BABEȘ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA

FACULTY OF MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER

SCIENCE

SPECIALIZATION SOFTWARE ENGINEERING IN

ENGLISH

THE PROPOSAL FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT

DUAL USE ITEMS

ETICĂ ȘI INTEGRITATE ACADEMICĂ.

METODOLOGIA CERCETĂRII ȘTIINȚIFICE.

CĂTĂLIN RĂZVAN BARTEȘ

2022
 Abstract
This paper presents the importance of dual use items. They have both a military and a civilian application,
and depending on how they are employed, they can have either positive or harmful impacts. Before a
certain kind of technology can be exported to nations that are not members of the European Union,
businesses based in Europe must first satisfy legal requirements and respect the moral rights of ordinary
people. The failure to take these precautions has, over the course of the years, resulted in a variety of
problems that worry people all over the world. The respective technology, the challenges produced by it,
the worries of citizens as well as the European Union, and, last but not least, the viable solutions for the
export and manufacture of devices that contain dual use materials are presented in this project. The
dissemination of technologies with dual applications to previously unexplored regions and nations is
being aided by globalization. In addition, developments in technology have made it simpler to create and
implement such high-risk technologies, even while the destructive potential of these technologies
continues to increase.
Because of this, it is vital that regulations governing the transfer of technologies with dual uses are seen
as being compatible with the norms and rules that are already in place, that they involve major
stakeholders, and that they do not go against major interests in controlling or sharing access to such
technologies. When evaluating strategies to stop the inappropriate use of dual-use technologies, there are
several important criteria to keep in mind, including whether or not they are legal, how inclusive they are,
and how effective they are.
What exactly are those items called? In what ways might they be utilized? Are they beneficial or harmful?
How can businesses keep tabs on how often customers use them? What are the ongoing issues that an EU
is facing as a result of them? What are the advantages of utilizing them for us? Should we, as citizens of
the European Union, be concerned about issues that arise on other continents? In the moral charts
developed by the EU, what solutions have you identified, and how could you enhance the situation, the
export, and the economy?
 Contents

