Philippine Bureaucracy and the Persistence of Political Dynasties

A Discussion Paper on Political and Institutional Reforms

Tony D. Igcalinos

I. INTRODUCTION

The interplay between bureaucracy and political dynasties is an interesting topic in the study of
public administration and governance. For one, the parallel development of bureaucratic expansion and
political dynasty entrenchment share an identical timeline in history, demanding fuller understanding
and critical analysis of the implications that bureaucracy and political dynasties, or vice versa, have on
each other and how their relationship influences policymaking and governance in the course of our
history.
The discourse on political dynasties cannot but confront the very basic social unit or structure where
all the extended discussions emanate—the Filipino family. (McCoy 1994). McCoy asserts that the family
is a more effective political unit than an individual as its reputation, loyalties, and alliances are deemed
transferable where one family member shares the traits of the others without necessarily innately
having them. In the other sections of the book, McCoy calls the family a kinship network whose
mutuality in terms of relationship extends to even non-family members.
This paper presents the issues and challenges in the evolution of Philippine bureaucracy parallel to
the beginnings and entrenchment and perpetuation of political dynasties. Sections on the different
modes of perpetuation as well as the issues surrounding political dynasties are also presented. One
important issue that relates closely to the phenomenon of political dynasties—term limits—and which
has a provision in the 1987 Constitution is also presented. Finally an anaysis on the dynamics of political
dynasties as the bureaucracy is also attempted.

II THE PHILIPPINE BUREAUCRACY

A. Evolution of Philippine Bureaucracy

The political structure in the precolonial Phiilippines provided the most rudimentary service to the
people. This local institution, known as the barangay, was headed by chief called a datu or rajah and
was assisted by a council of elders who were responsible for the maintenanc of internal peace and
defense, tribute collection, and administration of justice (De Guzman, 1998). Kinship defines
authority and the datu is considered the chief of the barangay. He performs the role of a judge,
lawmaker and implementer of laws (Rebullida and Serrano, 2006 ).
During the Spanish period, a highly centralized colonial administration was established on the
widely dispersed and community-based system of government (De Guzman, 1998). The once
independent barangays are now at the bottom of the hierarchy, subsumed under the pueblos that
were under the provincias. There was no separation of church and state, allowing intervention of
state affai s the le g . The t aditio al datus po e as also su su ed. The “pa ish olo ial
period also gave rise to the principalia, the local political and economic elite who have access to
both civil and church autho ities. “pai s th ee e tu ies of olo izatio esulted i to
institutionalized values and traits that influence public administration, among these pakikisama,
utang na loob, and hiya. It is argued that these values partly explain the rise of graft and corruption,
nepotism and favoritism, and pat o age. These alues a e i di e t o t ast to We e ia s
characteristic of a bureaucracy (Rebullida and Serrano, 2006). A civil service was established with
people performing integral executive, legislative, and judicial functions. However, the bureaucracy
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under Spain was perceived to be corrupt. Civil servants are said to be seldom paid but allowed
instead to retain a percentage of taxes they collected. Under Spain, there were only five main
departments, namely the Army, Navy, Justice, Finance, and the Directorate General of Civil
Administration.
The 1896 Revolution installed the Malolos Republic. Following the declaration of independence
in Malolos, a representative and democratic form of government with executive, legislative and
judicial branches was established. Accordingly, the most important document produced during the
period was the Malolos Constitution of 1899, outlining the form of government that is said to be
parliamentary in structure. A Council of Government was created under a president and composed
of seven departments each headed by a secretary: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, War, Army and
Navy, Public Instruction, Public Communications and Works, and Agriculture, Industry and
Commerce (De Guzman, 183).
When the Americans gained control of the Philippines, they retained the centralized form of
government but added a few departments and, more importantly, introduced the principle that
public office is a public trust, making civil servants accountable to the people they serve. While
remnants of Spanish-style governance can still be observed, the Americans introduced modern
bureaucracy characterized by accountability for public resources. The Philippine Commission was
then established and among its first acts was the passage of Act No. 5, 9 September 1900, An Act for
the Establishment of an Efficient and Honest Civil Service in the Philippines. The reform Act places all
government positions below a bureau director under the civil service, and covers national and local
positions. A system of merit and qualification was introduced underscoring competence,
independence, and integrity in public service. There were six government departments during this
period, namely: Finance, Justice, Public Instruction, Interior, Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
Commerce and Communications.
In 1935, the Philippine Commission was established and a constitution was approved in that
same year (De Guzman, 183) that contained a separate provision on civil service. The 1935
Constitution contained a separate provision stipulating that all appointments to government
positions should be made only based on merit and fitness to be determined in a competitive
examination. There were three additional departments created during this period.
The advent of the Second World War put the Philippines under the Japanese occupation, during
which time the bureaucracy was kept relatively small with only six ministries: Foreign Affairs,
Finance, Justice, Agriculture and Commerce, Public Works and Communications, and Education. An
all-Filipino civil service was in place led by the Philippine Executive Commission.
After the war, the Philippines began to restructure its bureaucracy and the regular departments
during the Commonwealth were augmented by the creation of a Department of Foreign Affairs.
Between this period until the middle of the 1950s, tales of graft and corruption and incompetence
were common as more unqualified personnel were brought in by the appointing powers of the time.
It was not until 1954 when administrative reforms were initialized by the creation of the
Government Survey and Reorganization Committee, followed by the Reorganization Committee in
1956. However, the reorganization intent of the Committee was rendered ineffectual because laws
were passed exempting agencies from coverage (De Guzman, 184).
With the growth and expansion of government came the large-scale spoils system that
characterized succeeding administrations. In 1965, upon his assumption to the presidency and
against the backdrop of an oversized and inefficient bureaucracy, Marcos asked Congress to effect a
reorganization anchored on simplicity, economy, and efficiency in government (De Guzman, 184).
Three years later, in 1968, Congress approved the Reorganization. But it was not until 1972 that
Congress approved the Integrated Reorganizational Plan without modification. The plan, adopted
entirely by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1 during Martial Law, had intended to streamline the
bureaucracy saddled with duplicative agencies. But the plan encountered difficulties in the
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implementation in the absence of an open consultation between decision-makers and the
implementers (De Guzman, 185).
The Philippine bureaucracy has evolved over a period of time. From the Post-war era until the
current administration of President Benigno Aquino III, a lot of reforms have been introduced all
intended to make the bureaucracy respond to needs and the demands of the citizenry. The
bureaucratic structures and models have undergone a series of changes and a lot of innovations and
reforms, both substantively and superficially, yet some of the things remain the same. It is as if all
those initiatives undertaken barely scratched the surface of the problem.

