Political Culture and Political Change

Author(s): Herbert H. Werlin and Harry Eckstein

Source: The American Political Science Review , Mar., 1990, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Mar., 1990),
pp. 249-259
Published by: American Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963642

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 POLITICAL CULTURE AND
POLITICAL CHANGE

In 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change" in the September 1988

issue of this Review, Harry Eckstein argued that "a cogent, potentially powerful theory
of political change can be derived from culturalist premises." But Herbert Werlin finds
Eckstein's effort to accommodate culture theory to political change unsatisfactory.
Werlin argues that politics in the sense of political engineering, rather than cultural
changes, mainly accounts for transformations in political life. Eckstein responds, argu-
ing that the political methods for inducing change are themselves culturally conditioned.

IQlarry Eckstein (1988) and structural change. However, the

correctly criticizes cultural theorists for rapid rise of nationalism in Africa and
coping inadequately with political Asia would have been impossible without
change. However, his effort to revise the an equally rapid process of Westerniza-
culturalist theory of change must be seen tion (Emerson 1960). The impact on
as unsatisfactory. African traditional culture of urbaniza-
First, Eckstein continues to defend the tion, capitalism, mass party systems, and
"postulate of cumulative socialization," technological changes has been well
namely, that early learning is a filter for researched. The same acculturation pro-
later learning, is harder to undo, and cess has been observed in Latin America
forms a coherent whole (p. 791). This is and Asia (Southall 1973).
based on Freudian theory that has come Third, the more rapid the pace of
to be discredited. E. Fuller Torrey, a political transformation, Eckstein insists,
psychiatrist and anthropologist, notes the more dysfunctional the consequences
that there is no evidence that early child- are likely to be, leading to political ex-
hood experiences are crucial in determin- tremism, ritual conformity, retreatism,
ing later behavior or that there are distinct rebellion, intransigence, regression, or
stages of personality development (1986, other unintended outcomes: "I suggest the
75). Rogowski (1974) questions, not only expectation that the long-run effects of at-
the extent to which early learning condi- tempted revolutionary transformation
tions later learning but also the durability will diverge considerably from revolu-
of early learning and its coherence. He tionary intentions and resemble more the
points out that there is no agreement, as prerevolutionary condition of society" (p.
to which cultural values are most durable 800). But none of these consequences are
or basic, that learned behavior can be dis- apparent as a result of the extraordinary
tinguished from other behavior, and that cultural transformations that have occur-
norms and values need to be congruent red in Asia's "newly industrialized coun-
with those stressed by the political tries," particularly Taiwan and South
system. Korea
Second, Eckstein argues that more As Taiwan's per capita annual income
modern societies are more flexible than has grown from $48 in 1952 to more than
more traditional societies (p. 795) and $5,000, many aspects of its way of life
thus can accommodate rapid situational have changed. Between the early 1950s

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 84 NO. 1 MARCH 1990

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

and the early 1980s, Taiwan went from able."

