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 Assessing the Success of
UN Peacekeeping Operations

DUANE BRATT

Despite the growth in the study of UN peacekeeping, one crucial aspect has been
neglected: how to judge whether a peacekeeping operation has been successful or not.
There are four ways that operational success can be measured: mandate performance,
facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limitation of casualties.
Each of these indicators is explored to determine its validity and relative importance.
Then, using these criteria, an assessment is made of the success of the 39 UN
peacekeeping operations conducted from 1945 to 1996, judging each operation as
either a complete success, a moderate success, or a failure. Following this assessment,
selected cases illustrate how the indicators have been applied. Thus a set of criteria is
developed which can be used to assess the success of future peacekeeping operations,
and an evaluation is made of the historical record of peacekeeping.

Since 1988, there has been an extraordinary growth in the number and size
of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the period 1945-87, the UN
undertook 13 operations, but in the last nine years, 28 new operations have
been created. In addition, the scope of peacekeeping has also increased
dramatically. Traditionally, UN peacekeeping referred to the interposition of
a neutral force between two warring states once a ceasefire had been agreed
to. However, since 1988, the UN has shifted its focus towards addressing
intra-state conflicts. To meet this new challenge, peacekeepers have been
assigned such new tasks as varied as conducting elections, civil
administration, repatriating refugees and protecting humanitarian convoys.
Matching this tremendous growth in peacekeeping has been a growth in
the literature dedicated to explaining and understanding the expansion of
peacekeeping. However, in the litany of peacekeeping studies one subject is
strangely neglected: how to judge whether a peacekeeping operation has
been successful or not. With the exception of brief sections in Marjorie
Brown's 'United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current
Issues" and Paul Diehl's International Peacekeeping,2 writers have
neglected to specify what exactly constitutes a successful operation.
Instead, they choose to use 'face validity" to determine operational success.
It was obvious to most observers that the operation in Somalia failed and
Duane Bratt recently received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, University of
Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 65

that the one in Namibia succeeded. However, this is not a systematic

procedure, nor does it recognize degrees of success. Moreover, it is
susceptible to serious problems when the operation in question produces a
mixed record. What happens when the peacekeepers succeed in some
respects, but fail in others? It is true that, as Thomas Weiss points out: 'the
ambiguity of success and failure, as well as the time frame used to measure
the durability of results'," makes it difficult to gauge success. Nevertheless,
a systematic attempt to define success is fundamental to an understanding
of peacekeeping.
The importance of defining success becomes even more critical when
evaluating performance. Whereas there has recently been a multitude of so-
called 'lessons learned' reports which have emerged in the wake of (usually
failed) operations, these analyses have not been based on an explicit
definition of success. In a strictly theoretical sense, it is wrong to classify
operations as successes or failures without reference to some kind of
objective standard. From a more practical point of view, the failure to
conceptualize peacekeeping success can lead to misguided policies. This is
because the UN Secretariat and member states rely on studies of lessons
learned to make decisions about future peacekeeping operations. Thus a
systematic attempt to define success is fundamental not only to
understanding peacekeeping but also to evaluating peacekeeping operations
in order to make decisions about future operations.
This article addresses two research questions. First, how is the success of
UN peacekeeping operations measured? A set of criteria will be developed to
measure the operational success of UN peacekeeping operations. Second,
using these criteria: how successful has UN peacekeeping been in the past?
The criteria for success will be applied to the 39 UN peacekeeping operations
which have been conducted between 1945 and 1996.1 Each operation will be
judged as to whether it was a complete success, a moderate success, or a
failure. Once this initial task has been completed, an overall assessment of
each operation's success will also be made.

Indicators of Operational Success

We can start by examining the criteria developed by Brown and Diehl to assess
peacekeeping success. Brown identified three criteria for determining success:
Was the mandate fulfilled, as specified by the appropriate Security Council
resolution? Did the operation lead to a resolution of the underlying disputes of
the conflict? Did the presence of the operation contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the
area of the operation? 6 Diehl developed two criteria: Was the operation able to
limit armed conflict? Did the operation facilitate conflict resolution?'
66 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

