Impact of Trump’s “China Virus” Rhetoric on Public Attitudes:

Regression Analysis of Pandemic-Related Tweets

Jinwen Wu

Northwestern University
jinwenwu2024@u.northwestern.edu

Abstract

This study investigates how former President Donald Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric on

Twitter impacted public online behavior by analyzing 632 related tweets and corresponding

Google and YouTube searches in 2020. Key findings indicate a significant positive correlation

between Trump’s use of politicized framing and an upsurge in related Google Trends, highlight-

ing the immediate influence of political rhetoric on public online behavior.

The study controlled for U.S. and China COVID-19 death rates and Trump’s approval ratings

to enhance the regression and marginal effects analysis. Results show a diminishing effect of

Trump’s xenophobic influence over time. This trend suggests that growing public desensitization

and an enhanced understanding of the pandemic could weaken the impact of elite xenophobic

rhetoric. The analysis demonstrates the dynamic interplay between political communication and

public response, highlighting the influential role of political leaders in shaping public discourse

through social media.

1 Introduction

COVID-19 posed significant challenges to the US public health system, hindered economic progress,

and jeopardized social stability. In 2020, the absence of a unified scientific stance on virus contain-

ment led to varied and inconsistent media coverage in the early stages of the pandemic. Research

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indicated that news reports across various media platforms often fed people with confusion, fear,

panic, stigmatization, and incidents of xenophobia [1, 2].

Different negative framings of the pandemic could weaponize COVID-19, threatening social sta-

bility by fostering public resistance to preventive measures. They often downplay the pandemic’s

seriousness, attribute the crisis to actors with presumed malicious intent, and undermine the im-

portance of virus containment actions. The extensive circulation of negative narratives height-

ened collective emotions—anxiety, fear, loneliness, and apprehension. While society grappled with

surging apprehension and pressing urgency in developing effective treatments, prevailing negative

emotions often led to preferences for impulsive decision-making, increasing susceptibility to inciting

and manipulative narratives [3, 4]. Misinformation could take precedence over factual information

in shaping public perception of COVID-19, thereby shaping people’s subsequent actions [5, 6].

Individuals with higher exposure to and belief in misleading information were more reluctant to

comply with coronavirus containment policies [7]. Beliefs in misleading rhetoric usually continued

for months and persistently increased people’s reluctance to follow public health guidelines, such

as vaccination, mask-wearing, quarantine, and social distancing [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. For instance,

data from various countries - such as the U.S., Italy, and China – supports a positive correlation

between vaccine hesitancy and heightened risk alarm. ([13, 14, 15]). A popular explanation ar-

gues that misinformation exploits people’s emotions, fosters confusion, and ultimately discourages

vaccination uptake [16, 17, 18]. As Larson highlights, the “deluge of conflicting, false, and ma-

nipulated information on social media” aggregates to become “a global public-health threat” [19].

Misinformation during the pandemic is featured by deliberately fabricated narratives; as it endan-

gered public health, the government leadership in guiding people to follow and executing effective

scientific preventive measures for COVID-19 containment is paramount.

However, despite the necessity of disconfirmation, effective public communication and policy

enforcement proved to be challenging. Manipulative rhetoric of COVID-19, especially the con-

spiracy theories, swayed public trust in government agencies and independent scientific experts,

exacerbated affective polarization, and even sometimes triggered racial resentment.[20, 21, 22].

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 Among misleading coverage about COVID-19, the unique role of former President Donald

Trump in spreading this type of rhetoric deserves additional attention. A significant conspiracy

theory framed COVID-19 as a hoax by left-wing groups to derail Trump’s reelection campaign. In

a national opinion survey, Jamieson (2020) found that 19% of the respondents suspected the CDC

of exaggerating the virus threat to undermine Trump [12]. In addition to his passive presence in

conspiratorial narratives, Trump also actively used his influence to manipulate public perception

of the virus. Another highly falsified theory - COVID-19 was a bioweapon by the Chinese to wage

war on the U.S. - offers an illustration. Trump often referred to COVID-19 as the “China virus”

when U.S. domestic inflection cases rose. His endorsement of the unfounded claim diverted public

attention to a dangerous imaginary enemy - China, sparking the “rally-round-the-flag” effect.

Trump’s frequent use of terms like “China virus” during press conferences and social media

correlates with a surge in racial discrimination against Asian Americans, particularly those of

Chinese descent. Among 112 of his “China Virus” related tweets posted in 2020, 31 were dated

to March 2020, when he used the terms most frequently in mass media. In a national survey

conducted in the same month among 1008 US adults, 23% of the participants agreed that it is

“probably true” or “definitely true” that the virus was created by the Chinese government. During

Trump’s administration, the United States Department of Justice reported a 77% increase in hate

crimes against Asian Americans in 2020 [23]. A national poll survey of Asian Americans and Pacific

Islanders revealed that 57% of the respondents quoted Donald Trump when asked to give major

reasons for anti-Asian discrimination [24, 25].

Motivated by these compelling statistics, the study aims to understand the impact of Trump’s

rhetoric in attributing the coronavirus to China on public perception of COVID-19 in the United

States. The research is grounded in keyword-based text analyses of Trump’s 632 pandemic-related

tweets throughout 2020. His frequent use of terms like “China Virus” could foster a xenophobic

sentiment against Asians (Chinese people) and encourage a racist perception of the pandemic. In

section 3.1, the study identifies and focuses on three terms that imply similar negative connota-

tions and can be used interchangeably: “China Virus”, “Chinese Virus”, and “Wuhan Virus”. To

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assess Trump’s active engagement with this narrative, the explanatory variable tracks his tweets

containing any of these three keywords in 2020. This measurement is case-insensitive to ensure

comprehensiveness. The response variable summarizes U.S. people’s information-seeking behaviors

on digital platforms, specifically Google and YouTube.

The study uncovers the extent to which Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric could lead the public to

adopt the xenophobic framing of COVID-19 and negative sentiment toward the Chinese. In section

3.3, two-sample t-tests suggest that Trump’s tweets that mentioned China-related information

indeed heightened the online web search trend for corresponding racist terms. One-sample t-tests

found no significant deviation in online search trends from the average patterns in weeks when

Trump blamed China for the pandemic. Furthermore, in section 4.1, the base linear regression

found that the logged Google web search trend is expected to increase by approximately 0.215

(about 14.10% of a standard deviation) in response to each additional “China Virus” tweet. As

COVID-19 cases and death rates continued to rise, more reliable and scientific information about

the pandemic was revealed to the public. Three marginal effect regressions in section 4.2 indicate

that the impact of Trump’s ‘China Virus’ rhetoric on the web search trend weakened over time.

