el Chapter 1 THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS A DEBATE RENEWED MORE MAY BE BETTER Kenneth N. Waltz What will the spread of nuclesr weapons do to the world? 1 say “spread” rather than “proliferation” because so far nuclear weapons have proliterated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals, Horizontally they have spread slovly acoss the world, and the pace isnot likely to change much. Short-term candidates for admission tothe nuclear clu ate not numerous, and they sre not likely to rush into the nuclear business, One reason is that the United States works with some effect to keep coun tries from doing tha Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally joining the chib. Membership grew to twelve in the ist fifty years of the nuclear age, and that num ber includ three countries that stidcenly foun! themselves in the nuclear military business as successor states to the Soviet Union. Membership inthe club then dropped to eight as South Aiea, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine liquidated thelr weapons. A fifty percent growth of membership in the next decade would be surprisin national conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the With New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defense Scott D. Sagan Kenneth N. Waltz ince rapid Ba W.W. Norton Company New York London 200 Wwice 4 Tite Seatan oF Nuctean Wearoxs, Spread of nuclear weapons is fortunate, Someday the world will be populated by fifteen or eighteen muclear-weapon states (hereaer refereed to as nuclear states). What the far ther spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is there fore a compeling question, ‘Tie Mrurtary Loci of Sere-Hirte Sistens The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than hhad been known in modem history, if peace is defined ws the absence of general war amang the major states ofthe world ‘The Second World War followed the first one within twenty ‘one years. Almost sity years have elapsed since the Alles victory over the Axis powers, Conflict marks all human fois. ln the past half century, conflict has generated hestiity famong slates and has at times issued in violence among the Weaker and smaller ones. Even though the more pawerfa states of the world were occasionally dtect participant, wat was confined geographically and limited milter Remarkably, general war Was avoided in a period of rapid and far-eaching change: decolonization; the rapid economic row of some states the formation and tightening of bows, and the eventual dissolution of one of them, the development ‘of new technologies; and the emengence of new sttategies for fighting guerila wars and deterring nuclear ene. The prover lence of peace, together with the fighting of circumscribed wars indicates a high ability ofthe postwar international sys tem to absorb changes and to contain conflicts and hostility, Presumably, features found in the postwar system that ‘were not present earlier account forthe World's recent good fortune. The biggest changes in the postwar world were, ist the shift from multipolanty to bipolaity and ultimately to Uuipolarity and, second, the introduction of nuclear weapons, In this chapter I concentrate onthe later. States coexist in a condition of anarchy: Selhelp is the Principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most impor More May Be Be tant way in which states must help themselves is by provi fing for their own security. Therefore in weighing the chances for peace the first questions to ask aze questions about the ‘ends for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ: The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without using force. War becomes less likely asthe casts of war rise in telation to por sible gains. Strategies bring ends and means together How nucle weapons affect the chances for peace is seen by exam ining the ciflerent implications of defense and deteence "How ean one state dissuade another state from attack ing? One way to counter an intended attack is to build forti- tations and to master forces tha ook forbiddngly strong. To build defenses so patently strong that no one will 1) 10 slestroy or overcome them would make intematinal life per fectly tranquil Teal this the defensive ideal. The other way 10 ‘counter an intended attack isto build retaliatory forces able to rin unacceptable punishment upon 9 would-be aggressor. “To deter” means to stop people from doing something by frightening them. In contrast to dissaasion by defense dis suasion by deterrence operates by frightening 4 state cut of altacking, not because ofthe difculty of launching an alack and carrying it ome, but because the expected reaction of the ‘opponent may result in one's own severe punishment Defense ancl deterrence are often confused. One use to heat statements lke this: "A strong defense in Europe will eter a Soviet attack.” What was meant was that a strong, defense ‘would dissuade the Soviet Union from attacking, Deterrence Is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish, Purely deterent