This study uses three of the indicators deployed by Brown and Diehl,
namely: mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, and containing
the conflict. However, the present analysis offers significant improvements on
the work of Brown and Diehl. First, it amends Diehl's criterion concerning the
limitation of armed conflict by considering whether operations were able to
limit casualties. This change is made because Diehl only took into account
combatant deaths, and a more encompassing assessment would also include
civilian deaths. In addition, Diehl's indicator does not include deaths that were
indirectly caused by conflict; for example, civilians who died of natural
causes that could have been prevented had humanitarian aid shipments not
been blocked because of the fighting. The approach here is more
comprehensive, counting not only deaths directly caused by armed conflict,
such as victims of sniper fire, land mines and terrorist bombings, but also
indirect causes such as famine and disease. Second, the present analysis
critically challenges the validity and relative importance of each of the four
indicators of operational success. This was neglected by Brown and only
partially accomplished by Diehl. Third, by combining the different criteria
identified by Brown and Diehl, a common frame of reference for assessing
success is developed. Fourth, the criteria will be used to systematically assess
the success of every UN peacekeeping operation. This allows for a greater
evaluation of the overall record of UN peacekeeping than the selected case
study approach utilized by Brown and Diehl.'
In the decision to use the indicators of mandate performance, facilitation
of conflict resolution, conflict containment and casualty limitation, some
potential indicators are dismissed. For example, in a review of Diehl's book,
Robert C. Johansen suggested two additional criteria: 'assess the effect of
peacekeeping forces on local people affected by their work'; and 'compare
the degree of misunderstanding, tension, or violence that occurs in the
presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance-of-power
activity without peacekeeping'.' Although both these indicators may offer
some insights into how we conceive of peacekeeping success, they will not
be used in this study. The first indicator - an operation's effect on the local
people - will not be used because it remains conceptually unclear. In
particular, there are many variables which could be used to determine an
operation's effects on the target country's population. Among them are
which people should be examined (the population as a whole, or selected on
the basis of factors such as age, gender, class, or political affiliation); and
which factors to take into account (living conditions, economic standing,
type of political system and so forth). Although there is a definite utility in
assessing the success of a peacekeeping operation on the basis of its effects
on the host population, there is still much methodological work that needs
to be done. The second criteria was not used because it would have relied
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 67
on speculation about what would have happened had the peacekeepers not
been deployed. It is difficult to assess what would have been the result in
Bosnia if the international community had conducted a Desert Storm
operation, or if nothing at all had been done. The performance of an
operation that has occurred can be objectively assessed, but to estimate the
results of an unchosen option is to delve into the realm of psychic
prediction.

Mandate Performance
The first indicator, whether the peacekeeping operation successfully
completed its mandate, can be determined by examining the stated mandate
in Security Council resolutions, and judging whether it was adequately
completed. This is a relatively straightforward procedure. For example, if
the peacekeepers were mandated to disarm the combatants, the analyst
simply determines the extent to which the stated tasks have been completed.
This is why mandate assessment has been the predominant tool for
assessing operational success.
However, many critics argue that the singular use of mandate
performance is inadequate. As Diehl noted: 'the mandate's given operations
are frequently vague, and there is much room for debate on the scope and
detail of the operation's missions; this alone makes it difficult to assess
whether the designs of the mandate have been achieved."' Second, as one
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) official stated, 'you can
get a completely unrealistic mandate that was cooked up to satisfy the
Security Council member's domestic political interests. Nobody on the
Council in their wildest dreams thought the mandate would ever be
implemented'." For example, UNIFIL's mandate was to restore the authority
of the disintegrated Lebanese government, but as one commentator noted,
the Security Council was, in effect, asking UNIFIL to 'raise a Lazarus'. 2
Further, as the DPKO official remarked: 'there is still the possibility of
having a useful and constructive international presence, and doing good
things and improving the situation. Even though there's no real
approximation of the mandate, and nobody ever expected there would be'."
Is it fair to judge an operation as a failure because the peacekeepers did not
complete an impossible mandate, despite the fact that much was
accomplished? Nevertheless an operation's mandate cannot be ignored - for
it does represent the wishes of the Security Council. In addition, of the four
indicators, only an operation's mandate is a unique measurement of its
objectives. Thus, while it may require some effort to value an operation's
mandate, it is a valid assessment of peacekeeping success.
68 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

FacilitatingConflict Resolution
The second indicator of success is whether the operation was able to
facilitate the resolution of the underlying causes of a conflict. Conflict
resolution requires a formal agreement between the warring parties, either a
peace treaty or, for internal conflicts, some type of power-sharing
arrangement. The reason for using this indicator is because it should be the
ultimate aim of all UN efforts. In fact, the Security Council has, in recent
cases, determined that a condition for continuing with the peacekeeping
operation is the level of progress towards conflict resolution which has been
made. When UNOMIG was established, the Security Council noted that its
mandate would be extended 'based on a report from the Secretary-General
whether or not substantive progress had been made towards implementing
measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace'. 4 Even when it is not
explicitly stated in its mandate, the deployment of a peacekeeping force
may put the fighting in a holding pattern, thus allowing peace negotiations
to occur. UNEF II did not have a mandate for conflict resolution, but its
presence helped prevent further fighting and aided the political negotiations
that led to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. UNFICYP is an
even better example of why conflict resolution is an integral part of
operational success. UNFICYP may have been successful in separating
Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus, but the conflict has been raging for
more than 30 years. In fact, as Birgisson has noted: 'UNFICYP has
managed to foster a semblance of calm and normalcy about the current
situation that may indeed discourage dialogue between the two communities
and, thus, a lasting political settlement'." In short, peacekeeping operations
should be judged on the basis of conflict resolution because the peace-
keepers have the ability to either facilitate, or hinder, conflict resolution.
However, there are also disadvantages to using conflict resolution as the
sole indicator of operational success. Principally, it places events beyond the
control of the peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers can facilitate conflict
resolution, but in the end it is the responsibility of the combatants to 'kiss
and make up'. In addition, the operation may not even be mandated to
attempt conflict resolution, as was the case in the UN's operation in
Afghanistan. UNGOMAP successfully supervised the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, but it 'did not affect the situation in Afghanistan or the
surrounding region significantly', as the 'civil war continued unabated'. 6
Moreover, if the conflict re-ignites following the withdrawal of the
peacekeepers, does that mean that the operation, which may have formerly
been deemed a success, is now relegated to the failed operation pile? How
long is a peacekeeping force supposed to be responsible for the outcome of
the conflict? Five years? Ten years? Conflict resolution ultimately lies with
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 69
the parties to the conflict, nevertheless the peacekeepers must make every
effort to achieve a lasting political settlement. This is because the
maintenance of international peace and security can only be ensured
through the resolution, not simply the mitigation of conflicts. Thus, despite
some difficulties in measurement, facilitating conflict resolution is an
appropriate way to assess the succes of peacekeeping operations.

