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Challenging Economic
Journalism
Covering Business and Politics in
an Age of Uncertainty
Henrik Müller
Challenging Economic Journalism
Henrik Müller
Challenging Economic
Journalism
Covering Business and Politics in an Age
of Uncertainty
Henrik Müller
Institute of Journalism and Mass Media
TU Dortmund University
Dortmund, Germany
ISBN 978-3-031-31029-4 ISBN 978-3-031-31030-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31030-0
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
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Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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Contents
1 The Loss of Certainty: Journalism vs. the Economy 1
2 Peculiar Products: The Business of Economic News 11
3 Good,
Bad or Ugly: On the Quality of Economic
Journalism 41
4 Making Sense: Narratives, Journalism and the Economy 73
5 Media
Coverage and Animal Spirits: The Interplay
Between Economic Journalism and the Economy105
6 Here,
There and Everywhere: Economic Globalization
and National Media143
7 The
Case of Europe: A Common Currency Without a
Common Public Sphere179
8 From
Gate Keeping to Scouting: the Changing Role of
Journalism211
v
vi Contents
9 What to Cover: Topic Selection and Research225
10 What’s at Stake: An Outlook for Economic Journalism263
References275
Index295
About the Author
Henrik Müller (*1965) is Professor of Economic Policy Journalism at

TU Dortmund University’s Institute of Journalism and Mass Media, the
largest facility for journalism studies in German-speaking countries, where
he conducts specialized Bachelor- and Master-level programs at the inter-
section of economics, communication science, and journalism. He’s also a
cofounder of the Dortmund Center data-based Media Analysis (DoCMA)
and Narrative Economics Alliance Ruhr (NEAR), two interdisciplinary
scholarly networks applying computational content analysis to economics
and other social sciences. Müller studied economics at the University of
Kiel, did his doctorate degree at the University of the Armed Forces in
Hamburg, and graduated from German School of Journalism in Munich.
He looks back at a two decades-spanning career as a journalist, working
for newspapers and magazines, his last position being deputy editor-in-
chief of manager magazin, a business monthly. He’s the author of numer-
ous books on economic issues, a frequent commentator in the media, and
a contributor of a weekly column to Der Spiegel.
vii
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Freedom of the Press vs. Corruption Perception. Source:

Freedom House, Transparency International (2017 data) 8
Fig. 2.1 Varieties of economic journalism by user motivation and
market size. Source: the author 29
Fig. 4.1 A hierarchy of narratives. Source: the author 83
Fig. 5.1 Humans in the loop—the role of qualitative assessment in
topic modelling. Source: the author 118
Fig. 5.2 Overall Uncertainty Perception Indicator for Germany and
related events [Share of analysis corpus relative to entire
corpus, Jan 2001–Jan 2023. Source: the author
(after Müller et al., 2021)] 124
Fig. 5.3 UPI—European and international topics and related events
[Relative to entire corpus, three-month backward-looking
moving averages, Jan 2001–Jan 2023. Source: the author
(after Müller et al., 2021)] 127
Fig. 5.4 UPI—Real-economy topics and related events [Relative to
entire corpus, three-month backward-looking moving
averages, Jan 2001–Jan 2023. Source: the author (after
Müller et al., 2022)] 128
Fig. 5.5 Overall Inflation Perception Indicator (IPI) and Harmonized
Consumer Price Index for Germany, selected events [Analysis
corpus share relative to entire corpus, percentage change
y-o-y, three-month backward looking moving averages,
Jan 2001–Jan 2023. Source: the author (after Müller et al., 2022)] 133
ix
x List of Figures
Fig. 5.6 Selected IPI topics related to the causes of inflation, selected
events [Relative to entire corpus, three-month backward-
looking moving averages, Jan 2001–Jan 2023. Source: the
author (after Müller et al., 2022)] 134
Fig. 6.1 Most read media brands by economic experts worldwide
(shares) [677 respondents, up to three media brands could be
named, Source: Boumans et al. (2023)] 168
Fig. 7.1 Europe-related Content as a Share of overall News
Coverage. Source: Bergammi and Mourlon-Druol (2021).
Note: E/T = European news as a share of total news 190
Fig. 7.2 ECB Coverage in European Newspapers, Shares Relative to
Corpora. Three-month moving averages. Source: Müller et al.
(2018, p. 10) 193
Fig. 7.3 Reform-related News Content, shares of entire coverage of
Europe (Shares relative to European corpora, three-month
moving averages). Source: Mourlon-Druol et al. (2022) 196
Fig. 7.4 Topics capturing EU-level Reforms [Share relative to
reform-related corpus; topics 12 (LM), 17 (HB), 10 (Sole);
three-month moving averages, and monthly values
(dotted lines)] and related events. Source: Mourlon-Druol
et al. (2022) 198
Fig. 9.1 Seven stages of research. Source: the author 232
Fig. 9.2 The issue attention cycle and its phases. 1: Pre-problem
stage, 2: alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm, 3:
Realizing the cost of significant progress, 4: Gradual decline
of intense public interest, 5: Post-problem stage;
Source: after Downs (1972, p. 39–41) 241
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Varieties of Economic Journalism 26

Table 3.1 The ESSF Formula and Specifications 65
xi
CHAPTER 1
The Loss of Certainty: Journalism vs.

the Economy
When I aspired to become an economic journalist, it was pretty clear what

the job required: profound knowledge of economics, some journalistic
craftsmanship, and a vivid sense of curiosity. So, I enrolled in an economics
program, later proceeded to journalism school, and started working as a
writer afterwards. Back then, in the late 80s and early 90s, we felt we were
on a sure footing. Economics as a profession claimed it could explain basi-
cally everything; its proponents were styling themselves more or less like
physicists, mathematically apt scholars of an exact science, rather than
social scientists dealing with the vagueness and contradictions of real-
world human actions. Markets, they said, were (mostly) inherently stable
and efficient. Macroeconomic fluctuations could be smoothed effectively.
Government intervention was suspected to have detrimental effects. Or so
the zeitgeist informed us.
Journalists, on the other hand, belonged to the privileged profession
that guarded the gates to the public sphere. What was not reported by
major newspapers or TV channels did not reach the public’s mind. Events
that weren’t covered had no political impact. Politicians and scientists,
entertainers and artists were not able to make it big unless they appeared
in the relevant media. Ideas that were not voiced in the press or on TV
didn’t reach an audience and thus effectively didn’t exist. Journalism had
a unique role. The big publishing houses and broadcasting corporations
enjoyed a commanding influence on public and political life, as well as fat
and stable profits.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Müller, Challenging Economic Journalism,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31030-0_1
2 H. MÜLLER
If economic journalism meant the combination of some kind of supe-

rior knowledge, public influence, and a decently paid job, it struck me as
an attractive occupation.
I’m recounting my early professional aspirations not for nostalgia’s sake,
but because quite a bit has changed since then, both economically and jour-
nalistically. Once-ironclad economic “laws” have been challenged by strik-
ing real-world events, like the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro crisis, or,
more recently, a peculiar combination of negative nominal interest rates,
weak investment, low productivity growth, low unemployment and defla-
tionary pressures, followed by a bout of inflation in the wake of the corona
pandemic and the Ukraine war that caught policy makers and many econo-
mists by surprise. The rise of populist politics in the west, and of authoritar-
ian China and Russia in the east, has undermined economic policy doctrines,
like free trade, balanced budgets, or independent central banking. Rising
geopolitical tensions challenge the very idea of globalization.
At the same time, public spheres have undergone profound changes,
partly eroding journalism’s formerly dominant position in setting the
agenda. Boundaries to public spheres have become porous, and discourses
disorderly, with a multitude of players, voices and opinions being able to
by-pass the formerly formidable gatekeepers. Journalism is still important
when it comes to informing the public and forming public opinion. But
it’s not the only game in town anymore. Many media outlets are in a sorry
state financially.
When old assumptions are overturned by reality, a new assessment is
warranted. That’s the purpose of this book. We need to think about eco-
nomic journalism—its foundations and functions, its shapes and routines,
its relationship with the economy and economics. What do we need eco-
nomic journalism for? Would societies function without it? And, quite
fundamentally, what is economic journalism, or what could—or should—
it become?
This book seeks to answer these questions from different angles: for
communication scholars, journalism students and practitioners it proposes
a framework for economic journalism and the nature of the specific ser-
vices it provides to society. Economists, who rely on economic journalism
for information, inspiration, and increasingly for the augmentation of
empirical analyses, may find insights into the patterns of shared narratives
in modern hybrid media spheres, as well as some methodological consid-
erations concerning the measurement of news content.
1 THE LOSS OF CERTAINTY: JOURNALISM VS. THE ECONOMY 3
1.1 On Truth, Reality and Bullshit

Journalism that is worth its name rests upon a fundamental assumption:
that there is an objective reality humans can grasp, and that this actual
state of the world can be described factually. The facts are the facts; they
are essential because when societies lose touch with the facts, they lose
touch with reality. That may sound ridiculously self-evident, but in recent
years the line between what’s true and what’s imagined has been blurred
considerably. Advances in Artificial Intelligence that enable machines to
manufacture convincing, yet possibly untrue stories in an unsupervised
fashion are exacerbating this problem. Therefore, it needs to be stressed
that there is no alternative reality governed by “alternative facts”, a term
coined by Kellyanne Conway, councillor to former US president Donald
Trump.1 “Post-truth politics” has become a catch phrase in an age of pop-
ulism, and journalism has played an important part in spreading it, repeat-
ing populist claims and frames, whether mindlessly or opportunistically
(e.g., Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Müller, 2017).
Harry S. Frankfurt, a philosopher at Princeton university, wrote two
influential essays, “On Bullshit” (2005) and “On Truth” (2006), that
provide a useful point of reference. Bullshit, according to Frankfurt, can
be defined as disrespect for the truth. Bullshitting is not identical to lying,
since the liar acts deliberately and thereby still shows some respect for the
truth, even though he refrains from making use of it. The bullshitter, in
contrast, purports whatever she or he deems advantageous in a particular
situation. To define what he means by truth, Frankfurt evades constructiv-
ist traps and in a practical manner defines truth as what really works, that
is, what works in the real world. An engineer who constructs a bridge and
bases her or his plans on falsities will very likely build a structure that col-
lapses. The truth has practical utility. Bullshitters not only refuse to recog-
nize reality, they obstruct it.
Relating Frankfurt’s thoughts to economic journalism is straightfor-
ward. If journalists are to inform the public about the state of their com-
munities, they need to be factual, dealing with real world problems and
possible remedies. They need to be focused on reality, gather and hunt for
evidence, present it comprehensively and digestibly to readers, users,
watchers, or listeners. If, in contrast, journalism falls prey to bullshit, it
risks losing its very purpose. While this may sound simple and natural, it is
worth noting that the rise of (economic) populism has prompted impor-
tant parts of the media to turn themselves into platforms where
4 H. MÜLLER
emotionally charged views are exchanged instead of serious, facts-based

arguments.
Over the past decade, economic populism, fake news and foreign pro-
paganda have proliferated, as they are at a communicative advantage: sim-
plistic, arousing stories are well suited to attract attention in modern media
environments. Animating, emotional content is a lot easier and cheaper to
produce than the factual variety. That’s why short-term media economic
incentives clearly favour the “media complicity” with populist politicians
that Mazzoleni (2008) identifies as a precondition for the latter’s success.
Pushed by the emotional arousal that prevails on social media, journalism
runs the risk of losing its level-headedness. Where anger and agitation
prevail, rational discourse is distorted to the effect that civilized debates
become virtually impossible, threatening the viability of democracy itself
(Müller, 2020, pp. 183–212).
When media populism meets economic populism, the results resemble
Gresham’s Law, known from monetary theory: the good stuff is being
driven out of the market by the bad stuff. While Gresham referred to com-
peting monies—the more trustworthy cash disappears as a means of pay-
ment because people hoard it as a store of value—in the context of media
markets heated populist interventions risk driving out sober comprehen-
sive reporting.
1.2 Of Minds and Markets

Interestingly, the rise of populism has put plenty of economic issues on the
agenda, that were largely ignored by the wider public before. Debates
about international trade or monetary policies used to be limited to the
nerdy circles of experts, technocrats and policy wonks. Politicians as well
as ordinary citizens hardly bothered to take notice. Now these issues have
risen to the centre of attention—though in reduced (and often negatively
charged) form. Whether it was the protectionist tariff policies of the
Trump administration in the US or the alleged costs of EU membership
in the Brexit campaign of 2016 in Britain, twenty-first century populism is
not only about identity, but to a great deal about the economy.
What we are witnessing are the results of two trends joining forces:
economization and mediatization. Economic aspects of public life have
become more important. This is partly due to the replacement of tradi-
tional forms of co-ordination within families and communities by markets
and a still-expanding division of labour, but also to the multitude of
economic crises that have shaken western societies. Mediatization, in turn,

implies that public and political life is increasingly being performed in
highly differentiated media spheres that augment, or even supersede, old-
fashioned direct communication. As a consequence, economic rationality
and public emotionality frequently collide. And economic journalism is
positioned right at the intersection, where these clashes occur—which
makes for a fascinating, yet demanding environment.
Economic journalism is particularly vulnerable because what we con-
sider the economy is the result of a set of constructions itself. For instance,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a twentieth century invention. We can-
not observe GDP with our senses, watch it grow or shrink. We may be
able to sense poverty, but whether the number of poor people in a country
is rising or falling is a matter of statistics. Many people believe that the
poor are getting poorer, that immigrants are depressing employment
opportunities, and that international trade is crippling the livelihoods of
average citizens. Whether these assertions are true can be answered by
hard-facts evidence. That’s the difference between believing and knowing,
and certainly journalism, as a “knowledge profession” (Donsbach, 2014),
should be concerned with the latter.
How a company is doing cannot be gauged by taking a look at its head-
quarters or at the way its top executives dress, but only by scrutinizing its
accounts—and by getting one’s hands on some suspicious internal docu-
ments. Again, what we call a profit or a loss is defined by rules, laws, and
customs. Economics, statistics, and accounting are based on definitions
derived from theoretical considerations as well as conventions. Most of the
time these assumptions are only implicitly present, to the effect that
reporting on the economy may give the impression as if it were about
constructing a belief system instead of pursuing reality. That’s why jour-
nalists need to treat abstract economic concepts with caution. Statistics,
national aggregates, or company accounts are hints to reality, but not the
real thing itself. Accordingly, researching and writing (or recording) sto-
ries about economic issues entails the investigation and presentation of all
of these aspects: facts and figures, persons and personalities, reporters’
first-hand evidence and experience. Hence, journalists need to develop
new routines and re-define their position in the new media landscapes.
That’s no easy task. On the one hand, journalists cannot ignore the tides
of public emotions, or else they risk losing their audience. On the other
hand, they must not neglect their main job of informing the citizenry in a
6 H. MÜLLER
factual and timely manner. The final part of this book proposes some con-
cepts on how to reconcile these two conflicting objectives.
1.3 Problems, Priorities and Uncertainty

