Lee v. Midland Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint

Case 7:22-cv-00185-BL Document 62 Filed 12/19/23 Page 1 of 56
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
JARED LEE, DANA ELLIS, §

MATTHEW COUNTS, §
GREGORY MCCLENDON, and §
BARRY RUSSELL, §
§ Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-185
Plaintiffs, §
§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
v. §
§
CITY OF MIDLAND, JENNIE §
ALONZO, ROSEMARY SHARP, and §
CAMILO FONSECA §
§
Defendants. §
PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Jared Lee, Dana Ellis, Matthew Counts, Gregory McClendon, and Barry Russell
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), by and through counsel, hereby file this civil rights action against the
City of Midland, Jennie Alonzo (“Alonzo”), individually, Rosemary Sharp (“Sharp”), individually,
and Camilo Fonseca (“Fonseca”), individually, for Defendants’ violations of the United States
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and would show the Court as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs, the
“Midland Christian Five,” (also referred to as the “Five”) are career educators who responded
reasonably, appropriately, and with integrity to a locker room incident involving horseplay among
members of Midland Christian School’s high school baseball team. Defendants are law
enforcement authorities who—in a remarkable abuse of power—arrested these educators as
retaliation for the educators asserting their Constitutional rights while complying with their
professional duties and the law. To make these false arrests, Defendants lied and omitted material
facts about the Midland Christian Five’s actions in sworn affidavits.
2. The fallout from Defendants’ illegal and unconstitutional actions has forever
changed the lives of the Midland Christian Five. Their images were plastered on worldwide media
and associated with false allegations of the most vile and callous nature. Ultimately, the criminal
justice system vindicated the Five when a grand jury found what the investigating officers had
known all along: no probable cause of a crime existed.
3. While the Five believed that this was the end of the City’s abusive tactics, it was
only the beginning. Outrageously, following the filing of this civil rights action, Defendants City
of Midland, Sharp, and Alonzo retaliated using the most powerful tool at their disposal—the
criminal justice system.
4. After receiving notice of the Five’s intent to bring the claims in this lawsuit, the
Midland Police Department (“MPD”) pursued and recommended additional, baseless failure to
report charges against three of the Midland Christian Five for an incident that preceded the events
originally at issue in this lawsuit. Fortunately, the state district court appointed an unbiased
prosecutor’s office outside of Midland County to take over these cases. That office, the Ector
County District Attorney’s Office (“ECDAO”), determined that these retaliatory charges were,
too, unsupported by probable cause, dismissing the charges in September 2023. The baselessness
of the new charges powerfully demonstrated the continued, malicious campaign against Plaintiffs
for an improper purpose.
5. The second round of charges also demonstrated the extent to which Defendant City
of Midland—via the highest levels of the MPD—approved the improper, unconstitutional, and
abusive use of the criminal justice system, an abuse that required the Midland Christian Five to
2
bring this lawsuit in the first place.
6. While Defendant City of Midland embraced these unlawful tactics—including
through job promotions of the officers involved—Midland citizens forcefully rejected them. At a
Midland City Council meeting held November 15, 2022, members of the Midland community
filled the room, calling for “an investigation of the[ ] arrests and indictments [of the Midland
Christian Five] and to ‘right the wrong direction of a culture created’ [by the MPD.]” 1 Residents
lamented that the City and its officers were committing a “weaponization of the law” through the
false charges against the Midland Christian Five, among others.2 Midland’s then mayor-elect,
Lori Blong, urged the need for the City to review the process and personnel that led to these
indictments.3
A Standing-Room-Only Crowd Attends a Midland City Council Meeting to Complain of Abuses by the Midland Police Department
in the Midland Christian Five Cases and Others. 4
1
Stewart Doreen, Blong: Council will evaluate best path regarding review of MPD, Midland Rep.-
Telegram, Nov. 15, 2022, available at https://www.mrt.com/news/local/article/Blong-Council-will-
evaluate-best-path-regarding-
17587555.php?fbclid=IwAR1EhrDuXGMVv9Dt2MvuBII7NBB_w54V2fhH1HjgWYIYAZH_uMjY7zL
JD2g (last visited Nov. 17, 2022).
2
Id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
3
7. The Midland Christian Five bring this case because the MPD and the named
defendants in this case are no longer credible or reliable public servants. This case aims to hold
accountable these police officers who violated their rights and the police department and city that
supported and directed these defendants.
****
8. The initial facts giving rise to this case began in a baseball locker room. In an
incident of horseplay, a sophomore player poked a freshman on his buttocks—over his clothes—
with a bat. Plaintiff Ellis (the secondary school principal) heard a rumor about the incident two
days after it occurred. As discussed below, Ellis heard about the incident through a hearsay
account from a person, who heard from a parent, who had heard from her freshman daughter, who
heard a rumor.
9. Upon learning of the rumor, Plaintiff Ellis immediately requested that Plaintiff
McClendon (the athletic director) investigate and identify the students involved. Plaintiff
McClendon, with the assistance of Plaintiff Counts (the assistant principal), interviewed several
baseball players, including the sophomore and the freshman. After multiple discussions with
players present during the incident, Plaintiffs determined that the boys had engaged in locker room
horseplay. Significantly, Plaintiffs twice spoke with the freshman “victim,” who denied that any
sexual assault had occurred.
10. At no time did any school official have reasonable cause to believe the freshman
had been sexually assaulted. And despite some hearsay characterizations of a poking “in the butt,”
the alleged victim himself repeatedly confirmed that the entire incident “wasn’t a big deal”—that
it was nothing more than locker room roughhousing—that no penetration occurred—and that he
had simply been poked on the fully clothed buttocks with a bat.
4
11. Nonetheless, administrators punished the alleged sophomore perpetrator in
accordance with school policy. The coaching staff also counseled all the players that such conduct
would not be tolerated in the future.
12. Over a week after the incident, another student (not present when the incident
occurred) allegedly overheard gossip about it during lunch. In a bizarre and unfortunate game of
“telephone,” a more extreme—and totally false—account of the incident emerged from this
student’s father. In this third- or fourth-hand hearsay account, instead of being “poked in the butt,”
the freshman’s “anus was penetrated far up with a bat.”
13. This gossip was, by all accounts, false. No one—not the freshman or the
sophomore involved, the other players present during the event, or the coaches who had supervised
the practice preceding the event—ever reported penetration of any kind. In any event, the student’s
father then reported the unsubstantiated gossip—which grossly misrepresented what had
occurred—to the police.
14. So began Defendants’ vindictive and malicious campaign to prosecute Plaintiffs
based upon the unsupported rumor. It quickly became obvious that Plaintiffs had offended
Defendants causing them to be outraged because Plaintiffs dared to investigate an unsubstantiated
rumor at the school level before involving law enforcement. Defendant Alonzo frankly expressed
her outrage to her supervisor Defendant Sharp during a break in an interview of Plaintiff Ellis,
saying, “I’m pissed. I’m fucking pissed. I’m so mad.” 5
15. Blinded by this unjustified anger, Defendant Alonzo spearheaded a tunnel-visioned
and biased “investigation” into the incident. Among other things, she intentionally excluded from
consideration (and, ultimately, from sworn warrants and criminal complaints) the overwhelming
5
In a September 2020 email regarding Defendant Alonzo’s performance evaluation, the MPD Chief of
Police joked about Defendant Alonzo’s unprofessional use of profanity, and indeed encouraged it.
5
facts supporting Plaintiffs’ reasonable—and correct—belief that no reportable abuse occurred.
Indeed, though Plaintiffs fully cooperated with Defendant Alonzo’s malicious investigation,
Defendant Alonzo took offense at Plaintiff Lee’s request—made at the direction of Midland
Christian School Board President Jason Stockstill—that Defendant Alonzo provide the school with
a search warrant before Plaintiff Lee disclosed documents containing sensitive student
information. The school requested a warrant to ensure that, in disclosing the private student
information, it would remain in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”).
16. In fact, when explaining the need for a warrant, Plaintiff Lee informed Defendant
Alonzo that, while he wanted to comply, the school’s FERPA obligations required a warrant.
Nonetheless, Defendant Alonzo still took offense at Plaintiffs’ assertion of their constitutional
rights and their protection of student privacy—resentments that Alonzo would never relinquish.
17. In an extreme and unreasonable abuse of power, Defendant Alonzo—supported and
directed by the other Defendants—maliciously pursued and obtained arrest warrants against
Plaintiffs for failing to report child abuse based on false information (“MC 1”). Significantly, to
secure Plaintiffs’ arrests, Defendant Alonzo wrote arrest warrant affidavits that contained
deliberate—or, alternatively, reckless—falsehoods and omissions. Defendant Alonzo deliberately
calculated these false statements to mislead the Justice of the Peace who issued the warrants.
18. Before police filed the affidavits with the Justice of the Peace, City of Midland
Chief of Police Seth Herman reviewed them and authorized the pursuit of Plaintiffs’ baseless
arrests. Chief Herman approved the affidavits and by doing so failed to correct the obvious and
known material misstatements and/or omissions described herein. Prior to giving his
authorization, Chief Herman sought the approval of the City Manager Robert Patrick to arrest
6
Plaintiffs and to do so in the public manner described below. City Manager Patrick gave his
consent after notifying Mayor Patrick Payton, who similarly approved of the arrests.
19. Egregiously, Defendants charged Plaintiffs with failing to report and with
intentionally concealing abuse. Without the concealment allegation, the failure to report charges
would have been misdemeanors and not felonies. Defendants concocted the concealment
allegation out of whole cloth, seeking to make their planned, highly publicized arrests more
palatable to the public. That is, Defendants chose to charge Plaintiffs with felonies because the
public would have been more likely to question the spectacle of Plaintiffs’ arrests had the charges
been simple misdemeanors.
20. Using the fraudulently obtained warrants, Defendant Alonzo, along with several
other MPD officers—including Defendants Sharp and Fonseca—handcuffed, arrested, and perp
walked Plaintiffs on the school campus in front of the news media that Defendants premeditatively
arranged to have present. Defendants intentionally created a spectacle in front of these career
educators’ students, colleagues, and the broader community (through the news media) to publicly
humiliate them. Indeed, shortly after the arrests, footage of the perp walks appeared on local news
outlets and quickly spread around the world.
21. After spending hours in jail for these baseless arrests, the Five were each released
on bond. Nearly three months later, a grand jury no-billed every MC 1 case against the Midland
Christian Five, and the Midland County District Attorney’s Office (“MCDAO”) had to dismiss the
unfounded charges.
22. Following the initial filing of the instant civil rights lawsuit, Defendants City of
Midland, Sharp, and Alonzo brought new, retaliatory, and vindictive charges against Plaintiffs
Lee, Ellis, and Counts—again, for failure to report child abuse (“MC 2”). The incident at issue
7
this time was an accident in which one student struck another with a bat. Everyone present during
the incident, including the student who was struck, described it as an accident. Indeed, the injured
student ultimately sued Midland Christian School—and even his lawsuit did not allege the incident
involved intentional conduct.
23. What’s more, Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts were not present for the incident but
were nevertheless indicted. But the educator who was present during the incident was not indicted.