1.What are dual use items?…………………………………………………………..…………. 4

2. Context and Background ……...…………………………………………………………… 5
3. Key conflicts ………………………………………………….…………………………….. 6
4. Measures in Place …………………….……………………..……………………………… 6
5. Possible Outcomes…………………………………………………………………………. 14
5.Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………. 14
1.What are dual use items?
The term "dual-use goods" refers to products that have potential uses in both civilian and military
contexts. These kinds of products are subject to stringent regulations due to the fact that they can be
categorized as being for civilian use and then converted for military objectives, or even worse, utilized for
terrorist activities.
Examples
Some products and technologies have more than one intended use. These include satellites used for global
positioning, missiles, nuclear technology, chemical and biological tools, night vision technology, thermal
imaging, certain models of drones, aluminum pipes with precise specifications, and certain types of ball
bearings.
To be more explicit with regard to this final illustration, ball bearings that meet a particular manufacturing
specification may be eligible for consideration as dual-use items; but the paperwork that corresponds to
the shipment may lack sufficient detail to establish such information.
Export controls
The specific commodities and technologies whose export is restricted in accordance with international
dual-use export control regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement have been incorporated into the national
export control legislation of a great number of nations. In addition, the United Nations mandates the
countries who are members of the organization to limit the export of commodities that could be
detrimental to the well-being of humanity and the quest for world peace.
The majority of nations utilize an application process for export licenses in order to regulate and strictly
enforce the stringent limitations placed on the export of dual-use commodities. If a party wants to sell
dual-use items to customers in a foreign nation, they must first ascertain the export license requirements,
submit an application for a license if the requirements evaluation concludes that they need one, and only
if the export license is granted may the good be exported. It is the obligation of financial institutions,
insurance firms, and many other parties involved in the international trade of dual-use commodities to
ensure that they are acting lawfully and in accordance with international standards when they are taking
part in transactions.
While the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom has established some regulatory
obligations, the European Commission has developed recommendations in order to assist with the
identification and management of the impact of dual-use goods. Although the United States, which has a
multitude of export controls and vigorously prosecutes export control violations, does not explicitly
require financial services firms to identify dual-use goods in trade finance transactions, there is increasing
pressure for them to do so. The United States has a myriad of export controls.
2. Context and Background
There are dangers associated with dual-use products, despite the fact that dual-use products have
contributed to the modernization of Europe's land forces in a way that benefits both the civilian and
military sectors. This is due to the fact that these kinds of technology also have disorienting effects and
raise worries regarding cybersecurity. Depending on the organizations that manage information and
communication technologies, there may be significant repercussions for everyday living in civilian
settings. (Pfaff, 2020) The European Union (EU), which is a prominent actor on human rights, has raised
export control hurdles in order to govern the conduct of dual-use commodities and discourage actors that
violate the rule of law from acquiring such technologies. The European Union (EU) has, over the course
of the past few years, developed an export control regime that consists of legislation and lists of dual-use
items, as well as authorisation processes and assessment criteria for the export of certain dual-use goods
to certain locations. (Commission of the European Union, 2021).
This export control system also includes restrictions for the end-use of civilian and military technologies,
as well as products that are not included on the list, which have the potential to violate human rights or
enable the manufacturing of advanced military weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
requirements of the European Union (EU) on export restriction of dual-use commodities to other entities
are in compliance with the rules of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is the fundamental organization.
(WA) (European Commission, 2021) (European Commission, 2021) The WA is a multilateral framework
for controlling exports that is made up of 42 countries. It regulates exports to countries that could speed
up the creation of advanced military equipment and weapons of mass destruction and governs the
behavior of things with dual uses. The European Union (EU) just recently, in May 2021, amended the
legislation governing export control in order to stimulate information exchange and cooperation among
member states regarding developing technologies and to discourage exports of dual-use items in weird
entities. (Regulation No. 2021/821 of the European Union) In any event, the European measures on dual-
use assets are important due to the fact that sensitive products may provide strategic benefits to the
opposing forces and lead to terrible abuses of human rights.
An already existing regulation on the export of new technology was proposed to be expanded by the
European Union (EU) as a response to the increased number of threats and abuses of human rights that
occurred in Europe.
This issue arose when the governments of places like Tunisia, Egypt, and West Sahara found some
advanced technologies that let them to listen in on protestors' phone conversations and other
communications.
They were successful in accomplishing this task with the assistance of European businesses specializing
in technology.
The European Union (EU) recommended expanding the law that was discussed earlier as a solution to
this problem.
The law mandates very precise export regulations for commodities that can serve two purposes (goods
that are used for both civilian and military applications).
The free movement of dual-use items is permitted within the EU, with the exception of certain especially
sensitive commodities, whose transfer inside the EU is still subject to the requirement of prior
authorization. The rule makes a contribution to the goals of the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the trade in nuclear material.
The regulation is directly applicable across the entirety of the European Union. However, in order to put
some of its provisions into effect, such as those pertaining to enforcement and fines, the member states of
the EU will need to adopt further actions.
As a result of this idea, Europe became divided into two camps with opposing viewpoints. There is a
coalition of nine countries (Sweden, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, the United Kingdom), and they
are of the opinion that the plan put forth by the Commission will reduce the level of competitiveness
enjoyed by EU-based businesses.
On the other hand, there is a coalition of 11 nations (including Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, and
Romania), which has been circulating a separate paper in support of the Commission's proposal to impose
cyber-surveillance restrictions for the purpose of safeguarding human rights.
When it comes to applications of research, the concept of "good uses" and "bad uses" presents
insurmountable challenges in terms of interpretation and description. In point of fact, national
governments and regulatory agencies even have different ways of identifying and specifying what
constitutes dual use in scientific research. There are occasions when funding sources won't allow certain
types of research, such as the kind that could have military applications. For instance, this is how things
stand with the Human Brain Project. However, regulating intents is not likely to be able to stop research
that initially has a benign objective from being utilized for harmful ends in the future. Regulators have
been trying to get more specific about what kinds of research and development should be restricted and
under what circumstances. For instance, in the context of trade, the European Commission, which is the
politically independent executive arm of the European Union (EU), states that "dual-use items" shall
mean items, including software and technology, that can be used for both civil and military purposes. This
is an example of how the term "dual-use items" is used. The European Union's Horizon 2020 program,
which provides funding for the Human Brain Project, is more specific. It requires applicants for funding
to ensure that "research and innovation activities carried out under Horizon 2020 shall have an exclusive
focus on civil applications," and they are required to complete an ethics checklist to demonstrate that they
comply with this requirement. In addition, the Human Brain Project is required to ensure that "research
and innovation activities carried out under Horizon 2020 shall have an exclusive focus on civil
applications."
In order to make things more clear, we contend that policy makers and regulators need to identify and
concentrate on particular detrimental or unwanted applications in the following four areas: the political
sphere, the security sphere, the intelligence sphere, and the military sphere (PSIM). We consider the ways
in which research that is justified in terms of socially constructive applications—in the European Human
Brain Project, the US BRAIN initiative, and other brain projects and related areas of neuroscience—can
also provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be applied in these four
domains. Specifically, we focus on the European Human Brain Project, the US BRAIN initiative, and
other brain projects and related areas of neuroscience. It is possible that those that fund, produce, or
oversee research and development (R&D) in neuroscience, neurotechnology, and neurorobotics will be
unable to govern its spread if they fail to shift away from the dual-use framework.
3. Key conflicts
We refer to the use of neuroscience or neurotechnologies by governing authorities in order to govern or
manage the behavior of individuals, groups, or populations. This can be done, for example, by changing
or manipulating attitudes, beliefs, opinions, emotions, or behavior. This is what we mean when we say
"political applications." In this discussion, we will concentrate on one example from the emerging
discipline of "neuropolitics," which refers to the applications of neuroscience research into explicit and
implicit attitudes as well as decision-making.
The incorporation of technologies developed for civilian use into the military sector will, in the long run,