B. Issues and Challenges in Philippine Bureaucracy

De Guzman identified more than a dozen major trouble spots in Philippine bureaucracy that
confront the civil servant, the public service end-user, and the policymakers. These troubles will
persist until hard decisions are taken to bring about difficult but necessary changes in the form and
substance of our bureaucracy (De Guzman, 197). We can start with the centralization versus
decentralization. Until Marcos misappropriated it, centralization did not project a specter of a
totalitarian regime. The Marcos regime started politicizing the bureaucracy, subverted public
interest, gave rise to crony capitalism, incurred huge public debts, and consolidated economic and
political power through Martial Law that is credited for numerous human rights violations and
corporate takeovers by the state. As a result, the government of the first Aquino administration
presided over the difficult period of transition and redemocratization, and shepherded the passage
of the new Constitution and the Local Government Code to guide the massive rebuilding and
reorganization. The 1987 Constitution underscores empowerment by devolution, ushering in
reforms in governance in the delivery of social services by engaging civil society and the grassroots
(Rebullida and Serrano, 2006). Yet, the ensuing decentralization suffered infirmity because much of
the devolution pertains only to powers and functions and not resources, resulting in a myriad of
unfunded mandates in our laws.
Duplication and overlapping of functions in personnel and agencies are noted, resulting in more
inefficiency and waste of resources. Inadequate coordination between and among agencies in
government cost both lives and resources. The latest example of this would be the event in
Mamasapano, Maguindanao wherein 44 PNP Special Forces operatives were killed in an encounter
with members of the rebel group MILF all because of the lack of coordination between and among
leaders in the PNP and the AFP.
Graft and corruption seems to be a permanent fixture in Philippine bureaucracy. This problem is
too huge it earns its own mystique. The scale is grand. Judging by the daily headlines and the
number of congressional inquiries on corruption cases involving bureaucrats one can definitely say
that corruption has already become an essential part of our culture, or our values system.
Red tape and inefficiency are inseparable and correlate even to graft and corruption. While we
have already an anti-red tape law in place, a lot remains to be done in terms of enforcing the policy
and incentivizing people to encourage efficiency, on the part of the public servants, and vigilance
among the public as end-users. Cumbersome and complicated procedures when transacting with
government agencies have stymied not only investors from doing business in the country. More
i po ta tl , it dis ou ages itize s e gage e t a d pa ti ipatio . “u e s afte su e s hu out
unfavorable results in terms of ease of doing business in the Philippines, at least generally. The
Citize s Cha te , ho e e , is a i po ta t i itiati e to i p o e pu li se i e deli e ut a lot of
people are not aware of it.
Ineffective administration of public enterprises brings back headlines on abuses of discretion
among officers and officials in government-owned and controlled corporations. The latest to banner
the dailies is the so- alled DBP ash sale o the illegal buying and selling of securities where no
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 real change of ownership takes place. The Napoles scandal reminds us of the weaknesses and the
many loopholes in our bureaucratic process despite its projected rigidity. Of course, corruption plays
a major part in those allegedly multibillion-peso anomaly involving high officials of the government.
The inadequacy of the communication system in the bureaucracy maybe understood on two
levels: on the level of human skills and on the level of hardware or technology, or the absence of
either one or both. The practice of creating adhocracies, or the penchant for creating
extrabureaucratic structures within the bureaucracy not only confuses functions and powers but
also bears on the resources of an agency. Yet the creation of this adhocracies are couched in
sophisti ated te h o at s ja go that de isio -makers are inclined to favor without giving thought
to the possibility that its creation is to mask the lack of planning, if not bad planning, that left a lot of
unanticipated needs.
Problems in personnel administration are probably a lifetime concern of the bureaucracy. Even
with the ongoing government-wide rationalization plan, reports of overstaffed yet undermanned
agencies are all too common, especially in areas where political patronage is high. The areal versus
sectoral planning and management dilemma will continue to linger until our planning philosophy is
able to strengthen the coordinative mechanisms at various levels of government. Equally important,
too, is the political leadership that can provide a sense of mission and direction so that all
government planning are directed and dedicated towards its accomplishment.
Development commitment among civil servants is such highly volatile topic as it related to
ethics, accountability, performance, professionalism and, of course, incentives. But it helps to bring
up the principle that public office is public trust as an entry of a values formation program in the civil
service, of which the Civil Service Commission is doing already. What is needed perhaps is a strong
monitoring program and regular assessment to check whether values formation initiatives answer
the organizational needs of agencies.
Fi all , itize s pa ti ipatio i go e a e, hile ess , is a effe ti e ou te poi t to the
i effi ie ies of u eau a . Citize s pa ti ipatio a e a dou le-edge sword, so it works either
to o e s ad a tage o disad a tage. Citize s participation is enshrined in the Constitution as a
reactive measure to the Marcos dictatorship. Participatory governance, in its various forms and
expressions, has improved delivery of basic social services especially to areas where government has
very limited presence. The Community-Driven Development approach, for example, used by the
government in its KALAHI-CIDDS program has shown encouraging results (Mangahas and Arroyo,
2014).

III. POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

A. History

a. Pre-Colonial Period

Scholars commonly trace the beginnings of political dynasties to as early as the pre-colonial
times, in the days of the datu, of the maharlikas, our own version of royalty that predates the
federal system of government, a system we copied poorly, if not wrongly, from the Americans. The
small villages of yore were virtual kingdoms each ruled by a datu, whose reign and succession is
guaranteed by his heirs—his family, his son.

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b. Colonial Period

The Spanish colonial times gave rise to the principalia, an emerging class that embodied the new
form of local elite. The Spaniards relied on the clergy for the administration of the islands and never
established a strong centralized State. Instead power was dispersed amongst various elite families in
the provinces. These families were granted the right to hold land, vote, and serve in positions of
local political power (Querubin, 2010). The principalia rose from playing puppets to Spanish
authorities to become rulers later on. They evolved from being clerks and trusted servants of the
Spanish power holders to become power-wielders themselves over time. From attendants of vast
landholdings of the Spanish Crown, they became landlords (hacienderos) themselves. And so after
four centuries, the principalia finally established its own foothold in the economic and political
affairs of the state. They would become the new ruling class. The principalia, along with a handful of
Chinese traders were on to become the oligarchs of the time. They were the new maharlikas. The
local principalia would further consolidate their power during the American colonial period.

c. American Period

The Americans needed a partner and loyal ally in the local elite who controlled the lands and
even forces that once fought agai st the “pa ia ds fo the to go e the isla ds. As a
concession, the Americans introduced elections (Querubin, 2010), the qualifications of which were
quite steep only the local elite could satisfy, such as literacy and property, and rightly so because
they were only the ones who could send their children to school. It should be noted that under
President Taft, voting and electoral participation were limited to the propertied class, which at that
time constituted less than one percent (1%) of the population (Tuason, 2010). Many of the
propertied class were descendants of the same local elite who gained concessions during the
Spanish period.
Predictably, in the elections that were held in 1901 and 1907, majority of those who emerged
winners were mostly coming from the ranks of the local elite. So while education and suffrage were
introduced, access and full exercise—meaning to elect and be elected—was not only limited but
also exclusive to a certain class. This clearly contributed to the rise of family power, of the local elite.
These elite families whose influence cut across business and politics would continue to receive
special favors and concessions from the Americans that allowed them to expand their businesses
and advance their political ambitions (Tuazon, 2010).

d. Post-war Era and Post-Edsa

In the post-war House of Representatives (1946 Congress), of the 98 congressmen elected, 61 or

62% came from families with elective position from 1907 to 1941. This proportion of dynastic share
of congressional seats continues to this day, even higher according to the AIM study (Mendoza et al,
2013). Yet the expansion of political dynasties may be traced back to the American colonial period
when the principalia was able to consolidate their power and control over the political and
economic affairs of the state.
A cursory look at the names of Philippine political leaders and administrators during and after
the American period reveals that the same families that control business and politics are very much
around, although some of their kin opted out of politics in favor of concentrating in business. The
most enduring example of a family or clan that is able to withstand several political transitions yet
maintain its formidable position in both politics and business is none other than the family of the
i u e t p eside t. The p eside t s la has p odu ed t o p eside ts, fi e se ato s, a ha dful of
o g esspe so s, a d se e al go e o s. O the usi ess side, the p eside t s elati es a e still
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perched on top of their respective industries. In terms of consolidated interests in business and
politics, the Lopezes, who are major beneficiaries of rent seeking (McCoy, p. 20) and who control
media conglomerate ABS-CBN and power utility monopoly Meralco may have been a perfect
example had the family decided to keep politics within and beyond their traditional turf in Western
Visayas. The clan has produced a vice president in Fernando and a few congresspersons who have
since retired.
During the Marcos years, political dynasties were dormant, deferring to the soon-to-be-
consolidated and now-returning Marcos-Romualdez dynasty. The reason was simple: Marcos had
most of the political dynasties under his clutches. The way to describe it today is a centralized
dynasty, with President Marcos at the top.
Afte Ma os ouste , a d upo Co azo A ui o s assu ptio i to po e , the o e do a t
political dynasties slowly wormed back themselves into power. And by the time the first Congress
post-Edsa opened, the once sidelined political dynasties found themselves reunited in the halls of
Congress and in provincial capitols nationwide. It was even estimated that in 1987, 80% of the
members of the House of Representatives belong to political dynasties.
The succeeding congresses saw a dismal reduction in the number of political dynasties
occupying seats in the Lower House, which in the 15th Congress had a 67% share. This is according
to a study by the AIM Policy Center. The 15th Congress has 234 regular members and 55 party-list
representatives, or a total membership of 289. This means that 157 representatives in the 16th
Congress belong to political dynasties. The AIM Policy Center is currently working on the results of
the May 2013 elections. But some preliminary reports indicate almost similar shares of seats at
around 70% in the 16th Congress, which translates into 164 dynastic members of the Lower House.
While some political dynasties suffered setbacks in the May 2013 elections, notably the Jalosjoses
(Philippine Star, May 14, 2013) in the Zamboanga region, the Singsons of Ilocos Sur were able to
wrestle more power than in the previous election of 2010.
Glaringly in the Senate, the Cayetano sibling act is now complimented by the entry of Jose Victor
JV Eje ito, ho sha es the sa e fathe ith “e ato Jose Ji ggo Est ada, Ma ila a o a d
former president Joseph Estrada, whose wife Loi is a former senator herself and who shared three
years of her term in the Senate with her son, Jinggoy. The Senate in the 16th Congress nearly had a
father-and-son tandem had Jack Enrile made it, who would have shared three years of the
remaining term of his father, former Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile.
While “e ato Na Bi a does ot ha e a elati e i the “e ate, she s i the limelight for the
simple reason that her father is Vice President Jejomar Binay, whose two other children themselves
ield po e i the ou t s p e ie usi ess apital, Makati Cit , he e daughte A igail is the
fi st dist i t ep ese tati e a d so Jejo a E i Ju ju Bi a is the it a o .
The e a ples tell us o e thi g: that afte , the e as assi e de o atizatio of politi al
dynasties. Overall, political dynasties prevailed (Philippine Star, May 18, 2013).

