China-India Relations - Wikipedia

09/05/2024, 15:16 China–India relations - Wikipedia
China–India relations
China and India have historically maintained peaceful
China–India relations
relations for thousands of years of recorded history, but the
harmony of their relationship has varied in modern times,
after the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the Chinese
Civil War in 1949, and especially post the Annexation of
Tibet by the People's Republic of China. The two nations
have sought economic cooperation with each other, while
frequent border disputes and economic nationalism in both
countries are major points of contention.
Cultural and economic relations within China and India China India
date back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as
Diplomatic mission
a major trade route between India and China, but is also
credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India Embassy of China, Embassy of India,
to East Asia.[1] During the 19th century, China was involved New Delhi Beijing
in a growing opium trade with the East India Company,
which exported opium grown in India.[2][3] During World War
II, both British India and the Republic of China (ROC) played a
crucial role in halting the progress of Imperial Japan.[4] After
India became independent in 1947, it established relations with
the ROC. The modern Sino-Indian diplomatic relationship
began in 1950, when India was among the first noncommunist
countries to end formal relations with the Republic of China President Xi with Prime Minister
and recognise the PRC as the legitimate government of both Modi, during the 2016 G20
Mainland China and Taiwan. China and India are two of the Hangzhou summit
major regional powers in Asia, and are the two most populous
countries and among the fastest growing major economies in
the world.
Growth in diplomatic and economic influence has increased the significance of their bilateral
relationship. Between 2008 and 2021, China has been India's largest trading partner, and the two
countries have also extended their strategic and military relations.[5][6][7][8] However, conflict of
interest leads to hostility. India has a large trade deficit that is favoured towards China. The two
countries failed to resolve their border dispute and Indian media outlets have repeatedly reported
Chinese military incursions into Indian territory.[9] And relations between contemporary China
and India have been characterised by border disputes, resulting in three military conflicts – the
Sino-Indian War of 1962, the border clashes in Nathu La and Cho La in 1967, and the 1987
Sumdorong Chu standoff.[10] Since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully rebuilt
diplomatic and economic ties. Since 2013, border disputes have reemerged to take centre stage in
the two countries' mutual relations. In early 2018, the two armies got engaged in a standoff at the
Doklam plateau along the disputed Bhutan-China border.[11] Since summer 2020, armed standoffs
and skirmishes at multiple locations along the entire Sino-Indian border escalated. A serious clash
occurred in the Galwan Valley, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and many Chinese
soldiers.[12] Both countries have steadily established military infrastructure along border areas,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China–India_relations 1/47
including amidst the 2020 China–India skirmishes.[9][13] Additionally, India remains wary about
China's strong strategic bilateral relations with Pakistan,[14] and China's relations to separatist
groups in Northeast India,[15] while China has expressed concerns about Indian military and
economic activities in the disputed South China Sea[16] as well as hosting of anti-China activity
from Tibetan exiles.[17][18] Today, the South Asian region is the premier site of intensified great
power competition between China and India.[19]
Geopolitical overview
China and India are separated by the Himalayas.
China and India today share a border, with Nepal
and Bhutan acting as buffer states. Parts of the
disputed Kashmir region claimed by India (J&K and
Ladakh) are claimed and administered by either
Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan) or by
the PRC (Aksai Chin). The Government of Pakistan,
on its maps, shows the Aksai Chin area as mostly
within China and labels the boundary "Frontier
Undefined", while India holds that Aksai Chin is
illegally occupied by the PRC. China and India also
Eastern and Southern Asia.
dispute most of Arunachal Pradesh.
(The border between the People's Republic of
Not only is China's India policy shaped by greater China and the Republic of India over Arunachal
competition with the United States, but there are Pradesh/South Tibet reflects actual control,
also real structural issues in India-China relations without dotted line showing claims.)
that exacerbate discord. These stem largely from
China's attempts to keep India at arm's length in the
Indo-Pacific region. There are clear differences in the regional order in Asia that the two countries
desire—India seeks a multipolar order, of which India is one of the main poles, while China seeks a
single pole, of which India is not a pole at all.[20]
History
Antiquity
Etched carnelian beads of Indus valley origin have been excavated from various archaeological
sites in China dating from the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn period (early half of 1st
millennium BCE) to the Han and Jin dynasties, indicating early cultural exchanges.[22]
China and India have also had some contact before the transmission of Buddhism. References to a
people called the Chinas, are found in ancient Indian literature. The Indian epic Mahabharata (c.
5th century BCE) contains references to "China", which may have been referring to the Qin state
which later became the Qin dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350–283 BCE), the prime minister of the
Maurya Empire, refers to Chinese silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk dress) and "cinapatta"
(Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra.[24]
The first records of contact between China and India were written during the 2nd century BCE,
especially following the expedition of Zhang Qian to Central Asia (138–114 BCE).[25] Buddhism
was transmitted from India to China in the 1st century CE.[26] Trade relations via the Silk Road
acted as economic contact between

the two regions. In the Records of
the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian
(d. 113 BCE) and Sima Qian (145–
90 BCE) make references to
"Shendu", which may have been
referring to the Indus Valley (the
Sindh province in modern
Xiangqi, or Chinese chess, which,
Pakistan), originally known as
like Western Chess is believed to be
"Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When descended from the Indian chess
Etched carnelian beads, Yunnan was annexed by the Han game of chaturanga.[23] The earliest
Harappa Culture.[21] Such dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese indications reveal the game may
beads were imported from authorities reported an Indian have been played as early as the
India to China in the early "Shendu" community living third century BCE.
half of 1st millennium there.[27]
BCE.[22]
A Greco-Roman text Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (mid 1st century
AD) describes the annual fair in present-day Northeast India, on the
border with China.
Every year, there turns up at the border of Thina a certain tribe, short in body and very
flat-faced ... called Sêsatai ... They come with their wives and children bearing great packs
resembling mats of green leaves and then remain at some spot on the border between
them and those on the Thina side, and they hold a festival for several days, spreading out
the mats under them, and then take off for their own homes in the interior.
— Periplus, §65[28]
Middle Ages
From the 1st century onwards, many Indian scholars and monks traveled to China, such as Batuo
(fl. 464–495 CE)—first abbot of the Shaolin Monastery—and Bodhidharma—founder of Chan/Zen
Buddhism—while many Chinese scholars and monks also traveled to India, such as Xuanzang (b.
604) and I Ching (635–713), both of whom were students at Nalanda University in Bihar.
Xuanzang wrote the Great Tang Records on the Western Regions, an account of his journey to
India, which later inspired Wu Cheng'en's Ming dynasty novel Journey to the West, one of the
Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature. According to some, St. Thomas the Apostle
travelled from India to China and back (see Perumalil, A.C. The Apostle in India. Patna, 1971: 5–
54.)
Tamil dynasties
The Cholas maintained a good relationship with the Chinese. Arrays of ancient Chinese coins have
been found in the Cholas homeland (i.e. Thanjavur, Tiruvarur, and Pudukkottai districts of Tamil
Nadu, India).[29]
Under Rajaraja Chola and his son Rajendra Chola, the Cholas had strong trading links with the
Chinese Song dynasty.[30][31][32] The Chola dynasty had strong influence over present-day
Indonesia (Sri Vijaya Empire )
Many sources describe Bodhidharma, the founder of the Zen school of

Buddhism in China, as a prince of the Pallava dynasty.[33]
Tang and Harsha dynasties

During the 7th century, Tang dynasty China gained control over large
portions of the Silk Road and Central Asia. In 649, the Chinese general
Wang Xuance, along with thousands of recruited Tibetan and
Nepalese troops, briefly invaded North India and won the battle.
During the 8th century, the astronomical table of sines by the Indian
astronomer and mathematician, Aryabhatta (476–550), were
translated into the Chinese astronomical and mathematical book of
the Treatise on Astrology of the Kaiyuan Era (Kaiyuan Zhanjing),
compiled in 718 CE during the Tang dynasty.[34] The Kaiyuan
Zhanjing was compiled by Gautama Siddha, an astronomer and
astrologer born in Chang'an, and whose family was originally from
India. He was also notable for his translation of the Navagraha
calendar into Chinese.
Yuan dynasty
A rich merchant from the Ma'bar Sultanate, Abu Ali (P'aehali) 孛哈里
(or 布哈爾 Buhaer), was associated closely with the Ma'bar royal
family. After a fallout with the Ma'bar family, he moved to Yuan Ambassador from Central
dynasty China and received a Korean woman as his wife and a job India (中天竺 Zhong
from the Emperor. The woman was formerly 桑哥 Sangha's wife and Tianzhu) to the court of the
her father was 蔡仁揆 채송년 Ch'ae In'gyu during the reign of 忠烈 Tang dynasty. Wanghuitu
Chungnyeol of Goryeo, recorded in the Dongguk Tonggam, Goryeosa (王会图) circa 650 CE.
and 留夢炎 Liu Mengyan's 中俺集 Zhong'anji.[35][36] 桑哥

Sangha was a Tibetan.[37] Tamil Hindu Indian merchants
traded in Quanzhou during the Yuan dynasty.[38][39][40][41]
Hindu statues were found in Quanzhou dating to this
period.[42]
According to Badauni and Ferishta, the Delhi Sultanate

under Muhammad bin Tughluq had ambitions to invade
China. There existed a direct trade relationship between
China and the Delhi Sultanate. Ibn Battuta mentions that
the Yuan Emperor had sent an embassy to Muhammad for Chola Empire under Rajendra Chola c.
reconstruction of a sacked temple at Sambhal. 1030 C.E.
Ming dynasty
Between 1405 and 1433, Ming dynasty China sponsored a series of seven naval expeditions led by
Admiral Zheng He. Zheng He visited numerous Indian kingdoms and ports, including the Malabar
coast, Bengal, and Ceylon, the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and later expeditions ventured down as far as
Malindi in what is now Kenya. Throughout his travels, Zheng He liberally dispensed Chinese gifts
of silk, porcelain, and other goods. In return, he received rich and unusual presents, including
African zebras and giraffes. Zheng He and his company paid

respect to local deities and customs, and in Ceylon, they erected
a monument (Galle Trilingual Inscription) honouring Buddha,
Allah, and Vishnu. Bengal sent twelve diplomatic missions to
Nanjing between 1405 and 1439.[43]
After the Ming treasure voyages, private Chinese traders

continued operating in the eastern Indian Ocean. Chinese
junks could frequently be seen in the ports of the Vijayanagara
Empire, carrying silks and other products.[44] The ports of
Mangalore, Honavar, Bhatkal, Barkur, Cochin, Cannanore,
Machilipatnam, and Dharmadam were important, for they
provided secure harbors for traders from China.[45] On the
other hand, Vijayanagara exports to China intensified and
included cotton, spices, jewels, semi-precious stones, ivory,
Stele installed in Calicut by Zheng
rhino horn, ebony, amber, coral, and aromatic products such as
He (modern replica)
perfumes.
The Mughals may have attempted to reach the Chinese market. According to East India Company
official William Hawkins, Emperor Jahangir's wardrobe master was ordered to replace a valuable
porcelain. To fulfill the task, the wardrobe master traveled to China but found nothing of
equivalent value.
Qing dynasty
The Bhois of Orissa maintained minor maritime trade links with China. This is noted from the
Manchu language memorials and edicts depicting contacts under the reign of the Qing dynasty in
China, when the Qianlong Emperor received a gift from the Brahmin (Ch. Polomen 婆羅門 , Ma.
Bolomen) envoy of a ruler whose Manchu name was Birakišora han of Utg’ali (Ch. Wutegali
bilaqishila han 烏特噶里畢拉奇碩拉汗 ), who is described as a ruler in Eastern India. Hence,
referring to Birakisore Deva I of Khurda (1736–1793) who styled himself as Gajapati, the ruler of
Utkala. Many of the gosains entering Tibet from China passed through his territory when visiting
the Jagannath temple at Puri.[46]
The reign of Tipu Sultan in Mysore saw Chinese technology used for sugar production,[47] and
sandalwood was exported to China.[48] Tipu's and Mysore's tryst with silk began in the early 1780s
when he received an ambassador from the Qing dynasty-ruled China at his court. The ambassador
presented him with a silk cloth. Tipu was said to be enchanted by the item to such an extent that he
resolved to introduce its production in his kingdom. He sent a return journey to China, which
returned after twelve years.[49]
After the Qing expansion into the Himalayas, there was increased contact with South Asia, which
often manifested in the form of tributary relations. The Qing were obliged to defend their
subservient state, Badakhshan, against the Afghans and Marathas, though no major clash with the
Marathas ever took place. The Afghans gained the initiative and defeated the Marathas at Panipat
in 1761. The battle's outcome was used by the Afghans to intimidate the Qing.[50]
Sino-Sikh War
In the 18th to 19th centuries, the Sikh Empire expanded into

neighbouring lands. It had annexed Ladakh into the state of
Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet and overran parts
of western Tibet. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh army in
December 1841, forcing the Sikh army to withdraw, and in
turn, entered Ladakh and besieged Leh, where they were, in
turn, defeated by the Sikh Army. At this point, neither side
wished to continue the conflict, as the Sikhs were embroiled in
tensions with the British that would lead up to the First Anglo-
Sikh War, while the Chinese were in the midst of the First
Opium War. The Sikhs claimed victory. The two parties signed
a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions
or interference in the other country's frontiers.[51]
British Raj
Indian soldiers, known as "sepoys", who were in British service
A Chinese barber in Goa, early
participated in the First and Second Opium Wars against Qing
1800s
China. Indian sepoys were also involved in the suppression of
the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, in addition to serving as guards in
the British colony of Hong Kong and foreign concessions such
as the Shanghai International Settlement. The Chinese slur
"Yindu A San" (Indian number three) was used to describe
Indian soldiers in British service.
Republic of China
Epitaph of Major Hsiao Chu Ching
Hu Shih, the Chinese ambassador to the United States from
at Jairampur cemetery[52][53]
1938 to 1942, commented, albeit critically, on India's
Buddhism almost completely subsuming Chinese society upon
its introduction.[54]
ASIA is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the
Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the
Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad
expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-
inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the
world and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and
the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end,
of life.[55]
While never having actually visited India in his lifetime, Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Republic of
China, occasionally spoke and wrote of India as a fellow Asian nation that was likewise subject to
harsh Western exploitation, and frequently called for a Pan-Asian united front against all unjust
imperialism. In a 1921 speech, Sun stated: "The Indians have long been oppressed by the British.
They have now reacted with a change in their revolutionary thinking...There is progress in their
revolutionary spirit, they will not be cowed down by Britain."[56][57] To this day, there is a
prominent street named Sun Yat-sen street in an old Chinatown in Calcutta, now known as
Kolkata.
In 1924, on his major tour of several major Chinese cities, giving lectures about using their shared
Asian values and traditional spirituality to help together promote world peace, Rabindranath
Tagore was invited to Canton by Sun Yat-sen, an invitation which he declined. There was
considerably mixed reception to Tagore from the Chinese students and intellectuals. For example,
a major Buddhist association in Shanghai stated that for seven hundred years, they had "waited for
a message from India", while others, mostly modernizers and communists, outright rejected his
ideals, stating that they did not "want philosophy, we want materialism" and "not wisdom, but
power".[58]
Believing that then-Republican China and British India were