largely agricultural to a largely industrial The primary thrust of Eckstein's article
country (Harris 1986, 46-47). The pro- is to suggest that while slow cultural
gress of South Korea may even be more change is normal, understandable, and
remarkable, considering the devastation perhaps useful, rapid cultural change is
of the Korean War, going from a 1957 per unusual, unsustainable, and dangerous.
capita annual income of $67 (in current This conclusion is discouraging for those
dollars) to about $2,300 by 1986: 'Today, of us working on foreign aid projects re-
the visitor who had been absent for two quiring swift behavioral modification
decades, traveling in almost any portion because it is often combined with the
of the nation, would have difficulty assertion that there are serious cultural
recognizing Korea, either urban or rural" barriers to rapid socioeconomic develop-
(Steinberg 1985, 20). While there has beenment. Three recent books (Harrison 1985,
some political unrest in both Taiwan and Hyden 1983, and Pye 1985) suggest that
South Korea, there is no evidence of these barriers may be almost insurmount-
traumatic cultural discontinuity. able. They follow a long line of culturo-
Culturalists might argue that the logical literature, proclaiming that "the
economic success of Taiwan and South behavior of peoples is determined by their
Korea is derived from basic Confucian respective cultural traditions" (White
cultural values that have remained un- 1969, xxiv).
changed, particularly respect for author- In regard to Latin America, Harrison
ity, education, and meritocratic adminis- points to supernatural belief systems,
tration. These cultural values, however, authoritarianism, corruption, absence of
were not evident during the Chinese trust and cooperation, patrimonial rela-
cultural revolution that had such a terri-tionships, and social rather than legal
ble effect from 1950 to 1980. While sanctions. Hyden stresses Africa's "econ-
Chinese culture may have partly survivedomy of affection"-the loyalty of people
this revolution, it cannot be used to ex- to groups defined by kin, community,
plain Chinese history. Taiwan's Kuomin- and religion, thereby undermining loyalty
tang and the Chinese Communist party, to the state and its institutions, laws or
Liu (1987) points out, grew out of the rules, and administration. Pye finds a far
same cultural tradition but have moved in greater degree of paternalism, authori-
quite divergent political directions, with tarianism, ethnocentricity, selfishness,
profound implications for all aspects of and xenophobia in Asia than in the West,
life. Townsend (1974, 2-3) notes, in despite cultural differences within these
regard to China, "At various times it was parts of the world.
thought that China could never gain true While recognizing the reality of these
unity and independence; that Chinese cultural barriers, we can question their in-
Communism could never become a signif-tractability. I will suggest some problems
icant political force; that China would with the culturalist case that remain unre-
necessarily develop as a pro-Western solved in the Eckstein article.
power; that the Chinese peasant could not Discontinuity. A number of scholars
be collectivized; that the Sino-Soviet once believed that there was something in
alliance could not be broken; that the the German national character (an au-
authority of the CPP could not be seri- thoritarian personality) that accounted
ously threatened from within." While for the rise of Nazism (Deutsch and Breit-
judgments and predictions may be possi- ling 1963). However, gloomy predictions
ble, he concludes, they require "an ex- about the future of democracy in West
panded vision of what is politically possi- Germany proved unsubstantiated (Verba

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 Political Culture and Change

1965). Eckstein questions the possibility revolution, international relations), and

of revolutionary cultural transformation political factors. The uncertainty about
(pp. 799-801), suggesting that the shift in the causes of culture motivates its use as a
West Germany from a totalitarian to a catch-all explanation, much as the psy-
democratic orientation between the 1930s chosomatic one in medicine (Papanek
and the 1960s is a "deviant case." How- 1988). As such, it loses its explanatory
ever, this case may not be so deviant. The value in regard to national development.
ability of people to drop quickly or add Chalmers Johnson, a leading U.S. expert
cultural attributes in response to new on Asia, notes that "Japan's culture was at
situations has been frequently observed,least not an obstacle to development
particularly in the United States. While adding, "But then neither was it an
immigrants to the United States main- obstacle to militarism, elitism, emperor
tained much of their cultural background, worship, colonialism, or many other
"paupers became shopkeepers, and the things that the Japanese prefer to forget"
sons and daughters of peasants bound for (quoted in Redding 1988, 100).
centuries to slivers of poor soil turned into Definition. Eckstein prefers the defini-
clerks and nurses and accountants and tion, "Culture is the distinctive, variable
schoolteachers and druggists and cab set of ways in which societies normatively
drivers and lawyers and doctors" (Cooke regulate social behavior" (p. 803). The
1973, 300-301). question remains, Where does politics fit
Rapid cultural change does not require in? While leaders are guided by societies,
a political revolution, as suggested by they also can manipulate them.
Eckstein. Within a relatively short time at If it is true, as Eckstein asserts, that this
the end of the eighteenth century, Josiah definition of culture is "justified by usage
Wedgwood had turned a traditionalistic in political science" (p. 803), it may be
work force (used to drinking on the job, because of the tendency to confine politics
working flexible hours, and working at to conflict and competition among in-
their own discretion) into an efficient, dividuals and groups. Interest group
diligent, and reliable work force (Langton pluralism goes back to an influential body
1984). A more recent example can be of literature, particularly Harold Lass-
found along the Mexican border area, well's Politics: Who Gets What, When,
where Mexican workers, thought to be How (1936). To see politics in this way is
lackadaisical, have proved highly produc- as misleading as to see the Olympics as
tive in maquilas, which, supported by nothing more than competing individuals
both Mexican and U.S. governments, and teams, neglecting the organizational
have been able to compete with East arrangements and consensus on rules,
Asian and European factories (Rivera and guidelines, judging, and participation that
Goodman 1981). are essential for what takes place. Our
Causation. While culturalists generally conception of politics is most meaningful,
see culture as a "persistent pattern of Wolin (1960, 434) reminds us, the closer
social behavior," they disagree about the we keep to the word's Greek derivation
causes of this behavior and the priority of from polis (community): "Political theory
the various kinds of factors: ideological must again be viewed as that form of
(prejudices, fears, values, beliefs, goals), knowledge which deals with what is
socioeconomic (class structure, inter- general and integrative to man, a life of
ethnic rivalry, standard of living, occupa- common involvements."
tion, technology, geography), historical Politics-the relationship of leadership
(impact of conquest, religion, colonial- to followership-affects culture, just as it
ism, nationalism, industrialization, war, is affected by culture. We can, for exam-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

