CHIEFS AND THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MALAWI: A HISTOR-

ICAL PERSPECTIVE

GW Kayira and PC Banda

West Virginia University,United States of America
ABSTRACT

This article describes the historical relationship between the state and chiefs in
colonial and post-colonial Malawi. It pays attention to the changes the state
has introduced over time in its quest to integrate chiefs into local government
structures. Unlike studies that reduce chiefs into obedient servants of pol-
iticians with little political agency, we pay attention to how chiefs have influ-
enced state decisions on the institution of chieftainship from the 1950s to the
end of the twentieth century. Relying mostly on documented sources, we ar-
gue that the state has over the years included chiefs in decentralised local
government structures not so much as a strategy of achieving effective ad-
ministration of local assemblies but as one for containing political challenges
of the time. Chiefly political capital, mostly manifesting through the capac-
ity of chiefs to command legitimacy among the rural masses, has significant-
ly influenced state bureaucrats and politicians over the years. We suggest
that if carefully harvested, this level of legitimacy could be a springboard
for building more active and participatory local government institutions.

Keywords: Chiefs, Decentralisation, Local Government, Political Capital

1. INTRODUCTION trict Administrative (Native) Ordinance

The historiography of the relationship
between chiefs and the state in South-
ern Africa has followed the major his-
torical turning points of the time. In
the case of Malawi, up until the 1970s,
the scholarly emphasis was on under-
standing how the state used chiefs
to achieve specific administrative or
political goals (Graham-Jolly, 1955;
Robinson, 1961, Baker, 1975;). From
these pioneering works and others
(Cross & Kutengule, 2001; Cammack
et al., 2009), it becomes clear that
contemporary notions of using chiefs
in local government have a long his-
tory and one that dates as far back
as 1912. That was the year when the
colonial government passed the Dis-
(DANO), according to which, the
state-appointed Principal Headmen
among African chiefs to assist in the
administration of the protectorate. Be-
tween 1912 and 1999, the institution of
chieftainship passed through multiple
changes most of which aimed at re-
defining the best position of chiefs un-
der prevailing political circumstances.
In this article, we describe these
changes by paying attention to those
relating to local government restruc-
turing. Theoretically, we locate our
study in Englebert’s (2002) “dualism of
structures of power” thesis, according
to which the state in Africa has com-
peted with traditional leaders for the
allegiance of citizens. In the case of

84 GW Kayira and PC Banda

Malawi, such a dualised process (or
‘mixed polity’ or mixed government’),
we argue, manifested itself in instanc-
es where the traditional leaders were
either formally recognised through
constitutional and policy changes or
thoroughly repressed, depending on
the specific interests of the state. Exist-
ing evidence shows that the state has
included chiefs in decentralised local
government structures not so much as
a strategy of achieving effective ad-
ministration but as one employed to
contain the prevailing political chal-
lenges. In doing so, political leaders
have tapped on chiefly political cap-
ital and the level of legitimacy chiefs
command among the rural masses.
We demonstrate that right from the
late colonial period (the early 1950s to
mid-1960s), local government reforms
have remained elusive and barely
aiming at integrating chiefs into the
formal governance structures. This sce-
nario has created an administrative
vacuum which politicians have read-
ily filled in to achieve political ends.
However, unlike existing literature
such as the one highlighted above,
including Chiweza (2008) which de-
pict chiefs as victims of bureaucratic
machination, we argue that whether
in overt or covert ways, chiefs have
played influential roles in driving the
course of administrative restructuring.
They have possessed political capi-
tal, making them command a certain
degree of legitimacy in local politics.
We suggest that if adequately inte-
grated into the formal administrative
structures, chiefly privileged position
among the masses could be a bed-
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
rock for building more effective partic-
ipatory local government institutions.
2. THE COLONIAL STATE AND CHIEFLY
AUTHORITY
While chiefs exercised influence in
local politics way before the British
declared a protectorate on Nyasa-
land in 1891, it was only in 1933 that
chiefly authority became thoroughly
integrated into the colonial admin-
istrative structures. It was in that year
that the colonial state passed the Na-
tive Authority and Native Courts Or-
dinances, and officially inaugurated
Indirect Rule in the protectorate. The
Native Authority Ordinance revised
the DANO and elevated most of the
Principal Headmen into Native Au-
thorities with jurisdiction over a wider
geographical area within the district.