Multivariate regression controlling for the U.S. death rate presented in 4.3 suggests a consistent

positive relationship between Google Trends and the frequency of Trump ascribing the pandemic

to China. Regression result visualization in the Conclusion session suggests that Google Trends

were likely to rise when Trump posted more than two “China Virus” rhetoric tweets in a week.

While the trend appears indicative, it may not imply strong causation due to limited observations

on the right tail.

The impact of these tweets is also significant in other multivariate regressions with different con-

trol variables. The study demonstrates that the impact of political leaders like Trump in polarizing

public opinion depends not just on the frequency but also on the timing of their communication.

Interestingly, despite the diminishing influence of the xenophobic framing, Trump did not mod-

erate his communication strategy and insisted on the “China Virus” rhetoric as shown in Figure 1.

This intriguing finding challenges the prevailing notion that Trump’s seemingly sporadic tweeting

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behavior was driven by strategic considerations and opens up new avenues for understanding his

strategic choices. The study thus invites further investigation into the reasons behind Trump’s

unwavering adherence to the “China Virus” narrative and its broader implications for political

communication and public opinion. The findings suggest that the impact of political communica-

tion on public opinion is not always linear or predictable, but rather nuanced and multifaceted. The

study underscores the need for a more critical examination of how political leaders’ communication

strategies, especially on social media, can affect public understanding and response to global crises.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Political Communication on Social Media

The rise of social media has motivated scholars to reexamine the traditional view that media, not

politicians, primarily set the public discourse agenda in liberal democracies. As early as 2012,

journalists started to rely increasingly on Twitter for generating stories and obtaining quotes from

politicians. This trend highlights that even the major news sources were drifting away from con-

ventional methods of news gathering to real-time, social media-based reporting [26].

Political communications on social media, particularly Twitter, challenge the long-held view of

limited political agenda-setting by democratic politicians [27, 28]. Riedl et al.’s study highlights the

evolution of social media influencers into opinion leaders. From lifestyle content to more substan-

tive policy discussions, influencers have engaged more deeply in political discourses. Their frequent

sharing of political opinions attracts more public attention to legislation and social problems, such

as pollution, discrimination, and inequality. Thus, new momentum is instilled in political commu-

nication; studies found it is featured by the amplification of radical ideologies alongside increased

civic engagement [29]. Social media platforms have become arenas where politicians can directly

influence public opinion, bypassing traditional media filters. This direct access to the electorate

introduces both opportunities and challenges, raising concerns about the unchecked spread of mis-

information and the lack of journalistic scrutiny.

While the factual accuracy of content may be improving, the tendency of these platforms to

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facilitate and even amplify polarized viewpoints remains a significant concern. Further analysis

by Flamino et al. finds a decrease in fake and extremely biased content on Twitter between the

2016 and 2020 US presidential elections. However, even with the improvement in information

accuracy, political discourses on Twitter continued to grapple with the increasing challenges of

echo chambers and ideological polarization [30]. The study suggests that social media platforms

are not just passive channels for information dissemination but active participants in shaping public

opinion. They could contribute to ideological silos and reinforce existing biases among users and

influencers collectively.

The rise of political communication on social media, with influencers and politicians directly

engaging with the public and setting the agenda, marks a significant shift from traditional, media-

centric discourse to a more participatory yet potentially polarized online model.

2.2 False Information, and Celebrity Influence

Recent studies have reported a consistent decline in public trust towards traditional media outlets.

This shift in public perception and news preference highly correlates with the rise of social media

as a dominant source of news [31, 32, 33, 34]. The transition to online media platforms was partic-

ularly prominent during the pandemic. As COVID-19 containment mandates, such as quarantine,

increased the use of the internet, social media platforms became key for both consuming and dis-

seminating information [35]. Despite propagated false information and conspiracy theories, these

online networks remained the primary source for many in the United States to stay updated on

COVID-19 [22, 18].

Compared to traditional media, social media offers greater accessibility and convenience. Ex-

tensive research discusses social media’s advantages over other news outlets [36, 37, 38, 39]. The

pandemic further accelerated this trend, as people adapted to online health information and com-

munication needs [40]. The New York Times reported a significant increase in social media traffic

during pandemic lockdowns [41]. In 2020, U.S. adults’ social media usage rose by 16.4%, more than

tripling the growth rate of the previous year [42].

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 Social media platforms not only supplement traditional news sources but also provide a dy-

namic environment for time-sensitive communication, where information continuously evolves. It

empowers citizen journalism and offers alternative viewpoints. However, discussions and sharing

of diverse opinions could create noise and could potentially lead to exaggerations. The quality of

information on social media doesn’t necessarily improve with its rising popularity [43]. The lack of

reliable fact-checking sped up the circulation of both truths and falsehoods. Discerning objective

facts in an endless stream of posts is increasingly challenging on social media[44, 45]. People are

often presented with content tailored to their interests: topics they are likely to agree with, as well

as those that provoke anger and prompt quick disagreement. The selective exposure frequently

amplifies extreme opinions, while simultaneously marginalizing moderate, divergent viewpoints,

thereby creating echo chambers and intensifying opinion polarization [46, 47]. A Pew Research

survey found that a significant majority of social media users regularly encounter false content [48].

Given the adverse consequences of misinformation and the cost of validating facts, people mainly

turn to a few selected “trustworthy” news sources as a rule of thumb for credible news. They

are prone to persist in a single source of information due to psychological reasons such as self-

fulfilling prophecy, despite the risk of encountering bias or only absorbing one-sided perspectives.

Therefore, it is not surprising that people often believe information from social media influencers is

more trustworthy than traditional media [49, 50]. Ironically, studies through social media mining

found the opposite: these influencers are more likely to spread misinformation than traditional

news outlets, particularly during the pandemic [51, 52, 53].

The paradox raises several critical questions: To what extent can celebrities manipulate pub-

lic opinion through negative framing on social media? And under what conditions can public

perception become immune to fabricated narratives propagated by elites?

2.3 Trump on Twitter

In exploring these questions, tactical political communication by former President Trump amid

COVID-19 is an ideal case study subject. Trump’s use of Twitter exemplifies the significant impact

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that a high-profile social media figure can have on public opinion. Trump’s adept use of social

media, especially his Twitter account @realDonaldTrump with over 86.8 million followers, allowed

him to directly communicate with his supporters and condemn his political enemies.