ple, organize or structure a course in suchment and by well-established organiza-

a way that every student is likely to cheattions (Paul 1986). In each case, success
on the final examination. Yet, we can also resulted when the quality of political rela-
reduce corruption. While corruption may tionships (political software) was high
have traditional roots, it was much more enough to enable the institutional struc-
controlled under colonialism than since tures (political hardware) to function
then in India and Nigeria (Dwivedy 1972,properly. Political software requirements
Ekiyor 1988). Corruption has also been include
effectively discouraged in Botswana, 1. Combinations of centralization and
Malawi, and the Ivory Coast, where lead- decentralization. Leaders delegate respon-
ers have seriously fought against it. On sibility to subordinate subdivisions or
the other hand, corruption has flourishedorganizational units without losing super-
where leaders have used it to survive. visory and correctional potential. Each
Cultural barriers to development are step toward- decentralization must be
certainly difficult to overcome. Only 11%followed by steps to improve managerial
of the U.S. Agency for International supervision, enforcement of regulations,
Development (USAID) projects and 44% and hierarchical control.
of the World Bank's projects have sur- 2. Boundary maintenance and controL
vived termination of foreign aid (World Certain positions (e.g., judges, evalua-
Bank, Operations Evaluation Department tors, auditors, and ombudsmen) are pro-
1987, 20; Werlin 1987, 41). Montgomery tected without diminishing the ultimate
(1987), in a study of management in nine responsibility of top political and admin-
southern African countries, found many istrative leaders for results. Experts must
of the complaints about African managers also be properly organized, assisted,
(concern with personal power and privi- motivated, supervised, protected, and
lege, indifference to policy issues, distrust controlled.
of the private sector, and fear of risk tak- 3. Soft-hard power integration. Leaders
ing and experimentation) to be valid. Yet maximize the use of soft forms of political
he also raises the question whether such power (influence, persuasion, incentives,
factors as ethnicity are behavioral or encouragement), as against hard forms
systemic. (coercion, punishment, threats). Leaders
The World Bank places the blame for must integrate the two forms of power in
the failure of 74% of its rural develop- motivational and constructive ways.
ment projects largely on deficiencies in 4. Legitimacy. Forms of popular or sub-
project design and implementation ordinate participation are encouraged
(World Bank, Operations Evaluation De-without undermining managerial and
partment 1988, 27-28). In 23% of its proj-leadership capacity. Social or ethnic
ects for the five fiscal years 1979-83, lack
discrimination must be avoided. Com-
of government support was judged themunication from below must be encour-
most important adverse factor. Thus, aged, the including conflict and dissent,
World Bank sees politics, rather than without diminishing the capacity of the
culture, as undermining these projects. leaders for policy implementation, in-
While cultural barriers to development terest aggregation, and rule adjudication.
are undoubtedly a reality, their immut- 5. Flexibility. Objectives are agreed on,
ability is a myth. Ultimately, politics is allowing a variety of approaches to be
more powerful than culture. This can be used to attain these objectives. Creativity
seen by looking at some of the foreign aid must be encouraged without diminishing
success stories where significant be- predictability, accountability, and en-
havioral modification was brought about forceability.
by strong leaders serious about develop-When political software requirements