B. The Problem with Definition

Article II, “e tio of the Co stitutio sa s "The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The key
phrases here are prohibit political dynasties and as may be defined by law. In plain language, the
provision is tentative and non-self-executory. This only means one thing: the need for a legislated
definition, an enabling law, to breathe life to the provision. The definition bears the mark of a
masterful trademark of politically expedient work on the part of the crafters of the 1987
Constitution who left the burden of defining what constitutes political dynasties to those who will
be affected by the provision: the dynastic members of Congress. Hence, from 1987 until 2015, the
constitutional prohibition of political dynasties remains unenforceable. In a first test case ever filed
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against members of political dynasties from the different parts of the country seeking various
elective positions in the 2013 midterm elections, the anti-dynasty advocates used Senior Associate
Justi e A to io Ca pio s o defi itio of politi al d ast in Navarro versus Ermita as a
phe o e o that o e t ates politi al po e a d pu li esou es ithi the o t ol of a fe
families whose members alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits." The
espo de ts elo g to hat is o side ed a o ious ase of politi al d ast . The ase as
dismissed by the Comelec and eventually by the Supreme Court, again, in the absence of an enabling
law.
The struggle against political dynasties is actually a struggle for a legislated definition for no
amount of public shaming will disqualify the so-called dynastic candidates from seeking elective
position. The same provision in the Constitutio that p ohi its politi al d asties gua a tees the
political rights of everyone to vote and be voted upon, including members of political dynasties. The
struggle for the passage of an enabling in Congress is now 28 years old and has gone though several
congresses already, starting with the first post-Edsa Congress. And for the first time in 27 years, an
anti-dynasty bill reached the House plenary in 2014. Understanding the difficulty in passing an anti-
dynasty provision is no rocket science as people are cautioned not to expect dynastic members of
Congress to legislate their own extinction. In a house dominated by political dynasties, it is
unthinkable that an anti-dynasty measure could even hurdle past the committee. Yet, it is now in
the Plenary. But while the measure has gone that far, the question is now on the content. Advocates
can only hope that the debate should now center on the definitions as to who is covered and
whether they should pass an anti-dynasty measure at all.
But to understand and appreciate better the issue of political dynasty and why is there a need
for a law to define it, it is good to revisit previous attempts as well as some definitions proposed for
legislation. Senate Bill No. 2649, authored by Senator Miriam Santiago, defines political dynasty as
existing when:
a a pe so ho is a spouse of a i u e t ele ti e offi ial holds o u s fo a
elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same
province or occupies immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective
official. It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons are spouses or
related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for
elective office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent
public official.
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, the Makabayan coalition also came up with their
own version. And very much like the Santiago bill, it shares the same prescribed limitations and
never saw the light of day in the 15th Congress.
Outside of Congress, several advocacy groups and political parties have come up with their own
proposals, notably the Kapatiran Party and the Partido Lakas ng Masa (PLM). In contrast to similar
bills pending in Congress before (and also now), the version of Kapatiran Party that gained support
from numerous civil society groups covered national positions. Additionally, Senate Bill No. 412 filed
by Senator Sergio Osmeña III during the first regular session of the Thirteenth Congress in 2004 also
covered national positions. Note that both the Santiago and Makabayan bills conveniently left out
the national positions. The decision to include national elective positions is on the realization that
consolidation of power takes place not only at the local, provincial level but also at the national
level. In fact, national elective officials had a hand in the perpetuation of political dynasties by
dispensing undue favors to relatives occupying top local positions and more significantly, by their
refusal to enact an enabling law to prohibit political dynasties.
To illustrate the effect of the legislated Kapatiran Party bill, for example, Senator Alan Cayetano
would have been prevented from seeking reelection while his sister is incumbent. If the law were in
effe t, it ould ha e p e e ted the se ato s othe s a dida fo o g ess a a d his siste s
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candidacy as mayor of Taguig City. Unfortunately, all the Cayetanos who ran in 2013 got elected,
except for the eldest sister, Pia who is serving her remaining three years in the Senate. One version
that is now in the Committee of Sen. Pimentel allows only one family member to run and covers the
post of a barangay councilor. Most versions so far are for legislative action. For all those bills to
move an inch outside their committees, the President has to certify them as urgent bills requiring
priority legislative action.

