DORCAS RADEBE

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

SOME TRC THEMES

1. Aims, purpose, structure of TRC

2. Atrocities committed by the apartheid government to destabalise the anc
3. Reactions and responses to the TRC
 International opinion/responses
 Public reaction/responses
4. Failure of trc to address racism by ordinary white south africans
5. Inability/unwillingness of the TRC to address cross-border raids by SADF
6. Basson got away with murder
7. The truth concealed
8. The truth revealed
9. Barriers to reconciliation
10. Reaction from political parties
11. The idea that justice was not served
1. TRC TIMELINE
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/10/98/truth_and_reconciliation/202453.stm
Seeking the truth: Timeline
1995
 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation is set up under the 1995 Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act to investigate crimes committed during the
apartheid era.
1996
 Hearings begin in April 1996 amid a swarm of international television cameras. The
hearings that follow, chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
 F.W. De Klerk appears before the Commission in August 1996, and asks for
forgiveness for the years of apartheid rule.
 In a breakthrough for the commission, top apartheid-era police general Johan van
der Merwe admits in October 1996 that he ordered sabotage attacks including

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blowing up the Johannesburg headquarters of the South African Council of Churches

in 1988.
1997
 The commission announces in June 1997 that Winnie Madikizela-Mandela is being
subpoenaed (summoned) to appear in connection with amnesty applications by her
former guards, nicknamed the Mandela United Football Club. Led by her, they stood
accused of kidnap and murder.

 Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, giving evidence for the first time to a Commission

hearing in Johannesburg in December 1997, describes evidence against her as
'ludicrous' and says the Commission is a "mud-slinging exercise".
 Former South African President, PW Botha ignores a summons to appear before the
Commission in December 1997. "Clearly the appeals of various people - including the
President of this country - have not prevailed and Mr PW Botha has seen fit not to
appear," says Archbishop Tutu. "We will let the law take its course."
1998
 In testimony in March 1988 on the death of black consciousness leader, Steve Biko in
1977, police officers who interrogated him admit they beat him but still say his death
was accidental.
 South African scientist Daan Goosen tells the Commission in June 1998 that the
apartheid government considered trying to develop bacteria which would kill only
blacks.
 Former Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok tells the commission in July that he
received orders from former South African President PW Botha to engineer the
bombing of the South African Council of Churches in 1988.
 The commission finds that testimony from Adriaan Vlok that South Africa's last white
president, F.W. de Klerk knew of illegal operations against black groups, contradicts
accounts given to the commission by Mr de Klerk himself.
 Winding up the hearings, the Commission hears testimony from Dr Wouter Basson
(Doctor Death) in July 1998, who headed a government chemical and biological
weapons programme during the apartheid era.
 The commission officially ends its work in July 1998 after more than two years of
hearings and investigations into human rights violations committed during the
apartheid era.
 Former South African President PW Botha is found guilty in August 1998 of contempt
for ignoring a summons to appear before the Commission to answer allegations that
he led a state-sponsored strategy to silence and harass anti-apartheid activists while
in office. His lawyers appeal against the fine and suspended one-year jail sentence.
 A leaked document from the Commission in October 1998 implicates the ANC in
human rights abuses and torture.
 A day before it is due to be released, the report is legally challenged by F.W. de Klerk
forcing the TRC to remove a section that implicated him in a series of bombings in
the 1980s.

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 Just hours before the final report is to be published the ANC fails in a court bid to
prevent its publication.

1. Aims, purpose, structure of TRC

In 1994, South Africa emerged not only from 40 years of apartheid, but from 400 years of
racial awareness and segregation. To establish the Rainbow Nation, much that was done in
the past would need to be forgiven, as would atrocities committed on both sides in the name
of security or freedom during the apartheid years. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) was set up by the Government of National Unity to help deal with what
happened under apartheid. The conflict during this period resulted in violence and human
rights abuses from all sides. No section of society escaped these abuses. Although South
Africa’s emergence as a democracy was indeed a kind of miracle, for many such a violent past
of great suffering and hatred could not be forgiven easily. Reconciliation was essential for the
survival of the new democracy.
 Both sides had committed atrocities during apartheid.
 The apartheid regime had been based on police brutality, torture, abduction and
killings to ensure white control and domination.
 At the same time, those fighting for liberation and human rights were responsible for
violence and bloodshed including sabotage, the killing of innocent civilians and the
torturing of informers in the name of liberation.
 The two groups were forced by the democratic government to become one non-racial
society and it became necessary to heal the divisions of the past.
 South Africa could not move forward without looking at the past. The government
used the judiciary to deal with acts of human rights abuses and the ANC appointed a
commission to investigate atrocities in MK camps.
 Political leaders agreed to grant amnesty (official pardon) to those who had committed
politically motivated crimes on condition that they made a full disclosure of their
activities.
 It was expected that the victims would forgive the culprits after they had given a full
explanation of the reasons for their actions and asked for forgiveness.
 Reconciliation was based on the spirit of Ubuntu, and reparations, rather than
retaliation and revenge.
 As a result, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established.
 The TRC had a number of high profile members: Archbishop Desmond Tutu
(chairman), Dr. Alex Boraine (Deputy Chairman), Mary Burton, Advocate Chris de
Jager, Bongani Finca, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Sisi Khampepe, Richard Lyster,
Wynand Malan, Reverend Khoza Mgojo, Hlengiwe Mkhize, Dumisa Ntsebeza (head of
the Investigative Unit), Dr. Wendy Orr, Advocate Denzil Potgieter, Mapule Ramashala,
Dr. Faizel Randera, Yasmin Sooka and Glenda Wildschut.
- It was led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and a liberal politician Alex Boraine.
- Its scope was to examine human rights abuses between 1960 and 1994.
- The perpetrators were required to tell the truth in order to avoid persecution.

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- They heard the testimonies of 21 000 victims who were either tortured or lost loved ones.
- They collected evidence of 14 000 deaths with 12 000 deaths unaccounted for.
- The Amnesty Committee received 7 121 applications and 1 146 were granted.
- Those who set up the TRC did not want a rewriting of the history of the recent past
(no historian was appointed) but wanted it to be a ‘hands-on’ body, concerned as much with
promoting reconciliation as with establishing historical truth.
After the legislation was passed, civil society groups continued to lobby for an open,
transparent nomination and selection process. Although the Act allowed the President to
select and appoint commissioners, Mandela introduced a public participatory process to affect
this. He appointed a committee that would oversee a public nomination, selection and
interview process.
Civil society was encouraged to make nominations, resulting in the submission of 229 names,
which the Committee narrowed down, and subsequently conducted public hearings with a
short list of 46 candidates.
25 names were then forwarded to President Mandela, who chose 17 including some who had
not been on the list. Interestingly, he chose to not take advantage of the option to appoint
international commissioners.

The Commissioners came from a range of backgrounds and different parts of the country.
There was representation from all racial groups, although whites were clearly over-
represented with six positions. Seven women were appointed and including the Chairperson,
three Christian ministers were included. None of the Commissioners were active politicians,
although two were former parliamentarians. In addition, most of Commissioners had been
actively engaged in some guise of socio-political activities relating to the past, drawn from the
NGO, legal and medical fields. Not surprisingly, this meant that most Commissioners were
drawn from within the broad parameters of the anti-apartheid movement.
The TRC affects its mandate through 3 committees: the Amnesty Committee, Reparation and
Rehabilitation (R&R) Committee and Human Rights Violations (HRV) Committee.

Human Rights Violations (HRV) Committee

The task of the HRV Committee was to investigate human rights abuses that took place
between 1960 and 1994, based on statements made to the TRC. The Committee established
the identity of the victims, their fate or present whereabouts, and the nature and extent of
the harm they have suffered; and whether the violations were the result of deliberate
planning by the state or any other organisation, group or individual. Once victims of gross
human rights violations are identified, they are referred to the Reparation and Rehabilitation
Committee.
Reparation and Rehabilitation (R&R) Committee
The enabling act empowered the R&R Committee to provide victim support to ensure that the
Truth Commission process restores victims' dignity; and to formulate policy proposals and
recommendations on rehabilitation and healing of survivors, their families and communities
at large. The envisaged overall function of all recommendations is to ensure non repetition,
healing and healthy co-existence. A President's Fund, funded by Parliament and private

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contributions, has been established to pay urgent interim reparation to victims in terms of the
regulations prescribed by the President.
Amnesty Committee (AC)
The primary function of the AC is to consider that applications for amnesty were done in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. Applicants could apply for amnesty for any act,
omission or offence associated with a political objective committed between 1 March 1960
and 6 December 1993. The cut-off date was later extended to 11 May 1994. The final date for
the submission of applications was 30 September 1997. Being granted amnesty for an act
means that the perpetrator is free from prosecution for that particular act.