The state gave chiefs the mandate
to collect taxes and use part of it on
native authority affairs. More signifi-
cantly, the Native Courts Ordinance
gave the Native Authorities powers
to preside over civil cases in the tra-
ditional courts set up under it. All Na-
tive Authorities fell directly under the
control of the Provincial and District
Commissioners and were subject to
deposition in the event of serious mis-
conduct. In doing so, the colonial
state had succeeded in subjecting
chiefs under its control (Baker, 1975).
While most of such changes were
localised, they were not without im-
perial context. They were primarily a
response to Frederick Lugard’s (the
then Governor of British-ruled Nigeria)
critique of the Direct Rule, the system
85
of administration which saw the state
sidelining the local authorities in the
administration of the colonies. He sug-
gested a system of administration (the
Indirect Rule) that would empower
the local authorities to perform spe-
cific tasks to aid the colonial govern-
ment. These broader developments
also influenced later changes in the
office organisation and duties of the
native authorities in Nyasaland. Of
significance to our discussion are pro-
posals to introduce local governments
across British colonies emerging in the
post-War (Second World War) peri-
od with the ascendancy to power
of the Labour Government in Britain.
In the wake of growing native unrests
across Africa, the Labour Government
sought to promote inclusive institu-
tions that would take on board the
interests of different groups of people
in the colonies. For instance, to bring
the chiefs along the values of colonial
governance, the colonial authorities in
Nyasaland provided training to the na-
tive authorities. Accompanied by their
wives, the government recruited chiefs
to attend a four-month training course
at Jeanes Center, at Domasi in Zomba.
The courses taught included the rights
and duties of a chief and the survey
of a village; The courses also dealt
with such areas as population, health,
economic, and social conditions.
Hygiene and sanitation, agriculture,
simple arithmetic and bookkeeping,
history and geography of Nyasaland,
and English comprised the most signif-
icant scholastic subjects. The indirect
rule policy also brought about high re-
muneration for chiefs, mostly under a
86 GW Kayira and PC Banda
fixed salary policy, which saw the prin-
cipal native authorities net as high as
£150 per annum. This policy contrast-
ed with the previous one (1912-1933) in
which chiefs were remunerated based
on the amount of money they col-
lected in tax (Lord Hailey, 1979: 259).
In the post-World War II era, there
were significant policy changes.
Highly popularised by Arthur Creech
Jones, the Secretary of State for Col-
onies (1946-1950), the existing Native
Authorities were rendered less useful.
Instead, the state sought to incorpo-
rate the educated elite and emerg-
ing nationalist leaders in the gover-
nance structures and systems. Most
of these accused the state of side-
lining them in colonial governance
in favour of the less-educated chiefs.
The proposal to create local govern-
ments (District Councils) with elected
members, effectively replacing the
Native Authorities, was, therefore,
part of the detribalization project in
which the colonial government was
slowly moving towards an active
partnership with the more enlight-
ened members of the African soci-
ety (Kelemen, 2006; Vaughan, 2006).
It was part of the Labour Government’s
attempts to contain or at least slow
down the anti-colonial campaign, the
adherents of which were both the in-
ternational community and Africans.
Moreover, it constituted one among
the three solutions the Labour Gov-
ernment put on the table to reform
colonialism – the other two were pro-
posals to promote Africa’s develop-
ment, and legalise trade unions along
the lines as conceptualised by Lon-
don (Cooper, 2005; Kelemen, 2006).
Consequently, in 1953 the Nyasaland
government passed the District Coun-
cils Ordinance and established, on a
pilot basis, multiracial District Councils
beginning with Cholo (Thyolo) District
in the same year. Later in 1954, the
changes were extended to Ntcheu,
Nkhata-Bay, Dedza, Rumphi and
Karonga Districts. Under the 1953 District
Councils Ordinance, chiefs became
the ex-official members of the District
Councils which fell under the chair-
manship of the District Commissioner.
While most of the council members
were initially nominated, the arrange-
ment was to move towards elected
membership. In any case, chiefs no
longer had direct control over the af-
fairs of their respective areas. Again,
as ex-official members, they were not
allowed to vote (Graham-Jolly, 1955).