Conflict Containment
The third indicator of operational success is conflict containment. This is
determined by whether the operation prevented major powers or
neighbouring states from intervening in the conflict. In addition, an
operation can be considered to have failed to contain the conflict even if the
intervention is authorized by the UN. UNOSOM I must be considered a
failure at conflict containment when the UN Security Council felt it
necessary to authorize UNITAF to intervene into Somalia.
Assessing an operation's ability to contain the conflict is important
because sometimes the sole rationale for deploying UN peacekeepers is to
prevent the conflict from escalating. UNEF I was deployed because of fears
that the crisis in Suez might draw in the Soviet Union and the United States.
Therefore, even if UNEF I could not find a solution to the Egyptian-Israeli
conflict, it was successful in preventing a greater war. An operation's
success in containing the conflict is just as important as its mandate
performance.
Nevertheless, conflict containment should not be the sole objective of a
peacekeeping operation. In some cases there is little threat of the conflict
expanding. Although the Security Council defined the situation in Somalia
as a 'threat to international peace and security', no real threat existed for
UNOSOM II to defend against." In addition, since the 1974 Turkish
invasion of Cyprus, UNFICYP has strongly aided efforts at keeping Greece
and Turkey from going to war. But must it remain in Cyprus indefinitely?
Thus, containment is not enough; eventually resolution must take place.

Limiting Casualties
The final indicator of success for a UN peacekeeping operation is whether
it limited casualties. This is determined by comparing the number of
casualties in the conflict (both military and civilian) prior to, and after, the
deployment of the peacekeeping operation. In general, a complete success
requires a significant reduction in casualties from the beginning of the
operation. Meanwhile, a moderate success occurs when the operation, after
some periodic flare-ups, is eventually able to limit casualties. Finally, an
operation is considered to have failed at limiting casualties if it has had little
or no effect on the overall rate of casualties.
70 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

In making these judgements, special attention is also given to

peacekeeper casualties. This is because a high level of peacekeeper
casualties illustrates that one, or more, of the combatants considers them to
be a party to the conflict. This further indicates that the peacekeeping force
has lost its ability to act as an impartial referee in the conflict, with the result
usually being a failed operation. More importantly, when peacekeepers die,
domestic political pressure may be put on the contributing state to withdraw
its forces. This negatively affects peacekeeping in two ways. First, it can
substantially weaken the capability of the current operation. A good
example occurred in Rwanda when, following the death of ten of its troops,
Belgium withdrew its entire contingent, which seriously eroding UNAMIR
I's capability. Second, it could have considerable repercussions on future
peacekeeping operations. US casualties in Somalia gave rise to a vocal, and
powerful, anti-UN movement which may still have the potential to
undermine the entire existence of UN peacekeeping or, at the very least,
make it difficult to establish new missions and continue with current ones.
Limiting casualties is a useful indicator, because peacekeepers make a
significant contribution to reducing the impact of armed conflict if they
limit the number of deaths, even if they are unable to ultimately resolve the
conflict. The example of UNEF I deployment in the Suez, which halted the
joint offensive by Israeli, French and British troops, illustrates how
peacekeepers can limit casualties by preventing armed conflict. Likewise,
peacekeeping operations, particularly those with primarily humanitarian
mandates, have the ability to greatly limit civilian casualties. UNAMIR II,
which was deployed in Rwanda following France's intervention, has been
successful in limiting fatalities through the provision of medical and food
aid and by securing the refugee camps.
Admittedly, the use of this measurement can be problematic. Should an
operation be considered a moderate success if, after failing for two years, it
succeeds in the third year at limiting casualties? Midecins sans Frontieres
has disputed UNITAF's claims that it improved the humanitarian situation
in Somalia because 'the famine had reached a peak in the summer of 1992
and the most vulnerable had already died.'" What about comparing the
actual casualties with what might have occurred without the presence of the
peacekeepers? Would more civilians in Bosnia have died if UNPROFOR
had not been established? A further problem arises when the fighting begins
again once the peacekeepers leave. When UNEF I withdrew from the Suez,
following a request by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, the 1967 war soon
began. Although it is likely that the war would have occurred, regardless of
the presence of UN peacekeepers, this reveals the weakness of concentrating
on stopping the immediate violence rather than addressing the root causes
of the conflict. For more than ten years UNEF I was successful in limiting
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 71
casualties, but the 1967 war greatly tarnished its reputation. Therefore,
limiting casualties, no matter how many lives it initially saves, must be
considered secondary to the ultimate resolution of the conflict.

Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Now that the criteria for assessing the success of UN peacekeeping

operations have been developed, the operations can be evaluated. For each
indicator of operational success, each peacekeeping operation is judged as a
complete success, a moderate success, or a failure. The results of this
evaluation will be represented in tables accompanying a discussion of
selected cases to illustrate how the indicators were applied.

Mandate Performance
Using the first indicator of operational success, mandate performance, UN
peacekeeping has, in general, been marginally successful (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
MANDATE SUCCESS

Complete Success Moderate Success Failure

UNEF I, UNSF, UNFICYP, ONUC, UNAMIR II, UNTAC UNTSO, UNMOGIP,
DOMREP, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIFIL,
UNDOF, UNGOMAP, MINURSO, UNOMUR,
UNIIMOG, UNAVEM I, UNOMIL, UNAMIR I,
UNTAG, ONUCA, UNIKOM, UNMOT, UNMIH I,
UNASOG, UNPREDEP, UNAMIC, UNCRO,
UNMIH II, ONUSAL, UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II,
UNOMIG, ONUMOZ UNPROFOR, UNAVEM II

UNEF I is a prime example of a peacekeeping operation completely

succeeding in performing its mandate. UNEF I was given four tasks: secure
and supervise a ceasefire by forming a buffer zone between Anglo-French-
Israeli and Egyptian forces; supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from
Egyptian territory and the Suez canal clearing operations; patrol border
areas and deter military incursions; and monitor the provisions of the
Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreements in the Gaza Strip and in the Sinai.
These tasks were effectively carried out by UNEF I from its deployment in
1956 to its withdrawal in 1967.
An example of a moderate success at mandate performance was
UNAMIR II. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which had led to
the withdrawal of UNAMIR I and an humanitarian intervention by France,
UNAMIR II was established. The essential features of its mandate were to:
to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their
agreement to a ceasefire; to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief
72 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

operations; to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk in

Rwanda of secure humanitarian areas; to provide security and support for
humanitarian relief operations; and establish and train a new civilian police
force. 20
UNAMIR II has been able to effectively complete several aspects of its
mandate: a ceasefire was established; humanitarian relief operations by UN
agencies and NGOs was resumed; and a humanitarian protected zone was
established. Although the French intervention was primarily responsible for
these achievements, UNAMIR II has been able to maintain them.
Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of UNAMIR II's mandate which
have not been fully realized. It has been largely unsuccessful in its efforts to
create and train a new civilian police force. Furthermore, a more serious gap
in its mandate performance was its inability to protect the refugees in the
camps that were established in Zaire." As the UN reported, 'acts of
intimidation and violence within the refugee camps have inhibited the
refugee population from choosing to return home'." More ominously, the
former Rwandese army is believed to be using the camps to train and rearm
for a future invasion of Rwanda.
There is little doubt that UNAMIR II has failed to perform certain
important features of its mandate. However, it must still be considered a
moderate success. This is because, as the Secretary-General reported in
1996, 'conditions in Rwanda are returning to normal'.23 This is particularly
evident with regard to the humanitarian situation. The inhabitants of the
refugee camps, even if they are being prevented from returning home, are
being furnished with food and medicine. In addition, the ceasefire has held,
despite some sabre-rattling by the former Rwandese army. UNAMIR II's
performance has not been perfect, but when compared with the
humanitarian tragedy that existed prior to its deployment, it must be viewed
as a moderate success.
An example of an operation which failed to complete its mandate is
UNOSOM II, which followed the US-led UNITAF intervention into
Somalia. It was mandated 'to establish throughout Somalia a secure
environment for humanitarian assistance' 24 To accomplish this, UNOSOM
II was granted Chapter VII powers to enforce the ceasefire and disarm the
Somalis. The forcible disarmament programme, for both the warlords and
the irregulars, was made the number one priority. This effort ended in
disaster as the Somalis, in particular those loyal to General Mohammed
Farah Aidid, forcibly resisted disarmament, resulting in substantial
casualties to UNOSOM II. The failure to perform its security mandate led
to a reversal of the humanitarian gains that had been obtained during
UNITAF. UNOSOM II forces were diverted from protecting humanitarian
convoys to pursue Aidid following the 6 June tragedy. In addition, NGOs
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 73
had 'to curtail their activities because of increasing insecurity and a growing
confusion between the military and humanitarian roles'." As a result,
malnutrition levels started rising again, and there was another outbreak of
cholera. Thus, UNOSOM II failed to complete both the security and
humanitarian elements of its mandate.