No one was exempt from being charged. As well as ordinary citizens, members of the police
could be charged and, most notably, members of the African National Congress, the ruling
party at the time of the trial, could also be charged. 5392 people were refused amnesty and
849 were granted amnesty, out of 7112 petitioners (there were a number of additional
categories, such as withdrawn).

December 21 1997 - SAPA

TRC'S REPUTATION ON THE LINE OVER BLANKET AMNESTY, SAYS NP
The opposition National Party called on Sunday for the Truth and Reconciliation Committee
to reveal its position over the blanket amnesty granted recently to 37 African National
Congress leaders.
Labelling the amnesties "illegal" and "backdoor", the NP urged the TRC to reveal what the
contents of Wim Trengrove's submissions to the committee were over the affair.
"In view of the fact that the TRC has apparently already received the legal opinion of
(Advocate) Trengrove, the sudden secrecy seems strange. The public has a right to know
what the legal opinion is, and the TRC is requested to disclose it as soon as possible.
"The National Party warned ealier that this blanket amnesty was illegal and invalid," said the
NP in a statement.
The NP also criticised Transport Minister Mac Maharaj for recent statements about the
collective amnesty.
"The NP is concerned about statements by Mac Maharaj that the ANC will under no
circumstances be deprived of their blanket amnesty. This reinforces the impression that
there are senior ANC leaders who deem themselves to be above the law," the statement
said.

2. RESPONSES TO THE WORK OF THE TRC

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(Zapiro 19-3-98)

 Though the ANC-led government had set up the TRC, when the TRC issued its report in
October 1998, the ANC was critical of it, alleging that it attempted to criminalise a
significant part of the struggle for liberation, and that it suggested that the gross
human-rights violations that occurred in its just struggle were morally equivalent to
acts pursued for an unjust cause.
 The TRC responded that it did not equate a just and an unjust cause, but that even
those who fought for a just cause must observe certain rules and not violate human
rights.
 FW de Klerk was also critical of the TRC for alleging that he was responsible for human-
rights violations while he was president. He claimed he did not know of these, and
when told of them, had acted against them.
 Other leading figures in the apartheid regime – cabinet ministers, generals and judges
– largely escaped the net of the TRC. Few of them testified and none were punished.
 When perpetrators appeared before the TRC, they often deplored the fact that the
politicians, who had given them their orders, were not being tried or even asked to
appear before the TRC.
 The TRC undoubtedly uncovered new information about how certain atrocities were
committed, and what happened to people who disappeared. But its findings on who
was responsible for these remained controversial, and some argued that by
uncovering evil deeds in the past, its work made the task of reconciliation more
difficult.
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3. FAILURES/FLAWS IN THE TRC PROCESS

 The TRC Report is particularly sketchy on what happened outside South Africa in the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
 It fails, for example, to deal with the many human-rights violations committed by
South Africans in Namibia.
 Atrocities involving the IFP are largely ignored, as are the broader consequences of
apartheid, such as the removal of millions of people in 1960s and 1970s, or of earlier
forms of racial segregation.
 The report is mainly concerned with describing what happened, rather than with trying
to explain why things happened.
 By telling the story of high-profile cases without sufficient context, the report does not
show adequately how things changed over time.
 In failing to analyse the structures of apartheid, and show how they changed over
time, the report gives a misleading picture of the nature of the main causes of the
gross violations of human rights in the period 1960 – 1994.
 In the aftermath of the TRC, many people feel that those perpetrators who had sought
amnesty or had been refused amnesty should have been tried.
- This was not done.
- It was said that the justice system did not have the capacity.

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- The few who were tried often escaped conviction e.g. Wouter Basson. He was the
former head of the biological and chemical weapons’ programme. These trials cost
vast amounts of money in legal fees.

Many in South Africa were fundamentally opposed to any kind of detailed introspection into
the past. Primarily those who were either functionaries or beneficiaries of the apartheid
system, including the security forces, the atomised right-wing political forces, as well as many
of those associated with the homeland and self-governing regimes that complemented the
regime articulated this position.

The TRC, it was argued, would be used as a political weapon against its opponents by a
dominant ANC bent on retribution. While the NP begrudgingly accepted the inevitability of
some sort of process, it continuously flagged its concerns about prejudice and political
agendas. The ANC’s other partner in the government, the IFP, denounced the process from its
inception, and refused to constructively engage in the debates that fed into the legislative
process. Both the NP and IFP also criticised the appointment of many Commissioners,
including the Chairperson, Archbishop Tutu, who was seen, especially by the IFP as staunchly
pro-ANC, and the vice-Chairperson, Alex Boraine, with whom the NP had a history of
altercation.

By and large these groups remained vocal in their opposition, although it could be argued that
the attention given to them reflected their ability to influence the media, and as such was
somewhat disproportionate in terms of the constituencies they represented. Nevertheless,
they articulated a number of important issues, which in turn provided important reference
points around which the Commission would have to plot its course.

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More significant, yet less vocal, were the articulations of concerns from ordinary South
Africans, many of who had been direct victims of apartheid repression and the related
conflicts of the past. The bulk of these people had not been consulted during the legislative
drafting process.
Although most welcomed an opportunity to record and acknowledge what had taken place in
the country, those who continued to seek redress through the criminal justice system
vehemently opposed the inclusion of conditional amnesty provisions in the Commission’s
legislation.

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Founded by legal statute and subject to the South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation,
the TRC was bound by a new and largely untested legal framework that sought to provide the
promotion and protection of a range of fundamental rights to all South Africans. Somewhat
ironically, it was the alleged perpetrators of violations who sought to use these protections to
constrain efforts by the Commission to fulfil its mandate. Consequently, considerable
attention and resources were diverted by the Commission for purposes of navigating its way
through this legal minefield.

Any assessment of what the TRC eventually achieved should take the environmental context
and background into consideration. The Commission was faced with an intimidating array of
substantive and procedural challenges from its inception. Despite favourable comparatives
with other Commission processes elsewhere in the world, it was afforded inadequate human
and financial resources to comprehensively address these challenges, many of which would
continue to plague it throughout its existence and beyond.
Summary of Successes and Failures
Successes
 Restorative justice
 Internationally, South Africa was commended on the course it had taken.
 Truth was revealed
Failures
 Some victims and interested parties preferred retributive justice over restorative
justice
 Some individual perpetrators refused to appear
 Some parties criticized the TRC
 Some victims and perpetrators said it opened old wounds
 Some families hoped they would be compensated
 Some perpetrators reacted by refusing to apologise
 Some claimed that they did not see the reason or duty of TRC
 Some victims and families were just satisfied to know what really happened

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4. SOURCES AND CASE STUDIES

“We are looking to maintain not retribution; we are seeking room for humanity
rather than revenge.” –Archbishop Desmond Tutu

In 1994, South Africa emerged not only from 40 years of apartheid, but from 400
years of racial awareness and segregation. To establish the Rainbow Nation, much that was
done in the past would need to be forgiven, as would atrocities committed on both sides in
the name of security or freedom during the apartheid years. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up by the Government of National Unity to help
deal with what happened under apartheid. The conflict during this period resulted in
violence and human rights abuses from all sides. No section of society escaped these
abuses.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu explains the purpose of the TRC.

“Having looked the beast of the past in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness and
having made amends, let us shut the door on the past – not in order to forget it, but in order not
to allow it to imprison us. Let us move into the glorious future of a new kind of society where
people count, not because of biological irrelevancies … but because they are persons of infinite
worth created in the image of God.”

Members of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission—including Dr. Alex Boraine
(second from left), deputy chair; Archbishop Desmond Tutu (centre), chair; and Rev. Bongani
Finca (right), commissioner—at the commission’s first hearing, April 1996, East London, S.A.
- Taken from sahistory.org

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The TRC established painful truths. Apartheid victims and or families of victims would finally
hear the truth. It was hoped that they would find closure, forgive perpetrators. Some
perpetrators sought forgiveness, some reparations were given to the victims and or their
families, amnesty was granted where the truth had been told and remorse shown. It was
hoped that despite the past, a nation would be built.

