REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN.BANC

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA,
Petitioner,
-versus-
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in
his capacity as the PNP-Provincial
Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in
his capacity as Chief~ Intelligence
Division, PNP Provincial Office,
Ilocos Norte,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 193636
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION**
PERALTA***'
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA**
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

JULY 24, 2012

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DECISION

SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
1 Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under

Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc.

No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City,
Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.4

At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R.

Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile,
respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.)
William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), “Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country.”7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10
May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon
the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled “A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private
Armies’ Report to the President” (the Report).10
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final
order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
2 A.M. No. 08-1-06-SC, 22 January 2008.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-47; Decision dated 9 September 2010.
4 Id. at 47.
5 Id. at 4, Appeal by Certiorari.
6 Id. at 39-40, Decision; id. at 142-143, Affidavit of P/SSupt. Chan dated 21 July 2010; id. at 144-145,
Affidavit of P/Supt. Fang dated 21 July 2010.
7 108 O.G. 310 (Jan., 2010).
8 Named after the Chairperson, retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa. The
other members of the body included Bishop Juan de Dios Pueblos, D.D., Alleem Mahmod Mala L. Adilao,
(Ret.) General Virtus V. Gil, (Ret.) Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan, (Ret.) Herman Zamora
Basbaño, Dante Lazaro Jimenez, and General Jaime Callada Echeverria (+). Rollo, pp. 292-299.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Rollo, pp. 287-563; rollo, p. 20, Appeal by Certiorari; rollo, p. 591, Comment.

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte

(PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against
her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that “x x x the PNP organized one
dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group
(PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities.”16
(c) Attached as Appendix “F” of the Report is a tabulation
generated by the PNP and captioned as “Status of PAGs Monitoring
by STGs as of April 19, 2010,” which classifies PAGs in the country
according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent
personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry
in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to
herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from
the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference
held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission
was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had
11 Id. at 6, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 51-52, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
12 Id. at 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 52, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari.
15 Id. at 20, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 337, Report.
16 Id. at 20-21, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 338, Report.
17 Id. at 21, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 430-463, Appendix “F” of the Report.
18 Id. at 431, Appendix “F” of the Report.

been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more

than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were

based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report is that
the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed
groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission
which has continued communicating with the [Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP)] and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide
data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that
the Commission’s efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs
because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the
PAGs[’] movement through the PNP. Commissioner [Lieutenant General
Edilberto Pardo Adan] also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized
so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19

(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of

the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which
is truly reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the
Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation system to
include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent
briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven
(7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians
alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with
a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information
that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa
Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other
19 Id. at 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 348-349, Report.
20 Id. at 22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 364, Report.
21 The records refer to two different television news programs: the Position Paper indicates TV Patrol
World, while the Return of the Writ mentions Bandila; id. at 6-7, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 37, Decision;
id. at 59, Affidavit of Demijon Castillo dated 9 July 2010; id. at 133, Return of the Writ; id. at 147-148,
Position Paper of Gamboa; id. at 591, Comment.
22 Id. at 6-7, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 166, Position Paper of Gamboa.
23 Id. at 52-53, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.

people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance

operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the
following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNPIlocos
Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher
PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering
respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and
(e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to
RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after
finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a)
instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to
and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting
on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa
Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may
have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered
respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting
affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted
within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and
24 Id. at 52-54.
25 Id. at 48-58.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 113-114, Writ of Habeas Data dated 14 July 2010; id. at 115-117, Order dated 14 July 2010.
28 Id.

surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database

supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated,
namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS
DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated
murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect
assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-
04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for
failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or
threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or
security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data
or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010,
dismissed the Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion
of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs, [Gamboa]’s right to privacy indubitably
has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and
security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having
a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her
petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited
29 Id. at 118-145, Return of the Writ dated 22 July 2010.
30 Id. at 125.
31 Id. at 126-131.
32 Id. at 131-132.
33 Id. at 36-47, Decision.

powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and

destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is
likewise undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into [Gamboa]’s
activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis
therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa
Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in
the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxxxxxxxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
[Gamboa] alleged as she accused respondents, who are public officials, of
having gathered and provided information that made the Zeñarosa
Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and
forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks
at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the
Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that
they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the
benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before
respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have
already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as
the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose
information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24
September 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
34 Id. at 41-42.
35 Id. at 44.
36 Id. at 44-46.
37 Id. at 47.
38 Id. at 3-34.