C. Modes of Perpetuation

a. Vertical and Horizontal Expansion

According to The New Oxford American dictionary, pe petuatio is to ake so ethi g,

t pi all a u desi a le situatio o u fou ded elief, o ti ue i defi itel . The pe siste e of
political dynasties is something that only the members desire its perpetuity. According to Mendoza,
the most common form of perpetuation is my succession, also called horizontal perpetuation, or
expansion. This is the case of generational transfer of political power within the family that in some
cases spans a generation. The transfer of power form one family member to the next is mainly due
to term limits, for which our Constitution provides. For positions other than the President down to
senators, a three-year term is allowed which means a total of nine years if a candidate is elected
consecutively. Mendoza calls this mode of perpetuation a thin type of dynasty.
Another mode of perpetuation is the horizontal perpetuation or expansion. This happens when
two or more members of the family simultaneously occupy positions. Dynasties in this category are
referred to as fat dynasty. By this type of definition, the family of Vice President Binay could easily
qualify, him being a vice president, who was succeeded in office as mayor by his son, whose two
sisters are members of Congress, one a senator the other a representative of her district. It would
ha e ee fatte if the i e p eside t s ife o upies a othe ele ti e post hethe lo all o
nationally.

b. Geopolitics

In the guise of better public service, political families ventured into gerrymandering as a form of
consolidating political power in the provinces. There were several cases that can be discussed but
among the famous ones is that of the Villafuertes in Camarines Sur. The proposal to carve a new
province out of Camarines Sur came from four lawmakers representing the province at that time at
the House of Representatives, Reps. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Luis Villafuerte Sr., Diosdado Ignacio
Dato A o o a d ‘ola do A da a. The autho ed House Bill , hi h as app o ed
House members in August 2011. But according to insiders in Camarines Sur, the context of dividing
the huge province is that Luis Sr. was looking for a district where he could continue to represent in
case he lost the battle for governorship to no other than his grandson, Miguel. Comelec records will
show that in fact Luis Sr. lost to his grandson who succeeded his father L-Ray as governor of
Camarines Sur in the 2013 mid-term elections. And Luis Sr., having no district to run, is now out of
office.
Another strategy for perpetuation is by expanding the family political power outside of its
traditional bailiwick that is akin to a franchise. This is what happened to the Jalosjos political dynasty
that is traditionally based in Zamboange del Norte but expanded to the rest of the Zamboanga
Peninsula, including Zamboanga de Sibugay as well as Misamis Occidental. But as the 2013 Comelec
records will bear, the Jalosjos dynasty suffered a major setback with only two family members
ele ted: ‘o eo s so “eth F ede i k as ep ese tati e of the first district of Zamboanga del Norte
and elder sister Rosalina Jalosjos-Johnson as city councilor of Dapitan.
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D. Problems with Political Dynasties

a. Distortion of Political Institutions

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) offered some explanations on why nations fail in terms of
attai i g e o o i de elop e t. Natio s fail e ause the do t ha e the ight politi al a d
economic institutions that facilitate and sustain growth and development. They maintain the view
that democratic political and inclusive economic institutions are indispensible for sustained long-
term development. Acemoglu and Robinson defined and made clear distinction of institutions as
either inclusive or extractive. Inclusive institutions are those that allow and encourage participation
of a broad segment of the population in both the process and outcomes of development. On the
other hand, extractive institutions concentrate and perpetuate political and economic power and
confine the benefits of production in the hands of the few, of the elite at the expense of the many,
or the masses. North Korea, some sub-Saharan African states, and Russia before and shortly after
the fall of the Soviet empire have such institutions. It may be contentious to some but China
exemplifies an extractive institution as the Central Communist Party remains the largest beneficiary
of the ou t s assi e e o o i e pa sio , the e efits of hi h did ot t i kle do to the
o di a illage people i the o ld s se o d la gest e o o . The Chi ese e o o i e pa sio
only serves to widen the gap between the rising number of millionaires and the hundreds of millions
of poor in rural villages.
Political dynasties, generally understood as the concentration of political power in the hands of
a family or clan, are an example of an extractive political institution. By concentrating and
perpetuating power in families or clans, political dynasties prevent the emergence of broad-based
political and economic institutions. In fact, political dynasties in the Philippines have become part of
life, an ideology in itself even. Political dynasties take the place of political parties—the very political
institutions entrusted with the task of setting the development agenda in legislature. Political
dynasties may not be invincible, but they are unavoidable and anyone who entertains the
temptation of getting into elective politics has to deal with them. There is no escaping them; they
are everywhere—in the Senate, the House of Representatives, in the provincial, city, or municipal
governments. Even in the barangays! But equally important to note is the presence of some of its
members in key executive positions in the national government. But that would be another point.

b. Self-Perpetuation, Self-Persistence, Undue Advantage and the Rise of Low-Quality Politician