Medical professionals who provided care to the injured student also were not indicted. To the
extent any reporting obligation existed (which was not the case), all of these adults had such an
obligation. Yet, no one reported it—because it was not a reportable incident under the law. The
incident was an accident which, by legal definition, does not constitute abuse. 6
24. In any event, while several adults knew of and did not report the incident,
Defendants only charged three of the five Plaintiffs in this case with a crime for doing so. At the
time Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts faced indictment for MC 2, they were suing for damages
caused by MC 1, which involved the City of Midland and the same investigating officers who had
also recommended the MC 2 charges.
25. To obtain the MC 2 indictments, MPD worked with the MCDAO to present a
legally insufficient case to the grand jury. Under the statute, accidents do not constitute reportable
abuse. In fact, the reporting statute specifically excludes accidental conduct. The term accident is
undefined in the law, but the MC 2 grand jury presentation included two definitions, one of which
was completely flawed. That definition allowed for the conclusion that if grand jurors could point
to an apparent cause of a child’s injury, the incident was not an accident and reportable child abuse
had occurred. Such a definition is wrong because an accident can have an apparent cause, such as
6
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(1)(C) (West) (defining abuse as, inter alia, “physical injury that results
in substantial harm to the child . . . excluding an accident”) (emphasis added).
8
an unintentional act, and thus, not constitute abuse. 7 The resulting indictments, which the ECDAO
immediately moved to dismiss after inheriting the case, demonstrate how this erroneous definition
led grand jurors astray to the wrong conclusion.
26. Just as City of Midland officials had approved of the MC 1 charges prior to arrests,
the same City officials also sanctioned the pursuit of the MC 2 indictments. Given the widespread
publicity that MC 1 and this litigation had received—MPD policy required Defendants Sharp and
Alonzo to keep the Chief abreast of their investigation.8 Defendants and their Chief maliciously
chose to proceed with the MC 2 charges despite an incomplete investigation, an awareness that the
MC 2 incident constituted an “accident”, and knowing that the charges lacked probable
cause. Before authorizing Defendant Sharp’s presentation of the MC 2 charges to a grand jury,
Chief Herman (again) sought and obtained the approval of City Manager Patrick and Mayor
Payton.
27. After the ECDAO assumed carriage of the MC 2 prosecutions, that district attorney
quickly moved to dismiss the charges because the evidence did not meet the elements of the failure
to report offense. Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts had been under the MC 2 indictments for 10
months and released on bond during that time. These indictments, like the MC 1 charges, had
7
All child abuse legally required to be reported, must be caused by an act or omission of a person. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § (1) (West) (stating, as an initial matter, that to constitute “abuse” the injury must have
resulted from “acts or omissions by a person”) (emphasis added). If it were true that abuse has a cause
while accidents have no cause, the statute would not need to exclude “accidents” from the definition of
reportable conduct. This is because accidents can have a cause, namely the unintentional actions of an
individual. The statute’s specification that an “accident” is not reportable abuse signifies that some injuries
can have an apparent cause and still not constitute abuse.
8
See Midland Police Department General Order Chapter 1, sec. 10 Duty Chief (“Major emergencies, events
generating great public interest, and those incidents that could bring recognition or embarrassment to the
Department require that a Duty Chief be notified in a timely manner. . . . When any of these things occur
during normal working hours, the Commander of the Division concerned notifies the appropriate Bureau
Chief. The Bureau Chief notifies the Chief of Police.”).
9
profound impacts upon their careers and educator certifications.
28. Defendants pursued the MC 2 charges against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts
maliciously and in bad faith, just as the MC 1 charges. The MPD and City’s approval of this piling
on of additional false charges against these career educators showed the ratification and approval
of Defendants Alonzo and Sharp’s malice towards Plaintiffs, and their aggressive campaign to
destroy their careers. It was also an act of unconstitutional retaliation against Plaintiffs for filing
a federal lawsuit to vindicate their civil rights in relation to the events of MC 1. Defendants City
of Midland, Sharp, and Alonzo selectively pursued charges solely against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and
Counts to send the vindictive message to Plaintiffs that their power is not to be challenged.
29. The approval of the MC 2 false prosecutions by the City’s policymakers
demonstrates their ratification of MPD’s vendetta and retaliation against these private school
educators.
****
30. The false and malicious allegations against Plaintiffs regarding the locker room
incident have profoundly disrupted their lives, irreversibly damaged their reputations, resulted in
missed career opportunities, and caused severe and ongoing emotional distress and trauma. The
bringing of additional, baseless, and retaliatory charges against three of the Plaintiffs only served
to exacerbate this harm. To clear their names, the Five persist in their suit against Defendants’
flagrant abuse of power.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
31. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas,
Midland-Odessa Division, as it is the district in which the defendants are located and in which the
10
events giving rise to this action occurred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
PARTIES
32. Plaintiff Jared Lee is a resident of Midland County, Texas. He was the
superintendent of Midland Christian School, a position he held for four years. The 2021-2022
school year was his thirteenth year on the faculty of the school, and his nineteenth year in
education. Plaintiff Lee previously served Midland Christian School as a teacher, junior high
school principal, and academic dean. Plaintiff Lee attended the school as a child while his father
was a principal who later became superintendent. His mother was a teacher at Midland Christian
School before later serving as its development director. Plaintiff Lee graduated from the school
in 1999. His two daughters attended the school as well.
33. Plaintiff Dana Ellis is a resident of Midland County, Texas. She was the principal
of the secondary school at Midland Christian School, a position she held for two years. The 2021-
2022 school year was Plaintiff Ellis’s sixth year on the faculty, having previously served as middle
school principal and an elementary school teacher. She had been in education for twelve years.
Plaintiff Ellis graduated from Midland Christian School in 1998, and she has four children who
attended the school.
34. Plaintiff Matthew Counts is a resident of Midland County, Texas. At the relevant
time, he was the assistant principal of the secondary school and a football coach at Midland
Christian School. The 2021-2022 school year was Plaintiff Counts’s fifth year on the faculty at
the school, having spent the previous years as a teacher and coach. He attended Midland Christian
School throughout high school and played football. Plaintiff Counts graduated from Midland
Christian School in 2013.
11
35. Plaintiff Gregory McClendon is a resident of Midland County, Texas. He is the
former athletic director and head football coach at Midland Christian School. Plaintiff
McClendon’s son was a quarterback for the Midland Christian School football team and won three
state championships with the team with his father as coach. His son later returned to teach and
coach at Midland Christian. Both of Plaintiff McClendon’s children attended Midland Christian
School from pre-kindergarten through high school graduation. Additionally, Plaintiff
McClendon’s wife was a teacher at Midland Christian and later served as its Director of
Curriculum. Plaintiff McClendon and his wife each served Midland Christian School for over
twenty years.
36. Plaintiff Barry Russell is a resident of Midland County, Texas. He was the head
baseball coach at Midland Christian School during the relevant period. Plaintiff Russell has
received numerous honors over the years, including the following awards: National Sunbelt Class
Hall of Fame Coach, Texas Sports Writers Association Coach of the Year, National Federation of
State High School Association Coach of the Year, Midland Independent School District Hero for
Kids Award, American Baseball Coaches Association Regional Coach of the Year for High School
Division II, and Texas High School Baseball Association All Star Coach. Plaintiff Russell has
also served as President of the Texas High School Baseball Coaches Association. He has been in
education for thirty-four years, and he served as the head baseball coach for Midland High School
for twenty-two years.
37. Defendant City of Midland is a municipal corporation organized under the
Constitution and laws of the State of Texas and located within the Western District of Texas,
Midland-Odessa Division. The Midland Police Department is a department operated by the City
of Midland. MPD sets policy for its police officers. Defendant City of Midland has been served
12
and has filed an appearance herein.
38. Defendant Jennie Alonzo is employed by the City of Midland as an MPD detective
who, at all times relevant to this action, was acting under the color of law and within the scope of
her employment. Defendant Alonzo is sued in her individual capacity. Defendant Alonzo has
been served and has filed an appearance herein.
39. Defendant Rosemary Sharp is employed by the City of Midland as an MPD
sergeant who, at all times relevant to this action, was acting under the color of law and within the
scope of her employment. Defendant Sharp is sued in her individual capacity. Defendant Sharp
has been served and has filed an appearance herein.
40. Defendant Camilo Fonseca is employed by the City of Midland as an MPD officer
who, at all times relevant to this action, was acting under the color of law and within the scope of
his employment. Defendant Fonseca is sued in his individual capacity. Defendant Fonseca has
been served and has filed an appearance herein.
FACTS
41. Defendants maliciously prosecuted and falsely arrested the Midland Christian Five
for purportedly failing to report child abuse and acting with the intent to conceal such alleged
abuse. Because of these false arrests, the Five spent hours in jail, underwent excruciating public
humiliation, and experienced severe reputational damage both personally and professionally. The
false arrests either ended, or substantially stymied, their careers in education. The Midland
Chrisitan School immediately placed them on administrative leave pending the outcome of their
criminal cases, and the Texas Education Agency temporarily suspended their educator
certifications. Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, McClendon, and Russell never returned to the school in any
official capacity, nor do they currently work in the education field. Midland Christian School
13
demoted Plaintiff Counts from his role as assistant principal.
42. Following the Five’s filing of the instant federal civil rights lawsuit, Defendants
maliciously prosecuted and falsely arrested Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts again for an additional
charge of failure to report child abuse and acting with the intent to conceal. The incident forming
the basis of this retaliatory charge was an accident between students that occurred prior to MC 1.
This second prosecution, MC 2, resulted in additional, hours-long processing at the city jail, public
humiliation, and reputational harm. It also has resulted in a second suspension of Plaintiffs Lee,
Ellis, and Counts’ educator certificates. This suspension remains active as of the date of this
pleading.
 Midland Christian School Administrators Hear a Rumor About the Baseball Team.
43. News of the locker room incident that led to this case first reached a member of the
Midland Christian School administration late in the evening on Thursday, January 20, 2022. The
news came not from an outcry by any victim—but instead through a chain of hearsay. Specifically,
a sixth-grade teacher at Midland Christian School received a text message from a ninth-grade
parent indicating that the ninth-grade parent’s daughter had told the ninth-grade parent that a
freshman involved in a locker room incident had been severely injured, requiring him to miss
school. The chain of hearsay was as follows:
14
Chain of Hearsay from Initial Report
????????????
Anonymous ninth-grade girl (not on boys' baseball team