When covering the economic aspects of society in a sufficiently compre-
hensive manner serious journalism is confronted with a mostly “inatten-
tive audience” (van Dalen et al., 2019). People shy away from hard-news.
It is inevitable, then, that editorial choices need to strike a balance between
sober elucidation and sweeping attention arousal. Sublime normative pos-
tulations concerning what journalism should or shouldn’t do are worth
little, if the fundamental challenge of engaging the public is not taken into
account. This trade-off has gotten a lot harder, due to digitalization and
the exponential growth of distracting entertaining content; globalization
and the increasing complexity of issues has rendered economic issues
harder to fathom.
To complicate things further, economic journalism should not only be
about the past and the present, but also about potential future outcomes.
More than other beats, it is expected to be forward-looking: journalists
not only need to unveil what’s gone wrong in the past, but also point out
what’s bound to fail in the future. Thus, there is often speculation involved:
it should be informed and educated, but there is always a considerable
degree of not-knowing. At any given point in time the two dominant
questions are: What’s going on now? And where does it lead us?
Gauging future implications of current developments has become more
difficult, as once-reliable causal relationships between economic variables
have broken down. An example is the absence of inflation in the 2010s,
which is all the more astonishing given the extraordinary monetary stimuli
central banks injected into the economy. If journalists had kept predicting
with firm conviction an inflationary shock that did not materialize, they
were making a mistake. But if, on the other hand, they called off any risk
of future inflation, like many economists did at the time, they were not
acting responsibly either. Scepticism is warranted, always and everywhere.
Economic journalism’s primary task is making sense of the economy as it
evolves, with all the uncertainty that comes with it.
This demanding environment calls for concepts that provide economic
journalism with a yardstick. Certainly, what to cover and what to ignore,
how to weigh facts and arguments, and how to frame an issue is a complex
undertaking. Economics may provide some guidance, though. Much of
the discipline is underpinned by the notion of a theoretically achievable

ideal world (although views on what this world should look like exactly
differ widely). Operationalizing fundamental notions of welfare econom-
ics, this book proposes a four-dimensional coordinate plane: efficiency, sta-
bility, sustainability, and fairness—the ESSF formula. Chapter 3 develops
this concept in detail. It is meant to help journalists gauging the relevance
of current developments and guiding the angles and frames they choose in
their reporting. Throughout the book the formula is applied to different
aspects of economic journalism, the fundamental idea being that viola-
tions of the four goals need to be publicly addressed to correct them. In
fact, if we lived in circumstances that resembled an economist’s nirvana,
there would be little need for economic journalism at all.
A major source of unfairness is the unequal distribution of information.
Illuminating the shady world of insider information is one of economic
journalism’s key tasks. By holding institutions and companies to account,
it diminishes the scope for corruption (Stiglitz, 2002). Executives and
public servants running the risk of being discovered and publicly exposed
by relentless journalistic scrutiny are deterred to succumb to the tempta-
tions of bribery. This in turn induces changes in social norms. Where the
media can do their job properly, corrupt behaviour is largely absent.
Where, in contrast, government intervention in the media is wide-spread,
so is corruption. In Fig. 1.1 the relationship between the freedom of the
press and the prevalence of corruption is depicted. In the upper right-
hand corner, the best-performers are located, i.e., the countries that com-
bine freedom of the press and a low prevalence of corruption, a spot that
is inhabited exclusively by Anglo-Saxon and northern European countries.
At the other end of the scale, countries can be found where corruption is
rife and freedom of the press non-existent, most prominently China and
Russia. There are only a few outliers, mostly rich city states such as
Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, whose institutions are relatively
clean despite curbing the freedom of the press and of expression in gen-
eral. Hence, independent journalism is a precondition for well-functioning
institutions, albeit not the only one. Press freedom explains about half of
the observed variations in corruption.
8 H. MÜLLER
100
less corruption
New Zeland 90
Norway
Sweden
Germany UK Canada 80
Australia
USA
70
60
Corruption
50
China
40
Russia
30
20
10
y = -0.5696x + 71.912
R² = 0.4908
0
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Freedom of the Press more freedom
Fig. 1.1 Freedom of the Press vs. Corruption Perception. Source: Freedom
House, Transparency International (2017 data)
1.4 Overview of the Book

This book is organized as follows: Chap. 2 focusses on the production of
economic news. It stresses how news is different from information.
Contrary to the latter the former is a product that is produced by compa-
nies and corporations, whether for-profit, non-profit or public-service,
facing specific incentives and constrains. Starting from a media economic
perspective, we analyse some peculiar properties of economic journalism,
provide a typology of the different types of economic journalism (busi-
ness, consumer, economic policy etc.), and show what different audiences
expect from it according to surveys. The producers of economic news
navigate a complex environment where vital economic interests as well as
activists and experts of different colours seek to influence them and discuss
a taxonomy of journalistic independence.
The output of economic news and its quality are at the centre of Chap. 3.
It starts with concepts familiar in journalism studies, such as news values,
framing, and agenda setting, and relates them to the specifics of economic
journalism. We develop a set of relevance criteria for economic and busi-

ness news, based on the above-mentioned ESSF formula, holding that
efficiency, stability, sustainability and fairness should prevail.
Chapter 4 puts the focus on the concept of the narrative, that has
become popular in economics, and relates it to economic journalism.
Following this approach, a leaning against the wind strategy is being
developed, adapted from central banking theory.
Chapter 5 takes an economist’s perspective: journalistic content has
become an input into economic analysis, particularly concerning business
cycle developments and the measurement of uncertainty. We discuss to
what extent media reception determines the perception of the economy
and which transmission channels link media content and the behaviour of
managers, investors and consumers.
Globalization and, even more so, European integration have brought
about a degree of interdependence that transcends national boundaries.
Politics and the media, though, are still predominantly national. Chapter 6
deals with this asynchrony that leads to a host of problems, from the mis-
management of global commons to incomplete EU governance struc-
tures. Ill-informed publics largely ignore the international dimension of
the political economy, paving the way for populists. In Chap. 7 the focus
is on Europe, a common market with a common currency, but no com-
mon public sphere. We take a closer look at the perception of the Euro
crisis in different member states’ media, the framing of the European
Central Bank (ECB) in different countries, and ask whether there is
empirical evidence for divergence or convergence in media coverage.
Chapter 8 highlights the changing roles and functions of economic and
business journalism. Despite radically altered media publics, there is a
need for specialists who select what is important for society at present,
who uncover what went wrong in the past, and who raise early warning
flags in order to prevent undesirable developments for the future. Chapter 9
translates these considerations into practicable routines. It proposes a
workable standard procedure for choosing topics and doing research and
analysis in economic journalism.
The final chapter provides an outlook on economic journalism’s future.
Although the economy is a vital part of social life and well-being, eco-
nomic journalism runs the risk of being pushed to the fringes of public
awareness. Media economics suggest the emergence of a specialized four-
tier market for business news. In this scenario the broader public risks
10 H. MÜLLER
being deprived of a continuous, comprehensive, balanced and indepen-

dent coverage of economic and business developments.
Note
1. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/meet-the-press-70-years/wh-spokesman-
gave-alternative-facts-inauguration-crowd-n710466
References
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quences for journalism education. Journalism, 15(6), 661–677.
Frankfurt, H. G. (2005). On bullshit. Princeton University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (2006). On truth. Princeton University Press.
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell
(Eds.), Twenty-first century populism. The spectre of Western European democracy
(pp. 49–67). Palgrave Macmillan.
Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation
and political style. Political Studies, 62, 381–397.
Müller, H. (2017). Populism, de-globalisation, and media competition: The spiral
of noise. Central European Journal of Communication, 9(1 (18)), 64–78.
Müller, H. (2020). Kurzschlusspolitik. Wie ständige Erregung unsere Demokratie
zerstört. Piper.
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Transparency in government. In World Bank (Eds.), The right
to tell. The role of mass media in economic development (pp. 27–44).
van Dalen, A., Svensson, H., Kalogeropoulos, A., Albaek, E., & de Vreese,
C. H. (2019). Economic news. Informing the inattentive audience. Routledge.
CHAPTER 2
Peculiar Products: The Business of Economic

News
Information is a vital resource in a merchant society. When you trade with

others, it helps to have an idea about the market situation—about supply
and demand of a particular good, the factor prices your competitors are
willing to pay, the production costs, and so forth. You may also form
expectations about the future. If you were a sixteenth century grain mer-
chant and you knew about a drought in some far-out producing region,
you might consider holding back some of your stocks since you’d be antic-
ipating meagre harvests, supply shortfalls and subsequently rising prices,
from which you’d strive to profit. Information improves decisions. If you
have earlier and more precise information than your competitors, that’s a
profound commercial advantage; if everybody else is well-informed except
you, you risk being driven out of the market. Prior to the merchant soci-
ety, the value of information on a broader scale was limited because there
wasn’t much of a market. In an agrarian subsistence economy where pro-
duction and consumption were all but local, and villagers mostly adscripted
peasants, there weren’t many decisions to be taken that would require
timely and correct information.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the first ventures in economic jour-
nalism were started as merchant societies began to flourish in sixteenth
century Europe. Among these pioneer publications were the so-called
Fuggerzeitungen (Fugger newspapers), produced by the highly influential
merchant family Fugger, headquartered in the Bavarian city of Augsburg.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Müller, Challenging Economic Journalism,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31030-0_2
12 H. MÜLLER
These papers were archived early on, the oldest editions dating from 1568,
and are well documented; today, they are kept at the Austrian National
Library (Keller, 2012). The Fugger papers were authored by writers in a
range of European cities, such as Antwerp, Cologne, Rome, or Venice.
Actually, they hardly resembled modern-day newspapers at all, but were
mostly hand-written, though some printed editions are conveyed as well.
They were shared rather than published, directed at an insider-expert
readership. After all, a reading mass audiences did not exist at the time due
to low literacy rates—although printed pamphlets containing mostly sen-
sationalist and religious stories, that were read out loud on public squares,
were prevalent during the reformation and thereafter (Schlögl, 2008,
p. 606). The Fugger newspapers can be interpreted as a precursor of the
modern newspaper, as early twentieth century scholars emphasized (e.g.,
Kempter, 1936), that is, writings directed at members of a business net-
work to share market-relevant information. They contained reports writ-
ten by correspondents of the family’s pan-European business network and
were distributed through this network. The purpose was to share informa-
tion to the readers’ mutual advantage. In terms of content, they catered to
business instincts as well as to general curiosity, comprising a wide array of
issues that ranged from specifically business-related matters, such as the
provision of grain, the European flow of trade from the Mediterranean to
the Rhine, transcontinental linkages such as the trade in spices and pre-
cious metals, but also aspects of economic policy, for instance changes in
tax laws, British piracy, the establishment of European colonies in Asia and
the Americas, as well as financial market news like exchange rates or the
emission of bonds (Keller, 2012, p. 189).
The Fugger newspapers’ accuracy and reliability have been called into
question; Matthews (1959) referred to them as a mix of “true reports and
false rumors, trivial occurrences and important events”; Habermas (1962)
saw them as an example of “news merchants” collaborating with state cen-
sors to control news flows. More recent research, though, has put the
Fugger newspapers into a more favourable light. Bauer’s (2011) content
analysis concludes that while business information was their original pur-
pose, economic news only contributed 6 per cent to their overall content,
25 per cent dealt with politics and 51 per cent with matters concerning the
military and violence. Furthermore, accuracy increased over the decades,
as correspondents became more professional; among them were employ-
ees of the Fugger organization, friends and acquaintances of the family as
well as professional news writers.
2 PECULIAR PRODUCTS: THE BUSINESS OF ECONOMIC NEWS 13
2.1 An Executive Must-Have:

The Evolution of News
The early example of the Fugger newspapers indicates two important
insights into economic news that are valid to this day: first, business
motives can serve as a starting point to create a supply of news media that
later branch out into the coverage of politics and other aspects of social
life, as readers’ curiosity about what is happening in the wider world and
awareness about their place therein is triggered. Second, in an economy
that grows more and more complex, information is a resource that requires
professional journalistic standards to ensure ongoing reliability; to be use-
ful, reported reality needs to be a credible representation of the real thing.1
Newspapers in the Dutch Golden Age

In the Netherlands, then Europe’s leading merchant nation and most
advanced society, newspapers were published on a frequent basis as early
as 1618 (van Groesen, 2016). The reformation and the rise of Reformist
Calvinism in the Low Countries had induced improved literacy rates,
while standards of living were rising markedly in the Dutch Golden Age.
By the mid-1600s a lively and highly competitive “courantes” market had
developed (der Weduwen, 2018). To this day, one of the papers founded
in that era is still being published: the Oprechte Haelemse Courant, now
called Haarlems Dagblad, first appeared in 1656 (Encyclopedia Britannica,
2023a). Golden Age publishers pioneered practices that would become
core features of news markets in the centuries to come. They broadened
the scope of their products’ content, so that they would appeal to larger
audiences. They sold advertising space to anybody who would pay for
it—to book publishers, a trade that grew in parallel to the news market,
but also to postal services, political pamphleteers or private citizens who
were looking for their missing pets (der Weduwen & Pettegree, 2020).
They were among the first “attention merchants”, a term coined by Wu
(2017), generating revenues not just by selling subscriptions and single
issues, but also ad space, thereby creating the two-sided markets that still
dominate today’s news business models.
What is more, fierce competition led publishers to invest in quality.
Dutch newsman Van der Macht, for example, ran a widespread network of
correspondents and pursued an early form of investigative chequebook
journalism, as der Weduwen (2018, p. 15) recounts: Van der Macht was a
14 H. MÜLLER
frequent visitor to the offices of state of the government in The Hague,