Written Source: This is part of a speech that Desmond Tutu delivered at the first hearing
of the TRC, held in East London, April 1996.
We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past; to lay the ghosts of that past so
that they will not return to haunt us. And that we will thereby contribute to the healing of a
traumatised and wounded people – for all of us in South Africa are wounded people – and
in this manner to promote national unity and reconciliation. We want to indicate that those
who testify before this Commission will enjoy the same privilege as in a court of law for the
testimony that they give, provided what they say is the truth as they understand it, and
provided what they have done is done in good faith.
[From: No Future Without Forgiveness by D Tutu]

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Country of My Skull by Antjie Krog, 1998

The TRC offers us more than a way of decoding the miracle of our times. It has become an
intensely illuminating spotlight on South Africa’s past. Because it has allowed the past to be
told through the personal recollections of those who testify before it … the people who tell
these stories, along with the people who listen to them, are living South Africans. They are
struggling to find identity for themselves, individually and collectively, within the shadows
still cast by their country’s brutal history. Many voices of this country were long silent,
unheard, often unheeded before they spoke in their own tongues, at the microphones of
South Africa’s Truth Commission. The voices of ordinary people … have shaped the passage
of history.

Interview with filmmaker of Long Night’s journey into Day, Frances Reid

When and how did you decide to undertake this project?

In 1997, after hearing stories of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I was
moved by what was happening there.
What were your goals in making Long Night’s Journey into Day? What would you like a
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viewer to understand after seeing the film and what would you like to see happen with
the film?
Our goals were to tell a story that was universal. We wanted to tell a story that people in
the United States could relate to as well as people in South Africa or anywhere in the
world. All of us have had the experience in some way of being wronged or of doing wrong
to others. How do we cope with those experiences? We wanted to make a film that
would spark viewers to think about and have conversations about how they face those
issues in their own lives, in their families, in their communities, and in their nations.
Did your initial theories or feelings towards the subject change during filming? If so, how
or in what ways? How do you incorporate (or ignore) those changes into the filmmaking
experience?
We started this project knowing very little about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
We just knew we were inspired by the stories we were hearing in the media here. It was
not until we got to South Africa that we truly began to understand what the TRC was about
and how it was viewed by many South Africans. As we talked with people we were not
surprised to learn that many were angry about the idea of amnesty being given to those
who had committed human rights violations, or about the fact that those who had been
‘fighting the good fight’ against apartheid were also expected to come before the TRC if
they had committed human rights violations. Many others completely accepted the idea of
the TRC and just wanted to know what had happened to a loved one who had
disappeared at the hands of the apartheid security forces. As the story became
increasingly complex, we incorporated those complexities into our filmmaking, while
maintaining our initial vision of showing a nation and a people grappling with the heights
and depths of their humanity.

Martin Meredith sums up the findings of the TRC. From The State of Africa: A History of Fifty
Years of Independence

The achievements of the TRC were considerable. It had established beyond all doubt that death
squads had operated not as aberrations but as part and parcel of the system of government
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oppressions; that torture had been used systematically and was in effect condoned as official
practice; and that violence between rival black factions had been officially encouraged, supported
and financed. It had established the chain of command leading to the highest levels of
government.
It had confronted the liberation movements with their own crimes of murder, torture and
necklacing, refusing to judge these crimes any differently from government crimes. It had helped
to solve many of the murders and disappearances that for so long had troubled so many families.
It had also provided a hearing for thousands of victims and their families, affording many people
relief from their suffering and grief for the first time.

The following is a case study about Griffiths Mxenge, a prominent ANC activist and Durban
civil Rights attorny.
In November 1981 Griffiths Mxenge was found murdered near Umlizi Stadium. His body had
approximately 40 stab wounds. Later, an inquest found that he was murdered by unknown
killers. In 1989 2 security branch policeman from Vlakplas near Pretoria, Dirk Coetzee and
Almond Nofomela admitted their involvement in his murder. This resulted in the
appointment of the Holms commission of inquiry into police death squads. Both Coetzee
and Nofomela gave evidence on Mxenge’s death but the commission refused to believe
their evidence regarding poilce death squads. In 1996 charges of murder were brought
against Nofomela, Coetzee and three others. De Kock was convicted on 89 charges, 6 of
them for murder, and he was sentenced to 212 years in prison, plus an additional 2 life
sentences. None of De Kock’s comanding officers were ever charged or arrested.

“Having looked the beast of the past in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness and having
made amends, let us shut the door on the past – not in order to forget it, but in order not to allow
it to imprison us. Let us move into the glorious future of a new kind of society where people
count, not because of biological irrelevancies … but because they are persons of infinite worth
created in the mage of God.”
Archbishop Desmond Tutu explains the purpose of the TRC.

The TRC offers us more than a way of decoding the miracle of our times. It has become an
intensely illuminating spotlight on South Africa’s past. Because it has allowed the past to be told
through the personal recollections of those who testify before it … the people who tell these
stories, along with the people who listen to them, are living South Africans. They are struggling to

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find identity for themselves, individually and collectively, within the shadows still cast by their
country’s brutal history. Many voices of this country were long silent, unheard, often unheeded
before they spoke in their own tongues, at the microphones of South Africa’s Truth Commission.
The voices of ordinary people … have shaped the passage of history.
Country of My Skull by Antjie Krog, 1998

There are survivors whose needs are very limited and who only seek the private
acknowledgment of a tombstone. Then there are others who need a more public recognition
of their suffering, such as the torture victim who said: "I don't need to know who tortured
me... I know that, I was there. But I want the world to know." There are still other survivors,
for example such as the father of Stanza Bopape - a friend and close colleague of mine who
"disappeared" whilst being held by the police in detention without trial. To its credit, the TRC
uncovered conclusively for the first time that Stanza Bopape was shocked to death during
police interrogation.

However, Stanza Bopape's father - now deceased - said at the time: I don't want to know what
they did to my son in the last hours of his life... it would simply be too painful. I just want the
bones of my son back so that I can bury him with dignity."
By contrast, the mother of slain student leader Sicelo Dhlomo is not only demanding an
opportunity to tell her story, she's also saying: "I want to hear about it from those who killed
my son". In her different and complex need, Mrs Dhlomo represents some of the most
difficult and terrifying dilemmas in the search for reconciliation - because having lived with the
assumption for over a decade that her son was murdered by the police, she's now receiving
information through a TRC amnesty application that in fact he was murdered by some of his
colleagues in the ANC.

Mrs Mlangeni - the mother of Bheki Mlangeni - whose son who was killed by a South African
Police Security Branch bomb hidden in the earphones of a walkman tape player. Despite her
status as survivor, Mrs Mlangeni described herself as dead when she said: "You kill one
member of the family and the whole family is dead... as we are dead now." In a different
context, Mr. Sithole - the father of an ANC guerrilla killed in action - similarly made no
mention of forgiveness. He acknowledged that his son was a former combatant - a fighter -
and did not express any surprise or anger at the fact that he was killed: “I understand why he
was killed. He fought to achieve what we have today, democracy, and change.” But Mr Sithole
went on to say: "What I want is that the world should know that the people he fought for are
now in positions of real power and I am nothing. What will they do for me now?"

THE CRADOCK FOUR

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The Cradock four: Matthew Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto, Fort Calata and Sicelo Mhlauli
On June 27th, 1985 Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto, and Sicelu Mhlawuli left
Port Elizabeth, a coastal city on South Africa’s Eastern Cape and headed toward Cradock, a small
community approximately 190 km to the north. They never arrived. Indeed, they never made it
out of the greater Port Elizabeth region.
Matthew Goniwe was a prominent activist in the Eastern Cape, and was a community leader in
Cradock. He had been active in leading various elements of the anti-apartheid movement that had
heated up in South Africa in the wake of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, and especially in the
months after September 1984 when mass protests hit the country. Those protests began in the
Transvaal and quickly spread to the Eastern Cape, a traditional hotbed of black activism. Goniwe
was a popular teacher in Cradock. He had helped to organise and support a school strike in the
community, a strike that served as a symbol and catalyst for the small town’s unexpectedly strong
ongoing resistance to South Africa’s racial caste system. The State had responded by attempting
to transfer Goniwe, but he refused the assignment.

