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Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Ethics
Theory and
Contemporary Issues
Ninth Edition
Barbara MacKinnon
University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita
Andrew Fiala
California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy
Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States
Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2018, 2015, 2012 Cengage Learning
Ninth Edition
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright
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Print Number: 01 Print Year: 2016
Contents
Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

History of Ethics Time Line xiii Command Theory 25
Pluralism and the Golden Rule 28
The Problem of Evil and Free
Part One ETHICAL THEORY 1
Will 29
Secular Ethics and Toleration 31
—1— Ethics and Ethical Criticisms of Secularism and Global
Reasoning 1 Ethics 32
Why Study Ethics? 1 READING Euthyphro • Plato 35
What Is Ethics? 2 Letter to a Christian Nation • SAM
HARRIS 38
Ethical and Other Types
Religion and Truth • Mohandas K.
of Evaluation 3 Gandhi 39
Sociobiology and the Naturalistic
Fallacy 5 Review Exercises 42
Ethical Terms 6
Ethics and Reasons 7 —3— Ethical Relativism 44
Intuitionism, Emotivism,
Subjectivism, Objectivism 7 Descriptive versus Normative
Ethical Reasoning and Ethical Relativism 45
Arguments 9 Individual versus Cultural
The Structure of Ethical Reasoning Relativism 46
and Argument 9 Strong and Weak Relativism 47
Evaluating and Making Good Reasons Supporting Ethical
Arguments 10 Relativism 48
Ethical Theory 11 The Diversity of Moral Views 48
Types of Ethical Theory 12 Tolerance and
Can Ethics Be Taught? 13 Open-Mindedness 48
Moral Uncertainty 48
READING Ethical Judgments and Matters of Situational Differences 48
Fact • David Hume 14
Emotivism and Ethics • Are These Reasons
C. L. Stevenson 15 Convincing? 49
Review Exercises 19 The Diversity of Moral Views 49
Tolerance and
Open-Mindedness 50
—2— Religion and Global Moral Uncertainty 50
Ethics 20 Situational Differences 50
Is Relativism
Freedom, Cosmopolitanism, and the Self-Contradictory? 51
European Enlightenment 22 Moral Realism 52
Religion, Civic Life, and Civil Moral Pluralism 53
Disobedience 24
iii ❮❮
iv CONTENTS
READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Relativism and Its Benefits • John Immanuel Kant 114
Lachs 62
Review Exercises 67 Deontology and the Ethics of
Duty 115
Immanuel Kant 117
—4— Egoism, Altruism, and the What Is the Right Motive? 117
Social Contract 68 What Is the Right Thing to Do? 118
Psychological Egoism 71 The Categorical Imperative 119
What Is Psychological Egoism? 71 The First Form 120
Is Psychological Egoism True? 72 The Second Form 121
Ethical Egoism 73 Evaluating Kant’s Moral
Theory 122
What Is Ethical Egoism? 73
Is Ethical Egoism a Good The Nature of Moral
Theory? 73 Obligation 122
The Social Contract 75 The Application of the Categorical
Imperative 122
The Moral Point of View 76 Duty 123
Why Be Moral? 77 Moral Equality and Impartiality 123
READING The Ring of Gyges • Plato 79 Perfect and Imperfect Duties 124
Self Love • Thomas Hobbes 85 Variations on Kant and
The Social Contract and Deontology 125
Altruism • Steven Pinker 88
READING Fundamental Principles of the
Review Exercises 92 Metaphysic of Morals • Immanuel
Kant 126
—5— Utilitarianism Review Exercises 137
and John Stuart Mill 93
Weighing Consequences 95 —7— Natural Law and Human
Historical Background 96 Rights 138
Jeremy Bentham and John Natural Law Theory 140
Stuart Mill 96 Historical Origins 141
The Principle of Utility 97 Evaluating Natural Law
Pleasure and Happiness 97 Theory 143
Calculating the Greatest Amount of Natural Rights 145
Happiness 98 Evaluating Natural Rights
Quantity versus Quality Theory 146
of Pleasure 100 Is There a Human Nature? 147
Evaluating Utilitarianism 101 READING On Natural Law • Thomas
Application of the Principle 101 Aquinas 149
Utilitarianism and Personal Second Treatise of Civil
Integrity 101 Government • John Locke 151
Ends and Means 102
Review Exercises 154
The Trolley Problem 102
Act and Rule Utilitarianism 103
“Proof” of the Theory 105 —8— Virtue Ethics 155
READING Utilitarianism • John Stuart Mill 107 Virtues and Everyday Life 156
Review Exercises 112 Aristotle 157
CONTENTS v
Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Nature, Human Nature, and the Euthanasia 213
Human Good 158 Making Moral Judgments About
Cross-Cultural and Contemporary Euthanasia 214
Virtue Ethics 160 The Moral Significance of
Evaluating Virtue Ethics 161 Voluntariness 214
READING The Nicomachean Active versus Passive
Ethics • Aristotle 163 Euthanasia 216
Review Exercises 170 READING The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia •
J. Gay-Williams 221
Active and Passive Euthanasia • James
—9— Feminist Thought and Rachels 224
the Ethics of Care 171 Review Exercises 228
Gender in Moral Reasoning and the Discussion Cases 230
Ethics of Care 174
Is There a Gender Difference in —11— Abortion 231
Morality? 176
The Source of Feminine Stages of Fetal Development 233
Morality 177 Methods of Abortion 235
Evaluating Gender-Specific Abortion and the Law 237
Approaches to Morality 178 Abortion: The Moral Question 240
Feminist Thought 179 Arguments That Do Not Depend
Evaluation of Feminist Thought on the Moral Status of the
and the Ethics of Care 181 Fetus 240
READING Caring • Nel Noddings 184 Utilitarian Reasoning 240
The Need for More Than Some Rights Arguments 241
Justice • Annette Baier 185 Arguments That Depend on
What Is Feminist Ethics? • Hilde the Moral Status of the
Lindemann 192
Fetus 242
Review Exercises 198 Method I 242
Method II 245
Part Two ETHICAL ISSUES 199 READING A Defense of Abortion • Judith Jarvis
Thomson 251
—10— Euthanasia 199 Why Abortion Is Immoral • Don
Marquis 252
Euthanasia for Infants The Value of Choice and the Choice
and the Disabled 201 to Value: Expanding the Discussion
Criteria for Death 203 About Fetal Life within Prochoice
Types of Euthanasia 206 Advocacy • Bertha Alvarez
Manninen 261
Active and Passive
Euthanasia 206 Review Exercises 275
Voluntary, Nonvoluntary, and Discussion Cases 276
Involuntary Euthanasia 207
Advance Directives 208
Physician-Assisted Suicide 209 —12— Sexual Morality 278
Pain Medication and Palliative
Sedation 211 Current Issues 280
Ordinary and Extraordinary Conceptual Problems: What Is and
Measures 212 Is Not Sexual 285
vi CONTENTS
Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

Sexual Morality and Ethical
Theories 287 Economic Inequality 346
Consequentialist or Utilitarian Poverty, Education, and Health
Considerations 287 Care 349
Non-consequentialist Conceptions of Social Justice 350
or Deontological Process Distributive Justice 352
Considerations 288 End-State Distributive
Natural Law Considerations 289 Justice 353
Same-Sex Marriage 291 Equal Opportunity 354
READING U.S. Supreme Court Decision June 26, Political and Economic
2015 • Obergefell v. Hodges 296 Theories 356
Law, Morality, and “Sexual Libertarianism 356
Orientation” • John Finnis 298 Capitalism 357
“It’s Not Natural” • John Corvino 306 Socialism 357
Review Exercises 307 Modern Liberalism 359
Discussion Cases 308 John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 360
Communitarianism 363
READING Justice as Fairness • John Rawls 367
Distributive Justice • Robert
—13— Equality and Nozick 368
Discrimination 309 Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal • Ayn
Rand 369
Discrimination 310
Evangelii Gaudium • Pope
Racial Discrimination 311 Francis 370
The Principle of Equality 316 Review Exercises 373
Justice 316 Discussion Cases 374
Social Benefits and Harms 316
Proof and Reality of
Difference 316 —15— Punishment
Relevant Differences 317 and the Death Penalty 375
Challenges to the Principle 318
The Nature of Legal
Current Issues and the Law 320 Punishment 377
Profiling 322 The Deterrence Argument 378
Hate Crimes 324 The Retributivist Argument 379
Affirmative Action and Preferential Punishment and
Treatment 325 Responsibility 381
Consequentialist Prisons 383
Considerations 326 Race 384
Non-consequentialist Restoration and Rehabilitation 385
Considerations 328
The Death Penalty 386
READING Five Faces of Oppression • Iris Marion
Legal Issues 386
Young 333
Exonerations 388
Racisms • Kwame Anthony
Racial Bias and Fairness 388
Appiah 334
Costs 389
White Privilege, Black Rights • Naomi
Deterrence Considerations 390
Zack 335
Retributivist Considerations 391
Review Exercises 342 Mercy and Restorative Justice 392
Discussion Cases 343 Humane Executions 394
CONTENTS vii
READING The New Jim Crow • Michelle Approaches to Animal Ethics 468
Alexander 400 Sentience, Equal Consideration,
Are Prisons Obsolete? • Angela Y. and Animal Welfare 469
Davis 401 Animal Rights 472
Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment
(1868) • John Stuart Mill 402 READING All Animals Are Equal • Peter
A Theory of Just Execution • Lloyd Singer 477
Steffen 406 The Case for Animal Rights • Tom
Regan 486
Review Exercises 415 Speciesism and the Idea of
Discussion Cases 416 Equality • Bonnie Steinbock 487
—16— Environmental Ethics 417 Discussion Cases 489
The Environment and Its