"sister nations from the dawn of history" who needed to
transform their "ancient friendship into a new camaraderie of
two freedom-loving nations", Jawaharlal Nehru visited China
in 1939 as an honored guest of the government. Highly praising
both Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Song Meiling, Nehru
referred to Chiang as "not only a great Chinese, but a great
Asiatic and world figure...one of the top most leaders of the
world...a successful general and captain in war", and Song as
"full of vitality and charm...a star hope for the Chinese
people...a symbol of China's invincibility". During his visit,
Chiang and Nehru shared a bunker one night when Japanese Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Song
bombers attacked Chongqing in late August, with Chiang Meiling with Mahatma Gandhi and
recording a favorable impression of Nehru in his diary; the Jawaharlal Nehru
Chiangs also regularly wrote Nehru during his time in prison
and even after their 1942 visit to India.[59][60]
Partially to enlist India's aid against both Japanese and

Western imperialism in exchange for China's support for
Indian independence, the Chiangs visited British India in 1942
and met with Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Muhammad Ali
Jinnah. The Chiangs also sought to present their nation as a
potential third option for the Indian people to ally themselves
with, with public sympathies at the time sharply split between
the British and the Japanese, who actively tried to sway India's
population with pledges to liberate Asia if they would help their
efforts against the British. Despite pledges of mutual friendship
and future cooperation between the two peoples, Chiang
argued that, while Gandhi's non-violent resistance was not
The Chiangs with Mahatma Gandhi
necessarily invalid for the Indian people, it was an unrealistic in Calcutta in 1942
worldview on a global context. Gandhi, who had at the time
insisted on India refraining from participating in any war
unless India was first given complete independence, in turn, later noted that, although "fun was
had by all...I would not say that I had learnt anything, and there was nothing that we could teach
him."[61][62] In their meeting in Calcutta, Jinnah tried to persuade Chiang, who had pressed Britain
to relinquish India as soon as possible, of the necessity of establishing a separate nation for
Muslims in the subcontinent, to which Chiang, who apparently recognized the Indian National
Congress as the sole nationalist force in the country, replied that if ten crores of Muslims could live
peacefully with other communities in China, then there was no true necessity as he saw it of a
separate state for a smaller population of nine crores of Muslims living in India.[63] While the
public reception to the Chiangs was mostly positive, some reacted less favorably to the Chiangs'
presence in India, with Jinnah believing that Chiang Kai-shek lacked proper understanding of
Indian society and feeling he was biased in favor of Nehru and Gandhi while neglecting the
demands of other religious communities,[64] with his newspaper Dawn calling him a "meddlesome
marshal", while other Indian Muslims, such as Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, expressed mistrust
for the couple's motives, believing that their government wanted to eventually expand its influence
to Indochina and the subcontinent after the British departure.[65]
For his part, Chiang apparently believed none of the major Indian leaders could help his
government meaningfully. As an ardent nationalist who lived through China's internally turbulent
years, he felt that Jinnah was "dishonest" and was being used by the British to divide the peoples of
India and, by extension, Asia, with he and his wife Song believing that cooperation between Indian
religious communities was difficult but possible. At the same time, he also felt genuinely
disappointed by Gandhi, with whom he initially had high expectations, and noted afterwards that
"he knows and loves only India, and doesn't care about other places and peoples". Having been
unable to make Gandhi change his views about satyagraha, even after arguing that some of their
enemies, such as the Japanese, would make the preaching of non-violence impossible, Chiang,
himself raised a Buddhist, blamed "traditional Indian philosophy" for his sole focus on endurance
of suffering rather than revolutionary zeal necessary to rally and unite the Asian peoples.[66]
Nevertheless, the Chiangs continued to commit themselves to supporting the Indian independence
movement from afar, mostly via diplomacy, with Song Meiling writing to Nehru encouragingly:
"We shall leave nothing undone in assisting you to gain freedom and independence. Our hearts are
drawn to you, and...the bond of affection between you and us has been strengthened by our
visit....When you are discouraged and weary...remember that you are not alone in your struggle, for
at all times we are with you in spirit."[67]
Although their meetings had ended on a positive note, with Gandhi offering to adopt Song as a
"daughter" in his ashram if Chiang left her there as his ambassador to India after she asked to be
taught about his non-violent principles, and giving her his spinning wheel as a farewell gift, both
sides were met with considerable obstacles in the aftermath.[68] After the Chiangs tried to seek
U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's help in persuading Winston Churchill to give India
independence during the war, Roosevelt suggested splitting India's territory in two in the hopes of
resolving tensions, to which Song replied that both she and Chiang felt that "India was as
indivisible as China". Gandhi wrote to Chiang shortly afterwards, seeking to clarify his stance: "I
need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the new move in India, I shall take no
hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the consideration that it
should not injure China, or encourage Japanese aggression. I am trying to enlist world opinion in
favor of a proposition which to me appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthening
of India and China's defence." Chiang sent a cable to Washington upon reading Gandhi's letter,
and advised Roosevelt that the best course of action would be to "restore complete freedom" to
India, but Churchill reportedly threatened to end Britain's alliance with China should the Chiangs
continue to try to interfere with Indian affairs.[69][70]
In 1942, a division of the Kuomintang's armies entered India as the Chinese Army in India in their
struggle against Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. Dwarkanath Kotnis and four other Indian
physicians traveled to war-torn China to provide medical assistance against the Imperial Japanese
Army.[71][72]
Post independence
On 15 August 1947, India gained independence from the British. The newly independent India
established diplomatic relations with the ROC. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation
Army defeated the Kuomintang (the ROC's ruling Nationalist Party) and took over Mainland
China, establishing the PRC. Soon afterwards, India became a federal, democratic republic after its
constitution came into effect on 26 January 1950.
1950s
India established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 1
April 1950, the first non-communist/socialist nation in Their last telegrame to us is an
act of gross discourtesy [...] It
Asia to do so.[74] Pakistan continued to recognize the ROC
looks as though it is not a friend
until 1951.[75]
speaking in that language but a
The relationship between India and a newly communist potential enemy [...] for the first
China started out on an optimistic note. Jawaharlal Nehru, time, after centuries, India’s
the first prime minister of India, and Chinese premier Zhou defence has to concentrate itself
Enlai articulated a vision of an internationalist foreign on two fronts simultaneously.
policy governed by the ethics of the Panchsheel (Five [...] In our calculations we shall
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence).[76] However, there was now have to reckon with
notable skepticism on the Indian side from the very communist China in the north
beginning about Chinese intentions. For example, Bhimrao and in the north-east, a
Ambedkar was surprised that Nehru took Panchsheel communist China which has
seriously,[77] while Acharya Kriplani said that Panchsheel definite ambitions and aims and
was "born in sin".[77] Nehru himself was disappointed which does not, in any way, seem
when it became clear that the two countries had a conflict friendly disposed towards us.
of interest in Tibet, which had traditionally served as a
buffer zone. Excerpt from Home Minister
Sardar Patel's letter to Prime
China viewed Tibet as a part of its territory. The preceding Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
government of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai- November 7, 1950[73]
shek also claimed Tibet as Chinese territory. However, he
was unable to re-assert control. Mao saw Indian concern
over Tibet as a manifestation of interference in the internal affairs of the PRC. The PRC reasserted
control over Tibet and to end Tibetan Buddhism and feudalism, which it did by force of arms in
1950. To avoid antagonizing the PRC, Nehru informed Chinese leaders that India had no political
ambitions or territorial ambitions and did not seek special privileges in Tibet, but that traditional
trading rights must continue. With Indian support, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May
1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing political and social system of
Tibet would continue.
In October 1954, China and India signed an agreement regarding Tibet, whereby India recognised
Tibet as part of China, with China accepting the continuance of the previous trade arrangements.
Observers noted the agreement heavily favored China.[78]
It is the popular perception that the catchphrase of India's

diplomacy with China in the 1950s was Hindi-Chini bhai-
bhai, which means, in Hindi, "Indians and Chinese are
brothers".[79] Nehru sought to initiate a more direct
dialogue between the peoples of China and India in culture
and literature. Around then, the Indian artist (painter)
Beohar Rammanohar Sinha, who had earlier decorated the
pages of the original Constitution of India, was sent to
China in 1957 on a Government of India fellowship to Founding of the Sino-Indian Friendship
establish a direct cross-cultural and inter-civilization Association on 16 May 1952 in Beijing.
bridge. Noted Indian scholar Rahul Sankrityayan and

diplomat Natwar Singh were also there, and Sarvapalli
Radhakrishnan paid a visit to the PRC.
After signing the 1954 agreement, India published new

maps showing defined borders, as it became apprehensive
that China might make claims on Indian territory.[80] Two
major territorial disputes existed between China and India,
which remained dormant until 1959. In the northeast,
Indian territory included the Assam Himalayan region up
to the McMahon Line, which China did not recognise as a Chairman Mao Zedong of the Chinese
legal boundary. In the western sector, Indian territory Communist Party and Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru. In April 1954, India
inherited from the British Raj included the Aksai Chin
and the PRC signed an eight-year
plateau, which Chinese maps started showing as Chinese
agreement on Tibet that became the Five
territory in the 1940s, if not earlier.[81] When India Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (or
discovered that China built a road through the region, Panchsheel). Jawaharlal Nehru of India,
border clashes and Indian protests became more frequent. during the latter's state visit to China,
In January 1959, PRC premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru, October 1954.
pointing out that no government in China had accepted as
legal the McMahon Line, which the 1914 Simla Convention
defined as the eastern section of the border between India and Tibet.
In March 1959, the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of the Tibet, sought sanctuary in
Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh, where he established the Tibetan government-in-exile. Thousands
of Tibetan refugees settled in northwestern India. Relations between India and China deteriorated
after India provided the Dalai Lama sanctuary.[82]
1960s
Border disputes resulted in a short border war between the People's Republic of China and India
on 20 October 1962.[82] The border clash resulted in an overall defeat of India as the PRC pushed
the Indian forces to within 48 km of the Assam plains in the northeast. It also occupied strategic
points in the Aksai Chin and Demchok regions of Ladakh, before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on
21 November. It claimed that it withdrew to 20 km behind its contended line of control. India
disagreed with the claim.
During the Sino-Indian border conflict, India's Communist Party was accused by the Indian
government of being pro-PRC, and many of its political leaders were jailed. Subsequently, the
Communist Party of India (CPI) split with the leftist section, forming the Communist Party of
India (Marxist) in 1964.

"I don't want to know what
happened in the past. All I want Relations between the
to know is who are my PRC and India
commanders, where are the deteriorated during the
Chinese, how much ammunition rest of the 1960s and
have I got…" the early 1970s, while
China–Pakistan
Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw relations improved and
recalling 1962 when he was Sino-Soviet relations
appointed to take charge of worsened. The PRC
NEFA following the resignation backed Pakistan in its
of Kaul and Menon in the 1965 war with India,
Disputed territories of India
aftermath of the China India and issued
war.[83] "ultimatums"
threatening military action at its own border. The threats
only served to damage Pakistan's relations with the
western powers.[84] In late 1967, there were two more
conflicts between Indian and Chinese forces at their contested border, in Sikkim, known as the
Nathu La and Cho La clashes. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but India came out in a better
position than the PRC.
The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign

against India and supplied ideological, financial,
and other assistance to dissident groups, especially
to tribes in northeastern India. The PRC accused
India of assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Sri
Lanka played the role of chief negotiator for the
withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Indian
territory. Both countries agreed to Colombo's
proposals.[85][86] Chinese demonstrations against Indian
"reactionary factions" in Beijing in 1967.
1970s
In August 1971, India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation with the Soviet
Union. The PRC sided with Pakistan in its December 1971 war with India. Although China strongly
condemned India, it did not carry out its veiled threat to intervene on Pakistan's behalf. By this
time, the PRC had replaced the Republic of China in the UN, where its representatives denounced
India as being a "tool of Soviet expansionism."
India and the PRC renewed efforts to improve relations after Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's Congress party lost the 1977 elections to Morarji Desai's Janata Party. In 1978, the Indian
Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a landmark visit to Beijing, an impetus to
both countries to officially re-establish diplomatic relations in 1979. The PRC modified its pro-
Pakistan stand on Kashmir and appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim
and its special advisory relationship with Bhutan. The PRC's leaders agreed to discuss the
boundary issue, India's priority, as the first step to a broadening of relations. The two countries
hosted each other's news agencies, and Mount Kailash and Mansarowar Lake in Tibet, the home of
the Hindu pantheon, were opened to annual pilgrimages.
1980s
In 1981, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Huang Hua, made a
landmark visit to New Delhi.[87] PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang concurrently toured Pakistan, Nepal,
and Bangladesh.
In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to upgrade the deployment of
forces around the Line of Actual Control. India also undertook infrastructural development in
disputed areas.[88][89] In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the Sumdorong
Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the
Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive and built a helipad at Wandung.[90] Surprised
by the Chinese occupation, India's then Chief of Army Staff, General K.Sundarji, airlifted a brigade
to the region.[89][91] Chinese troops could not move any further into the valley and were forced to
move away from the valley.[92] By 1987, Beijing's reaction was similar to that in 1962 and this
prompted many Western diplomats to predict war. However, Indian foreign minister N.D. Tiwari
and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi travelled to Beijing to negotiate a mutual de-escalation.[89]
India and the PRC held eight rounds of border negotiations between December 1981 and
November 1987. In 1985, the PRC insisted on mutual concessions without defining the exact terms
of its "package proposal" or where the actual line of control lay. In 1986 and 1987, the negotiations
achieved nothing, given the charges exchanged between the two countries of military
encroachment in the Sumdorung Chu Valley. China's construction of a military post and helicopter
pad in the area in 1986 and India's grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North-
East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides to deploy troops to the area. The PRC
relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson" if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese
territory. By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from conflict and denied
military clashes had taken place.
A warming trend in relations was facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988.
The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the
basis of the Panchsheel. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and
reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The
communiqué also expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and
reiterated that anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated. Rajiv
Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, established direct air
links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations
between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific co-operation, and a
joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign
secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs.
1990s
Top-level dialogue continued with the December 1991 visit of PRC premier Li Peng to India and the
May 1992 visit to China of Indian president R. Venkataraman. Six rounds of talks of the Indian-
Chinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held between December 1988 and June
1993. Progress was also made in reducing tensions on the border via mutual troop reductions,
regular meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification about military exercises.
In July 1992, Sharad Pawar visited Beijing, the first Indian Minister of Defence to do so.
Consulates reopened in Bombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in December 1992.
In 1993, the sixth-round of the joint working group talks was held in New Delhi but resulted in
only minor developments. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed a border
agreement dealing with cross-border trade, cooperation on environmental issues (e.g. Pollution,
Animal extinction, Global warming, etc.), and radio and television broadcasting. A senior-level
Chinese military delegation made a goodwill visit to India in December 1993 aimed at "fostering
confidence-building measures between the defence forces of the two countries." The visit, however,
came at a time when China was providing greater military support to Burma. The presence of
Chinese radar technicians in Burma's Coco Islands, which border India's Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, caused concern in India.
In January 1994, Beijing announced that it not only favored a negotiated solution on Kashmir, but
also opposed any form of independence for the region. Talks were held in New Delhi in February
aimed at confirming established "confidence-building measures", discussing clarification of the
"line of actual control", reduction of armed forces along the line, and prior information about
forthcoming military exercises. China's hope for settlement of the boundary issue was reiterated.
In 1995, talks by the India-China Expert Group led to an agreement to set up two additional points
of contact along the 4,000 km border to facilitate meetings between military personnel. The two
sides were reportedly "seriously engaged" in defining the McMahon Line and the line of actual
control vis-à-vis military exercises and prevention of air intrusion. Talks were held in Beijing in
July and in New Delhi in August to improve border security, combat cross-border crimes, and on
additional troop withdrawals from the border. These talks further reduced tensions.[93]
There was little notice taken in Beijing of the April 1995 announcement of the opening of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi. The centre serves as the representative office of the
Republic of China (Taiwan) and is the counterpart of the India-Taipei Association located in
Taiwan. Both institutions share the goal of improving India-ROC relations, which have been
strained since New Delhi's recognition of Beijing in 1950.
China-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests. Indian Defence
Minister George Fernandes declared that "“in my perception of national security, China is enemy
No 1....and any person who is concerned about India's security must agree with that fact",[94]
hinting that India developed nuclear weapons in defence against China's nuclear arsenal. During
the 1999 Kargil War, China voiced support for Pakistan, but also counseled Pakistan to withdraw
its forces.
2000s
In a major embarrassment for China, the 17th Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorje, who was
proclaimed by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim.
Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest to India on the issue would mean
an explicit endorsement on India's governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn't
recognised. In 2003, China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two
countries moved towards resolving their border disputes.
In 2004, the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula

and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim. 2004 was a milestone in China-
Indian bilateral trade, surpassing the US$10 billion mark for
the first time. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
visited Bangalore to push for increased China-Indian
cooperation in high-tech industries. Wen stated that the 21st
century will be "the Asian century of the IT industry."
Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support Indian and Chinese officers at Nathu
the idea, but had returned to a neutral position. La. Nathu La was re-opened in 2006
following numerous bilateral trade
In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation agreements. The opening of the
(SAARC) Summit in 2005, China was granted observer status. pass is expected to bolster the
While other countries in the region are ready to consider China economy of the region and play a
for permanent membership in the SAARC, India seemed key role in the growing China-Indian
reluctant. trade.
In 2005, China and India signed the 'Strategic and Cooperative

Partnership for Peace and Prosperity'.[95] However, there has been very little, if any, strategic
convergence between the two countries.[96]
Issues surrounding energy have risen in significance. Both countries have growing energy demand
to support economic growth. Both countries signed an agreement in 2006 to envisage ONGC
Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing joint bids for
promising projects.
In 2006, China and India re-opened the Nathula pass for trading; Nathula had been closed for 44
years prior to 2006. The re-opening of border trade helps to ease the economic isolation of the
region.[97] In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over the claim of the north-east
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square
kilometres of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its
own.[98]
In 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in
Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would
not need a visa to visit his own country.[99] Later in December 2007, China reversed its policy by
granting a visa to Marpe Sora, an Arunachal-born professor in computer science.[100][101] In
January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China to discuss trade, commerce,
defence, military, and various other issues.
Until 2008, the British Government's position remained the same as it had been since the Simla
Accord of 1913: that China held suzerainty over Tibet but not sovereignty. Britain revised this view
on 29 October 2008, when it recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet through its
website.[102][103][104] The Economist stated that although the British Foreign Office's website does
not use the word sovereignty, officials at the Foreign Office said "it means that, as far as Britain is
concerned, 'Tibet is part of China. Full stop.'"[105] This change in Britain's position affects India's
claim to its North Eastern territories, which rely on the same Simla Accord that Britain's prior
position on Tibet's sovereignty was based upon.[106]
In October 2009, the Asian Development Bank formally

acknowledged Arunachal Pradesh as part of India and
approved a loan to India for a development project there.
Earlier, China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the
loan.[107] However, India succeeded in securing the loan with
the help of the United States and Japan. China expressed
displeasure at the ADB.[108][109]
Hundreds of Tibetans protested
2010s against the Chinese government in
New Delhi, 2008.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to India from
15 to 17 December 2010, at the invitation of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh.[110] He was accompanied by 400 Chinese business leaders, who wished to sign
business deals with Indian companies.[111] During this visit, Premier Wen Jiabao said "India and
China are two very populous countries with ancient civilisations, friendship between the two
countries has a time-honoured history, which can be dated back 2,000 years".[112]
In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in Sanya, Hainan, China,[113] the two countries agreed to
restore defence cooperation and China had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering
stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir.[114][115] This practice was later stopped,[116] and
as a result, defence ties were resumed between the two countries and joint military drills were
expected.
In the March 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party and Chinese President Hu Jintao told Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that "it is
China's unswerving policy to develop China-Indian friendship, deepen strategic cooperation, and
seek common development". Other topics were discussed, including border dispute problems and
a unified BRICS central bank.[117] In April 2012, in response to India's test of an Agni-V missile
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Beijing, the PRC called for the two countries to "cherish
the hard-earned momentum of co-operation".[118]
The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks, before

being defused on 5 May 2013.[119] Days before a trip by
Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to China,
Khurshid said that both countries had a shared interest in
not having the border issue exacerbate or "destroy" long-
term progress in relations. The Chinese agreed to withdraw
their troops in exchange for an Indian agreement to
demolish several "live-in bunkers" 250 km to the south, in
the disputed Chumar sector.[120] Chinese Premier Li
The BRICS leaders in the 2019 G20
Keqiang made his first foreign visit to India on 18 May Osaka summit.
2013.[121][122] Indian President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to
Arunachal Pradesh in late November 2013 and mentioning
in his speech that the area was an "integral and important part of India" angered Beijing, and
retaliatory statements followed.[123][124]
Xi Jinping was one of the top world leaders to visit New Delhi after Narendra Modi took over as
Prime Minister of India in 2014.[125] India's insistence to raise the South China Sea in various
multilateral forums subsequently did not help that beginning once again, the relationship facing
suspicion from Indian administration and media alike.[126] In September 2014, the relationship
took a sting as troops of the People's Liberation Army reportedly entered two kilometres inside the
Line of Actual Control in the Chumar sector.[127] The next month, V. K. Singh said that China and
India had come to a "convergence of views" on the threat of terrorism emanating from
Pakistan.[128]
China and India have been working together to produce