“where he maintained financial relationships with clerks and secretaries to
gain access to the latest letters, memoranda and resolutions passed around
the government complex.” He also had a taste for unconfirmed rumours.
Each issue “ended with a report from The Hague (…) composed by
stringing together half a dozen sentences of hearsay, gossip and political
chatter—with little regard for their truthfulness. Van der Macht did what-
ever he could to present the freshest news—but he was more concerned
with providing a large quantity of news, rather than evaluating its accuracy.”
Reporting sensational rumors or wild made-up stories had the potential
to arouse public attention, but it hampered a publication’s reputation, and
consequently hurt its revenues. As several newspapers began covering
identical issues, their truthfulness could be compared. And early Dutch
publishers were all too happy to point out their competitors’ mistakes and
mishaps, in effect inventing media journalism. Over time, market forces
led to improved quality: “in the second half of the seventeenth century
commercial credibility and reputation came to play ever more important
roles in the news market” (der Weduwen, 2018, p. 19).
England and the Continent

The Dutch enjoyed liberties that were unknown elsewhere in Europe at
the time. England, the second economically advanced country, would fol-
low the Dutch example several decades later. During the Glorious
Revolution of 1688/89 partisan pamphlets had become wide-spread
instruments of agitation. Afterwards, the new constitutional order led to a
gradual removal of censorship. Instead, press laws were introduced that
obliged publishers and writers to assume liability for their content. Based
on these foundations, a free and diverse press began to flourish in eigh-
teenth century England (Schlögl, 2008). By early nineteenth century,
journalism had become entrenched in Britain to a degree, that its quality
and significance in society could be taken for granted. The liberal philoso-
pher Jeremy Bentham concluded, “moral aptitude” of those holding pub-
lic office depended “upon the influence exercised by the Public Opinion
Tribunal which in turn depended “upon the degree of liberty possessed by
the press” (Bentham, 1823, p. 178). Politics had become a complex pro-
cess involving masses of citizens, and journalists were their agents. The
freer the press the better. Bentham’s confidence that unrestricted and
diverse media would contribute to good governance and overall
welfare—instead of leading to a tyranny of an ill-informed majority, as

many of his contemporaries feared (Cutler, 1999, pp. 341–343)—attests
to the degree of journalistic professionalization and quality that the British
press had achieved by then.
Yet, most of Continental Europe was late to the game. Until early nine-
teenth century politics was shaped mostly in personal communication
inside and between the princes’ courts, detached from the public’s eye and
hence from public discourse. Politics constituted a “predominately perfor-
mative reality”, as Schlögl (2008, p. 606) notes. Since the public did not
have a say in it, censorship largely banned domestic politics from publica-
tions. In France after the Revolution, newspapers were subject to strict
surveillance under Napoleon’s reign. Public discourse and the exchange of
partisan arguments were deemed to weaken the common will of the peo-
ple and the unity of the nation. Only after the restauration of 1815, a
political press began to take hold in France.
Branching Out from Business

Even where freedom of the press, and freedom of expression in general,
was not granted, media catered to an ever-growing audience of literate
people. As the early example of the Fuggerzeitungen illustrates, forerun-
ners of modern journalism were often triggered by the informational
needs of business. As soon as a steady supply of news was established, it
spawned the coverage of other aspects of public life as well. Stories about
foreign events captured readers’ attention in particular, the more exotic
the better. An extreme example was a six-piece series published by the New
York Sun in 1835; the tabloid, run by Benjamin Day, reported on tele-
scopic observations of life on the surface of the moon, where, the story
claimed, humanish moonlings lived, sporting wings, copper-colored fur,
and a yellowish complexion.2 It took several decades longer to establish
reporting standards, that even tabloid journalism could not undercut
without harming its reputation.
Historical experience suggests a pattern: what is started as specialized
business journalism over time broadens in scope, as economies of scale kick
in; falling unit-costs lead to higher profits as circulations increase. There
are ample examples of this effect. Reuters started as a London-based news
wire company in 1851 focusing on banks, brokerages and businesses;
later, it branched out and turned itself into a general news agency serving
print media as well and becoming a wholesale supplier of news. It was not
16 H. MÜLLER
just its financial news service that was of value to newspapers, but also the
breadth and speed with which it was able to cover international events
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023b) Reuters’ founder, German-born entre-
preneur Paul Reuter, was among the first to exploit the opportunities aris-
ing from the hottest technology at the time, the telegraph. More than a
century later, Michael Bloomberg was following a similar path, when the
personal computer became the main instrument of data processing in the
1980s and 90s. His agency started as a financial data provider, later ven-
tured into financial news and eventually emerged as a general news service,
including television channels (Palmer, 2019, p. 180). The Financial
Times, launched in 1888, targeted the financial community of the City of
London at first. Over the years, it turned itself into the leading global
newspaper covering politics and business around the world, but also sci-
ence, arts, entertainment, and style. The Wall Street Journal is another
case in point: launched a year after the FT on the other side of the Atlantic,
it was an offspring of financial data provider Dow Jones that decided to
assemble its smallish specialized newsletters (“flimsies”) to form a proper
newspaper; today, it is among the US dailies with the largest circulation,
not just known for world-class business and politics journalism, but also
for distinctly conservative commentary.
Business and finance first, other issues later—the broad pattern has
repeated itself over and over again. Today highly specialized “verticals”
(newsletters providing the business and lobbyism community with expert
knowledge on politics, finance or technology) cross-finance newspapers
and website directed at the mass market, a business-model pioneered by
Washington-based Politico.
Notwithstanding the general media crisis, that has been simmering due
to digitalization and falling ad revenues since the late 2000s, many busi-
ness news outlets are still in rather decent shape. The Economist, founded
in 1843 in London, was initially aimed at fostering free trade in the UK; it
fiercely opposed the protectionist Corn Laws in place at the time. Under
its editor Walter Bagehot, who led the paper from 1861–77, it arguably
became the most influential publication of Victorian Britain. The Economist
has since morphed into one of the leading global media brands, covering
a broad range of issues and virtually every country on the planet. In non-
English language markets, too, business media retain a strong presence;
NRC Handelsbladet in the Netherlands, Il Sole 24 Ore in Italy, Les Échos in
France or Handelsblatt in Germany are among the most influential papers
in their respective countries, with a readership not confined to the business

community.
Furthermore, the rise of the general newspaper since the late nineteenth
century—a type of publication containing a broad range of issues and
political leanings to fully exploit economies of scale and maximize prof-
its—has turned business and economics into beats that are not just for
specialists, but directed at the general public. This trend was in line with
the more active economic and social policies and the larger shares of
national income being redistributed through taxes and transfers, that have
since become the norm in advanced economies. As governments have
become more involved in everyday life, the need for scrutiny in the “Public
Opinion Tribunal” (Bentham) has increased as well.
The business-first-other-issues-later pattern in the advancement of
journalism is embedded in a complex historical context. In many places
the market economy developed before democracy in a modern sense.
Hence, business journalism tended to precede political journalism. But
even where political opinions were largely censored, (foreign) politics
became an integral part of business content, as in the case of the
Fuggerzeitungen. Since developments outside of the market system were
prone to affect the market one way or another, these pieces of information
were important to economic agents. Crucially, mere profit-seeking readers
would eventually mature to become citoyens, people who care about what
is happening in society and its institutions and want a say in politics.
Seen from this perspective, the business press can be a means of libera-
tion. To this day, even in authoritarian states that suppress free media and
prefer to bathe citizens in political propaganda instead, business journal-
ism is among the most trustworthy sources of information; messing with
economically relevant information means messing with economic well-
being, which, in turn, potentially poses a threat to the people in power. In
China, the biweekly business magazine Caijing earned a reputation for
investigative journalism, enjoying relatively loose government oversight.
Generally, Chinese “newspapers focusing on economics and business
appear to be allowed wider latitude in what they can safely report,” Shirk
(2011, p. 12) concludes, albeit censorship has become markedly more
intrusive since president Xi Jinping seized office in 2012. Likewise, in
Russia the business press could report relatively freely, with Vedomosti, a
joint venture of the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal, being its
standard bearer; it was the segment’s flagship publication, until in 2020
the government decided to rein it in (Economist, 2020).
18 H. MÜLLER
Economic journalism may contribute to opening up rigid political sys-

tems in the long-run. But this process is suffering considerable set-backs
at the time of writing. After all, ruling parties and oligarchies show little
interest in the Public Opinion Tribunal.
2.2 Why Bother? Properties of News as a Product

As the brief historical overview has highlighted, news is different from
information. While the latter may be likened to an ever-evolving ether
floating through society, but mostly hidden in private, the former is an
economic good available to the public, up for open discussion, interpreta-
tion, and the formation of public opinion. Information is a vast, unruly
and in many aspects unknown social resource. News, in contrast, is sup-
posed to be concise, limited, and focused, supplied by companies and cor-
porations, whether for-profit, non-profit or public-service, that face
distinct incentives and constrains. Outlets cater to an audience whose
motivations have been a matter of research for decades (Fengler & Ruß-
Mohl, 2005, pp. 86–96).
The uses and gratifications approach (e.g., Lee, 2013, for an overview)
isolates four inclinations for news consumption: (a) information-driven
motivations (finding out about the state of the world, the performance of
government or companies, but also about matters that may affect oneself
directly), (b) entertainment-driven motivations (seeking excitement or fun,
fighting boredom), (c) opinion-driven motivations (developing a point of
view on issues, getting to know other people’s opinions or the views of like-
minded commentators), (d) social-driven motivations (being able to con-
verse with peers, gaining social status by knowing what is going on).
Hard-news consumption is primarily dominated by (a), where intrap-
ersonal factors, such as direct utility resulting from gaining knowledge or
following one’s conscience to fulfil the civic duty of being an informed
citizen, are at play. Interpersonal factors are involved, too; (d) points to
the effects of social norms on news consumption: if staying informed and
having well-founded opinions is rewarded by a social group, news con-
sumption is mutually reinforced by its members. If, in contrast, one’s
peers do not care much about current issues, the individual motivation to
concern oneself with hard-news is bound to deteriorate, as the social grati-
fication of news consumption declines.
From a media economic perspective (e. g., Hamilton, 2004) hard-news
journalism is a peculiar product. It is characterized by positive externalities,
cognitive disadvantages, asymmetric information, and economies of scale.

(For a conceptualization of the economics-rooted analysis of journalism
see Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2005; Fengler, 2016.) Economic journalism is
a slightly different story, to which we will turn a little farther below.
Positive Externalities
An informed citizenry is a precondition for democracy and the market
economy to work. More precisely, people need to concern themselves
with issues that are of relevance to society as a whole; if individuals were
just pursuing their own short-term interests, popular government would
be doomed. Without some knowledge and well-founded opinions on
pressing current issues, democracy is hardly conceivable, as public debates
would go astray, election outcomes may turn self-destructive, and the
Public Opinion Tribunal would cease to function. As early as 1904 US
justice Louis D. Brandeis postulated that the people could only govern
“by taking the trouble to inform themselves as to the facts necessary for a
correct decision, and then by recording that decision through a public
vote” (quoted after Goldstein, 2017). Citizens need to devote time, effort,
and potentially some money, to stay informed. In doing so, they contrib-
ute to the well-being of society as a whole, thus creating what economists
call positive externalities, i.e., individuals bear the costs of news absorp-
tion, but the associated benefits go far beyond the personal sphere. People
obtain information from the news media. The media contribute to setting
the public agenda, thereby channelling society’s collective attention.
Seen this way, quality journalism is systemically relevant for modern-
day mass democracies to function properly. Still, more than a century after
Brandeis’ assertion, populism and political aggressiveness are on the rise,
particularly in the US. Partisan media stir discontent and outrage. These
developments point to the familiar result of economics that wherever posi-
tive externalities arise, demand and supply tend to remain below socially
desirable levels. As a merit good—a good characterized by positive exter-
nalities—news may deserve extra support.
Cognitive Disadvantages
The problematic effects of positive externalities are aggravated by the cog-
nitive disadvantages hard news suffer from. Occupying oneself with com-
plex political and economic issues is cumbersome. As dual process theory
(most prominently: Kahneman, 2011, economics Nobel laureate of 2002)
20 H. MÜLLER
holds, there are two modes of applying human intelligence: System 1 is