Value 419 —18— Biotechnology and
Anthropocentrism 420 Bioengineering 490
Cost–Benefit Analysis 421 Current Issues 492
Environmental Justice 422
Athletic and Cognitive
Ecocentrism 423 Enhancement 492
Deep Ecology 425 Stem Cell Research 493
Ecofeminism 426 Cloning 495
Genetic Engineering and Genetic
Current Issues 427
Screening 496
Climate Change 427 Genetically Modified Plants and
Ozone Depletion 431 Animals 499
Waste Disposal and
Pollution 431 Legal and Ethical Issues 500
Wilderness Preservation 433 Athletic and Cognitive
International Environmental Enhancement 501
Conventions 434 Stem Cell Research 502
Global Justice and the Tragedy of the Cloning 503
Commons 435 Genetic Engineering and Genetic
READING People or Penguins: The Case for Screening 506
Optimal Pollution • William F. Genetically Modified Organisms 509
Baxter 442 READING Transhumanist Declaration • Various
Deep Ecology • Bill Devall and George Authors 514
Sessions 443 Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls • Leon R.
Radical American Environmentalism Kass 515
and Wilderness Preservation: A Third In Defense of Posthuman
World Critique • Ramachandra Dignity • Nick Bostrom 525
Guha 449 Review Exercises 526
Review Exercises 455 Discussion Cases 527
Discussion Cases 456
—19— Violence and War 528
—17— Animal Ethics 457 Realism 531
Current Issues 460 Pacifism 533
Moral Vegetarianism 460 Just War Theory 534
Animal Experimentation 463 Jus ad Bellum 534
Endangered Species 466 Jus in Bello 536
viii CONTENTS
Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Terrorism 538 Rights 567
Targeted Killing and Drones 540 Practical Considerations 568
Weapons of Mass Global Inequality 568
Destruction 542 Levels of International Aid 569
War Crimes and Universal Human Causes of Global Poverty 570
Rights 544 Solutions and Progress 573
Torture 546
Globalization and Its Critics 573
READING Peace • Andrew Fitz-Gibbon 548
The Triumph of Just War Theory (and Economic Impacts 574
the Dangers of Success) • Michael Cultural Diversity 575
Walzer 554 READING The Singer Solution to World
Review Exercises 558 Poverty • Peter Singer 580
Living on a Lifeboat • Garrett
Hardin 584
—20— Global Justice and
Globalization 560
Moral Arguments About Global
GLOSSARY 593
Poverty 563
Self-Interest 565 INDEX 603
Preface
This ninth edition of Ethics: Theory and Contem- This edition offers expanded and continued cov-
porary Issues contains a substantial revision of the erage of the following topics: global (non-Western)
text and extensive update of the empirical mate- philosophy and religion, the prisoner’s dilemma
rial contained in the chapters focused on contem- and the tragedy of the commons, social justice and
porary issues. Andrew Fiala joined as coauthor on economic inequality, mass incarceration and decar
decar-
the eighth edition. In the ninth edition, we have ceration, restorative justice, environmental justice,
included new learning apparatus, especially tables biotechnology and bioengineering, gene editing,
that outline possible moral positions with regard vegetarianism and the ethics of hunting, circuses,
to the issues considered. As in past editions, each race and racism, pacifism, gay marriage, global pov-
chapter begins with a detailed, accessible intro- erty, LGBT and transgender issues, Black Lives Mat-
duction that prepares the student to read accom- ter, Syrian refugees, the precautionary principle, and
panying selections from important and influential climate change. This edition includes some famil-
philosophers. The book remains a comprehensive iar readings from previous editions and some new
introduction to ethics in theory and practice. It also additions. In some cases, older readings have been
continues to emphasize pedagogy through clear shortened to make room for new readings and short
summaries, engaging examples, and various study excerpts by a more diverse set of authors, includ-
tools—such as review exercises and discussion ing some emerging voices. New readings include:
cases. Each chapter begins with a list of learning John Lachs on relativism, Hilde Lindemann on femi-
objectives, and the book ends with an extensive nism, a new essay on abortion by Bertha Alvarez
glossary of key terms. Manninen, U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell Deci-
sion, Naomi Zack on Black Lives Matter, Iris Marion
ADDITIONS AND CHANGES Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression,” Pope Francis
Although the basic elements remain the same, this and Ayn Rand on economic issues, Michelle Alex-
new ninth edition includes the following additions ander on the New Jim Crow, Tom Regan on ani-
and changes from the eighth edition. Each chapter mal rights, the Transhumanist declaration, Andrew
in Part I has been revised to focus on readability. All Fitz-Gibbon on peace, and Garret Hardin on global
introductory and empirical material in each chapter poverty.
in Part II has been updated to incorporate the latest
information about contemporary issues and current Key Elements
affairs. These updates include recent statistics, rel- Each chapter of Ethics: Theory and Contempo-
evant cases, and contemporary examples. rary Issues contains an extended summary of key
ix ❮❮
x PREFACE
concepts and issues written in clear, accessible prose. Pedagogical Aids This text is designed as an acces-
These detailed summaries go beyond the short intro- sible, “user-friendly” introduction to ethics. To aid both
ductions found in most ethics anthologies to provide instructor and student, we have provided the following
students with a thorough grounding in the theory pedagogical aids:
and practical application of philosophical ethics.
As previously noted, these discussions have been
❯ a list of learning objectives at the beginning of
each chapter (new to this edition)
thoroughly updated to include detailed information
on current events, statistics, and political and cul-
❯ a real-life event, hypothetical dialogue, or
updated empirical data at the beginning of each
tural developments.
chapter
The theory chapters in Part I present detailed
❯ diagrams, subheadings, and boldface key terms
summaries of the theories and major concepts, posi-
and definitions that provide guideposts for read-
tions, and arguments. The contemporary issues
ers and organize the summary exposition
chapters in Part II include summaries of:
❯ study questions for each reading selection
❯ current social conditions and recent events, with ❯ review exercises at the end of each chapter that
special emphasis on their relevance to students’ can be used for exams and quizzes
lives ❯ a glossary of definitions of key terms (new to
❯ conceptual issues, such as how to define key this edition)
words and phrases (for example, cloning,
cloning ❯ discussion cases that follow each chapter in
terrorism, and distributive justice) Part II and provide opportunities for class or
❯ arguments and suggested ways to organize an group discussion
ethical analysis of each topic ❯ topics and resources for written assignments in
❯ tables outlining possible moral positions, linked the discussion cases
to normative theories and key authors. ❯ tables outlining moral positions (new to this
edition).
Throughout this text, we seek to engage read-
ers by posing challenging ethical questions and then A Digital Solution for Students and
offering a range of possible answers or explanations. Instructors:
The aim is to present more than one side of each issue MindTap for Philosophy for Ethics: Theory and
so that students can decide for themselves what posi- Contemporary Issues is a personalized, online
tion they will take. This also allows instructors more digital learning platform providing students with an
latitude to emphasize specific arguments and con- immersive learning experience that builds critical
cepts and to direct the students’ focus as they see fit. thinking skills. Through a carefully designed chapter-
Where possible throughout the text, the rela- based learning path, MindTap allows students to
tion of ethical theory to the practical issues is indi- easily identify the chapter’s learning objectives;
cated. For example, one pervasive distinction used draw connections and improve writing skills by
throughout the text is between consequentialist and completing essay assignments; read short, manage-
non-consequentialist considerations and arguments. able sections from the e-book; and test their content
The idea is that if students are able to first situate knowledge with critical thinking Aplia™ questions.
or categorize a philosophical reason or argument,
then they will be better able to evaluate it critically ❯ Chapter e-Book: Each chapter within MindTap
in their thinking and writing. Connections to related contains the narrative of the chapter, offering an
concepts and issues in other chapters are also high- easy to navigate online reading experience.
lighted throughout the text to help students note ❯ Chapter Quiz: Each chapter within MindTap
similarities and contrasts among various ethical ends with a summative Chapter Test covering
positions. the chapter’s learning objectives and ensuring
PREFACE xi
students are reading and understanding the ❯ Digital flash cards are premade for each chapter,
material presented. and students can make their own by adding
❯ Chapter Aplia Assignment: Each chapter images, descriptions, and more.
includes an Aplia assignment that provides auto-
MindTap gives students ample opportunities for
matically graded critical thinking assignments
improving comprehension and for self-evaluation to
with detailed, immediate feedback and expla-
prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and
nations on every question. Students can also
students alike a clear way to measure and assess
choose to see another set of related questions if
student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a turn-
they did not earn all available points in their first
key solution or customize by adding YouTube videos,
attempt and want more practice.
RSS feeds, or their own documents directly within
❯ Ethics Simulations: Each chapter offers an
the e-book or within each chapter’s Learning Path.
interactive simulated ethical dilemma, allowing
MindTap goes well beyond an e-book and a home-
students to make decisions and see the implica-
work solution. It is truly a Personal Learning Experi-
tions of their choices.
ence that allows instructors to synchronize the reading
❯ Chapter Essay Question: Every chapter ends
with engaging assignments. To learn more, ask your
with essay prompts that ask students to explore
Cengage Learning sales representative to demo it for
and reflect on concepts from the chapter and
you—or go to www.Cengage.com/MindTap.
build writing and critical thinking faculties.
❯ KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog: The KnowNOW! Instructor’s Resources:
Philosophy Blog connects course concepts with
The Instructor’s Companion Site features an Instruc-
real-world events. Updated twice a week, the
tor’s Manual, PowerPoint Lecture Slides, and a
blog provides a succinct philosophical analysis of
robust Test Bank (Cengage Learning Testing pow-
major news stories, along with multimedia and
ered by Cognero).
discussion-starter questions.
The Instructor’s Manual provides useful sug-
MindTap also includes a variety of other tools that gestions for lectures and classroom activities, based
support philosophy teaching and learning: directly on the content in this book. Answers to
many review exercises or study questions are pro-
❯ The Philosophy Toolbox collects tutorials on vided, as well as questions for further thought.
using MindTap and researching and writing aca- The PowerPoint Lecture Slides offer a chapter-
demic papers, including citation information and by-chapter breakdown Cengage Learning Testing,
tools, that instructors can use to support students powered by Cognero, new to this edition, allows
in the writing process. instructors to author, edit, and manage Test Bank
❯ Questia allows professors and students to search content. Instructors can create multiple test versions
a database of thousands of peer-reviewed jour
jour- and instantly deliver them through their learning
nals, newspapers, magazines, and full-length management system right to the classroom.
books—all assets can be added to any relevant Interested instructors can find and access all this
chapter in MindTap, and students can content by adding the ninth edition of this book to
❯ Kaltura allows instructors to create and insert their bookshelf on Cengage.com.
inline video and audio into the MindTap platform.
❯ ReadSpeaker reads the text out loud to students IN SUMMARY
in a voice they can customize. We have sought to make this ninth edition of Ethics:
Ethics
❯ Note-taking and highlighting are organized in a Theory and Contemporary Issues the most compre-
central location that can be synced with Ever
Ever- hensive ethics text available. It combines theory
Note on any mobile device a student may have and issues, text and readings, as well as up-to-date
access to. empirical information about contemporary moral
xii PREFACE
problems. It is designed to be flexible, user-friendly, of South Carolina; Dusan Galic, College of DuPage;
current, pedagogically helpful, and balanced. Erin Anchustegu, Boise State University; Christina
Tomczak, Cedar Valley College; Susan Brown, Uni-
❯ The flexible structure of the text allows instruc- versity of West Florida; Philip Cronce, Chicago State
tors to emphasize only those theories and applied University; William Rodriguez, Bethune Cookman
ethical topics which best suit their courses. University; Robert Arp, Johnson County Community
❯ The text is user-friendly, while at the same time College; Jason Gooch, Yakima Valley Community
philosophically reliable. It employs pedagogical College; Jason Flato, Georgia Perimeter College; and
aids throughout and at the end of each chapter, Eric Severson, Seattle Pacific University.
and provides extensive examples from current Barbara MacKinnon especially wants to thank
events and trends. The exposition challenges the students in her classes at the University of San
students with stimulating questions and is Francisco. Over the years, they have contributed
interspersed with useful diagrams, charts, and greatly to this text by challenging her to keep up
headings. with the times and to make things more clear and
❯ The text not only provides up-to-date coverage more interesting. She also appreciates the support
of developments in the news and in scientific of her husband and fellow philosopher, Edward
journals but also on ethical issues as they are MacKinnon. She dedicates this book to her two
discussed in contemporary philosophy. wonderful daughters, Jennifer and Kathleen. Andrew
❯ It offers a balanced collection of readings, includ- Fiala is thankful for Barbara’s hard work throughout
ing both the ethical theories and contemporary the previous editions of this book and for the oppor-
sources on the issues. tunity to transform his classroom teaching experi-
❯ Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, ninth ence into a useful text for teaching ethics.
edition, is accompanied by a broad range of We also wish to acknowledge the many profes-
online and textual tools that amplify its teach- sional people from Cengage Learning and its ven-
ability and give instructors specific pedagogical dors who have worked on this edition, including:
tools for different learning styles. Debra Matteson, Product Manager; Adrienne Devlin,
Content Developer; Megan Garvey, Content Devel-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS opment Manager; Lauren MacLachlan, Production
We wish to thank the many people who have made Manager; Margaret Park Bridges, Senior Content
valuable suggestions for improving the ninth edi- Project Manager; Marissa Falco, Art Director; and
tion of the text, including Marie Gaudio-Zaccaria, Kritika Kaushik, Project Manager, at Cenveo Pub-
Georgia Perimeter College; K.C. Warble III, University lisher Services.
HISTORY OF ETHICS TIME LINE xiii
Ancient
500 B.C.E. 400 300 200 100 0 100 C.E. 200
Socrates Jesus
Sappho 469–399 Zeno ? 4 B.C.E.–C.E. 29 Plotinus
637–577 351–270 205–270
Plato Philo Judaeus
Buddha 427–347 20 B.C.E.–C.E. 40
557–477 Aristotle Sextus Empiricus
384–322 60–117
Confucius Marcus Aurelius
552–479 121–180
Medieval
C.E. 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
Augustine Anselm Aquinas
345–400 1033–1109 1224–1274
Boethius
480–524 Abelard Scotus
Mohammed 1079–1142 1265–1308
570–632 Avicebron Ockham
1021–1058 1285–1347
Maimonides
1135–1204
Avicenna Averroes
980–1037 1126–1198
Modern
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Bacon Locke Hume Kierkegaard Moore
1561–1626 1632–1704 1711–1776 1813–1851 1873–1958
Hobbes Leibniz Kant Marx Rawls
1588–1679 1646–1716 1724–1804 1818–1883 1921–2002
Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

