwardness, and overall efficiency as essential
considerations for providing reservation in promotions.
3. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India
Background:
The case involved a challenge to the judgment in Indra Sawhney (Mandal Commission case)
regarding the application of the creamy layer principle to Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled
Tribes (ST) reservations.
Key Points:
1. Creamy Layer Principle: The court disagreed with the decision in Indra Sawhney that the
creamy layer principle should not be applied to SC/ST reservations. It held that the principle
should indeed be applicable to prevent socially and economically advanced individuals within
29
the SC/ST communities from availing reservation benefits, ensuring that the most deserving
and disadvantaged sections receive the benefits.
2. Dominant Factor: The court agreed with the decision in Indra Sawhney that caste is a
dominant factor in providing reservations. It recognized that caste-based reservations are an
important measure to address historical discrimination and social inequalities. The court
upheld the significance of caste as a relevant criterion in determining reservation policies.
4. Ram Singh v. Union of India
Background: The case involved the inclusion of the Jats community in the Union Socially and
Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) list in several states.
Key Points:
1. Recommendations of the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC): The NCBC
suggested that the Jats community should not be included in the reservation category.
However, the Union government decided to include the Jats community in the SEBC list,
going against the recommendation of the NCBC. While the recommendation of the NCBC is
ordinarily binding, the Union government has discretion to deviate from it if the
recommendation is perverse or impossible. In this case, the court held that the NCBC's
recommendations were ignored without sufficient grounds and without appropriately
considering the social backwardness of the Jats community.
2. Use of Outdated Data: The court noted that, except for the State of Haryana, the data used to
demonstrate "inadequate representation" of the Jats community was more than a decade old.
The court emphasized that outdated data cannot be relied upon to determine inadequacy of
representation. Therefore, the court found the inclusion of the Jats community in the SEBC
list unconstitutional.
5. Jarnail Singh v. Union of India
Background: The case involved a re-examination of the decision in M Nagaraj v. Union of India,
which dealt with the issue of reservation in promotions for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled
Tribes (ST) in public employment.
Key Points:
1. Re-examination of M Nagaraj: The petitioner sought a re-examination of the decision in M
Nagaraj on the ground that it contradicted the rulings in Indra Sawhney and EV Chinnaiah.
However, the court refused to re-examine the decision, stating that it was consistent with the
ratio in Indra Sawhney and that the discussion on EV Chinnaiah was not necessary as it
pertained to SC/ST sub-classification, which was different from the issue in Nagaraj.
2. Overruling of Finding on Backwardness: The court overruled the finding in M Nagaraj that
there should be a finding of backwardness based on data, specifically concerning SC/STs. The
court held that this finding contradicted the ruling in Indra Sawhney, which presumed
backwardness among SC/STs. Therefore, the court clarified that the creamy layer within
SC/STs may be excluded from reservation in promotion practically, but not on paper. The
rest of the decision in Nagaraj did not require re-examination.
6. Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister
Facts:
30
• The case challenged the validity of the Maharashtra SEBC Act, which granted reservation to
the Maratha community in public employment and education.
• The issue raised was whether the Maratha community was socially and educationally
backward and if they required reservation.
Key Points:
• Adequate representation emphasized: The court held that ensuring adequate representation
is more important than proportionate reservation. In this case, the data presented showed
that the Maratha community was not socially and educationally backward and already had
sufficient representation.
• Exceeding the 50% reservation ceiling: The court noted that this case did not meet the criteria
for an extraordinary circumstance as stated in the Indra Sawhney case. Therefore, both the
Commission and the High Court were found to have erred by exceeding the 50% reservation
ceiling.
• States' power to create SEBC lists: The court addressed the question of whether states were
empowered to create separate SEBC lists following the 102nd Constitution Amendment Act.
The majority opinion held that only the Union government had the authority to create SEBC
lists after the amendment, invalidating the provision of reservation to the Maratha
community under the SEBC Act.
Outcome:
• The court unanimously struck down the Maharashtra SEBC Act in relation to providing
reservation to the Maratha community.
• It held that the power to create SEBC lists now rested with the Union government post the
102nd Amendment.
31
Article 19
1. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras
Facts:
Romesh Thappar, the publisher of the weekly magazine Crossroads, published articles that
questioned the government's public policies, particularly its foreign policy. These articles led to
suspicions among the public and resulted in the emergence of communist movements in certain
regions of Madras (now Tamil Nadu). In response, the Madras government imposed a ban on the
circulation of the magazine in areas where the communist movement was gaining momentum.
Issue:
The primary issue in this case was whether the ban imposed by the Madras government on the
circulation of Crossroads violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
Key Points:
1. Protection of Freedom of Speech and Expression: The Court held that the ban imposed by the
Madras government on the circulation of Crossroads violated the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
It emphasized that the freedom to propagate ideas, opinions, and viewpoints on matters of
public concern is an essential component of a democratic society.
2. Unconstitutionality of Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act: The
Court examined Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, which
provided the basis for the ban. It declared that this section, which allowed for restrictions on
the grounds of public safety and public order, fell outside the permissible limits of restrictions
under Article 19. Thus, it was deemed unconstitutional.
3. Doctrine of Severability: The Court invoked the doctrine of severability while considering the
constitutionality of the ban. It held that while the specific order imposing the ban was
unconstitutional, the entire legislation (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949) could
not be declared void. According to the Court, the legislation would only be null and void to
the extent of its inconsistency with fundamental rights, as outlined in Article 13 of the Indian
Constitution.
4. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Court reaffirmed its jurisdiction to hear cases
involving violations of fundamental rights. It emphasized that Article 32 of the Constitution
empowered the Supreme Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Thus, the Court asserted its duty to entertain petitions alleging infringements of fundamental
rights and safeguard those rights.
2. Supdt. Central Prisons v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960)
Facts:
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, the respondent, made a speech urging people not to pay the increased
irrigation tax imposed in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He was charged under Section 3 of the UP
Special Powers Act, 1932, which prescribed punishment for instigating someone to not pay a
liability.
Issue:
32
Whether the restriction imposed under Section 3 of the UP Special Powers Act, 1932, on instigating
someone to not pay a liability is constitutionally valid under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution.