Then they attempted to fire him outright –again, this tactic did not work, and in fact it merely
served to heighten the resolve of the striking children who were at the forefront of the protest
movement. Goniwe was also instrumental in helping to form CRADORA, the Cradock Residents
Association, which helped to provide an organised structure for black South African protest
against the State and the municipality. Finally, Goniwe was a respected and tireless field organiser
for the United Democratic Front (UDF) an organisation that for all intents and purposes took the
place of the banned African National Congress (ANC). In summary, Goniwe represented a serious
threat to the apartheid state, all the more as time went by and it became clear that the ANC/UDF
plan to “make South Africa ungovernable” was coming to fruition.

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Thus the four men left Port Elizabeth knowing that they were vulnerable. While not as visible as
the forceful and charismatic Goniwe, Calata had a history of activism that extended deep into his
family’s roots, as did Mkhonto. The four would never arrive in Cradock. After they had been
missing for several days, which greatly alarmed and disturbed the black community up and down
the Eastern Cape, their charred remains was discovered. Badly burned, their bodies each bore
numerous stab wounds; and although it would take a coroner to determine as much, their bodies
also revealed numerous other signs of physical harm. Some distance away stood their car, which
also had been burnt almost beyond recognition. Curiously, the license plates on the car were not
only still affixed; they also appeared to be untouched by the effects of the fire that had otherwise
gutted the car. The license plates were not those of the original car in which the four had been
travelling. Those license plates had been found in yet another location. The question quickly
became “who was responsible, and why?” For many South Africans, the answer was self-evident.
The problem lay in the fact that the evidence to justify that answer was as yet non-existent. The
murders bore all of the signs of a political killing. That being the case there were two real
possibilities. One was that this was the result of a conflict between the UDF and another anti-
apartheid group. In the Eastern Cape, that would most likely mean AZAPO, the Azanian People’s
Organisation. But most observers envisioned a far more likely scenario. That tableau involved the
State, and thus what was known as the Security Forces, an unofficial agglomeration of the South
African Police (SAP), South African Defence Forces (SADF), Railroad Police, and other groups the
existence of which many South Africans knew so little. These were the “Third Force.” Of course
the South African Police and state officials denied complicity in the killings.
The death of the Cradock Four quickly became major news across the country, and of course it hit
hardest in the Eastern Cape, and especially in the veld community of Cradock. In subsequent
weeks and months, an already overheated situation would increase in intensity. Cradock would
continue to stand as a strident symbol of resistance. The funeral of the Cradock Four would
become a major political event as had so many funerals before it. The Langa Massacre of March
1985, which had occurred twenty years to the day after the Sharpville Massacre, began as a clash
between funeral marchers and police. The heightened sense of indignation, protest, and anger
that the anti-apartheid masses felt, coupled with State fears that the ANC and UDF were indeed
fulfilling their promise to “make South Africa ungovernable” helped to fuel a crisis that would lead
one newspaper to call 1985 “the worst year of our lives.” In timing that was too close to be a
coincidence, on the eve of the funerals, state President P.W. Botha declared most of the country
to be under a State of Emergency. After a brief respite, a Second State of Emergency would follow
in 1986.
Eventually two inquests would attempt to clear up the issues surrounding the killings. Each would
merely serve to create more questions than it could possibly answer. After the first inquest, held
in Port Elizabeth in 1989, Judge E. De Beers announced his findings. He declared, after establishing
the obvious (namely that the Four had indeed been murdered) that there was “absolutely no
evidence before me that any member of the Force had anything whatsoever to do with the
killings.” Not surprisingly, few in the African community believed the truth of the finding. But it
was not really the fault of De Beers. Based on the evidence before him, it is clear that he decided
in the only way that he could. The Security Forces covered up their actions well. They left no
paper trail; no one who knew anything was speaking; there was no physical evidence, no witness.

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Any involvement of the police or other agents of the state seemingly went up in the smoke that
charred the bodies of Matthew Goniwe and his fallen comrades.
THE GUGULETHU SEVEN
Genuine remorse and forgiveness were often distant ideals and reconciliation an ambiguous aim.
Krog says that the trial went beyond law and into the realm of theology. If anyone was clear on
the Commission's aims, it was Archbishop Tutu, the Commission's chief architect and chairman.
Tutu based his idea of reconciliation on Christian forgiveness, but drew more explicitly from
Ubuntu, the African idea of shared humanity. This idea seems to have resonated powerfully with
some of the victims who gave evidence, like Cynthia Ngewu, mother of Christopher Piet, one of
the Guguletu Seven: "We do not want to return the evil that perpetrators committed to the
nation. We want to demonstrate humanness towards them, so that they in turn may restore their
own humanity"

"This thing called reconciliation … if I am understanding it correctly … it means this perpetrator,

this man who has killed [my son], if it means he becomes human again, this man, so that I, so
that all of us get our humanity back … then I agree, then I support it all."

The Gugulethu Seven is the name of the group of seven young men that were killed in an ambush
by the South African apartheid security forces in Gugulethu 3 March 1986. The seven young men
were anti-apartheid activists and members of the Umkhonto we Sizwe.
The names of the seven men are:
 Zandisile Zenith Mjobo
 Zola Alfred Swelani
 Mandla Simon Mxinwa
 Godfrey Jabulani Miya
 Themba Mlifi
 Zabonke John Konile
 Christopher Piet

When South Africa was liberated, the police officers involved got amnesty from the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission - many residents of Gugulethu were not pleased with this decision.
The officers said that they had killed the men as they believed that they were planning to mount
an attack on a police vehicle.

An explanation of the role and experiences of the TRC.

It was all that was left of her son, Siphiwo, in the physical sense. Everything else, the memory, the
emotion, was intact. What was hard for Joyce Mtimkulu was that after all these years, after all the
pain and anguish and unanswered questions, the truth about her son’s fate required her to
confront, to be with, the man who had sealed it. And know that the truth would set him free. It
was a harrowing experience that was repeated for many thousands of other South Africans in the
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 DORCAS RADEBE

course of the months of the hearings by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) into the
abuses – killings, torture, abductions, poisoning – of the last 33 years of the apartheid era. It was
hard. But, for Joyce Mtimkulu, never again would anyone be able to say that Gideon Niewoudt,
policeman and killer, was justified in taking Siphiwo’s life, and never again would anyone be able
to say they didn’t know. The TRC story is a story of the extremes of humanness.

The achievements of the TRC were considerable. It had established beyond all doubt that death
squads had operated not as aberrations but as part and parcel of the system of government
oppressions; that torture had been used systematically and was in effect condoned as official
practice; and that violence between rival black factions had been officially encouraged, supported
and financed. It had established the chain of command leading to the highest levels of
government.

STEVE BIKO

Biko was detained and interrogated four times between August 1975 and September 1977 under
Apartheid era anti-terrorism legislation. On 21 August 1977 Biko was detained by the Eastern
Cape security police and held in Port Elizabeth. From the Walmer police cells he was taken for
interrogation at the security police headquarters. On 7 September "Biko sustained a head injury
during interrogation, after which he acted strangely and was uncooperative. The doctors who
examined him (naked, lying on a mat and manacled to a metal grille) initially disregarded overt
signs of neurological injury."
By 11 September Biko had slipped into a continual, semi-conscious state and the police physician
recommended a transfer to hospital. Biko was, however, transported 1,200 km to Pretoria – a 12-