2. The trial court erred in declaring that [Gamboa] failed to present

sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the
Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the
Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by [Gamboa] is
an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct
to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a)
Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court
correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present
sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of the report
naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful
order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be
done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding
of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She also
reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the
subject information originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the
writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of
the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an
extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy;
and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest
involved in the case at bar.
39 Id. at 7-8, Appeal by Certiorari.
40 Id. at 589-622, Comment dated 3 January 2011.
41 Id. at 647-656, Reply dated 29 January 2012.
42 Id.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus
enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of
liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections
raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional
right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
“Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed
the beginning of all freedom.” As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone
is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis “the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.”
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x [I]n the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: “Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any
house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Douglas continued: “These cases bear witness that the
right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one.”
xxxxxxxxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: “The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
43 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.

Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life,
is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.”44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory
bases of the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the
right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of
our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
44 Id. at 433-436.
45 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
national security, public safety, or public health as may be
provided by law.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal
Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of
trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy
is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of
Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right
to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that
the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim
respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute
right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters
of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary
financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is
46 Id. at 972-975.
47 G.R. No. 167173, 27 December 2007, 541 SCRA 456.

not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.

Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough
to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing
state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
48 Id.at 475-476 [citing Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 43; Gordon v. Sabio, 535Phil. 687 (2006)].
49 Manila Electric Co. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 5 October 2010, 632 SCRA 195, 202.
50 Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, 7 September 2010, 630 SCRA 211, 239.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine

law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas
data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its
origins from the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be
guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52
in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its
national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen,
worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval
Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone. 53 He was
refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register,
which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to
which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this
procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention
of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or
political background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of
information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal
to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference
in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the
interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel
control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national
51 Guadamuz, A. “Habeas Data vs the European Data Protection Directive,” 2001 (3) The Journal of
Information, Law and Technology (JILT). <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_3/guadamuz/>
52 26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433.
53 Para. 10.
54 Paras. 12-13, 15-17, 19.
55 Article 8. 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder of crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
56 Para. 47.
57 Para. 48.

security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion
in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59
The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference
corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow
judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities
enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only
on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular
nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to
respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of
protecting national security, for the Contracting States to have laws
granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and
store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and,
secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of
candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr.
Leander’s legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his
possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as
such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of
28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading
a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of
appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing
social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for
achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide
one.
xxxxxxxxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military
authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself
warrant the conclusion that the interference was not “necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security”, as it is the
very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures
the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis,
the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, §
58).
58 Para. 49.
59 Para. 56.

The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before

the issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and
the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise
the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion
that the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system
meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent
State was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of
national security prevailed over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr.
Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a
specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding
legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be
granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon
the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of
information by the PNP vis-à-vis the
interest of the state to dismantle
private armies
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It
also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the
issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
60 Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 24.
61 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 6.

investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling

them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275
clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to
the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents,
books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa
Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other
law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its
functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by
law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives
and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and
the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One
of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that
the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the
PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
62 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(a).
63 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(f).
64 Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
1990, Sec. 24(a), (b), (c).
65 Rollo, p. 338; Report.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission
was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that
the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to
refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to
privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligencegathering
and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the
PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on
individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that
the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court
declines to make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing
information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise
would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment
of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection
established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems
it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing
must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information.
After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from “unwarranted
66 Id. at 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 364, Report.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 193636
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” 67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to
the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The

assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
 03 Gamboa v. Chan
G.R. No. 193636 (2012)
J. Sereno / Tita K

Subject Matter: Habeas Data

Summary:
Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group. Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-
Ilocos Norte. However, the SC ruled that the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data must be denied
because the State interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to
a lawful mandate.

Doctrines:
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy.