Held:
The Supreme Court struck down the provision of Section 3 of the UP Special Powers Act, 1932, as
unconstitutional.
Key Points:
• The phrase "public order" used in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution is used in a limited
sense, distinct from other grounds like "security of the state" and "friendly relations with foreign
states."
• Public order, in the context of Article 19(2), is synonymous with public peace, safety, and
tranquility and also covers instances of local significance.
• The restriction imposed must have a proximate relationship to the achievement of public order
and must be reasonable.
• Any far-fetched, hypothetical, or remote connection to public order would not support the
imposition of a restriction.
• The provision in question, which penalized instigating someone not to pay government dues, was
struck down as it was found to have no proximity to the destruction of public order.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared Section 3 of the UP Special Powers Act, 1932, unconstitutional. The
Court held that the restriction on instigating someone not to pay a liability did not have a proximate
relationship to the achievement of public order. The judgment emphasized the requirement of
reasonableness and the need for a direct and substantial connection between the restriction and the
preservation of public order.
3. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)
Facts:
The petitioner, Kedar Nath Singh, made a speech in Bihar where he criticized the government and
made certain statements, including referring to the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) as
"dogs" and stating that the people of India elected "Congress goondas" (thugs) to power. He was
charged under Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offense of sedition.
Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 124-A (sedition) but imposed certain
limitations on its application.
Key Points:
• Sedition can only be invoked if the words used have a tendency or intention to create public
disorder or disturb law and order.
• Mere criticism of the government, however strong, is not sufficient to constitute sedition.
• The expression "the Government established by law" must be distinguished from the individuals
who are currently engaged in carrying out the administration.
• The government established by law is the visible symbol of the State, and its subversion would
jeopardize the very existence of the State.
33
• Strong words used to show disapproval of the government, without inciting violence or causing
public disorder, do not fall under sedition.
• However, if a speech critical of the government has the effect of inciting violence or causing
public disorder, it can be considered seditious and may be restricted under Article 19(2) of the
Indian Constitution.
4. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 305)
Facts:
Sakal Papers, a Marathi newspaper company, published a daily edition of 6 pages for five days a
week, priced at 7np, and a Sunday edition of 10 pages, priced at 12np. The newspaper allocated about
40 percent of its space to advertisements, with the remaining dedicated to news, articles, features,
and views.
The Government of India appointed a Press Commission in 1952 to investigate press-related
matters. Based on the Commission's recommendations, the Central Government enacted the
Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, which linked the newspaper's price to the number of pages
and size. The Act also regulated the allocation of space for advertising matters.
Subsequently, the Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960, was introduced, which further
prescribed the maximum number of pages that could be published based on the charged price. The
Sakal newspaper, along with two shareholders in one writ petition and two readers in separate writ
petitions, challenged the constitutional validity of both the Act, 1956, and the Order, 1960.
Issue:
Whether the right to publish a newspaper and its circulation falls under the right of freedom of
speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India?
Held:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Newspaper Act and Newspaper Order were
unconstitutional, upholding the plea of the petitioners.
Key Points:
• The freedom of speech and expression includes not only the freedom of circulation but also the
volume of circulation.
• The Court found that the real intent of the restrictions was not to regulate the price but to
disproportionately raise the price of certain newspapers.
• The regulation of advertisement space directly affects the price of newspapers, leading to a
decrease in circulation. While the government has the power to regulate businesses in the
interest of the general public, it cannot achieve this by directly curtailing other rights of the
citizens.
• Even if the ends pursued by the legislation are legitimate, if the means used are disproportionate,
the law must be struck down as unconstitutional.
5. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India (1972)
Facts:
The government imposed various restrictions on newspapers through the Newsprint Control Order,
Import Control Order, and Import Policy for Newsprint. These restrictions included limits on the
number of pages in newspapers, no interchangeability between editions or papers of the same
34
ownership unit, and limitations on starting new newspapers or editions within the allocated
newsprint quota.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the restrictions imposed by the government were unconstitutional as
they violated Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 14 (right to equality).
Key Points:
• The restrictions, although framed as newsprint control measures, had the effect of controlling
newspapers themselves.
• The government's policy aimed to regulate the circulation, advertisements, and growth of
newspapers.
• The Court emphasized that the essence and effect of the restrictions, rather than their form or
purpose, must be considered.
• The page limit imposed on newspapers had no rational basis and treated unequally situated
newspapers equally.
• Freedom of circulation, which is part of Article 19(1)(a), allows newspapers to adjust their
circulation and number of pages within the allocated quota.
• The restrictions on common ownership units were partially upheld, allowing adjustments within
different editions, but disallowing the starting of new newspapers using the allotted quota
without a separate application.
6. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram (1989)
Facts:
The film 'Ore Oru Gramathile' challenged the existing idea of reservation and advocated for
reservation based on financial status. Initially, the film was rejected a censor certificate but was later
cleared by the Revising Committee. However, a Division Bench of the High Court revoked the
certificate due to the anticipated threat of demonstrations and violence.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the mere threat of demonstration or violence cannot be a valid ground
to prohibit the screening of a film. The State has an obligation to protect freedom of speech and
expression, even in situations where there is opposition or disagreement with the content of the film.
Key Points:
• The Court applied the "spark in a powder keg" test, stating that the anticipated danger must have
a proximate and direct nexus with the expression. It should not be conjectural or far-fetched.
• Films were distinguished as an expressive medium, justifying the need for prior censorship.
• If a film is otherwise unobjectionable, its exhibition cannot be restricted based on the threat of
demonstration or violence.
• The Censor Board should apply the standard of an ordinary prudent person and not a
hypersensitive individual.
• While the Censor Board should uphold the moral values of the country, it should not have a
conservative mindset.
• There should be a balance between public interest and free speech, and free speech can only be
restricted when the community interest is endangered, and such danger is proximate to the
expression.
35
7. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