The logic of persistence of political dynasties lies in the very structure of our political system
that is still very much rested on a client-patron arrangement against which cosmetic reforms failed
to even scratch its surface, so to speak. The symbiotic elite-mass, landlord-tenant, patron-client, and
candidate-voter relationship will probably linger much longer than political reform initiatives are
designed to address them. One theory that explains persistence is the theory of exchange that
postulates that consensus and peaceful exchange under the law is what characterize politics within
the territory of a state (McCoy, p. 46). This theory, in effect, makes elections a free-for-all exercise
with only those who have the means to win, including vote buying, likely to emerge as victors. The
succeeding paragraphs shall examine how theories of perpetuation and persistence are validated by
case studies at least in the Philippine context.
Dal Bo et al. (2009) investigate whether political power is self-perpetuating, that power begets
power. Self-perpetuation is defined as a power-treatment effect, whereby holding political power
i eases the p o a ilit that o e s hei s attai politi al po e i the futu e ega dless of fa il
characteristics. Focusing on the transmission of political power, they conclude that power, indeed, is
self-perpetuating and that power augments the political capital that is transmitted within a family,
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creating an advantage of a cumulative, rather than fixed, nature (Dal Bo 2009). The lo ge o e s
tenure, the more likely one is to establish a political dynasty and that this relationship is causal
(emphasis mine).
On the other hand, Querubin (2011) has done an exhaustive analysis on political dynasties in the

 there is an evidence of self-perpetuation in power by political dynasties in the Philippines (in

Philippines. His analysis on dynastic persistence yields the following findings:

affirming Dal Bo)

o the results of his research demonstrates that those who serve as congressmen or
provincial governors are four times more likely to have a future relative in office than a
candidate who run and lose
o this effect is not driven by unobserved characteristics of candidates and their families;
rather, there is a causal effect from holding political power on the electoral success of

 in the Philippines, dynastic candidates are 22% more likely to win an election than
future relatives. This is called incumbency advantage (also in Dal Bo).

individuals without any previous relatives in office. (Twenty-two percent may be minuscule,
but compared to zero probability is significant).
o the political system may create new powerful families because non-dynastic individuals
who access office are more likely to create political dynasty of their own.

 societies that draw its leaders from a small set of families could end up with politicians of
o the political system itself creates persistence.

lower quality. I believe there is no need for me to elaborate this point.

c. Anomaly in Modernizing Democratic Society

The prevalence and expansion of political dynasties is a continuing anomaly in our modern,
democratic politics. And rightly so because of our pretension that the emergence of organized
parties with strong ideological orientation as well as the growing population of young people can
take care of our so-called democratic deficits. But a report of the Bertelsmann Foundation, part of
which was carried by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was not the least damning as it was brutally frank.
Oligarchy, we realize, is what we are and we continue to be unless we do something fundamentally
difficult but necessary steps. And that calls for the dismantling of oligarchy and political dynasties
to ake politi s a d e o o i s o e t a spa e t a d o petiti e i PDI, Ap il , .
What makes the situation more anomalous is the reluctance, if not blatant refusal, of the
Aquino administration to make the passage of deep political reform measures a priority of this
government. There could be no other reason for the unwillingness of the president to upset the
imbalance except that he wants to perpetuate the system for pragmatic considerations.

d. Ethics and Accountability Issue

When the fate of a barangay, municipality, city, or province is discussed and decided over family
lunch or dinner, accountability is in danger. Accountability and the system of checks and balances
are imperatives for good governance. News of Sen. Jinggoy Estrada realigning his pork barrel, which
was just ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, to the City of Manila where his father is the
Mayor had the public confused. The public could not help but ask if the pork barrel was ruled illegal,
why not just return it, just like what majority of senators did. What added controversy to the
realignment is the idea that the P100M fund could have been spent in more needy areas in
Mi da ao. Wh Ma ila, hi h is fa f o a eed LGU, is e e o e s uestio at that ti e.

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 While there is no study that established causality between dynasties and corruption, the daily
headlines have something to tell. Besides resources, the other and more potent form of corruption
is that of political corruption where accountability is difficult to extract from the perpetrators.

E. Problem with Term Limits

Meanwhile, Que u i s stud o te li its ields the follo i g o lusio s:

 term limits do not effectively increase the turnover of incumbent families in Congress and
provincial governorships in the Philippines
o te li its a ha ge sta e i Co g ess i te s of social policies legislation, but
unlikely to change the fundamental interests represented in the democratic system
 eg. father anti-RH, successor son pro-RH
 term limits do not affect in any sense the fundamental sources of political power of
dynasties which include control over land, employment, and violence in their respective
provinces (3Gs of election; clientilism, patronalistic)
Que u i o ludes that efo s that do ot alte the u de l i g dist i utio of politi al
power will not succeed in substantively changing the political equilibrium because incumbents will
adapt a d e ai po e ful u de the e set of i stitutio s. He added that hile te li its a
allow quality politicians to remain in office for a longer period of time, it may also exacerbate the
dynastic nature of Philippine politics by providing incentives for incumbents to bring additional
e e s of thei fa il to po e a d thus o t ol se e al offi es si ulta eousl . This is the ase
with the Cayetanos and the Estradas, and at some point, the Zubiris of Bukidnon.