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 Political Culture and Change

are met, political culture can be changed tween Malays and Chinese) has inten-
quickly and effectively (Werlin 1986). In sified since independence; whereas in
El Salvador's Fundacion Desarroyo proj- Singapore, it has diminished. In each
ect, people were organized into mutual case, politics, rather than culture, has
help groups to build the infrastructure been the guiding force. We must not allow
and foundations for low-income housing. culturalists to diminish the importance of
They repaid loans and cooperated with politics without a strong counterargu-
management to an extent that surprised ment.
and delighted World Bank officials. In
HERBERT H. WERLIN
Egypt's USAID-supported Helwan proj-
ect, one of the community associations Howard University
gained enough support from residents to
rely on them to sweep the streets volun-
tarily rather than pay people to do it. In In my article on a culturalist theory of
Gujarat, India, low-income, self- political change I did not argue that such a
employed women were trained by the theory is valid (which remains to be seen),
Self-Employed Women's Association (an but that it is possible to construct such a
organization led by Ela Bhatt, a dynamic theory without cheating. I did this be-
local leader) to overcome their fear of the cause arguments that culturalists could
banking system and to undertake new not theorize about political change with-
types of production, storage, marketing,out undermining their own theoretical
and financial management. These cases, perspective existed and had a cogent
as well as many others, show that people basis-namely, that the postulates of
will respond to favorable political rela- political culture theory did indeed make
tionships under otherwise adverse circum- continuity the logical expectation. I also
stances. tried to spell out what such a theory
The most successful foreign aid projects would be in regard to various kinds of
combine incentives and penalties to change and what sort of changes it could
motivate people to improve their lives. not handle.
Such projects have been introduced by the Of course, this was no mere intellectual
World Bank in the Calcutta Metropolitan exercise. At a minimum, I wanted to show
District and by USAID in rural Egypt. that political culture should be regarded
They provide initial funds to civic units as a serious player in the game of explain-
for certain agreed-on programs, with ing political change. No doubt, also, I
renewed funding dependent upon specific lean toward culturalist theory, though
objectives being met. The Inter-American hardly as dogma (see Eckstein 1974). Still,
Foundation uses this approach, carefully Herbert Werlin's criticism of my article is
selecting nongovernmental proposals, based on a mistaken, if understandable,
monitoring their progress, and continuing reading of its nature. However, that does
to fund only the more successful. The not preclude examining the cogency of the
result might be called "political elas- attack.
ticity," simultaneously expanding oppor-Let us leave aside Werlin's minor
tunity and control (Werlin 1988). points: that I am a Freudian and that I
We end with warning as well as hope. make a dubious distinction between tradi-
tion and modernity (in fact, although I
Political culture an retrogress as quickly
as it can progress. The neighboring coun-use the words, I have always been con-
tries of Malaysia and Singapore provide cerned with "development" as a con-
tinuous dimension, not a dichotomy; see,
examples of each. In Malaysia, interethnic
esp., Eckstein 1982). The crucial argu-
or interracial conflict (particularly, be-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