or eyewitness)
Mother of anonymous ninth-grade girl
Sixth-grade
teacher
Principal
Dana Ellis
44. The rumor provided no information as to the identity of the alleged perpetrator—
or for that matter, the ninth-grade girl reporting it. Nonetheless, through conversation with the
sixth-grade teacher, Plaintiff Ellis learned that it was further rumored that the alleged victim had
not returned to school since the incident because of injuries allegedly sustained.
45. Plaintiff Ellis easily determined, however, that the alleged victim had not missed a
day of school. Plaintiff Ellis decided to further investigate the rumor because, among other things:
(1) the rumor was fourth-hand hearsay that originated from a ninth-grade female student who was
not on the baseball team or a witness to the alleged conduct; (2) the rumor did not provide the
identity of the perpetrator; and (3) there was an immediately apparent falsehood (i.e. that the
alleged victim involved had missed school) in the hearsay account.
46. The very next morning—less than twelve hours after first learning of the incident
and before the start of the school day—Plaintiff Ellis requested that Plaintiff McClendon
investigate. Plaintiff McClendon asked Plaintiff Counts to assist. Plaintiff Ellis also informed
15
Plaintiff Lee (the superintendent) of the investigation. Plaintiff Ellis did not participate in the
initial investigation because her son was on the baseball team.
 Student Witnesses Explain What Actually Occurred—Horseplay Involving a Bat.
47. Plaintiffs McClendon and Counts spoke with several baseball players about the
rumor, including most importantly, the freshman “victim” himself. These players consistently
reported that the freshman had been placed on the ground by one other sophomore baseball player.
With the freshman player in his baseball clothes (including baseball pants and sliding shorts) fully
fastened and on the entire time, the sophomore poked the freshman on his bottom with a bat one
time. Everyone, including the freshman, stated that the incident was “not a big deal.” The
freshman was asked if the bat somehow penetrated his “butt hole.” He repeatedly denied that this
had occurred.
48. The investigation continued Monday, January 24, which was the first day head
baseball coach Plaintiff Russell returned to school after nearly two weeks of leave due to a severe
COVID-19 infection (that at one point sent him to the emergency room). Plaintiff Counts asked
Plaintiff Russell to assist in the continued investigation. Plaintiff Russell saw the alleged freshman
victim in the hallway and asked if he was okay. The freshman informed Plaintiff Russell that the
sophomore player had tapped him on the behind with the bat. The freshman again said that he was
fully clothed, was not hurt, and that there was no penetration.
49. Plaintiff Russell held a meeting with the baseball team and told the team that the
administration needed to determine who had poked the freshman with a bat. Later that day, the
sophomore boy approached Plaintiff Counts, and later Plaintiff Russell, and admitted that he was
the one who had poked the freshman with a bat. Again, the sophomore stated that the bat did not
penetrate the freshman’s anus.
16
50. To discipline the sophomore player, Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts imposed the
school’s highest punishment short of expulsion.
 A Parent Reports an Inaccurate, Exaggerated Rumor to Police.
51. On Thursday, January 27—a week after Plaintiff Ellis first learned of the rumor
and days after Plaintiffs’ investigation had concluded—the parent of a freshman baseball player,
who was not present the day of the alleged incident, began sending a series of emails. That parent,
Matthew Friez, had a lengthy history (dating back six years) of emailing Midland Christian School
administration with various complaints. This time, Friez reported that his non-witness son said
that the bat had penetrated the freshman’s anus. Friez, therefore, concluded that the incident was
a sexual assault—based not on any facts, but upon multiple levels of inaccurate hearsay.
52. Plaintiff Lee informed Friez that the incident had been managed appropriately and
that Friez’s account was completely inconsistent with what had occurred. Nonetheless, Plaintiff
Lee also encouraged Friez to report the incident to the authorities if he believed it appropriate.
Plaintiff Lee wrote to Friez, “You have every right to contact the authorities[,]” and “[y]ou are
welcome to make a report based upon your son’s perception and information he gave to you, but
I can tell you that after many interviews with the players involved, there has been no evidence of
a sexual assault.”
 Plaintiffs Attempt to Comply with the Police Investigation.
53. On Friday, January 28, Matthew Friez contacted the MPD and reported his son’s
hearsay account of the incident. Defendant Fonseca and another uniformed officer visited Midland
Christian School and interviewed Plaintiff Lee. Defendant Fonseca’s body camera recorded this
interview. Despite video evidence to the contrary, Defendant Fonseca—according to Defendant
Alonzo’s warrant affidavits—would later report that “Lee stated that [the administration’s]
17
investigation found the baseball bat did in fact touch [the freshman’s] anus but did not go inside.”
54. But not only did the school’s investigation make no such finding, Plaintiff Lee
made no such statement. Indeed, Plaintiff Lee never used the word “anus” in describing what he
believed occurred—though he quoted Matthew Friez’s use of this word. Nor did he suggest that
contact with the student’s anus—by any name—had occurred. Instead, Plaintiff Lee stated that a
bat was “pushed around [the student’s] bottom.” Significantly, Plaintiff Lee informed Defendant
Fonseca that, after interviewing those involved with the incident, the administration found no
evidence that the bat penetrated anyone’s anus.
55. On that same day, Defendant Fonseca spoke with the freshman’s mother who was
aware of the incident but was surprised when Defendant Fonseca told her Matthew Friez’s account
of it. The freshman’s mother was also a teacher (with the same reporting obligations as the Five),
and she explained that she learned about the incident shortly after it happened. She told Defendant
Fonseca that her son’s behavior did not change after the incident and that she did not believe a bat
penetrated her son’s anus. Defendant Fonseca also admitted to the freshman’s mother that no one
told the principal (Plaintiff Ellis) about any alleged penetration.
56. Following initial interviews by Defendant Fonseca, Defendants took no
investigative action regarding the incident for two weeks. Then, on Friday, February 11, law
enforcement finally spoke directly with the alleged freshman victim. On that same day, the
freshman underwent a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) exam. The exam indicated there
was no injury and that the examiners observed no trauma.
57. Also on the same day, Defendants Alonzo and Sharp arrested the sophomore player
who had admitted to poking the freshman. They made the arrest at Midland Christian School. At
the time of the sophomore’s arrest, Defendant Alonzo ordered Plaintiff Ellis to not contact the
18
boy’s parents about the arrest. Defendant Alonzo remarked to Defendant Sharp that if anyone
called the sophomore’s parents, they too would be arrested—adding “I don’t give a fuck.”
58. Defendants Alonzo and Sharp initially insisted upon perp walking the boy through
the front doors of the school where his arrest would be more visible—despite several school
officials requesting that he be escorted through the back doors. Only when Defendants Alonzo
and Sharp received a phone call from a sergeant making the same request on behalf of the school
did Defendants Alonzo and Sharp reluctantly acquiesce.
59. Nonetheless, Defendant Alonzo remarked during this arrest that “it’s good to know
where to park.” In making this comment, Defendant Alonzo was discussing with Defendant Sharp
their premeditated plan to park at the front of the school again during the future arrests of Plaintiffs
so that their arrests could be as visible and as humiliating as possible.
60. Before leaving the school, Defendant Alonzo asked Plaintiff Ellis for the
documentation of the administration’s investigation into the alleged incident. Plaintiff Ellis
informed Defendant Alonzo that Plaintiff Lee was in possession of those documents and that
Plaintiff Lee was not on campus. Defendant Alonzo ordered Plaintiff Ellis to instruct Plaintiff Lee
to produce the documentation to her by noon the following Monday.
61. On Monday, February 14, Plaintiff Lee contacted Defendant Alonzo. During that
call, Plaintiff Lee expressed his desire and willingness to comply with Defendant Alonzo’s
investigation but requested that she obtain a warrant to ensure that the school followed FERPA—
a federal law protecting private information about students. Plaintiff Lee made this request after
being instructed to do so by the School Board President Jason Stockstill. Defendant Alonzo
responded angrily and stated, “[w]e are going to get a warrant and get everyone’s computer!”
19
 Defendants Search the School.
62. That afternoon, Defendants Alonzo and Sharp returned to the school with not only
a search warrant, but also several police vehicles and a crime scene investigation van. As in the
case of the criminal complaints and arrest warrants that would come later, the affidavit supporting
this search warrant contained material misrepresentations and omissions.
63. Relying upon a falsely obtained warrant, Defendants Alonzo and Sharp swarmed
the school’s front office with several armed police officers who proceeded to search Plaintiffs’
offices and computers. The officers also took photographs of all the offices within the main office,
including photographs of several staff members who were entirely unrelated to the investigation.
64. Defendant Alonzo then conducted recorded voluntary interviews of Plaintiffs
McClendon, Ellis, Counts, and Lee. The statements in those interviews mirrored Plaintiffs’ belief
that, prior to Friday, January 28, there was no evidence that a bat had contacted or penetrated a
student’s anus or that any form of a sexual assault had occurred. Plaintiff Russell was not present
on campus to be interviewed. However, he contacted Defendant Alonzo, as instructed, to schedule
his voluntary interview for a later date.
 Through Lies and Omissions, Defendants Obtain Warrants and Falsely Arrest the
Midland Christian Five in a Manner Deliberately Calculated for Maximum
Humiliation.
65. Two days later, on Wednesday, February 16, Defendant Alonzo, supported by
Defendants Sharp and Fonseca, signed arrest warrant affidavits that led to the malicious
prosecution and false arrests of Plaintiffs for felony failure to report child abuse with the intent to
conceal. Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca executed the arrest warrants at Midland
Christian School and purposefully walked the Midland Christian Five through the front doors in
handcuffs in front of their students and the media to create a public spectacle and lasting
20
humiliation. The Five requested the opportunity to turn themselves in at the police station but
Defendants denied their request. And there is no indication that Defendants ever considered
summonses. Instead, it was clear that Defendants’ goal was to publicly humiliate the Midland
Christian Five and to create the enduring stigma that the Five would inevitably experience due to
their public arrests.
66. Significantly, Defendants perp walked the handcuffed Midland Christian Five right
past the media that was present—apparently in accordance with Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and
City of Midland’s premeditated plan. The arrests received worldwide media attention ranging
from the local news to coverage by the British Broadcasting Corporation (“BBC”) and Newsweek.
Social media outlets such as Reddit and Tik Tok also circulated news of the Five’s arrests.
67. Following their arrests, the Midland Christian Five remained in police custody for
several hours before being released on bonds that evening. Three months later, a grand jury no-
billed the charges.
 Defendants Swear to Unconstitutional MC 1 Warrant Affidavits.
68. Defendant Alonzo wrote and swore to false allegations, in nearly identical (and
unconstitutional) form arrest warrant affidavits, which resulted in the malicious prosecution and
false arrests of the Midland Christian Five. Defendants Sharp and Fonseca assisted in the
preparation of those warrant affidavits and knowingly provided false information that Defendant
Alonzo included therein. The arrest warrant affidavits contained deliberate and reckless
falsehoods, misstatements, and omissions that were material and necessary to a finding of probable
cause.
69. Defendant Alonzo’s affidavits created the overall false impression that on or about
Thursday, January 20, 2022—two days after the locker room incident occurred—the Midland
21
Christian Five were aware that a student had been sexually assaulted.9 Specifically, Defendant
Alonzo stated—ignoring directly controverting evidence—that the Five “knew of [an] incident on
January 20, 2022, that one of the baseball players had a baseball bat shoved into his anus.”
70. Defendant Alonzo further created the patently false impression that a credible and
knowledgeable complainant reported the alleged penetration (instead the report was hearsay upon
hearsay), and that the allegation was uncontroverted (in fact, it was not only controverted, but
contrary to the accounts of everyone involved).
71. Egregiously, to obtain felony warrants, Defendant Alonzo—with the support,
assistance, and approval of Defendants Sharp (her direct supervisor) and Fonseca—made the false
allegation of concealment. Defendant Alonzo falsely stated that Plaintiff Lee was unwilling to
provide documentation of the school’s internal investigation—omitting that he was simply trying
to comply with federal privacy law. Defendant Alonzo also falsely insinuated that all of the Five
were intending to conceal the incident of abuse from authorities when there was no evidence that
any of them—particularly Barry Russell who had been out sick—were intending to do so.
72. Defendant Alonzo further materially misstated and omitted the details of how the
incident was first reported to the administration. The report was made through a chain of hearsay:
from an unknown person to a female student to a parent to a teacher and then to Plaintiff Ellis.
Defendant Alonzo further materially misstated and omitted the details of how MPD was notified
of a rumor of alleged penetration of the student’s anus, over a week after the incident had occurred.
9
Significantly, despite the global nature of the overarching allegations in the arrest warrant affidavits,
Defendant Alonzo was aware that Plaintiff Russell was absent from school due to a COVID infection on
Tuesday, January 18—the day the alleged incident occurred. Plaintiff Russell did not return to school until
the following Monday, January 24. So, Plaintiff Russell could not have failed to report abuse on January
20. The arrest warrant affidavits acknowledge that Plaintiff Ellis notified Plaintiff Lee of the rumor on
January 21 and that Plaintiffs McClendon and Counts were notified as well. However, the affidavits are
silent as to when Plaintiff Russell was notified.
22
Defendant Alonzo did not make clear that a participant in the incident did not make the report to
MPD, but instead a perpetually disgruntled parent whose child was neither a victim nor a witness
to the incident reported it based upon unreliable hearsay.
73. Defendant Alonzo also omitted that these disgruntled parents had made this belated
report to MPD just one day after he communicated the unfounded allegations to administrators.
And the affidavits omitted that, by the time the parents reported the rumor to the police, the Five
had already investigated and spoken directly with the students actually involved. From these
interviews, along with other sources of information, administrators concluded that only a single
poke on a student’s fully-clothed buttocks occurred.
74. Defendant Alonzo additionally omitted that the disgruntled parent who reported
that rumor refused to allow any administrator to speak with his son about the new—and incorrect—
version of the rumor. Instead of the delayed report making it clear that a sexual assault occurred,
these facts supported the reasonable position, at that time, that the recently concluded investigation
had correctly assessed the situation. Defendant Alonzo knew the details of this belated report and
referenced them in her investigative report.
75. Defendant Alonzo further materially misstated and omitted the details of the
school’s compliance with her investigation, the seriousness with which Plaintiffs handled the
incident, and Plaintiff Lee’s repeated encouragement to the disgruntled parent to report his belief
of abuse to police. Defendant Alonzo stated in her affidavits that Plaintiff Lee would not provide
documentation of the administration’s investigation and would not answer questions during a
phone call. But Defendant Alonzo omitted that when she asked for any and all records pertaining
to the investigation, Plaintiff Lee informed her that he wanted to comply, but would first need a
search warrant in order to meet his obligations under FERPA.
23
76. Defendant Alonzo also omitted that Plaintiffs Ellis, Counts, McClendon, and
Russell took no part in discussions with Defendant Alonzo about whether the school would
disclose the investigative documents she had demanded. Defendant Alonzo further failed to state
that, once she obtained a search warrant, Plaintiffs disclosed all the records to her without incident
and that each Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff Russell, voluntarily submitted to an interview with her.
Plaintiff Russell was unable to be interviewed because he was not present at the school during
Defendant Alonzo’s visit. He, nonetheless, called Defendant Alonzo to arrange to meet with her
on February 16, 2022.
77. Defendant Alonzo also omitted that Plaintiffs instituted the highest punishment
short of expulsion that the school allows to the alleged perpetrator. And Defendant Alonzo did
not include in her affidavits Plaintiff Lee’s repeated encouragement to the disgruntled parent that
he had “every right to contact the authorities” and that he was “welcome to make a report based
upon [his] son’s perception[.]” Defendant Alonzo was aware of all of these details as they are
referenced in her own investigative report, but she intentionally and maliciously—or at least
recklessly—omitted them in her affidavits.
78. Defendant Alonzo further interchanged, throughout her affidavits, the terms “butt”
and “anus,” recklessly creating the misconception that Plaintiffs believed the bat penetrated the
alleged victim’s anus. That was not the case. Defendant Alonzo knew that the Five did not believe
the bat had contacted the student’s anus, this was documented in their investigative notes, their
voluntary interviews with police, Defendant Alonzo’s investigative report, and contemporaneous
recordings.
79. Finally, Defendant Alonzo materially omitted from her affidavits facts that would
have placed the locker room incident in its proper context. She failed to include that the alleged
24
victim’s behavior did not change following the incident—one fact, among many, that weighed
against a finding that there was reportable abuse under Texas Family Code §§ 261.001 and
261.101. Defendant Alonzo further omitted that the alleged victim and perpetrator remained
friends and in good graces, and that the alleged victim felt safe at school—and, apparently, at
baseball practice—following the incident. Defendant Alonzo also failed to mention that the
alleged victim underwent a SANE exam, and that during that exam, the examiners determined that
he had no injury and that they observed no trauma.
80. Instead, the only mention of a SANE exam in the affidavits indicates that a SANE
exam was not conducted immediately after the incident—recklessly creating the false impression
that no SANE exam was ever conducted. In reality, a SANE exam was conducted five days prior
to the date Defendant Alonzo swore to the affidavits, which was ironically, two weeks after law
enforcement became involved. Defendant Alonzo was fully aware of the facts that she omitted as
she had discovered these facts during MPD’s investigation.
81. A non-exhaustive list of the material falsehoods and omissions from the affidavits
are included herein.
The Arrest Warrant Affidavits The Truth
1. “I was notified in reference to a possible A perpetually disgruntled parent of a student