Trump’s tweets offer an inclusive longitudinal record for the study. With approximately 49,000

tweets by early 2020, his tweets not only garnered extensive attention but also set the agenda for

news stories. Scholars found Trump’s fame on social media had given him considerable comparative

advantage in the 2016 election campaign. Specifically, each of his tweets on average garnered

triple the attention than his opponent, Hillary Clinton’s [54]. The popularity underscored Trump’s

greater success in capturing public interest. Moreover, through strategic language use, he effectively

communicated, mobilized, solidified, and primed his political appeal. For instance, Lewandowsky

et al. found that Trump used Twitter to divert media and public attention from topics potentially

harmful to him, such as the Mueller investigation.[55]. Recent research by Pillai et al. uncovered

a positive correlation between the frequency of Trump’s repeated falsehoods during his presidency

and the misperceptions among Republicans. The impact of repetition on belief was more substantial

among individuals who consumed more right-leaning news, particularly when the falsehoods were

predominantly circulated on Twitter [56]

During Trump’s administration, Hornsey et al.’s study with over 500 U.S. adults indicated

that Trump supporters showed greater vaccine hesitancy; the sentiment could be amplified by

exposure to Trump’s anti-vaccination tweets [57]. Furthermore, an analysis of tweets containing

links to low-credibility sources between February and April 27, 2020, revealed that “Trump” was the

most frequently occurring word in these tweets’ titles, underscoring his prominence in discussions

involving low-credibility information, particularly concerning China [52].

How was Trump and anti-Chinese sentiment connected? The answer is blatant. Disregarding

recommendations from both the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC), Trump tweeted the first time adopting the “China Virus”-related terminol-

ogy on March 16, 2020. On March 17, he tweeted it once, followed by four more tweets on March 18

despite global-wide criticism. Throughout 2020, Trump tweeted 629 times with either “pandemic”,

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“covid”, or “virus”. 69 of them explicitly used “China Virus”, “Chinese Virus”, or “Wuhan Virus”

or implicitly attached the virus to the Chinese government. As a side effect of Trump’s frequent

use of xenophobic rhetoric, racist hashtags against Asians (Chinese immigrants, in particular) con-

tagiously diffused on Twitter. A study analyzing 668,597 tweets posted from March 9 to 23, 2020,

revealed that 19.7% of tweets with the hashtag #covid19 displayed anti-Asian sentiment, while the

percentage rose to 50.4% for tweets containing #chinesevirus [58, 59]. A number of racist hashtags,

such as #Kungflu, #sinophobia, #bateatingchinese, and #yellowmanfever, arose, connected, or

tagged with #Chinesevirus and #Chinavirus on Twitter [58, 60]. Trump was identified as “the

most influential actor in the #Chinavirus and #Chinesevirus Twitter network” according to sta-

tistical and big data analyses [60]. In addition to thematic analysis based on monthly or quarterly

online data, researchers have also found a positive correlation between Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric

on social media and the increase in verbal and physical attacks targeting Asian Americans in the

United States [61].

Despite these empirical findings, limited attention has been given to assessing the impact of

Trump’s social media statements on public attitudes over the course of the pandemic. My study

seeks to fill this gap by collectively and qualitatively analyzing Trump’s pandemic-related tweets

and Google aggregate search trends data(web search and YouTube search) in 2020. It aims to

provide a more comprehensive understanding of political rhetoric on social media shifting public

opinion and behavior. This research addresses how elites’ xenophobic statements on social media

can communicate negative sentiment and influence public search behavior on a large scale.

3 Method

3.1 Data

The dependent variable in this analysis is the frequency of tweets by Donald Trump containing

specific keywords assigned to designated categories. The data were collected from the Trump

Twitter Archive and recorded the weekly frequency of Trump’s tweets about the pandemic, both

with and without the use of the “China Virus” terminology. The categories include COVID-related

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tweets, general China-related tweets, China-related tweets with a negative connotation, and tweets

with xenophobic sentiment. Searching keywords and cumulative frequency of each category can be

found in the appendix table 7.3. Figure 1 presents a line chart that tracks the weekly frequency

of tweets by Donald Trump categorized into four distinct groups based on their content from 2020

to 2021. COVID-related tweets are tweets that filtered with keywords “pandemic”, “virus”, and

“COVID”. The general China Related Tweets, illustrated by the green line, and the China

Related Tweets (Negative) (with negative connotation), represented by the orange line, exhibit

some correlation with each other, both demonstrating a moderate and more consistent presence

over the weeks. The red line, which indicates the Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets, maintains

the lowest frequency among the categories but still shows some variation week to week.

Figure 1: Frequency of Trump’s Pandemic-Related Tweets

My study measures the dependent variable, how people’s perception of the pandemic changes

over time, through Google aggregate search trends of 2020. Google data has been extensively

utilized as an indicator for information-seeking patterns and prevailing concerns among large pop-

ulations in public health, economics, and journalism studies [62]. It offers unique comparative

advantages to “capture the latent, or hard to observe, interests of populations over time” [63]; from

studying interests in human rights to reaction to militant strikes Google search data also served as

a proxy for study of public opinion in political science [64, 65].

Through text analysis, Trump used “China Virus”, “Chinese Virus”, and “Wuhan Virus” for

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the same agenda: ascribing the virus to the Chinese (government). Therefore, Google search trend

data of all three “China Virus”- related terminologies is collected. Although there are several words

with a similar racist connotation, such as “kung flu” or “Wuhan flu”, Google Trends data offers

several features that guided the decision to exclude these less popular terms from the analysis.

First, Google Trends is effective for popular terms but may not accurately represent less popular

terms due to their lower search volume. Second, incorporating less popular terms into this analysis

could skew the results, giving undue importance to terms that are not truly representative of user

preference, especially being compared with the selected keywords. Meanwhile, the “Rising” tab in

Google Trends indicates terms that have shown significant growth in volume over a selected time

period. This feature is crucial for identifying emerging trends but is less effective for low-volume

terms, which might not show substantial growth compared to more popular terms [66]. Third,

among Trump’s 629 pandemic-related tweets, he used the two terms - “China virus” and “Chinese

virus”. Although he did not tweeted “Wuhan virus” as original content, he retweeted posts with the

term twice and only mentioned the city name when posted COVID-related news between March 14,

2020, and April 27, 2020. During these weeks, He explicitly endorsed xenophobic COVID framing

(“China virus” and “Chinese virus”) most frequently.

Trump relied on social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to disseminate the “China Virus”

narrative. Analyzing public response to this negative framing using Google search trend data of-

fers several distinct advantages. First, unlike traditional public opinion polls or surveys, Google

Trends captures individuals’ immediate and authentic reactions to Trump’s tweets. The algorithm

of Google Trends aggregates search data for relevant keywords at the time of query submission,

normalizes the raw data using min-max normalization, and assigns a score on a scale of 1 to 100

based on weekly search counts. This approach minimizes treatment delay and data collection lags,

thus, requiring minimal time effect adjustment. Second, Google score sets allow for additive oper-

ations across different keywords. Although Google does not provide raw search totals, each search

score set is internally normalized and generated based on relative comparisons. By aggregating

annual search trend sets of each keyword, the response variable yields a comprehensive measure of

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people’s attitude about the xenophobic “China Virus” rhetoric. Third, as Google search data is

already adjusted through min-max normalization to reveal public search interest dynamics, addi-

tional transformations of these scores for statistical inference incur lower costs compared to working

directly with raw counts.