hasten the process of modernizing the ground forces of the EU. Both the European vision for a Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the transition of the armed forces into the digital era can be advanced
with the help of the next-generation technologies which contribute to the transformation. In spite of the
fact that the EU and its defense agencies have initiated a number of defense programs, the member states
appear to be disorganized. On the other hand, the member nations are unable to agree on a single position
about the role that NATO plays in the defense of Europe. It is important for the EU to achieve greater
levels of self-sufficiency, and the creation of a sophisticated European defense sector will result from the
establishment of the European Defense Fund. Both the EDF on its own and an increase in the budget for
European defense would be beneficial to the advancement of military technology projects. It is essential
for the civilian sector to play a more active role in the development of the drone industry, while
semiconductors and other goods with many applications enhance the combat effectiveness of military
hardware. Dual-use technologies strengthen Europe's military capabilities and demonstrate the legitimacy
of European ground forces in the conduct of war. Dual-use technology can be used for either civilian or
military purposes.
Controls on the export of things with dual purposes are an essential component of the security policies of
states that export goods and of attempts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Dual-use
goods and technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes, which requires careful oversight
over their export to countries that are considered unfriendly or have ambiguous attitudes toward foreign
policy. This is because dual-use goods and technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes.
State exporters are tasked with the obligation of striking a balance between the security goals pertaining
to the export of commodities with dual uses and the competitiveness of local economies. In this article,
the export control regime of the EU as well as the EU's membership in international export control bodies
are discussed. Comparative and normative research methods are selected for this purpose in order to
conduct an analysis of the previously published material on Council Regulation 428/2009 and other
international export control groups, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In the final section
of the article, we will discuss potential changes to the regulation and identify any deficiencies that have
been found.
The proposition that was made resulted in an intriguing conundrum. On the one hand, there is the issue of
having an interest in the most recent technologies in order to avoid giving the impression that Europe is
"technology-averse." On the other hand, there is a concern for democratic principles and human rights, as
well as an acknowledgment that technology can be intrusive.
To begin, they place an emphasis on human rights and the core values that make up the EU, which are the
recognition and protection of human dignity, freedom, equality, and the rule of law.
Another issue is the prevalence of dual-use products, which can be difficult to prove to pose a threat due
to the fact that it is difficult to demonstrate that an essential product can be abused or used as a weapon.
The dissemination of technology, technical help, know-how, and advice can be in violation of
international and EU export controls and sanctions regimes, which can result in significant penalties as
well as reputational costs.
It is important to keep in mind that there are a few dangers associated with dual-use products, the most
important of which are the legal and reputational dangers.
In addition, the working paper describes the idea as "an opportunity for boosting transparency" because
governments will be encouraged to make data public. This is one of the reasons why the plan was
developed.
The primary source of the problem is the fact that European businesses are selling governments
technology that can be put to use to suppress democratic movements.
It is abundantly evident that the financial aspect of several European businesses places a higher priority
on their priorities than the respect for human rights, ethics, and democracy.
Europe’s exports of spy tech to authoritarian countries revealed
The European Union (EU) began limiting the export of surveillance technology a few years ago in order
to prevent authoritarian regimes from utilizing European technology to suppress political opposition and
so abuse European technology. An inquiry that took place on both sides of the border found that this did
not prevent exports to countries that posed an issue.
Activists and organizations who work to protect human rights were overjoyed when the European Union
(EU) decided to place restrictions on the export of surveillance technologies by the end of 2014.
After more than three years of revelations in the wake of the Arab Spring showing how the European
surveillance industry helped dictators in the Middle East crack down on protests, European countries are
finally taking action. This comes after revelations showed how the European surveillance industry helped
dictators in the Arab Spring.
As stated in a press release issued by the Commission at the time, "growing security concerns regarding
the use of surveillance technology and cyber-tools that could be misused in violation of human rights or
against the EU's security," the export of cyber-surveillance technology to countries outside the Union
would now require the approval of their respective governments.
But unfortunately, disappointment has taken the place of yesterday's jubilation today. The new regulations
have not produced the effect that many people had thought they would.
An investigation that was carried out across many borders by a group of European news organizations has
revealed that the member states of the EU have approved the export of cyber-surveillance technology at
least 317 times over the course of the previous two years. 14 applications, on the other hand, were turned
down.
Researchers from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto previously exposed how an Italian vendor's
cyber-surveillance tools were used to spy on a well-known human rights activist who was a citizen of the
United Arab Emirates named Ahmed Mansoor. Mansoor is from the United Arab Emirates. Despite this,
both Denmark and the United Kingdom have given the United Arab Emirates permission to import
surveillance technology that is capable of conducting widespread monitoring of internet traffic. In
addition, Finland has granted the Finnish subsidiary of the Canadian corporation EXFO various permits,
which will enable the company to sell mobile phone monitoring equipment within the country.
As the Arab Spring unfolded, it was not difficult to determine which European companies were engaged
in the sale of technologies with dual applications.
They quickly discovered which businesses were involved in violating human rights and were complicit in
the crimes. However, there were other businesses who were unwilling to acknowledge any ethical
concerns; for instance, the ISS World trade fair stated that they are unable to monitor the customers that
purchase their products.
The Middle Eastern governments became more more intrusive as time went on. The regime of Al Assad
continues to maintain control over who may and who cannot access the internet.
The European Commission is in the process of modernizing the control it exercises over the export of
products with dual use. Their objective is to add a "human security" dimension to exports through the
implementation of more stringent controls and a system that utilizes cyber-surveillance.
The international cooperation and agreement need to be bolstered so that the Commission's efforts can be
more effectively accomplished. The member states are required to work toward reaching an agreement.
The governments of countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Libya, amongst others, were taken by surprise,
which led to violent crackdowns, civil conflicts, and instability that has not been resolved to this day.
Open Season: Building Syria's Surveillance State is the title of a new investigative report that is being
released today by Privacy International. The report is based on hundreds of original documents and pieces
of correspondence that are connected to the surveillance trade in this region prior to and during the Arab
Spring.
Over the course of the past few years, journalists and researchers have unearthed multiple instances of
European surveillance technology being used to repress regime critics in authoritarian regimes. These
instances occurred in several different countries. An investigation that was conducted by Bloomberg in
2011 discovered that political activists in Bahrain had been subjected to torture while being questioned
about private messages that the government of Bahrain had intercepted using equipment manufactured by
the Finnish-German company Nokia Siemens Networks.
Journalists working for the alternative media site Mamfakinch in Morocco have come under cyber attack,
allegedly at the hands of intrusion software developed by the Italian company Hacking Team.
Researchers from the University of Toronto discovered that the Ethiopian government has used the same
software against journalists living in exile in the United States. These journalists were targeted because
they were critical of the Ethiopian government.
According to the regulation, the authorities in the EU member states are required to take "all relevant
considerations" into account before deciding whether or not to issue a license for the export of
surveillance technology or other types of so-called dual-use products. This includes the possibility that the
technology could be used in a way that violates human rights. Products that have a dual-use are those that
have use in both the military and the civilian world.
But unlike the rules that govern the export of conventional arms, it is not obligatory for the authorities to
deny an export of dual use technology if it is believed that there is "a clear risk" that it could be used for
internal repression in the destination country. This is in contrast to the rules that govern the export of
conventional arms. It's possible that the authorities will decide to focus their attention on other matters
instead, such as fostering economic expansion or ensuring a positive relationship with the nation in issue.
According to Professor Quentin Michel of the Université de Liège, who is an expert in the field of export
control regulations, the fundamental problem is that the dual use regulation, which now also covers cyber-
surveillance technologies, was originally designed for a completely different purpose, namely to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is the main reason why the regulation has expanded
to include cyber-surveillance technologies.
As a result, the law is primarily directed toward preventing threats to national security and is not designed
to adequately address the dangers posed by potential abuses of human rights that are related with the
export of cyber-surveillance technologies.