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 DORCAS RADEBE

hour journey which he made lying naked in the back of a Land Rover. A few hours later, on 12
September, alone and still naked, lying on the floor of a cell in the Pretoria Central Prison, Biko
died from brain damage.
The Apartheid Government's Response
The South African Minister of Justice, James (Jimmy) Kruger initially suggested Biko had died of a
hunger-strike and said that his death "left him cold". The hunger strike story was dropped after
local and international media pressure, especially from Donald Woods, the editor of the East
London Daily Dispatch. It was revealed in the inquest that Biko had died of brain damage, but the
magistrate failed to find anyone responsible, ruling that Biko had died as a result of injuries
sustained during a scuffle with security police whilst in detention.
An Anti-Apartheid Martyr
Prior to this, at the inquests of a number of detainees who died under suspicious circumstances
magistrates declined to examine the interrogation methods used and attributed death to natural
causes, suicides or prison accidents. At the inquest into Biko's death no government official was
prepared to condemn the treatment meted out to Biko. The circumstances of his death were said
to be inconclusive and death was attributed to a prison accident. Yet, evidence led during the 15-
day inquest into Biko's death revealed otherwise. During his detention in a Port Elizabeth police
cell he had been chained to a grill at night and left to lie in urine-soaked blankets. He had been
stripped naked and kept in leg-irons for 48 hours in his cell. A blow in a scuffle with security police
led to him suffering brain damage by the time he was driven naked and manacled in the back of a
police van to Pretoria, where, on 12 September 1977, he died.
Two years later a South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC) disciplinary committee found
there was no prima facie case against the two doctors who had treated Biko shortly before his
death. Dissatisfied doctors, seeking another inquiry into the role of the medical authorities who
had treated Biko shortly before his death, presented a petition to the SAMDC in February 1982,
but this was rejected on the grounds that no new evidence had come to light. Biko's death caught
the attention of the international community, which increased their pressure on the South African
government to abolish its detention policies and called for an international probe on the cause of
his death. Even close allies of South Africa, Britain and the United States of America, expressed
deep concern about the death of Biko. They also joined the international demand for an
international probe.
It took eight years and intense pressure before the South African Medical Council took disciplinary
action. On 30 January 1985 the Pretoria Supreme Court ordered the SAMDC to hold an inquiry
into the conduct of the two doctors who treated Steve Biko during the five days before he died.
Judge President of the Transvaal Mr Justice W G Boshoff said in judgment handed down that there
was prima facie evidence of improper or disgraceful conduct on the part of the `Biko' doctors in a
professional respect.
Biko's death did not put an end to ill treatment, however. Years later, when young Dr Wendy Orr
made her disclosures about the treatment of detainees in the Eastern Cape it became clear that
conditions had changed very little. In September 1987 Helen Suzman once again produced claims
of torture and ill treatment in detention with thirty-seven signed affidavits. In 1997 Biko's killers
appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to request for amnesty for the
death of Biko. However, they only claimed responsibility for assaulting him and maintained that
his death was accidental. They also testified that they lied about his date of death.
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 DORCAS RADEBE

The family of Biko opposed the TRC hearings on the grounds that it would rob them of justice.
They accused the policeman responsible for Biko's death, Harold Synman, for adding more lies
about Biko's death.
The brutal circumstances of Biko's death caused a worldwide outcry and he became a martyr and
symbol of black resistance to the oppressive Apartheid regime. As a result, the South African
government banned a number of individuals (including Donald Woods) and organizations,
especially those Black Consciousness groups closely associated with Biko. The United Nations
Security Council responded by finally imposing an arms embargo against South Africa.
Biko's family sued the state for damages in 1979 and settled out of court for R65 000. The three
doctors connected with Biko's case were initially exonerated by the South African Medical
Disciplinary Committee. It was not until a second enquiry in 1985, eight years after Biko's death,
that any action was taken against them. The police officers responsible for Biko's death applied for
amnesty during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings which sat in Port Elizabeth in
1997. The Biko family did not ask the Commission to make a finding on his death.
"The Commission finds that the death in detention of Mr Stephen Bantu Biko on 12 September
1977 was a gross human rights violation. Magistrate Marthinus Prins found that the members of
the SAP were not implicated in his death. The magistrate's finding contributed to the creation of a
culture of impunity in the SAP. Despite the inquest finding no person responsible for his death, the
Commission finds that, in view of the fact that Biko died in the custody of law enforcement
officials, the probabilities are that he died as a result of injuries sustained during his detention."
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa report, March 1999, Macmillan.)

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 DORCAS RADEBE

The Trust Feed Massacre

In the early hours of 3 December 1988, gunmen opened fire on a house in the Trust Feed
community, near New Hanover, killing eleven people and wounding two. In October 1991,
seven serving and former members of the SAP stood trial on eleven counts of murder and
eight of attempted murder. The accused were Captain Brian Mitchell, Station Commander at
the New Hanover police station at the time of the massacre, Sergeant Neville Rose and
Captain Jakobus van der Heever (both of the SAP), and four former SAP special constables,
Mr Kehla Ngubane, Mr Thabo Sikhosana, Mr Dumisani Ndwalane and Mr David Khambule.

Brian Mitchell, his colleague Sergeant George Nichas and two Security Branch members,
together with the Inkatha leader in the area, Mr Jerome Gabela, were involved in setting up
the Inkatha-aligned Landowners’ Committee in opposition to the largely UDF-supporting
Trust Feed Crisis Committee. Gabela was also, at the time, in the ad hoc employ of the
Security Branch as an informer on trade union members at the bakery where he worked in
Greytown.

At a meeting at the Inkatha headquarters in Edendale in August 1988, attended by

Terreblanche, Mitchell, David Ntombela, Gabela and two other Inkatha members, an attack
on the Trust Feed area was planned for December 1988, involving members of Inkatha and
special constables. After a police ‘clean-up’ operation to disarm and round up UDF suspects,
the police would withdraw, leaving Inkatha members and the special constables to launch
an attack on UDF members.

On 29 November, Constable Willem de Wet brought four special constables to New Hanover
police station. They wore civilian clothing and lodged with Mr Gabela, who provided them
with firearms. On the following day, Captain Van der Heever arrived to run the operation
from the police and Riot Unit side. He requested Mitchell to assist in ‘sweeping’ the area
after the operation, picking up used shells (doppies) and removing evidence.

On 2 December, about thirty to forty policemen rounded up known UDF members,

videotaped them all and detained them under state of emergency regulations. The police
were then withdrawn from the area. At midnight, Mitchell, who had been drinking heavily,
went to see how the operation had gone, accompanied by two police reservists.
Disappointed that only a building had been burnt and no one had been killed, he instructed
the special constables to attack and burn the shop of Mr Faustus Mbongwe, chair of the
Crisis Committee, and to attack a particular house. These instructions were carried out, and
the doppies disposed of in a long-drop toilet at Gabela’s house.

In the attack on the house, which became known as the Trust Feed massacre, eleven people
were killed. The victims had been attending a night vigil following the death of a relative.
The deceased were Mr Mseleni Ntuli, Ms Dudu Shangase [KZN/KM/728/PM], Mr Zetha
Shangase, Mr Nkonyeni Shangase, Mr Muzi Shangase, Ms Filda Ntuli, Mr Fikile Zondi
[KZN/KM/735/PM], Ms Marita Xaba [KZN/KM/736/PM], Ms Sara Nyoka [KZN/KM/706/PM],

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 DORCAS RADEBE

Mr Alfred Zita and Mr Sisedewu Sithole. Ms Ida Hadebe and Ms Nomagoli Zulu were injured.
None was a member of the UDF.

Following the massacre, Mitchell reported to Major Deon Terreblanche who was the first
senior officer at the scene, joined by acting Greytown District Commander Davies and
Brigadier Marx who, according to Mitchell, knew of the special constables’ involvement in
the attack. When the two police reservists who had accompanied Mitchell volunteered
information to the investigating officer, Mitchell informed senior officers of the Security
Branch in Pretoria. He was told not to worry. Indeed, he told the Commission that he had
never worried that he might be arrested, and was sure the evidence would be covered up.

At an informal inquest into the deaths of the massacre victims at New Hanover, the
magistrate found that Mitchell and the special constables were all involved in the killings.

Warrants of arrest were issued for the special constables but were never circulated or sent
to the criminal record register in Pretoria. Almost immediately after the massacre, the
special constables were taken into hiding by certain senior KZP and Inkatha officials. They
were hidden for some time at the Mkhuze camp (which fell under the command of KZP
Captain Leonard Langeni) and continued to receive their salaries. Later they were taken to
the KZP barracks in Ulundi, and then to the homes of various Inkatha-supporting chiefs. In
1990, they were assisted in joining the KZP.

In July 1991, SAP Captain Frank Dutton took over the investigation of the case. He traced the
addresses of the special constables and was able to arrest two of the four: Khambule, who
was in Mpumalanga using a false identity document, and Ndwalane who was in hiding at the
home of an Inkatha-supporting Chief Khawula on the South Coast. Both were still serving
KZP members. They both made full admissions of guilt. Mitchell was arrested on the 2
August 1991 in Mooi River, despite being warned by colleagues of his impending arrest.

Immediately after this, General Van der Westhuizen, Colonel Langenhoven and Captain
Kritzinger from Pretoria were sent to Natal, ostensibly to assist with the investigation. It
soon became clear to Dutton that they had been sent to obstruct the work and prevailed on
the Attorney-General to remove them from the case.

Captain Dutton traced the other two special constables via the then Commissioner of the
KZP, General Jac Buchner, who arranged for them to be delivered by Langeni from their
hiding place at Mkhuze within days. In his section 29 hearing, Buchner confirmed the cover-
up and conspiracy in Trust Feed, claiming the involvement of not just one or two individuals,
but many.