films together, such as Kung Fu Yoga starring Jackie
Chan.[129] However, disruptions have risen again due to
China building trade routes, the China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor, with Pakistan on disputed Kashmir territory.[130]
On 16 June 2017, Chinese troops with construction vehicles
and road-building equipment began extending an existing
road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by
both China as well as India's ally
Bhutan. [131][132][133][134][135][136][137] On 18 June 2017, The Chinese President and Indian
around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two Prime Minister witnessing the signing of
bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from a memorandum of understanding
constructing the road.[133][134][138][139] Among other between the Chinese and Indian foreign
affairs ministers on opening a new route
charges, China accused India of illegal intrusion into its
for Indian pilgrimage (Kailash
territory—what it called the mutually agreed China-India Mansarovar Yatra) to the Tibet
boundary, and violation of its territorial sovereignty and UN Autonomous Region of the People's
Charter.[140] India accused China of changing the status quo Republic of China, in New Delhi in 2014
in violation of a 2012 understanding between the two
governments regarding the tri-junction boundary points
and causing "security concerns", which were widely understood as its concerns with the strategic
Siliguri Corridor.[141][142] India media reported that on June 28, Bhutan issued a demarche,
demanding that China cease road-building in Doklam and leave the area as is.[143] The Minister of
External Affairs of India at the time, Sushma Swaraj, asserted that if China unilaterally altered the
status-quo of the tri-junction point between China-India and Bhutan, the nation would be posing a
challenge to India's security.[144] China repeatedly stated that India's withdrawal was a
prerequisite for meaningful dialogue.[145][146] On 21 July 2017, the Minister of External Affairs of
India Sushma Swaraj said that for dialogue, both India and China must withdraw their troops.[147]
On 2 August 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China published a document claiming that
Indian border forces had illegally crossed the border between China and India and detailed China's
position on the matter.[148][149][150][151] The document said that China notified India regarding its
plan to construct a road in advance, "in full reflection of China's goodwill".[152] The Indian Foreign
Ministry replied by referring towards their earlier press release on this matter, as opposed to a
point-by-point rebuttal.[153] On 28 August 2017, China and India reached a consensus to end the
border stand-off.[154]
In May 2018, the two countries agreed to coordinate their development programmes in
Afghanistan in the areas of health, education, and food security.[155] In 2019, India reiterated that
it would not join China's Belt and Road Initiative, stating that it cannot accept a project that
ignores concerns about its territorial integrity.[156] On 11 October 2019, President Xi Jinping met
with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu, India, for a second informal
meeting between India and China.[157] Modi and Xi Jinping met 18 times between 2014 and
2019.[158]
China offered public health and economic assistance to India in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, although India refused per the United States' request.[159]: 14
2020s
On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu
La, Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.[160][161][162] Following
the skirmishes in Sikkim, tensions between the two countries
grew in Ladakh, with a buildup of troops at multiple
locations.[163] There were 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown
number of PLA soldiers killed on the night of 15/16 June.[164]
China reinforced troops near the Indian border with Tibet,
Chinese state media reported.[165] Bilateral agreements
between India and China prevent the use of guns along the line
The disputed territory of Kashmir is
of actual control. However, these skirmishes saw the first shots, administered by Pakistan (green
warning shots, being fired in decades.[166][167] and lime), India (blue and turquoise)
and China (yellow).
Following the deaths, Prime Minister Modi addressed the
nation about the incident, saying that "the sacrifice made by
our soldiers will not go in vain", while the Indian foreign minister told the Chinese foreign minister
that Chinese actions in Galwan were "pre-meditated".[168] Following the Galwan Valley clash on 15
June 2020, there were renewed calls across India to boycott Chinese goods. However, numerous
Indian government officials said that border tensions would have little impact on trade.[169][170]
On 29 June 2020, the Indian government banned 59 widely used Chinese mobile phone and
desktop applications in response to rising tensions and escalating diplomatic dispute between the
two nations.[171] On 19 August, The Times of India reported that the ministry of external affairs of
India has been told that visas for Chinese businessmen, academics, industry experts, and advocacy
groups will need prior security clearance, and the measures are similar to those that have long
been employed with Pakistan.[172] On 19 September, India police arrested a freelance journalist for
passing sensitive information to Chinese intelligence.[173]
On 27 October 2020, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement, enabling greater information-sharing and further defense cooperation, to counter
China's growing military power in the region.[174]
After the 2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India responded,
"Like many other countries, India, too, is concerned at recent developments. We urge the exercise
of restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions to change status quo, de-escalation of tensions, and
efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region."[175] India stopped reiterating the so-called
"One China" policy as early as 2010.[176]
In September 2022, India and China pulled back soldiers from a friction point along the line of
actual control. However, according to India's Ministry for External Affairs, the situation on the
Line of Actual Control is "still not normal".[177] The Diplomat has reported that normalcy around
the border between the countries seems unlikely and may not develop further.[178]
In June 2023, China placed a technical hold on a proposal moved by the U.S. and co-designated by
India to sanction accused Pakistani terrorist Sajid Mir under the 12/67 Al Qaeda Sanctions
Committee of the UN Security Council. Mir had previously orchestrated bombings in Mumbai,
killing some 175 people.[179] India heavily criticized the Chinese decision.
On 25 August 2023 during the 15th BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, Modi and Xi
spoke on the summit's sidelines where they agreed to deescalate tensions at the border. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China said both leaders "had a candid and in-depth exchange of
views on current China-India relations” and Xi stated that "improving China-India relations serves
the common interests of the two countries and peoples”, while the Ministry of External Affairs of
India stated that during the meeting Modi "underlined that the maintenance of peace and
tranquility in the border areas, and observing and respecting the LAC are essential for the
normalization of the India-China relationship." The meeting was seen as a step toward mending
the bilateral relations between the two countries.[180]
Triangular relations
The United States and Russia (previously Soviet Union) have been a consistent part of
developments in Chinese and Indian relations.
As a major power, Japan has also been part of China–India relations, with initiatives such as the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Pakistan and China share warm relations that drive Chinese
infrastructure projects in the disputed territory of northern Kashmir. The Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa are places where both India and China engage and compete. The Middle East
is important to both countries in terms of their energy security. In Africa, China and India seem
most engaged across a wide variety of issues, from development to peacekeeping. In South Asia
and South-East Asia, a power balance struggle between China and India is seen in triangular
relations.[181]
Nepal
Nepal's geostrategic situation during periods of heightened tensions between China and India,
such as during the 1962 war, resulted in varying shades of cautionary neutrality when making
statements. Nepal's Permanent Representative stated, "we do not want to pass judgement on the
merits of Sino-Indian border dispute. As a country friendly to both...". Tulsi Giri, then the Nepalese
foreign minister, stated, "Nepal's relations with India will remain close [...] Yet, Nepal has a 600-
mile boundary with China, China has now emerged as a great power. Friendly relations with our
northern neighbour (China) should be the natural aim of the country's foreign policy."[182] During
the time Tibet was independent, Nepal played the role as an important buffer state and was central
to influence between the regions.[183]
The China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor (CNIEC) was proposed by China in April 2018.[184] It is
an extension of the agreed upon China-Nepal Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity
Network into India. While China and Nepal have shown favourable reactions towards CNIEC,
India is "indifferent".[185] This indifference is postulated to stem from CNIEC being a part of BRI,
China's growing influence over Nepal, and an end to "India's monopoly over Nepal's transit points
and Nepal's attempt to end its dependency on India".[185]
United States
On 11 November 1950, Sri Aurobindo wrote in Mother India,[186]
"The gesture that can save is to take a firm line with China, denounce openly her
nefarious intentions, stand without reservations by the USA [...] Militarily, China is
almost ten times as strong as we are, but India as the spearhead of an American defence
of democracy can easily halt Mao’s mechanised millions."
On 28 March 1963, Sudhir Ghosh recorded the President of the United States John F Kennedy's
reaction on reading Sri Aurobindo's words, "One great Indian, Nehru, showed you the path of non-
alignment between China and America, and another great Indian Aurobindo, showed you another
way of survival. The choice is up to the people of India." Earlier in the meeting, Ghosh recorded
Kennedy's reaction to a letter from Nehru, "He indignantly said that only a few months earlier
when Mr Nehru was overwhelmed by the power of Communist China, he made desperate appeal to
him for air protection, and non-alignment or no non-alignment, the President had to respond. He
added sarcastically that Mr Nehru's conversion lasted only a few days".[186]
Unlike the left-wing diplomatic leanings of the Indian Congress Party, the BJP administration has
strengthened its strategic partnership with the United States.[187] China faces combined challenges
to its influence with its neighbors, and because it sees a growing threat from India and the United
States' cooperation, it has exaggerated the discord between the two countries to divide and conquer
its rivals.[20]
India participated in the restart of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,[188] and has strengthened the
military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia.[188]
More recently, after the deadly Chinese-initiated clash at Galwan Valley in June 2020, preceded by
the 2017 Doklam standoff, the U.S.-based think tank, the Center for Foreign Relations, explained
that there was a significant ramp-up in QUAD activity.[189][188][190] The group cites how, since
2020, the group has looked beyond regional cooperation and have focused on checking Chinese
regional behavior, with the four navies performing their first joint exercise in over a decade in
November 2020. This was specifically initiated by India in response to the border skirmishes.[190]
Indo-Pacific
Pakistan, and more importantly, Myanmar, other than India itself, are potential land routes into
the Indian Ocean. Pan Qi, Vice Minister for Communications, wrote in 1985 that China would need
to find an outlet for its landlocked provinces. At the time, he suggested routes to the Indian Ocean
through Myanmar.[191]
In the same vein of invigorating relationships with geopolitical allies, India has also strengthened
their Look East Policy, transforming it into the Act East Policy under the Modi
administration.[192][193] The rebranded Act East Policy has an increased focus on infrastructure
projects, such as the Agartala-Akhaura Rail Project and the Asian Trilateral Highway.[194] Such
geopolitical connectivity measures improved India's alliances with the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Vietnam to check Chinese dominance.[193][195] These soft power measures also enhance Indian
border security.[192][195]
Military relations
Border clashes
Since the 1950s, during the term of India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India and China
have repeatedly encountered border disputes at the Line of Actual Control, delineating the border
between the two nations.[196] The first Sino-India border war broke out in 1962 at the Aksai Chin
region, escalating into a month-long military conflict.[196] Initiating the conflict, China took
advantage of global concern about the ongoing Cuban missile crisis to time their regional invasion
in hopes of building a military road in India's Ladakh region.[197]
During the Narendra Modi administration, bloody clashes erupted again on the Sino-Indian
border.[189] The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan, and the vigorous arming of the
Pakistani forces, make India face the threat of a two-front war.[198] Indian officials said the huge
differences between the two sides on the border issue "eroded the entire basis" of their
relationship.[199]
Military exercises
China and India conduct a joint military exercise called
'Exercise Hand–in–Hand'.[200] The exercise began in 2007,
with the second edition taking place in 2008.[201] The third,
fifth, and seventh editions of Hand-in-Hand were conducted in
China in 2013, 2015, and 2018, respectively, while the fourth
edition and sixth editions were held in India in 2014 and INS Kora (P61) escorting PLA Navy
2016.[202] The eighth edition was held in India in 2019.[203] Ship Weifang off Visakhapatnam,
While bilateral military exercises between India and China India, in May 2014, during their visit
to the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval
have ceased over the past few years, India is still accepting
Command.
invitations from Russia for multilateral armed forces exercises
that also happen to host Chinese soldiers.[204]
Water sharing and hydro–politics

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India —
Indus, Satlej, Karnali (Ghaghara), Subansiri, Brahmaputra, and
Lohit (and its tributary Dulai).[205]
Brahma Chellaney has written that "India's formal recognition

of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest
security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian
territorial and river-water interests".[206]
Chinese fishing nets in Kochi,
India has concern with China's water–diversion, dam– Kerala, India.
building, and inter–river plans. More so, in a conflict, India
fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has
already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries, such as the Zangmu Dam,
and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the "great bend" called the Motuo Dam.
India's concerns also stem from the fact that China does not cooperate with regard to timely
sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing, nor does China allow
Indian experts to visit dam sites. There are a number of memoranda of understanding on
hydrological data sharing between the two countries with regard to the Brahmaputra, including
emergency management.[207]
An alternate view is also presented in relation to "misinformation spread by some (Indian)

newspapers" and the waters of Brahmaputra — "80 percent of the waters of the Brahmaputra
emanate from the north side of the Himalayas in China and that that country cannot be the sole
arbiter of its international waters. This is not right. Eighty percent of the waters of the mighty
Brahmaputra are picked up after it enters India" and that Chinese activities have helped India by
reducing annual flood intensity in the north-east.[205]
Economic relations
India-China economic relations have been institutionalized through the Joint Economic Group and
Business Council, as well as more focused efforts such as the "Agreement on the Avoidance of
Double Taxation".[208]
China and India have developed their own complementary skills following a period in which they
had cut themselves off from each other. By 2007, while China excelled at cost-effective
manufacturing, India was skilled in cost effective designing and development. In 2007, Tarun
Khanna wrote in Harvard Business Review that "The simplest, and most powerful, way of
combining China and India is to focus on hardware in China and on software in India."[209] In the
2009 book "Getting China and India Right", the authors suggest a China plus India strategy so as
to strategically benefit from both India's and China's scale, complementary strengths, and reducing
the risk of being unilaterally present.[210]
There are cases when Indian companies have gone to China and done well, such as Mahindra and
Mahindra, while Chinese companies such as Huawei have done well in India. Huawei set up its
Indian unit in 1999 and by 2007, had 1500 engineers. Huawei's Bangalore unit, already one of
Huawei's most important research and development centres, was Capability Maturity Model Level
5 certified in 2003.[209]
In the oil sector, there is competition and engagement — China's Sinopec and China National
Petroleum Corporation and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation fight over oil assets in some
regions, while winning bids as joint ventures in others such as Syria, Colombia, Angola, and
Venezuela.[209]
Since the deterioration of relations between the two countries in the 2010s, India has banned a
large number of Chinese technology companies and software, including Huawei, TikTok, WeChat,
etc., from entering the Indian market.[211] In order to reduce Western countries' previous
dependence on Chinese products, India plays an integral role in boosting supply chain resilience
through friendshoring.[212]
On 18 January 2024, at the World Economic Forum 2024 in Davos, Switzerland, top Indian
industrial policy bureaucrat Rajesh Kumar Singh told Reuters that due to easing of border tensions
between India and China in 2023, India could reduce its heightened scrutiny of Chinese
investments in India although timeframe for it was not given.[213]
Bilateral trade
China is India's 2nd largest trading partner.[214][215]
In June 2012, China asserted that "Sino-Indian ties"

India – China trade at a glance (USD billion)[216]
could be the most "important bilateral partnership of
the century", seemingly substantiated by current
Prime Minister Narenda Modi's historic visit to China in May 2015.[217][218] At that pivotal visit,
Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China, and Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India set a goal to
increase Indo-Chinese bilateral trade to US$100 billion by 2015.[219] At the India-China Business
Forum in Shanghai, Modi claimed that China and India would pool together their manufacturing
capabilities, citing initiative examples, such as building “50 million houses by 2022”, "develop[ing]
smart cities and mega industrial corridors”, and refining FDI policy and modernizing railway
systems together.[218]
Following that conference, bilateral

trade between China and India
touched US$89.6 billion in 2017–18,
with the trade deficit widening to
US$62.9 billion in China's
favor. [220][221] In 2017, the volume of
bilateral trade between India & China
stood at US$84.5 billion.[222] This
figure excludes bilateral trade
between India and Hong Kong, which
stands at another US$34
billion. [223][224] Chinese imports
Bilateral trade between India and China. India's imports from China
from India amounted to $16.4 billion,
— 2010 to 2019.
or 0.8% of its overall imports, and
4.2% of India's overall exports in
2014. Major commodities exported from India to China were: cotton; gems, precious metals, coins;
copper; ores, slag, ash; organic chemicals; salt, sulphur, stone, cement; machines, engines, and
pumps. Chinese exports to India amounted to $58.4 billion or 2.3% of its overall exports, which
made up approximately 12.6% of India's overall imports in 2014.[225][224] Major commodities
exported from China to India were: electronic equipment; machines, engines, pumps; organic
chemicals; fertilizers; iron and steel; plastics; iron or steel products; gems, precious metals, coins;
ships, boats; medical, and technical equipment.[225][224]
In 2018, a Standing Committee on Commerce chaired by Naresh Gujral submitted a report on the
'Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry.'[226] The report pointed out insufficient
implementation of existing anti-dumping laws, reliance on Chinese raw materials in sectors such
as pharmaceuticals, reliance on Chinese imports in India's National Solar Mission, Goods and
Services Tax on certain products resulting in increased imports from China, and Indian smart city
administrations preferring Chinese bicycles over Indian ones.[226] India imported $65.3 billion
worth of goods from China in the fiscal year ended March 2020, and exported $16.6 billion,
according to the commerce ministry.[227]
In 2020, in a departure from the previous pledges of collaboration, Modi instituted bans on
Chinese products, including both intangible apps (TikTok) and tangible goods (toys and
furniture).[228][229][230] Furthermore, the Modi administration created the Phased Manufacturing
Program to encourage India-based cellphone assembly and manufacturing.[228] Under guidance
from this legislation and the accompanying task force to reduce import dependence, India raised
import duties on electronic items produced in China, as well as a laundry list of ancillary
goods.[228][230]
According to a 2021 survey published in ThePrint, 43% of Indians did not buy ‘Made in China’
products since the Galwan clash the previous year.[231] Modi also took notice of Swadeshi Jagran
Manch's (SJM) campaigns, launching or reviving 220 out of 370 anti-dumping suits against
Chinese items ranging from steels, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals.[140][230]
Due to the international sanctions against Russia following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,
Indian oil refiners started using Chinese yuan for payments of Russian oil imports as an alternative
to the US dollar.[232] The Indian government also does not welcome the use of yuan for payments
by its companies.[233]
Public opinion
According to a 2014 BBC World Service Poll, 23% of Indians viewed China positively, with 47%
expressing a negative view, whereas 27% of Chinese people viewed India positively, with 35%
expressing a negative view.[234] A 2014 survey conducted by Pew Research Center had 39% of
Indian respondents holding an unfavourable view of China compared to 31% holding a favourable
view;[235] 72% of the respondents were concerned that territorial disputes between China and
neighbouring countries could lead to a military conflict.[236]
An Observer Research Foundation survey released in August 2021 of Indian youth found that 77%
of respondents distrusted China, which was higher than any other country including Pakistan. 86%
also supported the government's decision to ban Chinese mobile apps.[237] An August 2023 survey
by Pew Research Center found that 67% of Indian respondents had an unfavourable view of
China.[238]
A 2008 poll from Pew Research Center found that in China, views about India were mixed at best
– 25% said India was a partner while 24% said it was an enemy.[239] A 2023 Tsinghua University
survey found that 8% of Chinese respondents had a favourable view of India, 50.6% had an
unfavourable view and 41.5% had a neutral view.[240][241]
See also
China portal
India portal
Politics portal
Bilateral and multilateral relations
Chindian People of mixed Indian and Chinese ancestry

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
China in the Mahabharata
Chindia – China and India together in general, and their economies in particular
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
Bhutan–China relations
Bhutan–India relations
India–Hong Kong relations

China Study Group
India–Tibet relations
Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China
Five Fingers of Tibet
Look East policy (India)
China-South Asia Expo
Border disputes
Sino-Indian border dispute