4. Measures in Place
The Wassennar Arrangements (1996) is a global export system that was established with the intention of
making the trade in items with dual purposes more transparent. Instead, it places an emphasis on safety
and reliability. The issue of keeping track of people through their use of technology has recently been
brought up.
The High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, Navi Pillay, has stated that the idea is
more likely to be harmful than beneficial.
This briefing paper gives a summary of the efforts taken by governments in the MEMA region to
minimize the positive impact that ITCs can have. It then provides an analysis of the events in Tunisia,
Egypt, Syria, and other countries.
In conclusion, it suggests that European policy makers have numerous avenues to develop policy
solutions that could adequately respond to many of the issues made during the Arab Spring, in the
southern Mediterranean and beyond. These solutions could be implemented anywhere from Tunisia to the
United Kingdom.
Installing a form of virus that tracks the use of these goods and has the capacity to halt the activity of the
devices that were built utilizing dual-use items is still another approach to solving this problem. The
consumption of a company's products should be tracked, and the companies should report any issues that
arise as a result of those items.
5. Possible Outcomes
There are some goods that could be useful despite the risks they provide. The primary focus of the revised
export control laws in the EU is on these types of commodities with dual purposes.
For the sake of making a profit, European Companies have a tendency to forget that the objective of the
EU is to ensure that all people's fundamental rights and freedoms are protected. They contradict the
principles that the EU is attempting to promote while simultaneously making excuses for the export of
things with dual uses, arguing that they are unable to oversee what those items are used for.
Despite the fact that it is of the utmost importance for the EU to undergo reform,
Because of the extension of the law that was proposed by the European Commission for the private
sector, there is a possibility that an unanticipated result would occur.
It is possible that human rights, stability, and security, in addition to the European Union itself, may all be
negatively impacted.
Because of the inconvenient situation, there is a possibility that communication between nations could
break down, and who knows? Perhaps a war will break out as a result.