Facilitating Conflict Resolution

Under the second indicator of operational success, facilitating conflict
resolution, peacekeeping operations have been largely unsuccessful (see
Table 2). An exception is UNTAG, which assisted and monitored Namibia's
transfer from a South African colony to independence and which provides
an excellent example of how a peacekeeping operation can facilitate conflict
resolution. Although UNTAG's military responsibilities, like monitoring
the ceasefire and the phased withdrawal of South African troops, were a
necessary contribution to peace, it was UNTAG's work in the political
sphere which most facilitated the resolution of the Namibian conflict.
UNTAG may not have organized and conducted the election, but it
supervised the drafting of the electoral law and ensured that the South
African authorities met the necessary conditions for a free and fair election.
Of particular significance was UNTAG's effective monitoring of the South
African Police, who were still responsible for the maintenance of law and
order in Namibia, in order to ensure that they were not being used for
political intimidation. Thus, UNTAG facilitated conflict resolution by
lending its legitimacy and expertise to the electoral process, and
consequently the electoral results, which led to the transition to Namibian
self-rule.
TABLE 2
CONFLICT RESOLUTION SUCCESS

Complete Success Moderate Success Failure

UNSF, DOMREP, ONUC, UNIIMOG, UNTAC UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNEF I,
UNEF II, UNAVEM I, UNOGIL, UNYOM,
UNTAG, ONUCA, UNFICYP, UNIPOM,
ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, UNIFIL,
UNMIH II, UNASOG, UNGOMAP, UNOMUR,
UNPREDEP UNAVEM II, MINURSO,
UNAMIR I, UNOMIG,
UNOMIL, UNMOT,
UNAMIC, UNOSOM I,
UNCRO, UNAMIR II,
UNMIH I, UNOSOM II,
UNPROFOR, UNIKOM

Determining whether a peacekeeping operation facilitated conflict

resolution is quite easy in cases like Namibia. It becomes problematic in
74 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

cases where there has been significant movement by the combatants

towards conflict resolution, but where substantial threats to a renewal of the
conflict still remain. In these instances, the peacekeepers must be viewed as
having been moderately successful. Representative of this category is
UNTAC, which successfully conducted Cambodia's 1993 election. Despite
many threats from the Khmer Rouge (who had boycotted the election), it
took place in an atmosphere that was 'almost completely free of violence
and intimidation', with 'no significant disruption of the polling'.26
Moreover, the voter turnout was outstanding as 89 per cent of all registered
voters (83 per cent of the total eligible population) cast ballots. The results
of this election led to the formation of a coalition government comprising
the opposition FUNCINPEC party (45.5 per cent of the vote and 58 seats)
and the former Vietnamese-installed government currently called the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) (38.2 per cent of the vote and 51 seats).
Despite this, UNTAC cannot be viewed as having achieved an ultimate
resolution to the Cambodian conflict for two major reasons. First, the
power-sharing arrangement contained in the new Royal Cambodian
Government (RCG) has not reflected FUNCINPEC's electoral superiority.
The cabinet, including the prime ministership, is evenly divided between
members from FUNCINPEC and the CPP. In addition, the CPP, through its
party apparatus, has retained control of the 18 provinces. Moreover, there
remain many units in the new unified Cambodian armed forces which have
stayed loyal to the CPP. Second, the Khmer Rouge, which boycotted the
election, continues to constitute a threat to peace in Cambodia. The Khmer
Rouge's military capability has remained intact due to UNTAC's inability to
disarm or demobilize them. From bases in the jungle along the
Thai-Cambodian border, the Khmer Rouge has been involved in a series of
low-level clashes with the RCG. In addition, the decision to either declare
war against the Khmer Rouge or include it in the government has
exacerbated the internal divisions already present in the RCG.
Nevertheless, the fact that an ultimate resolution to the conflict in
Cambodia has not occurred should not diminish the advances towards
political reconciliation made by UNTAC. First, the democratic experience
that ordinary Cambodians received through the 1993 election process
should not be underestimated. Second, some important reconciliation has
come about between two former adversaries, FUNCINPEC and the CPP.
Finally, there has not been a renewal of a full-scale civil war with the Khmer
Rouge. It is for these reasons that UNTAC must be considered a moderate
success at facilitating conflict resolution in Cambodia.
In contrast to UNTAG, which was completely successful, and UNTAC,
which was moderately successful, UNAVEM II was a failure at facilitating
conflict resolution in Angola. Following on the heels of UNAVEM I's
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 75
effective monitoring of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola,
UNAVEM II was established in 1991 to supervise the implementation of the
Peace Accords, which were intended to end the civil war between UNITA
and the Angolan government. The elections in the autumn of 1992 were the
centrepiece of this peace plan. Unfortunately, UNITA claimed that there had
been systematic electoral fraud and they rejected the election results. This
led to a return of the civil war. Eventually a new peace agreement was
signed in Angola (the Lusaka Protocol in January 1995). The UN decided
to establish a new peacekeeping operation, UNAVEM III, to implement it,
UNAVEM II's mission having ended without a resolution of the Angolan
conflict.