sexual assault of a child that . . . was who was not present at baseball practice on
reported to have occurred on or about the day of the alleged incident and was,
Thursday, January 20, 2022.” therefore, a non-witness, informed
Defendants of his belief that a bat had
penetrated a baseball player’s anus. The
[Continued from previous page . . . .] alleged incident had occurred on Tuesday,
January 18 and Friez made his report ten
days later—well after Plaintiffs had already
completed an investigation.10
10
“In Franks [v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)], the Supreme Court observed that the warrant requirement
25
2. “It was discovered that on Thursday, Plaintiff Ellis was first notified of an
January 20, 2022, Ellis was notified in incident through a chain of hearsay: a ninth-
reference to a sexual assault that had grade, female student told her parent who
occurred. Ellis stated that she knew . . . told a sixth-grade teacher who told Plaintiff
one of [the] baseball players had a baseball Ellis that there was a rumor. Plaintiff Ellis
bat shoved into his anus.” was told it was an incident involving a bat
during which the boy’s pants were on the
entire time and they were horseplaying.
(Def. Alonzo’s Report). Plaintiff Ellis heard
something about a baseball bat and a rear but
did not know any specifics. (Def. Alonzo’s
2/14/22 Interview of Pl. Ellis). Plaintiff
Ellis did not believe a sexual assault had
occurred.
3. “On January 21, 2022, Ellis notified Lee in Plaintiff Ellis notified Plaintiff Lee that an
reference to the student having a baseball incident was rumored to have occurred
bat shoved up his anus to which he was during which the boy’s pants were on the
aware on that date.” entire time and they were horseplaying.
Plaintiff Ellis did not know any specifics.
4. “At that time Lee directed [McClendon and The school administrators investigated
Counts] to conduct an ‘investigation’ into because they did not have reliable
the incident instead of notifying law information as to what occurred, nor did
enforcement or another state agency . . .” they know which students were involved.
There was absolutely no evidence that the
school administrators conducted an
investigation in bad faith or with the goal of
evading their requirement to report child
abuse. And ultimately, Plaintiffs did not
contact law enforcement because they did
not believe a sexual assault occurred.
5. “On February 14, 2022, I received a call On February 14, 2022, Lee offered his notes
from Lee who stated that he would not of the investigation and stated, “we want to
is meant to allow the magistrate to make an independent evaluation of the matter. It requires affiants to set
forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause, including those that
concern the reliability of the information and the credibility of the source to avoid deliberately or reckless
false statements.” Deshotel v. CardCash Exch., Inc., No. 6:19-373, 2020 WL 2319300, at *8 (W.D. La.
Apr. 2, 2020), adopted by, 2020 WL 2308201 (W.D. La. May 8, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alterations included); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (“[T]he affidavit must recite
. . . some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed was credible or his information reliable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alterations included).
26
provide the documentation and refused to comply and cooperate,” but he first
answer any questions during the call, he requested a search warrant to comply with
requested a search warrant.” FERPA.
6. During a conversation with Officer Fonseca Plaintiff Lee never stated that he believed
on January 28, 2022, “Lee stated that their the baseball bat touched an anus and made
investigation found the baseball bat did in clear the alleged victim had never “outcried”
fact touch [the freshman player’s] anus but or stated this occurred. (Def. Fonseca’s
did not go inside.” Body Camera).
7. OMITTED FACTS Plaintiff Lee’s investigative notes indicated
his belief that a bat was pushed on the
player’s butt or that the player received a
poke on his butt. Matthew Friez’s hearsay
account of the incident was not supported by
the evidence collected. The administrators
spoke with the freshman player at least twice
on January 21 and both times he stated that
his pants were on and that he was just poked
on the butt.
8. “During the course of the investigation, it During the course of the investigation, it was
was found that [Plaintiffs] had knowledge found that Plaintiffs had knowledge of an
of the sexual assault on January 21, incident in which a student was poked on the
2022[.]” butt with a bat, while wearing sliding shorts
and baseball pants. Plaintiffs had no reason
to believe—and did not believe—a sexual
assault had occurred. The freshman player
himself, inter alia, twice stated on January
21 that the bat did not penetrate.
9. OMITTED FACTS Plaintiff Ellis was not told that the baseball
bat penetrated. (And she was told that it had
not penetrated.)
10. “Instead of reporting the incident they have On February 14, 2022, Lee offered his notes
continually attempted to conceal the of investigation and stated that he wanted to
incident o[f] abuse from authorities.” comply, but he first requested a search
warrant out of his concern that he needed to
comply with FERPA.
Plaintiff Lee encouraged Friez to contact

law enforcement if Friez believed a sexual
assault occurred. Plaintiff Lee told Friez on
February 10, 2022, in a meeting that Friez
27
surreptitiously recorded (unbeknownst to