7. Concluding remarks
Both the application of cyber technology and the dissemination of that technology in third world nations
frequently need the making of compromises. The right to privacy and the ability to express oneself could
be severely compromised if surveillance technology in the form of the internet is utilized in a way that is
not ethically sound. The Arab Spring sparked widespread interest among the general public in the
interconnections that exist between, on the one hand, the export of surveillance technology and, on the
other hand, the infringement of fundamental freedoms in countries of destination. The proposal that was
presented by the European Commission in September 2016 is normatively consistent with the
commitment that the EU has made to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in its foreign
activities.
At the same time, the arguments that surround the proposal shed light on some of the hurdles that impede
the incorporation of human rights principles in the external action of the EU. This is notably the case in
situations in which a diverse selection of corporate sectors inside the EU are impacted. It is already
expected of enterprises to take into account human rights and engage in human rights due diligence in
accordance with a variety of international norms, one of which being the United Nations Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGP). At the level of an abstract and general concept, the
necessity of human rights considerations in commercial activities, including those that are conducted
overseas, may be openly contested by very few people. However, the debates that have surrounded the
reform of dual-use export control have thrown light on a significant amount of reluctance on the part of
corporations and political authorities to place private corporate entities in the position of assessors of
human rights hazards. It has been brought to people's attention that businesses are unable to accurately
forecast the dangers that are posed by their goods when they are shipped to other countries. Therefore, in
spite of the fact that the narrative of "business and human rights" has matured at the international, EU,
and domestic levels, many exporters still find it unsettling to play the role of human rights guardians in
their day-to-day commercial operations. This kind of hesitancy is possible not only in the area of export
control, but also possibly in a great number of other circumstances involving the EU's foreign activities.

Overall, the discussion that has surrounded the Commission's proposal to reform the EU's dual-use export
control is a necessary process to incrementally integrate human rights norms into the EU's international
trade law and policies. This discussion has surrounded the proposal that was made by the Commission. A
space for deliberation has been created as a result of the proposal for rights-based export control. This
space allows government officials, politicians, business leaders from various industrial sectors, human
rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and other stakeholders to discuss the degree
to which human rights should and could be accommodated in dual-use export control practices. The fact
that stakeholders are addressing the practical application of 'business and human rights' beyond rhetoric is
a big step forward, despite the fact that these stakeholders have differing opinions on the topic. After all,
the discussion that surrounded the suggestion made by the Commission has already increased people's
level of awareness on this significant issue. To be more specific, the decision to give a license always
involves making a normative choice between conflicting demands, and every choice of this kind has
repercussions in some other region of the world.
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