Rule of Lenity

The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws,

including the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This
is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought
to be presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of
lenity. It is the doctrine that "a court, in construing an ambiguous
criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment."
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through
the lens of the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." Since the goal of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court
should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused.
Reference: Separate Opinion of CJ Corona in People vs Temporada, GR 173473

Principle of Dubio Pro Reo

The principle of in dubio pro reo (Latin for "[when] in doubt, for the
accused") means that a defendant may not be convicted by the court when
doubts about his or her guilt remain. The rule of lenity is the doctrine
that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the more lenient punishment.
=================================
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws,
including the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be
presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.
It is the doctrine that "a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient
punishment."

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through
the lens of the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."8 Since the goal
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable
to the accused.
Reference: People vs Temporada, GR 173473 - Separate Opinion of Justice
Carpio

Doctrine of Equipoise Evidence Rule

The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the evidence of
the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of
such evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused.
Thus, the evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to overcome the
presumption of innocence of the accused. The constitutional basis of the
rule is Bill of Rights which finds expressions in Sec. 1, par. (a), Rule
115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended (see People v.
Argawamon, 215 SCRA 652; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 101435, 8 November
1993; People v. De la Iglesia, G.R. No. 110991-92, 24 Feb. 1995).
Reference: Vicario vs CA, GR 124491 (1991)

Principle Favorabilia Sunt Amplianda

Adiosa Restrigenda
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC,
however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall
be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the
rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity
of laws.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is
well entrenched. It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in
these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying
our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the
general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question
favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised
Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x
x. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are
prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following
maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not
backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for the
future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a
prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law
justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism:
Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished
author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity,
and accepted by science.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a
right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the
right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based,
and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but
as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22
of the RPC applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as to
special laws,53 such as Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A.
No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No.
10586,60 to cite a few.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive
laws, not procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains
penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.

Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining
order) filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the
authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners
herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court
assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information.

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the
charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.

... the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to
the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup
d’etat before the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the
Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial

against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of
coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.

RULING
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by
holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is
‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly,
the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different
statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has
jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts
of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of
the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable
only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed
organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military
personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to
civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization
dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate
disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior
may question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or
injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil
court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed,
military discipline will collapse.
Reference: Gonzales vs Abaya, GR 164007 (2006 - En Banc)

Doctrine of Double Jeopardy

1987 Constitution, Article 3 - Bill of Rights
Section 27. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent; and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent’s husband and damage to the spouses’ vehicle.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information
in Criminal Case No. 82366 through a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803) for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

SC: We hold that xxx (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution
shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in
1954.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties
under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted?
Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging
all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the
scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Reference: Aguilar vs Judge Modesto-San Juan (Ponce), GR 172716 (2010)

Doctrine of Prejudicial Publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal
cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on
how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an
accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different.
US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of
pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and
present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised
in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile
criminal cases. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1955) later
reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al., 287 SCRA
581 (1998) we laid down the doctrine that:

"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print
and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to
a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-
gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the
art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our
idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of
touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members
are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx
xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part

of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro,
et al., GR L-30894 (1970 - En Banc), we rejected this standard of
 possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to
warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show
more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases
against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a
special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the
members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel
has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess
whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
Reference:
Estrada vs Desierto, GR 146710-15 (2001 – En Banc)

Doctrine of Executive Immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against
him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history
executive immunity will be most enlightening.

The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case

law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104
the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron
Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City
of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport
him to China.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive
was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important
matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive
spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of
 one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies;
a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to
the integrity of government itself."

One of the amendments of the 1973 Constitution involved executive immunity.

Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter,
no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President
referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this
history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of

the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since, the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can
be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make
it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160
(1986) that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity
is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the

scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of
the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It
declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that
'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained
the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The
Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim
that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts
committed during his incumbency.

Maxim: nullum crimen, nulla poena sige

lege
Applicable here is the familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum crimen nulla
poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no law punishing it.