Google Trends normalizes each search score of a keyword based on its total number of searches

in 2020, which helps in comparing relative popularity of a search query keyword over time. In the

study, annual Google Trends data for each of the selected terms - “China Virus”, “Chinese Virus”,

and “Wuhan Virus” - are collected individually. These data sets are then synthesizely analyzed

to construct an independent variable, as outlined in the equation 1. This formula is designed to

integrate three search trends and fluctuations in public interest over time, providing a quantifiable

measure of how perceptions related to the pandemic and its origins have evolved throughout the

year 2020. This approach ensures a reliable representation of the xenophobic searching behaviors

on Google and social media, particularly YouTube.

By regressing the weekly Google search trend(web search and YouTube search) against Trump’s

tweeting frequency, my study examines how and to what extent Trump’s tweets influenced people’s

perceptions of the pandemic through analyzing their searching behavior. Marginal effect regressions

in Results section identify the periods when his framing influence was most prominent.

Admittedly, Google search trend data has certain limitations. Some biases are effectively mit-

igated through data filtering and regression design. For instance, Google Trends data is not case-

sensitive. To account for this characteristic, automated filtering and text analysis of Trump’s tweets

disregard capitalization differences, minimizing the risk of type I errors. Additionally, since Google

generates search trends based on keyword containment, it is possible that a few counted queries

may not necessarily indicate xenophobia (for example, search for pandemic information in China).

Hence, China’s pandemic severity, as represented by logged weekly case changes in regression, is

controlled to avoid Type II errors in section Regression with Controls. While it is important to ac-

knowledge the potential limitation, highly unlikely would rare cases significantly distort the overall

trend. Containing either key identifier but free from racist implication, confounding search strings

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deviate from most observations by length (i.e., “China government issuing a new regulation for

coronavirus containment” can potentially contribute to one query count of “China Virus”). Among

the top 25 related queries associated with the term ’China Virus,’ the longest query consists of only

5 words, and only 1/5 of them exceed 3 words. The large size of Google raw real-time search data

helps prevent this distortion despite the absence of a direct feeling thermometer.

3.2 Assumptions

To address the challenges of limited observations and non-normally distributed data, the following

assumptions are made. First, the three keywords (“China Virus”, “Chinese Virus”, and “Wuhan

Virus”) hold equal importance in analyzing public opinion regarding the blame on the Chinese for

the pandemic. Although nuanced differences may exist, it is reasonable to assume that the general

U.S. population perceives each term similarly. The raw sum of the three search trend data captures

the general dynamic of public opinion on the “China Virus” narrative.

Second, the study assumes that a log transformation of weekly Google search data through the

equation 1 preserves the underlying pattern of people’s searching behavior. The raw Google web

and YouTube search trends are characterized by a skewed distribution. A logarithmic transforma-

tion normalizes this skewed data, creating a distribution that is more suitable for linear regression

analysis, thereby minimizing the distortion caused by outliers. Meanwhile, log transformation

linearizes these relationships, simplifying the interpretation of the regression coefficients and en-

hancing homoscedasticity. By stabilizing this variance, the log transformation ensures more reliable

regression results. Therefore, the modified data serves as the dependent variable in the regression.

The general formula is listed below:

Google Trendsi = log ((Aggregate Google Trends Scorei − min(Aggregate Google Trends) + 1))

(1)

The third assumption is that individuals who oppose these xenophobic framings always avoid

using them for searches and vice versa. Despite the absence of direct measurement for people’s

attitudes towards each keyword, all three “China Virus” terminologies explicitly express users’

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xenophobic and racist attitudes. Consequently, a higher level of public acceptance and endorsement

of the “China Virus” rhetoric corresponds to an increased value in weekly Google Trends data.

Fourth, Trump consistently propagated the “China Virus” narrative by directly adopting the

three key terms in his tweets to attack the Chinese. The collection of the dependent variable data

relies on the Trump Twitter Archive, which includes the textual content of all Trump’s tweets [67].

However, Trump may have activated racial resentment without directly using the key terms (e.g.,

retweeting a video that disseminates “China Virus” information without providing direct com-

ments). The study primarily researches the impact of Trump’s tweets by quantitatively measuring

the frequency of keyword usage in text-based online networks.

3.3 Test and Hypothesis

The first question the study investigated is whether there are salient differences between people’s

searching behavior on social media and web search engines. Google Trends data allows the research.

I collected both raw YouTube and web search trend data for the 3 keywords. Applying the same

logarithmic transformation, the two variables serve as independent variables for regression analysis.

The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.951.

Then, I performed one-sample T-tests to further investigate how people’s searching behaviors on

the two platforms would converge in response to a treatment variable – Trump’s tweets. The results

from eight one-sample t-tests indicate that there is no significant statistical difference between the

mean Google Trends scores during weeks when President Trump tweeted using the keywords and

the overall mean Google Trends scores in the dataset. This was tested across all four categories of

tweets — COVID Related, China Related, China Related (Negative), and Xenophobic Sentiment

Tweets — and two platforms: web search trends and YouTube search trends. The results of the

t-tests for the web trend show t-statistics ranging from -0.618 to 1.093 and p-values from 0.281 to

0.787. Similarly, the t-tests for the YouTube trends have t-statistics ranging from -0.905 to 0.731

and p-values from 0.376 to 0.929. None of the test statistics are statistically significant. These

findings suggest that Trump’s tweets, even those with potentially provocative keywords related

14
to China or xenophobic sentiments, did not have a significant impact on the frequency of related

Google web and YouTube searches. Measured by search trends, Trump’s influence on these specific

online behaviors was not as strong as expected. Complete test results can be found at the One-

sample T-test Results.

Eight two-sample t-tests further investigated the influence of President Trump’s tweets on search

behavior. No results exhibited a statistically significant impact on Google web or YouTube search

trends. The positive t-statistics in the t-tests for the ’China Related Tweets’ and ’China Related

Tweets (Negative)’ categories suggest a tendency for increased search activity on both web and

YouTube platforms. However, the significance of these findings is constrained by p-values exceed-

ing the significance threshold (α = 0.05). Notably, the impact of ’China Related Tweets’ on web

trends presents a p-value of 0.058, marginally surpassing the α level. Within the limited scope of a

year’s dataset, this result implies a potentially substantial effect that warrants further exploration.

Conversely, the ’COVID Related Tweets’ correlated with a marginal decrease in search trends, as

indicated by negative t-statistics; however, the difference was similarly statistically insignificant.