It did not take long before this ex-
perimentation with multiracial District
Councils ruptured. The central gov-
ernment’s attempt to incorporate the
otherwise irate African elites in local
district administration came at the
expense of depriving chiefs of their
former powers. In the wake of late
1950s opposition, the central govern-
ment sought to separate chiefs from
the councils in ways that would help
it regain its control over them (Baker,
1975: 153-157). In 1960, it amended
both the Native Authorities and the
District Councils Ordinances there-
by divorcing chiefs from the councils.
This administrative reorganisation
brought the chiefs firmly under the
direct control of the central govern-
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
ment. Native Authorities were no lon-
ger under the control of the District
Councils. Again, the state reinstated
chiefly powers over the control of lo-
cal resources, just like it did with their
previous powers to make rules, so long
as they were not in conflict with the
District Councils’ by-laws. What the
preceding discussion demonstrates,
therefore, is that the chiefs were at the
mercy of colonial bureaucrats who
would adjust the chieftaincy to ad-
dress specific administrative and polit-
ical challenges. Such analyses, how-
ever, obscure more than reveal the
critical roles chiefs played in the decol-
onisation process and how they have
over time influenced those in power.
Their story is thus told only through the
lens of the political elite. Within this
framework, the ways in which chiefs
sought to negotiate their involvement
in the changing political times during
the later colonial period and after
independence become obscure.
We argue that once the call for Nyasa-
land’s (Malawi’s) independence from
the British colonial rule became prom-
inent, the country’s chiefs became
significant political players often influ-
encing crucial decisions about the in-
stitution of chieftainship not just during
the period of political transition but also
way after the country attained inde-
pendence in 1964. Between 1950 and
1963, for instance, chiefs were import-
ant power brokers and posed a threat
to both the colonial authorities and
the nationalist leaders. In the wake of
growing levels of detribalisation of the
1950s, the government issued a poli-
cy to appoint ordinary members into
Chief Councils (Chiefs-in Councils) in
87
preparation for fully-fledged District
Councils (Graham-Jolly, 1955:198).
Chiefs were however aware of the
erosion of their power and were
equally anxious about their future.
Moreover, nationalists considered
them as stooges of the colonial au-
thorities deployed to frustrate the
cause of decolonisation. For instance,
there were concerns to the effect that
“the central colonial government was
suppressing the emergence of na-
tionalist leaders by over-boosting the
prestige of traditional rulers” (Baker,
1975:49). The colonial government re-
futed such allegations arguing chiefs
were not acting under any official in-
fluence. Chiefs were however aware
that power was slowly shifting towards
the new elite and therefore acted in
ways that cemented their authority
among the masses. Proposals for the
establishment of the Central African
Federation, a single political entity
(comprising what is now Malawi, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe) and which lasted
from 1953-64, further aggravated their
fears, forcing them to create a niche
for themselves within the politics of
the time to consolidate their power.
Between 15 and 16 November 1952,
more than 100 chiefs convened in Li-
longwe and passed a resolution to
send a delegation to London to pro-
test the formation of the Federation. In
January the following year, nine chiefs
(including other representatives) ar-
rived in London armed with a petition
addressed to Her Majesty, Queen Eliz-
abeth the Second, with an attach-
ment of over 100 signatures (Petition
Against Central African Federation,
88 GW Kayira and PC Banda
January 19, 1953. H.K Banda Archive,
Indiana University Library). When it be-
came clear that there would be no
change of position on the Federation,
sixteen chiefs resigned in June 1953 in
protest of the decision. They argued
that the Federation would erode their
authority and contribute to loss of land
through the influx of white settlers from
Southern Rhodesia (The Nyasaland
Times, June 20, 1953). Among them,
eleven rescinded their resignation, but
Native Authorities Mwase of Kasungu,
who also doubled as the president of
the Supreme Council of Nyasaland
Chiefs, Kapeni of Blantyre, and Msa-
mala of Zomba remained adamant.
They were joined respectively, by
Subordinate Authorities Kaluluma and
Kumtumanji of Kasungu and Zomba.