1632–1677 1770–1831 1844–1900 1929–
Rousseau
1712–1778 Mill Sartre Singer
1806–1873 1905–1979 b. 1946–
Gandhi Noddings
1869–1948 b. 1929–
Wollstonecraft
1759–1797 DeBeauvoir
1908–1986
Bentham James
1748–1832 1846–1910
Dewey
1859–1952
Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

• Discuss the difference between normative
•
intrinsic values.
Jack Hollingsworth/Photodisc/Getty Images

and descriptive claims. Distinguish consequentialist from
• Define key terms: intuitionism, emotivism,
objectivism, and subjectivism.
nonconsequentialist approaches to
ethics.
• Explain the difference between

metaethics and normative ethics.
• Use the distinctions among motives,
acts, and consequences to analyze
• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

of ethics commit the naturalistic fallacy.
ethical phenomena.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
WHY STUDY ETHICS?

It is clear that we often disagree about questions of value. Should same-sex marriage
be legal? Should women have abortions? Should drugs such as marijuana be legal-
ized? Should we torture terrorists in order to get information from them? Should we
eat animals or use them in medical experiments? These sorts of questions are sure to
expose divergent ideas about what is right or wrong.
Discussions of these sorts of questions often devolve into unreasonable name-
calling, foot-stomping, and other questionable argument styles. The philosophical
study of ethics aims to produce good arguments that provide reasonable support for
our opinions about practical topics. If someone says that abortion should (or should
not) be permitted, he or she needs to explain why this is so. It is not enough to say
that abortion should not be permitted because it is wrong or that women should be
allowed to choose abortion because it is wrong to limit women’s choices. To say
that these things are wrong is merely to reiterate that they should not be permitted.
Such an answer begs the question. Circular, question-begging arguments are falla-
cious. We need further argument and information to know why abortion is wrong
or why limiting free choice is wrong. We need a theory of what is right and wrong,
good or evil, justified, permissible, and unjustifiable, and we need to understand how
our theory applies in concrete cases. The first half of this text will discuss various
2 PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
theories and concepts that can be used to help us basic ethical questions. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
avoid begging the question in debates about ethical world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether
issues. The second half looks in detail at a number there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared
of these issues. by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what
It is appropriate to wonder, at the outset, why we ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed.
need to do this. Why isn’t it sufficient to simply state
your opinion and assert that “x is wrong (or evil, WHAT IS ETHICS?
just, permissible, etc.)”? One answer to this ques- On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu-
tion is that such assertions do nothing to solve the dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques-
deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We tion, “What is ethics?”
know that people disagree about abortion, same- How would you answer? Over the years, there
sex marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we have been significant differences of opinion among
are to make progress toward understanding each our students on this issue. Some have argued that
other, if we are to make progress toward establishing ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private
some consensus about these topics, then we have opinion. Others claim that our values come from
to understand why we think certain things are right family upbringing. Other students think that ethics
and others are wrong. We need to make arguments is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci-
and give reasons in order to work out our own con- ety or particular groups within it, such as medical
clusions about these issues and in order to explain or legal organizations. Some write that many people
our conclusions to others. get their ethical beliefs from their religion.
It is also insufficient to appeal to custom or One general conclusion can be drawn from these
authority in deriving our conclusions about moral students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as
issues. While it may be appropriate for children to the set of values or principles held by individuals
simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours;
strive for more than conformity and obedience to groups—professional organizations and societies,
authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents for example—have shared sets of values. We can
are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. study the various sets of values that people have.
Sometimes the law is wrong—or laws conflict. This could be done historically and sociologically.
And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or Or we could take a psychological interest in deter-
authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on mining how people form their values. But philosoph-
moral issues, we would first have to decide which ical ethics is a critical enterprise that asks whether
authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli- any particular set of values or beliefs is better than
gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set any other. We compare and evaluate sets of values
of laws in which country is to be followed? Even and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We
within the United States, there is currently a conflict ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for
of laws with regard to some of these issues: some preferring one set of ethics over another?” In this
states have legalized medical marijuana or physi- text, we examine ethics from a critical or evaluative
cian assisted suicide, others have not. The world’s standpoint. This examination will help you come to
religions also disagree about a number of issues: a better understanding of your own values and the
for example, the status of women, the permissibil- values of others.
ity of abortion, and the question of whether war Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called
is justifiable. And members of the same religion moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis-
or denomination may disagree among themselves cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to
about these issues. To begin resolving these con- answer—basic questions about key areas or sub-
flicts, we need critical philosophical inquiry into ject matters of human life and about pervasive and
Chapter 1 ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 3
significant aspects of experience. Some philoso- Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions
phers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this about the good life, about what is better and worse,
systematically by interrelating their philosophical about whether there is any objective right and wrong,
views in many areas. According to Alfred North and how we know it if there is.
Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a One objective of ethics is to help us decide what
coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas is good or bad, better or worse. This is generally
in terms of which every element of our experience called normative ethics. Normative ethics defends
can be interpreted.” 1 Some contemporary philoso- a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Norma-
phers have given up on the goal of building a sys- tive ethics can be distinguished from metaethics.
tem of general ideas, arguing instead that we must Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the
work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one partic- nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical
ular issue at a time. For instance, some philosophers terms and judgments. Questions about the relation
might analyze the meaning of the phrase to know, between philosophical ethics and religion—as we
while others might work on the morality of lying. discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoretical
Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in
address these problems, while others are more skep- Chapter 3—are also metaethical. The other chapters
tical because they think that the way we analyze the in Part I are more properly designated as ethical
issues and the conclusions we draw will always be theory. These chapters present concrete normative
influenced by our background, culture, and habitual theories; they make claims about what is good or
ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these evil, just or unjust.
problems are worth wondering about and caring From the mid 1930s until recently, metaeth-
about. ics predominated in English-speaking universities.
We can ask philosophical questions about many In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean-
subjects. In the philosophical study of aesthetics, ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether
philosophers ask basic or foundational questions the death penalty is morally justified, we would
about art and objects of beauty: what kinds of things ask what we meant in calling something “morally
do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a cer- justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical
tain way, for example)? Is what makes something language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to
an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expres- determine what they mean. In doing this, we func-
siveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability tion at a level removed from that implied by our
to reveal truths that cannot be described in other definition. It is for this reason that we call this other
ways? In the philosophy of science, philosophers type of ethics metaethics—
metaethics meta meaning “beyond.”
ask whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi-
of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, cal discussions—for example, the analysis of vari-
and whether the scientific method discloses truth. ous senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be
Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature learned from such discussions.
of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature
of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal respon- ETHICAL AND OTHER TYPES
sibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called OF EVALUATION
epistemology, we try to answer questions about “That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious
what we can know of ourselves and our world, and meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All of these
what it means to know something rather than just to statements express approval of something. They do
believe it. In each area, philosophers ask basic ques- not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they
tions about the particular subject matter. This is also do imply that the speaker thought they were good.
true of moral philosophy. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements
or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what “That is a good knife” is an evaluative or nor-
the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not sim- mative statement. However, it does not mean that
ply describe the object of the judgment—for exam- the knife is morally good. In making ethical judg-
ple, as an action that occurred at a certain time or ments, we use terms such as good, bad, right,
that affected people in a certain way. They go further wrong, obligatory, and permissible. We talk about
and express a positive or negative regard for it. Of what we ought or ought not to do. These are evalu-
course, factual matters are relevant to moral evalua- ative terms. But not all evaluations are moral in
tion. For example, factual judgments about whether nature. We speak of a good knife without attribut-
capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be ing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife,
relevant to our moral judgments about it. So also we are probably referring to its practical usefulness
would we want to know the facts about whether for cutting. Other evaluations refer to other systems
violence can ever bring about peace; this would of values. When people tell us that a law is legiti-
help us judge the morality of war. Because ethical mate or unconstitutional, that is a legal judgment.
judgments often rely on such empirical informa - When we read that two articles of clothing ought not
tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such to be worn together, that is an aesthetic judgment.
as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we When religious leaders tell members of their com-
can distinguish between empirical or descriptive munities what they ought to do, that is a religious
claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative matter. When a community teaches people to bow
judgments, which state whether such facts are good before elders or use eating utensils in a certain way,
or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative that is a matter of custom. These various normative
judgments are also called normative judgments. or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal,
Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their
a value,” negative or positive, on some action or justification.
practice, such as capital punishment. How do other types of normative judgments
differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers
• Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish-
believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts”
ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent.
in particular that they override other “oughts,” such
• Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment
as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose
is justifiable (or unjustifiable).
between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is
We also evaluate people, saying that a person is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally
good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua- right. In this way, morality may also take prece-
tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil
good or right, they are also normative. For example, disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds
the judgment that a person is a hero or a villain is that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons.
based upon a normative theory about good or evil Although moral evaluations differ from other nor-
sorts of people. mative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no
Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in
Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology
relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often against simplistically deriving an ought from an is
form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in Hume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logi-
the United States—results from a variety of political cal, for example, to base our ideas about how we
compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for ought to behave from a factual account of how we
moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that actually do behave. This logical mistake was called
we can “legislate morality,” as the saying goes. Of the naturalistic fallacy by G. E. Moore, an influ-
course, there is still an open debate about whether ential philosopher of the early twentieth century.
the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of Moore maintained that moral terms such as good
issues such as gay marriage or abortion. are names for nonempirical properties that cannot be
There may be moral reasons supporting legal reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed
arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for that to attempt to define good in terms of some mun-
example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between dane or natural thing such as pleasure is to com-
forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg- mit a version of this fallacy. The problem is that we
ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just
between certain actions and certain situations or because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is
beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there
are judged morally by their practical usefulness for is always an open question about whether what is
producing valued ends. For now, however, note that natural is also good.
ethics is not the only area in which we make norma- Now, not everyone agrees that appeals to nature
tive judgments. in ethics are fallacious. There are a variety of natu-
ralistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE NATURALISTIC traditional approach to ethics is called natural law
FALLACY ethics (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 7).
The distinction between descriptive and norma- Natural law ethics focuses on human nature and
tive claims is a central issue for thinking about eth- derives ethical precepts from an account of what
ics. We often confuse these issues in our ordinary is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may
thinking, in part because we think that what we argue, for example, that human body parts have
ordinarily do is what we ought to do. Many people natural functions and that by understanding these
are inclined to say that if something is natural to natural functions, we can figure out certain moral
us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents
argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we might argue that this commits the naturalistic fal-
ought to eat meat. But vegetarians will disagree. lacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be
Indeed, there is no necessary relation between what seen in the structure and function of our body parts.
is ethical and what is natural or customary. It is thus A more recent version of naturalism in ethics
not true that what is natural is always good. But focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci-
people often make the mistake of confusing facts of ence. From this perspective, to understand morality,
nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we we need to understand the basic functions of our
are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, species, including the evolutionary reasons behind
the shift from is to ought. Consider an example used moral behavior. We also need to understand how
by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, our brains function in order to explain how pleasure
who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural— works, why some people are psychopathic, and why
animals do it all the time. But human beings con- we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti-
demn incest. If it is natural, why do we condemn it? vations. One version of this naturalism is known
Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ought as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by
from an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule the biologist E. O. Wilson. 2 “If the brain evolved
Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