Legal Maxim: “nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,” that is, that there
can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem
it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of
justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
References:
Evangelista vs People, GR 108135-36 (2000)
Corpuz vs People (Tangcoy), GR 180016 (2014 – En Banc)

CRIMINAL: The Doctrine in Nelmida

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two (2) kinds of complex crime: compound
crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes," not a complex crime.
Case Reference: G.R. No. 184500, 11 September 2012, 680 SCRA 386
Codal Reference: ACT 3815 - Revised Penal Code
Article 48. PENALTY FOR COMPLEX CRIMES. —
When a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Doctrine of Praeter Intentionem

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits
an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or
not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused.
References:
People vs Adriano, GR 205228 (2015)
People vs Herrera, 422 Phil. 830, 857 (2001)

Doctrine of Praeter Intentionem

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits
an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or
not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused.
References:
People vs Adriano, GR 205228 (2015)
People vs Herrera, 422 Phil. 830, 857 (2001)

Principle of Conspiracy
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and
Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.[23] In this
jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to
commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime,
and prescribes a penalty for it.[24] The exception is exemplified in
Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136
(conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection)
and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code.
When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the
agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their
community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one.[25] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose.[26] Hence, conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is
the express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the
co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always
shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form,
the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more
persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.[27] Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a
joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.[28]
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be
shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in
furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held
responsible for the results of his own acts.
Reference:
Arroyo vs People [Sandiganbayan], GR 220598 (July 19, 2016 - En Banc)
Plunder
Article 8 of RPC
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
It
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy,
and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere
possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even
when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted
when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of
proof required in all criminal cases.
Reference:
Ladonga vs People, GR 141066 (February 17, 2005)

[Mala in se vs Mala prohibita]

Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the
act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is
the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Reference:
Ysidoro vs People, GR 192330 (November 14, 2012)
Luciano vs Bautista, GR L-31622 (August 31, 1970 – En Banc), 145 Phil. 454,
464-465
The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches
then, he could not have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without
intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal.
SC: "When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."
Reference: Mabunot vs People, GR 204659 (September 19, 2016)

[Three-fold Liability Rule]

As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle
in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which
states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin
in these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others.
Reference:
Ampil vs Ombudsman, GR 192685 (2013)

[Doctrine of Prosecution
Evidence in Criminal Case]
G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019
People vs Gumban and Cheng
 Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the mandatory procedural
safeguards in buy-bust operations
Indeed, non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set
would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the
dangerous drugs as long as there were justifiable grounds for the non-
compliance and the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.[9]
Records of the instant case reveal that the absence of a DOJ
representative during the marking, inventory and photographing of the
seized items was due to the fact that it was already late at night.[10]
This explanation, however, was found unjustifiable and unacceptable in
People v. Miranda[11] and recently in People v. Lim.[12] Moreover,
assuming to be true, coordination with the mayor in securing the
attendance of a DOJ representative was not tantamount to a genuine and
serious attempt to secure the presence of the DOJ representative.
Indeed, appellant's failure to present any evidence for her defense as
she waived her right to do so was inconsequential. The well-entrenched dictum
in criminal law is that "the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." If the
prosecution cannot, to begin with, establish the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to adduce
evidence.
All told, the totality of the prosecution's evidence presented in this
case did not support appellant's conviction for violation of Section 5,
Article II, RA 9165 as the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the object of the sale which is an
element of the offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.

Variance Doctrine
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the "variance doctrine":

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When

there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
 ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the
latter.

Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether petitioner can be convicted of
the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding
that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification
of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

The Variance Rule (Sections 4 – 5, Rule 120): Accordingly, in case of

variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of
the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved.
Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is
necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of
falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As
such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the
willful act of falsification of public documents.
Reference: Sevilla vs People, GR 194390 (2014) - Reckless Imprudence

Can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in the information?
The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included
in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute
or form part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently,
the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily
included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved.
The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
source: Teves vs Sandiganbayan, GR 154182 (2004, En banc)

In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged
with qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610 91 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt
to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what
was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The
slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of
rape. People v. Bonaagua 94 discussed this distinction:

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora
of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches
through
the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape

sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding,

in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It
must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina.
This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it
cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting
Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault. 95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all
existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this
interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to
the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The
degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human
dignity."96
Reference:

Ricalde vs People, GR 211002 (January 21, 2015 – Second Division)

[Constitution's Grave Abuse

Clause]
**1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 8 - Judicial Department, Section 1
(second paragraph):

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.**

The Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by
the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo.

is comparable to the remedy of

Amparo libertad habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial
review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.
Writ of Amparo
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities
in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the
habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of
the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and
(5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the
agrarian reform process.
Reference: Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, GR 180906 (2008 – En
Banc)

["Multiple Publication" Rule on

Libel]
We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines.
Thus, in the cases of Montinola v. Montalvo (34 Phil. 662, [1916]) and United States v.
Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1971]),
this Court ruled that each and every publication of
the same libel constitutes a distinct offense.
Stated more succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art.
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same written
matter is communicated such communication is considered a distinct and
separate publication of the libel.
Reference:
Soriano vs Intermediate Appelate Court [Tantuico] GR 72383 (November 9,
1988)

[Doctrine of Prima Facie

Evidence]
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to
establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to
warrant a conviction.
Reference:
Salonga v. Cruz Paño, GR L-59524 (February 18, 1985 – En Banc)

[What is an Overt Act?]

II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be
shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in
furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held
responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection, the
character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:[29]
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre
for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases,
the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has
never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of
his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be
lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement
of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of
the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so
long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what
the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must
have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[31] the Court recognized two nuances of
appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy
and the chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the
hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the
spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to
succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each
spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are
multiple conspiracies.[32]
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy
involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed
against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President
Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused
individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States[33]
illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple conspiracies were established
instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31
independent individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US
Government. Although all the defendants were engaged in the same type of
illegal activity, there was no common purpose or overall plan among them,
and they were not liable for involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan
was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in
having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no
conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate
conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy.[34]

Animus Possidendi
Animus Possidendi
is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely
dependent on attendant events in each case.
may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused,
as well as the surrounding circumstances.
The case at bar involves the first imposition of the death penalty on a
woman, Josefina A. Esparas. Her crime is bringing to the country shabu whose
street value at that time was estimated at P30 Million.
 In the case at bar, there is evidence to believe that appellant knew the existence of the
shabu in her traveling bags. Upon arriving at the NAIA, her co-accused, Libed, managed to
obtain an official business (OB) pass to gain access at the restricted customs inspection
area. He tried dissuade the customs personnel from examining appellant's luggage but failed.
Appellant's used clothes were found inside the bags upon inspection. Upon further
inspection, shabu was discovered in the false bottom of said bags. Shortly after the
discovery of the shabu, and as customs personnel were arguing with accused Libed, appellant
walked away from the customs inspection lane without waiting for her other luggage to be
cleared. In an unmistakable attempt to run away, appellant and Juson clandestinely headed
towards the exit gate. They were fortunately intercepted by Agent Biteng. These
circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant knew the illegal contents of
her traveling bags.

Reference: People vs Esparas, GR 120034 (1988, En Banc)

Principle on Determination of
Probable Cause
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not
require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term itself implies,
probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or
even moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation
conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in Raro
v. Sandiganbayan, that:

x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may

be well-founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason
to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.39
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.40
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial.
It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x
x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
Reference:
Ampil vs Ombudsman, GR 192685 (2013)
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor
as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. (Words and
Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Reference:
Paredes vs Sandiganbayan (Gelacio), GR 108251 (1996, En Banc)
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that
one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will
lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without
probable cause. And the reason for the rule, as stated by blackstone, is
"that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice if
prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be
used at law whenever their indictments miscarried."
Reference:
Buchanan vs Viuda De Esteban, GR L-10402 (November 30, 1915 - En Banc)
.. When a fiscal investigates a complaint in order to determine whether he should
file charges with the court against the person complained of, the scope of
the investigation is far short of a trial of an accused before the
court. It is not required that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused must be
removed; it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to established probable cause that
the accused committed the crime charged.
Reference:
Trocio v. Manta (L-34834, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 241, 246)
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be
subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Reference:
De Lima vs Reyes, GR 209330 (2016)

Doctrine of Abuse of Superior

Strength
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that
is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely
selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in
the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon,
by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before
stabbing her repeatedly,
unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his
unarmed victim.
As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established
that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which
the woman was unable to defend herself.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of
both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5,
2011.