fast, intuitive and emotional, System 2 is slow, sceptical and rational.
Politics and public discourse should be governed by the latter (though the
former adds some spice). The trouble is that System 2 thinking virtually
hurts, to the effect that people tend to avoid it whenever they are given a
choice. That’s why hard news is a tough sell in an environment where soft
news and entertainment (from YouTube celebrities to gaming and stream-
ing) are abundant. From a citizen’s perspective, perception is costly, and
opportunity costs are rising with the expansion of more pleasurable
alternatives.
In the terms of the uses and gratifications approach, information-driven
motivations of media consumption may prompt people to go through the
hassle of System 2-thinking, but the other three motivations, entertain-
ment-, opinion- and social-driven ones, tend to favour System 1 mode; if
these motivations dominate news consumption, it hardly matters whether
the content is correct or relevant, as long as it is fun, easy to grasp and
accepted by one’s peer-group. As media users’ calculus is adjusted to lower
levels of hard-news consumption, suppliers, too, are tempted to trim their
products to make them easier to conceive and to stress emotional quali-
ties. What’s more, digital content providers, such as social media platforms
and search engines, deliberately target System 1 triggers, aiming at maxi-
mizing users’ engagement, that is, the time they spend online and the
attention they devote to it (e.g., Williams, 2018). Publishing companies,
dependent on distributing their content via digital platforms, are prone to
follow this logic, adjusting their content to click-baiting.
Asymmetric Information
The paradox of news as a product is that users purchase or obtain it, and
devote a portion of their time budgets to it, without being able to judge
its quality ex ante. After all, the very meaning of news is that users are
informed of stuff they didn’t know before. Asymmetric information
(between reporters/editors and readers) is a crucial property of news,
making it a credence good based on trustworthiness and consequently the
ultimate experience good (Nelson, 1970; Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2005,
pp. 78–80): only when users have consumed the same product over and
over again, they can judge its quality, albeit imperfectly, since the product
is somewhat different each time they turn to it (a newspaper, for instance,
contains different stories every day). Still, people have to rely on the media
to emphasize the most pressing social issues and to report the relevant
facts correctly.
Asymmetries are aggravated by the fact that much of journalism is
rooted in abstractions, that construct a societal collective beyond human
cognitive capabilities. People cannot sense whether national unemploy-
ment is going up or down, crime rates are falling or rising, health stan-
dards improve or deteriorate, if distributional fairness increases or
decreases, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grows or shrinks, let alone if
the “output gap”3 is positive or negative. All these abstractions matter,
though, in the sense that they inform governments, civil society, compa-
nies, or investors whether or not to take certain actions (e.g., raise the
minimum wage, prop up the police, invest in automation, or sell a particu-
lar asset class). In a market-democracy, citizens should be able to judge the
appropriateness of measures taken. And the media should provide them
with the relevant information (news), discussions concerning the underly-
ing rationale (analysis) and opinions about the adequacy of policies (com-
mentary). Hence, there are different levels of information asymmetries:
neither do laymen media users know whether the reporters got the facts
straight, nor can they assess whether the reported rationale is correct, nor
can they evaluate the viability of the arguments presented in an opinion
piece. The abstractions of modern societies are beyond people’s sensual
grasp. “The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out
of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined,” as
Lippmann (1922, p. 18) put it. Hence, it is all the more difficult to judge
the quality of news.
In economics, the effects of asymmetric information between buyers
and sellers have been discussed under the headline of the “market for lem-
ons” analogy (Akerlof, 1970), that can be applied to highlight some of the
problems of news markets as well (Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2005; Fengler,
2016). Since buyers cannot judge the quality of the individual product,
they have to rely on “(…) some market statistic to judge the quality of
prospective purchases” (p. 488). In news markets, it may be the reputa-
tion of “the media” in general that informs potential buyers of the assumed
quality of the individual product, and thus of the anticipated utility accru-
ing to the buyer. If you live in a society where people trust the media in
general, it is reasonable to assume that you will be inclined to purchase an
individual media product, say, a particular newspaper. Note that consum-
ers have to resort to “some market statistic” in this setting. This, in turn,
implies that the individual producer is (partly) off the hook; his or her
22 H. MÜLLER
product quality is not judged individually ex ante, but consumers antici-

pate some kind of average quality. Therefore, from an individual produc-
er’s perspective, there is an incentive to undercut competitors in terms of
quality: you can profit from the overall reputation of news, but contribute
little to it (and save the associated costs). Over time, average quality may
deteriorate further: “(…) there tends to be a reduction in the average
quality of goods and also in the size of the market.” (p. 488). Lower-than-
necessary quality could be a chronic ailment of markets in general: “For it
is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the
medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a
sequence of events that no market exists at all” (pp. 499–500).
Economies of Scale (and Scope)

Much of media supply is driven by, in the terms of microeconomic pro-
duction theory, increasing returns to scale. Roughly speaking, the bigger
a publication becomes, the lower the unit costs of production and the
higher the profits. Bigger news companies tend to be more profitable, are
able to invest even more in content, production and distribution, poten-
tially driving smaller competitors out of the market. Over the course of
media history, economies of scale have increased dramatically—from early-
day publishers who would apply moveable-letters printing and distribute
their product, at first a single printed sheet, in small quantities locally, to
today’s leading international media, such as The Economist or the Financial
Times, that are produced on a global scale and distributed mostly
electronically.
Economies of scale in the media industry are the result of several mutu-
ally enforcing factors. The first factor is manufacturing the actual product.
When printing became fast and cheap with the introduction of rotary print-
ing in late nineteenth century, large-circulation newspapers enjoyed a com-
petitive advantage, due to low unit printing costs; the more issues were
printed, the cheaper the individual paper could be. The second factor was
distribution: once a publisher had established a distribution network—a
fleet of horse-drawn carriages, or trucks later on, to serve newsstands,
hawkers in city streets, paperboys who hauled freshly printed issues to sub-
scribers’ homes—, an increase in circulation led to decreasing delivery costs
per newspaper. The third factor was content: since a publisher could enjoy
low printing and distribution costs, if she or he was able to attract enough
readers, it made sense to invest in scope (and quality) as well. Large staffs
of reporters and editors were built up to cover a wide range of issues from
different angles and perspectives. Fixed costs would rise with an increasing
number of people on the payroll and more printing presses running, but
once these outlays were covered, handsome profits could be made.
The result was the already mentioned model of the general newspaper,
the first truly mass media, catering to as many people as possible from dif-
ferent walks of life with a variety of political tastes. Editorial neutrality and
impartiality, later aggrandized as journalistic ideals, became a business
imperative. Strong ideological leanings, in contrast, stood in the way of
the pursuit of profit. Better still, the attention of a large readership could
be sold to advertisers, creating a second stream of income.
The three mutually enforcing factors were at work in other parts of the
media industry as well. The economies of scale facilitated by a new tech-
nology, the telegraph, helped the news wire industry in the second half the
nineteenth century to grow from highly specialized financial data provid-
ers to general news agencies, with Reuters being its long-time frontrunner
(see above). Radio and later television broadcasting were run either by
national public-service (or government) corporations (mostly in Europe)
or by a small number of national networks of commercial local stations
that shared centrally-produced news and entertainment content (in the
USA). Another technological innovation, the introduction of cable and
satellite TV in the 1970s and 80s, shook up the television market again,
opening inroads to new competitors such as 24/7 news channels, pio-
neered by CNN.
Digitalization and Its Discontents

Economies of scale are particularly pronounced in purely electronic news
markets. Here, unit costs of (re)production and distribution tend to con-
verge to zero as the number of users increases. These markets exhibit a
peculiar twist: while an investigative news report, or an in-depth TV fea-
ture, may cost hundreds of thousands of Euros or Dollars to research,
write, and film, the costs of reproducing and distributing it electronically
are very low; selling an additional unit of the same piece costs essentially
nothing. (The same is true for a software program or a movie, though in
these cases the initial costs are a lot higher, Shapiro & Varian, 1999.) In
economics jargon, marginal costs are zero. As textbook economics informs
us, in a competitive market, prices tend to equal marginal production
costs. But: if the price is zero, there will be no (commercial) supply. On
24 H. MÜLLER
the other hand, if a company is able to somehow charge for its product, it
is poised for substantial profits. That’s why platform companies have
grown to become money-making behemoths.
The likes of Alphabet (Google, YouTube) and Meta (Facebook, Instagram)
profit from yet another economies-of-scale effect: the more users they can
attract, the more data they accumulate, the better their algorithms get at
targeting users, whose attention they sell to advertisers. Unfortunately,
news publishers are in a less favourable position. Ad revenues have largely
migrated to the platforms. Compared with the digital giants even the big-
gest news providers are small companies, and many struggle to survive in
the digital era. Problematically, many of them cannot help but rely on
distributing their content via Google or Facebook, thereby being effectively
forced to adapt to social media’s attention-grabbing logic and tailor their
stories to it (von Nordheim, 2019). Moreover, the platforms are able to
use their algorithms to produce individualized news streams tailored to
the tastes of each user, akin to what communication scholar Nicolas
Negroponte (1995) foresaw early on: the coming of the “daily me”—a
personalized news supply, that is pretty much the opposite of the general
news that thus far has laid the foundation of democratic discourse, where
everybody is served the same news diet and has the chance to be con-
fronted with stories that she or he hasn’t thought about before. Sunstein
(2017) calls the latter property of traditional public spheres “serendipity”:
encountering issues that one would not have bothered to look for, but
that are important as they constitute the basis for compassionate compro-
mise in society. Only if citizens concern themselves with what’s important
to others as well, there’s a chance to reconcile opposing interests.
Note that the root cause of the loss of serendipity is the shifting of
economies of scale—from product to process. In the old days of the gen-
eral newspaper, it was cost-efficient to print voluminous issues, in which
different groups of people found articles of interest to them, and, maybe,
browsed through the rest (thereby producing serendipity as a by-product).
Publishers did not have to know much about their customers tastes, inter-
ests and habits, as long as they bought the papers and advertisers paid for
the space between articles. Now that the process of production and distri-
bution involves algorithms and databases, the economies of scale lay in the
information that media suppliers accumulate and employ to sell ads and
other products. Hence, the more engagement the better—the more
detailed information media companies can retrieve from their customers,
the more money they can make of them. Personalizing news feeds and ads
furthers this goal.
Spelling out the properties of news as a product may look like painting
a rather bleak picture. But pessimism is tempered by a host of practices
journalists, publishers, and policymakers have adopted to make news a
viable product; this approach worked fairly well in the past—to work in
the future still, an update is needed. Moreover, economic journalism dif-
fers somewhat from the general variety. Let’s proceed with the latter and
then turn to the former.
2.3 Business First, Politics Fast:

On the Economics of Economic News
Harking back to the uses and gratifications approach cited in the previous
section, entertainment-driven motivations can largely be excluded where
the consumption of economic journalism is concerned. Seriously grap-
pling with the interplay of markets and politics is hardly fun (though well-
told stories may make for a pleasant read, or watch, thereby easing the pain
System 2 thinking evokes). Instead, economic news consumption is moti-
vated by the desire to acquire knowledge about what is going on (infor-
mation), to relate oneself to these wider developments (opinion), and to
be able to converse with one’s peers (social). In a poll conducted among
users of economic news, most participants indicated they were looking for
“information about current economic, political and social developments”
(82 per cent), followed by “gaining personal knowledge” (78 per cent);
the social-driven motivation of being able to “converse with colleagues
and friends” gained somewhat lower values (56 per cent). Among profes-
sional readers—“decision-makers” who are considered the core users of
economic journalism—the results were even more pronounced (Mast,
2012, p. 152).
Economic journalism is provided through highly differentiated mar-
kets. Content touching economic issues is not only found on the special-
ized pages of newspapers and websites, but also in the relevant segments
of TV and (public) radio programs. Other sections, such as politics, cul-
ture or sports, too, choose economic angles frequently, for instance con-
cerning budget issues of theatres and museums or the business models of
major league football and its sponsors. As economic considerations are of
particular importance in modern societies, economic perspectives have
gained ground outside of the business sections.
26 H. MÜLLER
A Taxonomy of Economic Journalism

Economic journalism in a narrow sense comes in a range of types. Table 2.1
proposes a taxonomy, from the most practical to the more abstract genres.
To highlight the different approaches, consider how a sharp increase of oil
Table 2.1 Varieties of Economic Journalism

Genre Target audience Issues, angles Protagonists Typical conflicts
Consumer The buying public Prices, quality, Consumers, “The Little

Journalism service, companies Guy vs Big
consumer rights Business”
and protection
Private Private investors, savers Returns, risks, Investors, “Greed vs
Investor fees, taxes banks, caution”, “Big
Journalism investment Finance vs
funds, asset private
managers, investors”
insurance
companies
Financial Financial Market valuations, Quoted “Big Business
Market professionals, leverage, systemic companies, vs
Journalism regulators, general risk asset shareholders”,
public managers, “profitability vs
hedge funds, stability”
private equity,
analysts,
regulators,
central
bankers
Business Companies’employees, Earnings Senior “Company A vs
Journalism competitors, position, market executives, Company B”
shareholders, outlook, competitors,
stakeholders top-brass union leaders,
executives, politicians
mismanagement
Economic General public, politics Regulation, Politicians and “Efficiency vs
Policy (incl. lobbyists), stabilisation, parties, fairness”,
Journalism business executives redistribution government “stability vs
ministries, dynamism”,
companies, “Interest group
citizens, A vs Interest
NGOs, think Group B”
tanks
Source: after Müller (2017)

prices might be covered respectively: Consumer Journalism might focus

on the consequences of dearer oil for private households’ budgets and
present options for the reduction of their oil bill. Private Investor
Journalism could ask how different asset classes and individual stocks are
affected, while Financial Market Journalism evaluates the consequences
for financial stability and Business Journalism sheds light on the ensuing
risks and opportunities to certain companies and sectors as well as com-
pany boards’ reactions to these altered circumstances. Economic Policy
Journalism, in turn, may ask what the macroeconomic implications of an
oil price shock could be: e.g., is there a recession in the making? Are cen-
tral bankers about to raise interest rates? Will unions campaign for sub-
stantial wage hikes? (Müller, 2017).
To put it more generally, Consumer Journalism is aimed at providing
people with practical information concerning the purchase of certain
goods. Likewise, Private Investor Journalism is targeted at private house-
holds’ decisions with regard to their retirement and wealth accumulation
in general. Consumer and Investor Journalism have in common that they
pledge to provide individuals with information enabling them to make
better personal choices. Enhanced individual consumption or investment
decisions also potentially lead to better working markets; concerning one-
self with the quality of products may have the side effect of benefiting
consumers or savers who do not bother to do so themselves, as companies
alter their practices or regulators become more vigilante. Therefore, these
types of journalism, too, may be characterized by positive externalities,
though to a limited extend, as use is largely motivated by the quest for
personal improvement.
Financial Market and Business Journalism are targeted at users with a
specific interest, who tend to have a high degree of issue-specific knowl-
edge. Subscribers of the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal, for
instance, can be expected to be economics-savvy and to have some deep
understanding of their respective professional field; an executive working
for a large corporation, say, should be aware of proceedings inside the firm
she is working for. Hence, information asymmetries are less pronounced
compared to general journalism discussed in the previous section, as spe-
cialist readers have a framework at their disposal to decipher the meaning
of new information. Furthermore, their interest is rooted in professional
concerns: an analyst seeking information about recent developments; an
executive trying to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of a rival company;
a union leader observing the employment situation in a particular
28 H. MÜLLER
industry; and so forth. These professional readers’ motivations are not