The lack of statistical significance underscores the complexity of attributing search behaviors di-

rectly to the influence of presidential communication. Overall, the data indicates that while there

may be observable trends, the evidence is not robust enough to assert a definitive causal relationship

between Trump’s tweeting activity and changes in Google search behaviors. Further investigation

is needed to unpack the impact of Trump’s xenophobic framing of the pandemic. Complete test

results can be found in Table 8.

It is evident that the web search behaviors of individuals on the search engine Google and

the social media platform YouTube display strikingly parallel patterns. This is not only substan-

tiated by the high statistical correlation coefficient of 0.951 between the two Google Trends but

also by the consistent nature of responses to elite influences across both platforms. Despite the

lack of statistically significant impact from the tweet categories analyzed, the near-significant p-

values observed, particularly in relation to China Related Tweets on web search and YouTube

(p-value = 0.060) trends. The homogeneity in the reaction to Trump’s tweets on both Google

15
and YouTube underscores the pervasive reach of elite communication in shaping public search

behavior. The convergence in response patterns highlights the consistent information consump-

tion preference across digital platforms. Therefore, later models primarily focus on web trend as

the response variable. Complete regression codes with both dependent variables can be found in

https://github.com/jinwenwu-57/writing_sample/tree/main/regression.

4 Results

4.1 Basic Regression

The variable China Related Tweets (Negative) serves as the primary independent variable to quan-

tify the frequency of President Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric. By quantifying the frequency of

Trump’s tweets mentioning terms like “China virus”, “Chinese virus”, and related phrases, the

variable captures his negative framing against China. Although the Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets

category is a more precise measure, the three selected keywords resulted in a very small sample size.

China Related Tweets variable counts how many times China-related information was mentioned

when Trump tweeted about COVID-19, so it is too broad to study the topic of interest -The impact

of Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric on public attitudes. The selected category is a middle ground

between China Related Tweets and Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets. For simplicity, the category

China Related Tweets (Negative) is also denoted as “China Virus” tweets in the later part of the

analysis.

This operationalization directly aligns with the research question which seeks to explore whether

Trump’s rhetoric influences public sentiment. This measure offers a quantifiable link to potential

shifts in public sentiment and search behavior. The basic regression model employed an OLS

(Ordinary Least Squares) linear regression without controls. The single variable regression posits

a direct relationship:

Google Trends(web) = β0 + β1 × Trump’s “China Virus” Rhetoric Tweets + ϵ

As shown in Figure 2 above, there is a clear positive correlation between Trump’s “China

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 Figure 2: Regression of Web Trend on Trumpś “China Virus” Rhetoric Tweets

Virus” rhetoric, as measured by the frequency of specific terms in his tweets, and the intensity

of web searches related to this topic each week. The confidence interval widens as the number

of China Related Tweets (Negative) increases, which implies that predictions for higher counts of

tweets are less precise than for lower counts. This is typical in regression analysis, especially if

the range of the independent variable is extended beyond the observed data. A similar significant

correlation pattern was also found in the regression of using YouTube search trend data as the

dependent variable as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Regression of Web and YouTube Trend on Trumpś “China Virus” Rhetoric Tweets

Basic Regression Result shows a positive coefficient for China Related Tweets (Negative) (coef

= 0.215), with a standard error of 0.096. The t-value of 2.248 indicates that this coefficient is

statistically significant at the 0.029 level. An increase in the weekly count of Trump’s China-

related tweets is associated with 14.10% of its standard deviation increase in the web search trend

score. There is less than a 3% probability that this effect is due to chance.

17
 Trump’s China-related tweets could have a considerable influence on web search behaviors,

potentially leading to an increase in searches that reflect a xenophobic sentiment. This provides

some empirical support for the study’s hypothesis that Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric could incite

public xenophobia or even racist attitudes, which ties back to the surge in hate crimes against

Asians in 2020. In the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, the high p-value (0.771) suggests

that the linear model is homoscedastic. However, there are limitations to this analysis. The modest

R-squared value suggests that the model explains only a small portion of the variation in web search

trends. Note, the significant Omnibus and Jarque-Bera tests, along with the skewness, indicate

that the regression model violates the normality assumption. By introducing controls, the problem

is mitigated.

4.2 Marginal Effects of Regression

The study performed three marginal effects analyses, interacting Trump’s “China Virus” tweets

with time, and newly reported deaths from COVID-19 reported each week in the U.S. and China.

The pandemic infection data is built upon CSSEGISandData COVID-19 public archive provided

by Johns Hopkins University on GitHub [68].

The first regression model is formulated as:

Google Trends(web) = β0 +β1 ×Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets +β2 ×Week+β3 ×Interaction Term+ϵ

• Interaction Term is the product of the Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets and Week, capturing

the changing effect of tweets over time.

As Figure 4 demonstrates, Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric was strongly associated with in-

creased web search activity at the beginning of 2020. However, as weeks pass, this effect diminishes.

The crossing of the zero line is significant as it marks the point where the influence of the tweets

transitions from positive to potentially negative or has no effect at all. During the early weeks, the

lower bound of the confidence interval remained above zero. The pattern implies that the positive

marginal impact of the tweets was statistically significant. However, as the weeks progress, the con-

fidence interval widens and encompasses the zero line, indicating a lack of statistical significance

18
 Figure 4: Changing Marginal Impact of Trump’s “China Virus” Rhetoric Tweets Over Time

for the later periods. This could be due to various factors, such as changes in public interest, the

evolving nature of the pandemic, or other external influences not accounted for in the model.

To unpack potential contributors to the trend, the next two interaction models explore how

the weekly change in newly reported deaths from COVID-19 in the U.S. and China could under-

mine(strengthen) Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric on social media. The models are:

Google Trends(web) = β0 + β1 × Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets

+ β2 × COVID-19 Death Changes + β3 × Interaction Term + ϵ

• Interaction Term is the product of the Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets and COVID-19 Death Changes,

capturing the newly reported deaths from COVID-19 each week in China(United States).

As the number of new COVID-19 deaths reported in China each week increases, the marginal

impact on web trends rises. The upward slope indicates a positive relationship between deaths

in China and the influence of Trump’s tweets on web search trends. The rising death toll could

have amplified the attention and concern about the pandemic spreading in China - coinciding with

the increased web searches as Trump’s tweets highlighted the issue. The severity could also imply

that the Chinese government did not do well in containing the virus. Consequently, people would

suspect that travelers and immigrants from China to the U.S. were more likely to carry the virus.

Thus, Trump’s tweets -attributing COVID-19 to China- could have gained more popularity.