Aksai Chin – controlled by China and claimed by India.
Chinese salami slicing strategy
Tawang District – controlled by India and claimed by China.
Shaksgam Valley – controlled by China and claimed by India (Conferred to China in 1963 by
Pakistan), Trans-Karakoram Tract.
Bhutan–China border
References
1. Backus, Maria (September 2002). Ancient China. Lorenz Educational Press, 2002. ISBN 978-
0-7877-0557-2.
2. Janin, Hunt (January 1999). The India-japan opium trade in the two century. McFarland, 1999.
ISBN 978-0-7864-0715-6.
3. Tansen Sen (January 2003). Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-
Indian Relations, 600-1400 (https://books.google.com/books?id=blBTHAY_A4wC&q=774+787
+srivijaya). University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-2593-5.
4. Williams, Barbara (2005). World War Two (https://archive.org/details/worldwariipacifi0000will).
Twenty-First Century Books, 2004. ISBN 978-0-8225-0138-1.
5. Lancaster, John (12 April 2005). "India, China Hoping to 'Reshape the World Order' Together"
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43053-2005Apr11.html). The Washington
Post. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110209160559/http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A43053-2005Apr11.html) from the original on 9 February 2011.
6. "Why Indo-China ties will be more favourable than Sino-Pak" (http://www.theworldreporter.com/
2010/07/why-indo-china-ties-will-be-more.html). Theworldreporter.com. 7 July 2010. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20101019172133/http://www.theworldreporter.com/2010/07/why-i
ndo-china-ties-will-be-more.html) from the original on 19 October 2010.
7. India-China trade surpasses target (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/indiachina-trad
e-surpasses-target/article1129785.ece) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013051013033
4/http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/indiachina-trade-surpasses-target/article112978
5.ece) 10 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine, The Hindu, 2 January 2010.
8. "US Becomes India's Biggest Trading Partner, Surpasses China" (https://www.ndtv.com/busine
ss/us-becomes-india-biggest-trading-partner-surpasses-china-3018969). NDTV. 29 May 2022.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220529052719/https://www.ndtv.com/business/us-bec
omes-india-biggest-trading-partner-surpasses-china-3018969) from the original on 29 May
2022. Retrieved 29 May 2022.
9. Jeff M. Smith today's Wall Street Journal Asia (24 June 2009). "The China-India Border Brawl"
(https://web.archive.org/web/20150710060101/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1245788811015
43463). The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original (https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12
4578881101543463) on 10 July 2015. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
10. [1] (http://www.apcss.org/core/BIOS/malik/India-China_Relations.pdf)
11. Joshi, Manoj (2017), Doklam: To start at the very beginning (http://www.orfonline.org/research/
doklam-start-very-beginning/), Observer Research Foundation, archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20171220035217/http://www.orfonline.org/research/doklam-start-very-beginning/) from
the original on 20 December 2017, retrieved 7 February 2018
12. "Galwan Valley: China and India clash on freezing and inhospitable battlefield" (https://www.bb
c.com/news/world-asia-india-53076781). BBC News. 17 June 2020. Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20220531131817/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53076781) from the
original on 31 May 2022. Retrieved 29 September 2021.
13. AK Antony admits China incursion (http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_ak-antony-admits-chi
na-incursion_1592435) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110930132104/http://www.dna
india.com/india/report_ak-antony-admits-china-incursion_1592435) 30 September 2011 at the
Wayback Machine, DNA, 28 September 2011.
14. "China-Pakistan military links upset India" (https://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d5497f0-db8d-11de
-9424-00144feabdc0.html). Financial Times. 27 November 2009. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
15. Lintner, Bertil (30 October 2020). "Behind China's threat to support insurgency in India" (https://
asiatimes.com/2020/10/behind-chinas-threat-to-support-insurgency-in-india/). Asia Times.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20201031104540/https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/behind-
chinas-threat-to-support-insurgency-in-india/) from the original on 31 October 2020. Retrieved
31 October 2020.
16. China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects (http://www.thehindu.com/news/int
ernational/article2455647.ece) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110924173917/http://w
ww.thehindu.com/news/international/article2455647.ece) 24 September 2011 at the Wayback
Machine, The Hindu, 15 September 2011.
17. Aamir Peerzada (16 October 2020). "The Tibetans serving in 'secretive' Indian force" (https://w
ww.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-54464189). BBC News. Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20201019055103/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-54464189) from the original
on 19 October 2020. Retrieved 28 May 2022.
18. Geeta Mohan [in Finnish] (1 January 2022). "China protests Indian MPs' attending Tibetan
reception, Tibet govt-in-exile fires back" (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-protests-ind
ian-mp-attending-tibet-govt-in-exile-reception-1894845-2022-01-01). India Today. Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20220101101625/https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-protests-
indian-mp-attending-tibet-govt-in-exile-reception-1894845-2022-01-01) from the original on 1
January 2022. Retrieved 28 May 2022.
19. "Major Power Rivalry in South Asia" (https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-south-asia).
Council on Foreign Relations. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230424131004/https://w
ww.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-south-asia) from the original on 24 April 2023. Retrieved
24 April 2023.
20. "Analysing China's threat perception of India-United States relations" (https://www.firstpost.co
m/opinion/analysing-chinas-threat-perception-of-india-united-states-relations-12427052.html).
Firstpost. 8 April 2023. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230408162253/https://www.firs
tpost.com/opinion/analysing-chinas-threat-perception-of-india-united-states-relations-1242705
2.html) from the original on 8 April 2023. Retrieved 8 April 2023.
21. Chanhudaro, Ernest J. Mackay, American Oriental Society, 2090
22. Zhao, Deyun (2014). "Study on the etched carnelian beads unearthed in China" (http://www.ka
ogu.cn/uploads/soft/Chinese%20Archaeology/14/20180303y3.pdf) (PDF). Chinese
Archaeology. 14: 176–181. doi:10.1515/char-2014-0019 (https://doi.org/10.1515%2Fchar-2014
-0019). S2CID 132040238 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:132040238). Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20211202073138/http://www.kaogu.cn/uploads/soft/Chinese%20Arch
aeology/14/20180303y3.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2 December 2021. Retrieved
28 February 2021 – via The Institute of Archaeology (CASS).
23. Henry Davidson, A Short History of Chess, p. 6.
24. Colless, Brian (December 1980). "Han and Shen-tu China's Ancient Relations with South Asia".
East and West. 30 (1/4): 157–177. JSTOR 29756564 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/29756564).
Interpretations of the term differ, but there is evidence from Roman sources of Chinese goods
from a place called This travelling from Central Asia to the port of Barygaza and thence to
South India.
25. Zhao, Deyun (2014). "Study on the etched carnelian beads unearthed in China" (http://www.ka
ogu.cn/uploads/soft/Chinese%20Archaeology/14/20180303y3.pdf) (PDF). Chinese
Archaeology. 14: 179. doi:10.1515/char-2014-0019 (https://doi.org/10.1515%2Fchar-2014-001
9). S2CID 132040238 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:132040238). Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20211202073138/http://www.kaogu.cn/uploads/soft/Chinese%20Archaeol
ogy/14/20180303y3.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2 December 2021. Retrieved 28 February
2021 – via The Institute of Archaeology (CASS). Also see "When I was in Bactria (Daxia)",
Zhang Qian reported, "I saw bamboo canes from Qiong and cloth made in the province of Shu
(territories of southwestern China). When I asked the people how they had gotten such articles,
they replied, "Our merchants go buy them in the markets of Shendu (India)." (Shiji 123, Sima
Qian, trans. Burton Watson).
26. Indian Embassy, Beijing. India-China Bilateral Relations – Historical Ties. (http://www.indianem
bassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=1&SubMenuId=0) Archived (https://web.archive.o
rg/web/20130821001742/http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=1&
SubMenuId=0) 21 August 2013 at the Wayback Machine
27. Tan Chung (1998). A Sino-Indian Perspective for India-China Understanding. (http://ignca.nic.i
n/ks_41019.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20070606221357/http://ignca.nic.in/ks_
41019.htm) 6 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine
28. Casson (1989), pp. 51–93.
29. "Old coins narrate Sino-Tamil story" (https://web.archive.org/web/20160605052206/http://www.
newindianexpress.com/cities/chennai/article526352.ece). The New Indian Express. Archived
from the original (http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/chennai/article526352.ece) on 5
June 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
30. Smith, Vincent Arthur (1904), The Early History of India, The Clarendon press, pp. 336–358,
ISBN 81-7156-618-9
31. Srivastava, Balram (1973), Rajendra Chola, National Book Trust, India, p. 80, "The mission
which Rajendra sent to China was essentially a trade mission,..."
32. D. Curtin, Philip (1984), Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge University Press,
p. 101, ISBN 0-521-26931-8
33. Kamil V. Zvelebil (1987). "The Sound of the One Hand", Journal of the American Oriental
Society, Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 125–126.
34. Joseph Needham, Volume 3, p. 109
35. Angela Schottenhammer (2008). The East Asian Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of
Culture, Commerce and Human Migration (https://books.google.com/books?id=GSA_AaRdgio
C&pg=PA138). Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. pp. 138–. ISBN 978-3-447-05809-4. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20160821080515/https://books.google.com/books?id=GSA_AaRdgioC
&pg=PA138) from the original on 21 August 2016.
36. SEN, TANSEN (2006). "The Yuan Khanate and India: Cross-Cultural Diplomacy in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries". Asia Major. 19 (1/2): 299–326. JSTOR 41649921 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/41649921).
37. "Shaykh 'Âlam: the Emperor of Early Sixteenth-Century China" (http://www.sino-platonic.org/co
mplete/spp110_wuzong_emperor.pdf) (PDF). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20161220
223438/http://www.sino-platonic.org/complete/spp110_wuzong_emperor.pdf) (PDF) from the
original on 20 December 2016. Retrieved 17 September 2016. p. 15.
38. Ananth Krishnan (19 July 2013). "Behind China's Hindu temples, a forgotten history" (http://ww
w.thehindu.com/news/national/behind-chinas-hindu-temples-a-forgotten-history/article4932458.
ece). The Hindu. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20140621040237/http://www.thehindu.
com/news/national/behind-chinas-hindu-temples-a-forgotten-history/article4932458.ece) from
the original on 21 June 2014. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
39. China's Hindu temples: A forgotten history (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gcb643uVtSc).
18 July 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160310054322/https://www.youtube.co
m/watch?v=Gcb643uVtSc) from the original on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016 – via
YouTube.
40. China's Hindu temples: A forgotten history (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gcb643uVtSc#t
=0). 18 July 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160310054322/https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Gcb643uVtSc#t=0) from the original on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 16 May
2016 – via YouTube.
41. "Multimedia" (http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/dynamic/01523/TH20_PAGE_1_ANANTH_
1523758g.jpg). The Hindu. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160119135250/http://www.
thehindu.com/multimedia/dynamic/01523/TH20_PAGE_1_ANANTH_1523758g.jpg) from the
original on 19 January 2016.
42. "What to do in Quanzhou: China's forgotten historic port – CNN Travel" (http://travel.cnn.com/q
uanzhou-chinas-forgotten-historic-port-258149/). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201603
05020143/http://travel.cnn.com/quanzhou-chinas-forgotten-historic-port-258149/) from the
original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
43. Chatterjee, Garga (14 May 2017). "OBOR: As Mamata seeks Chinese investment for Bengal,
why is Delhi bent on playing spoilsport?" (https://scroll.in/article/837096/as-mamata-banerjee-s
eeks-chinese-investment-for-bengal-why-is-delhi-bent-on-playing-spoilsport). Scroll Media Inc.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20180907033736/https://scroll.in/article/837096/as-mam
ata-banerjee-seeks-chinese-investment-for-bengal-why-is-delhi-bent-on-playing-spoilsport)
from the original on 7 September 2018. Retrieved 6 September 2018.
44. Nilakanta Sastri 2002, pp. 304–305.
45. From the notes of Abdur Razzak in Nilakanta Sastri 2002, p. 304
46. Cheng, Anne; Kumar, Sanchit (2020). Indian Mendicants in Ming and Qing China: A
Preliminary Study by Matthew W. Mosca in INDIA-CHINA: INTERSECTING UNIVERSALITIES
(https://books.openedition.org/cdf/7531?lang=en). Collège de France. p. 19.
ISBN 9782722605367. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220510021433/https://books.o
penedition.org/cdf/7531?lang=en) from the original on 10 May 2022. Retrieved 10 May 2022.
47. Kamath (2001), p235-236
48. Kamath (2001), p236-237
49. "A sultan's silken dreams" (https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/economy/a-sultan-s-silken-dre
ams-51808). www.downtoearth.org.in. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220821051446/
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/economy/a-sultan-s-silken-dreams-51808) from the
original on 21 August 2022. Retrieved 21 August 2022.
50. Mosca, Matthew W. (31 July 2015). From frontier policy to foreign policy : the question of India
and the transformation of geopolitics in Qing China (http://worldcat.org/oclc/1027518281).
Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-9729-0. OCLC 1027518281 (https://www.worldca
t.org/oclc/1027518281).
51. The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January 1960), pp. 96–125.
52. "When Indian, Chinese soldiers fought together" (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwa
hati/when-indian-chinese-soldiers-fought-together/articleshow/78118475.cms). The Times of
India. 15 September 2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210712165111/https://time
sofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/when-indian-chinese-soldiers-fought-together/articlesho
w/78118475.cms) from the original on 12 July 2021. Retrieved 11 July 2021.
53. Choudhuri, Atonu (29 January 2008). "Monumental neglect of war graves – Discovered in
1997, Jairampur cemetery gets entangled in red tape" (https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-e
ast/monumental-neglect-of-war-graves-discovered-in-1997-jairampur-cemetery-gets-entangled
-in-red-tape/cid/631872). Telegraph India. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202107111816
17/https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/monumental-neglect-of-war-graves-discovered-in
-1997-jairampur-cemetery-gets-entangled-in-red-tape/cid/631872) from the original on 11 July
2021. Retrieved 11 July 2021.
54. "Religion in Chinese Life" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080414144233/http://www.csua.berk
eley.edu/~mrl/HuShih/ReligionChinese.html). Archived from the original (http://csua.berkeley.ed
u/~mrl/HuShih/ReligionChinese.html) on 14 April 2008. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
55. Okakura, Tenshin (1904) Ideal of the East (http://www.sacred-texts.com/shi/ioe) Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20220810193906/https://www.sacred-texts.com/shi/ioe/) 10 August
2022 at the Wayback Machine
56. Sun Yat-sen's speech on Pan-Asianism
57. "In the Footsteps of Xuanzang: Tan Yun-Shan and India" (https://web.archive.org/web/2014031
6053112/http://ignca.nic.in/ks_40034.htm#_edn24). Archived from the original (http://ignca.nic.i
n/ks_40034.htm#_edn24) on 16 March 2014. Retrieved 16 March 2014.
58. Hogel, Bernhard (2005). India and China in the Colonial World (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=IZ5RdT5mHHIC&q=materialism). Berghahn Books. ISBN 9788187358206. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20230424130709/https://books.google.com/books?id=IZ5RdT5mHHIC
&q=materialism) from the original on 24 April 2023. Retrieved 18 March 2023.
59. "Transforming India-Taiwan Relations" (https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph35.pdf) (PDF).
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220526192816/https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph
35.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 26 May 2022. Retrieved 17 June 2022.
60. Playing with Fire: Taiwan and India's Long Courtship (https://www.globalasia.org/v12no3/featur
e/playing-with-fire-taiwan-and-indias-long-courtship_james-baron) Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20230408005631/https://www.globalasia.org/v12no3/feature/playing-with-fire-taiwan
-and-indias-long-courtship_james-baron) 8 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine Global Asia
61. Payne, Robert (6 June 2014). The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=e9WCDwAAQBAJ&q=gandhi%20charmed). Ibooks. ISBN 9781899694792.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230408005628/https://books.google.com/books?id=e
9WCDwAAQBAJ&q=gandhi%20charmed) from the original on 8 April 2023. Retrieved
18 March 2023.
62. "Shaping the Future of Asia" (https://web.archive.org/web/20140611065601/http://www.ace.lu.s
e/images/Syd_och_sydostasienstudier/working_papers/Samarani.pdf) (PDF). Archived from
the original (http://www.ace.lu.se/images/Syd_och_sydostasienstudier/working_papers/Samara
ni.pdf) (PDF) on 11 June 2014.
63. Mishra, Basanta Kumar (12 May 1982). "The Cripps Mission: A Reappraisal" (https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=MoTr7rCnMwEC&dq=Chiang+Jinnah&pg=PA49). Concept Publishing
Company. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230424130707/https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=MoTr7rCnMwEC&dq=Chiang+Jinnah&pg=PA49) from the original on 24 April 2023.
Retrieved 14 March 2023 – via Google Books.
64. Deepak, B. R. (2005). India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=As9qCwAAQBAJ&q=alleged%20that). VIJ Books (India) PVT Limited.
ISBN 9789384464912. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230424130829/https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=As9qCwAAQBAJ&q=alleged%20that) from the original on 24 April 2023.
Retrieved 18 March 2023.
65. Tyson Li, Laura (September 2007). Madame Chiang Kai-Shek – China's Eternal First Lady (htt
ps://books.google.com/books?id=FRY0v7AH2ngC&q=indochina). Grove Press.
ISBN 9780802143228. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230408081109/https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=FRY0v7AH2ngC&q=indochina) from the original on 8 April 2023.
Retrieved 18 March 2023.
66. "Jiang Meets Gandhi" (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602143024/http://125.22.40.134:808