forces provide no defense The message of the suategy is this: “Although we ave defense les, if you attack we may punish you to-an extent that mone than cancels your gains.” Second strike nuclear forces serve that kind of srategy: Purely defensive loees provide no deter rence. They offer no means of punishment. The message of the slrategy s this: “Although we cannot strike beck a you, you will find our defenses s0 dificult to overcome that vou willrazav of NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6 Tue dash youre pieces against then.” The Maginot ine was tooeve hand of sete! ‘Do mater weapon irate or decease the chances of war hear dpe nether nee eng Pe mit an encourage tats to deploy forces i Ways tal ma Ieee ao foe more ely and way ht romise to be more or less destructive. If nuclear weapons attic mre ect and he Baska et tore compeling, then clear weapons are bad forthe Morac uthe mos so the mow wily difsed nuclear Verfoe fee en an etree a mae sr {nvm lay the spam wep may Sapte opposite resull, To maa th secu Inyo he mea ay a ate a he aang fs thy ean make for eel floes tht he quale Thy of ineational life varies with the case othe cficlty Suteeperence hake spo an sats change th station fant way ta then ore of sce span a ‘well suited for conquest, neighbors have more peace of minc Whe shoul expect ar fo become ln ily when weaponry sty make conuet moe dif, discourage pre- tenptive and preventive wat an to make cereive teases Stowers cane our by cose hos lest deterrence Sra clea dence improve the prospects or peace. . First, war can be fought in the face of deterrent thsests bt she higher the esa the se cunt moves raat wing ther te move Soy at ony ‘no andi estat Son eo ly {Gra moje for minor ans Wa ween nla tas tray escalate asthe lower uees Target a larger warheads Fearing tht stats will want to daw back Not escalation but elation becomes ily Watts possible, but ve wen war ato dangerous to ight for sates can sore ‘ama gain tecuse lage oes keith Tae deceive ht More May Be Better 7 Second, states act with less car if the expecta costs of War are low and with more cae they are high. In 1953 and 1854 Britain and France eypected to win an easy Victory if they ‘went fo wat against Russia. Prestige abroad and politcal por larity at home would be gained, if ot much els. The vague ness of their expectations was matched by the carcleses of {heir actions, In blundering into the Crimean War they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concer for am aly’ whim than for the adversary’s situation, failed to specify the changes in behavior that threts were supposed {0 bring, and inclined toward testing strength frst and bargaining second In sharp contrast, the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khrushehev in ‘he Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can’t win much and might lose everything? Third, the deterrent deployment af nuclear weapons ‘contributes more toa country’s security than does cones of territory A country with a deterrent strategy docs mot need territory as much as a country relying on conventional defense. A deterrnt strategy makes it unnecessary fora coun try to fight for the sake of increasing its security and thus removes a major cause of war? Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on capabilites and nthe willtouse them. The wllof the atacked stving to pre- ‘serve is own territory, canbe presumed to be stone tha the vill f the attacker, striving to annex someone eae’ lertory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker i further inhibited + Fit, certainty about the relative sirength of adversaries also makes war les likely: From the late nineteenth century ‘onward, the speed of technological innovation increased the icity of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World. War Il, technological advance has been even faster, but short of a ballistic muse defense breakthrough, thishas not mattered I did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side's missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the8 The Spaeap of Nucutan WEAPONS her sid’ mises, 1906, the Heth Dreadnought, with ee se ange and fie power of ts gus, made older st MekeetGucaiste This does not happen to miss, AS (she pati "eapons that donot ave to igh hee Tenor tame useless Bein of he advent of newer and aaa miypensThey may ave to seevve tke, But hat ethan simpler problem to salve ay oes gt have een avoided hal their out- come bla foreseen Tobe sure” Geog Sel iat, "the sa ti presupposition foe preventing struggle the mos (Rowe ofthe comparative tenth ofthe fo par SEE LSay en ony to obtained by the actual ting Sew B Yacconit"* Mscalclation causes vars, Oae side ory at an atioable pric, while the ober side POS SINa deren Tle the ferences between conven rere puclear works ae fundamental fn the former, onal a Qutaien tempted to act on advartages that re Shs ccna ant nr clulted. In 914, neither Cen Trance every ard to avo a general Wat ott hoped for ctory even teh they believed he apps aor tobe gue evenly matched. in 1941, Japan in re