ment here is one in favor of "political We are told that one always needs a right
engineering." Incremental (gradual, balance between decentralized responsi-
limited) change does not seem to be in bility and central supervision and control
question, since it is the sort of change least (whatever such a balance may be). One of
problematic for culturalist explanation. the fundamental differences among
Rather, the point is that political change political systems and their cultures con-
that is rapid, broad-scale, and nonrevolu- cerns precisely this variable. Could one
tionary can be politically wrought-if really, for instance, imagine any major
only the right "tools" are used. (If I havemodification in Switzerland's highly de-
read correctly, that makes most of centralized cantonal system, simply as a
Werlin's examples of change not really tool to achieve some end? After all, at-
pertinent.) True, USAID and World Bank tempts to form a centralized union have
projects hardly have had an impressive failed since 1481 except for the very
record of success (although their objec- gradual formation of a weak "state" out
tives rarely, if ever, have approached of various alliances and confederations of
broad transformative political change). "sovereign" cantons, divided (culturally)
But that, my critic argues, is not due to by language and religion, as well as by
cultural inertia but to engineering errors: economic differences (Steiner 1971,
bad management or faulty project design 15-44).
and implementation and lack of govern- By contrast how would one go about
mental support. This view is only to be loosening the grip of France's equally an-
expected from agencies and officials cient centralized bureaucracy in order to
engaged in bringing about meliorative introduce a dose of local autonomy
change. healthy for attaining reformist or trans-
The activity is laudable. But just for formative goals? That system, long in the
that reason it should be pursued without making, has remained virtually un-
illusions. Engineers achieve results effec- changed through monarchies, empires,
tively by adapting well-established and republics. As Deschanel put it for the
theories (or in lieu of theory, reliable ex-Fourth Republic, "The republic on top
perience) to the conditions with which, and the empire underneath" (Williams
willy-nilly, they must work. It is both1954, 2). The system is a prototypical ex-
possible and likely that culture is one of ample of cultural "inertia." In less-
the givens to which social engineers must developed nations the difficulty of balanc-
adapt, whether in management, project ing centralization and decentralization
design, implementation, or obtaining tends to be greatly compounded by the
governmental support. It is also likely fact that central permeation of local areas
that culture will rule out certain objectives generally is highly imperfect. Many devel-
in certain contexts. If social engineers areoping nations, it has been said, are 'heads
serious, then, they should welcome cul- without bodies." An effective central ad-
ministration that can effectively control
turalist theories as possible aids to achiev-
ing effectively results and defining and supervise at the local level seems itself
realistic, however limited, goals and to require prolonged development. This
means. includes the development of suitable
But the argument here seems to be that cultural dispositions, as Weber argued in
"politics" can achieve just about any ef- his justly influential work on bureau-
fects if only the right methods are used. cracy. It also requires modification of
What, then, are these methods? They are,profound cultural (tribal or communal)
without exception, just the sort of thingsidentities. Resources matter, too, but they
that are the essence of political cultures! are probably the least obstacle.

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 Political Culture and Change

Take another example. Werlin argues cumstances, I refer readers to an impor-

that one of the "software tools" by which tant book by John F. Witte, Democracy,
politics may overcome culture is to obtain Authority, and Alienation at Work
subordinate participation in project deci- (1980). He finds, in essence, that workers
sions (though, somehow, without lessen- do not participate much even with as
ing the capacity of leaders). This will much encouragement as is conceivable
legitimize actions and goals and, presum- and that those who do participate are
ably, provide information to leaders of highly atypical-either workers who par-
"where the shoe pinches." But how are ticipate to advance into (be coopted by)
obstacles to sufficient participation the hierarchy or rebels who use participa-
(discussed in a great many studies and tory opportunities as platforms to make
generally rooted in cultures or subcul- trouble. (So much for legitimacy.)
tures) to be overcome? How is the "tool" One could go through the rest of the
of participation to be fashioned? Werlin "tools" listed similarly. In fact, some
does not address this, as if it were a simple make easier prey for culturalists, for in-
matter of "project design" to get people to stance, assuring the independence of cer-
participate. tain officials, getting leaders (Khomeini?
But inducing participation has been one Noriega?) to use gentle influence and per-
of the great, unresolved problems of suasion, avoiding ethnic conflict, or get-
democratic theory and practice. It is diffi- ting consensus on objectives. But space
cult to deny Almond and Verba's evi- forbids. In any case, the point should be
dence that there are more or less "partici-sufficiently made. The software and hard-
pant cultures" (1963) or Verba and Nie's ware by which, according to Werlin,
finding that even in a highly participant politics may overcome culture only leads
culture, the United States, only about us back to the institutions and relation-
10% participate much in politics except to ships that are themselves essential
vote (1972). John Stuart Mill sought the elements of political cultures. That is not
remedy in the high devolution of power to to say that with proper understanding and
local governments (1910, 347-48), which in proper ways, they cannot be used at all
are more proximate to citizens and in to bring about intended effects. It does
which, consequently, they might partic- mean that Werlin's so-called solutions to a
ipate frequently and regularly. Pateman large extent only describe the problems oP
(1970) puts more emphasis on still more political engineering.
proximate participation in the workplace. El Salvador is hardly a good example of
It should be noted that in both cases, the "soft power," Egypt of a balance of decen-
point is to form something cultural- tralized power and central control, nor
general participatory dispositions. It India of the absence of dissensus or dis-
should also be noted that the formation of crimination, working large-scale changes.
such dispositions, even in institutions as But the stability of contemporary West
proximate and important to people as German democracy is invoked, as it was
workplaces, has proved extremely diffi-by Rogowski (1974), as a glaring (though
cult, not least because of cultural factors. singular) case of nonrevolutionary trans-
On this, I recently wrote, citing evidence,formation to invalidate culturalist theo-
that "not all the piety and wit of work- ries of political change. I want to dwell on
place reformers have been able to dent the that case a bit more than in ny original
inertia of the existing structure of author- article, because the West German case,
ity" (Eckstein 1984, 126). For a superior, I properly understood, seems to me, pre-
think generalizable, case study of the dif- cisely because of its singularity, to score
ficulties, even under what seem ideal cir- points for culturalist theory.