Conflict Containment
Of all the indicators of operational success, conflict containment has shown
to have the greatest degree of success (see Table 3). One example of
completely successful conflict containment was UNTAC. As Findlay stated,
an 'outspoken strategic aim of the Paris Accords' was 'the de-
internationalization of the Cambodian conflict'." This was achieved
through UNTAC's implementation of the Paris Accords. Vietnam has
withdrawn its troops from Cambodia, and China has stopped supporting the
Khmer Rouge. In fact, rather than hindering UNTAC's efforts, the five
permanent members of the Security Council and other regional states
provided great support through their participation in the Core Group for
Cambodia. Even the Thai military, which has aided and abetted the Khmer
Rouge, has not given any indications that it would intervene into
Cambodia's domestic affairs. Thus, Cambodia, through the efforts of
UNTAC, has ceased to be a source of regional tensions.
TABLE 3
SUCCESS AT CONTAINING THE CONFLICT

Complete Success Moderate Success Failure

UNEF I, UNSF, DOMREP, UNMOGIP, ONUC, UNTSO, UNOGIL,
UNOMIL, UNIPOM, UNIIMOG, MINURSO, UNYOM, UNIFIL,
UNEF II, UNDOF, UNOMIG, UNCRO, UNOMUR, UNAMIR I,
UNGOMAP, UNAVEM I, UNAMIR II, UNFICYP UNMOT, UNPROFOR,
UNTAG UNAVEM II, UNMIH I, UNOSOM I
ONUCA, ONUSAL,
ONUMOZ, UNTAC,
UNPREDEP, UNOSOM II,
UNAMIC, UNMIH II,
UNASOG, UNIKOM

An example of a moderate success was UNFICYP. When UNFICYP

was deployed to Cyprus in 1964, one of its objectives was to prevent Greece
76 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

and Turkey from becoming involved in a conflict which could lead to a

wider war between the two NATO allies. With one notable exception, this
objective has been achieved. However, that one exception - Turkey's 1974
invasion - requires some discussion. The invasion was precipitated when a
group of officers from the Cypriot National Guard, at the behest of Greece's
military rulers, launched a coup d'itat which unseated Archbishop
Makarios as President of Cyprus. Turkey responded to this perceived threat
against the Turkish Cypriots by launching a large-scale intervention. These
events not only heightened the potential for a Greco-Turkish war, but could
have escalated and included Britain in the fighting. The crisis was
eventually averted due to political pressure applied on Ankara by the
Security Council and other member states. However, these negotiations
would likely have come to nought without UNFICYP's work in the field. Of
primary importance was UNFICYP's pre-emptive action in seizing Nicosia
Airport from the Greek Cypriots who controlled it and declaring it a UN-
protected area.28 This action kept the airport, which held important
commercial and political value, out of the hands of the advancing Turkish
army. By stabilizing the situation on the ground, UNFICYP was able to help
prevent a further escalation of the crisis.
As a result of the 1974 Turkish invasion, UNFICYP cannot be viewed
as a complete success at containing the conflict. Nevertheless, it cannot be
viewed as having failed, because its efforts at helping regain control of the
situation played a crucial role in preventing a counter-intervention by
Greece or Britain. In addition, since 1974, UNFICYP's continued presence
has helped to prevent similar incidents. Thus, UNFICYP has been
moderately successful at conflict containment.
Although, UN peacekeeping has seen its greatest success in containing
conflicts, there have been exceptions. One of these was UNOSOM I, which
was unable to effectively address the famine and war which led to the
massive movement of Somali refugees throughout the Horn of Africa. By
January 1993, there were over 400,000 Somali refugees in Kenya alone.29
These refugee flows were the justification for the Security Council to call
the conflict a 'threat to international peace and security', allowing it to
establish UNITAF. Thus, not only was UNOSOM I incapable of preventing
the Somali conflict from spreading to the rest of the region, but its failure
led to the intervention of over 40,000 multinational troops.

Limiting Casualties
UN peacekeepers have been moderately successful in limiting casualties in
the conflicts where they have been deployed (see Table 4).
ONUSAL, which was created in 1991 to verify the implementation of
the peace agreement between the El Salvador government and the FMLN,
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 77
TABLE 4
SUCCESS AT LIMITING CASUALTIES