F. Weak Bureaucracy and Strong Political Families: The Lethal Mix

McCoy (1994) traces two key elements that contribute to the rise of political dynasties that in
turn weakens the bureaucracy: the rise of rents, or popularly referred to as rent seeking and the
diminished central government control over provinces. Rent seeking is a form of monopoly where
markets are restricted through numerous regulations with the intent of awarding access to favored
constituents (McCoy, p. 11). Rent seeking characterized Philippine politics as the country emerged
from the clutches of its last colonial masters. The emergence of the Philippine Republic is what
provided the impetus for heightened rent seeking such that politicians at that time won their posts
in elections largely funded by local elite. As a form of payment, concessions were made to favor the
elite political supporters from one administration to the next, and these favors would encroach into
the realms of appointments in the civil service. The unabated concessions of the government to
local political and business elite left i pa ted the state s esou es the e eake i g the
bureaucracy and in effect strengthening political families, reinforcing the view that Philippine
bureaucracy has long been penetrated by particularistic oligarchic interests, which have a firm
independent economic base yet rely heavily upon their access to the political machinery in order to
promote private accumulation. Because the state apparatus is unable to provide the calculability
necessary for advanced capitalism, one finds instead a kind of rent capitalism based, ultimately, on
the plunder of the state apparatus by powerful oligarchic interests (McCoy, 1994, p. 13). The
weakening of the state bureaucracy can be traced back then to as early as the American period
when the American administrators, in trying to correct the perceived excesses of the Spanish
colonization, introduced local autonomy and elections that opened access to political power to the
local elite.

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IV. DYNASTIES AS THE BUREAUCRACY

The concepts of dynasty and bureaucracy, presumably, are far apart in literatures either in
political science or public administration yet their origins and convergence seem inevitable probably
because these concepts are intertwined, if not interlocked, especially when discussed in the
Philippine context. For a starter, bureaucracy is understood as a specific form of social organization
for administrative purpose and for dealing with the activities of a large number of people in a way
similar to the family (De Guzman, p.181). The framework by which we can understand the
interlocking relationship and their implication on each is the client-patron arrangement. Rocamora
(2008) uses as example the case of then Makati City mayor and now Vice President Jejomar Binay to
illustrate how a budding dynasty at that time could parallel or alternate, if not totally replace the
fu tio s of a u eau a a d ho it is do e effi ie tl su h that it e efits the pat o , in this
case the former mayor, and the clients themselves, the underprivileged Makati constituents. In my
own province, Bukidnon, before the advent of socialized health insurance and other aid programs
the name Zubiri is synonymous to a hospital, a market or grocery, a funeral parlor, and an ATM
machine (although ATMs were not yet popular at the time, especially in Mindanao, much less
Bukidnon). The Zubiri patriarch, incumbent Governor Jose Maria Jr., is the chief political patron and
kingmaker of the province even to this day, whose political career is built on patronage but not
violence. Even before he became an assemblyman, his first foray into politics, Joe as the governor is
fo dl alled, is a ag et fo ha it , hi h he sh e dl o e ted i to political capital by
distributing goods and cash whenever opportunity presented itself. Like Binay, Joe Zubiri saw the
lack of government response, if not ineptitude, to the needs of his constituents and the absence of
readily accessible services. In a sense, the distribution of patronage is efficient, but it was hardly
i lusi e e ause ot all eed eside ts ha e a ailed of the a a f o suga a e, as Joe )u i i s
funds were mostly personal and drawn from his income in his sugar business, at least according to
the patriarch himself.
The tales above may not illustrate the more graphic examples of how dynasties not only
alternate or replace government or its essential functions but turned their constituents captive in an
unequal client-patron relationship. Anecdotally, some political dynasties in Mindanao behave like
monarchs in a democratic, republican country.