JMC records seized from the Wartburg police station during the investigation implicated
Mitchell in the creation of the Trust Feed Landowner’s Committee as a STRATCOM project.

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 DORCAS RADEBE

In court, Mitchell, the special constables and Mr Jerome Gabela changed their evidence to
exonerate Captain Van der Heever. However, Van der Heever was implicated in Mitchell’s
amnesty application. During the trial, it became evident that the special constables were to
take full responsibility for the massacre. They demanded separate legal representation,
which set about exposing the role of Mitchell’s command. By this time, Mitchell could not
implicate his senior officers without revealing his earlier perjury.

In his judgement, Mr Justice Andrew Wilson called for a full, open inquiry into the matter of
SAP cover-up and rejected a departmental investigation. He questioned, amongst other
things, the actions of General Van der Westhuizen and his two officers, the promotion of
Mitchell despite knowledge of his complicity, and other areas where the police failed to
investigate. He also questioned the readiness of the Commissioner of Police to authorise the
employment of senior counsel to assist a police officer who, on the face of it, appeared to
have acted improperly.21

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 DORCAS RADEBE

DE KOCK/ VLAKPLAS

EUGENE DE KOCK “Prime Evil”

Can evil be pardoned?

Article By: Rebekah Kendal
Thu, 28 Jan 2010
Is evil monochromatic, or does it come in shades of
grey? Is it more or less evil to kill for profit or
because you are psychologically dysfunctional than
it is to kill for a cause that you believe in? Are any
causes worth killing for?
The man dubbed 'Prime Evil' by the very men who
worked beneath him throws these questions into
sharp relief. Was Eugene de Kock simply a product of the society in which he lived — a cog in
the inexcusable machine that was the apartheid system? Or is he, despite the society in which
he lived, as culpable for his actions as the next man?
That De Kock murdered at least six people is incontrovertible. That he took pride in doing so is
also common knowledge. But so too is the fact that his superiors rewarded him — going so far
as to bestow medals on him — for doing so.

A cog in a twisted system?

De Kock grew up in a conservative, nationalist Afrikaner home. Under the influence of a
Broederbond father, De Kock was indoctrinated from a young age into believing that
communism was an evil that should be crushed at all costs.
At the age of 17 he joined the army and was later sent to the army's counterinsurgency unit,
Koevoet, in Namibia. He was transferred from Koevoet to Vlakplaas in the early 1980s. Some
reports suggest that he was transferred because he was suffering from stress-related

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depression, while others suggest that it was because of his aggressive behaviour towards his
colleagues.
De Kock was commander at Vlakplaas from 1985 to 1993 and it was here that he earned the
nickname Prime Evil. A place of nightmares and horror stories, Vlakplaas — a farm 20km
outside Pretoria — was the headquarters of South African Police's counterinsurgency unit C1
(originally known as C10). Functioning as a parliamentary hit squad, the unit would capture
political opponents of the government (and occasionally those only tenuously linked to
opponents), torture them and then either turn them (making them askaris) or execute them.
The torture was gruesome and the callous treatment of the victims and their bodies horrified
the nation when the details became public in De Kock's trial. More often than not, the victims'
bodies would be blown to pieces in mines or burnt for hours until no trace of the victim
remained. During his Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearing, De Kock described
how the members of C1 embraced the gruesome interrogation techniques.
"The mentality at that time was not to be forced to participate... people actually queued... not
for promotion, but to ensure that terrorism never occurred in South Africa."
De Kock was arrested in 1994 and at the end of his trial he was found guilty of 89 charges —
including six murder charges, two counts of conspiracy to murder and one of culpable
homicide — and sentenced to 212 years in prison. His grisly resume includes: blowing up the
ANC headquarters in London; planting arms to prompt deadly raids; killing police informants;
murdering ANC activists in SA and Swaziland; and sending a tape recorder rigged with a bomb
to ANC lawyer Bheki Mlangeni.
Seeking forgiveness
Following his trial, De Kock took part in the TRC revealing some, but not all, of the details of
his many crimes. In doing so, he implicated members of the apartheid government who he
claims gave the orders for some of the executions.
The TRC amnesty committee, while it did grant him amnesty on a number of cases —
including the murders of Pantou Smith, Sipho Dlamini, Busi Majola, Zwelinzima Nyanda, Keith
McFaddon, Goodwill Sikhakhane, and Johannes Mabotha — refused to grant De Kock full
amnesty on the grounds that some of his crimes were found to have been "grossly
disproportionate" and committed without political motive.
De Kock, who was 47 when he was sentenced in 1996, has now spent 13 years of his 212 years
in prison. During this time, he has made efforts to prove that he is remorseful for his actions.
These efforts include meeting with and pleading for forgiveness from the widows of some of
the men he killed.
Interestingly, psychology professor Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, who spent time interviewing
De Kock and subsequently wrote the book 'A Human Being Died That Night: A South African
Story of Forgiveness', believes that De Kock should be pardoned. Not only because he has
shown remorse for his actions, but also because he was part of a larger, deeply flawed society.
The important question, however, is whether these are motivation enough. Remorse, while
no doubt good for the perpetrator's soul, is by no means reason for release. De Kock has not
only been imprisoned to remove him from society, he has also been imprisoned, primarily, as
punishment. The very fact that De Kock is remorseful in no way diminishes the debt which he
owes society.

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 DORCAS RADEBE

The fact that De Kock operated in an immoral system is indisputable. However, he was not
without agency. Whether he regarded himself as a soldier in a war on terror or not, De Kock
still chose to commit the crimes that he did. The fact that he did not necessarily see them as
crimes doesn't make them any less so. The fact that others may have ordered the crimes does
not reduce De Kock's culpability; it simply means that others are also culpable and should be
tried accordingly.
Is Eugene de Kock evil? Perhaps not. Did he commit evil deeds? Without a doubt.
While a pardon for Eugene de Kock would sit well with Jacob Zuma's rhetoric of reconciliation,
it wouldn't do much to change the commonly-held conception that Zuma has little respect for
the justice system and the rule of law. For his own good, and that of South African society,
Zuma should not pardon De Kock. And the reasons for this have nothing to do with Schabir
Shaik.

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 DORCAS RADEBE

Adrian Vlok asked forgiveness from Frank Chikane in 2006 and requested
other whites to follow his example. As a sign of humbling himself, he washed
Chikane’s feet.

Wouter Basson
Wouter Basson (born July 6, 1950) is a
South African cardiologist and former
head of the country's secret chemical and
biological warfare project, Project Coast,
during the apartheid era. Nicknamed "Dr
Death" for his alleged actions in
apartheid South Africa, Basson was
acquitted in 2002 of 67 charges, after
having been suspended from his military
post with full pay in 1999. Among other
charges, Basson was alleged to have
supplied a "lethal triple cocktail of
powerful muscle relaxants" which were used during Operation Dual (the systematic elimination of

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SWAPO prisoners of war and South African Defence Force (SADF) members who posed a threat to
South African covert operations).

In November 2008, Basson was charged at a hearing of the Health Professions Council of South
Africa with offences stemming from his time as an apartheid era "germ warfare expert". The
hearing was postponed on an application submitted by the defence.
On the 30th of June 2010 the application by Wouter Basson to the South African High Court was
rejected. The application to the High Court attempted to have the charges set aside as unlawful,
unreasonable and unfair. The Judge found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Council
was influenced to be biased or prejudiced against the doctor.

Project Coast
Much of what Basson was working on is still secret. It is known that in 1981, when he was working
as a personal physician to state president P. W. Botha, the country's Surgeon-General hired Basson
to work for and form 7 Medical Battalion Group a specialist unit of the South African Military Health
Services . His job was to collect information about other countries' chemical and biological warfare
capabilities under the name Project Coast. After his preliminary report, Basson became the head
project officer and began to work on the country's chemical and biological weapons capability. He
recruited about 200 researchers from around the world and received annual funds equivalent to
$10 million. In 1982, Basson is alleged to have arranged the killing of 200 SWAPO prisoners.