Complete Success Moderate Success Failure

UNEF I, UNSF, DOMREP, UNFICYP, ONUCA, UNTSO, UNMOGIP,
UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNOMIG, UNAMIR II UNOGIL, ONUC,
UNDOF, UNIIMOG, UNYOM, UNIFIL,
UNAVEM I, UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNAVEM II,
UNIKOM, ONUSAL, UNOMUR, UNOMIL,
MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNMOT, UNCRO,
UNMIH II, UNASOG, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I,
UNAMIC, UNAMIR II, UNOSOM II, UNAMIR I,
UNPREDEP, UNTAC UNMIH I

was completely successful in limiting casualties - although there were a few

casualties during the peacekeeping operation, these must be seen in contrast
to the deaths of 75,000 people during the Salvadorean civil war which raged
throughout the 1980s.30 This situation was completely turned around during
ONUSAL's mission, as the combatants adhered to the ceasefire and
casualties were kept to a bare minimum. Although several politicians were
murdered during the 1994 election campaign, the major parties (the
government, FMLN and ONUSAL) responded quickly with the formation
of a Tripartite Commission to investigate the circumstances of each case.
Further, the success of the 1994 elections, and the disarmament of the
FMLN, suggests that the violence of the past will not return once ONUSAL
leaves. The relative lack of political violence in El Salvador was due to
many factors, but ONUSAL's deployment - as a neutral third party
representing the will of the international community - was a necessary
requirement. Therefore, it is clear that ONUSAL completely successful in
helping to limit casualties in El Salvador.
UNOMIG is an example of a moderate success in limiting casualties.
UNOMIG was established in 1993 to supervise the ceasefire between the
Georgian government and the secessionist Abkhaz in the former Soviet
republic of Georgia. UNOMIG comprised military observers who worked
with a peacekeeping force from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). UNOMIG has largely succeeded in limiting
casualties through its supervision of the ceasefire. However, this was dented
by two violations of the ceasefire by the Abkhaz militia in the Gali region.
The first, in March 1995, led to 28 deaths and forced 1,500 civilians to
flee." The second, in November 1995, resulted in another seven deaths and
more displaced persons. 2 In both instances, there were additional civilians
who were injured or kidnapped. 'The pervasive lawlessness in the security
and restricted weapons zones of Abkhazia', which has led to several civilian
deaths, has also diminished UNOMIG's efforts at limiting casualties."
78 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

Despite these incidents, UNOMIG has been moderately successful at

limiting casualties because its presence, and that of the CIS peacekeepers,
has helped prevent a resumption of the civil war.
In seeking to identify an operation that failed to limit casualties, we do
not have to look much further than UNAMIR I. Despite being deployed in
Rwanda prior to the April 1994 outbreak of genocidal violence, UNAMIR
I was incapable of preventing it. In fact, in an explicit recognition of its
impotence, UNAMIR I's force strength was reduced from 2,500 to 450.'^ It
is estimated that, in the space of several months, at least 500,000 people
perished in Rwanda.3 In no other case has a UN peacekeeping operation
failed so miserably to prevent casualties.

The Overall Record

Now that each peacekeeping operation has been assessed using the four
indicators of operational success, it is necessary to determine each
operation's overall level of success. This will enable us to give a combined
ranking for the success of UN peacekeeping operations since 1945. As in
the previous section, there are three categories of operational success. A
complete success occurs when there has been a resolution to the conflict. A
moderate success occurs when one of the remaining three objectives has
been substantially fulfilled. In most cases, this would also imply success or
partial success under one of the other indicators. Finally, a failed operation
is one which fails under all four indicators of operational success. In
addition, if an operation only had limited success in one of the
measurements, it is also classified as a failure. This is because, as one
DPKO official stated, 'we need to be harsh in our judgements', and to do
otherwise would simply be 'turning up and spending some money and not
achieving anything'.36
An assessment of the overall record of UN peacekeeping shows a
mediocre performance (see Table 5). There have been just as many failures
as successes (either complete or moderate). Although its record is not as
bleak as critics of the UN have suggested, neither has it achieved as much
as its proponents have argued. While there have been enough successes in
the past to justify continuing to use peacekeeping, it is clear that steps must
be taken to improve the UN's efficiency.

Conclusion

This study has dealt with two main tasks. First, it has developed a set of
criteria which can be used to assess the success of UN peacekeeping
operations. These criteria include four indicators of operational success:
mandate, conflict resolution, containing the conflict, and limiting casualties.
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 79
TABLE 5

OVERALL SUCCESS OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Complete Success Moderate Success Failure

UNSF, DOMREP, UNFICYP, UNEF I, UNTSO, UNMOGIP,
UNEF II, UNAVEM I, UNIPOM, UNDOF, ONUC, UNOGIL,
UNTAG, ONUCA, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNYOM, UNIFIL,
ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNIKOM, UNTAC, UNAMIC, UNAVEM II,
UNMIH II, UNASOG, UNAMIR II MINURSO, UNCRO,
UNPREDEP UNOSOM I, UNOMUR,
UNPROFOR, UNOMIG,
UNOSOM II, UNMIH I,
UNOMIL, UNAMIR I, UNMOT

The use of these criteria greatly strengthens the future study of

peacekeeping because it establishes a concise method for assessing the
success of peacekeeping operations. The criteria will also be useful for
policy makers when decisions are made about establishing or withdrawing
future peacekeeping operations.
Second, the criteria have been employed to systematically assess every
UN peacekeeping operation, providing an empirical record of peacekeeping
success. From the analysis several conclusions can be made.

- The overall success rate of UN peacekeeping has been mediocre.