In the same year, Chief Phillip Goma-
ni of Ntcheu organised his people to
protest the Federation through civil dis-
obedience. He ordered his people to
refuse to pay taxes and to disobey the
soil conservation regulations the gov-
ernment imposed on the colony (Ka-
linga, 1996:447). In response, the colo-
nial government arrested Gomani, an
act which led to the outbreak of wide-
spread riots in Ntcheu District. Chief
Gomani was later deposed and even-
tually died in prison. Again, in August of
1953, the government arrested Chief
Ngamwane of Thyolo (Luchenza area).
Ngamwane was the ringleader in the
protests against a Mr. Basil Tennette,
an estate owner who was alleged to
have killed some Africans who stole
his oranges. The arrest of Chief Ngam-
wane also provoked massive riots
among the masses and only subsided
after the authorities released the chief
from Blantyre police station (Kalinga,
1996:448). Elsewhere in Domasi, the
police shot dead two people when
they protested the court trial of their
chief who had allegedly led them into
civil disobedience (Kalinga, 1996: 448).
Following the disturbances, the gov-
ernment moved with speed to amend
the District Native Ordinance and
enact the multiracial District Councils
Ordinance later in December 1953.
Far less clear is the coincidence in the
changes and events described here.
However, as noted above, the integra-
tive nature of the councils would help
to constrain the alienation of chiefs to-
wards the nationalist elites. Moreover,
in his campaign for the establishment
of District Councils, the Secretary for
African Affairs emphasised the need
for togetherness which, as he saw
it, could best be achieved through
multiracial local governments uniting
different groups of people in the col-
onies at district levels (Baker, 1975:45).
It was, therefore, less surprising that
Cholo District, the seat of the distur-
bances, became the first in piloting
District Councils, followed by Ntcheu
and other equally volatile districts.
We can note similar calculations in the
1960 changes to the District Council.
In the wake of the late 1950s distur-
bances leading to the 1959 Nyasaland
State of Emergency (also declared in
Southern and Northern Rhodesia), the
colonial government divorced the Na-
tive Authorities from the District Coun-
cil. The experimentation with multi-
racial District Council had flopped.
Instead, the colonial government
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
brought the chiefs under the control
of the central government as one way
of retaining the masses whom the lat-
ter ably commanded (Baker, 1975).
Subsequently, the two sides (colonial
authorities and nationalists) went to
the constitutional talks in London in
1960 fully recognising chiefs as an influ-
ential interest group. As per their tradi-
tion, Chiefs went to the Constitutional
Conference with yet another petition
of over 120 signatures gathered from
the Southern Province of Nyasaland
and addressed to the Secretary of
State for Colonies, Ian MacLeod. “[We]
beg to inform you,” the petition read,
“that the people of Nyasaland are all
united in one front, and that is seces-
sion and self-government now…we
do not make any mistakes about this”
(Memorandum from Chiefs of Nyasa-
land to Secretary of State for Colonies,
July 1960. H.K Banda Archive). Again.
before their inclusion in the delegation
to the 1960 Constitutional Conference,
some of the chiefs wrote letters of pro-
test to the Nyasaland Government.
In one of the letters, the chiefs, who
were initially excluded from the list
of delegates, argued that it was not
enough for the people of Nyasaland
to be represented at the Constitution-
al Talks by a meagre two African mem-
bers of the Legislative Council (Legco),
whom they argued did not command
substantial support among the African
masses. The chiefs also deplored the
inclusion of Asians and other European
settlers on the delegation, arguing that
the two groups did not represent the
interests of the local masses (Memo-
randum by Nkhata-Bay Chiefs to Chief
89
Secretary, Nyasaland Government.
22 June 1960. H.K. Banda Archive).
Chiefs Chikumbu, Chinde, Kuntaja,
Makanjira, and Masula finally repre-
sented their group in the company
of party officials from Malawi Con-
gress Party, United Federal Party,
Congress Liberation Party and others
(Nyasaland Constitutional Confer-
ence Report, 1960). Chiefs appear to
have achieved their objective, with
the conference report affirming that
“the traditional political institutions
in Nyasaland must be harmonious-
ly reconciled with the development
of parliamentary government at the
center so that that modern democrat-
ic government can be established in
an orderly way” (Nyasaland Consti-
tutional Conference Report, 1960:8).