Lee), that Friez was not wrong for talking to
the police and that Friez had every right to
talk to the police. On February 14, 2022,
Plaintiff Lee voluntarily interviewed with
Defendant Alonzo about the investigation.
“Instead of reporting the incident they have Plaintiff Ellis told Defendants Alonzo and
continually attempted to conceal the
Sharp that Plaintiff Lee had the notes of the
incident o[f] abuse from authorities.” investigation and that she herself did not
participate in the investigation. And, on
February 14, 2022, Plaintiff Ellis voluntarily
interviewed with Defendant Alonzo about
the investigation.
[Continued from previous page . . . .] Plaintiff Counts provided notes of his

investigation as requested. And on February
14, 2022, Plaintiff Counts voluntarily
the investigation.
Plaintiff McClendon provided notes of his

investigation as requested. And on February
14, 2022, Plaintiff McClendon voluntarily
the investigation.
Plaintiff Russell was on sick leave with a

severe COVID infection during the time of
the alleged incident and during the time it
was initially reported. Plaintiff Russell was
not requested to provide any notes in
reference to the investigation. Plaintiff
Russell was not present at the school when
Defendant Alonzo conducted voluntary
interviews of the other Plaintiffs. However,
in the days following, Plaintiff Russell
reached out to Defendant Alonzo to
schedule his interview for Wednesday,
February 16, 2022, at 3 p.m. Defendants
arrested Plaintiff Russell on February 16
28
before he had the opportunity to attend his

interview.
Plaintiffs Ellis, Counts, McClendon, and

Russell took no part in discussions with
Defendant Alonzo about whether the private
internal investigation documents would be
disclosed without the service of legal
process.
11. “The [Plaintiffs] conducted their own Plaintiffs conducted a reasonable and
‘investigation’ although they had genuine investigation to determine what
knowledge of the sexual assault.” occurred and never received evidence of a
sexual assault. Defendant Alonzo’s derisive
use of quotation marks in referring to
Plaintiffs’ investigation is indicative of her
contempt for the school and its decision to
make a reasonable inquiry into the rumor
instead of mindlessly reporting a chain of
false hearsay to authorities.
Plaintiff Lee believed that a bat pushed or

poked the freshman’s butt. The freshman
himself repeatedly told administrators the
bat did not penetrate. Plaintiffs never had
knowledge of a sexual assault.
12. “[In notes taken by Plaintiffs McClendon The notes from Plaintiff Counts indicated
and Counts] there was documentation that that the freshman stated the bat prodded him
describes [the freshman’s] anus was but did not penetrate. The sophomore who
touched with the baseball bat.” poked him with the bat stated the same.
The notes from Plaintiff McClendon

indicated that the freshman was poked on the
outside of his clothes with a bat and that the
bat did not go inside his rectum or in any
way penetrate.
There was absolutely no documentation

from either Plaintiff that the freshman’s anus
was touched.
29
13. “None of the students were interviewed by Plaintiffs conducted interviews of several
a forensic interviewer. The victim did not students, including those directly involved,
have a forensic interview, nor did he have a and determined that the incident was a bat
SANE done at that time due to law poking a student’s fully clothed buttocks.
enforcement not being notified of the
incident.”
The disgruntled parent notified law
enforcement of the alleged incident on
January 28, 2022, and yet no immediate
forensic interview or SANE exam of the
“victim” occurred. That interview and exam
did not occur until Friday, February 11—
two weeks after law enforcement itself
became involved.
Nevertheless, a SANE exam was performed

prior to the warrant affidavit, and it
determined that there had been no injury or
trauma—a material fact intentionally
omitted from the affidavit.
14. OMITTED FACTS The freshman’s behavior did not change
following the incident. The freshman and
his alleged assailant remained friends and in
good graces, and the alleged victim felt safe
at school (and, apparently, at baseball
practice) following the incident.
15. “I was also given emails that contained The initial complainant to the police did not
communication between the initial provide the initial report received by
complainant [and Plaintiffs that] made very Plaintiffs. The complainant to the police,
clear that a sexual assault had occurred, and Matthew Friez, was the parent of a student
the school had a duty to report.” who was not present at baseball practice on
the day of the alleged incident and was a
non-witness. Matthew Friez, therefore, had
no direct knowledge of the alleged incident.
The emails did not “ma[k]e very clear that a
sexual assault had occurred[.]” The emails
instead made clear that Matthew Friez had
heard an unsubstantiated, hearsay rumor that
Plaintiffs had already investigated.
30
16. “The complainant told the school By the time the rumor, and a more extreme
administration if they did not report the version at that, reached Friez—well over a
incident, he would have to as a week after the alleged incident occurred—
mandatory/professional reporter. There the school had already spoken with everyone
were multiple emails exchanged. Several who had firsthand knowledge of the
of the administrators refused to report the incident. The administrators spoke with the
incident as shown in emails when freshman repeatedly, and he repeatedly
communicating and responding to the stated that his pants were on and that he was
complainant.” just poked on the butt. The freshman also
repeatedly stated that the bat did not
penetrate. Plaintiff Lee informed Friez in
the emails that the school had found no
evidence of a bat penetrating the child’s anus
and that Friez’s son’s account of the alleged
incident was not accurate. Nonetheless,
Plaintiff Lee encouraged Friez to contact
law enforcement if Friez believed a sexual
assault occurred.
 Defendants Conspire with the MCDAO to Pursue MC 2 Charges in Retaliation for

the MC 1 No-Bills and the Filing of the Instant Civil Rights Lawsuit.
82. On May 11, 2022—the day of the MC 1 no-bills—Midland County District
Attorney Laura Nodolf left a voicemail for Defendant Sharp stating that she was “irritated” with
the MC 1 no-bill and that she knew Defendant Sharp was also “irritated.” DA Nodolf then asked
Defendant Sharp to specifically let her, the DA, know when MC 2 was ready for prosecution.
Plaintiffs notified Defendants of their intention to file the instant civil rights lawsuit against them
on June 9, 2022. Defendant Sharp shortly thereafter submitted MC 2 to the MCDAO on June 29,
2022. Prior to submitting MC 2 to prosecutors for consideration, the MCDAO instructed
Defendants Sharp and Alonzo not to complete their investigation but to instead present their
incomplete case to the grand jury first and follow up after.
83. After the embarrassment of orchestrating such public and high-profile arrests, only
to have the cases result in no-bills, both Defendants and the MCDAO sought a do-over, regardless
31
of whether probable cause existed.
 Defendants’ Investigation Reveals MC 2 Incident Did Not Constitute Reportable