Facts:
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology
Act, 2000, along with several other provisions. Section 66A was struck down by the court for being
vague, overbroad, and having a chilling effect on free speech. The court also examined other related
provisions such as Section 69A, Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, Section 118 of the Kerala Police Act,
and the IT Rules, Rule 3(4).
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Section 66A of the IT Act was unconstitutional and struck down the
entire provision. The court stated that free speech can take the forms of discussion, advocacy, and
incitement, and it is only when it enters the realm of incitement that it can be restricted. The first
two forms, although unpalatable, should not be regulated.
5. Public Order: The court noted that the restriction imposed by Section 66A on speech lacked a
proximate and direct nexus with public disorder. It observed that the anticipated danger should
not be conjectural or far-fetched but must have a reasonable connection with the expression.
6. Defamation: The court highlighted that something grossly offensive and annoying may not
necessarily be defamatory, as defamation involves affecting the reputation of a person.
7. Vagueness: The court emphasized that a primary tenet of criminal law is to provide notice to
individuals about whether they are infringing the law. However, Section 66A was found to be
vague, as terms like "annoying," "inconvenient," and "grossly offensive" lacked clarity and
precision.
8. Chilling Effect: The court recognized that Section 66A had a chilling effect on free speech, as its
broad and vague language could lead to self-censorship by individuals fearing legal
consequences.
9. Actual Knowledge: The court clarified the interpretation of "actual knowledge" under Section
79(3)(b) of the IT Act. It held that "actual knowledge" would only be inferred when an
intermediary fails to expeditiously remove materials after receiving a court order specifically
directing them to do so.
8. N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India (2018)
Facts:
The petitioners alleged that the novel titled 'Meesha' contained portions derogatory to temple-
going Hindu women. They sought a court order to restrain further circulation and publication of
the novel on the grounds that it had the potential to disturb public order.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that an objective assessment of the book as a whole should be conducted
rather than judging it in a fragmented manner. The court considered the following key points:
1. Obscenity: In judging the question of obscenity, the court emphasized that the judge should
put themselves in the shoes of both the author and the reader. This involves considering
whether the book has any artistic value and the likely effect on the minds of the reader. The
court also took into account the settings, elements constituting the characters, their
consistency, plots, sub-plots, and the purpose of the book.
2. Mature Reader Standard: The court appeared to adopt the standard of a "mature reader" in
its assessment. This suggests that the book should be evaluated from the perspective of a
36
reasonable, adult reader who is capable of discerning the artistic and contextual nuances
presented in the work.
9. Indibily Creative Pvt Ltd v. West Bengal (2019)
Facts:
The petitioners were the producers of a movie titled 'Bhobhishyoter Bhoot' which was a social
satire and had received a UA (Universal Adult) certificate. Prior to the release of the film, the
petitioners received a letter from the Joint Commissioner of Police, requesting a prior screening of
the movie due to complaints suggesting it may cause law and order issues. However, the producers
refused to arrange the screening. After the film's release, it was immediately withdrawn from most,
if not all, theaters in Kolkata, allegedly due to the police asking theater owners not to display it.
The petitioners challenged the police's action, and interim directions were issued by the court to
ensure the smooth exhibition of the film.
Held:
The Supreme Court struck down the action of the police and imposed costs on them. The court
made the following key observations:
1. Statutory Powers: Although there are certain powers under statutory law to prevent the
exhibition of a film on public order grounds, the state itself accepted that no such exercise of
powers occurred in this case.
2. Harm Principle: The court referred to the "harm principle," which states that restraints can
only be imposed when the exercise of a right may lead to harm to others. In this case, the
court found no evidence to suggest that the film's exhibition would cause harm or disturb
public order.
3. Positive Mandate: The court held that the police had a positive mandate to ensure the
circulation of artistic works. The police's action of preventing the exhibition of the film was
found to be inconsistent with this mandate.
37
Article 21
1. Reversal of AK Gopalan in Maneka Gandhi
Facts:
• The case involves a reversal of the interpretation of fundamental rights in AK Gopalan by the
Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi.
• In AK Gopalan, the Court held that fundamental rights operate independently, and a law
restricting life or personal liberty only needed to be passed by the legislature.
• However, in Maneka Gandhi, the Court departed from the strict interpretation of AK Gopalan
and emphasized the interconnectedness of fundamental rights.
Key Points:
• Fundamental Rights as Interconnected: The Court in Maneka Gandhi recognized that
fundamental rights do not exist in isolation. When a restriction is placed on life or personal
liberty, it must be examined in light of the specific rights implicated.
• Shift to Procedural Due Process: The Court moved away from the concept of "pure form due
process" in AK Gopalan. Mere legislation was no longer sufficient; the procedure under the
law restricting rights must also be fair, just, and reasonable.
• Procedural Due Process Requirement: After Maneka Gandhi, the following scheme was
established:
1. Freedoms falling under both Articles 19 and 21: The reasonableness test of Article 19,
the non-arbitrariness test of Article 14, and the requirements of Article 21 must all be
satisfied.
2. Freedoms falling under Article 21 only: The non-arbitrariness test of Article 14 and the
requirements of Article 21 must be satisfied.
Outcome:
• The decision in Maneka Gandhi marked a significant departure from the interpretation of
fundamental rights in AK Gopalan.
• It established that the procedure under which rights are restricted must be fair, just, and
reasonable, rather than solely relying on the existence of legislation.
• The case established a framework for analyzing restrictions on life and personal liberty,
considering the interconnectedness of fundamental rights and the requirement of procedural
due process.
2. Olga Tellis v Municipal Corporation of Bombay (Right to livelihood and shelter)
Facts:
• The case involves a challenge to the eviction of pavement and slum dwellers by the Municipal
Corporation of Bombay under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The
provision allowed the Commissioner to remove objects or structures on the streets without
notice.
• The court addressed the issue of the right to livelihood as an integral part of the right to life.
38
Key Points:
• Right to Livelihood and Right to Life: The court recognized that the right to livelihood is an
integral part of the right to life.
• Restriction on Deprivation of Life or Personal Liberty: The court acknowledged that there is
no absolute prohibition on the deprivation of life or personal liberty, but certain safeguards
must be in place.
• Validity of Section 314: The court upheld Section 314, noting that pavement dwellers do not
have a right to encroach on public property. However, it held that the power of eviction
without notice should be presumed to be used only in limited circumstances where delay
cannot be tolerated.
• Entitlements before Eviction: The court established two entitlements before eviction: the
right to a hearing and the right to rehabilitation under existing schemes.
• Specific Directions: The court issued specific directions related to the case, including a one-
month embargo on eviction, offering alternative pitches to pavement dwellers, and protecting
slums in existence for 20 years or more unless the land is required for a public purpose.
• Deference to the State: The court acknowledged that in eviction cases, courts have generally
been deferential to the state and have not always insisted on providing alternative
accommodation unless there is an existing resettlement and rehabilitation scheme.
Outcome:
• The court recognized the right to livelihood as an integral part of the right to life.
• Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was upheld, but limitations were
placed on its use to ensure procedural fairness.
• The court provided entitlements of a hearing and rehabilitation before eviction.
• Specific directions were given in the case, but courts have generally shown deference to the
state in eviction cases.
3. Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration (Right of individuals in detention and
protection homes)
Facts:
• The case involves a challenge to the practice of keeping death row prisoners in solitary
confinement and the use of bar fetters on an undertrial prisoner. The state defended these
practices under Section 30 of the Prisons Act.
Key Points:
• Solitary Confinement: The court struck down the practice of keeping death row prisoners in
solitary confinement, emphasizing that it violates the right to live with human dignity. Section
30 of the Prisons Act, which requires keeping a prisoner under death sentence in a separate
cell, does not mean solitary confinement. The prisoner should be within the sight and sound
of other prisoners and take food with them.
• Bar Fetters: The court held that the use of bar fetters on prisoners is allowed only in
exceptional circumstances, depending on the specific circumstances of the prisoner. The
length of the sentence is irrelevant in determining the use of bar fetters.
39
• Handcuffing: The court held that handcuffing should only be used in exceptional
circumstances and that it goes against the right to a dignified life. Although the court did not
strike down the provisions, it interpreted them in a manner consistent with the protection of
human dignity.
Outcome:
• The court ruled that unless an extreme case of necessity is demonstrated and the prisoner is
truly under a sentence of death, solitary confinement is not permitted. The power to order
solitary confinement is limited to a judicial authority.
• The court restricted the use of bar fetters to exceptional circumstances, taking into account
the specific circumstances of the prisoner.
• Handcuffing is allowed only in exceptional circumstances and should not be used as a routine
practice.
4. Francis Coralie Mullin v Delhi (Right to socialize)
Facts:
• The petitioner, a foreign national, was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange
and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) on charges of possessing drugs.
Those detained under COFEPOSA faced more stringent prison rules, including limited
meetings with friends and family and restricted access to lawyers.
Key Points:
• Differentiation between preventive and punitive detention: The court recognized the need to
differentiate between preventive and punitive detention. Preventive detention is an
anticipatory measure where a person is detained based on suspicion of committing a future
crime, while punitive detention is for individuals who have already committed an offense.
• Test of Article 21: The court held that even under preventive detention laws, which are meant
to prevent future crimes, the principles of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) must
be upheld. Preventive detention laws must be fair, just, and reasonable.
• Preservation of fundamental rights during detention: The court emphasized that
fundamental rights do not evaporate once a person has been detained. The right to life
includes the right to live with dignity.
• Right to socialize: The court recognized that the right to a dignified life and personal liberty
includes the right to have periodic interviews with friends and family. The court directed that
detainees should have at least two interviews per week and should be allowed to meet with
their lawyers at any reasonable hour, without the mandatory presence of a customs officer
and not within hearing distance.
Outcome:
• The court ruled that detainees have the right to socialize and maintain contact with friends,
family, and lawyers. The restrictions imposed under COFEPOSA on the frequency and
conditions of meetings were deemed unconstitutional.
• Detainees were granted the right to have at least two meetings per week with friends and
family.
40
• Detainees were allowed to meet with their lawyers at any reasonable hour, with the approval
of the jail superintendent, without the mandatory presence of a customs officer.
5. Puttuswamy v. Union of India
Issue 1: Validity of Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill
The petitioners contended that the Aadhaar Act was passed as a Money Bill, which violated Article
110 of the Constitution. The majority upheld the Act as a Money Bill, stating that its primary purpose
was to enable the targeting of welfare subsidies, impacting the Consolidated Fund of India. They
considered other provisions of the Act as ancillary. However, the dissenting opinion, in addition to
the majority's reasoning, argued that the Act did not fulfill the criteria for a Money Bill as many
provisions were unrelated to matters mentioned in Article 110, rendering the use of the Money Bill
route unconstitutional.
Dissent: The dissenting opinion held that the use of the Money Bill route for passing the Aadhaar
Act was unconstitutional as most provisions of the Act had nothing to do with matters mentioned in
Article 110.
Issue 2: Privacy Concerns and Biometric Data
The petitioners raised concerns about privacy, specifically regarding the collection and storage of
biometric data under the Aadhaar scheme. The majority held that demographic information does
not carry an expectation of privacy. They emphasized the secure storage of biometric data using
multiple protocols and the purpose-blind collection of data, making the merging of silos impossible.
Enrolment agencies, AUAs, and KUAs were stated to be bound by UIDAI's security protocols.
Dissent: The dissenting opinion expressed concerns about the proportionality of the means used,
potential privacy risks, foreign licensing of biometric software, lack of oversight over UIDAI's
powers, and the ability to determine the location of an Aadhaar Number Holder through access to
