British ORBAT and tactics

British Army Doctrine in the 1980s relied on two pillars. The first was the initiative of its junior
commanders and the second was the extensive use of ground to gain a tactical advantage.

Strategic Picture

The British Army of the Rhine's (BAOR'S) strategic plan is now well-known. One division
was to act as a screen, delaying the Russian advance and identifying the main axis of
advance. It would probably be effectively destroyed over several days of intense combat.

Behind it one division would cover the Northern sector, and one division the Southern
sector. Their aim was to bring the attack to a halt, so that the fourth British division could
then counter-attack the flank of the attack. The fifth division was the artillery division in
support.

The Territorial Army (TA) infantry units served as reinforcements and would have been
divided up into company sized packets, to be used for rear area security or perhaps as the
rear guard during a retreat. (Basically, you leave a dug in infantry company on the enemy
route of advance. The defence would be bolstered by FV 432 Swingfire Milan missiles who
would fire until the enemy attack closed with the defending infantry and would then retreat,
leaving the infantry to their fate.)

During the 1950's to the 1970's, the NATO plan was to hold the overwhelming power of the
Russians long enough to ensure negotiations stopped the war before a strategic nuclear
exchange started. However, in the late 1970's the balance of power shifted. At sea, NATO
would have defeated the Russians easily. In the air, Western technology and training meant
that nearly all analysts on both sides projected NATO gaining air superiority within 1 to 2
weeks. On the ground, the slow build-up of ground forces since the 1950's meant
that NATO was at last able to stand a chance of stopping a Russian advance somewhere in
Germany. Realistically. 1989 was the last year the Warsaw Pact could have launched
an invasion. For what it is worth, this author's opinion is that the attack in 1989 would have
been decisively defeated within 3-4 weeks by NATO.

The much-feared surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact was a little bit of fantasy. The Warsaw
Pact divisions in Germany had war stocks for perhaps one day's worth of combat. It would
not have been politically sensible to leave Warsaw Pact allies with huge amounts of
munitions. As a Russian Tank Division would require 1073 tons on the offensive per
day, a Rifle Division 1223 tons, the Russians would have required a massive logistic buildup
of 100,000s of tons of fuel and ammunition if they were to sustain the advance into Europe
(Dunnigan J.F. 1982, How to Make War). This would involve 1,000+ fully laden trains
carrying supplies, men and vehicles arriving in East Germany daily.

Because both sides had military observers (BRIXMAS) Who could drive around Germany,
this build-up could not have gone unnoticed. If these observers disappeared, it would have
been the clearest of signals to NATO that war was imminent and they should mobilise, 48
hours was the minimum notice for an attack and realistically, at least a week’s build up would
have been necessary to give the Russians a sound logistical chance. (See Geraghty T.,
1997, BRIXMAS, Harper Collins)
ORBAT

In combat, the peacetime administrative idea of a company or battalion was replaced by the
concept of the all-arms formations. These were Combat Teams (CT) and Battle Groups
(BG).

The mix of vehicles in these unils depended upon the mission assigned to them. For
example, a ‘typical’ CT might contain:

• Two infantry platoons (4 FV 432's in each, 3 infantry sections + command section)

• Two tank troops (3 Chieftains each)
• A pair of Scimitar recce vehicles (light tanks)
• Infantry CT HQ 1 FV 432 or
• Armour CT HQ 3 Chieftains
• FV 432 with a Forward Observation Officer for artillery support
• Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile team in a Spartan
• FV 432 Ambulance
• Light Aid Detachment either Armour CT Chieftain ARV or a FV434
And two FV 432 ARV and one FV432

Various anti-tank teams might be attached, for example a pair of Swingfire vehicles with
Milan launchers

BG were composed of a number of CTs, for example an infantry heavy CT would have had 3
infantry CTs in it and 1 armour CT.

A number of BG's were grouped into Brigades (called a Task Force or Field Force until
1980). Brigades were grouped into divisions.

The British army had lorry borne infantry (e.g, TA) for key point defence, bridge guards or
other rear area security operations. These could have been supported by troops (platoons)
of Scorpion light tanks.