restricted to obtaining new information, or picking up some snippet-com-
patible insights for dinner party chatter, but they also seek to get a glimpse
of public opinion in the making: what degree of importance or urgency do
the media attach to certain events? What is the framing? Who is being
portrayed as a villain, who as a hero? For all these reasons, financial and
business news, like Consumer and Private Investor Journalism, is less
affected by externalities, since the costs and benefits of consumption
remain largely in the sphere of individual news recipients.
Economic Policy Journalism is somewhat different in so far as it is aimed
at the general public. Direct individual benefits of news consumption are
limited, while the costs falling on recipients can be substantial: at the pol-
icy level, economic developments and policies tend to be both complex
and abstract. If they are presented in a sufficiently differentiated way,
grasping them can be a cumbersome undertaking. Keeping up with the
latest proposals for pension reform or the rationale behind the reformula-
tion of the central bank’s strategy requires a certain degree of civic-
mindedness. While an attentive society is a prerequisite for the Public
Opinion Tribunal to work properly on economic policy issues too, it can-
not be taken for granted, as Economic Policy Journalism is characterized
by positive externalities and information asymmetries. Due to the complex-
ity of the issues at stake, it also suffers from cognitive disadvantages. To
arouse awareness for economic policy issues, general news media can be
tempted to resort to tactical dramatization, that is, inducing fear in users,
and/or to populist narratives that combine simplicity with conflict and
negative emotions. (We will get back to this theme in Chap. 6).
However, Economic Policy Journalism, too, comes in highly special-
ized forms. There is a professional scene pursuing public policy, or trying
to alter its results in their favour, that is comprised of people working for
political parties, government, public administration, NGOs, think tanks,
lobbying firms, big companies, business associations, unions, law firms,
banks, academia, PR, media and so forth. These policy bubbles, clustered
particularly in capital cities, prefer media providing inside information. In
Washington and Brussels, Politico provides the respective bubbles’ occu-
pants with deep and detailed knowledge about the workings of (economic)
policy making. Other publishers have followed the example and have
started publishing “verticals” (specialized news briefs) for different profes-
sional target audiences. The motivation for consuming this type of jour-
nalism, that I call Targeted Economic (Policy) Journalism, is largely
professional, associated with a substantial willingness to pay. Positive exter-

nalities are virtually non-existent.
Market Size and Readers’ Motivations

Figure 2.1 illustrates a taxonomy of economic journalism. On the vertical
axis, user motivation is shown in a personal-political continuum. Users’
willingness to pay for news should be high when personal benefits of
media use are expected (low marks on vertical axis). It should be low when
purely political motivations prevail, that is, benefits of media use are social
rather than personal (positive externalities).
On the horizontal axis, the potential size of the audiences is depicted.
Since economies of scale are at play, the number of users is crucial. Fixed
costs, particularly staffs’ salaries, need to be covered. A sizable paying
„General“
Economic
Political
Policy
Journalism
Declining willingness to pay
User motivation
Business
Journalism,
Financial
Market
Journalism
Personal
„Targeted“ Private Investor Consumer

Economic Journalism Journalism
(Policy)
Journalism
Specialized Audience General
Increasing size of potential audience
Fig. 2.1 Varieties of economic journalism by user motivation and market size.
Source: the author
30 H. MÜLLER
(and/or marketable) audience is a necessary precondition of any media

business model. Journalism for small audiences is thus only viable where
the users’ willingness and ability to pay is very high, like in the case of
Targeted Economic Journalism, located at the bottom-left in Fig. 2.1.
(This market segment does not need to be limited to economic policy
issues. For instance, investment expertise tailored to high net-worth indi-
viduals, aka the rich, also shares these properties.)
On the other hand, consumers make for a large audience, while their
motivation of gaining product-specific information is highly personal, as
the position at the bottom-right indicates. General consumer media, such
as Consumer Reports in the US or Test in Germany, both owned and sup-
ported by foundations, pursue highly sophisticated quality checks of
everything from household appliances to life-insurances. Maintaining
large paying audiences, they are able to employ large staffs, as they earn
their revenues largely from selling digital content. In contrast, specialized
publications that manage with limited staffs are less affected by economies
of scale. As a consequence, the consumer market segment is highly dif-
ferentiated. A wide range of special interest sub-genres cater to specific
interests, such as collectors of vintage cars, electric guitars for heavy metal
afficionados, or fans of fly-fishing gear. (However, professional journalism
in these fields faces newish competition from user generated-content
models where readers resort to the recommendations of fellow users, as
well as a confusingly differentiated field of YouTubers and influencers.)
Private Investor Journalism is positioned in a middle position at the
bottom of Fig. 2.1, since its target audience is limited to people with spare
funds to invest, that is, people with sizeable positive personal savings rates
(roughly, the upper third of the income distribution in rich countries). In
sum, Consumer and Personal Investor Journalism operate in a relatively
benign environment, where overall audiences are large, personal motiva-
tion and willingness to pay are high (i.e., externalities are of limited impor-
tance), and economies of scale are less pronounced.
Business and Financial Market Journalism are in a different position. As
upmarket products, their overall audiences are smaller and more special-
ized. While these mostly high-income readers would be able to pay high
product prices in principle, their willingness to pay largely depends on
direct personal gains from news consumption. (Note that these personal
benefits, according to the uses and gratifications approach, may also
involve social-driven motivations, such as being able to converse with
one’s sophisticated peers.) Since the motivation of Business and Financial
Market Journalism usage is somewhat “political”, as denoted in Fig. 2.1,

positive externalities are at play, though to a limited extend. At the same
time, quality demands are high. Hence, sizeable staffs of decently paid
specialized reporters and editors are needed, driving up fixed costs, to the
effect that economies of scale are crucial. In sum, these factors lead to
highly concentrated markets, rendering viable only a few publications per
country—as a rule of thumb, the smaller the country, the harder they are
to sustain, as tiny market-sizes are insufficient to support specialized high-
quality media products. What is more, globalization has led to an interna-
tionalization of the target audience. With cross-border markets closely
integrated, and English being the lingual common denominator of the
business and finance community, global economic media have emerged.
The Financial Times and the Economist have transcended national bound-
aries of their respective home market (Chap. 6). They have pushed econo-
mies of scale to new levels, potentially threatening the viability of national,
non-English language business and finance media by out-competing them
in terms of scope and quality.
General Economic Policy Journalism is the most problematic variety.
While the potential audience is very large, and staying informed about
policy issues of all kinds is a precondition for democracy to work, as dis-
cussed above, disincentives of usage are considerable from an individual
user’s perspective: direct personal benefits of news consumption are small.
Keeping up with current economic and social issues may be necessary to
being accepted in certain circles. But aside from such considerations,
Economic Policy Journalism is largely consumed for intrinsic political
motivations. As a consequence, positive externalities are pronounced, ren-
dering users’ willingness to pay limited. From a suppliers’ perspective,
sizeable qualified staffs are needed to cover all the areas of economic policy
on a constant basis in sufficient depth. Therefore, high fixed costs contrib-
ute to considerable economies of scale.
It is thus hardly surprising, that there are virtually no pure-play general
economic policy publications. Economic Policy Journalism, therefore, has
some resemblance to a public good: served in high quality, it is beneficial to
society, but tends to be produced and consumed in less-than-optimal
amounts and qualities. Public-good characteristics, according to standard
textbook economics, include “non-rivalry” and “non-excludability”. In
the digital era, non-rivalry clearly applies to news: a news piece does not
deteriorate when it is consumed by someone; rather, it can be re-
reproduced without loss of quality at zero marginal cost. Therefore, a
32 H. MÜLLER
welfare-economic argument can be made for giving the entire population

free access to hard-news economic policy journalism. If this argument is
accepted, however, the question arises who should cover the costs of pro-
duction, as paywalls and subscription fees would need to be scrapped to
establish non-excludability. (We’ll get back to these questions in the final
chapter.)
Bundling and Competition Laws

As shown above, different types of economic news are characterized by
different degrees of marketability as well as different cost structures. Some
types of economic news, most notably Economic Policy Journalism, are
associated with considerable externalities, but at the same time require
large, specialized and expensive staffs. Also, Finance and Business
Journalism are plagued by smallish audiences while depending on special-
ized and expensive staffs. One strategy to deal with these discrepancies is
bundling. Like the general newspaper, general business media provide all
the different types of economic journalism (Table 2.1) to some degree,
thereby broadening their audience and exploiting economies of scale.
While personal gains from Finance or Business Journalism consumption
may be the reason why subscribers sign up to a certain media brand, excel-
lent Economic Policy reporting may serve as a signal of high-quality
standards.
Pronounced economies of scale tend to create monopolistic media
market structures. Public discourse, however, requires diversity and multi-
perspectivity of news supplies to ensure all relevant issues, angles and
frames to be voiced. As in other parts of society, monopolies tend to
induce deteriorating quality. That’s why competition laws have been used
to prevent the exploitation of news market power. Particularly at the local
and regional level, where in many places only one news outlet exists any-
more, mergers have been prohibited (e.g., in Germany) or secondary news
media have been subsidized (e.g., in Scandinavia). Now competition
authorities in many countries strive to tame the power of social media
platforms.
“Alternative” News Media

Thus far, the discussion has been confined to traditional kinds of eco-
nomic journalism. However, there is also an “alternative” variety (not
shown in Fig. 2.1) that has grown considerably in scope. As the political
fringes in western societies have grown, media catering to these more
extreme parts of the public have increased in number. These publications,
too, carry content concerning the economy; some of them sport econom-
ics or business and finance sections. This sub-segment of the news market
encompasses a wide array of media, ranging from hard-right publications
such as Breitbart (USA) or Compact (Germany) and Russian government-
linked media Sputnik News and Russia Today, operating in a range of
countries, to leftist outlets like Les Crises or Rebellyon in France (Institut
Montaigne, 2019). Due to digitalization, barriers to market-entry have
been lowered considerably; anybody can set up a website and a social
media account. Furthermore, running an “alternative” outlet is a rela-
tively low-cost business, as producing opinionated pieces about a narrow
range of issues does not require large specialized staffs, limiting fixed costs.
Therefore, small audiences suffice to generate revenues (from advertising,
subscriptions, or merchandise products) that cover operating costs.
This type of media can be sorted into two categories: “reactive” and
“autonomous” (von Nordheim et al., 2019), the former reflecting largely
on what mainstream, or “core”, media report, but framing it from dis-
tinctly ideological points of view; the latter striving to present an alterna-
tive version of reality covering aspects and issues that are neglected by
mainstream media. User motivation in this sphere can be expected to be
mainly driven by social objectives; inhabitants of “echo chambers” gain
status among their peers if they are aware of the latest twists in stories
popular in their respective social group (Sunstein, 2017), in contrast to
staying informed about factual developments. In countries where political
polarization remains limited, only niche audiences are inclined to use
“alternative” media. However, increased polarization of the citizenry may
prompt some traditional media to pivot to more extreme edges, following
the audience and reinforcing their views, as has been the case with US
cable program Fox News (Institut Montaigne, 2019, p. 35). While “alter-
native” media are not the focus of this book, they clearly pose a challenge
to economic quality journalism: they vie for attention and have the poten-
tial to deform public discourse on economic issues. The next chapter deals
with the question how to define and measure the quality of economic
journalism. Here, the focus is on the economics of media supply.
34 H. MÜLLER
2.4 Solutions: Tackling Quality Uncertainty

and the Erosion of Trust
As the discussion has shown, quality journalism is an improbable product

in many respects. Plagued by severe market deficiencies, it is a bit surpris-
ing that it does exist at all. Pronounced positive externalities imply that
associated benefits are largely socialized, while cognitive disadvantages
amount to considerable (opportunity) costs of consumption. Information
asymmetries mean that users cannot judge the quality of an individual
product ex ante.
Under these conditions, competitive dynamics have the propensity to
drive higher-quality products out of the market. Since buyers suffer from
“quality uncertainty”, they gauge the value of a specific product according
to some kind of market average. Thus, from the perspective of news pro-
ducers, there is a recurring incentive to undercut average quality standards
for short term gains, as Akerlof (1970, p. 499–500) points out. In effect,
sequences of quality depletion may occur. Applying this scenario to news
markets leads to the notion that quality can be expected to decrease as
competition gets more intense. To be sure, this does not mean that
monopoly structures suit news markets best; diversity of news media and
facts-based controversy are indispensable preconditions for public dis-
course to succeed. Yet, some kind of balance needs to be struck: market
conditions need to be set in a way that news suppliers compete for higher,
not lower quality, while ensuring a sufficiently diverse supply of news. This
balancing act has become more challenging, as digitalization has ushered
in fiercer competition by lowering barriers to market entry: virtually every-
body can set up a website that has the look and feel of the digital derivative
of a traditional broadsheet newspaper, or create a YouTube channel that
mimics a traditional TV format, but carries “news” that resort to opinion-
ated gossip, prejudice, or thinly veiled propaganda. If the users take this
kind of mimicry media for the real thing, the average value of news con-
tent is diminished and the sequence of quality depletion enters
another round.
Branding
A key issue for dealing with asymmetric information is trust. If users
believe that the media choose relevant issues and report on them accu-
rately, timely, impartially, and intelligibly, it adds to the value of news as a
product. The periodical nature of media means that they tend to be
consumed in a recurrent mode. This is an advantage compared to, say, cars