0/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2553/1/Mitter%2C%20Jiang%20meets%20Gandhi.pdf) (PDF).
Archived from the original (http://125.22.40.134:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2553/1/Mitte
r%2C%20Jiang%20meets%20Gandhi.pdf) (PDF) on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 17 June 2022.
67. Pakula, Hannah (2009). The Last Empress Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern
China (https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZpVntUTZfkC&q=nothing%20undone). Simon and
Schuster. ISBN 9781439154236. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230408081108/http
s://books.google.com/books?id=4ZpVntUTZfkC&q=nothing%20undone) from the original on 8
April 2023. Retrieved 18 March 2023.
68. Raghavan, Srinath (10 May 2016). India's War: World War II and the Making of Modern South
Asia (https://books.google.com/books?id=0jVVCwAAQBAJ&dq=soong+gandhi=source=bl&pg=
PP146). Basic Books. ISBN 9780465098620. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230408
005630/https://books.google.com/books?id=0jVVCwAAQBAJ&dq=soong+gandhi=source=bl&p
g=PP146) from the original on 8 April 2023. Retrieved 14 March 2023 – via Google Books.
69. Hogel, Bernhard (2005). India and China in the Colonial World (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=IZ5RdT5mHHIC&q=emphatic). Berghahn Books. ISBN 9788187358206. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20230424130710/https://books.google.com/books?id=IZ5RdT5mHHIC
&q=emphatic) from the original on 24 April 2023. Retrieved 18 March 2023.
70. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers · Volume 1 (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=9iI5WSCjLmMC&q=assurance%20hasty). U.S. Government Printing Office. 1960.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230424130831/https://books.google.com/books?id=9iI
5WSCjLmMC&q=assurance%20hasty) from the original on 24 April 2023. Retrieved 18 March
2023.
71. Why is India's Dr Kotnis revered in China? (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-225993
56) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220901131112/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-a
sia-india-22599356) 1 September 2022 at the Wayback Machine BBC
72. "蒋介石曾以"元首身份"访印度与甘地谈6小时" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131227235219/h
ttp://cul.china.com.cn/lishi/2012-10/17/content_5410894.htm). Archived from the original (http://
cul.china.com.cn/lishi/2012-10/17/content_5410894.htm) on 27 December 2013. Retrieved
11 January 2014.
73. Mohanty, Sachidananda (August 2020). "The Chinese Betrayal, Early Warnings Unheeded:
Lessons from Sardar Patel and Sri Aurobindo" (http://www.friendsoftibet.org/research/downloa
d/The_Chinese_Betrayal_09102020.pdf) (PDF). Friends of Tibet. pp. 21–27. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20210120011402/http://friendsoftibet.org/research/download/The_Chines
e_Betrayal_09102020.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 20 January 2021. Retrieved 30 January
2021.
74. "Xi to Kovind: China-India relations are at a new starting point" (https://www.theweek.in/news/w
orld/2020/04/01/xi-to-kovind-china-india-relations-are-at-a-new-starting-point.html). The Week.
1 April 2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200510111921/https://www.theweek.in/n
ews/world/2020/04/01/xi-to-kovind-china-india-relations-are-at-a-new-starting-point.html) from
the original on 10 May 2020. Retrieved 26 May 2020.
75. "Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and
Business" (https://web.archive.org/web/20060222171729/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China
_Business/HB15Cb02.html). 22 February 2006. Archived from the original (http://www.atimes.c
om/atimes/China_Business/HB15Cb02.html) on 22 February 2006.
76. "Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region" (https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-doc
uments.htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Region).
www.mea.gov.in. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210723162431/https://www.mea.go
v.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Reg
ion) from the original on 23 July 2021. Retrieved 23 July 2021.
77. LL Mehrotra (2000). India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal And Options (https://tibet.net/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/Inidas-Tibet-Policy.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202304080056
29/https://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Inidas-Tibet-Policy.pdf) 8 April 2023 at the
Wayback Machine. pp 25, 26. Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre. Third
edition. New Delhi.
78. "China, quid without a quo: 1954 India-China trade agreement was one-sided affair" (https://ww
w.financialexpress.com/opinion/china-quid-without-a-quo-trade-agreement-was-one-sided-affai
r/2017939/). The Financial Express. 9 July 2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202008
07020627/https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/china-quid-without-a-quo-trade-agreement
-was-one-sided-affair/2017939/) from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 8 August 2020.
79. "Don't believe in Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, Nehru told envoy" (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/
dont-believe-in-hindichini-bhaibhai-nehr/570332/). The Indian Express. Archived (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20110305124336/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dont-believe-in-hindichini-
bhaibhai-nehr/570332/) from the original on 5 March 2011.
80. Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India (https://books.google.com/books?id
=EbtBJb1bsHUC), Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7, pp. 241-242.
81. Hudson, G. F. (1963), "Aksai Chin" (http://pahar.in/?wpfb_dl=20160), Far Eastern Affairs, St.
Antony's Papers, vol. 14, London: Chatto & Windus, archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202
11022112735/http://pahar.in/?wpfb_dl=20160) from the original on 22 October 2021, retrieved
3 March 2021, pp.17–18
82. Fingar, Thomas (2016). "China's Goals in South Asia". The new great game : China and South
and Central Asia in the era of reform (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/939553543). Thomas
Fingar. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 31. ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1.
OCLC 939553543 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/939553543).
83. "The MAN In Sam Manekshaw" (https://www.brut.media/in/news/the-man-in-sam-manekshaw-
3e667609-d683-42ca-a232-fcad67af3763). Brut. Parzor Foundation. 3 July 2020 [2002].
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210301074946/https://www.brut.media/in/news/the-m
an-in-sam-manekshaw-3e667609-d683-42ca-a232-fcad67af3763) from the original on 1 March
2021. Retrieved 8 March 2021. "The life and career of Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji
Manekshaw... Back in 2002, interviewed by his own grandson for a documentary, this is how
he recounted his days […] Thanks to Parzor Foundation for the footage."
84. Bajwa, Farooq Naseem. (30 September 2013). From Kutch to Tashkent : the Indo-Pakistan
war of 1965 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/809939368). London. ISBN 978-1-84904-230-7.
OCLC 809939368 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/809939368). Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20200605140550/http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/809939368) from the original on 5 June
2020. Retrieved 14 January 2021.
85. The Foreign Policy of Sirimavo Bandaranaike – THE COLOMBO POWERS AND THE SINO-
INDIAN WAR OF 1962
86. "Rapprochement Across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations Post Cold"Mishra,
Keshav (2004). Rapprochement Across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations Post
Cold War Period (1947–2003) (https://books.google.com/books?id=pSpncRn2YFYC). Gyan
Publishing House. ISBN 9788178352947. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160106003
728/https://books.google.com/books?id=pSpncRn2YFYC) from the original on 6 January 2016.
Retrieved 15 November 2015. p. 40
87. Ananth Krishnan (25 November 2010). "Huang Hua, diplomat who helped thaw ties with India,
passes away" (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/huang-hua-diplomat-who-helped-th
aw-ties-with-india-passes-away/article913255.ece). The Hindu. Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20160109141426/http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/huang-hua-diplomat-who-
helped-thaw-ties-with-india-passes-away/article913255.ece) from the original on 9 January
88. "Military common sense" (https://web.archive.org/web/20090317092702/http://www.hinduonne
t.com/fline/fl1903/19030740.htm). Archived from the original (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl
1903/19030740.htm) on 17 March 2009. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
89. "indiatodaygroup.com" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080602213750/http://www.indiatodaygro

up.com/itoday/18051998/cover.html). Archived from the original (http://www.indiatodaygroup.co
m/itoday/18051998/cover.html) on 2 June 2008.
90. India's Land of the Rising Sun (http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/apr172005/spotligh
t942292005416.asp) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20051231125701/http://www.decca
nherald.com/deccanherald/apr172005/spotlight942292005416.asp) 31 December 2005 at the
Wayback Machine Deccan Herald
91. "Obituary: Warrior as Scholar: Gen (retd) K Sundarji (1928–1999)" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20090924204131/http://www.india-today.com/itoday/22021999/obit.html). Archived from the
original (http://www.india-today.com/itoday/22021999/obit.html) on 24 September 2009.
Retrieved 16 May 2016.
92. "Need to strengthen border with China" (https://web.archive.org/web/20050223021909/http://w
ww.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/sep03/edst.asp). Deccan Herald. Archived from the
original (http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/sep03/edst.asp) on 23 February 2005.
93. Lin Liangguang Ye Zhengjia and Han Hua, Contemporary China's Relations with South Asia
Countries, Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House 2001.
94. "Why is China alienating half a billion young Indians?" (http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopol
itics/article/2104017/why-china-so-keen-alienate-half-billion-young-indians-no). South China
Morning Post. 25 July 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170725145210/http://ww
w.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2104017/why-china-so-keen-alienate-half-billion-you
ng-indians-no) from the original on 25 July 2017. Retrieved 27 July 2017.
95. "China, India agree on "strategic partnership" " (http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/ssygd/zygx/t1
91496.htm). Chinese Embassy in India. 12 April 2005. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0200217020914/http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191496.htm) from the original
on 17 February 2020. Retrieved 26 May 2020.
96. "The reality of the India-China strategic dialogue" (https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/TtuTsD7C
wbo1nLKDeLDJ4K/The-reality-of-the-IndiaChina-strategic-dialogue.html). Livemint. 24
February 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200727211126/https://www.livemint.co
m/Opinion/TtuTsD7Cwbo1nLKDeLDJ4K/The-reality-of-the-IndiaChina-strategic-dialogue.html)
from the original on 27 July 2020. Retrieved 26 May 2020.
97. "India-China trade link to reopen" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5093712.stm)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20060621055444/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
5093712.stm) 21 June 2006 at the Wayback Machine, BBC News, 19 June 2006. Retrieved 31
January 2007.
98. "India and China row over border" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6145866.stm)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20080215103833/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
6145866.stm) 15 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine, BBC News, 14 November 2006.
Retrieved 31 January 2007.
99. "China denies visa to IAS officer" (http://www.ibnlive.com/news/china-denies-visa-to-ias-officer/
41328-3.html). CNN-IBN. 25 May 2007. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2007082119201
6/http://www.ibnlive.com/news/china-denies-visa-to-ias-officer/41328-3.html) from the original
on 21 August 2007. Retrieved 31 August 2007.
100. "South Asia – Chinese 'border gesture' to India" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/713263
6.stm). 7 December 2007. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160718211146/http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7132636.stm) from the original on 18 July 2016. Retrieved 16 May
2016.
101. "A thaw? China lets Arunachalee visit" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131104011315/http://arti
cles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-12-09/india/27989328_1_marpe-sora-chinese-visa-arun
achalee). The Times of India. Archived from the original (http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.c
om/2007-12-09/india/27989328_1_marpe-sora-chinese-visa-arunachalee) on 4 November
102. David Miliband, Written Ministerial Statement on Tibet (29/10/2008) (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/n

