Council: United Nations Security Council, UNSC

Sponsors: The United States of America

Signatories:
Topic: The Question on the Impacts of Artificial Intelligence on International Security

The United Nations Security Council,

Recognising the rapid advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and their use in Autonomous Weapons
Systems (AWS) and their potential implications for global security,

Emphasizing the importance of addressing ethical and legal considerations in the development and
deployment of AWS,

Recognising the role of both private sector and governmental entities in the development and production
of AWS,

Reiterating the significance of ensuring transparency and accountability in the development and use of
AWS,

Stressing the need for international cooperation and dialogue to establish common and regulations for the
responsible use of AWS,

Reaffirming the commitment to safeguarding international security and preventing the unlawful use of
AWS,

Hereby;

ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS

1. Defines the following terms:

a. “Artificial Intelligence, (AI)” as a machine-based system that can, for a given set of
human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing
real or virtual environments;
b. “Full System-Autonomy” as the ability of a system to complete its entire engagement
cycle with no human involvement;
c. “AI-enabled” as the use of fully trained AI models as the primary enabler of
system-autonomy;
d. “Militarisation of AI” as the development, deployment and implementation of fully
trained AI models in the military domain and are to be used in warfare contexts,
including but not limited to the development of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWSs),
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cyber attack or defense mechanisms;
e. “Autonomous Weapons Systems, (AWS)” as a weapon system that, once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by an operator. This includes, but is
not limited to, operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to
allow operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage
targets without further operator input after activation;
f. “Operator-Supervised AWS” as an autonomous weapon system that is designed to
provide operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in
the event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur;
g. “Semi-Autonomous Weapons Systems” as a weapon system that, once activated, is
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been
selected by a human operator;
h. “Human Control” as the ability for human operators to exercise meaningful control over
the deployment and use of AWSes, including the ability intervene, override or deactivate
such systems when deemed necessary to ensure compliance with the International
Humanitarian Law;
i. “Purpose of AWSes” as an AI-enabled weapon system that is and deployed with the
purpose of applying destructive force towards specific categories of targets;
j. “Unintended Engagement” as the use of force against persons or objects that operators
did not intend to be the targets of military operations, including unacceptable levels of
collateral damage beyond those consistent with the International Humanitarian Law;
k. “Operational Failure” as an actual or perceived degradation or loss of intended
functionality or inability of the system to perform as intended or designed. Minimizing
the probability and consequences of operational failure means reducing the probability
and consequences of unintended engagements to acceptable levels consistent with the
International Humanitarian Law while meeting mission objectives and does not mean
achieving the lowest possible level of risk;
 l. “Weapon System Safety Rules” as guidance for personnel, issued by competent authority,
focused on addressing weapon safety issues and concerns that present significant mishap
risk and to ensure minimal unintended engagement such as unintended death or injury,
unintended damage to or loss of equipment or property, or unintended damage to the
environment;

ARTICLE II: RECOGNISING THE VALID ETHICAL CONCERNS BEHIND AWSs

2. Affirms the importance of upholding ethical standards in the development, deployment and
implementation of AWSs in armed conflict, in accordance with the International Humanitarian
Law, the Geneva Conventions, the Human Rights Law and other applicable ethical principles;

3. Recognises the following ethical concerns raised by the proliferation of AWs, including but not
limited to:
a. Loss of Human Control; the potential for AWSs to operate without direct Human Control
and oversight, leading to a loss of Human Control over critical decisions related to the
use of lethal force and increased risk of Unintended Engagement and Operational Failure;
b. Lack of Critical Discrimination; the potential for AWSs to struggle to distinguish between
civilians and combatants, leading to Unintended Engagement, Operational Failure and
violating the Principle of Distinction;
c. Lack of Ethical Justification for the Use of Lethal Force; the potential for AWSs to
struggle to assess the necessity and proportionality of lethal actions due to the lack of
human judgment and contextual thinking, leading to Unintended Engagement,
Operational Failure and violating the Principle of Proportionality;
d. Inherent Bias and Discrimination; the potential for AWSs to reflect and perpetuate biases
present in their design and training data, leading to unfair outcomes that may cause the
disproportionate targeting of certain groups and exacerbating social inequalities;
e. Lack of Accountability and Liability; without clear internationally-accepted lines of legal
and ethical accountability, it may be difficult to assign responsibility for the consequences
of autonomous actions, particularly in cases of Unintended Engagement and Operational
Failure;
f. Lack of Transparency; the lack of transparency regarding the training and development of
AI models makes it challenging to evaluate the ethical implications of AWSs and ensure
their adherence to the International Humanitarian Law and other applicable principles;
 g. Escalation and Proliferation; without effective international regulations and measures, the
unchecked proliferation of AWSs may increase the likelihood of armed conflict,
exacerbate existing security challenges and cause a global arms race for the acquisition of
AWSs, posing risks to international security;