Abuse.
84. Months before the events forming MC 1, November 15, 2021, a Midland Christian
School freshman swung a bat and accidentally hit a sophomore. The MC 2 sophomore was taken
to the ER and found to have suffered a concussion. Later, the MC 2 sophomore experienced
ongoing difficulties with balance, dizziness, and headaches. The MC 2 sophomore’s parents filed
a civil negligence lawsuit in the 385th District Court of Midland County, 11 which is pending.
85. By all witness accounts, the incident was an accident and Defendants’ incomplete
investigation revealed as much. As documented in Defendant Sharp’s report, the MC 2 sophomore
stated that the bat had hit him by accident and that the freshman did not intentionally strike him.
As further documented in Defendant Sharp’s report, the teacher who had taught the class in which
the incident occurred had stated, “I honestly think it was a very tragic accident, I really do.” And
the teacher indicated that other students present at that time also stated it was an accident.
86. Despite this clear evidence, Defendants Sharp and Alonzo, pursued baseless failure
to report charges under the theory that Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts—none of whom were
present when the incident occurred—had a duty to report this accident to law enforcement.12 When
choosing to simply charge people who were suing them, Defendants selectively declined to
prosecute other adults directly involved in the event. The other professionals involved and not
11
Marquez, et al. v. Midland Christian School, No. CV58926 (385th Dist. Ct. Midland Cnty. filed Sept. 23,
2022).
12
“[I]n Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court held that an officer can be held liable for a search authorized
by a warrant when the affidavit presented to the magistrate was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. The Malley wrong is not the presentment of false
evidence, but the obvious failure of accurately presented evidence to support the probable cause required
for the issuance of a warrant.” Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
32
prosecuted included the educator in the classroom at the time of the incident, the school nurse, and
the ER staff who had provided care to the sophomore.
 Defendants Collude with the MCDAO to Taint the Grand Jury and Obtain
Indictments Lacking Probable Cause.
87. The MCDAO presented the MC 2 cases to the grand jury on November 9, 2022.
Defendants Sharp and Alonzo met with Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Lively (“ADA
Lively”) shortly before her and Defendant Sharp’s grand jury presentation. In that meeting, ADA
Lively referred to this litigation as “the federal bullshit case.” The prosecutor then joked that if
she could re-present MC 1 to the grand jury during her MC 2 presentation that would make
Defendants’ “civil suit really fun.” ADA Lively indicated she would be willing to try (again) to
secure an MC 1 indictment during her MC 2 presentation to the grand jury, but she would first
have to call her boss, DA Nodolf, to “make sure she’s okay with indicting those sons of bitches
again.”
88. MC 2 grand jurors considered a presentation by police and prosecutors that
provided an erroneous definition of “an accident”, the only type of conduct that the law specifically
excluded from the reporting requirement. That definition allowed grand jurors to conclude that if
they could point to an apparent cause of the child’s injury, the incident was not an accident and a
reportable event had occurred. The presentation made by ADA Lively and Defendant Sharp
asserted that because there existed a cause for the injury in MC 2—a student swinging a bat in a
classroom—the incident could not be an accident and required a report to law enforcement.
89. The blatantly erroneous definition of “accident” tainted the grand jury proceeding.
Under this definition, a grand jury could, and did, indict individuals for failure to report child abuse
when no probable cause existed. Proof of how this definition improperly influenced the grand jury
into indicting in a case without sufficient probable cause is evidenced by the ECDAO’s swift
33
dismissal of the charges.
90. Defendant Sharp and prosecutors maliciously conspired to present the legally
insufficient and retaliatory charges to the grand jury and in doing so, tainted the grand jury process
to ensure they obtained indictments of Plaintiffs Lee Ellis, and Counts. Prior to presenting MC 2
to the grand jury, Defendant Sharp obtained the approval of Chief Herman to pursue these charges.
The Chief also had obtained the approval of City Manager Patrick and Mayor Payton for these
charges.
 The ECDAO is Appointed and the MC 2 Indictments Are Promptly Dismissed.
91. Following the MC 2 indictments, on April 25, 2023, Defendant Alonzo testified
during the related failure to report child abuse trials of private school administrators from the
Trinity School of Midland. 13 Defendants arrested the Trinity School administrators a week after
the MC 1 arrests for identical failure to report with the intention to conceal charges. During the
trial, Defendant Alonzo testified that the MCDAO encouraged her to file charges in MC 1, MC 2,
and the Trinity failure to report cases, without having completed the investigations. After DA
Nodolf and ADA Lively executed affidavits detailing how Defendant Alonzo had lied, the
MCDAO moved for dismissal of the failure to report indictments against the Trinity School
administrators. 14 Then, MCDAO recused itself from the MC 2 prosecutions and a court appointed
the ECDAO as prosecutor on August 3, 2023. Just a few weeks later, September 18, 2023, the
ECDAO moved to dismiss the MC 2 indictments, stating that the evidence did not meet the
13
See, e.g., State v. Chrystal Myers, No. CR58382 (142nd Dist. Ct. Midland Cnty.).
14
Rachel Robinson, Midland mayor, Midland County DA, Trinity defense attorney comment on case
dismissal, News West 9, Apr. 27, 2023, available at
https://www.newswest9.com/article/news/local/midland-mayor-da-trinity-defense-attorney-comment-
case-dismissal/513-78fb99b3-e378-4179-bdf1-cba387d846fe (last visited Dec. 13, 2023).
34
elements of the failure to report offense. A court agreed and dismissed the indictments.
 Defendants City of Midland and Sharp Failed to Supervise and Correct Defendant
Alonzo. Defendant City of Midland Ratified her Improper Conduct and Directly
Participated in Her Constitutional Violations at the Policymaker Level.
92. Defendant City of Midland has maintained a policy, custom, and practice of
substandard ethical supervision and correction of officers in their investigative and testimonial
functions. As part of that, Defendants City of Midland and Sharp did not properly supervise or
correct Defendant Alonzo in conducting reliable and trustworthy investigations and providing
reliable and trustworthy sworn testimony before courts. Defendants City of Midland and Sharp
specifically did not properly supervise or correct Defendant Alonzo in the investigation of the
locker room incident at Midland Christian School which led to Plaintiffs’ arrests. Defendant
Sharp, Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick, and Mayor Payton had approved these arrests before
they occurred. These charges remained pending for nearly three months without correction from
City policymakers. When prosecutors dismissed the MC 1 charges, these policymakers doubled-
down and ratified Defendant Alonzo’s malice by approving the retaliatory MC 2 charges. Due to
Defendant City of Midland’s failure to supervise and correct Defendant Alonzo, police arrested
and charged the Five and then police arrested Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts on additional
charges without cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional rights.
93. The City of Midland, through its policymakers—the Chief of Police, the City
Manager, and the Mayor—approved Defendant Alonzo’s unconstitutional and malicious
prosecution of Plaintiffs before the MC 1 arrests. And these same municipal actors also ratified
the unconstitutional and malicious pursuit of criminal charges against Plaintiffs following their
arrests. The ratification of Defendant Alonzo’s misconduct was evidenced, for instance, by the
policymakers’ approval of the pursuit of the retaliatory and baseless charges against Plaintiffs Lee,
35
Ellis, and Counts in MC 2.
94. Additionally, prior to the MC 1 arrests, Deputy Chief G. McCright reviewed
evidence in the Five’s cases. This evidence indicated that the Five had investigated the incident
prior to the disgruntled parent’s report; that these educators had no cause to believe abuse occurred;
that they had no intent to conceal; and that they instead encouraged the disgruntled parent to report
the incident to law enforcement if he deemed it necessary.15 The Deputy Chief discussed this
evidence with the Chief.
95. Yet, the Chief and Deputy Chief never intervened to stop the malicious pursuit of
the baseless charges or to reprimand Defendant Alonzo during the three months the charges were
pending. To the contrary, the two MPD leaders directly encouraged, condoned, and adopted a
policy promoting the pursuit of these charges and similar charges.
96. Significantly, the Chief further ratified Defendant Alonzo’s misconduct by
approving the pursuit of new, baseless MC 2 charges against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts,
which Defendant Alonzo also purported to investigate. Defendants pursued these charges with the
intention of further humiliating the Plaintiffs. The new failure to report charges related to an
accident between two students that had occurred prior to the incident for which Defendants initially
arrested Plaintiffs.
97. An accident does not constitute reportable abuse, which Defendants knew. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(1)(C). But nonetheless, Defendants Alonzo and Sharp, with the
permission and subsequent ratification by Defendant City of Midland through the Midland Police
Chief, City Manager, and Mayor, pursued these additional false charges, continuing a malicious
15 See Def. Alonzo’s Report at 26 (“It should be noted that on Thursday, February 24, 2022, I was ordered
to turn the emails over to DC Mccright [sic] so they could be released to city legal. At which time I wrote
the word “evidence” in red ink at the bottom of every page. This was done to show that these documents
were evidence in an ongoing investigation and should not be released any further.”).
36
campaign against Plaintiffs and in retaliation for the instant lawsuit.
98. Defendant Sharp is liable because she approved of and helped to facilitate
Defendant Alonzo’s misconduct against Plaintiffs regarding the locker room incident. Defendant
Sharp fully participated in the investigation of the locker room incident at Midland Christian
School. She was therefore aware that Plaintiffs genuinely had no cause to believe that reportable
abuse occurred, and she was aware that Plaintiffs were earnestly cooperating with Defendants’
investigation. And yet, Defendant Sharp gave approval for Defendant Alonzo to pursue felony
failure to report with intent to conceal charges and arrests against Plaintiffs. Defendant Sharp
further assisted Defendant Alonzo in preparing the arrest warrant affidavits, and she provided
information that was included in those affidavits. And Defendant Sharp spearheaded the filing of
the new, false retaliatory charges in MC 2.
 Defendant Fonseca is Liable for His Actions.
99. Defendant Fonseca knew that Plaintiffs genuinely had no cause to believe that
reportable abuse had occurred. For example, Defendant Fonseca’s notes, dated January 28, 2022,
stated that Defendant Ellis had been told the baseball bat did not penetrate an anus.
100. On January 28, 2022, Defendant Fonseca witnessed the shock of the victim’s own
mother’s when Defendant Fonseca informed her of the new, more extreme rumor that the baseball
bat had penetrated her son’s rectum. Defendant Fonseca was also close to the investigation and
was aware that the alleged victim’s baseball pants and sliding shorts were on during the incident
and that the alleged victim’s behavior did not change following the incident.
101. Yet, Defendant Fonseca assisted Defendant Alonzo in crafting materially false and
misleading arrest warrant affidavits and in falsely arresting Plaintiffs. Defendant Fonseca provided
information that Defendant Alonzo included in the false and misleading warrant affidavits.
37
CAUSES OF ACTION
102. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs by reference herein.
103. Plaintiffs had the right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to be secure in their persons, homes, and property against unreasonable seizure and
to not have a warrant issued for their arrests without probable cause. The Fourteenth Amendment
protects these rights against deprivation by state actors. The Fourteenth Amendment also protects
against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
104. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the parties injured in an action for redress.
105. Each Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
106. Each Defendant, jointly, severally, or both, deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under
the Fourth Amendment as incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Each Defendant also jointly, severally, or both, deprived Plaintiffs of due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
107. The acts and omissions of each Defendant were a proximate cause and cause-in-
fact of Plaintiffs’ damages.
Count 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 1 False Arrest in Violation of Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments
108. Each of the paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated as if restated fully herein.
109. As described above, Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca, while acting under
the color of law and within the scope of their employment, deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
38
110. On February 16, 2022, while acting under color of Texas law, Defendant Alonzo
deprived Plaintiffs or caused them to be deprived of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by knowingly or recklessly preparing and swearing to arrest warrant affidavits that
contained numerous, materially false and misleading statements and omissions.
111. Defendant Alonzo presented the arrest warrant affidavits to a Justice of the Peace
for Precinct 2.
112. Defendant Alonzo swore under oath to the truthfulness of the contents of those
affidavits.
113. In the absence of the materially false and misleading statements and omissions
contained therein, the arrest warrants were not supported by probable cause. That is, the Justice
of the Peace should not and would not have signed the arrest warrants but for Defendant Alonzo’s
multiple misrepresentations and omissions.
114. Defendant Alonzo, together with Defendants Sharp and Fonseca, all acting under
color of law, executed the arrest warrants at Midland Christian School in front of Plaintiffs’
students, colleagues, parents of students, and the news media present in accordance with
Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and City of Midland’s premeditated plan.
115. Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by arresting Plaintiffs without probable cause as the facts within their knowledge
were not reasonably sufficient to support the belief that Plaintiffs had committed an offense. No
reasonable officer would have concluded that the facts supported Plaintiffs’ arrests.
116. The conduct of all individually named Defendants was motivated by malice and/or
involved reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants engaged
in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and
39
reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
117. At the time of Defendants’ actions described herein, no reasonable officer with the
same information could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of clearly established
law. Therefore, the individually named Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Count 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 1 Initiation of Criminal Charges Without