19
Figure 5: Changing Marginal Impact of Trump’s “China Virus” Rhetoric Tweets by Death Changes

Contrarily, the increasing COVID-19 death toll in the United States triggered a different re-

sponse; Trump’s tweets may have been overshadowed by the local severity of the pandemic or

been perceived as less relevant in the face of increasing domestic deaths. Over time, the US audi-

ence might have become desensitized to the repeated racist and xenophobic messaging in Trump’s

tweets. The two models highlight that the marginal impact of political rhetoric on public behavior

is complex and can vary significantly depending on the context and ongoing events. It is important

to consider local and international factors when assessing the influence of political communication

on public sentiment and behavior.

4.3 Regression with Controls

Based on the marginal effect analyses, the newly reported death from COVID-19 in both the U.S.

and China each week could affect the influence of Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric over people’s

information-seeking behaviors online. To further examine the main effect, regressions in the section

include several controls: U.S. and China pandemic severity, represented by the logged weekly

infection case change.

An increase in newly reported deaths from COVID-19 in the United States can decrease Google

web search trends of the “China Virus” rhetoric. As the crisis hit closer to home, public attention

pivoted from geopolitical blame and a plausible origin of the virus to more pressing domestic issues

20
such as local healthcare capacity, community safety measures, the availability of medical resources,

etc. The refocusing of priorities could result in a decrease in public engagement with the politicized

narrative of COVID-19, the “China Virus”. On the other hand, the escalation in U.S. weekly

COVID-19 deaths could act as a catalyst for President Trump to amplify his use of the “China

Virus” framing in his tweets. This rhetorical strategy could deflect criticism of the handling of the

pandemic domestically by targeting China as a foreign threat and the source to blame.

If the newly reported COVID-19 deaths surged in China, Trump would have grounds to intensify

his “China Virus” rhetoric. He could more effectively foster the narrative that aligns with his

political strategy(prime foreign threats and prevail xenophobia in the society to spark a rally-

around-flag effect, for example). Google web search trends relating to the “China Virus” rhetoric

could also go up due to heightened global vigilance. People seek to understand the trajectory

and scale of the outbreak - its current impact in China and implications for the rest of the world.

Consequently, the search trends of the “China Virus” keyword, a narrative that emphasized the

geographic feature of the virus, could go up as general searches about the pandemic increased.

Moreover, Trump’s public approval rating is another important confounding variable to consider.

A decline in Trump’s approval rating could prompt him to tweet with the “China Virus” framing

more frequently. The tactical communication could divert public attention from the inefficiency of

the domestic healthcare system and channel it towards external factors - the geographic origin of

the virus. By that, Trump potentially consolidated his base by reinforcing nationalistic sentiments.

Conversely, when approval ratings rise up, the electorate’s endorsement of Trump may concurrently

bolster the resonance of his messaging. As supporters were inclined to align with his viewpoints,

they would adopt the “China Virus” terminology in their online discourse and queries, pushing up

the dependent variable. Motivated by the potential causal relationships linking to the dependent

and independent variables, the study collects the weekly average of voters’ approval ratings for

Trump from the FiveThirtyEight opinion poll [69].

In summary, each of the three variables, Trump’s approval ratings, and deaths from COVID-19

in the U.S. and China can impact both the regressors and regressands. They are included as controls

21
in the regression of Google Trend(web) on Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric tweets. To quantify

the relevance, the results of single variate regression with each of the controls as the independent

variable is reported in Regression Models of the Confounders.

The Summary of Regression Models reveal a consistent positive and significant relationship

between the frequency of Trump’s “China Virus” tweets and the activity on Google Trends(web).

This relationship confirms that as Trump increasingly used the “China Virus” rhetoric in his tweets,

there was a corresponding rise in web searches of related keywords. The persistence of this positive

coefficient across all models underscores the strength and stability of Trump’s public influence.

Detailed results with test statistics of each regression can be found in the Appendix.

Model 1 (Weekly US COVID-19 Death Changes as a Control Variable) meets most linear

regression requirements and hence provides the most reliable coefficients. The observed relationship

is less likely to be due to model specification errors or violations of regression assumptions. The

coefficient of the main variable of interest (0.185) reflects a genuine pattern in the data. Compared

with the basic regression, including the control decreases the relationship between the variables of

interest. Each Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric tweet increased Google Trends(web) score of relevant

keywords by approximately 12.2% of its standard deviation. Trump’s use of the xenophobic framing

- ascribing COVID-19 to China has a modest but non-negligible impact on how frequently these

terms are searched for on Google. The result reaffirm his public influence on social media during

2020 despite the pandemic challenged the public trust in the government. The regression model is

visualized in 6;

Based on the Omnibus and Jarque-Bera tests fail to reject that the model’s residuals are nor-

mally distributed. The BP Test (p-value = 0.120) suggests that there is no strong evidence of

heteroscedasticity. However, the model may suffer from some positive autocorrelation in the resid-

uals (as shown by the Durbin-Watson statistic). The skewness and kurtosis values suggest a slight

right skew and lighter tails than a normal distribution. Compared with the basic model R-squared

value being 0.092, the R-squared value has increased substantially. The model explains 23.5% of

the variability in Google Trends(web).

22
 Model 2 extends Model 1 by also including Weekly China COVID-19 Death Changes as a Control

Variable. The R-squared suggests that the model explains approximately 36.7% of the variability

in Google Trends(web). Although including a new control substantially improved the previous

model, Model 2 suffers from greater specification error as shown by the Omnibus and Jarque-Bera

tests. Model 3 controls for All discussed confounding variables and offers a comprehensive view by

accounting for the most potential external influences. As both shown in the Model 3 of Summary of

Regression Models and the results in Regression Models of the Confounders, approval ratings had

limited impact on shaping the relationship between Trump’s “China Virus” narrative and people’s

information-seeking behavior online.

Table 1: Summary of Regression Models

Basic Regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Intercept 1.9227*** 2.6870*** 2.3743*** -6.7814

(0.240) (0.336) (0.324) (5.404)

Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets 0.2148** 0.1852** 0.1887** 0.1754**

(0.096) (0.089) (0.082) (0.081)

COVID-19 Death Changes (U.S.) -0.0001*** -9.669e-05*** -0.0001***

(3.68e-05) (3.42e-05) (3.39e-05)

COVID-19 Death Changes (China) 0.0023*** 0.0020***

(0.001) (0.001)

Trump’s Approval Ratings 0.2124

(0.142)

Observations 52 52 52 52

R-squared 0.092 0.235 0.367 0.395

Adj. R-squared 0.074 0.204 0.327 0.344

F-statistic 5.052 7.533 9.263 7.694

Prob (F-statistic) 0.0290 0.00140 6.09e-05 7.54e-05

23
5 Discussion

This study offers critical insights into the intersection of political rhetoric, public sentiment, and

digital information-seeking behavior, with a particular focus on how national political leaders com-

municate international crises. By examining the correlation between former President Trump’s

use of the term ”China Virus” and the subsequent increase in related web searches, our findings

underscore the powerful role that political elites can play in shaping discourse not only within their

own countries but also on a global scale. This influence extends beyond immediate public health

concerns to touch upon broader issues of international relations and cross-cultural understanding.