ARTICLE III: ADDRESSING THE ETHICAL CONCERNS BEHIND AWSs

4. Calls for the establishment of Council Overseeing the use Of Military ai (COOM):
a. Mandated to serve as the apex body responsible for formulating, coordinating and
enforcing comprehensive international regulations and standards pertaining to the
Militarisation of AI and AWSs, and is to enforce the aforementioned definitions from
Article I;
b. Mandated to be comprised of high-level representatives from member states, international
organizations such as UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),
relevant academic and stakeholders;
c. Mandated to facilitate information exchange, capacity-building and collaborative
initiatives among member states and stakeholders;
d. Mandated to periodically review and update its regulatory frameworks in response to
technological advancements and emerging challenges;
e. Mandated to investigate all allegations of violations of the international regulatory
frameworks and definitions laid out by the COOM or any and all activity concerned with
the Militarisation of AI and AWSs that is deemed to be a threat to international security,
committed by both governmental or private sector entities;
f. Mandated to coordinate with undermentioned specialized subcommittees to ensure
coherent implementation and enforcement of definitions and regulatory frameworks;
5. Calls for the establishment of a subcommittee on Government Oversight and Regulation
(GOR):
a. Mandated to report all activities directly to the COOM;
b. Mandated to focus on monitoring and regulating governmental activities related to the
Militarisation of AI and AWSs;
c. Mandated to consist of relevant and various experts in international military, legal, ethical
and diplomatic fields, representing member states and relevant international organizations
such as the CCW;
 d. Mandated to conduct regular annual assessments of government policies, programmes
and initiatives concerning the Militarisation of AI and AWSs
e. Mandated to evaluate countries’ compliance with the definitions and international
regulatory frameworks laid out by the COOM, as well as adherence to other relevant
principles such as the International Humanitarian Law;
f. Mandated to provide recommendations and guidance to the governments of member
states on best practices for responsible use of AI in their militaries;
6. Calls for the establishment of a subcommittee on Industry Oversight and Regulation (IOR):
a. Mandated to report all activities directly to the COOM;
b. Mandated to monitor and regulate the activities of private sector entities involved in the
development, production and sale of Militarised AI and AWSs;
c. Mandated to be comprised of representatives from leading technology firms, defense
contractors, industry associations and international legal experts;
d. Mandated to monitor and assess the compliance of private sector entities with the
definitions and international regulatory frameworks laid out by the COOM;
e. Mandated to conduct regular audits, inspections and risk-assessments of projects and
technologies developed by companies that are related to the Militarisation of AI and
AWSs;
f. Mandated to collaborate with companies to better address the ethical concerns such as
algorithmic bias arising from the design and training data used in the AI-models;
g. Mandated to collaborate with relevant companies and stakeholders to promote
responsible innovation, transparency and accountability in the industry;

ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MILITARISATION OF AI

7. Affirms that if allegations of violations of the international regulatory frameworks and

definitions laid out by the COOM or any and all activity concerned with the Militarisation of AI
and AWSs that is deemed to be a threat to international security is considered to be valid or
substantial after thorough investigation by the COOM, all relevant measures such as legal actions
will be taken to ensure accountability. This is including but not limited to:
a. Trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ); countries found to have violated the
regulatory frameworks set out by the COOM will be brought before the ICJ for legal
proceedings;
 b. Imposition of Sanctions; the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will authorize the
imposition of sanctions on the countries involved in breaching the COOM’s regulatory
frameworks, such as, but not limited to sanctions on semiconductors;
c. Trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC); companies or individuals found to have
violated the regulatory frameworks set out by the COOM will be brought before the ICC
for legal proceedings;
d. Financial Penalties; the UNSC will call for relevant member states to implement the
freezing of the involved companies’ assets or restricting their access to financial markets;

ARTICLE V: MITIGATING THE DANGERS POSED BY INCREASED DIGITAL WARFARE

8. Calls for the establishment of a Cybersecurity Coordination Office (CCO) within the United
Nations (UN) to oversee activities related to the mitigation of digital warfare and cybersecurity
cooperation:
a. Mandated to work closely with other UN bodies such as the UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA) to address cyber threats in a holistic manner;
b. Mandated to consist of member states, relevant international organizations, private sector
entities, civil society organizations and other applicable stakeholders;
c. Mandated to serve as an international platform for dialogue, information-sharing and
capacity-building on cybersecurity issues;
9. Calls for the strengthening of the role of Interpol and Europol:
a. Empower Interpol and Europol to serve as focal points for international cooperation on
cybercrime and cybersecurity;
b. Enhance Interpol and Eurpol’s capabilities for cyber threat intelligence sharing, joint
investigations and capacity-building initiatives;
10. Calls for the utilization of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support capacity-building in developing
countries:
a. Mandated to provide technical assistance, training programmes and resources to
strengthen cybersecurity capabilities at the national scale;
11. Calls for the promotion of public-private partnerships (PPP) for increased cybersecurity,
leveraging existing initiatives such as the World Economic Forum’s Centre for Cybersecurity and
the Cybersecurity Tech Accord;
a. Encouraged to facilitate collaboration between government agencies, industry
associations and technology companies to address common cybersecurity challenges;
12. Reaffirms its commitment to upholding and making improvements to existing international
laws and cybersecurity standards;
a. Support the work of international standards organizations such as the International
Organization for Standardization (IOS) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) in developing cybersecurity standards and guidelines;
b. Engage with existing forums such as the UN Group of Governmental Expert (GGE) on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security to improve on the existing standards and measures;
c. Strengthen existing international legal frameworks pertaining to cybercrime, such as the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes;

ARTICLE VI: Others

13. Decides to remain actively seized on this issue.