and other behaviors to spread themselves. Thus,
when we cooperate within groups that share a
genetic endowment, we help to preserve the group
and help to disseminate our shared genetic char-
acteristics, often in competition with rival genetic
groups.4
In discussing sociobiology and interpreting bio-
logical evidence, we must be careful, however, not
to anthropomorphize.5 When we look at the natu-
ral world, we often interpret it in anthropomorphic
terms, seeing in animals and even in genes them-
selves the motivations and interests that human
beings have. In other words, we must be careful that
our value judgments do not cloud or confuse our
description of the facts.
While the naturalistic approach of sociobiology
Jeannette Katzir Photog/Shutterstock.com
is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because
altruistic behavior is natural and useful in the evo-
lutionary struggle for survival does not mean that
it is good, just, or right. To see this, let us return
to Hume’s example of incest. Incest might be useful
as a method for disseminating our genetic material—
so long as the negative problems associated with
Does animal behavior provide a guide for human inbreeding are minimized. We do inbreed animals in
ethical behavior? this way in order to select for desirable traits. But
it is still appropriate to ask whether incest is mor
mor-
ally permissible for human beings—the question of
by natural selection, even the capacities to select ought might not be settled by what is.
particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs
must have arisen by the same mechanistic process,” ETHICAL TERMS
Wilson explained. 3 The basic idea of sociobiology You might have wondered what the difference is
is that human behaviors result from the pressures between calling something “right” and calling it
of natural selection. Understanding human moral- “good.” Consider the ethical meaning for these
ity involves understanding the adaptive advantage terms. Right and wrong usually apply to actions, as
of certain behaviors, which can be studied by com- in “You did the right thing,” or “That is the wrong
paring human behaviors with the behavior of other thing to do.” These terms prescribe things for us to
social animals—from insects to chimpanzees. do or not to do. On the other hand, when we say
Sociobiology attempts to understand altruism, for that something is morally good, we may not explic-
example, in terms of evolutionary processes. From itly recommend doing it. However, we do recom-
this perspective, altruistic concern develops through mend that it be positively regarded. Thus, we say
natural selection because altruistic animals will things such as “Peace is good, and distress is bad.”
help each other survive. Biologist Richard Dawkins It is also interesting that with “right” and “wrong”
explains a related idea in terms of “the selfish gene.” there seems to be no in-between; it is either one or
the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely
room for degrees, and some things are thought to be true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy,
better or worse than others. or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and preju-
Other ethical terms require careful consideration. dice may stem from such strong feelings. We think
For example, when we say that something “ought” prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judg-
or “ought not” to be done, there is a sense of ing rightly. But emotions can often aid good deci-
urgency and obligation. We can refrain from doing sion making. We may, for example, simply feel the
what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. injustice of a certain situation or the wrongness of
On the other hand, there are certain actions that we someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about
think are permissible but that we are not obligated some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more
to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obliga- carefully examine the ethical issues involved. How-
tion to help someone in trouble, though it is “mor- ever, some explanation of why we hold a certain
ally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even moral position is still required. Simply to say “X
“praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat is just wrong” without explanation, or to merely
more specific ethical terms include just and unjust express strong feelings or convictions about “X,” is
and virtuous and vicious. not sufficient.
To a certain extent, which set of terms we use
depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM,
or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we SUBJECTIVISM, OBJECTIVISM
discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in Philosophers differ on how we know what is
this first part of the text. good. They also differ on the question of whether
moral judgments refer to something objective or
ETHICS AND REASONS whether they are reports of subjective opinions or
When we evaluate something as right or wrong, dispositions.
good or bad, we appeal to certain norms or rea- To say that something is good is often thought
sons. If I say that affirmative action is unjustified, I to be different from saying that something is yel-
should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be low or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical,
acceptable for me to respond that this is merely the known by our senses. However, good or goodness
way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response is held to be a nonempirical property, said by some
to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, to be knowable through intuition. A position known
then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics
whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi-
have experienced the bad results of such programs. cal truths. This view is associated with G. E. Moore,
Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring whom we discussed earlier. 6 Another philoso-
or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is pher, W. D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of
unfair. In either case, I will be expected to push the “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These
matter further and explain why it is unfair or even intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics,
what constitutes fairness and unfairness. which Ross explains using an analogy with mathe-
Reason-giving is essential in philosophical eth- matics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth
ics. However, this does not mean that making ethi- of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit ethical truths:
cal judgments is and must be purely rational. We for example, that we have a duty to keep our prom-
might be tempted to think that good moral judg- ises. As Ross explains,
ments require us to be objective and not let our feel- Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain
ings, or emotions, enter into our decision making. crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that
Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way we can know about the nature of numbers and the
nature of duty . . . we do not read off our knowledge of One worry, however, is that our emotions and
particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel-
good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from ative. Our own emotional responses vary depending
intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7 upon our moods and these responses vary among
A very important question is whether our intu- and between individuals. Emotional responses are
itions point toward some objective moral facts in the relative to culture and even to the subjective dis-
world or whether they are reports of something sub- positions of individuals. Indeed, our own feelings
jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that change over time and are not reliable or sufficient
people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the gauges of what is going on in the external world.
crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are The worry here is that our emotions merely express
shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not internal or subjective responses to things and that
apparently shared by everyone. they do not connect us to an objective and stable
Another view, sometimes called emotivism, source of value.
maintains that when we say something is good, we Other moral theories aim for more objective
are showing our approval of it and recommending it sources for morality. From this standpoint, there
to others rather than describing it. This view is asso- must be objective reasons that ground our subjec-
ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso- tive and emotional responses to things. Instead
phers such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But it of saying that the things we desire are good, an
has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to
such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers desire things that are good—with an emphasis on
Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our
example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher
by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists
are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen- hold that values have an objective reality—that they
timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings are objects available for knowledge—as opposed
are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments
and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, merely express subjective opinion. Plato argues that
ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and
another, experienced by social beings like ourselves. that we can compare our subjective moral opinions
Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl- about morality with this objective standard. Those
edge that is subjective, with moral judgments resting who want to ground morality in God are objectivists,
upon subjective experience. One version of emotiv- as are those who defend some form of natural law
ism makes ethical judgments akin to expressions of ethics, which focuses on essential or objective fea-
approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder tures of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the
is wrong” is to express something like “murder— approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist
yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is in this sense. Although the sociobiologist bases her
good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice— study of morality on objective facts in the world, the
yay!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments
we study in Chapter 18, argues that there is wisdom represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse
in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that puts it,
our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on
insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external
that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as
as cloning. sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something
biology makes us believe in, so that we will further The Structure of Ethical Reasoning
our evolutionary ends.8 and Argument
One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection To be able to reason well in ethics you need to under
under-
of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between stand what constitutes a good argument. We can do
intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental this by looking at an argument’s basic structure.
goods are things that are useful as instruments or This is the structure not only of ethical arguments
tools—we value them as means toward some other about what is good or right but also of arguments
end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in about what is the case or what is true.
themselves or for their own sake. For example, we Suppose you are standing on the shore and a perper-
might say that life is an intrinsic good and funda- son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to
mentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good rescue that person? You may or may not be able to
because it is a means or tool that is used to sup- swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue
port life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is the person. In this case, however, there is no time
merely an instrumental good that is used by evolu- for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly.
tion for other purposes. Morality is, from this perper- On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case,
spective, simply a tool that helps the human species you would have to think through the reasons for
to survive. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard and against trying to rescue the person. You might
Dawkins understands individual human beings conclude that if you could actually rescue the perper-
instrumentally, as carriers of genetic information: son, then you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly might go as follows:
programmed to serve the selfish molecules known
as genes.” 9 This runs counter to our usual moral Every human life is valuable.
view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or inherent value. The idea that some things have should be attempted.
My swimming out to rescue this person has a good
intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety
chance of saving his life.
of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The
Therefore, I ought to do so.
intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objec-
tive fact about that thing, which has no relation to
Or you might conclude that you could not save this
our subjective response to that thing. Claims about
person, and your reasoning might go like this:
intrinsic value show up in arguments about human
rights and about the environment. Do human
beings, ecosystems, or species have intrinsic value, Every human life is valuable.
Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life
or is the value of these things contained within our
should be attempted.
subjective responses and in their instrumental uses?
In this case, there is no chance of saving this life
This question shows us that the metaethical theories because I cannot swim.
are connected to important practical issues. Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although,
if others are around who can help, I might be
ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS obligated to try to get them to help).
It is important to know how to reason well in think-
ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi-
not only in trying to determine what to think about cal argument, although some are longer and more
controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for complex chains than the simple form given here.
something you believe is right and in critically eval- One can recognize the reasons in an argument by
uating positions held by others. their introduction through key words such as since,
because, and given that. The conclusion often con- what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one
tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself?
supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments
sound argument, the premises are true and the con- may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a
clusion follows from them. In the case presented ear
ear- ‘person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam-
lier, then, we want to know whether you can save ple) and “What is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’?”
this person and also whether his life is valuable. We (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some-
also need to know whether the conclusion actually times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue
follows from the premises. In the case of the earlier are a matter of differences not in values but in the
examples, it does. If you say you ought to do what meaning of the terms used.
will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to Ethical arguments often also rely on factual
do it. However, there may be other principles that claims. In our example, we might want to know
would need to be brought into the argument, such whether it was actually true that you could save
as whether and why one is always obligated to save the drowning person. In arguments about the death
someone else’s life when one can. penalty, we may want to know whether such pun-
To know under what conditions a conclusion ishment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need
actually follows from the premises, we would need to know what scientific studies have found and
to analyze arguments in much greater detail than whether the studies themselves were well grounded.
we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to
connection is a logical connection—in other words, seek out a range of reliable sources of information
it must make rational sense. You can improve your and be open-minded. The chapters in Part II of this
ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to book include factual material that is relevant to ethi-
pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu- cal decisions about the topics under consideration.
ment. Only then can you subject them to critical It is important to be clear about the distinction
examination in ways we suggest here. between facts and values when dealing with moral
conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether
Evaluating and Making Good Arguments we disagree about the values involved, about the
Ethical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. concepts and terms we are employing, or about the
Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con- facts connected to the case.
structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu- There are various ways in which reasoning can
ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion go wrong or be fallacious. We began this chapter by
actually follows from the premises, and the prem- considering the fallacy of begging the question
ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on
argument is poorly constructed when it is fallacious the argument’s conclusion to support its premises,
or when the reasons on which it is based are not as in “abortion is wrong because it is immoral.”
true or are uncertain. An ethical argument always Another familiar problem of argumentation is the
involves some claim about values—for example, ad hominem fallacy. In this fallacy, people say
that saving a life is good. These value-based claims something like, “That can’t be right because just
must be established through some theory of values. look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the
Part I of this book examines different theories that opinion rather than the reasons given for it. You can
help establish basic values. find out more about these and other fallacies from
Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking.
factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that You also can improve your understanding of ethi-
relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For cal arguments by making note of a particular type of
example, in a case of lying, we would want to know reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments
from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