Willful Blindness Doctrine

MERE RELIANCE on another person in preparing, filing and paying income
taxes is not a justification for failure to file the right information on
income taxes.
In People v. Gloria Kintanar (CTA EB Crim. No. 006, Dec. 3, 2010), Ms.
Kintanar was charged with failure to make or file her income tax returns
(ITR), violating Section 255 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended. She claimed that she did not actively participate in
the filing of her joint ITR with her husband since she entrusted such duty
to the latter who, in turn, hired an accountant to perform their tax
responsibilities. She testified that she did not know how much her tax
obligation was; nor did she bother to inquire or determine the facts
surrounding the filing of her ITRs. Despite several notices and subpoena
received by the accused, only an unsupported protest letter made by her
husband was filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc found her neglect or omission tantamount to
“deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance”. As an experienced
businesswoman, her reliance on her husband to file the required ITR without
ensuring its full compliance showed clear indication of deliberate lack of
concern on her part to perform her tax obligations. This ruling was
sustained by the Supreme Court (SC) in 2012.
Based on the foregoing, the willful blindness doctrine was applied by the
CTA, as sustained by SC on cases where there is a natural presumption that
the taxpayer knows his/her tax obligations under the law considering the
factual circumstances of the case, such as being a businesswoman or
official of a company. This case set a precedent that mere reliance on a
representative or agent (i.e., accountant or husband) is not a valid ground
to justify any noncompliance in tax obligations. The taxpayer must inquire,
check and validate whether or not his/her representative or agent has
complied with the taxpayer’s tax responsibilities.
However, in the recent case of People v. Judy Ann Santos (CTA Crim. Case
no. 012, Jan. 16, 2013), the CTA Division seemed to have a change of heart
and acquitted Ms. Santos despite having almost the same circumstances as
that of the case of Ms. Kintanar. In this case, Ms. Santos was accused of
failure to supply correct and accurate information in her ITR. She claimed
that by virtue of trust, respect and confidence, she has entrusted her
professional, financial and tax responsibilities to her manager since she
was 12 years old. She participated and maintained her intention to settle
the case, and thus provided all the documents needed as well as payment of
her taxes. The element of willfulness was not established and the CTA found
her to be merely negligent. The CTA also noted the intention of Ms. Santos
to settle the case, which negates any motive to commit fraud. This was
affirmed by the SC in its resolution issued April 2013.
THE DIFFERENCES
“Willful blindness” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “deliberate
avoidance of knowledge of a crime, especially by failing to make a
reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing, despite being aware that it
is highly probable.” A “willful act” is described as one done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.
“Willful” in tax crimes means voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty, and bad faith or bad purpose need not be shown. It is a state
of mind that may be inferred from the circumstances of the case; thus,
proof of willfulness may be, and usually is, shown by circumstantial
evidence alone. Therefore, to convict the accused for willful failure to
file ITR or submit accurate information, it must be shown that the accused
was (1) aware of his/her obligation to file annual ITR or submit accurate
information, but that (2) he/she, or his/her supposed agent, nevertheless
voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally failed to file the required ret
urns or submit accurate information. Bad faith or intent to defraud need
not be shown.
As can be observed in the first case, the accused knew that she had to
timely file and supply correct and accurate information of the joint ITR
with the BIR in relation to the profession or the position she holds. The
knowledge was presumed based on the fact that Ms. Kintanar is an
“experienced” businesswoman, having been an independent distributor of a
product for several years. However, despite this knowledge, the CTA found
that she voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally failed to fulfill her tax
responsibilities by not participating in the filing of the ITR and ensuring
that everything was filed correctly and accurately. As compared with the
Santos case, which the SC affirmed, the element of “voluntarily, knowingly
and intentionally” was taken differently by the CTA in consideration of the
facts of the case. Ms. Santos fully entrusted her tax obligations and
finances to her manager since she was a child. It can be said that she is
not an “experienced” manager of her finances and taxes since she never
handled such task, as compared with the situation of Ms. Kintanar, who is
considered an experienced businesswoman who manages her business as well as
her financial and tax responsibilities -- which is expected of somebody in
her position (i.e., president and/or businessperson).
The concept of willful blindness doctrine is new in Philippine
jurisprudence. The application of this doctrine by the CTA in the said
cases was guided by the appreciation of the facts and the pieces of
evidence produced by the prosecution and accused to prove the non-existence
of willfulness. However, defined and clear standards in its application
must be done as guidance for future application. This is necessary to avoid
arbitrary application and to encourage proper use of the doctrine by both
parties in the case.