(Akerlof’s illustrative example), of which most people only buy a few over
their lifetime. Media users may not be able to judge the quality of a par-
ticular article or TV news show, but coming back on a frequent basis
enables them to judge its quality by experience. Branding, therefore, is a
central strategy for news media. Since trust is vital to bridge information
asymmetries, reputation matters. That’s why the digital revolution has not
eliminated strong traditional media brands—such as the New York Times,
Il Sole 24 Ore, or Der Spiegel—, but allowed them to transform themselves
and adapt to the digital age (Reuters Institute, 2022; Nielsen, 2016).
Branding also applies to individual reporters, columnists or bloggers; news
people who establish a reputation for having to say something relevant
and interesting may convince users to come back frequently.
However, trust in the media has declined in many countries in recent
decades. Whether this is due to the deteriorating quality of the media, or
to the emancipation of citizens in liberal democracies who may have
adopted a sceptical attitude in general, is a matter of debate. Still, “it is
clear that news media trust is at least fragile” (Strömbäck et al., 2020).
Business and financial media have been particularly hard hit by a “trust
meltdown” (Schifferes, 2012) following the financial crisis that many
media had failed to detect, until the bust of 2008 almost brought down
the entire economic system. (We’ll get to this aspect in more detail in the
next chapter.)
Media Accountability
Eurobarometer data show that levels of trust differ greatly even between
European countries: in Northern Europe large majorities still trust the
written press, TV and radio, while the corresponding values are low for
southern and eastern (formerly socialist) European countries (European
Parliament, 2022, p. 37). These observations are in line with international
comparisons of media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), that derive at
the general conclusion that trust in the media is greatest where news orga-
nizations are independent, highly professionalized and well-managed
practices of transparency-enhancing self-governance are pursued.
The need to apply effective measures of media accountability directly
follows from the notion of media independence and non-interference of
government. Instruments are based both at the level of individual media
outlets and at the sectoral level. Frequently used instruments include
media councils run by publishers associations; publicly accessible codes of
Another random document with
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III.
Royaume de Kiev.
Kiev, situé sur une hauteur, qui domine le Dniéper, un peu en

aval de son confluent avec la Desna, avait une situation très
favorable au commerce dans un temps où les rivières étaient les
principales voies de communication. Son importance en tant que
centre commercial, politique et militaire devait dater de très loin,
puisque lorsque ses chroniqueurs se mirent à y rassembler des
renseignements sur les débuts de sa vie politique et de sa dynastie,
ils ne purent guère recueillir que de simples légendes. Ils racontent
que Kiev tirerait son origine d’un bac établi à cet endroit sur le
Dniéper et dont le passeur aurait porté le nom de Kyï ; d’autres récits
prétendent que Kyï était un prince de la tribu des Polianes établis
dans cette contrée, qui y aurait bâti le premier un château fort.
Les premiers princes de la dynastie de Kiev, sur lesquels des
informations certaines nous soient parvenues, vivaient dans la
première moitié du Xe siècle : c’étaient le prince Igor et son épouse
Olga, qui avait reçu le baptême au milieu du IXe siècle. De leur
mariage naquit le prince Sviatoslav, dont le fils Vladimir christianisa
le pays, organisa l’église et donna l’élan à la vie intellectuelle et par
conséquent à la littérature. Il y avait eu avant Igor un prince Oleg, qui
a gardé dans la littérature un renom de prince sage et tant soit peu
magicien (dans les « bylines » il est appelé « Volga », nom analogue
à celui de la princesse Olga « princesse sage »). Mais on ne sait
quels étaient ses liens avec la dynastie. Probablement nous nous
trouvons là en face d’une pure conjecture émise par l’un des
rédacteurs de la chronique de Kiev, qui prétend que le prince Igor
était fils du Varègue Rurik, prince de Novogorod : Igor avec son
oncle Oleg seraient venus à Kiev avec des Varègues-Russes et
auraient conquis le pays. Des traités passés par Oleg et Igor avec
Byzance, en 907, 911 et 944, qui sont tombés sous les yeux d’un
des rédacteurs postérieurs de la chronique de Kiev, confirment en
effet que ces princes étaient bien souverains à Kiev, qu’ils se
faisaient appeler « princes russes » et que dans leur entourage on
trouvait beaucoup de noms scandinaves. C’est évidemment ce qui a
donné au chroniqueur l’idée d’attribuer aux Russes et à la dynastie
de Kiev une origine scandinave, et comme le nom de Russe n’était
connu ni en Suède, ni en Scandinavie en général, le chroniqueur
s’est vu obligé d’affirmer que Rurik, en se rendant chez les Slaves,
avait emmené avec lui « tous les Russes ».
Quelle que soit l’origine de cette appellation, elle désignait aux
IXe et Xe siècles cette caste militaire en même temps que
commerçante, qui dominait à Kiev, qui assujettissait peu à peu les
pays slaves voisins, trafiquait des esclaves et des produits qu’elle
percevait en qualité de tributs sur les contrées qui lui étaient
soumises. C’est à Kiev et à ses environs, le pays des Polianes, que
l’on donnait le nom de Russie. C’est là un fait bien établi, qu’on
explique cette dénomination comme on voudra, qu’elle ait été
importée par des étrangers appelés russes ou qu’elle fût une
appellation locale adoptée par les troupes des Varègues.
Naturellement à mesure que les princes de Kiev étendaient leurs
conquêtes sur les Slaves méridionaux — que nous considérons
aujourd’hui comme Ukrainiens — et sur les Slaves septentrionaux —
Ruthènes blancs et Moscovites — le nom de Russie était adopté par
les pays conquis, qui le considéraient comme une appellation
politique et jusqu’à un certain point nationale. Mais au sens restreint
elle s’appliquait exclusivement, entre le XIe et le XIIIe siècles, à la
contrée de Kiev [3] .
[3] Une remarque caractéristique c’est que le
chroniqueur nous présente le pays de Novogorod comme
la première base de l’expansion des Russes scandinaves
dans le monde slave. Mais pour les gens du pays de
Novogorod la « Russie » c’était Kiev et l’Ukraine, par
opposition à leur propre contrée. Ceci rend l’hypothèse
du chroniqueur bien chancelante.
Les Russes sont mentionnés pour la première fois dans les

documents grecs du commencement du IXe siècle, à l’occasion des
expéditions militaires qu’ils entreprirent, soit pour se procurer du
butin, soit pour entamer des relations commerciales, vers les cités
byzantines du littoral de la Mer Noire. Il est probable que c’est à
cause de ces expéditions que l’empereur grec se vit forcé dans les
environs de 835 d’entamer des négociations avec les princes
russes. Les annales carolingiennes nous disent en passant qu’en
l’année 839 l’empereur de Byzance envoya des ambassadeurs
russes à Louis le Débonnaire, afin qu’ils pussent retourner chez eux
en faisant ce détour, parce que la route directe leur était barrée par
quelque horde hostile. Mais peu de temps après, les expéditions
russes se renouvellent et, en 860, Constantinople elle-même faillit
tomber entre leurs mains. Le gouvernement grec dut se mettre en
frais pour établir des relations amicales avec les Russes : on leur
envoya des ambassadeurs munis de riches présents et des
missionnaires, conduits par un évêque, qui en baptisèrent un grand
nombre.
L’expédition de 860 est le premier fait historique, touchant la
Russie, que les compilateurs de Kiev du XIe siècle aient trouvé dans
les sources byzantines. Ils notèrent que c’était à partir de ce moment
que « les pays russes » furent connus et sans hésiter donnèrent pour
chef à cette expédition les princes de Kiev, Ascold et Dir, dont les
tombeaux gardaient encore vivant le souvenir. Il est curieux que le
chroniqueur n’eût pas la moindre idée d’un autre centre russe. De
même il faut noter qu’Ascold s’étant fait connaître par ses vertus
chrétiennes, on éleva une église sur son tombeau. Ceci évoque à la
mémoire le succès des missionnaires byzantins de 860, auquel on
rattache la mission chez les Khozares de Constantin-Cyrille, l’apôtre
des Slaves [4] .
[4] Un détail curieux permet de situer avec certitude
l’état « russe » du IXe siècle en Ukraine : le prince des
russes en 839 s’attribue le titre de Khakan (autre forme
de Kahan) qui est le titre des souverains Khozares.
Hilarion, dans le panégyrique qu’il a fait de Vladimir le
Grand, lui donnera plus tard cette qualification, que
porteront dans les documents postérieurs les divers
princes de l’Ukraine. C’est là un témoignage de
l’influence des Khozares sur l’Ukraine et sur le pouvoir
des princes russes qui se développait dans un pays où
leur action se faisait sentir.
Les sources étrangères — grecques, latines, arabes,

arméniennes, hébraïques — font surtout mention de ces Russes à
propos des expéditions qu’ils entreprirent en Crimée, en Asie
mineure, sur le littoral de la Caspienne, en quête de butin. Les
chroniqueurs de Kiev prêtent particulièrement leur attention à
l’expansion du pouvoir et de l’influence de leurs princes sur les
Slaves et autres tribus voisines. Mais les débuts de ce mouvement
dataient déjà de trop loin pour qu’ils pussent nous en donner des
renseignements précis dans son stade primitif.
Il est hors de doute que, déjà au IXe siècle, les princes de Kiev
étaient maîtres du Dniéper et de ses ramifications vers le nord, qu’ils
appelaient « route de chez les Varègues jusque chez les Grecs ». Et
cette dénomination était exacte, en fait, depuis la fin du Xe siècle et
le fut surtout au XIe siècle, alors que les troupes Varègues prenaient
habituellement ce chemin, pour se rendre à Byzance, où elles
s’engageaient dans la garde impériale, dont elles formaient le plus
fort contingent. D’après les chroniqueurs, c’est le prince légendaire
Oleg, qui se serait rendu maître de la voie du Dniéper, ce qui prouve
qu’ils n’en savaient rien de certain. De son temps les princes de Kiev
commandaient les voies terrestres et fluviales, qui menaient à l’est à
travers les contrées habitées par les Slaves et les Finnois jusqu’à la
Volga ; là se trouvaient dans les villes du pays les gens d’Oleg. Les
traités que ce dernier conclut avec Byzance font mention des « très
hauts et sérénissimes princes » et des « puissants boïards » qui sont
soumis à sa domination. Un traité d’Igor en énumère une vingtaine.
C’était donc une organisation politique assez importante, assez
lâche, peu centralisée, dont l’union était maintenue par les garnisons
« russes » et par les visites périodiques des princes, mais qui, traitée
avec énergie, pouvait fournir au pouvoir central des armées et des
moyens matériels considérables.
Le traité byzantin sur l’administration de l’empire, qui porte le
nom de Constantin Porphyrogénète, nous donne des informations
sur la pratique administrative du royaume de Kiev, aux environs de
940, l’époque d’Igor. Au mois de novembre, les princes à la tête de
tous les russes, sortent de Kiev et se rendent « en poludie » pour
percevoir les tributs annuels, que doivent leur payer les contrées
slaves de Novogorod, les Derevlianes, les Dregovitches, les
Krivitches (les Ruthènes blancs d’aujourd’hui), les Siverianes et
autres peuplades, qui leur sont soumises. Ils y établissent leurs
quartiers d’hiver, et au mois d’avril, quand le Dniéper dégèle, ils
rentrent à Kiev. De là ils expédient en bateaux par le fleuve et la Mer
Noire sur le marché de Constantinople les marchandises et esclaves
recueillis. Les Russes de Kiev, leur boïards et leurs princes sont en
même temps des guerriers et des commerçants. Ce sont les intérêts
de leur commerce qui gouvernent leur politique : les voies fluviales
de l’Europe orientale, gardées par leurs garnisons, constituent la
charpente de leur domination, dont les résultats se traduisent en un
substantiel profit commercial.
IV.
Le Christianisme.
L’histoire du royaume de Kiev au Xe siècle n’est qu’une série de