ewsroom/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=8299838) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2008
1202021442/http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=8299838) 2
December 2008 at the Wayback Machine, Foreign Office website. Retrieved 25 November
2008.
103. Richard Spencer, UK recognises China's direct rule over Tibet (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ne
ws/worldnews/asia/tibet/3385803/UK-recognises-Chinas-direct-rule-over-Tibet.html) Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20101103224606/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asi
a/tibet/3385803/UK-recognises-Chinas-direct-rule-over-Tibet.html) 3 November 2010 at the
Wayback Machine, The Daily Telegraph, 5 November 2008
104. Shai Oster, U.K. Policy Angers Tibet Ahead of Beijing Talks (https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12
2549900302589905?mod=googlenews_wsj) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201708050
13206/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122549900302589905?mod=googlenews_wsj) 5 August
2017 at the Wayback Machine, The Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2008
105. Britain's suzerain remedy (http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=125
70571) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20081210165838/http://www.economist.com/wor
ld/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12570571) 10 December 2008 at the Wayback Machine, The
Economist, 6 November 2008
106. Robert Barnett, Did Britain Just Sell Tibet? (https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/opinion/25bar
nett.html?_r=1&ref=opinion) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20150105005512/http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/opinion/25barnett.html?_r=1&ref=opinion) 5 January 2015 at the
Wayback Machine, The New York Times, 24 November 2008
107. "Project Records | Asian Development Bank" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120424055142/htt
p://www2.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=42192). Adb.org. 11 September 2008. Archived from
the original (http://www.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=42192) on 24 April 2012. Retrieved
3 August 2012.
108. "China objected to ADB loan to India" (https://web.archive.org/web/20131106091607/http://new
indianexpress.com/nation/article92904.ece). The New Indian Express. 9 July 2009. Archived
from the original (http://newindianexpress.com/nation/article92904.ece) on 6 November 2013.
Retrieved 3 August 2012.
109. "China objected to ADB loan to India for Arunachal project: Krishna (Lead) – Thaindian News"
(https://web.archive.org/web/20121007035211/http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategori
zed/china-objected-to-adb-loan-to-india-for-arunachal-project-krishna-lead_100215729.html).
Thaindian.com. 9 July 2009. Archived from the original (http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/u
ncategorized/china-objected-to-adb-loan-to-india-for-arunachal-project-krishna-lead_10021572
9.html) on 7 October 2012. Retrieved 3 August 2012.
110. "Chinese premier urges closer cultural, youth links with India – People's Daily Online" (http://en
glish.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7234845.html). People's Daily. 17 December
2010. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20121015130509/http://english.peopledaily.com.c
n/90001/90776/90883/7234845.html) from the original on 15 October 2012. Retrieved 3 August
2012.
111. "Chinese PM Wen Jiabao begins bumper Indian trade trip" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
south-asia-11997221). BBC News. 15 December 2010. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/
20110126030456/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997221) from the original on
26 January 2011.
112. "The Tribune, Chandigarh, India – Main News" (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20101216/m
ain2.htm). The Tribune. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20121102111044/http://www.trib
uneindia.com/2010/20101216/main2.htm) from the original on 2 November 2012. Retrieved
3 August 2012.
113. "Indian PM Manmohan Singh heads to China for talks" (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
13034172). BBC News. 11 April 2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110412035312/
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13034172) from the original on 12 April 2011.
114. "Nri" (http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/visa-and-immigration/china-hints-at-scrapping-stapl

ed-visa-for-j-and-k-people/articleshow/7970880.cms). The Times of India. 13 April 2011.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110418094702/http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/vi
sa-and-immigration/china-hints-at-scrapping-stapled-visa-for-j-and-k-people/articleshow/79708
80.cms) from the original on 18 April 2011.
115. "India, China to restore defence co-operation : Neighbours, News" (http://indiatoday.intoday.in/s
ite/story/india-china-to-restore-defence-co-operation/1/135160.html). India Today. 13 April
2011. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20110801173352/http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/st
ory/india-china-to-restore-defence-co-operation/1/135160.html) from the original on 1 August
2011. Retrieved 3 August 2012.
116. "2011: India, China solve stapled visa issue; put off border talks" (http://economictimes.indiatim
es.com//articleshow/11217007.cms). The Times of India. 23 December 2011. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20170314153435/http://economictimes.indiatimes.com//articleshow/1121
7007.cms) from the original on 14 March 2017.
117. "China wants to deepen strategic cooperation with India: Hu Jintao" (http://economictimes.india
times.com/news/politics/nation/china-wants-to-deepen-strategic-cooperation-with-india-hu-jinta
o/articleshow/12469429.cms). The Times of India. 30 March 2012. Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20170314065809/http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/china-wa
nts-to-deepen-strategic-cooperation-with-india-hu-jintao/articleshow/12469429.cms) from the
original on 14 March 2017.
118. Nelson, Dean. "China warns India of arrogance over missile launch." (https://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9216554/China-warns-India-of-arrogance-over-missile-launch.ht
ml) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120420155645/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/w
orldnews/asia/china/9216554/China-warns-India-of-arrogance-over-missile-launch.html) 20
April 2012 at the Wayback Machine The Telegraph. 20 April 2012.
119. "India says China agrees retreat to de facto border in faceoff deal" (https://www.reuters.com/art
icle/us-india-china-idUSBRE9440B220130506). Reuters Editorial. 6 May 2013. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20150924181040/http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-india-c
hina-idUSBRE9440B220130506) from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 16 May
2016.
120. Defence News. "India Destroyed Bunkers in Chumar to Resolve Ladakh Row" (http://www.defe
ncenews.in/defence-news-internal.asp?get=new&id=1554) Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20130724185744/http://defencenews.in/defence-news-internal.asp?get=new&id=1554) 24
July 2013 at the Wayback Machine. Defence News. 8 May 2013. Retrieved 11 May 2013.
121. "Chinese premier visits India" (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/05/201351972251986
773.html). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160314021927/http://www.aljazeera.com/n
ews/asia/2013/05/201351972251986773.html) from the original on 14 March 2016. Retrieved
16 May 2016.
122. "Joint Statement on the State Visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India" (http://mea.gov.in/bil
ateral-documents.htm?dtl/21723/Joint+Statement+on+the+State+Visit+of+Chinese++Li+Keqia
ng+to+India). Ministry of External Affairs (India). 20 May 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20160109141426/http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F21723%2FJoint+Sta
tement+on+the+State+Visit+of+Chinese++Li+Keqiang+to+India) from the original on 9 January
2016. Retrieved 14 October 2015.
123. Aakriti Bachhawat; The Diplomat. "China's Arunachal Pradesh Fixation" (https://thediplomat.co
m/2013/12/chinas-arunachal-pradesh-fixation/). The Diplomat. Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20160304235102/https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-arunachal-pradesh-fixation/)
from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
124. "China reiterates claim on Arunachal Pradesh through mouthpiece" (http://timesofindia.indiatim

es.com/india/China-reiterates-claim-on-Arunachal-Pradesh-through-mouthpiece/articleshow/26
644947.cms?referral=PM). The Times of India. 30 November 2013. Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20140903225941/http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-reiterates-claim-on
-Arunachal-Pradesh-through-mouthpiece/articleshow/26644947.cms?referral=PM) from the
original on 3 September 2014.
125. Goswami, Ranjit (13 May 2015). "Make China India's natural ally for development" (http://www.
orfonline.org/research/make-china-indias-natural-ally-for-development/). Observer Research
Foundation. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170214182139/http://www.orfonline.org/r
esearch/make-china-indias-natural-ally-for-development/) from the original on 14 February
2017. Retrieved 14 February 2017.
126. Goswami, Ranjit (11 May 2015). "Can Modi Make China India's Natural Ally for Development?"
(http://www.huffingtonpost.in/ranjit-goswami/can-pm-modi-make-china-in_b_7206320.html).
HuffPost. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170214181157/http://www.huffingtonpost.in/
ranjit-goswami/can-pm-modi-make-china-in_b_7206320.html) from the original on 14 February
2017. Retrieved 14 February 2017.
127. "Chinese troops said to be 2 km inside LAC, build-up on the rise" (http://indianexpress.com/arti
cle/india/india-others/chinese-troops-said-to-be-2-km-inside-lac-build-up-on-the-rise/). The
Indian Express. 23 September 2014. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160305160702/h
ttp://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/chinese-troops-said-to-be-2-km-inside-lac-buil
d-up-on-the-rise/) from the original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
128. Krishnan, Ananth (31 October 2014). "Delhi, Kabul warn China: Pak maybe your ally but it
exports terror" (http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/afghanistan-meet-china-india-pakistan-terror-c
oncerns-border-taliban-terrorism/1/398565.html). India Today. Living Media India Limited.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20141101124724/http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/afgha
nistan-meet-china-india-pakistan-terror-concerns-border-taliban-terrorism/1/398565.html) from
the original on 1 November 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
129. Patrick Frater (4 November 2015). "AFM: Golden Network Kicks Off With Jackie Chan Movie
Pair" (https://variety.com/2015/film/asia/jackie-chan-pair-for-golden-network-1201632878/).
Variety. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170202063731/http://variety.com/2015/film/asi
a/jackie-chan-pair-for-golden-network-1201632878/) from the original on 2 February 2017.
Retrieved 1 November 2016.
130. "India to boycott China summit amid Kashmir concerns" (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/new
s/asiapacific/india-to-boycott-china-summit-amid-kashmir-concerns-8844892). Channel
NewsAsia. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170516170650/http://www.channelnewsasi
a.com/news/asiapacific/india-to-boycott-china-summit-amid-kashmir-concerns-8844892) from
the original on 16 May 2017. Retrieved 27 July 2017.
131. "Press Release – Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (https://web.archive.org/web/20170630023420/htt
p://www.mfa.gov.bt/press-releases/press-release-272.html). mfa.gov.bt. Archived from the
original (http://www.mfa.gov.bt/press-releases/press-release-272.html) on 30 June 2017.
132. China Foreign Ministry 2017, p. 6.
133. Barry, Steven Lee Myers, Ellen; Fisher, Max (26 July 2017). "How India and China Have Come
to the Brink Over a Remote Mountain Pass" (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/d
olam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (https://www.wo
rldcat.org/issn/0362-4331). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170827150313/https://ww
w.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-bhutan.html) from the original
on 27 August 2017. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
134. "China says India violates 1890 agreement in border stand-off" (https://www.reuters.com/articl
e/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109). Reuters. 3 July 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20170815072409/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109) from the
135. Safi, Michael (5 July 2017). "Chinese and Indian troops face off in Bhutan border dispute" (http
s://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/china-india-bhutan-standoff-disputed-territory). The
Guardian. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170810170337/https://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2017/jul/06/china-india-bhutan-standoff-disputed-territory) from the original on 10
August 2017. Retrieved 10 August 2017.
136. "Doklam standoff: China sends a warning to India over border dispute" (https://www.latimes.co
m/world/la-fg-china-india-doklam-standoff-20170724-story.html). Los Angeles Times.
Associated Press. 24 July 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170811062048/http://
www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-china-india-doklam-standoff-20170724-story.html) from the
137. Heydarian, Richard (24 June 2019). "Beijing's Inchoate Hegemony: The Brewing Backlash in
Asia to China's Resurgence" (https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/24/beijing-s-inchoate-he
gemony-brewing-backlash-in-asia-to-china-s-resurgence-pub-79302). Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230518092319/https://carnegieen
dowment.org/2019/06/24/beijing-s-inchoate-hegemony-brewing-backlash-in-asia-to-china-s-res
urgence-pub-79302) from the original on 18 May 2023. Retrieved 8 April 2023.
138. Safi, Michael (5 July 2017). "Chinese and Indian troops face off in Bhutan border dispute" (http
s://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/china-india-bhutan-standoff-disputed-territory). The
Guardian. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170810170337/https://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2017/jul/06/china-india-bhutan-standoff-disputed-territory) from the original on 10
August 2017. Retrieved 10 August 2017.
139. "China warns Indian troops to get out of contested region" (http://accesswdun.com/article/2017/
8/566782). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170810132801/http://accesswdun.com/arti
cle/2017/8/566782) from the original on 10 August 2017. Retrieved 10 August 2017.
140. China Foreign Ministry (2 August 2017). "The Facts and China's Position Concerning the
Indian Border Troops' Crossing of the China-India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the
Chinese Territory (2017-08-02)" (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/
P020170802542676636134.pdf) (PDF). fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170802010101/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt
_665385/2649_665393/P020170802542676636134.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2 August
2017. Retrieved 15 August 2017.
141. "Recent Developments in Doklam Area" (http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28572/Rece
nt_Developments_in_Doklam_Area). mea.gov.in. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170
816104552/http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F28572%2FRecent_Developments_in_
Doklam_Area) from the original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
142. Diplomat, Ankit Panda, The. "What's Driving the India-China Standoff at Doklam?" (https://thedi
plomat.com/2017/07/whats-driving-the-india-china-standoff-at-doklam/). The Diplomat.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170719092125/https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/what
s-driving-the-india-china-standoff-at-doklam/) from the original on 19 July 2017. Retrieved
17 August 2017.
143. "Bhutan issues demarche to China over its army's road construction" (http://indianexpress.com/
article/world/bhutan-issues-demarche-to-china-over-its-armys-road-construction-4726615/). 28
June 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170729002236/http://indianexpress.com/a
rticle/world/bhutan-issues-demarche-to-china-over-its-armys-road-construction-4726615/) from
the original on 29 July 2017. Retrieved 28 July 2017.
144. "If China unilaterally changes status-quo in Doklam, it's a challenge to our security: Sushma
Swaraj" (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/sushma-swaraj-rajya-sabha-bhutan-sikkim-china
-india-doklam-standoff-4759229/). The Indian Express. 20 July 2017. Archived (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20170729010029/http://indianexpress.com/article/india/sushma-swaraj-rajya-sab
ha-bhutan-sikkim-china-india-doklam-standoff-4759229/) from the original on 29 July 2017.
Retrieved 27 July 2017.
145. ANI (10 July 2017). "Doklam stand-off: China wants India to retreat for meaningful dialogue" (ht
tp://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/doklam-stand-off-china-wants-india-to-re
treat-for-meaningful-dialogue-117071000810_1.html). Business Standard. Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20170729005142/http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/d
oklam-stand-off-china-wants-india-to-retreat-for-meaningful-dialogue-117071000810_1.html)
from the original on 29 July 2017. Retrieved 27 July 2017.
146. Rise of the India (20 July 2017). "China said India's withdrawal a prerequisite for meaningful
dialogue" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SJGrLuamEw). Archived (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20190302011517/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SJGrLuamEw) from the original
on 2 March 2019. Retrieved 27 July 2017 – via YouTube.
147. Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (21 July 2017). "For dialogue, both India and China must withdraw
troops, says Sushma Swaraj" (http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-aimin
g-at-unilaterally-changing-tri-junction-status-sushma-swaraj/articleshow/59681474.cms). The
Economic Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170729030245/http://economictime
s.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-aiming-at-unilaterally-changing-tri-junction-status-sushm
a-swaraj/articleshow/59681474.cms) from the original on 29 July 2017. Retrieved 27 July 2017.
148. "印度边防部队在中印边界锡金段越界进入中国领土的事实和中国的立场" (http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/web/zyxw/P020170802541371281020.pdf) (PDF) (in Chinese). Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20170802164857/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/P020170802541371281020.pd
f) (PDF) from the original on 2 August 2017.
149. "The Facts and China's Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops' Crossing of the China-
India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector into the Chinese Territory (2017-08-02)" (http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/P020170802542676636134.pdf) (PDF).
fmprc.gov.cn. 2 August 2017. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170802010101/http://ww
w.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/P020170802542676636134.pdf) (PDF)
from the original on 2 August 2017. Retrieved 12 August 2017.
150. "China issues position document on Indian border troop trespass – Xinhua | English.news.cn"
(https://web.archive.org/web/20190821205225/http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-08/02/c
_136494051.htm). Xinhua News Agency. Archived from the original (http://www.xinhuanet.co
m//english/2017-08/02/c_136494051.htm) on 21 August 2019. Retrieved 21 August 2019.
151. Blanchard, Ben (4 August 2017). "China says India building up troops amid border stand-off" (h
ttps://www.yahoo.com/news/china-says-india-building-troops-amid-border-stand-002422962.ht
ml). Reuters. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20170805063513/https://www.yahoo.com/n
ews/china-says-india-building-troops-amid-border-stand-002422962.html) from the original on
5 August 2017. Retrieved 5 August 2017.
152. Ministry of External Affairs, India (4 August 2017), Weekly Media Briefing by Official
Spokesperson (August 4, 2017) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJnAoru8VsY), archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20190302011516/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJnAoru8Vs
Y) from the original on 2 March 2019, retrieved 16 August 2017
153. TheWire (2 August 2017). "With the Release of an Official Document, China Ups the Ante
Again on Doklam" (https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-doklam-document). The Wire. Archived (h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20180626164115/https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-doklam-docume
nt) from the original on 26 June 2018. Retrieved 26 June 2018.
154. Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (29 August 2017). "Doklam: There won't be a war at Doklam as India
and China agree to disengage" (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-natio
n/there-wont-be-a-war-at-doklam-as-india-and-china-agree-to-disengage/articleshow/6025548
5.cms). The Economic Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20201111150216/http://ec
onomictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/there-wont-be-a-war-at-doklam-as-india-
and-china-agree-to-disengage/articleshow/60255485.cms) from the original on 11 November
2020. Retrieved 3 October 2020.
155. India, China likely to jointly undertake projects in Afghanistan (https://economictimes.indiatime