verification logs.
Issue 3: Exclusions and Leakages caused by Aadhaar
The petitioners argued that Aadhaar resulted in exclusions and leakages. The majority
acknowledged that Aadhaar aimed to prevent leakages in welfare benefits and emphasized the
prevention of large-scale leakages despite a small percentage of exclusion due to biometric
authentication failure. They found the petitioners failed to demonstrate a more effective alternative.
Dissent: The dissenting opinion raised concerns about biometric authentication failure, the need for
less intrusive measures for vulnerable groups, and the potential trade-off between dignity and
privacy. They emphasized the requirement for the state to prove that there are no less onerous
measures and provide solutions for cases where biometric authentication may fail, such as manual
laborers and older people.
Proportionality Standard:
The court applied the proportionality standard to assess the constitutionality of Aadhaar. The
majority required a lawful measure serving a legitimate state aim, a rational connection between the
measure and the aim, the least intrusive among available alternatives, and a balance between the
impact on the right and the state aim. They found Aadhaar met these requirements, with iris and
fingerprints being the least problematic biometrics for ensuring a dignified life while minimizing
privacy intrusion.
41
Dissent: The dissenting opinion simplified the proportionality standard to four requirements,
including being backed by law, serving a legitimate state aim, being proportionate without excessive
impairment of the right, and providing sufficient safeguards for data storage and protection. They
highlighted the need for the state to guarantee consent-based collection and use of personal
information, individual ownership of data, and the right of access to the collected data.
Bilchitz Standard:
The Bilchitz formulation was introduced to address issues raised by previous tests. It requires courts
to assess each alternative and determine if it can fulfill the state aim in a real and substantial manner.
Afterward, the impact of the alternatives on the rights is examined, which is the fifth stage of the
proportionality standard: balancing.
Dissent: The dissenting opinion did not explicitly refer to the Bilchitz standard but emphasized the
need for measures to be proportional and not infringe rights to a greater extent than necessary.
Conclusion:
In the Puttuswamy case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the Aadhaar
project while addressing concerns related to privacy, exclusion, and leakages. The majority found
the Act as a Money Bill, proportionate, and necessary for targeting welfare subsidies. The dissent
raised concerns about privacy, alternative measures, safeguards for data storage, and the trade-off
between dignity and privacy.
6. Bandhua Mukti Morcha
Facts:
The Bandhua Mukti Morcha case shed light on the issue of child labor within the carpet industry in
Uttar Pradesh. It revealed that a significant number of children were being abducted from Bihar and
employed in the industry. The exploitation of these children involved their employment at a young
age, below 14 years, and subjected them to physical abuse.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court issued several significant rulings in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case, addressing
the violation of fundamental rights and the eradication of child labor.
Key Points:
1. Violation of Fundamental Rights:
a. Articles 21 and 23: The court held that the prevailing conditions and practices in the carpet
industry violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 (right to life) and 23
(prohibition of human trafficking and forced labor) of the Indian Constitution. The court reiterated
that the right to life encompasses the right to live with human dignity.
2. Directives to the States:
a. Policy formulation: The court directed the states to devise strategies and policies to effectively
eliminate the employment of children below the age of 14 in the carpet industry.
b. Mandatory education: Compulsory education was mandated for all children employed in
factories, mines, and other industries.
c. Nutritious food and health check-ups: The court emphasized the provision of nutrient-rich food
and regular health check-ups for these children.
42
d. Progress reports: The court required periodic reports on the implementation of its directives to
be submitted to the court's registry.
Outcome:
1. Rehabilitation of Workers:
a. State responsibility: The court directed the state to take appropriate measures for the
rehabilitation of the affected workers, ensuring their well-being and protection.
2. Maintainability of Petitions: The court rejected the state's arguments challenging the
maintainability of the petitions filed in the case, affirming the legitimacy of the grievances brought
forward.
3. Prohibition of Child Labor: Age restriction: The court ruled that no child below the age of 14 shall
be employed in factories, mines, or any other hazardous employment, aligning with the provisions
of the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986.
4. Monitoring progress: The court mandated the submission of periodic reports on the progress
made in the implementation of its directives to the court's registry, ensuring accountability and
monitoring of the situation.
7. Hinsa Virodhak Sangh
Facts: The case revolves around the imposition of short-term restrictions on the production of meat.
The petitioners contended that these resolutions infringed upon their right to engage in trade and
business related to livestock and mutton.
High Court's Decision: The High Court scrutinized the restrictions and determined that they could
only be considered reasonable if they were imposed in the public interest. Upon evaluation, the court
found the resolutions to be arbitrary and discriminatory. However, the court acknowledged the
appellants' argument that the nine-day restriction on slaughterhouses and non-vegetarians
constituted a partial restriction for a limited duration, which did not qualify as disproportionate or
unreasonable.
Supreme Court's Considerations: The Supreme Court acknowledged the High Court's assessment
but raised concerns regarding the imposition of prolonged restrictions on slaughterhouses. It
highlighted that extending the limitations for a substantial period would result in excessive and
invalid resolutions. Such extended restrictions would not only render many individuals associated
with slaughterhouses unemployed but also impose a vegetarian lifestyle on a significant number of
non-vegetarians residing in Ahmedabad.
Right to Privacy and Dietary Preferences: In the context of dietary preferences, the Court
emphasized that one's food choices are a personal matter and form part of their right to privacy,
protected under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court referenced the case of R. Rajagopal
vs. State of Tamil Nadu, which recognized the right to privacy as the 'right to be let alone.'
Key Points:
1. The High Court deemed the resolutions restricting meat production as arbitrary and
discriminatory if not imposed in the public interest.
2. The Supreme Court considered the temporary nature of the nine-day restrictions as not
disproportionate or unreasonable.
43
3. However, the Supreme Court cautioned against imposing extended restrictions on