pares familiar examples with the issue being disputed. Ethical Theory
If the two cases are similar in relevant ways, then
whatever one concludes about the first familiar case
one should also conclude about the disputed case.
For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (as discussed Ethical Principle
in Chapter 11) once asked whether it would be ethi-
cally acceptable to “unplug” someone who had been
attached to you and who was using your kidneys
to save his life. If you say that you are justified in Ethical Judgment
unplugging, then a pregnant woman is also justified
in doing the same with regard to her fetus. The reader
is prompted to critically examine such an argument
by asking whether or not the two cases were similar We can think of the diagram as a ladder. In prac-
in relevant ways—that is, whether the analogy fits. tice, we can start at the ladder’s top or bottom. At the
Finally, we should note that giving reasons to top, at the level of theory, we can start by clarifying
justify a conclusion is also not the same as giving for ourselves what we think are basic ethical values.
an explanation for why one believes something. We then move downward to the level of principles
A woman might explain that she does not sup- generated from the theory. The next step is to apply
port euthanasia because that was the way she was these principles to concrete cases. We can also start
brought up or that she is opposed to the death pen- at the bottom of the ladder, facing a particular ethical
alty because she cannot stand to see someone die. choice or dilemma. We can work our way back up the
To justify such beliefs, one would need rather to give ladder, thinking through the principles and theories
reasons that show not why one does, in fact, believe that implicitly guide our concrete decisions. Ultimately
something but why one should believe it. Nor are and ideally, we come to a basic justification, or the
rationalizations justifying reasons. They are usually elements of what would be an ethical theory. If we
reasons given after the fact that are not one’s true look at the actual practice of thinking people as they
reasons. Rationalizations are usually excuses, used develop their ethical views over time, the movement
to explain away bad behavior. These false reasons is probably in both directions. We use concrete cases
are given to make us look better to others or our- to reform our basic ethical views, and we use the basic
selves. To argue well about ethical matters, we need ethical views to throw light on concrete cases.
to examine and give reasons that support the con- An example of this movement in both directions
clusions we draw. would be if we start with the belief that pleasure
is the ultimate value and then find that applying
ETHICAL THEORY this value in practice leads us to do things that are
Good reasoning in ethics usually involves either contrary to common moral sense or that are repug-
implicit or explicit reference to an ethical theory. An nant to us and others. We may then be forced to
ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a par par-- look again and possibly alter our views about the
ticular view about what is the nature and basis of moral significance of pleasure. Or we may change
good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms our views about the rightness or wrongness of some
for judging acts to be right or wrong; it provides a particular act or practice on the basis of our theo-
justification for these norms. These norms can then retical reflections. Obviously, this sketch of moral
be used as a guide for action. We can diagram the reasoning is quite simplified. Feminists and others
relationship between ethical theories and moral deci- have criticized this model of ethical reasoning, partly
sion making as follows. because it claims that ethics is governed by general
principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethi- That was good because it helped Jim develop his
cal situations. Does this form of reasoning give due self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim
consideration to the particularities of individual, to believe things about himself that were not true.
concrete cases? Can we really make a general judg- (Consequences)
ment about the value of truthfulness or courage that
will help us know what to do in particular cases in Although we generally think that a person’s motive
which these issues play a role? is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his
or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar
primar-
TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also
In Part I of this book, we consider the following types have good reasons to think that the results of actions
of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, utili-
utili matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg-
tarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue ments on consequences are called consequentialist
ethics,, and feminist ethics. These theories differ in or sometimes teleological moral theories (from the
terms of what they say we should look at in mak- Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those
ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong
example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the regardless of their consequences are called noncon-
right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it sequentialist or deontological theories (from the
must make some moral difference, we think. But sup- Greek root deon, meaning “duty”).
pose that in acting with good motives I violate some- One moral theory we will examine is utilitari-
one’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? anism. It provides us with an example of a conse-
We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether
however, that in violating someone’s rights, I am an action is better than alternatives by its actual or
able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the expected results or consequences; actions are then
violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in judged in terms of the promotion of human hap-
terms of their motive, some in terms of the character piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also
or nature of the act itself, and others in terms of the examine, provides us with an example of a non-
consequences of the actions or practices. consequentialist theory, according to which acts are
We often appeal to one of these types of reason. judged right or wrong independently of their conse-
Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether
can make the following judgments about this action. they conform to requirements of rationality and
Note the different types of reasons given for the human dignity. The other ethical theories that we
judgments. will examine stress human nature as the source of
what is right and wrong. Some elements of these
theories are deontological and some teleological. So,
also, some teleological theories are consequentialist
Motive Act Consequences
in that they advise us to produce some good. But if
the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization,
then such theories differ from consequentialist the-
ories such as utilitarianism. As anyone who has
That was good because you intended to make Jim
tried to put some order to the many ethical theories
happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad
knows, no theory completely and easily fits one clas-
because you meant to deceive him and do him harm.
(Motive) sification, even those given here. Feminist theories
That was good because it is good to make people of care provide yet another way of determining what
happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this
tell a lie. (Act) text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues.
As we do so, we will note how various ethical theo- Most moral philosophers think that a course on
ries analyze the problems from different perspectives ethics is ethically useful. It should help students
and sometimes reach different conclusions about understand the nature of ethical problems and help
what is morally right or wrong, better or worse. them think critically about ethical matters by pro-
viding conceptual tools and skills. It should enable
CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? them to form and critically analyze ethical argu-
It would be interesting to know just why some col- ments. It is up to the individual, however, to use
lege and university programs require their students these skills to reason about ethical matters. A study
to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement of ethics should also lead students to respect oppos-
stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral ing views because it requires them to analyze care-
philosophy can actually make people good? fully the arguments that support views contrary to
When asked whether ethics can be taught, stu- their own. It also provides opportunities to consider
dents have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that
taught, then why are we taking this class?” a stu- they may not have considered.
dent wondered. Another student responded, “Look In this opening chapter, we have learned some-
at the behavior of certain corporate executives who thing about what the philosophical study of ethics
have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They is. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We
surely haven’t learned proper ethical values.” Still have provided a description of ethical reasoning and
others disagreed with both views. Although certain arguments. We have briefly considered the nature of
ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical ethical theories and the role they play in ethical rea-
behavior cannot be taught because it is a matter of soning. We will examine these theories more care-
individual choice, they said. fully in the chapters to come, and we will see how
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that they might help us analyze and come to conclusions
ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is about particular ethical issues.
ignorance.” In other words, we do what is wrong The reading selections for this chapter come from
because we do not know or believe it is wrong; and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first pub-
if we truly believe that something is right, we should lished in 1739, and from C. L. Stevenson, a philoso-
necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with pher associated with the Anglo-American tradition
Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know in twentieth-century philosophy. The excerpt from
that I should not have that second piece of pie, does Hume discusses the problem of deriving normative
this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might claims from descriptive claims, the problem of deriv-
attempt to convince us that he is right by examining ing an ought from an is, with a particular focus on
or clarifying what he means by the phrase to know. the question of the morality of incest. Stevenson dis-
If we were really convinced with our whole heart cusses the difficulty of connecting ethics and natural
and mind that something is wrong, then we might science, while also outlining an emotivist approach
be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. to understanding ethical terms.
However, whether ethics courses should attempt to
convince students of such things is surely debatable. NOTES
Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics
concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows 1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality
something to be the right thing to do, does there still (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 4.
remain the question of why we should do it? One 2. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis
way to motivate people to be ethical may be to show (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
them that it is in their own best interest to do the 3. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA:
right thing. Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 2.
4. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 6. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Buffalo, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989). Prometheus, 1903).
5. See Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of 7. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 144–45.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 8. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?
Also see Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 237.
What Science Is Discovering about the Human 9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th
Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow, Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
1990). Press, 2006), p. xxi.
R E A D I N G
Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact*
DAV I D H U M E
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely
of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?
2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.
3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?
I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