Doctrine of Libelous Speech

Libel - Guingguing vs CA, G.R. No. 128959 (September 30, 2005)
Criminal libel laws present a special problem. At face value, they might strike as laws
passed that abridge the freedom of speech, expression, or the press.
Whatever seeming conflict between these two precepts has long been
judicially resolved with the doctrine that libelous speech does not fall
within the ambit of constitutional protection. Nonetheless, in ascertaining
what class of materials may be considered as libelous, the freedom of
expression clause, its purposes as well as the evils it guards against,
warrant primordial consideration and application.
Posted 24th February 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Hernandez Doctrine or Political
Offense Doctrine
Section 48 of the Penal Code, providing for penalties for complex crime,
says that "when an offense is a necessary means to commit the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period

Doctrine Tenacious Resistance

G.R. No. 175946, People v. Dadulla
Suffice to state this assertion is utterly trivial in nature and does not
affect the merits of the case. It bears to stress that in rape cases, the
law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because
it is not an element of rape.[12] Thus, the failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the
criminal act of the offender.

Jumawan Ruling | martial rape

The Court has firmly established martial rape in People v. Jumawan, 94
ruling that “[h]usbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.”95 The accused was charged and found guilty of two
counts of rape committed by means of force upon a person:
This doctrine was reiterated in Quintos, where the accused alleged that the
victim was his sweetheart. There, the Supreme Court stated that “[R.A. No.]
9262 recognizes that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may
be raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts by
stating that committing acts of rape against these persons are considered
violence against women

Doctrine of Consent
Dulay, G.R. No. 144344-68.
that is initially given by the woman. Thus: At common law rape could be
committed only where the unlawful carnal knowledge of a female was had
without her consent or against her will; lack of consent was an essential
element of the offense; and there can be no rape in the common-law sense
without the element of lack of consent. Under the statutes punishing the
offense, an essential element of the crime of rape is that the act was
committed without the consent of the female, or, as it is otherwise
expressed, against her will. The act of sexual intercourse is against the
female’s will or without her consent when, for any cause, she is not in a
position to exercise any judgment about the matter.
Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she
is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent. Thus, mere copulation, with the woman passively acquiescent, does
not constitute rape. The female must not at any time consent; her consent,
given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if
accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from
being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.
Thus, where a man takes hold of a woman against her will and she afterward
consents to intercourse before the act is committed, his act is not rape.
However, where the female consents, but then withdraws her consent before
penetration, and the act is accomplished by force, it is rape; and where a
woman offers to allow a man to have intercourse with her on certain
conditions and he refuses to comply with the conditions, but accomplishes
the act without her consent, he is guilty of rape.93 The last underscored
sentence, which qualifies consent in such a way that rape can still be
committed despite initial consent having been given, has been omitted in
Butiong when it quoted CJS. Thus, when Amarela reiterated the same
pronouncements, it stops at “provided the consent is willing and free of
initial coercion”—making the presence or absence of such “initial consent”
the only basis of whether rape was committed