The system above was very flexible which could be a useful force multiplier, such as taking
advantage of sudden opportunities, but it also meant that units were not always composed of
troops who had trained together. It also included a larger proportion of mechanical support
that Russian armies, this was to keep the maximum amount of Britain's limited forces mobile
in the field.
Defence

There are two types of defence; hasty and deliberate. Hasty is where the enemy are
encountered at short notice and there is no time to dig in, lay obstacles or make other field
defences.

To understand the deliberate defence, it is important to know the principles upon which it
was based. The principles of defence came out of extensive historical studies, starting with
the German methods at the end of World War II.

Depth Positions should be deeper than they are wide. This is very important for meeting
Russian-type echelon attacks, as the succeeding waves find they hit new defensive
positions. The British had a greater emphasis on depth than other
NATO armies.

The ideal situation would be one, that whenever an attack took a position, it would
immediately be under fire from the next position in depth.

Mutual Support Each position should be able to cover the front of adjacent positions with
fire.So an assault penetrating a flanking position would then come under fire from the either
side. Neighbouring units would coordinate arcs of fire and counter-attack plans.

All Round Defence During World War II entire armies collapsed when attacked from an
unexpected direction. The aim of all round defence is to be prepared to fight whichever
direction the enemy come from.

Concealment The enemy will not be able to fire effectively at what they cannot see.
Therefore, the British army emphasized the ability to blend into the landscape. This also
included aggressive measures to stop the enemy scouts seeing what is going on. Basically,
the whole BAOR hide in the woods, urban areas or behind hills.

The 'Typical' Defence

The CT commander would place recce elements forward observation posts to provide
advance notice of the enemy movements. If available, pairs of snipers were put to the front.
They could snipe at passing recce elements and force armoured vehicles to button up.
Scimitar recce vehicle crews often dismount to observe the enemy. The recce would
be expected to open fire on the enemy for several rounds, then retreat behind the nearest
feature of terrain (ideally a ridge).

The CT tanks started on the reverse slope of hills or ridges,but would edge forward to find
hull down positions with maximum fields of fire. While the enemy were at range, the tanks
would jockey' which was firing 1 or 2 rounds from one position, then moving to the next fire
position. The tanks normally stayed in "hides', concealed positions such as in woods or farm
buildings until just before the battle started. This was in contrast to many armies where the
vehicles stayed in the positions they intended to fight from.

The infantry would dig in, normally on a reverse slope. They were normally sited 300-400
metres from the crest to be at the optimum range for their weapons. Soviet tanks would have
been vulnerable when crossing the crest, being silhouetted. They would be surprised by the
infantry and the delay as each vehicle in the wave crossed over the crest would also have
given the infantry vital seconds to concentrate fire on those first vehicles over the crest.
Soviet tanks, due to their relatively low silhouette, found it difficult to depress their guns at
entrenched enemy forces that were downhill (as seen in Afghanistan). The concealment
offered by the hill would limit the accuracy of Soviet pre-assault artillery bombardment.
The Forward Observation Officer (FOO) would have setup pre-planned fire missions on
likely areas of attack. These would be triggered by simple code phrases. There would also
be Final Protective Fire (FPF) that would be aimed just in front of the friendly positions or
even on it. Gun batteries that were not firing on other tasks, always shifted their aim back to
the arranged FPF coordinates, so that if a position was surprised, supporting fire can be on
its way within 30 seconds of the radio call for a fire mission.

Minefields would be laid to help channel the enemy into 'killing zones'. Killing Zones were
areas where the enemy was forced to move through due to urban areas, rivers, steep
slopes, thick woods etc... The aim was to bring every available anti-tank weapon to bear on
the enemy within these areas.

Commanders would have expected to improvise. Given time they would have cratered
roads, pulled down trees, laid barbed wire, set up booby traps or anything else they could
think of to slow the enemy down.

One area of doctrine that was not clear was the role of the tanks if the Russian attack was
not stopped at a distance. Perhaps it would have been demotivating to discuss with tanks
crews what to do if they failed to stop the enemy. Clearly, it would have been foolish to stay
until the Soviet tanks closed to ranges where the British tanks armour would no longer give
them an advantage. One option would have been to fall back from the infantry position 1-
2km and fire on any Russian vehicles emerging from the battle around the infantry trenches.