Various rhetoric employed by political leaders, especially during crises, can have profound impli-

cations for international relations. Terms like ”China Virus” not only frame public understanding

of global events but also influence the tone of international discourse. Such language can exacer-

bate tensions between countries, affect diplomatic relations, and contribute to a broader climate

of xenophobia and racism. This study’s findings highlight the need for careful consideration of

political communication’s impact on international affairs, particularly in how it may shape global

perceptions and interactions during pivotal moments.

One of the primary limitations of this study lies in its reliance on publicly available web search

data of certain keywords, which may not fully capture the breadth of public sentiment or political

rhetoric. The ”China Virus” rhetoric search frequency offers a quantifiable measure but may

overlook the complexity of discourse dynamics, including the tone, context, and reception of such

messages across different cultures and communities. Additionally, web search trends only serve as a

proxy for public interest. The study assumes a direct link between search behavior and sentiment,

which may not account for searches driven by curiosity, counter-narratives, or information-seeking

beyond the xenophobic implications.

The analytical model, primarily multiple OLS regressions, provides valuable insights into the

correlation between Trump’s rhetoric and web search behavior. However, this approach may not

fully account for confounding variables that influence international public opinion, such as media

coverage, governmental responses, and other concurrent global events. The absence of controls for

24
such factors may lead to an overestimation or underestimation of the rhetoric’s impact. Moreover,

the model’s assumption of homoscedasticity and normality in residuals may not hold in the complex

landscape of international discourse, where reactions can be highly variable and influenced by

diverse cultural and social contexts.

The analysis reveals a temporal decrease in the impact of Trump’s ”China Virus” rhetoric on

web search behavior, suggesting an evolving public discourse. This evolution points to the dynamic

nature of international public opinion, which, while initially susceptible to political narratives, may

shift towards a more nuanced understanding of global events. This shift underscores the resilience

of the public sphere to political influence over time and highlights the potential for scientific and

factual narratives to regain prominence in international discourse.

The study’s findings have significant implications for cross-cultural understanding and interna-

tional cooperation. The initial surge in xenophobic searches triggered by political rhetoric demon-

strates how easily public sentiment can be swayed toward division and mistrust. However, the

observed temporal decline in this effect offers hope for the ability of international communities

to move beyond divisive narratives. It emphasizes the importance of fostering a global discourse

grounded in mutual respect, understanding, and shared challenges, particularly in the face of global

crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Future research could benefit from a more diversified data collection approach, incorporating

multilingual social media analysis, international news coverage, and survey data on public attitudes

from multiple countries. This would allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the global

impact of political rhetoric on international relations and cross-cultural understanding. Employing

advanced analytics, such as sentiment analysis and network analysis, could also provide deeper

insights into the tone and spread of political narratives across different regions and social networks.

Adopting a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative analysis with qualitative as-

sessments of political rhetoric’s content and context could enrich the understanding of its interna-

tional implications. Integrating time-series analysis or panel data models could also help in captur-

ing the dynamic nature of public sentiment and its evolution over time. Furthermore, employing

25
causal inference techniques, such as instrumental variables or difference-in-differences models, could

strengthen claims regarding the impact of political rhetoric on international relations and public

sentiment.

6 Conclusion

The study delineates interconnections between the frequency of former President Trump’s “China

Virus” tweets and subsequent web search behaviors online. Regression analyses indicate a consistent

positive correlation: an increase in tweet frequency correlates with heightened online search activity

for related terms. Interestingly, the impact of Trump’s xenophobic framing decreased over time.

This attenuation points to the fluidity of political influence on public consciousness, highlighting a

potential shift toward scientific narratives during the pandemic progression. The pattern suggests

a complex interplay between political messaging and public focus that changes in response to the

unfolding pandemic and increased dissemination of scientific information. Below is the visualization

of Model 1 without outliers (observations more than two standard deviations from the mean). It

presents a shared positive correlation and general pattern: Google Trends rose whenever Trump

published more than two tweets employing the “China Virus” rhetoric in a given week in 2020.

Figure 6: Visualization: Regression with U.S. COVID-19 Death Change Controlled

The study highlights the power of political figures to shape public discourse and potentially

sway opinion through strategic communication. Focusing on social media networks and online

26
information-seeking behavior, the study finds that Trump’s “China Virus” rhetoric encouraged

xenophobic sentiments, as evidenced by Google Trends data. Lastly, the diminishing impact over

time suggests a possible public recalibration to more informed views as scientific understanding of

the pandemic grows, reflecting a resilience against Trump’s sustained political narratives. Repeated

exposure to xenophobic messages often results in desensitization. In such cases, the decrease in

public responsiveness may not necessarily be due to disagreement, but rather due to a growing sense

of indifference. This change underscores the complexity of public reaction to sustained political

communication, particularly in a prolonged crisis context.

This study aims to contribute to the broader discourse on the intersection of political communi-

cation, public sentiment, and social media dynamics. Future research could explore the long-term

effects of political rhetoric on public attitudes beyond the immediacy of social media reactions.

It would also be beneficial to investigate the psychological mechanisms by which public opinion

becomes immune to repeated political messaging. Understanding these dynamics is essential for

developing strategies to mitigate the negative impacts of politicized communication on society.

27
7 Appendix

7.1 Regression Results

7.1.1 Regression Models of the Confounders

Table 2: Regression Models of the Confounders

Confounder 1 Confounder 2 Confounder 3

Intercept -10.7537 2.9872*** 1.9696***

(7.241) (0.313) (0.208)

Trump’s Approval Ratings 0.2983

(0.167)

COVID-19 Death Changes (U.S.) -0.0001***

(3.78e-05 )

COVID-19 Death Changes (China) 0.0025***

(0.001)

Observations 52 52 52

R-squared 0.060 0.168 0.170

Adj. R-squared 0.041 0.151 0.153

F-statistic 3.206 10.08 10.21

Prob (F-statistic) 0.0794 0.00257 0.00242

28
7.1.2 Basic Regression Result

OLS Regression Results

Dep. Variable: web trend

Method: Least Squares

No. Observations: 52

Covariance Type: nonrobust

R-squared: 0.092

Adj. R-squared: 0.074

F-statistic: 5.052

Prob (F-statistic): 0.0290

Log-Likelihood: -92.675

Variable coef std err t P> |t| [0.025, 0.975]

Intercept 1.9227 0.240 8.022 0.000 [1.441, 2.404]

Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets 0.2148 0.096 2.248 0.029 [0.023, 0.407]

Omnibus: 5.316 Durbin-Watson: 0.351

Prob(Omnibus): 0.070 Jarque-Bera (JB): 5.043

Skew: 0.705 Prob(JB): 0.0803

Kurtosis: 2.416 Cond. No.: 3.10

Table 3: Basic OLS Regression Results for Web Trend Analysis

29
7.1.3 Regressions with Controls Result

OLS Model 1

Dep. Variable: web trend

Method: Least Squares

No. Observations: 52

Covariance Type: nonrobust

R-squared: 0.235

Adj. R-squared: 0.204

F-statistic: 7.533

Prob (F-statistic): 0.0140

Log-Likelihood: -88.207

AIC: 182.4

BIC: 188.3

Variable coef std err t P> |t| [0.025, 0.975]

Intercept 2.6870 0.336 7.995 0.000 [3.362, 2.012]

Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets 0.1852 0.089 2.078 0.043 [0.006, 0.364]

COVID-19 Death Changes (U.S.) -0.0001 3.68e-05 -3.031 0.004 [-0.000, -3.76e-05]

Omnibus: 3.808 Durbin-Watson: 0.401

Prob(Omnibus): 0.149 Jarque-Bera (JB): 2.598

Skew: 0.372 Prob(JB): 0.273

Kurtosis: 2.196 Cond. No.: 1.49e+04

Table 4: OLS Regression with U.S. COVID-19 Death Change Controlled

30
 OLS Model 2

Dep. Variable: web trend

Method: Least Squares

No. Observations: 52

Covariance Type: nonrobust

R-squared: 0.367

Adj. R-squared: 0.327

F-statistic: 9.263

Prob (F-statistic): 6.09e-05

Log-Likelihood: -83.302

AIC: 174.6

BIC: 182.4

Variable coef std err t P> |t| [0.025, 0.975]

Intercept 2.3743 0.324 7.318 0.000 [1.722, 3.027]

Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets 0.1887 0.082 2.302 0.026 [0.024, 0.353]

COVID-19 Death Changes (U.S.) -9.669e-05 3.42e-05 -2.831 0.007 [-0.000, -2.8e-05]

COVID-19 Death Changes (China) 0.0023 0.001 3.157 0.003 [0.001, 0.004]

Omnibus: 4.949 Durbin-Watson: 0.786

Prob(Omnibus): 0.084 Jarque-Bera (JB): 4.474

Skew: 0.718 Prob(JB): 0.107

Kurtosis: 3.012 Cond. No.: 1.56e+04

Table 5: Regression with U.S. and China COVID-19 Death Change Controlled

31
 OLS Model 3

Dep. Variable: web trend

Method: Least Squares

No. Observations: 52

Covariance Type: nonrobust

R-squared: 0.395

Adj. R-squared: 0.344

F-statistic: 7.684

Prob (F-statistic): 7.54e-05

Log-Likelihood: -82.096

AIC: 174.2

BIC: 183.9

Variable coef std err t P> |t| [0.025, 0.975]

Intercept -6.7814 6.137 -1.105 0.275 [-19.128, 5.565]

Trump’s “China Virus” Tweets 0.1754 0.081 2.154 0.036 [0.012, 0.339]

COVID-19 Death Changes (U.S.) -0.0001 3.39e-05 -3.002 0.004 [-0.000, -3.36e-05]

COVID-19 Death Changes (China) 0.0020 0.001 2.798 0.007 [0.001, 0.003]

Trump’s Approval Ratings 0.2124 0.142 1.494 0.142 [-0.074, 0.498]

Omnibus: 1.619 Durbin-Watson: 0.777

Prob(Omnibus): 0.445 Jarque-Bera (JB): 1.391

Skew: 0.395 Prob(JB): 0.499

Kurtosis: 2.865 Cond. No.: 2.98e+05

Table 6: OLS Regression Results with All Controls

32
7.2 T-Test Results

7.2.1 One-sample T-test Results

Tweet Type Dependent Variable T-statistic P-value

China Related Tweets Google Trends (Web) 0.873 0.390

Google Trends (YouTube) 0.570 0.574

China Related Tweets (Negative) Google Trends (Web) 1.094 0.282

Google Trends (YouTube) 0.732 0.469

COVID Related Tweets Google Trends (Web) -0.271 0.788

Google Trends (YouTube) -0.089 0.929

Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets Google Trends (Web) -0.618 0.543

Google Trends (YouTube) -0.905 0.376

Table 7: One-sample T-test Results

7.2.2 Two-sample T-test Results

Independent Variable Dependent Variable T-statistic P-value

China Related Tweets Google Trends (Web) 1.376 0.175

Google Trends (YouTube) 1.453 0.152

China Related Tweets (Negative) Google Trends (Web) 1.960 0.058

Google Trends (YouTube) 1.945 0.060

COVID Related Tweets Google Trends (Web) -0.580 0.584

Google Trends (YouTube) -0.182 0.862

Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets Google Trends (Web) -0.778 0.441

Google Trends (YouTube) -0.631 0.531

Table 8: Two-sample T-test Results for Impact of Trump’s Tweets on Google Trends

33
7.3 Regression Code

Type Frequency Keywords (Case Insensitive)

COVID Related Tweets 629 “virus”, “pandemic”, “covid”

China Related Tweets 112 “china”, “chinese”, “wuhan”, “beijing”, “ccp”,

“xi”, “communist”, “prc”, “communism”

China Related Tweets(Negative) 69 “china virus”, “chinese virus”, “wuhan”, “bei-

jing”, “ccp”, “xi”, “communist”, “prc”, “com-

munism”

Xenophobic Sentiment Tweets 46 “china virus”, “chinese virus”, “wuhan”

Table 9: Frequency and Keywords of Different Tweet Types

Regression Code Google Trends Data Source

china virus U.S. Web Search of 2020 with Keyword “China Virus”

chinese virus U.S. Web Search of 2020 with Keyword “Chinese Virus”

wuhan virus U.S. Web Search of 2020 with Keyword “Wuhan Virus”

china virus youtube U.S. YouTube Search of 2020 with Keyword “China Virus”

chinese virus youtube U.S. YouTube Search of 2020 with Keyword “Chinese Virus”

wuhan virus youtube U.S. YouTube Search of 2020 with Keyword “Wuhan Virus”

Table 10: Google Trends Search Keywords with Regression Code

7.4 Dependent Variable Formulas

web trend = log(china virus + chinese virus + wuhan virus

− min(china virus + chinese virus + wuhan virus) + 1) (2)

youtube trend = log(china virus youtube + chinese virus youtube + wuhan virus youtube

− min(china virus youtube + chinese virus youtube + wuhan virus youtube) + 1) (3)

34
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