species is criminal, and why the very same
action, and the same relations in animals have
or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate
being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which
depends only on the will and appetite, and which,
not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If both in thought and reality, may be distinguished
it be answered, that this action is innocent in ani- from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same
mals, because they have not reason sufficient to relations, with respect to each other, as the human
discover its turpitude; but that man, being endowed species, and therefore would also be susceptible of
with that faculty which ought to restrain him to his the same morality, if the essence of morality con-
duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to sisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient
him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is degree of reason may hinder them from perceiv-
evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can ing the duties and obligations of morality, but can
perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and never hinder these duties from existing; since they
consequently is independent of the decisions of our must antecedently exist, in order to their being per
per-
reason, and is their object more properly than their ceived. Reason must find them, and can never pro-
effect. According to this system, then, every animal, duce them. This argument deserves to be weighed,
that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.
animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues
and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame
From David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739; Project
to human creatures. All the difference is, that our Gutenberg, 2010), bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/
superior reason may serve to discover the vice or files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm
virtue, and by that means may augment the blame *Title supplied by the editor.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
“Are you Mr. Chadsey?” my fellow china-hunter asked. “We saw
you with something that looked old-fashioned in your hand, and we
thought you might have or know of some antique furniture or old
crockery that the owners would be willing to sell.”
“Wal, I ain’t got any to sell; I only mend furnitoor. I’ve got a couple
of tall clocks in here repairin’, but they ain’t mine, so I can’t sell ’em.
N-o—I don’t know of none—except—What furnitoor do you want?”
“Oh, anything, almost, that is old, and china especially; any old
blue pie-plates or such things.”
Elam stood slowly rubbing his claw-foot and at last answered: “I
know some old blue-and-white crockery preserve-jars, or jell-pots, ye
might call ’em, which I ruther think ye could get ef ye want ’em. Ye
see, Abiel Hartshorn, he’s a widower an’ he’s a-goin’ ter marry a
school-marm up ter Collation Corners, an’ she’s got awful highty-
tighty notions, an’ he’s a-goin’ ter sell the farm, an’ she come down
ter see what things she wanted saved out of the house fur her. An’
Abiel’s fust wife she had all these old blue-an’-white pots with letters
on ’em, an’ some had long spouts, an’ she always kep’ her
preserves an’ jelly an’ sweet pickles in ’em, an’ mighty handy they
was too. An’ when this woman see ’em she was real pleased with
’em, but her brother was along with her, and he’s a clerk in a drug-
store, an’ he bust out a-larfin’, an’ says he: ‘Them letters on them
jell-pots means senna, an’ jalap, an’ calomel, an’ sweet syrup of
buckthorn, an’ lixypro, an’ lixylutis, an’ all sorts of bad-tastin’
medicines.’ An’ then she fired right up, an’ says she: ‘I won’t have
any of my preserves kep’ in them horrid-tastin’ old medicine-bottles;’
so I guess Abiel would be glad enough ter sell ’em fur most
anything.”
We suspected at once that these “jell-pots” with blue lettering of
the names of drugs were Delft apothecary jars, and that the “ones
with spouts” were the old jars, so rarely seen, that are identical in
shape with the “siroop-pots” of Dutch museums. When the Dutch
used these jars a century or more ago, they covered the open top
with tightly tied oilskin and poured the contents from the spout, which
at other times was kept carefully corked. By what strange,
roundabout journey had these Delft jars strayed to that New England
farm? We asked eagerly where we could see the despised “jell-
pots.”
“Abiel’s house is about two mile from here by the road. I tell ye
what ye can do. Ye may as well see ’em now’s ever. I’ll walk cross-
lots an’ you drive there. Go on down the road a piece an’ turn the
fust road ter the right. ’Tain’t much of a road—it’s kind of a lane. Go
on to the fust house ye come to. I’d better come, ’cause mebbe Abiel
wouldn’t let ye see ’em ef ye went alone.”
We left him and drove on and down through the narrow, grass-
grown lane. When we reached the old gray farm-house we found it
deserted and still, so we sat down on the stone doorstep and waited
for Elam Chadsey, and soon he climbed over the stone wall before
us.
“Ain’t Abiel at hum? All the better! We’ll go in ’n’ see the preserve-
jars, an’ then he won’t know any city folks want ’em an’ won’t put the
price up on ye.”
He prowled around the house, trying in vain to open first the doors
and then the windows, but to his amazement he found all carefully
locked.
“The ninny!” he said, indignantly, “he ain’t got nothin’ to steal! What
did he lock up fur? I never heard of such a thing—lockin’ up in the
daytime; it makes me mad. The dresser stan’s right in that room and
them jars is on top of it; ef ye could only see in that window ye could
look right at it, then ye’d know whether ye wanted ’em or not.”
“Isn’t there anything I could climb up on?” doubtfully I asked.
He searched in the wood-shed for a ladder, but with no success.
At last he called out: “I guess ef you two’ll help me a little we can pull
this around fur ye to stand on.”
“This” was a hen-coop or hen-house, evidently in present use as a
hen-habitation. Its sides were about four feet high, and from them
ran up a pointed roof, the highest peak of which was about five feet
and a half from the ground.
“There,” he exclaimed, triumphantly, as he pushed it under the
window, “ef ye can git up an’ stan’ on that ye can see in. Then”—
vindictively—“we’ll leave it here fur Abiel to drag back himself, to pay
him fur bein’ such a gump as to lock his doors. I guess it’ll hold ye, ef
ye are pretty hefty.”
I may as well state the annoying fact that to be “pretty hefty” is a
great drawback in searches after “antiques.” You cannot climb up
narrow, steep ladders and through square holes into treasure-
holding attic-lofts, as may a slender antique-hunter. You must remain
patiently below and let her shout down, telling and describing what is
above. It is such a trial to an explorer to have to explore by proxy,
especially when you know you could discover more than anyone
else could. I determined that “heft” should be no obstacle to me in
this case, though the hen-house did look rather steep and high; and I
bravely started to climb. I placed one knee, then the other, and then
my feet upon the ledge at the edge of the roof, while Elam Chadsey
pushed. He weighed about one hundred pounds, and was thin,
wizened, and wrinkled to the last New England degree. He braced
his feet firmly in the ground, set his teeth, and pushed with might and
main. Alone I scaled the second height. I had barely set my feet
firmly on the peak of the roof, had shaded my eyes from the sunlight
with one hand, while I clung to the window-frame with the other, had
caught one glimpse of a row of blue-and-white apothecary jars, when
—crack!—smash! went the frail roof under my feet, and down I went
—down into the hen-house!
In spite of my distress of mind and my discomfort of body, one
impression overwhelmed all others—the anguish and consternation
of Elam Chadsey. He darted from side to side, exactly like a
distracted hen; he literally groaned aloud.
“Darn that gump of an Abiel Hartshorn! He’s the biggest fool in
Rhode Island—lockin’ up his house jest ’cause he’s goin’ away, an’
gettin’ us in this fix. Wait, miss, keep still, an’ I’ll see if I can find an
axe to chop ye out.”
Wait! keep still!—indeed I would—I couldn’t do otherwise. Off he
ran to the wood-shed, and soon came back madder than ever; he
fairly sizzled.
“Oh, the ninny! the big donkey! his axe is in the house. What do
you s’pose he locked it up fur? He’s a reg’lar wood-chuck! I’ll tell him
what I think on him. Ye ain’t hurted much, be ye, miss?”
“Oh, no,” I answered, calmly, “I’m all right as long as I keep still.
But if I try to move there are several big and very sharp splinters that
stick into me, and nails, too, I think—rusty nails, without doubt, which
will probably give me the lock-jaw. Oh, Mr. Chadsey, do you suppose
there are many eggs in this house?”
“Not many hull ones, I’ll bet. Oh, no”—very scornfully—“I s’pose
Abiel took ’em into the house to lock ’em up—the ninny. He’s the
biggest ninny I ever see. Do ye think, miss, if we could manage to tip
the hen-house over, that we could drag you out?”
“No,” I answered, vehemently, “the splinters are all pointing
downward, and if you try to pull me out they will all stick into me
worse than they do now. I have got to be chopped out of this trap,
and you must go home, or somewhere, or anywhere, and get an axe
to do it. Take our horse, and drive there, and do be careful when you
go around the corners, or the cart will upset—and do, oh, do hurry.
You must both go, our pony is so queer and tricky, and Mr. Chadsey
might have trouble with him. Now, don’t object, nothing can happen
to me in my fortress.”
So, rather unwillingly, they drove off, Elam Chadsey muttering to
himself, “that Abiel Hartshorn’s the biggest ninny in Rhode Island.”
I was alone in my hen-house. I was not at all uncomfortable—
while I kept still—though I was “cabin’d, cribb’d, confin’d.” The true
china-hunting madness filled my brain as I thought of the row of fine
blue-and-white apothecary jars which would soon be mine, and other
thoughts were crowded out. The calm and quiet of the beautiful day
also soothed and cheered me in spite of myself. The wind sighed
musically through the great ancient pine-tree that stood near the
house. Flickering rays of glowing sunlight shone down on my head
through the feathery foliage of the locust-trees that filled the door-
yard. A great field of blossoming buckwheat wafted fresh balm in
little puffs of pure perfume. Bees hummed and buzzed around me,
and a meadow-lark sung somewhere near, sung and sung as if
summer were eternal. A flood of light and perfume and melody and
warmth filled me with sensuous delight in spite of my awkward
imprisonment, and I fairly laughed aloud, and frightened the hens
and chickens that had come clucking round me in inquisitive wonder
at the removal and invasion of their home.
But my ill-timed and absurd sense of being in a summer paradise
did not last long, for I heard in a few minutes the loud clatter of
wheels coming down the lane from the opposite direction to that
which had been taken by the hurrying pair. Of course, I could not
see, for I had fallen with my face toward the house, and I did not like
to try to turn around—it inconvenienced the splinters so. The sound
came nearer and nearer, and at last I managed to move my head
enough to see a country horse and wagon with two men. Then I
leaned my face on my folded arms, and I hoped and prayed that they
might drive past. But, to my horror, to my intense mortification, they
turned and came up the driveway and underneath the shed of the
Hartshorn house.
A great dog bounded around and stared at me. I heard around the
corner the murmuring sounds of suppressed laughter and eager
questioning, of which one sentence only came distinctly to my ears:
“Queer sort of hens you keep, Hartshorn;” and then the two men
came round the house.
I hardly know what I said; I think it was this: “If you are Mr.
Hartshorn, I must beg your pardon for my sudden, impertinent, and
most unexpected intrusion on the privacy of your—hen-house” (here
we all three burst out laughing), “and I must ask if you will please get
your axe and chop up your own hen-house in order to get me out.”
Never speak to me again of Yankee inquisitiveness! Without
asking one question, Hartshorn ran into the house, brought out his
hidden axe, and while the boards were firmly held by the other man
(who, alas! was young and well-dressed, and who proved to be the
city purchaser of the farm), Abiel carefully chopped and split. I
heroically bore this undignified ordeal in silence, until at last I was
released.
“Come into the house,” said Abiel, with wonderful hospitality to so
impertinent an intruder; “ye must be a leetle tired of standin’; come in
and sit down. Ye ain’t hurt much, air ye?”
“Oh, no,” I answered, “only some deep scratches; but let me
explain to you”—and I did explain with much self-abasement how I
came to be fixed in my absurd position.
In the meantime the distracted pair had obtained the axe and were
on their way back to the scene of disaster. As soon as they were
within a full view of the house my companion china-hunter burst
forth: “Why, she is gone! Where can she be? Do you suppose she
has fainted and sunk into the hen-house? No, I can see, it is empty;
she has got out of it somehow.” Then she jumped out of the cart, ran
up the path and through the open door, and found me sitting calmly
talking with the well-dressed young man.
From the kitchen we soon heard sounds of violent and vituperative
altercation.
“Abiel Hartshorn, yer the biggest fool I ever see. What did ye lock
yer house up in the daytime fur?”
“To keep out jest such pryin’ haddocks as you and them be.”
“Ye ain’t got nothin’ in it, anyway.”
“Then what did you and her want to peek in fur?”
“Such a rotten old hen-house I never see.”
“’Tain’t made as a platform fur to hold a woman of her size.”
“She don’t weigh much.”
“She do, too. Ye ain’t no judge of heft, Elam; ye don’t weigh
enough yerself.”
“What did yer lock up yer axe fur?”
“Ef I’d a-knowed yer’d a-wanted it so bad, I’d a-perlitely left it out
fur ye.”
“Wal, I never heard of sech a thing as lockin’ up a house in the
daytime, and yer axe, too—how could ye be such a fool? Say, Abiel,
she looked funny though, didn’t she?”
All’s well that ends well. Abiel, having sold the farm, was glad to
sell the roofless hen-house for two dollars, and he eagerly gave me
the drug-pots. The former antique was never claimed, and the blue-
and-white jars proved for many months too painful and too hateful a
reminder to have in sight. Now they stand on table and shelf—pretty
posy-holders, but severe and unceasing monitors. Their clear blue
letters—“Succ: E, Spin: C,” and “U: Althæ,” and “C: Rosar: R,” etc.—
speak not to me of drugs and syrups, of lohocks and electuaries;
they are abbreviations of various Biblical proverbs such as “Every
fool will be meddling,” “He taketh the wise in their own craftiness,”
“Boast not thyself of to-morrow, for thou knowest not what a day may
bring forth,” “Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall,”
etc. And the little ill-drawn blue cherubs that further decorate the
drug-pots seem always to wink and to smirk maliciously at me, and
to hold their fat sides as though they were thinking of the first time
they peeped at me and jeered at me out of the window of the gray
old farm-house as I stood entrapped in my meddlesome folly in the
sunlight under the beautiful locust-trees in old Narragansett.
I cannot tell a romantic story of a further acquaintance with the
good-looking young man; I never saw him again, and I am sure I
never want to. Still, I know, ah, too well I know, that he often thinks of
me. On that susceptible masculine heart I made an impression at
first sight. When he welcomes visitors to his country-home I know he
often speaks of his first glimpse of the house—and of me. ’Tis
pleasant to feel my memory will ever bring to one face a cheerful
smile, and furnish a never-failing “good story”—nay, to three, for I
know that Elam Chadsey and Abiel Hartshorn both keep my memory
green; that to them my mishap was “argument for a week, laughter
for a month, and a good jest forever.”
THE DANCING TURKEY
In the States Papers office in London is a “propper ballad” entitled
a “Sommons to New England,” which was written about 1680. It
alluringly recites natural conditions in the colonies. One verse runs
thus:
“There flights of foules doe cloud the light,