The report had thus broken the stale-
mate between nationalists and the
colonial authority in their battle to win
the hearts and minds of chiefs. Fur-
thermore, the report recommended
the immediate implementation of the
conclusions of the conference, effec-
tively calling for the inclusion of chiefs
in the government that would emerge.
Ironically, when different parties met in
London for the November 1962 Con-
stitutional Conference, chiefs were
not invited nor were chiefly affairs de-
liberated. The absence of chiefs at the
conference should not be surprising.
Earlier in June the same year, the Af-
rican-dominated Legislative Council
had successfully abolished the old
system of Native Authority Courts.
The primary argument of the debate
on the ‘Bill to scrape off local courts’
bordered on the need to eliminate
90 GW Kayira and PC Banda
all previous aspects that represented
the miscarriage of justice, especial-
ly under chiefly-dominated courts.
In his contribution to that debate, one
respected nationalist, Dunduzu Chisi-
za, celebrated the Bill arguing it “put
to end an era of notorious justice….
We hope, Mr. Speaker,” he urged his
colleagues, “the implementation of
this Bill will take effect immediately”
(Nyasaland Legislative Council Pro-
ceedings, June 1, 1962). Later, when
the 1964 constitution was finally adopt-
ed, chiefs were relegated into mere
guardians of tradition with no effec-
tive political voice. What chiefs had
feared concerning the erosion of their
power and influence in government
affairs seemed to have materialised.
2. CHIEFS AND THE STATE IN THE
POST-COLONIAL SETTING
From the developments of the early
1960s, it is clear to pinpoint the declin-
ing powers of chiefs in the immediate
post-independence era. Granted that
politics of confrontation had gradu-
ally ebbed by 1963, chiefs no longer
held the political capital with which
to command recognition from either
side. However, that was a short-lived
state of affair. The political changes
that ensued in the immediate after-
math of the attainment of indepen-
dence in July 1964, we argue, once
again brought the chiefs into the lime-
light. Between August and October
1964, Malawi underwent what had
been widely described as the ‘Cabi-
net Crisis’ in which the Malawi leader,
Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, disagreed
with some of his Cabinet Ministers over
matters concerning the country’s do-
mestic and foreign policies (Baker,
2001). Consequently, Banda dismissed
three of his ministers forcing three
others to resign in protest of that de-
cision. Many of the ministers fled into
exile and constantly threatened Ban-
da with a military coup after one of
them, Henry Masauko Chipembere,
had already attempted one in 1964.
It was that political context that ne-
cessitated the need to restructure
the institution of chieftainship, as Dr.
Banda deemed them to be of sig-
nificant use in cementing his grip on
political power and the Malawian
state in general. That led to the pass-
ing of a new Native Authority Ordi-
nance, to suit the prevailing political
conditions of the time. Among the
fundamental policy changes, was
the Government’s move to pass the
Chiefs Act, in 1967. The conventional
explanation posits that the 1967 Act
possibly marked the beginning of the
dominance of the state over chiefs
thereby reinforcing a similar top-down
story as noted above. Colin Baker, for
instance, shows how the 1967 Chiefs
Act helped to put the chiefs under the
control of the Malawi Congress Party
(MCP) government by once again
subjecting them under the District
Commissioners (Baker, 1975:55-60).
Among other things, the Act abolished
the office of the Native Authority and
replaced it with that of Traditional Au-
thorities. Having subjected them to
the office of the District Commissioner,
itself an agent of the central authori-
ty, the Act provided for an elaborate
organizational structure of chieftain-
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
cy. This structure was arranged hier-
archically beginning with the Village
Headman, Group Village Headman,
Sub-chief, Traditional Authority, all
the way to the Senior chief. Later the
highest office of this structure would
be the Paramount Chief (Chiwe-
za, 2008:60). Within their new offices,
chiefs were solely responsible for the
maintenance of law and order under
the overall leadership of the central
government. They no longer had pow-
ers to make even the most straight-
forward laws as was the case before.