Project Coast secretly researched chemical and biological warfare in violation of the international
BTWC agreement. Basson created four front companies; Delta G Scientific Company; Roodeplaat
Research Laboratories (RRL), Protechnik and Infadel, which in 1989 was split into two companies -
D. John Truter Financial Consultants and Sefmed Information Services. The companies were used to
officially distance the military from the project, to procure necessary chemicals and channel funds
for the research. According to later investigation, Basson had a free rein to do what he wanted.
Delta G did most of the research, production and development of the chemical agents, while RRL
developed chemical and biological pathogens and allegedly was involved with genetic engineering.
Protechnik was a large nuclear, biological and chemical warfare plant developing defences against
chemical weapons.
Infadel dealt with those on a smaller scale and concentrated on financing and administration of
other units and possibly channelling funds between military and research facilities. Many of the
employees were not aware of what they were involved with.

In the 1980s Basson and the project were allegedly involved with attacks and assassinations against
the members of anti-apartheid movements. African leaders in South Africa, Angola and Namibia
also claimed that the more dangerous chemicals were used for crowd control in the country,
although the government claimed otherwise and claimed that chemical weapons were used against
South African troops. Basson provided the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) with lethal chemicals to
be used against prominent anti-apartheid activists. Basson continued to travel all over the world to
gather information about chemical and biological warfare programs and set up other shell and
paper companies as additional front companies, possibly for money laundering.

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 DORCAS RADEBE

When F. W. de Klerk became president in 1990, he ordered the production of the chemicals to be
stopped and the lethal agents destroyed. Basson concentrated on non-lethal chemical agents and
chemicals the government had not banned. That included a large amount of ecstasy and Mandrax
that were apparently exported or allegedly sold to the drug dealers in communities active in the
anti-apartheid movement (Basson brownies). Most of the stockpile disappeared afterwards.
Scientists working on the project later stated that they believed it was to be used to create drug-
laced tear gas. In January 1992, Mozambique reported that a South African helicopter had attacked
their soldiers by releasing an unknown lethal substance that led to four fatalities. Investigation by
the United Nations, U.S. and the United Kingdom identified it as BZ nerve agent. USA and Britain
began to pressure the South African government and in January 1993 Project Coast was wound
down. Basson was officially retired and hired to dismantle the project, and allegedly profited when
some of the South African front companies were privatised. Later government investigation found
that there were large amounts of chemicals and agents missing.

TRC investigation
In 1993 the Office of Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) began to investigate Basson's business
dealings in an as yet unheard of seven year forensic audit. In 1995 the South African government
hired Basson to work for Transnet, a transportation and infrastructure company and possibly for
other more secretive jobs. The USA and UK governments suspected that during his visits to Libya
between 1993 and 1995, Basson might have sold chemical and biological weapons secrets. In 1995,
the government of Nelson Mandela rehired Basson as an army surgeon, allegedly due to USA and
UK pressure and possibly because the government wanted to keep an eye on him.
In 1996, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began to investigate the SADF
and determined that the army had probably used lethal toxins against ANC activists. Basson was
connected to many of these attacks. In 1997, the CIA told the South African government that
Basson intended to leave the country. When Basson was arrested in a sting operation in Pretoria,
he had a large quantity of ecstasy pills and various documents with him. The TRC began to
investigate Project Coast which led them to suspect that Basson had sold his secrets to
governments of countries like Libya and Iraq. In 1997 they asked the help of the Netherlands
Institute for Southern Africa (NIZA) whose investigation report was included in the Truth
Commission Files.
At the same time, the Office for Serious Economic Offences, The National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
and the Gauteng Attorney-General's Special Investigation Team investigated Basson's affairs.
Conflict of interest slowed down the Commission investigation but the TRC gained more
information from OSEO. Basson was arrested in a sting operation in 1997 for the attempted sale
and possession of 1000 ecstasy tablets. At the time, he had hundreds of secret Project Coast
documents in his car. Basson appeared before the TRC on July 31, 1998 and gave evidence for 12
hours. His lawyers constantly interrupted the questioning with legal technicalities but the
Commission determined that Basson had been the primary decision maker in Project Coast and
should be put on trial.

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Trial
Basson's trial began on October 4, 1999 in Pretoria. At the time, the South African media had
dubbed him "Dr Death". Basson faced 67 charges, including drug possession, drug trafficking, fraud
and embezzlement of a total of R36,000,000, 229 murders and conspiracy to murder and theft.
Basson refused to seek amnesty from the Truth Commission. The prosecution presented 153
witnesses, but the case soon began to turn against them. On October 11, 1999 Judge Willie
Hartzenberg dismissed 6 important charges, including four charges of murder and possible
involvement in 200 deaths in Namibia; because he stated that the South African court could not
prosecute crimes committed in other countries. Basson was also included in the Namibian amnesty
of 1989. Hartzenberg then adjourned the trial for two weeks. After 18 months of trial, he reduced
the number of charges to 46.
In July 2001 Basson began to present his own evidence, speaking for 40 days. He stated that he had
learned about the weapons of mass destruction from Saddam Hussein, that he had indeed had free
rein in the project and that he had exchanged information with foreign governments. However,
technically all that was legal. The defence argued that Basson should have immunity for anything
that had happened in Namibia. On April 22, 2002 Judge Hartzenberg dismissed all the remaining
charges against Basson and granted him amnesty. The trial had lasted 30 months. The state
threatened to appeal the judgment due to legal inaccuracies, but the Supreme Court of Appeal
refused to order a retrial in 2003.

After his release, Basson continued to travel all over the world as a guest speaker, and has founded
his own private medical practice. In June 2005, a group of Swiss investigators questioned him about
illegal trade in weapons and nuclear material and asked the South African government to stop
cooperating with him. Later that year the Constitutional Court, South Africa's highest court
overturned the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal. It ruled that crimes allegedly committed
outside the country could be prosecuted in South Africa. Since then the National Prosecuting
Authority has not instituted proceedings against Basson for crimes against humanity.

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BASSON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER

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This source is from an interview held by Lerato Mbele with FW de Klerk, Roelf Meyer and Cyril
Ramaphosa on Interface – SABC 3 on 30 April 2006.

FW DE KLERK: The TRC process was flawed in many respects: numerous atrocities (killings)
of the past have not been properly investigated; there was an over-emphasis on the role of
the former security forces; the assassination of about 400 top IFP leaders has not been
thoroughly probed; there has not been an in-depth analysis of what many would call 'black-
on-black' violence. These flaws create an imbalance which tarnishes the credibility of the
TRC. Furthermore I think the TRC failed to get to the core of understanding the past, or
building understanding thereof. There is unfinished business, but we must now live the
spirit of the Constitution. We must have ubuntu ... instead of seeking vengeance. We should
have reparation, instead of retaliation. If prosecutions go ahead, they must be even-handed:
there must be prosecution of undisclosed crimes from all sides, not just from one side. I've
never been in favour of blanket amnesty, but it will have a tremendous negative effect if we
now get a situation that can be interpreted as a witch hunt. We must strike a balance.
Prosecution in exceptional cases can be justified, if it is clear that people have hidden the
truth of serious crimes for which they should have applied for amnesty.

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CYRIL RAMAPHOSA: FW de Klerk uses emotive (sensitive) words when he says 'witch hunt'.
The term 'witch hunt' has never been part of the lexicon (dictionary) of the new South
Africa. Nelson Mandela in leading this country to unity and reconciliation made sure that
there would not be any blanket 'witch hunt' type of process. We are not accustomed to
witch hunts; we are, however, as an emerging democracy, accustomed to justice. If crimes
were committed in the past, by whomever, and no application for amnesty was made when
the opportunity was there, justice must prevail.
[From: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 10 years on by C Villa-Vicencio & F du Toit]

Below is the introduction of the National Party’s submission to the TRC by Mr F.W. De Klerk.
Taken from www.justice.gov.za/trc

The National Party’s view of the historical context within the conflicts of the past should be
considered. It provides an analysis of the origin of the conflict; it deals with the perceptions
that motivated government policies; it analyses the ensuing conflict and the steps the
government took, on the one hand to protect society against revolution and on the other
hand to promote a peaceful solution to the complex problems that confronted us. It deals in
some detail with issues such as amnesty, reconciliation, responsibility, the circumstances
that necessitated unconventional strategies and the measures that we took to try to
prevent abuses. This submission also sets out the National Parties views on the framework
within which we believe the commission should carry out its mandate.

It is not however, the purpose of this submission to provide details of specific incidence that
occurred during the conflict of the past. We understand that detailed submissions will be

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made in this regard by the former leadership of the South African Police and by the South
African National Defence Force. Should the Commission have any particular requirements or
queries the National Party will be happy to assist it in any way that we can. I am acutely
aware of the difficulty of establishing exactly what happened during past conflicts. The many
judicial commissions that the former Government established during my Presidency
experienced the same difficulty. Nevertheless, the National Party will do everything that it
can to assist the Commission with its task.