V. THE WAY FORWARD

A. Insulating Bureaucracy

The classic Weberian bureaucracy is sought in the face of politicization of our administrative
system. While a politics-free bureaucracy is utopic, its professionalization may approximate what
many desire to be an independent civil service with well-informed and economically self-reliant
members who are immune to political pressure within and outside of their workplaces. It is a widely
held belief that the economically independent class are free from the dictates of politicians. In some
cases, the reverse is true. The current efforts, or rather the cumulative undertakings of the
government, in professionalizing the civil service may have fallen short in strengthening our
bureaucracy. However, no efforts can and should be taken as stand alone tools or solutions in
insulating bureaucracy. The passage of supporting measures is highly desirable such as further
rationalization of performance incentives and bonuses to inspire higher performance in the public
sector.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that The State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law. It sounds neat, but not really. This provision is non-self-executory in the first place and
therefore requires an enabling law to take effect.
Unfortunately, the task of defining political dynasties as provided for in the Constitution is
essentially left to Congress, which is a lair of political dynasties. The Congress is therefore a wrong
place and a wrong choice for legislating a defining of political dynasties. It is wishful thinking to
expect Congress to legislate its own members eventual extinction! This explains why after 27 years,
Congress has failed to enact an anti-dynasty law, and the simple and obvious reason is that such a
law would go against the interest of a majority of its members.
The discourse on political dynasties in relation to the development or degeneration of our
bureaucracy hopefully will never lose academic and research value as we continue to analyze and
scrutinize the logic that undergirds such relationship as well as prod on to search for ways to
improve governance and administration against the specter of this continuing anomaly.
F o a ad o ate s pe spe ti e, the e is o eas a to su eed i hat the Be telsmann
Foundation prescribes as the dismantling of the oligarchy and political dynasties to make politics
and economics competitive. That statement was made from a position of comfort because the
realities on the ground so far remain to be perfect haven for dynastic expansion and mini oligarchy.
Until we began addressing the underlying problems that underpin the issues at hand, we are only
trying to scratch the itch and not kill the virus.
Finally, the parallel development of bureaucratic expansion and political dynasty entrenchment
share an identical timeline in history, demanding fuller understanding and critical analysis of the
implications that bureaucracy and political dynasties, or vice versa, have on each other and how
their relationship influences policymaking and governance in the course of our history.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two levels of recommendations I wish to make in this paper: the academic and
research level, and the programmatic level.
For academic and research interest purposes, it is worthy to pursue studies looking into the
history of policy prescriptions of those perceived to belong to a political dynasty in terms of policy
impact on public interest as well as their own. This should target those elected and appointed
officials for the last 15 years. The length of time is three times more than the usual cycle for policy
reviews. This is to allow policy corrections in cases of policies running in conflict with existing laws
and provisions in the Constitution or in cases where such policies have become untenable therefore
needed reform. The study should also look at the cost and quality of those policies.
Another point of investigation is the economics of political dynasties, as SALNs of members have
p o ed to e u elia le i di ato of o e s ealth. The interest here is on ethics, accountability, and
integrity of publicly elected (and appointed) officials although some may contend that this function
properly belongs to the Commission on Audit.
On the pragmatic side, but still within the domain of the academe, a continuing conversation on
the issues in terms of the latest in legislative efforts and constraints are strongly encouraged. The
engagement and full participation of civil society organizations and the youth sector are strongly
encouraged to hear their inputs to be considered for any future course of action.
Bringing around the issue to the grassroots is a worthy yet expensive undertaking. It is therefore
encouraged that the Internet and social media be utilized to disseminate informational and
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educational materials for the public, and specific target audience, to gain a deeper understanding on
the issue. Again, the academe should lead in terms of formulating a common point for convergence
for all sectors to come together and agree and propose a unified action such as pressuring Congress
to pass not only an anti-dynasty bill but also the FOI, the competition, political party development,
party list reform, budget reform, and electoral reform bills.
It is paramount that advocates of anti-dynasty find common ground with those in the different
reform advocacies and complement each other because all these measures coming from different
groups will all lead towards improving the same locus or ecosystem where we operate.
Finally, the combination of the preceding recommendations are thought to bring together the
public, having familiarized with the issue at heart, into action which can be a form of pressure on
Congress to legislate a definition of what constitutes political dynasty.

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References

Journals

Mangahas, Joel V., and Arroyo, Dennis (2014). Improving Local Service Delivery through the Community-Driven
Development Approach. Asian Review of Public Administration 25(1), pp. 56-73.

Dal Bo, Ernestro, Dal Bo Pedro, and Snyder, Jason. Political Dynasties in Review of Economic Studies (2009) 76,
115–142.

Books

Acemoglu, D. and J.Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. New York:
Random House.

Acemoglu, D. and J.Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Book Chapters

De Guzman, Raul P., Brillantes, Alex B., and Pacho, Arturo G (1988). The Bureaucracy. In Raul P. De Guzman and
Mila A. Reforma (Eds), Government and Politics of the Philippines (pp. 180-206). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

Rebullida, Ma. Lourdes G. Genato, Serrano, Cecilia (2006). Bureaucracy and Public Management in Democracy,
Development, and Governance in the Philippines. In Noel M. Morada and Teresa Encarnacion Tadem (Eds),
Philippine Politics and Governance (pp. 217-248). Quezon City: UP Department of Political Science

McCoy, Alfred W. (1994). Anarchy of Families: The Histiriography of State and Family in the Philippines. In Alfred
W. McCoy, (Ed), Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (1-27). Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press.

Fegan, Brian (1994). Entrepreneurs in Votes and Violence. In Alfred W. McCoy, (Ed), Anarchy of Families: State and
Family in the Philippines (41-52). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Rocamora, Joel (1995). Classes, Bosses, Goons, and Guns: Re-imagining Philippine Political Culture.” In Jose F.
Lacaba (Ed), Boss: Five Case Studies of Local Politics in the Philippines, Pasig: Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism.

Published Articles

CENPEG Issue Analysis, Policy Study, Publication and Advocacy. No. 08 S. 2012

Me doza et al, Politi al D asties a d Po e t : Chi ke o the Egg . Makati Cit : Asia I stitute of
Management.

Querubin, Pablo (2011). Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the
Philippines, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, October, 2011.

Querubin, Pablo (2010) "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines", mimeo, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.

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Tuazon, Bobby M (2010). Six Centuries of Political Dynasties: Why the Philippines Will Forever be Ruled by Political
Clans? Quezon City: Center for People Empowerment in Governance.

Other Sources

The 1987 Philippine Constitution

HB 3413, Fifteenth Congress of the Philippines, First Regular Session.

Senate Bill No. 2649

The Philippine Star, May 14, 2013.

Websites

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/308899/news/nation/phl-political-dynasties-winners-losers-in-may-13-
elections).

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/293487/news/nation/anti-political-dynasty-group-seeks-to-disqualify-
six-candidates

http://business.inquirer.net/192967/wash-sales-said-to-be-common-practice

http://www.rappler.com/nation/57370-anti-political-dynasty-bill-house-plenary

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/276411/news/specialreports/the-great-divide-the-politics-and-
economics-of-splitting-camsur.

http://www.rappler.com/nation/57370-anti-political-dynasty-bill-house-plenary and committee records

www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/293487/news/nation/anti-political-dynasty-group-seeks-to-disqualify-six-
candidates

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