Chiweza argued that just like the co-
lonial regime, the post-colonial gov-
ernment simply used chiefs to its ad-
vantage. Concerning the 1967 Chiefs
Act, she noted that “what Banda did
was to incorporate chiefly patrimonial
authority within the new hegemonic
form of party power…. Therefore, it
may not be farfetched to conclude
that the MCP’s popular rhetoric about
‘respect for tradition’ bore some re-
semblance to the colonial experi-
ence, in which tradition was paid lip
service in order to exploit it to control
the rural masses” (Chiweza, 2008:61).
What scholarship often overlooks,
however, is that even after the gov-
ernment passed the 1967 Chiefs Act,
chiefly powers were not completely
wiped out. On the contrary, Dr. Ban-
da’s government was caught up in
serious administrative compromis-
es to accommodate chiefs, whom
it touted as agents of local devel-
opment. To achieve that object,
Banda and his government delib-
erately avoided the District Coun-
cils, the legitimate institutions for the
91
promotion of local development.
For instance, earlier in 1965, the Mala-
wi Government approved Hon. Aleke
Banda’s proposal to establish District
Development Committees (DDCs) as
one way of decentralising the activi-
ties of short-lived Ministry of Develop-
ment and Planning which he headed
in his capacity as a minister (Miller,
1970). The state sought to use the com-
mittees as a forum for soliciting ideas
of development and specific project
needs from rural areas which would
then be filtered upwards to the ministry
for further processing. Miller (1970:131)
listed the following as members of the
Committee: The District Commissioner,
who served as the chairman; all par-
liamentary members of the district;
District Chairman of the Party (MCP);
League of Malawi Youth, and League
of Malawi Women; Chairman and
Clerk to District Council; Farmers Mar-
keting Board supervisor, Agricultural
Officer; District Education Officer; and
Community Development Worker.
While the committee included import-
ant figures of the government and
the party (MCP), conspicuously miss-
ing from it were chiefs. However, the
chairman was given the mandate
to co-opt into the committee other
members such as chiefs. Under such
circumstances, chiefs would only be
part of the people the chairperson
would mobilise in the implementation
of the Committees’ decisions. In any
case, the committee, argues Miller,
mostly served to endorse policies of
the Development Division under the
Mistry of Economic Affairs to which
it was transferred after the abolition
92 GW Kayira and PC Banda
of the Ministry of Development and
Planning. Coincidentally, the Ministry
of Economic Affairs was again under
the leadership of Hon. Aleke Banda.
In 1966, proposals were made to estab-
lish under the DDCs, Area and Village
Action Groups. These would be the in-
formal committees responsible for the
actual implementation of DDCs rec-
ommendations.Commentators argue
that by establishing the DDCs with an
elaborate chain of command down
to the village level, the Government
had succeeded in by-passing the Dis-
trict Councils (Cross& Kutengule, 2001,
Cammack et al., 2009). Ironically, the
DDCs finally fell under the Office of
President and Cabinet. That central-
isation of power thus defeated the
principle of decentralisation. More
significantly, chiefs came to play es-
sential roles in both Village and Area
Action groups, serving as chairpersons.
In criticising that arrangement, Chiwe-
za noted that “the decision marked a
fundamental step by the post-inde-
pendence government in sidelining
local government structures in favour
of an enlarged role for central govern-
ment structures in rural development
activities with direct links to chiefs”
(Chiweza, 2008:62). While acknowl-
edging Chiweza’s concern for the
country’s long-term economic devel-
opment, such criticisms, however, fell
short of interrogating forces leading to
a compromise on the part of the state
– the use of informal structures under
the leadership of chiefs when formal
structures were already available.
An interrogation of the reasons be-
hind that level of compromise, real
or speculative, can shed some light
on the contemporary dilemma rela-
tive to the position of chiefs in modern
politics and development. Indeed,
we contend that contemporary calls
for real decentralisation that reaches
down to the ordinary person on the
ground are not without precedence.
We note, however, that forces leading
to that compromise have not changed
over time – especially on who should
take the responsibility to control the
otherwise unpredictable and popular
chiefs. Unlike what Chikulo (2014) has
argued, in the case of Zambia, that
chiefs lack real legitimacy there, such
that the country could as well dismiss
them in the implementation of Zambi-
an decentralization reforms, Malawi’s
case is a complete contrast. The histor-
ical experience detailed above shows
that chiefs have been active actors
in the past and no government has
wholly succeeded in ignoring them.