Ling the United Stites, old ope for victory only fa sees Mae wat were posible et ily tok place Fee Rape grab resourecssufilet for continang saree aot Chien and then to dig into defend a imsted Tage Moma, the Unite Sates and Britain would Pere att Genzany, supposedly having detente the SD Shion ana therefore gning supreme im Europe: sree Mild hen hopeto ighta defensive war unl Ameren faerie weakened became wing 0 mae 8 compre tise pence in Asi” Pete us ore eal run the aks of war when defeat fie Sane inane and is expected to bring only Tinted {labose, Given such expectations, leaders co not have (0 be Samees Sn the tape ad ge thei people Be Bold Se Seon inte pest of veto. Te come of Bat Se SRT Rta ef campaigns ate hard to forse Bossuse More May Be Bettor 5 1 many things aft ham, Preing the el of cmv Sula pve ie ncn sow eutpnes doe not work dcsel gaia he ign of wars conenonl words Cot ames wh conventional weapons got war Knowing at tenn deet ter leg wl ed, Cason stout near war are made dicey. Amulet word eal fora diferent Kind of reasoning counties nme with nuclear weapons go to war wih each oer, they doso kno ing ht tha ulin nay be nlite. OF cure Wao inay mabe buh er the nd e unetatytaecou ‘ges anyone oe fos ns cnvenional sion ier abot winning orig Tne ns word one Sci eng mine can thet itn is stp il oa precio ty 10 make cise it ot mule dese ‘Sciate of oppsng fons The numberof one's tt Cane severe damaged ical othe nanbero sata Sraheads an sdverstycanceliver Varian of mmber ‘mnie win wie ange Te expt eo he seme achloves sn esp city tent wide margin of error in estimates of the damage one may suffer do not mat: ter Do we expt oo Sy o to, vo es en? Won thse te the perinen questions, we slop thinking About Ring ke And sta wong aout how oad them, na conventional worl date teats ei tive bene the drmge tte Is dtr, ed, ae Pmblomatc Nuc weopore make mila nscale Sct and polly print pet cay nar Witt 1 Semean or Nocera Wearons Do ro THE Wort? : ete ontemplating the nuclear past gives ground for hoping that ‘he word wl survive res miler power fa ay sigh This hope called into guuson by shove who Delo0 The Sruean or NucteaR WEAPONS thatthe infirmities of some new nuclear states and the deli acy oftheir auclear forces will work against the preservation | fof peace and forthe fighting of nuclear wars. The likelihood ‘favoiding destruction as more states become members ofthe nuclear club is ofen coupled with the question of rho those ‘States wil be. What are the likely differences in situation and ‘Dehavior of new as compared to old nuclear powers? Nuclear Weapons and Domestic Stability ‘What ate the principal worries? Bacause ofthe importance of controlling nuclear weapons—of keeping them firmly in the bands of eliableofiials-rulers of nuclear states may become ‘ote authoritarian and ever more given to secrecy. Moreover, “ome potential macleat states ae not politically strong and sta Diccnonigh to ensure control ofthe weapons and contro ofthe cision to use the. If neighboring, hostile, unstable states fire armest with nucle weapons, each will fear attack by the ‘ther Feelings of insecurity may lead to arms races that sub ‘rdinate civil needs to military necessities. Feass are com. pounded by the danger of intemal coups, in which the cotzo! Df nuclear weapons may be the main object and the key t0 political power. Under these fearful cicumatances, it may be Fmpossible to maintain governmental authority and civil ‘der The legitimacy ofthe state andthe loyalty of tscitizenry may dissolve because the tte no longer thought tobe caps ‘le of maintaining external security and internal onder. The first fears that states become tyrannical the second, that they Tose conteol Both fears may be realized either in diferent states orn the some sate at diffrent times® ‘What can one say? Four things primarily First, posses: sion of nuclear weapons may slow arms races doven, rather than speed them up,a possiblity considered later Second, for Jess developes! couniries to build nuclear arsenals requites @ Jong lead time, Nuclear weapons require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of Considerable cos that pay off ony inthe lang run. The more ‘More May Be Better u leaders Tey Rave to dea with today’s prem and hope unpredictable fashion, but unless a minimum of continu ty is rol? I see litle more reason to fear that one faction or another likely to lead to escalation and to global rose ae uelear Wexpons and Regional Stebility Nuclear weapons are no ikely tobe use! at home. Are they2 ‘Tue Seta oF NucLean WEAPONS thaly tobe used abroad? As milesr weapons spread, what neces tay bring ects diferent om, and worse tha these known earth mace age? This section considers fue wayein which the new words expected oer rom the old and then examines the prompts for ad he conse {fuses of ner nici sas wing tee weeapons for lake ator or ighting ofesive ware Th what wats nay the acne and ineratons of new cleat tates eile fom tows of old clear powers? Fst Tew cle sates may come in Hole pis a share a com Manborder Where sates arbiter enees one may fear