Zapiro’s response to the National Party’s submission to the TRC, which appeared in the
Sowetan on 23 Aug 1996

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Ex-President F.W. de Klerk made the following apology for apartheid before the TRC:
Apartheid was wrong. I apologise in my capacity as leader of the National Party to the millions of
South Africans who suffered the wrenching disruption of forced removals in respect of their
homes, businesses and land. Who over the years suffered the shame of being arrested for pass
law offences. Who over the decades and indeed centuries suffered the indignities and humiliation
of racial discrimination. Who for a long time were prevented from exercising their full democratic
rights in the land of their birth. Who were unable to achieve their full potential because of job
reservation. And who in any other way suffered as a result of discriminatory legislation and
policies. This apology is offered in a spirit of true repentance, in full knowledge of the tremendous
harm that apartheid has done to millions of South Africans.

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It had confronted the liberation movements with their own crimes of murder, torture and
necklacing, refusing to judge these crimes any differently from government crimes. It had helped
to solve many of the murders and disappearances that for so long had troubled so many families.
It had also provided a hearing for thousands of victims and their families, affording many people
relief from their suffering and grief for the first time.

Martin Meredith sums up the findings of the TRC. From The State of Africa: A History of Fifty
Years of Independence.

Dr Alex Boraine, vice chairperson of the TRC had the following to say about the process of
the TRC
It becomes clear that the expectations of some in the ANC were that the TRC would
condemn the National Party and its many allies for their inhumane policies and the ANC
would emerge as the hero that had stopped the villain in its tracks and ushered in a new
democracy with a human face. Such expectations are understandable, and I have strong
sympathy with them. But the goal of the TRC was to hold up a mirror to reflect the complete
picture...

South Africa could not move forward without looking at the past. The government used the
judiciary to deal with acts of human rights abuses and the ANC appointed a commission to
investigate atrocities in MK camps. Political leaders agreed to grant amnesty (official pardon) to
those who had committed politically motivated crimes on condition that they made a full
disclosure of their activities. It was expected that the victims would forgive the culprits after
they had given a full explanation of the reasons for their actions and asked for forgiveness.
Reconciliation was based on the spirit of ubuntu, and reparations, rather than retaliation and
revenge. As a result, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established.

Mangosuthu Butheleze had the following to say regarding the outbreak of violence:
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Inkatha beieves it has a right to defend itself. We will not be intimidated out of existance. I
am a Black Leader in the midst of violence. I am a leader of an angry people....

The following text expresses the failure of the TRC to summons the leader of the Inkatha
Freedom Party and has been adapted from “South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building
Democracy – Truth Commission and Interpretations of Violence”.
Taken from www.overcomingapartheid.msu.edu

Despite the findings of the TRC that the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) was the second largest
violator of human rights violations in South Africa, the TRC failed to summons the head of
the IFP. This decision was made deliberatly for fear of generation violence in the volatile
(unstable) Kwa- Zulu Natal region. The IFP had been viewed as an allie to the apartheid
government until 1992. During the 1980s, the South African Defence Force trained and
armed an offensive parlimentary unit of the IFP, known as the Caprivi Squad to destabalise
communities. The strategy is aimed at weakening the ANC and promoting Inkatha in its
place.The TRC later described its failure to issue the summons as ‘..in retrospect … probably
an incorrect decision.’ (trc, 1998D: 207)

This is an excerpt from Harry Gwala’s speech, ANC leadwer in Natal. He was responding to
the ongoing political violence.

Make no mistake we kill Inkatha warlords. Why be appologetic about it? When they come to
attack us, we offer them no bibles. We believe in just war. the difference between us and
Inkatha is that we do not kill women and children. We hit hard on those who target us...

An extract from Nic Basson’s report. (High ranking official in the state security agency,
BOSS). It outline the apartheid governement’s invovement in violence.

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The governemnt decided that black-on-black violence should be one of the strategies and a
confrontation between Zulus and Xhosas should be encouraged because the two ethnic
groups were the largest in the country. The army recruited people from ourtside South
Africa, mainly rebel sodiers –trained them and sentthem to protect compunds and start
violence. They were trained to destabalise communities. The strategy is aimed at weakening
the ANC and promoting Inkatha in its place.

Nelson Mandela had the following to say on the role of the ANC in the outbreak of violence
in the 1990s.
There are members of the ANC killing our people. We must face the truth. It is true that the
government is involved in the violence. It is members of the army, members of the police
force and members of the intelligence service who are also behind this violence because
they want to cripple and weaken the ANC. But I am not going to criticise the government
and Inkatha. People who participate in this violence for whatever reason - kill innocent
people just because others have killed innocent people – these ‘freedom fighters’ - are not
serving the cause of freedom. Those of you [ANC members] who have in your midst
members of Inkatha, PAC or AZAPO do not use violence against them unless it is self-
defence...

www.sahistory,org,za

Winnie Madikizela- Madela, former ANC Women’s Legue President and Deputy Minister of
Arts and Culture was found guilty on four charges of kidnapping and four of being an
accesory after the fact to assault. Co- accused John Morgan was found guilty of kidnapping
and Zoliswa Xoliswa Faliti guilty of kidnapping and of assault with intent to do grievious
bodily harm. The case arouse from the fact that one of the kidnapped youths, 14 year old
Stompie Sepei had been found dead from his injuries near the crime scene. The sentencing
was schedualled for 14 May 1991. The actual crime had allegidly been committed by her
thi=uggish body gaurds dubbed the Mandela United Football Club. In 1997 the TRC reached
a verdict that Madikizela- Madela was guilty and had played a role in the killing of Stompie
Sepei.

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Stompie Sepei age 14 (left), tortured to death in the presence of Winnie Mandela (right) for
being an informant.

This is an extract of testomony given on 8th May 1996 in Durban by Mamanki Sepei, mother
of Stompie Sepei who was killed under mysterious circumstances in 1989.
On the 13 February 1989, they took us and we went to Brixton. We went to Diepkloof
Mortuary. That’s where I identified Stompie. His body was decomposed, but your son is
your son. I was fighting for my rights. There were signs that really indicated to me that it was
Stopmie. After having been killed hewas thrown into the river between new Canada and
Sowetho. You couldn’t even identify him. I looked at Stompie because I am his mother. I had
a deep look at him. I saw the first sign. I said, “ I know my son. He doesn’t have hair at the
back.” His eyes were gouged, and I said, “ This is Stompie.” He had a scar on his eye. I looked
at the nose and he had a birth mark. I looked at his chest and I could see a scar, becauwse
he fought with another boy in Thumahole. And I looked at his left hand. IOt was identical to
mine. ... Reporters came to. They said to me, “ Stompie is alive. He is in Botsawana.” They
said Mrs Mandela told them that Stompie is alive, he in Botswana. I said to them, “I am not
bearing a zombie, I am baring my son. I know his birth marks. I raised him from
childhood. ... Nobody will ever tell me anything about my child. We went to the mortuary to
see him for the last time. He was decomposed, he had a bad smell. We couldn’t bring him to
the house. Together with my family and my father we went to see him and he was the real
Stompie. But Mr Msipidi said to us, “This is not Stompie.” .... They were spreading the
rumour that Stompie was an informer. “The owner of the mortuary says the person who

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died is not Stompie.” I said, “ That is news to me.” The person that I am going to bury
tomorrow is my son.”

Mamanki Sepei, testifying at the TRC

Images taken from www.oryxmedia.co.za/.../winie-mandela

The text below describes the reaction of Winnie Mandela to allegations against her as
revealed by the TRC. The visual source shows the reactions of her supporters to the
allegations. The written source has been adapted from, www.sahistory.org.za and the image
has been taken from www.oryxmedia.co.za/.../winnie-mandela

The image below shows members of the ANC Women’s League protesting in front the TRC
Hearing in which Winnie Mandela found guilty on four charges of kidnapping and four of
being an accesory after the fact to assault. The case arouse from the fact that one of the
kidnapped youths, 14 year old Stompie Sepei had been found dead from his injuries near
the crime scene. The actual crime had allegidly been committed in her presence by her
thuggish body gaurds dubbed the, ‘Mandela United Football Club’. In 1997 the TRC reached

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a verdict that Madikizela- Madela was guilty and had played a role in the killing of Stompie
Sepei.

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