Of turkies three score pound in weight
As bigg as ostridges.”
All the early travellers in America confirm the vast weight of these
wild turkeys—Josselyn said sixty pounds. The turkey has not grown
larger by domestication, the wild birds are still finer and more
beautiful than the tame ones. All foreign epicures agree that
American turkeys are the best in the world. In America we make fine
distinctions, even in American turkeys; tastes differ with localities. In
some northern States no turkey is perfect unless stuffed with
chestnuts—that is, as food. In Louisiana he is gorged with pecan-
nuts. In South Carolina raw rice is your only prime turkey-food. In
Virginia wild persimmons give the turkey a tang that gilds refined
gold. The President of the United States, whoever he may be, feasts
every Thanksgiving Day on a Narragansett turkey fattened on
Narragansett grasshoppers—and I approve the President’s taste.
These Presidential turkeys, though great and fat, are not “as bigg
as ostridges;” but a Narragansett turkey with whom I was acquainted
—as Rosa Bonheur would say—fairly rivalled his ancestors of
colonial days.
His name was Launcelot Gobbo; he was born, or rather hatched,
on a Narragansett farm. He was the joint property of Bill and Ralph
Prime, two farmer’s sons, fourteen and fifteen years of age, who,
according to the good old fashion in the Prime family, were given
each year some portion of the farm stock—a cosset lamb, a brood of
chickens, a pig, a cote of pigeons—to rear and sell, or keep as their
very own. This year their share of the farm-products was Launcelot
Gobbo and his mate. His name was given him by the village school-
teacher, a young college student who chanced to come frequently to
call on the boy’s sister, Mary Prime. Gobbo was chosen as their
handsel because he was such a mammoth turkey-chick, a nine-
days’-old wonder; and by tender cherishing he had fulfilled the great
promise of his youth.
This great size had been aided by careful feeding, on a composite
diet, of Narragansett fashion, extended by Oriental suggestion. His
first food was such as all well-reared Narragansett turkeys have, milk
curdled with rennet, by which the gasps and stomach-ache so fatal
to turkey infancy were avoided. Then came the natural food-supply
of grasshoppers and Rhode Island whole corn. The Prime boys had
few books to read; among them were several dry and colorless
memoirs of sainted missionaries to the East. There was one
nutritious kernel, however, in one of these rustling husks of books; it
was an account of the preparation of locusts as food, the roasting,
frying, and drying them for grinding them into meal. Bill Prime was an
inventive genius, a true Yankee, ever ready to take a hint; moreover,
he was animated by sincere affection for his pet, and pride in his
size; and as he read the meagre missionary accounts he conceived
the notion of supplying Gobbo with his dearly loved grasshoppers
after autumnal winds had chilled and cleared the fields of vegetable
and insect life.
It was not as easy a task to catch and dry these American
grasshoppers as Oriental locusts, but love laughs at limitations; just
as Gobbo laughed when his daily dole of grasshoppers was dealt out
to him on chill October and November mornings, with the Tallman
sweetings that formed his dessert. “Laugh and grow fat” is the old
saying; and as Gobbo laughed he also grew fat, and he waxed taller
and taller. Ralph thought Gobbo weighed thirty pounds; Bill set the
weight at least five pounds higher. As the turkey was full and rich of
feather he looked to me twice as large as any other I had ever seen;
really big enough to reach the seventeenth-century standard of
“three score pound in weight.”
But Gobbo had other claims to consideration besides his size or
his distinguished name; he was an accomplished turkey—a trick-
performer. Like Shakespeare’s famous Gobbo for whom he was
named, he “used his heels at his master’s commands.” When Bill
struck the ground near him with a stick and called out “Dance,
Gobbo, dance for the ladies,” and set up a shrill fife-like whistle,
Gobbo spread his great fan-like tail, and nodded and bowed his
head, and circled and hopped around in exact time with the rapping
of the stick, in the most pompous, ridiculous, mirth-provoking
caricature of a dance that ever was footed or clawed. He posed
before the whole town as a show-bird. Stolid Narragansett farmers
and fishermen for miles around came to see him, and roared aloud
at his dancing, which he had to exhibit every day in the week. Even
on Sunday, at the nooning, Bill proudly but secretly led the
neighbors’ boys home to the farm and behind the barn; though the
deacon sternly frowned on a Sunday dance, even by a turkey who
had no soul to be saved.
It was the second week of November; Gobbo was still growing and
still dancing, when one day a gayly painted vehicle with a smart
horse came dashing into town. The wagon had an enclosed box
behind the chaise front. It might be taken for a peddler’s cart or a
patent-medicine coach, but it was neither; it was the collecting-van of
a Boston “antique-man.” Persuasive, smiling, flattering, peering into
every kitchen, cupboard, and dresser, in every parlor closet, in every
bedroom and gabled attic, he gathered in his lucrative autumnal
harvest of brass andirons and candlesticks, of old blue dishes and
copper lustre pitchers, of harp-back chairs and spinning-wheels. He
débonnairly purchased two pewter porringers, a sampler, and an old
mirror of Mrs. Prime, while he effusively praised the farm and the
cattle. And as he partook of the apples and cider generously set
before him, he shouted with laughter at Gobbo, who proudly danced
for him again and again. As the early twilight began to lower, the
“antique-man” called out a cheerful good-night and drove away.
Gobbo also stalked off—and forever—from the Prime door-yard, for
in the morning he had vanished from the farm as completely as if he
had evaporated.
How the boys stormed and mourned! how fiercely they descended
on the “colored” Johnsons, more than suspected in the past of
chicken-stealing! how they hunted the woods and meadows! how
they fretted and fumed!—but to no avail. To check their worry and
anger, their mother sent them off to Boston to spend Thanksgiving
week with their married sister.
With the sea-loving curiosity of all boys, they haunted the wharves
and lower portions of the city, and on the day before Thanksgiving,
as they wandered up from the docks through a crowded and noisy
street, they joined a little group gathered around the show-window of
a “dime musee,” for in the window stood as a lure, a promise of
treasures and wonders within, an enormous turkey, penned in a wire
coop, drooping of feather, and listlessly feeding.
“He isn’t nearly as big as Gobbo,” said Bill, contemptuously. “Not
much,” answered Ralph; but even as they spoke there gathered in
their questioning brains, in their eager eyes, a conviction which burst
forth from their lips: “It is Gobbo!”
Now they were Yankee boys, slow but shrewd, and they knew
every feather of the wings, every fold of the comb and wattle of their
pet; but each paid his dime and entered the museum to be sure.
Past the voluble showman, the wax figures, the stuffed animals, they
silently strolled to the window. No one else stood near within doors.
“Dance, Gobbo, dance for the ladies!” cried Bill, excitedly, striking the
floor with his cane, and his heart beat high. Oh! how the crowd
outside on the street laughed as Gobbo spread his tail and danced
“most high and disposedly,” as the French ambassador said of
Queen Elizabeth in the gavotte.
A great printed card hung over Gobbo’s pen; he was to be raffled
that very night. Made suspicious by fraud, the boys scarcely dared
leave the hall even for food, but with the instinctive good sense of
many of country birth, Bill interviewed a friendly policeman on the
beat, and another policeman appeared at the raffling at eight o’clock
and sat near the Prime boys on the front row of seats in the hall.
At the appointed hour a noisy but not disorderly crowd had
gathered. The master of ceremonies removed the wire netting from
around Gobbo, who was still feeding and still fattening. The
showman entreated silence, and in a reasonable stillness began:
“Gentlemen, this magnificent turkey, the biggest ever known in the
civilized world, the feathered monarch of the ornithological world, will
—” when a shrill whistle pierced the air, and “Dance, Gobbo, dance
for the ladies!” was roared out. The turkey reared his long neck and
head like a snake, and with a piercing gobble literally flew from the
platform to his friend Bill, with a force that almost stunned the boy.
The showman advanced: “What does this mean?” he shouted. “Don’t
you touch him,” screamed Bill, and “Don’t you touch him,” confirmed
with emphasis the policeman, while Ralph explained to the
inquisitive and sympathizing ’longshoremen and sailors who
crowded around him, how the turkey had been lost and found; not
without some bitter aspersions on the character of the antique-man.
An adjourned meeting was held at the police-station the following
morning, when the Prime boys testified and Gobbo danced, and a
gay session it was in those dingy rooms; and the showman with a
sham good-humor resigned his claims to what had proved to him a
very lucrative drawing-card.
There ought to be a romantic ending to this tale of a lost love; but
every turkey has his day, and this was Gobbo’s. He was too big to
keep in a city yard, and too big to take home in the cars; thus did his
greatness, as did Cardinal Wolsey’s, prove his destruction. Even his
accomplishments were a snare; for when it was known he could
dance, his talent could not be hidden under a bushel in obscure
country-life. He had ever been destined for a city market, and soon
again he graced a window, this time of a great city poulterer; and on
the eve of Thanksgiving he was again raffled—the second time, alas!
with hanging wings, and plucked sides, and drooping head.
CUDDYMONK’S GHOST
Black Cuddymonk and his wife Rosann were holding an animated
discussion as they sat before the fire in their cheerful kitchen in old
Narragansett. That is, Cuddymonk was talking loudly and effusively,
while Rosann said little, but said it firmly; and in the end succeeded
in having her own way, as such stubborn, talk-less persons usually
do, whether they be black or white. Cuddy had had an offer of
employment for a month, and he was unwilling to accept the position
and do the work; but Rosann calmly overruled him and he had to
yield. It was not that the work was hard, or that the pay was poor, but
simply that Cuddy was afraid, he was too superstitious to dare to
face the terrors that the performance of his duties might bring forth.
And yet it seemed simple enough! Old Dr. Greene had the
rheumatism and could not hold the reins to drive, and he wanted to
hire Cuddy to drive in his chaise with him when he went on his daily
round of visits, and to care for the horse when he returned home.
Cuddy would have loved to feed and rub down the horse, and drive
through the sunny lanes and green woods, and sit in the sun while
the Doctor visited and dosed and bled within doors. It would be like
making a round of visits himself, for he was then “Black Gov’nor,”
and at every house in village or on farm he would find some friend or
constituent to chat and gossip with. But alas! all the Doctor’s visits
were not made in the daytime, and Cuddy shrank from the thought of
driving all over Narragansett in the night. He thus complained to
Rosann: “I wouldn’t care if it warn’t for dem darminted graveyards.
Dere’s a graveyard on ebery farm all ober dis country. I nebber see
sech fools es folks is in Narragansett. Dey warnts ter hab ghosts
ebberywhere. Why don’t dey keep ’em all in de ole church-yard ober
ter Fender Zeke’s corner, den yer can go de road dat leads round de
udder way, an’ not meet ’em. Down Boston way dey buries folks in
church-yards an’ keeps der ghosts where dey belongs.”
Cuddymonk had travelled, and knew how things should be; he had
ridden to Boston thirty years previously with Judge Potter; and the
strange sights he had seen, and the new ways he had learned at
that metropolis, had been his chief stock-in-trade ever since, and,
indeed, had formed one of his great qualifications for election as
Black Governor.
Rosann answered him calmly and coldly: “I’s sick er ghosts,
Cuddymonk. I’se been mar’d forty year, and you’s a-talkin’ about
ghosts all de whole during time an’ a-speerin’ for ghosts all dem
years, an’ yer ain’t nebber seed one yit. You’s jess got ter go ter de
Doctor’s termorrer an’ dribe for him.”
“Rosann, when yer sees me brung home a ragin’ luniac wid misery
ob de head, yer’ll wish yer hadn’ drove yer ole man erway from yer
bed ’n’ b’ord ter go foolin’ all ober de country in de night-time, seein’
ghosts and sperits an’ witches. P’raps I sha’n’t nebber come home
alibe, anyway.”
“You’s got ter go, Cuddy, an’ dar ain’t no use er talkin’ ’bout it. I
guess de ole Doctor kin charm off any ghost you’ll eber see. ’Sides,
he won’t be out much nights when he got de rheumatiz ser bad.
’Tain’t ebry day yer kin git yer keep an’ ten dollars a month, an’ yer
ought ter dribe fer him anyway, ter ’comerdate him, when he sabed
yer troo de bronchiters.”
So Cuddy went to the Doctor, and for a week all was well with him.
He drove to all points from Wickford to Biscuit Town, and received
such greeting and honor from all of his race as was due a governor.