changements périodiques vers la consolidation ou l’affaiblissement
de l’état. Réunies par le système des garnisons, les tribus
ancestrales de ceux que nous appelons aujourd’hui les Ukrainiens,
les Ruthènes blancs, les Grands Russes, les Finnois et
probablement aussi les Lithuaniens, ne pouvaient être maintenues
dans cet état de sujétion que par les armes. Or les Russes de Kiev
n’étaient pas assez nombreux pour contrôler efficacement la vie
locale de toutes ces contrées ; leurs tendances visaient surtout à
s’étendre, à s’emparer de riches territoires et de centres
commerciaux importants.
Le règne de Sviatoslav, fils d’Igor (de 960 à 970) marque une
période d’expansion énergique. Ce fut l’époque de nombreuses
expéditions vers la Volga et sur le littoral de la Caspienne, de vastes
aspirations sur la Bulgarie et même sur Constantinople. Sviatoslav
reprenait à son compte le projet d’un empire gréco-slave, qui avait
déjà tenté le roi bulgare Siméon. L’habile politique de Byzance fit
échouer ses desseins. L’un de ses fils, Vladimir, après avoir réuni de
nouveau sous sa domination les contrées soumises à son père,
suivit une autre politique, qui marque le commencement d’une ère
nouvelle pour les nations slaves et l’Europe orientale en général. Il
chercha à établir un système de gouvernement plus solide dans le
royaume de Kiev, il s’efforça de consolider le pouvoir du prince, de
lui donner un fondement moral en relevant son prestige, au lieu de
ne lui laisser que la force comme unique soutien. Et de même que
beaucoup d’illustres souverains du moyen-âge s’étaient servis dans
ce but des traditions laissées en Europe par l’empire romain, il
s’adressa à Byzance.
D’abord il fait la paix avec elle, lui prête son assistance dans les
luttes intestines qui la déchiraient et en obtient en revanche des
titres, des insignes et l’appui de son église et de sa civilisation. Il ne
rêve plus comme son père de conquérir Constantinople, mais il tient
à devenir le beau-frère de l’empereur grec, à rentrer de quelque
façon dans la famille impériale, qui lui prêtera quelque chose de son
éclat. Ce n’était d’ailleurs pas une nouveauté : dans le traité
d’administration mentionné plus haut, nous lisons, que les princes
« khozares, magyares, russes et autres » en échange de services
rendus, demandaient à recevoir des mains de l’empereur la
couronne et les insignes impériaux. Ils avaient à cœur d’obtenir la
main d’une princesse byzantine, ou de donner en mariage une de
leurs princesses à un membre de la famille impériale pour relever
par là le prestige de leurs dynasties. Les efforts de Vladimir furent
couronnés de succès, et cette fois les conséquences en furent
considérables, parce qu’elles faisaient partie d’un plan habilement
conçu et poursuivi avec beaucoup d’énergie.
Pour lui avoir prêté secours, Vladimir demanda à l’empereur de
lui accorder sa sœur en mariage et, probablement aussi, de lui
envoyer la couronne et les insignes. C’est là, vraisemblablement,
l’origine des récits qui coururent plus tard au sujet des insignes
royaux apportés en Russie et dans lesquels un des souverains
postérieurs du même nom, Vladimir Monomaque, joue le principal
rôle. Une fois sauvé du péril, il fallut que Vladimir le frappât à
l’endroit sensible : il marcha vers la Crimée, s’empara de la
Chersonèse, de sorte que l’empereur dut céder. La princesse Anna
fut envoyée en Russie, Vladimir reçut le baptême et, comme il avait
pris avec lui de la Chersonèse le clergé ainsi que divers objets du
culte chrétien et de l’art grec, il se mit à implanter chez lui, à Kiev et
à propager dans les autres parties de son royaume la civilisation
slavo-byzantine.
Ni le christianisme, ni la civilisation byzantine n’étaient chose
nouvelle pour le pays : nous avons déjà mentionné le succès des
missionnaires de Byzance en 860 et le baptême d’Olga. De plus,
des fouilles récentes entreprises à Kiev, aux environs de l’ancienne
demeure des princes, ont mis à jour un cimetière chrétien, qui date
sûrement d’une époque plus ancienne que celle de Vladimir. Dans
les vieilles sépultures, tant à Kiev, que dans tout le bassin du
Dniéper, nous trouvons un amalgame caractéristique d’influences
byzantines et orientales — irano-arabes venant du Turkestan et du
Califat — que l’on remarque non seulement dans les objets
importés, comme tissus, pièces de céramique ou d’orfèvrerie, mais
encore dans les produits de l’industrie locale. (L’art de Byzance lui-
même était à cette époque fortement imprégné de goût oriental par
l’influence de la Syrie, de l’Arménie et de la Perse.) L’importance de
l’œuvre de Vladimir consista surtout à donner la prédominance à
l’influence byzantine sur celle de l’orient, en lui ouvrant plus
largement la voie qu’on ne l’avait fait jusque-là. Par dessus tout,
l’organisation d’une église chrétienne sur le modèle de celle de
Constantinople était grosse de conséquences : devenue, dès
l’époque de Vladimir, religion d’état, l’église se répand par les
canaux de l’appareil administratif et fait sentir partout son action
civilisatrice.
Les historiens de Kiev nous disent ouvertement, que
l’acceptation du christianisme avait été tout aussi forcée que
spontanée. Vladimir avait ordonné non seulement de détruire les
objets du culte païen, mais de baptiser de force les gens de Kiev et
des autres grandes villes. D’un autre côté, le paganisme chez les
Slaves orientaux n’avait pas de formes bien arrêtées, point de caste
sacerdotale, point de temples ou de sanctuaires nationaux ; c’était
plutôt un état d’esprit qu’un culte. C’est pourquoi il céda sans
résistance devant le christianisme, s’amalgamant en partie avec lui
pour former ce qui est resté dans la littérature chrétienne sous le
nom de « religion à double tradition ». Le petit nombre des
missionnaires empêcha la nouvelle religion de se répandre
facilement dans le fond des provinces, mais parmi les classes
dirigeantes, concentrées dans les villes, elle gagna rapidement du
terrain, grâce au soutien que lui accordait le pouvoir, grâce à son
excellente organisation, à sa hiérarchie, aux formes éclatantes de
ses cérémonies et enfin grâce aux arts et aux lettres, qu’elle avait
pris à son service.
Les églises et les monastères de bois ou de pierre s’élèvent de
toutes parts. De la Bulgarie et des villes grecques accourent avec le
clergé des architectes, des maçons, des artisans, des mosaïstes,
des joailliers, puis des peintres, des maîtres de chant, des scribes.
Les élèves se recrutent dans la population locale ; on les initie dans
le secret des arts. Vladimir enlève les jeunes gens aux familles les
plus distinguées et les donne aux prêtres étrangers « pour être
instruits dans les lettres ». A l’instar de Byzance, il bat monnaie ;
nous y voyons son effigie parée des insignes d’un basileus byzantin.
Modes, vêtements, parures viennent de Byzance, les classes
supérieures s’en emparent, puis les font pénétrer dans les couches
plus profondes de la population. Les clichés décoratifs, les sujets
littéraires byzantins viennent se combiner avec les dessins et les
fables slaves et orientales. Le royaume de Kiev, et avant tout le
triangle ukrainien, formé par les trois grosses villes de Kiev,
Tchernyhiv et Pereïaslav, devient le foyer, d’où la civilisation gréco-
romaine, sous son enveloppe slavo-byzantine, va se répandre dans
toute l’Europe orientale.
V.
Développement de la vie sociale et
nationale sur de nouveaux principes.
Le long règne de Vladimir (979–1015), suivi d’une courte

contestation entre ses fils, qui un moment se partagèrent son
royaume, puis le règne non moins long de son fils Iaroslav (1019–
1054) remplissent la période, où la réorganisation de l’état de Kiev
se poursuit, sur les bases jetées par Vladimir. Le chroniqueur de
Kiev caractérise cette époque de développement du christianisme
de la manière suivante : « Vladimir avait préparé le sol en éclairant le
pays par le baptême ; Iaroslav a semé la bonne parole au milieu des
fidèles, et nous (la troisième génération), nous en recueillons les
fruits en tirant profit des sciences. » Nous pourrions appliquer aussi
bien cette caractéristique aux autres domaines de l’édification
sociale. De même que les événements politiques de cette époque
nous rappellent, tantôt les grands rois barbares de l’occident, tantôt
l’âge de Charlemagne.
Les anciens écrivains de Kiev notent le changement brusque qui
survint dans la façon d’agir de Vladimir dès qu’il eut reçu le baptême.
Rude, sanguinaire, despote auparavant, il s’adoucit, devient
compatissant envers le peuple et se soucie beaucoup plus de faire
régner la paix dans le pays que d’agrandir ses domaines. Il s’entoure
non seulement de chefs militaires, mais aussi d’évêques ; il appelle à
sa cour les « anciens », les citoyens distingués à qui il « demande
conseil en tout ce qui touche l’ordre et l’organisation de l’état ». Par
exemple le chroniqueur cite les lois sur le meurtre, que Vladimir
modifia et promulgua après en avoir délibéré en conseil. Tous les
jours des tables somptueuses étaient dressées à la cour, que le
prince fût présent à Kiev ou qu’il n’y fût pas, pour les antrustions, les
fonctionnaires du palais et les citoyens de qualité. Les fêtes étaient
l’occasion de fastueux banquets publics, qui duraient plusieurs jours.
On préparait des centaines de jarres d’hydromel, on distribuait de
l’argent aux pauvres et l’on portait à domicile une part du festin aux
malades et aux infirmes.
Les anciens auteurs citent tous ces faits pour montrer l’influence
exercée sur Vladimir par le christianisme, qui avait transformé un
guerrier rude et sauvage en un prince plein de vertus et canonisé
plus tard par l’église. Mais on ne peut douter que ce ne fût là un
programme politique soigneusement suivi, qui atteignit
complètement son but : rapprocher la classe guerrière du reste de la
population, donner au pouvoir un solide fondement moral et en
général unifier l’état. Nous en trouvons la preuve dans la tradition,
qui a survécu à toutes les catastrophes politiques, passant dans la
poésie populaire, inspirant même les chansons épiques de l’extrême
nord, d’Archangel, et d’Olonets, nous parlant encore du « gracieux
prince Vladimir, beau comme le soleil » et de ses festins journaliers.
Le principe d’un état patrimonial, introduit par Vladimir et qui
s’affermit sous Iaroslav et ses descendants, apporta un autre appui
moral à l’organisation de l’état. Avant Vladimir, les membres de la
famille régnante étaient peu nombreux et l’on n’attachait pas grande
importance au principe dynastique. Vladimir, que la légende nous
représente comme très adonné aux femmes, eut un grand nombre
de fils, entre lesquels il distribua ses domaines, déjà de son vivant,
pour qu’ils les gouvernassent, remplaçant ainsi l’ancien système de
la vice-royauté par le régime patrimonial. Les débuts n’en furent pas
bien encourageants : à sa mort, ses fils commencèrent aussitôt à
s’entretuer pour s’emparer de l’héritage, tout comme l’avaient fait les
fils de Sviatoslav, y compris Vladimir lui-même. Mais le clergé,
soutenu par la nouvelle littérature ecclésiastique, tenait beaucoup à
ce système, qui imposait aux princes le devoir de se laisser guider
dans leurs relations mutuelles par l’amour fraternel et l’esprit de
famille. Le peuple aussi se rangeait à cette façon de voir, qui
semblait lui donner des garanties contre les discordes des princes,
dont il avait tant à souffrir. Ainsi au cours des temps, parallèlement
avec l’expansion de la morale chrétienne dans les classes
supérieures, l’idée finit par s’établir que le royaume de Kiev était le
patrimoine de la dynastie du « vieux Vladimir », une propriété dans
laquelle chaque membre de la famille princière avait droit à son
domaine particulier, à charge de veiller, tous ensemble, à ce
qu’aucune partie de ce territoire ne tombât entre des mains
étrangères. Le trône de Kiev devait appartenir à l’aîné, qui, dans ses
rapports avec ses frères puînés, avait le devoir de les traiter
« véritablement en frères », tandis que ces derniers étaient obligés
de le « considérer comme un père » et d’obéir à ses volontés. Cela
va sans dire, cette constitution patriarcale ne fut pas toujours
strictement observée en pratique, mais elle donnait en tous cas une
idée directrice et nous en verrons les conséquences importantes
dans la suite.
Cet ensemble de principautés était régi par les lois et décisions
prises par le prince aîné de Kiev « dans la douma » ou conseil
comprenant, outre les autres princes du sang et boïards, les
évêques et les anciens de la population. Nous en avons déjà
rencontré un exemple. Le plus ancien recueil d’arrêts et décisions
est connu sous le nom de « Droit russe de Iaroslav ». C’est un
compendium analogue aux leges barbarorum de l’Europe
occidentale ; il s’agit surtout de lois pénales, de mesures protectrices
en faveur du prince et de ses gens. La première partie porte un tel
caractère d’ancienneté qu’il faut l’attribuer à l’époque de Iaroslav ou
de Vladimir. C’est aussi à Iaroslav qu’appartient la fixation du taux
d’une contribution, que l’agent du prince ou ses aides ont le droit de
lever sur la population au cours de leurs tournées périodiques. Il
fallait défendre les sujets contre les agents du fisc dont la rapacité
était déjà un thème favori de la littérature de l’époque. A cette partie
primitive ont été faites de nouvelles additions provenant évidemment
des fils et petit-fils de Iaroslav et de la pratique judiciaire postérieure.
Ces lois et arrêtés de Kiev furent considérés comme les règles
de la procédure judiciaire dans les autres parties du royaume : les
historiens du droit reconnaissent aussi dans les monuments
législatifs et les arrêtés judiciaires des contrées de la Russie blanche
et de la Moscovie les mêmes principes, qui se trouvaient déjà dans
les compilateurs anonymes de la législation de Kiev des XIIe et XIIIe
siècles, qui conserve toujours le nom de « Droit russe ». Ainsi Kiev
donna des lois à toute l’Europe orientale, et cela pendant une longue
suite de siècles.
Mais ce fut surtout l’église qui constitua le plus ferme pilier de la
domination de Kiev et dont l’action contribua le plus à cimenter les
diverses parties du royaume. Iaroslav s’était appliqué à doter le
mieux possible l’archevêché de Kiev : il bâtit dans sa capitale la
cathédrale de Sainte Sophie (vers 1035), un monument de l’art
byzantin des plus précieux, qui, avec ses mosaïques, ses fresques
et ses sculptures, nous a été conservé jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Le
métropolite restera pendant trois siècles le chef spirituel du royaume,
c’est-à-dire de toute l’Europe orientale, ne dépendant de
Constantinople qu’au point de vue strictement canonique.
Indépendamment du clergé séculier, se fonde à Kiev, vers le milieu
du XIe siècle, le monastère devenu célèbre plus tard sous le nom de
monastère des cavernes (Petcherska Lavra), qui sera une pépinière
pour le clergé régulier et où se recrutera la hiérarchie de toute
l’Europe orientale. Après s’être concerté avec le métropolite, le
prince nommait aux évêchés vacants dans les provinces et les
« hégoumènes » (abbés) de Kiev conservaient ainsi dans la
hiérarchie l’influence du clergé de la capitale, de même que l’unité
de la dynastie et de l’aristocratie boïarde maintenait l’unité dans
l’administration civile. Ayant importé de Byzance le principe d’une
étroite union entre l’église et l’état, dans laquelle, en échange de son
patronat, l’église offrait au souverain ses services, le clergé
s’évertuait à relever le prestige de son patron immédiat, le prince
local et celui du souverain de Kiev, travaillant ainsi à
l’affermissement du système et à la consolidation de l’unité
nationale.
Pendant ce temps l’élément scandinave avait cessé de jouer un
rôle dans la formation de l’état. Au XIe siècle nous ne rencontrons
plus que quelques émigrants du nord isolés, qui se fondent bientôt
dans l’élément slave. En général il est difficile de savoir quelle a été
l’influence exacte de l’élément scandinave sur la civilisation de Kiev.
Les savants qui se sont occupés de cette question sont portés à
croire qu’elle n’a été ni profonde, ni persistante. En tous cas, à
l’époque de Vladimir et de Iaroslav, c’était bien l’élément slave qui
créait la civilisation de Kiev et organisait le royaume d’après la
tradition politique, venue de Byzance.
Et il s’agissait bien là avant tout de ces populations que nous
appelons aujourd’hui ukrainiennes. Le peuple ukrainien moderne est
sorti, sans aucun doute, par une évolution continue, des unités
ethnographiques, qui peuplaient aussi le triangle formé par les trois
capitales d’alors : Kiev — Pereïaslav — Tchernihiv. L’hypothèse
émise par quelques savants que l’ancienne population de ce
territoire aurait émigré vers le nord aux XIIIe et XIVe siècle, par suite
de revers subis dans la steppe et que le bassin du Dniéper aurait été
à nouveau colonisé par des émigrés venant de l’Ukraine occidentale
(Galicie actuelle), ne repose sur aucun fondement. L’élément
indigène, s’appuyant sur la zone boisée, y est resté fermement
implanté et la frontière septentrionale actuelle des dialectes
ukrainiens nous démontre clairement cette stabilité et cette
perpétuité de la colonisation ukrainienne. L’organisation de l’état de
Kiev et sa civilisation furent donc avant tout l’œuvre des tribus
ukrainiennes. Mais elles s’étendaient bien au delà du territoire de
ces tribus.
En fait, sous Vladimir, le royaume de Kiev était très étendu. Un
document de la chancellerie pontificale en trace les frontières ainsi
qu’il suit : au nord-ouest elles sont voisines de la Prusse, au sud-
ouest elles passent « près de Cracovie ». Au nord Novogorod,
Rostov et Mourome sont les capitales des apanages des fils de
Vladimir ; au sud-est elles embrassent Tmoutorokhan ou
Tamatarque, l’ancienne Phanagorie. Les tribus des slaves orientaux
ne s’étant pas encore beaucoup différenciées entre elles, toutes
s’accommodent aisément aux usages de Kiev et participent à
l’expansion de sa civilisation. Elles se considèrent comme faisant
partie de la Russie au sens large, elles en adoptent non seulement
les lois mais la langue et la littérature. Cela leur fait une conscience
commune, tout ainsi bien aux Ukrainiens, qu’aux Ruthènes blancs et
qu’aux Grands Russes. Mais les gens de Kiev exercent une
influence souveraine sur tout le système, ce sont eux les promoteurs
de la civilisation et ils seraient bien étonnés, s’ils pouvaient prévoir
qu’un jour les colons slaves de Novogorod et de Rostov
contesteraient à leurs descendants le droit de se considérer comme
les héritiers de la tradition kiévienne.
VI.
La vie intellectuelle.
Ces trois facteurs principaux : la dynastie de Kiev, la classe