Probable Cause and for an Improper Purpose in Violation of Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments
119. As described above, Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca, while acting under
the color of law and within the scope of their employment deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
120. On February 16, 2022, while acting under color of Texas law, Defendant Alonzo
deprived Plaintiffs or caused them to be deprived of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by knowingly and recklessly initiating a criminal proceeding against Plaintiffs
without probable cause.
121. Defendant Alonzo pursued felony failure to report with the intent to conceal
charges against Plaintiffs for an improper purpose and specifically out of her resentment of
Plaintiffs’ assertions of their constitutional rights and compliance with their professional duties
and federal law.
122. The outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated by Defendant Alonzo was
favorable to Plaintiffs as a grand jury no-billed each of their cases.
123. Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by pursuing felony criminal charges against Plaintiffs without probable cause as the
facts within their knowledge were not reasonably sufficient to support the belief that Plaintiffs had
40
committed an offense. No reasonable officer would have concluded that the facts supported
charges against Plaintiffs for failure to report with the intent to conceal.
124. The conduct of all individually named Defendants was motivated by malice and/or
involved reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants engaged
in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and
reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
125. At the time of Defendants’ actions described herein, no reasonable officer with the
same information could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of clearly established
law. Therefore, the individually named Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Count 3 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 1 Supervisory Liability
127. As described above, Defendant Sharp, while acting under the color of law and
within the scope of her employment, deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
128. Defendant Sharp facilitated, approved, condoned, consciously turned a blind eye,
or some combination of the foregoing to Defendant Alonzo’s malicious pursuit of criminal charges
and the false arrests of Plaintiffs.
129. Defendant Sharp was aware that no probable cause existed to support felony
criminal charges for failure to report with the intent to conceal. And yet, Defendant Sharp assisted
Defendant Alonzo in drafting materially false affidavits and obtaining arrest warrants, effectuating
Plaintiffs’ arrests, and otherwise pursuing criminal charges against Plaintiffs. Defendant Sharp
further failed to intervene to stop Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests or to otherwise prevent or halt the
malicious pursuit of charges against them, through the time of the no-bills. Defendant Sharp failed
41
to discipline Defendant Alonzo for her misconduct. Instead, Defendant Sharp approved of
Defendant Alonzo’s actions as was evidenced, inter alia, by Defendant Alonzo’s comfort in
pursuing baseless charges alongside Defendant Sharp; their joint plan to conduct Plaintiffs’ false
arrests publicly in front of the news media; and the ease with which Defendant Alonzo fearlessly
stated to her supervisor, Defendant Sharp, that she would (unlawfully) arrest any administrator
who informed the sophomore’s parent that Defendants were arresting him. Defendant Alonzo
further stated to Defendant Sharp that she would do so because she did not “give a fuck.”
130. Defendant Sharp caused the violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
by participating in and condoning the pursuit of felony criminal charges against Plaintiffs without
probable cause because the facts within her knowledge were not reasonably sufficient to support
the belief that Plaintiffs had committed an offense. Defendant Sharp further caused the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations by failing to adequately supervise Defendant Alonzo and failing
to intervene against the malicious pursuit of charges through the swearing of false warrant
affidavits. No reasonable officer would have concluded that the facts supported felony charges
against Plaintiffs for failure to report with the intent to conceal.
131. Defendant Sharp’s conduct was motivated by malice and/or involved reckless and
callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendant Sharp engaged in this conduct
intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard
for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
132. At the time of Defendant Sharp’s actions described herein, no reasonable officer
with the same information could have believed that their actions were lawful in light of clearly
established law. Therefore, Defendant Sharp is not entitled to qualified immunity.
42
Count 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 1 Municipal Liability — Failure to Supervise

and Correct (The Instant Course of Events) & Final Policymaker
Decision
134. Municipalities may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional
deprivations committed pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality.
Occasionally, a single incident of failing to supervise can demonstrate a policy that was
implemented with deliberate indifference to the known constitutional violations that would result.
Deliberate indifference in this context is shown where it should have been apparent to the
municipality’s policymakers that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence
of a particular policy. Additionally, the decision of a person with final policymaking authority can
constitute a custom that represents municipal policy.
135. As described above, Defendant City of Midland, at all times relevant to this
complaint has maintained policies, customs, or practices that caused and were the moving force
behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
136. The acts and omissions of each individually named Defendant were caused by said
policies, customs, or practices.
137. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick,
and Mayor Payton were deliberately indifferent to said policies, customs, or practices.
138. Said policies, customs, and practices included a failure to adequately supervise and
correct Defendant Alonzo in conducting a reliable and trustworthy investigation of the Midland
Christian Five and in providing reliable and trustworthy testimony before the judicial officer who
signed the warrants for Plaintiffs’ arrests. Said policies, customs, and practices also included the
false pursuit of criminal charges without probable cause and for an improper purpose against
43
Plaintiffs. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick, and
Mayor Payton not only authorized the false and malicious arrests of Plaintiffs, but they also
approved the public nature of those arrests before the news media. Defendant Alonzo showed no
restraint in her malicious, public, and humiliating pursuit of false charges against Plaintiffs that
would have indicated a fear of intervention or discipline from Defendant City of Midland’s
policymakers. Indeed, Defendant Alonzo’s actions were pre-authorized by Defendant City of
Midland’s policymakers.
139. Defendant City of Midland was aware and thereby on notice that Defendant Alonzo
was maliciously weaponizing and misapplying the failure to report law against Plaintiffs.
Defendant City of Midland was further aware and thereby on notice that Plaintiffs had no
reasonable cause to believe abuse occurred and had not intended to conceal anything. Therefore,
Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers were aware that Defendant Alonzo was falsely,
maliciously, and improperly applying this law against Plaintiffs.
140. Prior to the arrests of Plaintiffs, and shortly thereafter, Defendant City of Midland’s
policymakers were aware that Defendant Alonzo provided sworn, false allegations in the arrest
warrant affidavits that omitted material information. Yet, not only did Defendant City of
Midland’s policymakers Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick, and Mayor Payton permit
Plaintiffs’ public arrests, but they also failed to intervene at any point to stop the pursuit of the
false charges against Plaintiffs or to discipline Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, or Fonseca.
141. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers were aware and on notice that
Defendants Sharp, Alonzo, and Fonseca had conducted an unconstitutional, unprofessional, and
unreliable investigation in their pursuit of charges against Plaintiffs. Defendant City of Midland
was, at a minimum, deliberately indifferent to the known or obvious fact that constitutional
44
violations would result and continue to result from this misconduct.
142. Defendant City of Midland caused the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations by approving of, participating in, and being, at a minimum, deliberately indifferent to
Defendant Alonzo’s, and the other defendants’, repeated, blatant, and public misconduct against
the Midland Christian Five. Defendant City of Midland’s conduct was motivated by malice and/or
involved reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendant City of
Midland engaged in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with deliberate
indifference to, and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Count 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 1 Municipal Liability — Ratification
deprivations committed pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality. A policy,
custom, or practice can be evidenced by a policymaker’s ratification of a subordinate’s unlawful
actions. Ratification occurs where a policymaker knowingly approves a subordinate’s actions and
the improper basis for those actions.
145. As described above, Defendant City of Midland at all times relevant to this
147. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers were deliberately indifferent to—or,
alternatively, intentionally adopted—said policies, customs, or practices.
148. Said policies, customs, and practices included a ratification of Defendant Alonzo’s
45
knowing and reckless preparation of, and swearing to, arrest warrant affidavits that contained
numerous false and misleading statements and omissions. The policies, customs, and practices
also included a ratification of Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca’s arrests of Plaintiffs
without probable cause, as the facts within their knowledge were not reasonably sufficient to
support the belief that Plaintiffs had committed an offense. The policies, customs, and practices
further included ratification of Defendant Alonzo’s pursuit of felony failure to report with the
intent to conceal charges against Plaintiffs for an improper purpose, and specifically, out of her
resentment of Plaintiffs’ assertions of their constitutional rights and compliance with their
professional duties and federal law.
149. Defendant City of Midland’s ratification of Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and
Fonseca’s misconduct and its improper purpose was evidenced, inter alia, by Deputy Chief’s
review of evidence indicating innocence but still failing to intervene to halt the pursuit of the false
charges. Instead, Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers continued to authorize and encourage
the charges. Ratification was further demonstrated by Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick, and
Mayor Payton’s approval of new, baseless, failure to report charges against three of the Midland
Christian Five—charges intended to continue the improper purpose of the initial arrests and
charges pursued solely in retaliation for the instant lawsuit.
violations by being deliberately indifferent to or alternatively, intentionally approving of,
Defendant Alonzo’s, and the other defendants’, repeated, blatant, and public misconduct against
the Midland Christian Five and by ratifying their conduct. Defendant City of Midland’s conduct
was motivated by malice and/or involved reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. Defendant City of Midland engaged in this conduct intentionally, willfully,
46
and wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
Count 6 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 2 False Arrest in Violation of Fourth and

152. As described above, Defendants Sharp and Alonzo, while acting under the color of
law and within the scope of their employment, deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
153. On November 9, 2022, while acting under color of Texas law, Defendant Sharp
deprived Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts or caused them to be deprived of their rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by knowingly or recklessly preparing and swearing to a grand
jury presentation that contained facts which were wholly insufficient to establish probable cause.
Defendant Sharp also provided the grand jury with a critically flawed definition of an “accident.”
154. In the absence of the materially false and misleading definition of the term
“accident” contained in the grand jury presentation, the MC 2 indictments would not have been
obtained. In any event, the MC 2 indictments were not supported by probable cause.
155. Defendant Sharp, together with Defendant Alonso, both acting under color of law,
conspired with the MCDAO to present a flawed presentation lacking probable cause to the MC 2
grand jury in order to effectuate the second arrests of Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts.
156. Defendants Sharp and Alonzo violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by
arresting Plaintiffs without probable cause as the facts within their knowledge were not reasonably
sufficient to support the belief that Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts had committed an offense. No
reasonable officer would have concluded that the facts supported these Plaintiffs’ arrests.
157. The conduct of Defendants Sharp and Alonzo was motivated by malice and/or
47
involved reckless and callous indifference to Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts’s constitutional
rights. Defendants Sharp and Alonzo engaged in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and
wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for these Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
158. At the time of Defendants Sharp and Alonzo’s actions described herein, no
reasonable officer with the same information could have believed that their actions were lawful in
light of clearly established law. Therefore, Defendants Sharp and Alonzo are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Count 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 2 Initiation of Criminal Charges Without

Probable Cause and for an Improper Purpose in Violation of Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments
law and within the scope of their employment deprived Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts of their
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by knowingly or recklessly initiating a criminal proceeding
against these Plaintiffs without probable cause.
162. Defendants Sharp and Alonzo pursued the MC 2 felony failure to report with the
intent to conceal charges against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts for an improper purpose and
specifically out of their resentment of Plaintiffs’ assertions of their constitutional rights,
compliance with their professional duties and federal law, and their filing of the instant civil rights
lawsuit.
48
163. The outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated by Defendants Sharp and Alonzo
was favorable to Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts as an independent district attorney’s office
successfully moved to dismiss the charges because the facts clearly did not meet the elements of
the failure to report offense.
164. Defendants Sharp and Alonzo violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by
pursuing felony MC 2 criminal charges against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts without probable
cause as the facts within their knowledge were not reasonably sufficient to support the belief that
these Plaintiffs had committed an offense. No reasonable officer would have concluded that the
facts supported charges against these Plaintiffs for failure to report with the intent to conceal.
involved reckless and callous indifference to these Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants
Sharp and Alonzo engaged in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with
deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
reasonable officer with the same information could have believed that their actions were lawful in
light of clearly established law. Therefore, Defendants Sharp and Alonzo are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Count 8 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 2 Retaliation Through the Filing of Criminal