" The biggest failure of UN peacekeeping has been in its attempt to
facilitate conflict resolution.
* UN peacekeeping has been most successful at preventing the escalation
of conflicts.
As with the development of the criteria for success, this evaluation of the
historical record of peacekeeping will be useful in the decision-making
process because it identifies which operations have been most successful.
.It is clear that further research into assessing the success of UN
peacekeeping operations is warranted. In particular, there is an urgent need
to be able to explain why peacekeeping operations succeed or fail. A future
research project could, on the basis of the historical record established here,
attempt to determine the conditions under which peacekeeping is most
likely to succeed. Possible factors could include: the nature of the conflict;
the size of the peacekeeping force; the type of mandate; the existence of a
prior UN-authorized military intervention; the involvement of the
permanent members of the Security Council; the geographical conditions of
the conflict; and the importance of consent, impartiality, and minimum use
of force by the peacekeepers. A follow-up study which could identify those
80 THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE

factors which facilitate, or constrain, peacekeeping success would be a

major advance in our understanding of UN peacekeeping.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank Tom Keating, Juris Lejnieks, Paul Diehl, Wolfgang Biermann, as well as
the anonymous referees, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

NOTES

1 Marjorie Ann Brown, 'United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current
Issues', Reportfor Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1993.
2. Paul F. Diehl, InternationalPeacekeeping,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993.
3. Ibid., p.36.
4. Thomas G. Weiss, 'The United Nations and Civil Wars', in Weiss (ed.), The United Nations
197
and Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.

.
5. This study has made a few changes in how it totals the number of peacekeeping operations.
First, the operations in Haiti and Rwanda have been split into two (UNMIH I, UNMIH II,
UNAMIR I, UNAMIR II) with the dividing line being the UN-authorized military
intervention which occurred in both countries. Second, UNAVEM III (created in February
1995) and UNTAES (created in January 1996) have been excluded because the operations
have just been established.
6. Brown (see n.l above), pp.20-9.
7. Diehl (n.2 above), p.36.
8. Brown examined UNTSO, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNEF I, UNEF II, and UNDOF, while Diehl
examined UNEF I, UNEF II, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, and the non-UN Multinational
Force (MNF) in the Lebanon.
9. Robert C. Johansen, 'U.N. Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?', Mershon
InternationalStudies Review, Vol.38, 1994, pp.309-10. The suggestion that peacekeeping
success should be determined by assessing 'the effect of the operation on the people in those
countries in which the missions are deployed' was also made in Sandra Whitworth, 'Where
is the Politics in Peacekeeping?', InternationalJournal, Vol.50, No.2, spring 1995, p. 4 2 8
.

10. Diehl (n.2 above), p.33.

11. Confidential interview, New York, 9 Nov. 1994.
12. Mona Ghali, 'United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present', in William J. Durch
(ed.), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center,
1993, p.197.
13. Confidential interview, New York, 9 Nov. 1994.
14 SC Res. 858, 24 Aug. 1993.
15. Karl Th. Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus' in Durch (ed.), (see n.12
above), p.234.
16. Birgisson, 'United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan', in ibid.,
p.309.
17. SC Res. 794, 3 Dec. 1992 and 814, 26 Mar. 1993.
18. 'Somalia: Humanitarian Aid Outgunned', in Jean Frangois (ed.), Life, Death and Aid: The
4
Medecins Sans FrontieresReport on World Crisis, New York: Routledge, 1993, p.10
.

19. GA Res. 1000, 5 Nov. 1956.

20. SC Res. 912, 21 April 1994; 918, 17 May 1994; 965, 30 Nov. 1994.
21. An indication of the seriousness of the situation inside the refugee camps is the fact that the
UN Secretariat sought authorization for a new military force to provide security for the
camps, but this request was turned down by the Security Council. S/1994/1308, 18 Nov.
1994 and S/Prst/1994/75, 30 Nov. 1994.
ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS 81
21. An indication of the seriousness of the situation inside the refugee camps is the fact that the
UN Secretariat sought authorization for a new military force to provide security for the
camps, but this request was turned down by the Security Council. S/1994/1308, 18 Nov.
1994 and S/Prst/1994/75, 30 Nov. 1994.
22. S/1994/1133, 6 October 1994.
23. s/1996/149, 29 Feb. 1996.
24. SC Res. 814, 26 Mar. 1993.
25. Frangois (n.18 above), p.106.
26. S/25879, 2 June 1993.
27. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report
No.9, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.106.
28. For more information on UNFICYP's actions during the 1974 invasion see Francis Henn,
'The Nicosia Airport Incident of 1974: A Peacekeeping Gamble', International
Peacekeeping, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 1994, pp.80-98.
29. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peacefrom Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,
International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993,
pp.48-9.
30. lan Johnstone, Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador, International Peace
Academy Occasional Paper, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 1 2

.
31. S/1995/342, 1 May 1995.
32. S/1996/5, 2 Jan. 1996.
33. S/1996/5, 2 Jan. 1996.
34. SC Res. 912, 21 April 1994.
35. S/1995/297, 9 April 1995.
36. Confidential interview, New York, 9 Nov. 1994.