In their 2004 paper, Helmke and Lev-
itsky suggested that for us to under-
stand how informal and formal struc-
tures of authority combine, we need
to know more about what induces
political actors to rely on and often
formalise informal institutions rather
than opposing them. We could locate
one answer to that question in the very
political capital which those that are
in control of informal institutions and
yet enjoy widespread support possess.
As noted above, chiefs have over time
been an indispensable group forc-
ing both the colonial and immediate
post-colonial authorities to work with
them not so much to achieve effec-
tive administration of rural areas but
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
to help in the consolidation and suste-
nance of the power of those in author-
ity. In the case of Dr. Banda, he would
not have afforded to be caught up
in colonial-like politics in which chiefs
were torn between supporting the dis-
sidents in exile and his government.
It should be less surprising, therefore,
that when Banda was asked in 1969
whether he was not putting too much
importance to traditional chiefs in
Malawi, his only response was “the
chiefs have a part to play in the po-
litical and social life of this country”
(Excerpt from Noticias da Beira, July
9, 1969. H. K Banda Archive). Nor
should it surprise us that following the
1969 reforms of the Traditional Court
System, the state reinstated chief-
ly judicial powers and made some
selected senior chiefs preside over
high-profile treason cases of Orton
Chirwa and others who had fallen
out with Dr. Banda (Chimango, 1977).
The very traditional courts abolished
in 1962 had re-emerged with chiefs
once again in control. After 1994,
these courts were abolished again
following the dawn of the second
wave of multiparty politics (Cammack
et al., 2009). Even with that, howev-
er, we need to face the reality that
chieftainship remains a significant
institution for those competing for a
political office more so because of
the capacity of chiefs to command
legitimacy among the local masses.
Ironically, while the post-Dr. Banda
governments in Malawi acknowledge
the influential role of chiefs in rural ar-
eas (Chiweza, 2016), that level of le-
gitimacy has not been adequately
93
tapped on for effective administra-
tion and development of rural areas.
Chiefs continue to operate mostly un-
der informal arrangements, a scenario
that reinforces Muhamood Mamdani’s
concept of “citizen and subject” –
with citizens mostly living in urban and
semi-urban areas and operating un-
der formal or civil law, while subjects
live in rural areas under the dictates
of customary law (Mamdani, 1996).
Even though the Malawi Constitution
acknowledges the existence of the
institution of chieftainship, for instance,
it falls short of spelling out chiefly roles
and responsibilities. What is more, even
the 1998 Malawi Decentralization Poli-
cy remains less clear about the role of
chiefs in a decentralized local govern-
ment system (Malawi Decentralization
Policy, 1998). Moreover, what obtains
is the same 1950s scenario with the
District Assemblies only incorporating
chiefs as non-official/ex-official mem-
bers. Because existing administrative
frameworks fall short of effectively in-
tegrating chiefs into the formal gover-
nance frameworks, politicians continu-
ally tap on “informalised” chieftainships
to gain hegemony over the coun-
try’s rural masses (Chinsinga, 2009).
Tam O’Neil et al. (2014) also highlight-
ed similar sentiments, when they pos-
ited that there is still a long way to go
before attaining real democratic de-
centralisation in Malawi. These schol-
ars highlighted how institutional and
governance challenges hamper the
delivery of social services, especially
in areas of health service delivery, ed-
ucation, and infrastructural develop-
ment. Most significantly, the incoher-
94 GW Kayira and PC Banda
ent policy directions, some of which
we discussed above, have often led
not only to unclear mandates (includ-
ing that of chiefs) but also overlapping
jurisdictions in the local government
system. The latter has continued to
operate under ‘informal’ processes.
Kanyongolo (2016:63-65) decries this
scenario as at best representing “in-
formalisation of politics,” further ac-
knowledging how the court in the
country has contributed to this kind of
informalisation by legitimizing the in-
formal politics surrounding chieftaincy
apparatus; upholding customary law
thereby sustaining its informal aspects;
and affirming people’s obligation to
comply with the orders that tradition-
al leaders make. Kanyongolo consid-
ers this undue emphasis on traditional
aspects of governance as anomalous
and not in line with democratic poli-
tics. What Kanyongolo’s work also re-
veals, however, is the command of in-
fluence chiefs possess which, whether
intentionally or not, has not escaped
the court’s attention in the country.