slaughterhouses to avoid adverse consequences on employment and individual dietary
choices.
4. The Court affirmed that individuals' food choices are a personal matter protected under the
right to privacy enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
44
Public Interest Litigation

1. Balwant Singh Chaufal v State of Uttaranchal
Facts: This case involved a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) where the High Court was asked to
determine the validity of the appointment of an Advocate General beyond the age of 62 years in the
State of Uttaranchal.
Issues:
The main issue was whether the appointment of an Advocate General beyond the age of 62 years
was valid under Article 217, which sets the retirement age for judges of the High Court.
Ruling:
The Court observed that Article 217 specifically applies to judges of the High Court and does not
extend to the Advocate General. The petitioners in the PIL failed to provide any legal basis or reasons
to question the settled law regarding the appointment of the Advocate General. The Court found the
petition to be lacking thoughtful consideration.
Directions and Safeguards:
In order to prevent the abuse of PIL, the Court laid down certain safeguards. These include:
(i) Encouraging genuine and bona fide PILs.
(ii) Each High Court has the authority to formulate rules for PIL.
(iii) Prima facie verification of the credentials of the petitioner.
(iv) Ensuring that public interest is involved.
(v) Giving priority to PILs that involve public interest, gravity, and urgency.
(vi) Imposing exemplary costs on individuals who file frivolous petitions.
The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 1 lakh on the petitioner for bringing a petition that challenged a
position that had already been well settled. This was done to deter individuals from filing baseless
petitions and wasting the court's time.
Key Points:
1. The case clarified that the retirement age prescribed for judges of the High Court under
Article 217 does not apply to the Advocate General.
2. The Court emphasized the need for PILs to be genuine and based on bona fide concerns
related to public interest.
3. Safeguards were established to prevent the abuse of PIL, including verification of the
petitioner's credentials and imposition of costs for frivolous petitions.
45
Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25 to 28)