tat the wl i unbleto s sng hew mla wespos Saat eachother This isa worry about the fate that the fant does not disclose. The Soviet Union and the United Bisa he Svie! Union and Chin, were haste enough Sa the latter pas shared a Tong border. Nilea weapons {Ease Chi andthe Soviet Ui to del cautiously with SE othe But bitterness among some potential nuclear Stites itis sid exceeds that felt By the Okt ones, Maying Slwn the biterece sometimes el by the United States, the SSrie Union and China rie ceatve eng of istry. Moreover thove who belive that biermess causes wars MStis cae acocation at seldom ou between it {Srnec amen atonal her ilies to un high sks Sond, any er that stats thet ae Fadia a home wut ekisiy se tei neleat weapon in puri of vo Tony ends abrood, Sates that ate radical a home, how ‘Sen may ntberiealabrond, Few states hae ben adil Shthe conduct of their foreign policy, and fever have ‘Rinained'so for long Think ofthe Soviet Union and the Peoples Repaic of China, State oowst ina competive ra The presses of competition ese theo to behave Stops th ake the teats they face manageable, in ways tat nie tm to along, Sates can mana Toreign policy only if they are overhelmingly stong—8s te of heen mula states wll eo thei acs fall {hunt of daging stl inteess of other nuclear powers ‘More My Be Better ry States that acquire clear weapons will not be regarded with ndferenc. States tht want fo be fren eee ae Stay out ofthe miler busines. A nla eg fo xa ‘would have fo show caution, eve in theoreti suler ‘taliton in response to someone elses anonyme tack on third state. Tat state, fgnorant of who attache ght ‘lai that its inteligence agents had Kontied Tng athe culpst an take the oppor fo silence it by sing = heavy conventional blow Nolen weapons induce can imany stato espe in weak ones “hid, some new niles tates tay have governments ane socetios thet ae ot wll oot fa county sa ne Collection of stile tbe, tts laers frm a thin veneet Bop a people partly nomad if he state hos a history a authoritarian rule, it leaders say be freer of consents than, and have diferent valves frm, thse who ele der and iore fly develope polities Idi Amin an Marana Quatre of Uganda and Libya, the cagoren td ty er fone otk a le Supposedly could nt be tasted to manage mca weapon ‘esponsioly Despite wild theta aimed ot oveigners hows eee both ofthese “irons rulers became cas ad tmodest when ponitve ations aginst them might have threatened thee ability to rl. Eventhough Amer tly slaughtered members of tribes he disliked, he yuichiy stopped goading Britain when scm tht fi might inte, ene militarily Qaddafi showed sia restraint He and Egypt's Anwar Sadat were openly host: In fly of 1977 goth launched command attacks an sir mids, Inluding two lage ar stkes by Egypton Libya's el Adem ninbose forever neither sie lth atiacks ge out of hand. Cada showed hima tobe forbering and anne to maton by other Arab leaders, Shai Feldman sed those ad er ramp tate tht And ders a dtr aig frordnate rhs not bce hey engage inate atonal calculations but simply Beene the, like oter rues ae “sensitive to costs” Saddam Hussein further iusto he4 The Sreran oF NUCLEAR WEAPONS point ding and even pir to the war of 191. He invaded Benoni ater he United Sates had given many sic saw vould nexeppose hiv or use military force to - rene iwat conuered by req, Daring the war, Ne ame ates gant tse. But rag’s misses Were so eta the He ek was run of Prompting atacks eh Rung than what oq was already stslring eee rae oredr the Unit States a or sel 8 havior every other ncn tte Say estore write erly aboot fate ia whic ‘hint Hed counties have male wenpons. They seem 10 Tare Le opl f these nations in theo imperast man- sere eeP cede thot hel” As eer, with eno aa, speculation takes the plee of evidence Hose SEE [tow tea ruclararmed and newly hostile Eayel 0 we eee ned an slr note Spi, woul not se 0 SE taser mul either dao a he sof Ite Doms seyret own ties Almost a quarter of Egypt's sacs in four eties Caio, Alexandria, Giza, and people Jef ein. More dans uarter of Syria’ vein reaee ammscus Aleppo, and HHoms."© What government ain son ne of ue proportion, odes of RoE prporion? Rare wont have a county that ee ter orale: Some Aral coartry might wish hat wee Sthon arab country would rik is own desc TALES Gcsmoying sac, but why shold one tink that a dy woul be wling to do a0? Despite ample Biter aaa Art hae ite hse wars and acepted ee a placed on them by eer. Arabs dl not easel eneuiabtt and make ans lot odes rae ee Swe lvl cul strike back with maces ar teeta Elenor eect eounte osk more in he pres arate Nien weapons then they di in thei absence sees ie dome mony about sear sats coming sonal ae aers wort that hey won come in ste iyo elatone when one party em once Synge uthen andthe caseo akeuating More May Be Beter 5 forces and estimating the dangers they pose, maybe lst, Eany in he cold wo the Und tats deed the Soviet Snion, and in de course, the Soviet Union detred the “ned Stes soon a atonal sates ome the maceat al or biological weapons." The strategy would supposedly deter states or