The identification of the solutions to the
multiple challenges identified above,
we argue, should begin by officially
acknowledging chiefly influence. By
thoroughly and formerly integrating
chiefs into local government structures,
for instance, the state will be inherently
addressing the problem of informalisa-
tion of politics and or that of dual laws
which scholars such as Kanyongolo
(2016), Helmke and Levitsky (2004),
and Mamdani (1996) describe above.
Simply put, the solution to the creation
of governance features with the po-
tential to strengthen democratic insti-
tutions should not primarily rest in the
separation between formal and infor-
mal governance structures. This trend
would only perpetuate an imposed
democratic culture shallowly rooted in
the country’s overall cultural tradition.
As Fukuyama warns us elsewhere, “the
informal matrix of norms, beliefs, val-
ues, traditions, and habits that consti-
tute a society is critical for the proper
functioning of formal [governance]
institutions [and] a political science
that pays attention to the design of
formal institutions without understand-
ing normative and cultural factors will
inevitably fail” (Fukuyama, 2008:199). It
is in this respect that formally engag-
ing chiefs in governance structures is
one step towards building more ef-
fective and participatory local gov-
ernment institutions more so because
besides their agency, chiefs are also
custodians of cultural norms, traditions
and others which Fukuyama cites.
Already, recent experience with cul-
tural mobilisation in Malawi manifest-
ing itself in annual festivals of the ‘Mul-
hako wa Alhomwe’, ‘Mzimba Heritage
Foundation’, ‘Chewa Heritage Foun-
dation,’ and others, demonstrate the
capacity of chiefs to mobilise popular
participation. More significantly, histor-
ical experience shows how well chiefs
served the colonial state under Indirect
Rule (its weaknesses not withstanding),
guided by formal structures govern-
ing their conduct and checking other
excesses. They helped to mobilise the
communities in the implementation
of the soil conservation measures (at
least before the 1950s), collection of
tax, and other duties. Moreover, be-
Journal of Public Administrative and Development Alternatives Vol.3 No 1.1 September 2018
fore the colonial era, chiefs were in-
strumental in the provision of political,
administrative, as well as social leader-
ship to their communities (Phiri, 1977).
As Malawi strives to fulfill or meet its
development goals, including such
internationally-sanctioned obliga-
tions as ‘The 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development,’ full participa-
tion of the citizenry at the grassroots
level is required. Chiefs, especially
those that command legitimacy at
that level as demonstrated above,
could serve as the first point of con-
tact to secure that participation.
As the Minister of Local Government
and Rural Development recently ac-
knowledged, the government has in
recent years relied on the chiefs to
mobilise the masses to participate in
such programs as the Farm Input Sub-
sidy Programme (FISP), among others
(Speech by Kondwani Nankhumwa,
Nyasatimes, August 12, 2018). Ironical-
ly, the instruments governing the place
and roles of chiefs in a democratic
society remain far more elusive than
they were during the colonial era.
3. CONCLUSION
This article has undertaken a historical
overview of the relationship between
the state and chiefs in colonial and
post-colonial Malawi. Relying on the
concept of the ‘dualism of structures
of power,’ we have traced the rela-
tionship right from the initial phases of
British colonial rule to the present. As
the colonial state worked towards en-
trenching its own authority, it became
clear to the colonial administrators
that local chiefs had to be incorpo-
95
rated in the administrative set-up, al-
beit at a local and mostly unofficial
level. From 1912, when the DANO was
passed, we have shown, throughout
the article, the agency with which the
chiefs have conducted their contacts
and relationship with the state. The
state authorities have also throughout
the study period, come up with various
constitutional and policy changes, in-
cluding restructuring the local govern-
ment set-up, to suit their political de-
sires and goals. We have argued that
since chiefs seem to be indispensable,
it would only be fair for the state au-
thorities to integrate them in the state’s
formal administrative institutions, rath-
er than the merely ex-official positions
that they currently hold in governance
institutions. If such policy changes
were to be implemented, the chiefs
would be an indispensable fixture in
the country’s development agenda.
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