1. Commissioner v. Lakshmindra Swamiar
Facts:
The issue revolved around a law that provided for the management of a Math estate. The law had
provisions that affected both the religious and secular aspects of the Math estate. The question
before the court was whether these provisions were constitutional and in accordance with the
religious freedom guaranteed under the Indian Constitution.
Held:
The court ruled that the law providing for the management of the Math estate was constitutional
with certain limitations. The court made the following key observations:
1. Religious/Secular Aspects: The court had to determine which aspects of the law were regulating
secular aspects and which were regulating religious aspects. While the management of the
property by a secular Commissioner was found to be constitutional, giving the Commissioner the
power to enter the temple at any time was considered unconstitutional.
2. Navigating Constitutional Provisions: The court examined the relationship between Article 26(b)
and Article 26(d) of the Indian Constitution. It concluded that the management of the Math
estate fell within the purview of Article 26(b) regarding the administration of religious affairs.
3. Constitutional Limitations: Although the state has the authority to regulate secular activities
associated with religious practice under Article 25(2)(b), it cannot interfere with the essential
religious practices and beliefs of a religious denomination.
2. Sardar Saifuddin v. State of Bombay
Facts:
In the case of Sardar Saifuddin v. State of Bombay, the head of the Dawoodi Bohra clan challenged
the validity of the Bombay Excommunication Act, which prohibited the practice of
excommunication within religious communities.
Held:
The Supreme Court made the following key holdings:
1. Essential Religious Practice Test: The court examined the history of the Dawoodi Bohra
community and found that the power of excommunication had always been vested in the head
of the community. Based on a previous decision of the Privy Council, the court held that
excommunication was an essential religious practice of the community.
2. Article 25(2)(b): The court held that the Bombay Excommunication Act could not be saved by
Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, which allows the state to regulate or restrict secular activities
associated with religious practices. The court did not provide a detailed analysis or explanation
for this conclusion.
Critique:
The court's decision in this case has been criticized for several reasons:
1. Lack of Justification: The court categorized excommunication as an essential religious practice
without providing a clear rationale or justification for this classification.
46
2. Ambiguity in Article 25(2)(b): The court did not provide a thorough analysis of the application
of Article 25(2)(b) and its relationship with the Bombay Excommunication Act, leaving the
reasoning behind its conclusion unclear.
3. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu

Facts:
the issue involved an act that aimed to abolish the hereditary appointment of archakas (temple
priests) in temples. The question before the court was whether the act was constitutional,
considering the religious and secular aspects of the appointment of archakas.
1. Religious/Secular Distinction: The court observed that the archaka, or temple priest, does not
hold the status of a spiritual head and is not regarded as the spiritual authority of the institution.
The appointment of archakas is controlled by secular authorities and trustees, and they perform
rituals and worship as part of their duties.
2. Article 25 of the Indian Constitution: Article 25(1) guarantees the freedom of religion to every
individual, while Article 25(2)(a) allows the state to make laws regulating or restricting any
religious practice.
3. Article 25(2)(b) of the Indian Constitution: Article 25(2)(b) permits the state to make laws
regulating or restricting any secular activity associated with religious practice.
Held:
The court held that the act abolishing the hereditary appointment of archakas in temples was
constitutional. The court made the following key observations:
1. Religious/Secular Distinction: The court found that the archakas, despite being knowledgeable
in temple rituals, did not hold the status of a spiritual head and were appointed by secular
authorities. Their appointment and the performance of rituals were not considered essential
religious practices or matters of religion.
2. Applicability of Article 25(2)(b): The court did not delve into the religious/secular distinction in
detail as Article 25(2)(b) directly applied to the case. The act aimed at regulating the secular
activity of appointment rather than interfering with religious practices.
3. Scope of Article 25(2)(a): It can be argued that a showing that the practice is religious must
precede the application of Article 25(2)(b). If the religious nature of the practice is not proved,
then Article 25(2)(a) would directly apply.
4. N. Adithyan v. Travancore
Facts:
In the case of N. Adithyan v. Travancore, the issue involved the appointment of a non-Malayala
Brahmin as a priest of the Siva Ernakulam Temple. The question before the court was whether the
temple board had the authority to appoint a non-Brahmin priest for the temple.
1. Custom or Usage: The court considered the existence of any custom or usage that might restrict
the appointment of non-Brahmin priests in the Siva Ernakulam Temple.
47
2. Constitutional Mandate: The court examined whether any custom or usage violated human
rights, dignity, social equality, and the specific provisions of the Constitution and laws made by
Parliament.
Held:
The court held that there was no evidence to support the claim that only Brahmins were entitled to
serve as priests in the Siva Ernakulam Temple. The court made the following key observations:
1. Custom or Usage: The court found no evidence to establish that the appointment of non-Brahmin
priests was prohibited by any valid custom or usage.
2. Constitutional Compatibility: The court stated that any custom or usage, regardless of its
historical existence, cannot be recognized as a source of law if it violates human rights, dignity,
social equality, and the specific mandate of the Constitution and laws made by Parliament.
3. Unnecessary Normative Statements: The court acknowledged that the second part of its
reasoning, which stated that Hinduism's elements conflicting with the Constitution should not
be considered part of Hinduism, was unnecessary. It resembled previous normative statements
about the conformity of Hinduism with constitutional principles.
5. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwara Avadhuta
Facts:
In the case of Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwara Avadhuta, the issue was similar to
the previous case (Avadhuta I). The question before the court was whether the tandava dance,
mandated in the holy book called the Cary Cary by the leader of the sect, could be considered an
essential religious practice.
Essential Religious Practices: The court examined whether the tandava dance was an essential
religious practice of the sect.
Held:
The court completely abandoned the pretense of deferring to the religion itself in this case. It held
that religions could not be allowed to circumvent court decisions by altering their essential practices.
The court made the following key observations:
1. Essential Practices Test: The court did not apply the essential religious practices test as it did in
the previous case. Instead, it explicitly stated that religions cannot evade court decisions by
changing their essential practices.
2. Non-Deferral to Religion: The court rejected any notion of deferring to religious mandates that
were introduced solely to bypass the court's earlier decision.
6. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India
Facts:
In the case of Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, the central question was whether the state had the
authority to take over land on which a mosque was located. The issue gained significance in the
aftermath of the Ayodhya dispute.
Held:
The Supreme Court held:
48
Essential Religious Practices Test: The court held that worshiping at any specific mosque was not an
essential religious practice in Islam. Therefore, the state's takeover of the land on which a mosque
was situated did not violate the essential religious practices of Islam.
Protection of Minorities and Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29 & 30)
1. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka
Facts:
In the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, the T.M.A. Pai Foundation, a trust, owned
and administered the Manipal Institute of Technology, an educational institution. The state of
Karnataka promulgated an ordinance called the Karnataka Educational Institutions Ordinance,
1984, and later enacted an act fixing the rates of capitation fee and tuition fee chargeable to private
unaided educational institutions. The trust challenged the validity of the ordinance and the state's
actions.
Legal Issues:
1. Fundamental Right to Set Up Educational Institutions: Whether there exists a fundamental right
to set up educational institutions and, if so, under which provision?
2. Government Regulations on Private Institutions: To what extent can the government impose
regulations upon private educational institutions?
3. Determining Minority Status: What is the unit to determine the existence of a religious or
linguistic minority in relation to Article 30?
Held:
The Supreme Court made the following key rulings:
1. Fundamental Right to Establish Educational Institutions: The court held that there exists a
fundamental right to establish and maintain educational institutions. This right is derived from
Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business)
and Article 26(a) (right of religious denominations to establish and maintain institutions).
2. Government Regulations: The court emphasized that while the government can impose
regulations on private educational institutions in matters of public order, morality, and health, such
regulations should not interfere with the right of minorities to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice under Article 30.
3. Determining Minority Status: The court ruled that all minorities, whether based on religion or
language, have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
Discrimination in granting aid to educational institutions based on minority status is prohibited.
Conclusion:
In the T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka case, the Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental right to establish and maintain educational institutions. It held that government
regulations on private educational institutions should not infringe upon the rights of minorities
under Article 30. The court also clarified that minority status, whether based on religion or language,
grants the right to establish and administer educational institutions of choice.
2. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra
Facts:
49
The P.A. Inamdar case involved a dispute regarding the extent to which professional education could
be considered as a matter falling under the rights of minorities under Article 30 of the Indian
Constitution. The case also addressed the issue of whether the admission of students to minority
educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, could be regulated by the State Government or
the affiliated university. The key questions in the case were related to the fundamental right to
establish educational institutions and the extent of government regulations on private institutions.
Legal Issues:
1. Professional Education and Minority Rights: To what extent can professional education be treated
as a matter falling under the rights of minorities under Article 30?
2. Regulation of Admission in Minority Institutions: Can the admission of students to minority
educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, be regulated by the State Government or the
affiliated university?
3. Fundamental Right to Set up Educational Institutions: Is there a fundamental right to set up
educational institutions?
4. Government Regulations on Private Institutions: Can there be government regulations on private
educational institutions, and if so, to what extent?
Held:
The Supreme Court made the following key rulings:
1. Professional Education and Minority Rights: The court held that professional education could be
considered a matter falling under the rights of minorities under Article 30.
2. Regulation of Admission in Minority Institutions: The court ruled that the State Government or
the affiliated university could regulate the admission of students in minority educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided. However, such regulations should be fair, transparent, and
non-exploitative.
3. Fundamental Right to Set up Educational Institutions: The court affirmed the existence of a
fundamental right to set up educational institutions.
4. Government Regulations on Private Institutions: The court stated that private educational
institutions could be subject to government regulations. However, institutions were allowed to
devise their own fee structure, with the limitation that there should be no profiteering or charging
of capitation fees. NRI seats were permissible up to 15% in all institutions.
Conclusion:
In the P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra case, the Supreme Court recognized the right of
minorities to establish and administer educational institutions, including professional education. It
held that the State Government or the affiliated university could regulate admission in minority
institutions, but such regulations should be fair and non-exploitative. The court also confirmed the
fundamental right to set up educational institutions and allowed for government regulations on
private institutions, with limitations on fee structures and prohibition of capitation fees. The court
encouraged the central and state governments to develop comprehensive legislation on the subject
in the absence of central legislation.
50

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Constitutional Law I - Pratham Gupta

Constitutional Law I – Case Briefs

3. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) ........................................... 25

5. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwara Avadhuta ........................................... 48

Principles of Reasonableness, Non-Arbitrariness and Manifest Arbitrariness

2. Joseph Shine v UOI

5. Colonel Nitisha v. Union of India

7. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

3. However, the Supreme Court cautioned against imposing extended restrictions on

Public Interest Litigation

Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25 to 28)

3. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu

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