The British View was that the FV432's were not well enough armed to fight in the battle.
Therefore, they would drop the infantry off and they move back into a Zulu muster point to
await the retreating infantry if necessary.
Attack

There are two main types of attack; an advance to contact and a deliberate attack. The
advance to contact was moving forward into an enemy held territory where opposition was
expected, but there was uncertainty about its location and strength. A deliberate attack was
a well-planned, heavily supported assault on a pre-defined location and enemy force.

In advance to contact, one of the CTs was nominated as point for the BG. The normal
formation was arrowhead with the rest of the is one tactical bound behind (as in far enough
behind that they could not be engaged at the same time as the point CT)

Once contact was made the BG commander made a military appreciation of the enemy
strength. If the enemy was minor, the lead CT would attempt to overrun the enemy. If the
enemy was too strong, then the rest of the battle group would be used.

One or two of the lead CTs tank troops would form a fire base and put down maximum fire
on the enemy. The designated assault group would move to an assembly area in dead
around (ground that is hidden from the enemy such as behind a hill wood or a town). Hasty
orders would be given and then the assault would be launched. The assault could be
launched from the front, flanks or even the rear in training the flanks were the most favoured
option, but in war a frontal assault was found to have its advantages. Trying to turn the flank
was found to lead to becoming engaged by the enemy units covering the enemy flank (just
as British units are mutually supporting). In addition, if armoured vehicles attack from the
flank, they were potentially exposing their own weaker flank or rear to the enemy.

The fire base would aim to ‘win the firefight' by laying down sufficient accurate fire to force
the defenders to take cover and not return effective fire.

The assault would then close with the defenders using 'fire and movement'. Elements of the
assault would take it in turn to move, with part of the force always having one foot on the
ground. This meant that someone was always firing at the enemy from a stationary position.

There was no definitive doctrine for when the armoured infantry should dismount from their
FV 432's. Some commanders wanted the infantry out and firing as early as possible,
exposing them to artillery fire, but keeping the vulnerable FV 432's back from the battle.
Others wanted the FV432's to drive over the top of the nearest enemy trench to neutralise it
and dismount the infantry directly onto the enemy. It would have been a judgement call for
the individual commanders. If the defenders were still firing, moving up the FV 432's could
lead to volleys of RPG's destroying the FV 432's (and the infantry inside).

The infantry would ‘fight through’ the position, grenading each position, checking each
stationary enemy vehicle was empty. Doctrine stated that units should reorganise several
hundred meters beyond the enemy position to avoid the defender's artillery firing at the
position. However, umpires on exercises in BAOR despaired at times trying to encourage
the infantry to expend the necessary physical effort to carry on fire and movement for
several hundred more metres past the enemy line.

During World War II, the Germans mastered the art to the counter-attack. As soon as a
position had been lost, German policy was to rally whoever was nearest and counter-attack
as rapidly as possible. The Germans realised that a successful attack was very vulnerable
immediately it had succeeded. The attackers had normally used nearly all their ammunition,
they were disorganised by the battle and mentally they start to switch off. Based on the
success of the German policy of counter-attacking in World War II, the British training was to
counter-attack at any level, if the opportunity arose.
Conclusions

The British tactics relied on the Chieftain tank's outgunning the enemy and on the individual
superiority of the soldiers in its army, Flexibility, as described above, was seen as an
essential part of the training of junior commanders in direct contrast to the more rigid
Soviet system. During the war in Afghanistan, Soviet commanders had to improvise to win
the battles or even to survive. The Russian military started to relearn the lessons of World
War II about how rigid doctrine was good, but at times innovation was required to win.
Fighting battles between East and West using these rules is a good as way as any of
comparing the two military doctrines.

Further Reading on CONTACT!

The principal book on the Canadian army in World War III was by Kenneth Macksey (1985)
First Clash, combat close-up in World War Three. The book covers in detail three days of
combat for a Canadian unit in a hypothetical war in Europe. It was written as an official
manual for the Canadian Army, but deviated from Canadian Army doctrine as the experience
of the author contradicted the text books. Well worth reading by any wargamer interested
in modern warfare

Other Cold War rules published by the History of Wargaming Project include:

Dunn Kempf American Army Truining War Game Rules 1977-1997

The British Army Desert War Game: MOD Wargaming Rules (1978)
First Battle: American Army Divisional Level Wargaming in the Cold War (1979)