It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Parties:
Petitioner MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PNPPROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF
Respondent ILOCOS NORTE, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O. FANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF,
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PNP PROVINCIAL OFFICE, ILOCOS NORTE
Facts:
Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent Chan was the Officerin Charge, and
respondent Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the
Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
Pres. Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), creating the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country.
Gamboa alleged that the PNP– Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Allegedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP-
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her
inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. She was publicly tagged as someone
who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNPIlocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. She appeared on ABSCBN evening news program and on print media.
As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining
a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her,
susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.
RTC
Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents contending that her right
to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed. She prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP Ilocos Norte database;
(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials;
 (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor;
(d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and
(e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.
RTC dismissed the Petition. RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy. Nevertheless Gamboa failed to prove
through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they
forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari.
Issue/s:

1. WON Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data. (NO)

Ratio:

NO – Gamboa should not be granted the privilege of the writ of Habeas Data.

 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:

“Habeas data.—The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”

 The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.

 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

 In order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

o The determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an
extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged
intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
o The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in
the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from
the latter.
o The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence gathering and investigation. Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
o Also, Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended
disclosure.
o This Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
 o Finally, the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the
private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
o Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Wherefore, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9
September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the
writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

(December 7, 1995)
Ponentia: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts:

1. Republic Act No. 4850 created the “Laguna Lake Development Authority” (Authority) – a Government
Agency that works toward environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
development. This agency is responsible for the development of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces, cities and towns in view of the national and regional plans.
2. President Ferdinand E. Marcos then passed Presidential Decree No. 813 amending certain sections of
R.A. No. 4850 as response to the deteriorating environmental condition of the Metropolitan Manila area
and the surrounding areas of the Laguna de Bay. Problems include the environmental impact of
development of water quality, inflow of polluted water, increasing urbanization and floods in Metropolitan
Manila.
3. Sec. 1 of P.D. 813 established a policy of development with environmental management and control,
among others for the Laguna Lake Development Authority. Special powers, pertinent to this case, were
also granted under Sec. 3. which include the exclusive jurisdiction of the Authority to issue new permit
for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including
navigation, construction, and
4. operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. The Authority also has the power to collect
fees for these activities and projects which may be shared with other governmental agencies and political
sub-divisions.
5. The Authority was further empowered by Executive Order No. 927 which enlarged its functions and
powers. Said Order also named and enumerated towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term
“Laguna de Bay Region.” The Chief Executive based this Order on an assessment that the land and waters
of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management.
6. Under Sec. 2 of E.O. 927, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. Coverage for “Laguna de Bay
Region” included several provinces, cities and towns around the Laguna Lake. Under Sec. 3, the collection
of fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries were enforced by the Authority.
7. Then, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enforced. Municipalities around
the Laguna Lake Region interpreted this law as delegating the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.
8. Municipal governments started issuing fishing privileges and fishing permits to big fishpen operators.
These unregulated issuances of Mayor’s permits to construct fishpens were clear violations of the policies
implemented by the Authority.
9. To solve the problem, the Authority issues a notice to the general public declaring as illegal all fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Bay Region that were not registered with the Authority.
The notice includes a threat of penalty of demolition and imprisonment and/or fine. After a month, the
Authority sent notices to the concerned owners stating that demolition shall be effected within 10 days.
10. Affected fishpen owners filed seven injunction cases against the Authority in various trial courts. Authority
filed a motion to dismiss the cases on jurisdictional grounds which was denied by the lower court.
Temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Authority from
demolishing the structures in question. Authority appealed the case to the Court of Appeals but the Court
dismissed the consolidated petitions of the Authority. CA established that LLDA is not a quasi-judicial
agency of the government and it cannot exercise quasi-judicial functions as far as fishpens are concerned.
CA the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisions of the LLDA Charter thereby devolving the
power to grant permits to the local government units concerned. Authority appealed to the Supreme Court
with petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction against the respondents.

Issue: WON the Laguna Lake Development Authority should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar
as the issuance of permits for fisheries privileges is concerned.

Held: Yes. The LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for
fisheries is concerned.

Petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they related to the
authority of the LLDA to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

Restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued against the LLDA are declared null and void and
ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct
and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region. Previous
issuances are null and void.