militaire dirigeante russe, et la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et
administrative de la nouvelle métropole de la « Russie » [5] , avaient
puissamment contribué à étouffer l’ancien particularisme ethnique et
local des peuplades slaves et des tribus affiliées, d’où sont sorties
les trois grandes branches des slaves orientaux : les Ukrainiens, les
Ruthènes blancs et les Grands Russes.
[5] La forme slave de ce mot est Russǐ (nom collectif ;
Russin désigne l’individu ; l’adjectif est russǐski ou rusǐki).
La forme grecque était Rhos pour le peuple, Rhosia pour
le pays. La capitale du royaume de Kiev était désignée
dans les documents grecs sous le nom de métropole de
la Russie (Rhosias). Plus tard cette forme a été
également adoptée par la terminologie slave.
Les princes puînés, tout autant que les boïards Kiéviens, qui
allaient assumer des fonctions dans les provinces, avaient tout
intérêt à ne point être regardés comme des étrangers, mais à se
trouver partout comme chez eux. Il en était de même du clergé
métropolitain qui recueillait les prébendes provinciales, avec l’espoir
d’être rappelé à Kiev pour y remplir de plus hautes fonctions.
Aussi la nouvelle littérature, qui naît dans les monastères de la
métropole, se met-elle au service de ces tendances. Elle s’attache à
des thèmes d’un intérêt général, elle met en avant la notion du
« bien des pays russes », entendant par là les intérêts et les
aspirations du royaume entier, écartant toute manifestation du
particularisme.
La littérature laïque, cultivée à la cour du prince et chez les plus
puissants boïards, soutenait évidemment les mêmes principes. Nous
en trouvons la preuve un siècle et demi plus tard dans la chanson
d’Igor, œuvre anonyme, composée par un poète de la cour aux
environs de 1186. C’est l’intérêt des « pays russes », qui l’inspire,
elle fait entendre des admonitions aux princes, qui négligent la vieille
tradition de Kiev. Sans doute l’auteur ne fait que suivre les traces
des anciens poètes de la cour, dont il fait mention à plusieurs
reprises.
Après l’établissement du métropolite à Kiev, les premiers groupes
de personnes versées dans les lettres se réunirent sous son
influence et un des premiers essais littéraires fut le commencement
de la chronique de Kiev.
Jusqu’à la fin de cette période, toute la production littéraire du
royaume vient de Kiev. C’est là que se forme une langue littéraire
commune (κοινή). D’abord ce travail d’unification se trouvait facilité
par la présence à Kiev, aussi bien dans les monastères que dans les
rangs du clergé séculier, de personnes lettrées attirées à dessein de
toutes les parties du royaume et qui, dans ce nouveau milieu,
apportaient pour les polir et les fondre ensemble, leurs particularités
dialectiques provinciales. En outre, on s’appliquait sciemment à cette
uniformisation en s’attachant à imiter le plus fidèlement possible les
modèles fournis par la Bulgarie. C’est pourquoi les monuments écrits
de Kiev se distinguent nettement de ceux de Novogorod par
exemple, en ce qu’ils n’offrent guère de particularités dialectiques [6]
et qu’ils manifestent une tendance à demeurer toujours sur le terrain
commun des intérêts généraux de la « terre russe ». Ceci leur assura
une large pénétration dans les provinces. Ce qui nous en reste
aujourd’hui a été préservé presque exclusivement dans les pays du
nord, qui ont été moins éprouvés par les catastrophes postérieures
qui désolèrent l’Ukraine.
[6] C’est justement ce qui a fait naître l’hypothèse
mentionnée plus haut, d’après laquelle la population de
Kiev aux XIe et XIIe siècles, aurait eu un tout autre
caractère ethnographique, bien plus ressemblant à celui
des Grands-Russiens d’aujourd’hui, et qu’elle aurait été
remplacée plus tard par une émigration ukrainienne
venant de l’ouest. Nous l’avons dit, cette hypothèse ne
résiste pas à une critique sérieuse.
La chronique de Kiev, qui malgré les nombreux remaniements

postérieurs a toujours conservé le même titre : Povesti vremenych
let, se propose de « raconter chronologiquement d’où est sortie la
terre Russe ; qui fut le premier prince à Kiev et comment s’est
formée la terre Russe ». Dans sa première rédaction, qui date
probablement de l’époque de Iaroslav entre 1030 et 1040, le terme
« terre Russe » est pris dans le sens étroit, comme s’appliquant
strictement aux pays de Kiev et il ne s’agit que de l’histoire de cette
contrée. Mais déjà à une époque très ancienne, l’un des rédacteurs
élargit la matière de sa chronique, en incorporant aux récits de Kiev
ceux de Novogorod, lui donnant ainsi l’ampleur d’un ouvrage
« russe » dans le sens le plus large du mot. A partir de ce moment le
travail littéraire ne s’interrompra plus à Kiev. On y crée une histoire
nationale de tous les pays russes, où le particularisme n’apparaît
plus et où sont enregistrées, sans distinction de provenance,
principalement les traditions locales du christianisme, qui surtout
paraissaient dignes d’être transmises à la postérité. Le premier
groupe des rédactions s’arrête vers le commencement du XIIe
siècle ; elles sont suivies d’une vaste compilation de matériaux
historiques et littéraires variés, embrassant tout le siècle. Grâce à la
chronique de Kiev une foule de renseignements précieux et
d’anciens fragments littéraires ont pu être conservés jusqu’à nos
jours.
Du reste, il n’existait pas à cette époque de centre intellectuel qui
eût pu rivaliser avec Kiev. Au point de vue politique et commercial
seulement, on lui opposa au début Novogorod, la grande ville du
Nord en antagonisme avec celle du Midi. Les traditions historiques
des premiers siècles sont pleines des rivalités politiques entre ces
deux grands centres, l’un s’appuyant sur la Mer Noire et restant en
contact avec Byzance, l’autre sur la Baltique, entretenant des
relations avec les « Varègues ». Tantôt les princes de Kiev
s’assujettissent Novogorod, tantôt les boïards de Novogorod
soutiennent leurs princes issus de la dynastie régnante dans leurs
prétentions au trône, et obtiennent en échange des privilèges ou des
droits de souveraineté plus étendus sur leurs domaines provinciaux.
Mais depuis Vladimir et Iaroslav la prépondérance intellectuelle de
Kiev est assurée.
Autant ses chroniques dès le début du XIe siècle sont
abondantes, riches d’idées, estimables pour leur style, autant les
annales de Novogorod sont pauvres et maigres. Déjà sous Iaroslav
nous rencontrons un brillant rhéteur comme le métropolite Hilarion.
Le monastère des cavernes nous fournit les sermons de Théodose,
les hagiographies de Nestor et de bien d’autres anonymes, qui
malgré leur simplicité de style, révèlent des talents de narrateurs qui
nous attirent et nous fascinent. C’est encore à Kiev que sont écrits
de nombreux ouvrages historiques, dont malheureusement seule
une faible part nous est parvenue, comme l’histoire de la guerre de
Volhynie, écrite par un certain Basile. Puis ce sont des sermons,
point du tout dépourvus de talent, que divers recueils nous ont
conservés. De son côté, la chanson d’Igor, par ses allusions, ses
citations, son allure, évoque devant nos yeux toute une poésie
profane, s’épanouissant à la cour.
Quel est le centre provincial qui pourrait nous offrir rien de
semblable ? Où trouverions nous, soit dans les pays des Ruthènes
blancs (chez les Krivitches, les Drehovitches et les Radimitches),
soit dans les contrées des Grands Russiens, un foyer d’élite comme
celui-ci ?
Il ne manque pas de témoignages qui prouvent que, dans les
pays que nous venons de nommer, on regardait Kiev et la Russie du
midi comme une contrée bien distincte des autres territoires. Aller en
« Russie » signifiait à Novogorod se rendre en Ukraine. Dans le pays
de Rostov-Souzdal, nous voyons la population s’insurger contre les
fonctionnaires « russes », venus des villes du midi, c’est-à-dire de
l’Ukraine. Mais l’hégémonie de Kiev se fait tellement sentir dans la
politique et surtout dans la vie intellectuelle qu’elle dérobe à nos
yeux les différences qui existaient entre les trois principales
branches des Slaves orientaux.

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Challenging Economic Journalism Covering Business and Politics in An Age of Uncertainty Henrik Muller Full Chapter

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Challenging Economic Journalism:

Covering Business and Politics in an

ISBN 978-3-031-31029-4 ISBN 978-3-031-31030-0 (eBook)

Cover illustration: Nikolay Pandev / Getty Images

1 The Loss of Certainty: Journalism vs. the Economy 1

2 Peculiar Products: The Business of Economic News 11

4 Making Sense: Narratives, Journalism and the Economy 73

9 What to Cover: Topic Selection and Research225

10 What’s at Stake: An Outlook for Economic Journalism263

Henrik Müller (*1965) is Professor of Economic Policy Journalism at

Fig. 1.1 Freedom of the Press vs. Corruption Perception. Source:

Table 2.1 Varieties of Economic Journalism 26

The Loss of Certainty: Journalism vs.

When I aspired to become an economic journalist, it was pretty clear what

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

If economic journalism meant the combination of some kind of supe-

1.1 On Truth, Reality and Bullshit

emotionally charged views are exchanged instead of serious, facts-based

1.2 Of Minds and Markets

economic crises that have shaken western societies. Mediatization, in turn,

1.3 Problems, Priorities and Uncertainty

the discipline is underpinned by the notion of a theoretically achievable

1.4 Overview of the Book

journalism. We develop a set of relevance criteria for economic and busi-

being deprived of a continuous, comprehensive, balanced and indepen-

Peculiar Products: The Business of Economic

Information is a vital resource in a merchant society. When you trade with

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

2.1 An Executive Must-Have:

Newspapers in the Dutch Golden Age

frequent visitor to the offices of state of the government in The Hague,

England and the Continent

welfare—instead of leading to a tyranny of an ill-informed majority, as

Branching Out from Business

in their respective countries, with a readership not confined to the business

Economic journalism may contribute to opening up rigid political sys-

2.2 Why Bother? Properties of News as a Product

cognitive disadvantages, asymmetric information, and economies of scale.

holds, there are two modes of applying human intelligence: System 1 is

product quality is not judged individually ex ante, but consumers antici-

Economies of Scale (and Scope)

Digitalization and Its Discontents

2.3 Business First, Politics Fast:

A Taxonomy of Economic Journalism

Table 2.1 Varieties of Economic Journalism

Consumer The buying public Prices, quality, Consumers, “The Little

Source: after Müller (2017)

prices might be covered respectively: Consumer Journalism might focus

industry; and so forth. These professional readers’ motivations are not

professional, associated with a substantial willingness to pay. Positive exter-

Market Size and Readers’ Motivations

„Targeted“ Private Investor Consumer

Specialized Audience General

Increasing size of potential audience

(and/or marketable) audience is a necessary precondition of any media

Market Journalism usage is somewhat “political”, as denoted in Fig. 2.1,

welfare-economic argument can be made for giving the entire population

Bundling and Competition Laws

“Alternative” News Media

2.4 Solutions: Tackling Quality Uncertainty

As the discussion has shown, quality journalism is an improbable product

consumed in a recurrent mode. This is an advantage compared to, say, cars

Kiev, situé sur une hauteur, qui domine le Dniéper, un peu en

1 The Loss of Certainty: Journalism vs. the Economy 1

2 Peculiar Products: The Business of Economic News 11

4 Making Sense: Narratives, Journalism and the Economy 73

9 What to Cover: Topic Selection and Research225

10 What’s at Stake: An Outlook for Economic Journalism263

Table 2.1 Varieties of Economic Journalism 26