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

I pointed out that West Germany has to exceptions and thus disposing of them
often been considered a "deviant case," in (Kendall and Wolf 1949, 12-13). "De-
the sense of an exception to be disre- viant case analysis," in the technical
garded, but I also stated that just treating sense, both explains cases and validates
it as exceptional is improper. The utility the general rules from which they differ.
of deviant cases is that they can tell us a What makes Germany such a case, I ar-
great deal about typical cases, precisely gued sometime ago (Eckstein 1979), is that
through their singular nature. An exem- Germany has, ever since unification,
plary use of deviant case analysis for this undergone shock wave after shock wave
purpose is the Lipset, Trow, and Coleman of generally disorienting experiences, far
(1956) study of democracy in the Inter- more so than any other country: not just
national Typographical Union (ITU) (at Nazism and the war, but rapid industriali-
any rate as it was). The study is relevant zation in the nineteenth century, the first
here simply because West Germany may World War and the loss of much of a
reasonably be considered the ITU of whole male generation, rapid and extreme
political systems-at least, up to a certain democratization in the Weimar Republic,
chronological point, since it is distinctly the Great Inflation and the Great Depres-
possible, and quite consistent with my sion, and, after the traumas of Nazism
thesis, that over the last half century Ger- and the Second World War, the occupa-
man democracy has become increasinglytion, the great influx of refugees from East
"enculturated." Germany, and the stratificatory disloca-
The ITU was a "deviant" case among tions attendant on the Wirtschafts-
trade unions because it had a highly wunder. The point is that Germany is a
democratic structure where oligarchy case in which culture, due to large-scale
generally prevails. It had a genuine two- disorientation after disorientation should
party system; it used referenda copiously be regarded as extremely weak and thus
(often to overturn leaders' preferences- as unable to provide much friction against
not least leaders' preferences for salary in- either raw political power (the Nazis) or
creases); it held regular, well-attended reconstruction through rationally devised
meetings of the members; it had an insti- law (the Federal Republic). (The rationale
tutionalized (and varying) opposition able that leads us to this point is provided in
to print and distribute material, including detail in Eckstein 1979 [p. 14].)
a newspaper; and so on. If one could It would be unfortunate if my article
understand both what conditions made were taken as an attempt to demonstrate
for this and that the conditions are highly the futility of any and all "political
exceptional, even unique, among unions engineering." But agencies like USAID
(and perhaps other organizations) one and the World Bank, and, more generally,
could have, at the same, an explanation of constitution makers, nation builders, and,
the ITU's structure and confirmation of indeed, the many admirable people who
the iron law of oligarchy. Without going have sought to "improve" others in, for
into details, this is exactly what emerges instance, the foreign and domestic Peace
from the Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) Corps-in fact all of us-have much to
study and may emerge from any study learn about such engineering. A few sym-
that follows Kendall and Wolf's notion pathetic books free of comfortable illu-
that deviant cases not anticipated by sions, like Foster's on inner-city teaching
theory, can, in many cases, be the cases (1974), have reminded us of this. But
most fruitful for theory building, pro- naturally, we would rather believe that all
vided they are not used simply to "tidy can be done, and done rapidly, by using
up" loose ends by giving some plausibility (preferably simple) correct techniques.

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 Political Culture and Change

In regard to culture and political engi- Eckstein, Harry. 1984. "Civic Inclusion and Its Dis-
neering, I want to make just two points, contents." Daedalus 113(4):107-46.
Eckstein, Harry. 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of
in conclusion. First (to repeat a critical Political Change." American Political Science
point), as engineers must work with mate- Review 82:789-804.
rial givens, so political engineers must Ekiyor, Henry A. 1988. "Political Corruption in the
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