The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put by operators by virtue of permits issued
by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition
by the LLDA.
Ratio:

(1) Provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA No. 7160) do not repeal the laws creating the LLDA.
Therefore, LLDA maintains its exclusive authority over issuances of permits.
- The charter of the LLDA is a SPECIAL LAW while the Local Government Code of 1991 is a GENERAL LAW. A
basic rule of statutory construction is that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.
- When there is conflict between a general law and a special law, the special law will prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
- A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent law by mere implications.
- In Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty, this basic rule is upheld with an exception when the subsequent
general law has a manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. In this case, such intent is not proven
in this case.
(2) Legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission of environmental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development for the Laguna Lake Region.
- The power of the local government units, exercised through fragmented management policies, is
interested in fishing privileges for REVENUE PURPOSES. In contrast, the power of the Authority is aimed at
effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay Region for QUALITY CONTROL and
MANAGEMENT. Thus, the Authority is in a better position to manage the issuance of permits.
(3) Charter of the Authority prevails because it is a valid exercise of POLICE POWER of the State.
(4) Although the LLDA is not co-equal to the RTCs, LLDA is still a quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases that can issue ‘cease and desist order’ (Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA).

Padilla, J. (Concurring Opinion):

I fully concur. But I just want to say guys that the LGUs can still impose on those who apply for permit with an
additional local permit or license for revenue purposes. This would harmonize RA No. 4850 with RA No. 7160
(LGC 1991).

MMDA vs Concened Residents of Manila Bay

December 18, 2008; G.R. Nos. 171947-48 (Mickey)

Facts:
1. January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (with Atty. Oposa as their lawyer) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the

Manila Bay.
2. The complaint alleges that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential

Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

3. That the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

4. It was shown by the respondents that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when

what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the “SB”

level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

5. The RTC held the petitioners and other agencies jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB

classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. And within 6 months have a concerted, consolidated

and coordinated plan for the cleanup of the bay.

The various agencies have been instructed to perform their duties including defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures

and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which

eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate

in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
6. The petitioners appealed to the CA contending: 1. arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only

to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general and 2. that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act

which can be compelled by mandamus.

7. CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision as it did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

Issue:
I. Is the cleaning and/or restoration of Manila Bay a ministerial act of the petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus?
II. Does sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 pertain only to specific cleaning of pollution and not cleaning in general?

*Note: It is the MMDA and DPWH together with the LGUs that are the primary agencies tasked to remove and demolish the nuisance structures

and obstructions along the bay

Held:
I. Yes, It is a ministerial act.
a. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that “requires neither the exercise of official

discretion nor judgment.” It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a “simple, definite duty

arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.”

b. The court said that the obligation to perform their ( based on MMDA’s argument) duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to

carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
 c. The MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative

garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. This is provided in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924

creating the MMDA.

d. A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the

MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
e. The following agencies are therefore precluded from choosing not to perform these duties DENR, MWSS, LWUA, DA, DPWH, PCG,

DILG, PPA, DOH, DepEd, DBM and MMDA.

f. Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed “when persons or

entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public

places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds.”

i. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all

structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers,

waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila.

g. Furthermore it is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy

of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and

marine waters.
h. Lastly the court said that said: “All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and

complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that

their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.”

II. Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General
a. The Court finds for the respondents and their emphasis that Sec. 62(g) of RA 9275(Clean Water Act), far from being a delimiting

provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents

contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

i. Also Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to

a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
ii. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
iii. The Court quoting the CA decision: “PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and

management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution

incidents.”
b. The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of

the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.
c. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on

continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and

preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,” the

Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to

naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

d. The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along

drainage ways of the river system.

i. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized

structures would be on top of the list.

e. Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other

waterways.
f. Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of

the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. They should have their waste treatment facilities or otherwise should

be forced to transfer or shutdown.

g. The court then cites the ADB commissioned study on the garbage problem of Metro Manila in The Garbage Book which emphasizes

on the alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.

 i. The Court then calls for sufficient sanitary landfills now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological

Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and

possibly the MMDA.

h. The Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and

discharge their respective official duties and obligations.

i. Finally they reiterate what has been said in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology

need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to

exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the clean-up, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically the Philippine Environment Code or Presidential Decree (PD) 1152.
As plaintiffs a quo, respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit
to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The RTC ruled in the respondents’
favor.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five (5) other executive departments
and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners were one in
arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning
of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about
the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the
trial court decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws. Thus, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion periods, the
Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks.

ISSUE/HELD

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the bay

YES. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.
A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a
simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law. Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts
to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. 1 In the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid
waste & liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its
duty being a statutory imposition. Such duty is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act (RA)
7924 creating the MMDA.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of waste disposal, in this regard, is set forth not only in
the PD 1152 and Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), but in its charter
as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary for discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty
is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-
related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield the conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the
clean-up, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

Whether or not PD 1152 includes a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the clean-up of specific
pollution incidents

The PD does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution

1
As referenced from Social Justice Society v. Atienza, the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three (3) big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their
business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six (6) months from the effectivity of the ordinance.
 incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional
on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners
to clean up the bay, the same and their representatives cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible.

Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the powers and
functions of the Executive Branch

NO. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but
an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data
or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final
decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

In view thereof, the Supreme Court affirmed ― with modifications incorporating subsequent
developments or supervening events ― the ruling of CA.2
2
DENR to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time.

 DILG to direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their
respective areas of jurisdiction and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands
abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations.

 MWSS to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro
Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time

 LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage
in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time

 DA, through the BFAR, to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay and to assist the LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the
fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay

 PCG and the PNP Maritime Group to apprehend violators of laws and regulations designed to prevent marine
pollution in the Manila Bay

 PPA to immediately adopt measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid & liquid wastes and other ship-
generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators

 MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC,
and other agencies, to dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or
built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila; In addition, MMDA to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill,
as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision and to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
laws on pollution

 DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country
more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, to remove and demolish all
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 Freedom of the Press

JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the Philippine Press Institute (PPI) that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”

ISSUE:

structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna
De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay

 DOH, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, to determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies
have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

 DepEd to integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago

 DBM to consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding
years to cover the expenses relating to the clean-up, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila
Bay

 Heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group,
DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," from finality of
this Decision, to each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken
Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious and press freedom?

RULING:

No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the
exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its
application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in connection with the
latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
“it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a
tax on him for delivering a sermon.”

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes.
To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 249 SCRA 635

FACTS:

Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling dismissing the petitions
filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not “originate exclusively” in the HoR as required by
Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third
readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House
bill by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform
with the Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate, and not the HoR.

HELD:

Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first instance where the
Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in the
House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution (striking out the text and substituting
it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not
shown what substantial difference it would make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it
cannot be applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that
bills must “originate exclusively in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.” The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the
House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the
former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third readings.

Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their contention that such are
separate and distinct. The President certified the bills separately only because the certification had to
be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was being considered.

Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to insert new provisions. The jurisdiction
of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House.
It may propose an entirely new provision, given that such are germane to the subject of the
conference, and that the respective houses of Congress subsequently approve its report.

Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from
VAT is not expressed in the title of the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes
that the title of the R.A. satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.

Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having removed them
from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the
law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract clauses
and the rule on taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already
provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the base
of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power having authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in s similar situation.

Tolentino v Sec. of Finance

Facts:

- House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its
Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)

- Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House
Bill

- Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day

- Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which
eventually became the EVAT law.

Procedural Issue:

(1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of
Consti

(2) WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on separate days” requirement of the Consti

(3) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.

NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes.
After the passage of EVAT, they were already included. PAL contended that neither the House or
Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made
after the meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of RA 7166
Held:

(1) YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the House of Rep, but the
revenue bill which was required to originate from the House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from
the Lower House because they are elected in the district level – meaning they are expected to be more
sensitive to the needs of the locality.

Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate.
Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill.

(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the
requirement not only of printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate
accepted the Pres. certification

(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system
and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.
It is also in the power of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public
utility when the common good so requires.

One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of
pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their situation not because of any defect
in title but because they might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its
existence.

TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE Case Digest

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

1994 Aug 25

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630

FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from
the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT
on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate
the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of contracts.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contract clause under
Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the
sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law
would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract
but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the
exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth,
the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this
claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made
by a general, but only by a specific, law.

Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive
aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes - beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of
powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the
free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are
prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of
2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass
3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law
but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor
does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.

*****

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in
these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of
the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the
press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional."

Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on
the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its
application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the
latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
"it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a
tax on him for delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes.
To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution

Sahin v. Turkey
View this case and other resources at:

Bloomberg Law

Citation. Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99 (2005)

Brief Fact Summary.

A Turkish Muslim by the name Sahin (P) alleged that the Republic of Turkey (D) violated her rights
and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by
banning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher education.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Students rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious
clothing in institutions of higher education.

Facts.