But an end came to all this content, for late on a misty, miserable
September afternoon young Joe Champlin came riding up to the
doctor’s door in great speed, and in a few moments the Doctor
shouted out to Cuddy to harness up Peggy. Cuddy was wretched.
He knew well where the Champlin farm lay—far up on Boston Neck
—and he thought with keen terror of the lonely road, of the many
little enclosed graveyards that lay between him and the Champlin
homestead. Fear made him bold, and he managed to stammer out to
the Doctor the request that he would have Joe Champlin hitch his
saddle-horse behind the chaise and drive the Doctor to the farm,
where horse and chaise and doctor could remain all night; then he
(Cuddy) would walk up early in the morning to drive back. The
Doctor scoffed at the ridiculous proposition, and barely gave Cuddy
time ere they started to put on his coat and waistcoat wrong side out
—a sure safeguard against ghosts. As they drove up Boston Neck in
the misty twilight Cuddy suffered keen thrills of terror whenever he
got down from the chaise to let down bars or open gates; for the only
roads at that time in that region of Narragansett were drift-ways
through the fields—well-travelled, to be sure—but still kept closed by
gates. Cuddy clambered in and out of the chaise, and opened and
closed the gates with an agility that amazed the Doctor, who had
previously had frequent occasions in the daytime to revile him for his
laziness in like duties. He also glanced with apprehension and dread
at the family burying-grounds they passed, counting to himself the
whole dreary number that would have to be repassed on the way
home.
These sad little resting-places are dotted all over Narragansett. In
olden times each family was buried in some corner on the family-
farm. Sometimes the burying-place was enclosed in a high stone
wall; often they were overgrown with great pine or hemlock trees, or
half-shaded with airy locust-trees. Ugly little gravestones were
clustered in these family resting-places—slate head-stones carved
with winged cherub heads and quaint old names, and lists of the
virtues of the lost ones; and all the simple but tender stone-script of
the country stone-cutter’s lore—hackneyed but loving verses—
repeated on stone after stone. Beautifully ideal is the thought and
reality of these old Narragansett planters and their wives and
children resting in the ground they loved so dearly, and so faithfully
worked for. But there was nothing beautiful in the thought to Cuddy;
he groaned as he passed them, and thought of his midnight return;
and he tried to learn from the Doctor how long he would probably be
detained at the Champlin farm. But Dr. Greene, accustomed to ride
alone for hours through the country, was taciturn and gruff, and kept
Cuddy in ignorance of both the name and ailment of the patient.
When they reached the Champlin farm Cuddy ventured to say,
with a cheerful assumption of interest: “’S’pose you’ll stay here all
night, Doctor, it’s so cole an’ damp an’ so bad fer yer rheumatiz. I’ll
sleep in de hay in de barn an’ won’t bodder nobody.”
“No, indeed,” answered the Doctor, sharply, “we’ll start back in half
an hour.” Cuddymonk gloomily hitched and blanketed the horse, and
walked into the great kitchen, where, nodding and dozing, sat old
Ruth Champlin, the negro cook. When Ruth saw his reversed
clothing, she did not dream of smiling at his absurd appearance, but
at once sympathized with him in his gloomy forebodings; and while
she filled him with metheglin—a fermented mead made of water,
honey, and locust-beans—she also filled him with fresh stories of
witches and ghosts until the time came to start on the homeward
drive, when the poor “Black Gov’nor’s” nerves were completely
unstrung.
I will not give a list of the terrors that assailed Cuddy from the first
moment of his ride home. A rustling leaf, a cracking branch, a
sighing wind, were magnified into groans and wails. Every stone,
every bush, seemed an uncanny form; every cluster of blackberry
bushes, every hay-rick, a looming monster. And when Dr. Greene
decided to return by Pender Zeke’s corner, and thus pass the old
church foundation of the Narragansett Church and its cluster of
deserted gravestones, Cuddy’s terror found words.
“Don’ do it, Doctor; don’ go by dat darminted ole church
foundashum. It’s a dreffle lonely road, an’ ebberybody knows dere’s
ghosts in dat ole church-yard ebbery night. Ole Mum Amey seed one
a-dancin’ on ole Brenton’s table-stone. Fer de lub ob praise, Doctor,
don’ less go dere to-night. Ole Tuggie Bannocks an’ all dem dashted
ole witches gadders in de ole noon-house dat stan’s in de church-
yard an’ brews dere witch-broth; an’ ef anyone sees ’em a-brewin’
dey can nebber eat nothin’ else, an’ pines away wid misery ob de
stummick an’ dies.”
The Doctor only answered, gruffly, “Go by the corners, Cuddy; I’ll
drive off the ghost.”
As they approached the haunted church-yard Cuddy was fairly
speechless with apprehension. His teeth chattered, and he held the
whip in one trembling hand to ward off any ghostly or witchly attack.
Words would fail in attempting to express the horror, the agony,
which seized him, which overwhelmed him when he saw as he
passed the old noon-house an unearthly, an appalling, object, which
he could not bear to look at, nor could he force his staring eyes to
look away from. The Doctor saw it, too—a tall slender column, about
seven feet in height, of faintly shimmering light vaguely outlining a
robed figure, not of a human being, but plainly of a ghost. It
appeared to be about a hundred feet from the road, though it could
be clearly seen through the mist, and it seemed palpitating with a
faint, uncanny radiance. “Stop, Cuddy,” eagerly roared the Doctor, “I
want to see what that is!” And as Cuddy showed no sign of stopping
the horse’s progress, he seized the reins from the negro’s shaking
hands. Cuddy, frightened out of all sense of respect or deference,
shouted out, “G’lang, git up,” and attempted to whip the steed.
“Cuddy, you black imp! if you dare to do that again, I’ll whip you
within an inch of your life. I’m going to get out and see what that is. It
is a very interesting physical phenomenon.”
“Oh, Doctor dear, you’s bewitched a’ready. Dere ain’t no physic
about dat, it’s a moonack. Fer de lub of God, don’t go near it—you’ll
nebber walk out alibe”—and with that the unhappy black man fairly
burst into tears and threw his restraining arms around the Doctor’s
neck.
The unheeding Doctor jumped from the side of the chaise with a
force that nearly dragged Cuddymonk with him. The weeping negro’s
affection and interest would carry him no farther, and as the Doctor
walked sturdily across the church-green, Cuddy, moaning and
groaning in despair, gathered up the reins, ready, at any motion or
sound of the ghost, to start the horse down the road and wholly
desert the Doctor.
The brave ghost-investigator walked up the four narrow stone
steps that once led to the church door—but now, alas! lead sadly
nowhere—then turned into the graveyard. As he stumbled eagerly
along through the high grass and tangled blackberry-bushes, and as
he passed under the shading branches of a wild-cherry tree, a most
terrifying catastrophe took place—he plunged and slid into an open
grave containing about a foot of water. Cuddy heard the splash, and
it indicated to him the Doctor’s utter annihilation. He gathered the
reins up with a groan of despair and prepared to drive off with speed,
lest the moonack chase and overwhelm him also, when he heard the
Doctor’s voice. The instinct of obedience was strong in him—for he
had been born a slave—and he delayed a moment to listen. “Come
here, Cuddy,” shouted the Doctor, “I’ve fallen into the grave they’ve
dug for old Tom Hazard.” Cuddy groaned, but did not move, either to
drive, or to fly to the Doctor’s rescue. “Come here, I say, and help me
out; I shall die of the rheumatism if I stay here.” Another groan, but
still no motion to render assistance. “Cuddy, if you don’t come, I’ll
conjure you with that big skeleton in my closet.” Still no answer, and
at last, the Doctor, by dint of struggling and breaking away the earth,
managed to drag himself out of the shallow grave. Undaunted by a
mishap that would have both mentally unnerved and physically
exhausted anyone but a country doctor, unchilled in spirit though
shivering in body, the determined investigator walked up to the
ghost.
He took one glance and at once turned, and, avoiding the open
grave, ran down the steps and across the green. “Come here,
Cuddy; if I die of rheumatism I’ll take you up and show you that
ghost. I’ll conjure you with every charm in the witch-book if you don’t
come.” Cuddy was weak with terror, and the Doctor seized him by
the collar, pulled him out of the chaise and up the steps. With
chattering teeth and closed eyes he stumbled along by the Doctor’s
side, clutching his leader’s arm and muttering words of Voodoo
charms. When they reached the faintly shining ghost, the Doctor
shouted, “Open your eyes, Cuddy,” and his power fairly forced
Cuddy to comply. The Doctor raised his whip and brought it down on
the shining ghost; a great swarm of fire-flies rose in the air, leaving
disclosed a juniper-tree, which had chanced to grow somewhat in
the form of a human figure. This strange phenomenon I cannot
explain, but it is not the only time that a juniper-tree on a misty night
in fall has attracted a swarm of fire-flies to light upon it.
Cuddy nearly fainted in revulsion of feeling. Both returned to the
road and clambered into the chaise. The Doctor was now thoroughly
chilled. He took from the medicine-chest that he always carried (“the
Doctor’s bag o’ tools,” Cuddy called it) a flask that may have
contained medicine, but which smelled more like “kill-devil,” and
bade Cuddy drive with speed to Zeke Gardiner’s; for when the heat
of the chase was over, the valiant old Doctor began to feel the
twinges of an enemy that he dreaded more than any ghost—his
rheumatism—and he dare not ride home dripping with icy grave-
water, even if he were full of Jamaica rum.
No lights were seen at Zeke’s, but a vigorous knocking at the door
roused the entire amazed and sympathetic family; and while one
blew up a roaring fire in the chimney, another heated a warming-pan,
another took off the Doctor’s muddy clothes, and Mistress Gardiner
concocted a terrible mixture—a compound tea of boneset,
snakeroot, and chamomile, which, in spite of the Doctor’s fierce
remonstrances and entreaties for a mug of flip instead, she poured
down his throat, thus cancelling in one fell dose many a debt of
nauseous bolus, pill, or draught that she owed to him.
The perspiring Doctor, as he was being smothered in the great
feather-bed, and singed with the warming-pan, and filled to the teeth
with scalding herb-tea, gave his parting order to Cuddy—to drive
home and tell Mrs. Greene that he had been detained at the
Gardiners’ all night “on account of an overdose of spirits,” and then
to come for him in the morning. Cuddy listened respectfully and
answered obediently, went quietly around behind the Gardiners’
house, calmly placed the horse in the Gardiners’ stable and the
chaise in the Gardiners’ barn, slept the sleep of the brave, the
obedient, the unhaunted, in the hay in the upper hay-mow, and
appeared, as ordered, with horse and chaise at the front door the
following morning.
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A unique and entertaining collection of material, gathered
from old records of every sort, regarding the dress stuffs,
wigs, hats, coats, and every article of costume in vogue
among our colonial ancestors.
The Sabbath in Puritan New England

Textbook Ethics Theory and Contemporary Issues 9Th Edition Barbara Mackinnon Ebook All Chapter PDF

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Textbook Ethics Theory and Contemporary Issues 9Th Edition Barbara Mackinnon Ebook All Chapter PDF

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Available Formats

Ethics: Theory and Contemporary

Issues 9th Edition Barbara Mackinnon

Ethics theory and contemporary issues Ninth Edition

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Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States

Printed in the United States of America

Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine

READING Who’s to Judge? • Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and

Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of

Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344

The Environment and Its

Current Issues 538 Justice 565

Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas

• Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and

Jack Hollingsworth/Photodisc/Getty Images

• Explain the difference between

• Decide whether naturalistic explanations

For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.

WHY STUDY ETHICS?

Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in

Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology

Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic

is provocative and insightful, we might still worry

from analogy. In this type of argument, one com-

For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.

I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human

“There flights of foules doe cloud the light,

In Old Narragansett (Ivory Series)

Colonial Days in Old New York

Costume of Colonial Times

The Sabbath in Puritan New England

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