terorists from brandishing or using their weapons. Yet General Butler himself Believes, as Ido, that Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemicals and bio- logical in the Gulf War 4 During the 1993 American-South Korean “Team Spirit” military exercises, North Korea denied acces International ‘Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and threatened to with- trays from the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The North's reaction stiggests, as one would expect, thatthe more vulnet- tle North Korea eels, the more strenuously it will pursue & rhucler program. The pattern has been univers ever since fhe United States led the way into the nuclear age. Noticing this, we should be careful about conveying military threats to weak states, ‘One worry remains: A nuclear Nosth Korea would put pressure on South Korea and Japan to develop comparable tNeapors. Their doing so would hardly be surprising. Nuclear | en Be ee Sots ae ten cme nel ily led to the Soviet Union's, the Soviet Unio to cae Chin's Ind’ tvs o Pais’ nee an tas efor to acquire bombs of sown. Counties ae al aerable to capabilities that they lack and others have: Saone wt then ove Sore ie heyy tw a compl api es rrotetion ostream Bean change age-old pattems of intemational behavior? A voclene Konhitnistitoneesnferateranses a f go nuclear, especially wher fidence in Amartes Meet wan os ern sinh lA diecrJanecMey ss, bent te Sct ners ofthe Ue Sac ha serbia ans hed a man sy ae {cal ara peut pete Ds es in cone that forth were minos fone fanetee th privlege of sates having macane weapons, whe eee exe en fought ‘mainly by those who lack them. Weak states, et hep ig ary ste a Shave then find itso hand to halt We pce Covetusion The conclusion iin two parts. The frst part applics iin two parts. The fist part app condo in art applies the above sss tothe present. The second part ise ito pec nthe hut Fallows fom My Analysis? {hove argued hat he gradual pend of nar weapon etter than either nce no spread or rap spent. We do sot tapay choices. We may prefer that counts Rove corns Sonal weapons only, cont run ams aces and dover he2 ‘Tue Seneao oF Nuctzan Wrarons Yt the alternative to nuclear wespons may be ruinous arms aces for some countees with a high risk of their becoming, tengaged in devastating conventional wars. Countries have to take care of thei oven security coun- tries fel insecure and believe that nuclear weapons would rake them more secure, America’s policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons will not prevail Any slight chance ‘of bringing the spread of nuclear weapons to halt exists only ifthe United States strenuously tries to achieve that el To do 0 carries costs measured in terms of other interests, The Strongest way forthe United Sates to persuade other countries to forego nuclear weapons is lo guataniew thle sceurty. How many slates” security do we wart to guarantee? Wisely, we are reluctant to make promises, but then we should not expec decide how other countries provide for tir security. ‘Some have feared that weakening opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons will ead mamerots states to obtain them because it may seem that “evervane is doing it” Why should we think that f we relay, numerous states wil bgin to ‘make nuclear weapons? Both the United States and the Soviet ‘Union were relaxed in the past, and those effects di not fl low: The Soviet Union initially supported China’s nuclear pro- gram. The United States helped both Britain and France to produce nuclear weapons. By 1968 the CIA had informed President Johnson ofthe existence of Israc nuclear weapons, and in Jly of 1970, Richard Helms, director of the CLA, gave this information to the Senate Forcign Relations Committee These and later disclosures were not followed by censure of Israel or by reductions of economic assistance. ® And in September of 180, the executive branch, against the will ofthe House of Representatives but with the approval ofthe Senate, continued to do nuclear business with iia despite is explo sion ofa miclear device and despite its unwillingness to sig the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Tea. Many more countries can make nuclear weapons than lo, One can believe that American opposition to nuclear arm- ing stays the deluge only by overlooking the complications of ‘Move May Be Better 6 lneratonal ie. Any state has o examine many condone fore deciding whether ot nat to develop nacezenenpens ur opposion is only ene factor and ha ikely toe he decisive one Many states fel fairy secure ving wit er Aeighbos: Why should they want mace wears? Sone counties, feng threatened, have found sec the Shir ve stenuous eters nd though arangements ee vith others, South Kore isan outstanding example: Moy officals ive that South Koren wuld oat more son American suppor if aguiedmuclear weapons ton soul gin by having thm’ ® Further on eceson we ght Slow the spread of mucleat weapons by not opposing tee sweat weapons programs of tome eountrcn Wes we {ppose Pakistan's nuclear program, oe were saying tate