Sahin (P) had a traditional background of family practicing Muslims and considered it her religious
duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. When she was in her 5th year at the faculty of medicine of the
University of Istanbul in 1998, the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which
stipulated that students with beards and wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to
lectures, courses and tutorials. Sahin (P) was denied access to a written exam and the University
authorities refused to enroll her in a course and to admit her to various lectures and other written
exams because of the Islamic headscarf she was putting on. She later left the University to further her
studies in Vienna and had lived in Vienna since then. Before leaving Istanbul, Sahin (P) filed an
application against the Republic of Turkey (P) with the European Commission of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms alleging that her rights and freedom under the Convention had been violated.
A judgment was rendered by the European Court after it heard the case.

Issue.

Are students’ rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms violated when a secular country places a ban on the wearing of religious
clothing in institutions of higher learning?
Held.

No. Student’s rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious
clothing in institutions of higher education. Constitutionally, Turkey (D) is a secular state founded on
the principles of equality without regard to distinctions based on sex, religion or denomination. In
1989, Turkey’s (D) Constitutional Court decided that granting legal recognition to a religious symbol
such as the Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the principle that the state education must be
neutral and might generate conflicts between students of different religions. The Vice Chancellor
explained the banning of the headscarf at the University School of Medicine in a memorandum which
was circulated that the ban was not intended to infringe on students freedom of conscience or religion,
but to comply with the laws and regulations in force and that such compliance would be sensitive to
patients’ rights. Hence, the ban did not prohibit Muslim students from manifesting their religion in
accordance with habitual forms of Muslim observance and it was not directed only at Muslim attire.
So the view of the Court should not be interchanged for that of the University who are better placed to
evaluate local needs. The right to behave in a manner governed by a religion belief is not guaranteed
by Article 9 and it also does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have
proved to be justified. By giving due regard to Turkey’s (D) margin of appreciation, the interference
here was justified in principle and proportionate to aim pursued. Hence, Article 9 was not
contravened.

Dissent.

(Tulkens, J.) Religious freedom is necessary for the protection of a democratic society and not
secularism alone. Therefore, the Court should have established that the ban on wearing the Islamic
headscarf was necessary to secure compliance with secularism and met a “pressing social need.” But a
cogent example supporting the Court’s view is not provided. Hence, the ban was not based on
relevant or sufficient reasons and therefore cannot be deemed interference that is “necessary in a
democratic society” within Article 9 S 2’s meaning. Sahin (P) right to freedom of religion under the
Convention has therefore been breached.

Discussion.

Margin of appreciation is the word-for-word English translation of the French phrase “marge
d’appreciation,” a concept used in a number of courts in Europe, among them the Strasbourg human
rights court and the European Union courts in Luxembourg. The Court is covered under the margin of
appreciation to account for the fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in different
signatory states, so that judges are obliged to take into account the cultural, historic and philosophical
contexts of the particular nation in question.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Citation. 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1942 U.S. 851.

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Brief Fact Summary.

Chaplinsky was convicted under a State statute for calling a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer”
and a “damned fascist” in a public place.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

“Fighting words” are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)

Facts.

A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is on any street or public place or calling him by any derisive name.
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, called a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned
fascist” in a public place and was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute.

Issue.

Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments violate his free speech
rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?

Held.

No. The lower court is affirmed.

Considering the purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free
speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes of speech
that have never been protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. These include “fighting
words,” words that inflict injury or tend to excite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of
such little expositional or social value that any benefit they might produce is far outweighed by their
costs on social interests in order and morality.

The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain
of government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter
of the meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the Statute as applying only to “fighting words”.
Therefore, the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right of free speech.

Discussion.

By holding that “fighting words” are not protected forms of speech the Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form of content based restriction on speech that is
permissible. The student should consider what characteristics distinguish a “fight word” from a bona
fide criticism. One difference may lie in the speaker’s intent. “Fighting words” are intended to inflict
harm, bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate ideas. Another difference may lie in the
differing likely effects of each: “fighting words” are likely to provoke the average person to violence
while bona fide criticisms are not
ROWARD TUBOG JD -1
USJR-LAW SY: 2020-2021

SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1

TOPIC: Residence Requirement (Domicile v. Residence)
TITLE: Marcos v. COMELEC
CITATION: G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing
that her residence in the place was seven (7) months. On March 23, 1995,
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she
did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she
lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for
the House of Representative. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under
residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s
proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed
itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that
she was the overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass
completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.
RULING:
Yes.

The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to
the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. It can be concluded that the facts supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.