Charges Without Probable Cause in Violation of First, Fourth, and
law and within the scope of their employment deprived Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts of their
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
49
First and Fourteenth Amendments by knowingly or recklessly initiating a criminal proceeding
against these Plaintiffs without probable cause and as retribution for these Plaintiffs’ assertions of
their constitutional rights in the instant federal lawsuit.
involved reckless and callous indifference to these Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants
Sharp and Alonzo engaged in this conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with
deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
reasonable officer with the same information could have believed that their actions were lawful
considering clearly established law. Therefore, Defendants Sharp and Alonzo are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Count 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 2 Municipal Liability — Failure to Supervise

and Correct (The Instant Course of Events) & Final Policymaker
Decision
deprivations committed pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality.
Occasionally, a single incident of failing to supervise can demonstrate a policy that was
implemented with deliberate indifference to the known constitutional violations that would result.
Deliberate indifference in this context is shown where it should have been apparent to the
municipality’s policymakers that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence
of a particular policy. Additionally, the decision of a person with final policymaking authority can
50
constitute a custom that represents municipal policy.
174. As described above, Defendant City of Midland at all times relevant to this
175. The acts and omissions of Defendants Sharp and Alonzo were caused by said
176. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick,
and Mayor Payton were deliberately indifferent to said policies, customs, or practices.
177. Said policies, customs, and practices included a failure to adequately supervise and
correct Defendants Sharp and Alonzo in conducting a reliable and trustworthy investigation of
Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts and in providing reliable and trustworthy testimony before the
grand jury who indicted these Plaintiffs. Said policies, customs, and practices also included the
pursuit of the MC 2 criminal charges without probable cause and for an improper purpose against
Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers Chief Herman, City
Manager Patrick, and Mayor Payton authorized the baseless and malicious pursuit of retaliatory
charges against Plaintiffs.
178. Defendant City of Midland was aware and thereby on notice that Defendants Sharp
and Alonzo were maliciously weaponizing and misapplying the failure to report law against
Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts in MC 2. Defendant City of Midland was further aware and
thereby on notice that Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts had no reasonable cause to believe abuse
occurred in MC 2 and had not intended to conceal anything. Therefore, Defendant City of
Midland’s policymakers were aware that Defendants Sharp and Alonzo were falsely, maliciously,
and improperly applying this law against these Plaintiffs.
51
179. Prior to the MC 2 arrests of Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts, Defendant City of
Midland’s policymakers were aware that Defendant Sharp had fabricated and presented a critically
flawed case to the grand jury. Yet, not only did Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers, Chief
Herman, City Manager Patrick, and Mayor Payton permit this second set of baseless charges
against Plaintiffs Lee, Ellis, and Counts, they also failed to intervene at any point to stop the pursuit
of the false charges against these Plaintiffs or to discipline Defendants Sharp or Alonzo.
180. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers, Chief Herman, City Manager Patrick,
and Mayor Payton were aware and on notice that Defendants Sharp and Alonzo had conducted an
unconstitutional, unprofessional, and unreliable investigation in their pursuit of retaliatory charges
against Plaintiffs. Defendant City of Midland was, at a minimum, deliberately indifferent to the
known or obvious fact that constitutional violations would result and continue to result from this
misconduct.
violations by approving of, participating in, and being, at a minimum, deliberately indifferent to
Defendants Sharp and Alonzo’s repeated, blatant, and public misconduct against Plaintiffs Lee,
Ellis, and Counts. This conduct was motivated by malice and/or involved reckless and callous
indifference to these Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendant City of Midland engaged in this
conduct intentionally, willfully, and wantonly, and with deliberate indifference to, and reckless
disregard for these Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Count 10 42 U.S.C. § 1983: MC 2 Municipal Liability — Pattern or Practice
deprivations committed pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of the municipality. Even absent
52
an officially adopted policy, a custom or practice that is so persistent and widespread that it fairly
represents a municipal policy will support liability against the municipality. A pattern of
unconstitutional conduct may be shown on the part of the municipal employees who are not
policymakers.
184. Defendant City of Midland at all times relevant to this complaint has maintained
policies, customs, or practices that caused and were the moving force behind the violation of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
186. Defendant City of Midland’s policymakers were deliberately indifferent as to said
187. Said policies, customs, and practices included a failure to adequately train and
supervise officers in conducting reliable and trustworthy investigations and in providing reliable
and trustworthy testimony before judicial officers. This pattern was specifically evident in three
failure to report charges investigated and pursued by Defendants in the year 2022. These three
cases—MC 1, Trinity, and MC 2—involved identical charges, the same City Defendants, and
private school administrators from the two largest private schools in the City of Midland.
Significantly, each of these three cases demonstrated the City’s policy of substandard supervision
and correction in the investigative and testimonial functions of the police department resulting in
charges being brought without probable cause.
188. Defendant City of Midland was aware and thereby on notice of a repeated pattern
of unconstitutional and unprofessional behavior on the part of Defendants Alonzo and Sharp in
failing to conduct reliable and trustworthy investigations and in failing to provide reliable and
53
trustworthy testimony before judicial officers. This awareness of unconstitutional and
unprofessional behavior was particularly stark with regard to Defendants Alonzo and Sharp’s
pursuit of charges in MC 1, Trinity, and MC 2.
DAMAGES
189. Defendants’ actions, both jointly and severally, deprived Plaintiffs of their
protected rights under the United States Constitution and federal law.
190. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have suffered the
deprivation of liberty, reputational harm, public humiliation, distress, pain, and suffering for which
they are entitled to compensatory damages, including damages for mental and emotional distress.
191. Additionally, Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca acted with malice and with
intentional disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights for which Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive
damages. Such damages would assist in deterring and preventing similar conduct in the future.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
192. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs, including expert fees.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
193. Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on all claims for which the law provides a
right to a jury trial.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
194. Plaintiffs respectfully pray that all Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein,
and that Plaintiffs have judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory,
punitive, and emotional distress damages against all individual Defendants, pre-and post-judgment
interest, attorneys’ fees and costs of court, and all further relief, both legal and equitable, as to
54
which Plaintiffs show themselves justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Rusty Hardin

Rusty Hardin
Attorney-in-Charge
State Bar No. 08972800
Of Counsel:
Jennifer Brevorka
Kendall Valenti Speer
Aisha Dennis
RUSTY HARDIN & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1401 McKinney Street, Suite 2250
Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: (713) 652-9000
Facsimile : (713) 652-9800
Email: rhardin@rustyhardin.com
Email: jbrevorka@rustyhardin.com
Email: kspeer@rustyhardin.com
Email: adennis@rustyhardin.com
and
Jeffrey Parras
LAW OFFICES OF JEFF PARRAS
908 West Wall Street
Midland, Texas 79701
Telephone: (432) 687-1606
Facsimile: (432) 687-1607
Email: jparras@parraslaw.net
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
55
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 19, 2023 a true and correct copy of the above pleading
filed via the CM/ECF system which served the document on all counsel of record.
/s/ Aisha Dennis

Aisha Dennis
56

Lee v. Midland Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint

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Lee v. Midland Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint

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Case 7:22-cv-00185-BL Document 62 Filed 12/19/23 Page 1 of 56

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JARED LEE, DANA ELLIS, §

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

enforcement authorities who—in a remarkable abuse of power—arrested these educators as

facts about the Midland Christian Five’s actions in sworn affidavits.

known all along: no probable cause of a crime existed.

criminal justice system.

for an improper purpose.

bring this lawsuit in the first place.

6. While Defendant City of Midland embraced these unlawful tactics—including

supported and directed these defendants.

sexual assault had occurred.

11. Nonetheless, administrators punished the alleged sophomore perpetrator in

would not be tolerated in the future.

the freshman’s “anus was penetrated far up with a bat.”

occurred—to the police.

14. So began Defendants’ vindictive and malicious campaign to prosecute Plaintiffs

Defendants causing them to be outraged because Plaintiffs dared to investigate an unsubstantiated

saying, “I’m pissed. I’m fucking pissed. I’m so mad.” 5

15. Blinded by this unjustified anger, Defendant Alonzo spearheaded a tunnel-visioned

facts supporting Plaintiffs’ reasonable—and correct—belief that no reportable abuse occurred.

17. In an extreme and unreasonable abuse of power, Defendant Alonzo—supported and

deliberate—or, alternatively, reckless—falsehoods and omissions. Defendant Alonzo deliberately

been simple misdemeanors.

outlets and quickly spread around the world.

involved intentional conduct.

also recommended the MC 2 charges.

led grand jurors astray to the wrong conclusion.

profound impacts upon their careers and educator certifications.

29. The approval of the MC 2 false prosecutions by the City’s policymakers

flagrant abuse of power.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

in 1999. His two daughters attended the school as well.

attended the school.

Christian School in 2013.

35. Plaintiff Gregory McClendon is a resident of Midland County, Texas. He is the

School from pre-kindergarten through high school graduation. Additionally, Plaintiff

for twenty-two years.

37. Defendant City of Midland is a municipal corporation organized under the

and has filed an appearance herein.

been served and has filed an appearance herein.

39. Defendant Rosemary Sharp is employed by the City of Midland as an MPD

has been served and has filed an appearance herein.

been served and has filed an appearance herein.

demoted Plaintiff Counts from his role as assistant principal.

school. The chain of hearsay was as follows:

Chain of Hearsay from Initial Report

Anonymous ninth-grade girl (not on boys' baseball team

Mother of anonymous ninth-grade girl

alleged victim involved had missed school) in the hearsay account.

initial investigation because her son was on the baseball team.

 Student Witnesses Explain What Actually Occurred—Horseplay Involving a Bat.

penetrate the freshman’s anus.

school’s highest punishment short of expulsion.

 A Parent Reports an Inaccurate, Exaggerated Rumor to Police.

 Plaintiffs Attempt to Comply with the Police Investigation.

interview. Despite video evidence to the contrary, Defendant Fonseca—according to Defendant

evidence that the bat penetrated anyone’s anus.

told the principal (Plaintiff Ellis) about any alleged penetration.

56. Following initial interviews by Defendant Fonseca, Defendants took no

was no injury and that the examiners observed no trauma.

did Defendants Alonzo and Sharp reluctantly acquiesce.

so that their arrests could be as visible and as humiliating as possible.