s.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-china-likely-to-jointly-undertake-projects-in-afghanistan/art
icleshow/64057491.cms) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20180507223039/https://econo
mictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-china-likely-to-jointly-undertake-project
s-in-afghanistan/articleshow/64057491.cms) 7 May 2018 at the Wayback Machine, The
Economic Times, 7 May 2018.
156. "India won't join BRI, its concept won't apply to us: Jaishankar" (https://www.aninews.in/news/n
ational/general-news/india-wont-join-bri-its-concept-wont-apply-to-us-jaishankar201910041611
40/). Asian News International. 4 October 2019. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/201910
06024513/https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/india-wont-join-bri-its-concept-w
ont-apply-to-us-jaishankar20191004161140/) from the original on 6 October 2019. Retrieved
5 October 2019.
157. Mehta, Ashok K. (10 October 2020). "PM Modi, Xi Jinping Spend "Quality Time", Talk Trade,
Terror: 10 Points" (https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/xi-jinping-india-china-informal-summit-bord
er-terror-on-agenda-at-pm-modi-xi-meet-today-2115002). NDTV. Archived (https://web.archive.
org/web/20201018042412/https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/xi-jinping-india-china-informal-sum
mit-border-terror-on-agenda-at-pm-modi-xi-meet-today-2115002) from the original on 18
October 2020. Retrieved 10 October 2020.
158. Mehta, Ashok K. (10 October 2020). "Where Does the India-China Border Dispute Stand Now,
and What Can We Expect?" (https://thewire.in/security/india-china-lac-border-dispute). The
Wire. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20201015085914/https://thewire.in/security/india-c
hina-lac-border-dispute) from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 10 October 2020.
159. Korolev, Alexander S. (2023). "Political and Economic Security in Multipolar Eurasia". China
and Eurasian Powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and
Cyberspace. Mher Sahakyan. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-003-35258-7.
OCLC 1353290533 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1353290533).
160. Janjua, Haroon (10 May 2020). "Chinese and Indian troops injured in border brawl" (https://ww
w.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injured-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r). The
Times. ISSN 0140-0460 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0140-0460). Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20200512042352/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injur
ed-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r) from the original on 12 May 2020. Retrieved 12 May 2020.
161. "Indian and Chinese soldiers injured in cross-border fistfight, says Delhi" (https://www.theguardi
an.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfight-says-d
elhi). The Guardian. Agence France-Presse. 11 May 2020. ISSN 0261-3077 (https://www.world
cat.org/issn/0261-3077). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200512035152/https://www.t
heguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfigh
t-says-delhi) from the original on 12 May 2020. Retrieved 12 May 2020.
162. Vedika Sud; Ben Westcott (11 May 2020). "Chinese and Indian soldiers engage in 'aggressive'
cross-border skirmish" (https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/11/asia/china-india-border-dispute-intl-hn
k/index.html). CNN. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200512041538/https://www.cnn.c
om/2020/05/11/asia/china-india-border-dispute-intl-hnk/index.html) from the original on 12 May
163. Sushant Singh, Chinese intrusions at 3 places in Ladakh, Army chief takes stock (https://indian
express.com/article/india/m-m-naravane-army-chief-line-of-actual-control-lac-chinese-transgres
sions-6424478/) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200530185104/https://indianexpress.
com/article/india/m-m-naravane-army-chief-line-of-actual-control-lac-chinese-transgressions-64
24478/) 30 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, The Indian Express, 24 May 2020.
164. Pubby, Manu (17 June 2020). "Over 20 soldiers, including Commanding Officer killed at
Galwan border clash with China" (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/over-20
-soldiers-including-commanding-officer-killed-at-galwan-border-clash-with-china/articleshow/76
410908.cms). The Economic Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200617021553/ht
tps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/over-20-soldiers-including-commanding-offi
cer-killed-at-galwan-border-clash-with-china/articleshow/76410908.cms) from the original on 17
June 2020. Retrieved 17 June 2020.
165. "China sent martial artists to LAC before deadly clash: Report" (https://www.aljazeera.com/new
s/2020/06/china-martial-artists-lac-deadly-clash-report-200628073902603.html). Aljazeera. 28
June 2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200703141355/https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2020/06/china-martial-artists-lac-deadly-clash-report-200628073902603.html) from the
original on 3 July 2020. Retrieved 4 July 2020.
166. Patranobis, Sutirtho (28 June 2020). "China deployed martial art trainers along Tibet during
border tension with India: Reports" (https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-deploye
d-martial-art-trainers-along-tibet-during-border-tension-with-india-reports/story-wf9kJluUhDHpk
MPYTgDSAP.html). Hindustan Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200705003427/
https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-deployed-martial-art-trainers-along-tibet-dur
ing-border-tension-with-india-reports/story-wf9kJluUhDHpkMPYTgDSAP.html) from the original
on 5 July 2020. Retrieved 4 July 2020.
167. Singh, Vijaita (11 September 2020). "LAC standoff | Officials confirm two incidents of firing at
south bank of Pangong Tso" (https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-officials-con
firm-two-incidents-of-firing-at-south-bank-of-pangong-tso/article32576781.ece). The Hindu.
ISSN 0971-751X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0971-751X). Archived (https://web.archive.org/
web/20201104150422/https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-officials-confirm-tw
o-incidents-of-firing-at-south-bank-of-pangong-tso/article32576781.ece) from the original on 4
November 2020. Retrieved 11 September 2020.
168. Laskar, Rezaul H; Singh, Rahul; Patranobis, Sutirtho (18 June 2020). "India warns China of
serious impact on ties, Modi talks of 'befitting' reply" (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne
ws/india-warns-china-of-serious-impact-on-ties-modi-talks-of-befitting-reply/story-pWgAXVlQT7
yeQnepFpzj3O.html). Hindustan Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2020061722433
5/https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-warns-china-of-serious-impact-on-ties-mod
i-talks-of-befitting-reply/story-pWgAXVlQT7yeQnepFpzj3O.html) from the original on 17 June
2020. Retrieved 18 June 2020.
169. Suneja, Kirtika; Agarwal, Surabhi (17 June 2020). "Is This Hindi-Chini Bye Bye on Trade Front?
Maybe Not: No immediate impact likely on business relations, say govt officials" (https://epape
r.timesgroup.com/) (print version). The Economic Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/
20200617152043/https://epaper.timesgroup.com/TOI/TimesOfIndia/index.html?a=c/) from the
original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 18 June 2020.
170. P, Neelam; ey (16 June 2020). "Traders' body calls for boycott of 3,000 Chinese products over
'continued' border clashes" (https://theprint.in/india/traders-body-calls-for-boycott-of-3000-chine
se-products-over-continued-border-clashes/442885/). ThePrint. Archived (https://web.archive.o
rg/web/20200618094901/https://theprint.in/india/traders-body-calls-for-boycott-of-3000-chinese
-products-over-continued-border-clashes/442885/) from the original on 18 June 2020.
Retrieved 17 June 2020.
171. "Tik Tok ban in India: Centre bans 59 mobile apps including Tik Tok. This action was taken by
the Indian government after a border conflict with China that left over twenty Indian soldiers
dead. UC Browser, others" (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/centre-
bans-59-mobile-apps-including-tik-tok-uc-browser-others/articleshow/76694828.cms). The
Times of India. 29 June 2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20200629223334/https://ti
mesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/centre-bans-59-mobile-apps-including-tik-t
ok-uc-browser-others/articleshow/76694828.cms) from the original on 29 June 2020. Retrieved
29 June 2020.
172. Bloomberg (21 August 2020). "India slaps new curbs on visas, schools to stem China's
influence" (https://web.archive.org/web/20200822060654/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/in
dia/india-slaps-new-curbs-on-visas-schools-to-stem-chinas-influence/articleshow/77675489.cm
s). The Times of India. Archived from the original (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indi
a-slaps-new-curbs-on-visas-schools-to-stem-chinas-influence/articleshow/77675489.cms) on
22 August 2020. Retrieved 21 August 2020.
173. The Time of India. "Chinese spy ring busted in Delhi, 3 held" (https://web.archive.org/web/2020
0920035648/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/chinese-spy-ring-busted-in-delhi-
3-held/videoshow/78203014.cms). The Times of India. Archived from the original (https://times
ofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/chinese-spy-ring-busted-in-delhi-3-held/videoshow/782030
14.cms) on 20 September 2020. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
174. Griffiths, James (27 October 2020). "India signs defensive agreement with US following
Himalayan standoff with China" (https://web.archive.org/web/20201028052816/https://www.cn
n.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html). CNN. Archived from the
original (https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html) on
28 October 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
175. Laskar, Rezaul H (12 August 2022). "In 1st remarks on Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan trip, India
doesn't mention 'one-China' policy" (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-1st-remark
s-on-pelosi-s-taiwan-trip-india-doesn-t-mention-one-china-policy-101660315978897.html).
Hindustan Times. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220812150023/https://www.hindust
antimes.com/india-news/in-1st-remarks-on-pelosi-s-taiwan-trip-india-doesn-t-mention-one-chin
a-policy-101660315978897.html) from the original on 12 August 2022. Retrieved 13 August
2022.
176. "Explained: The 'One China' policy on Taiwan and India's stance on it" (https://www.firstpost.co
m/explainers/explained-the-one-china-policy-on-taiwan-and-indias-stance-on-it-11009041.htm
l). First post. 4 August 2022. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230527100853/https://w
ww.firstpost.com/explainers/explained-the-one-china-policy-on-taiwan-and-indias-stance-on-it-
11009041.html) from the original on 27 May 2023. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
177. "India-China Situation "Still Not Normal", Says Government" (https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/i
ndia-china-situation-still-not-normal-says-government-3411397). NDTV. Archived (https://web.a
rchive.org/web/20221007131551/https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-china-situation-still-not
-normal-says-government-3411397) from the original on 7 October 2022. Retrieved 7 October
2022.
178. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. "China-India Relations in a State of Limbo" (https://thediplomat.c
om/2022/08/china-india-relations-in-a-state-of-limbo/). DIPLOMAT MEDIA INC. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20221023215517/https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/china-india-relation
s-in-a-state-of-limbo/) from the original on 23 October 2022. Retrieved 23 October 2022.
179. "India slams China at UN for blocking move to designate 2611 accused Sajid Mir as 'global
terrorist' " (https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slams-china-at-un-for-blocking-move-
to-designate-2611-accused-sajid-mir-as-global-terrorist/article66993043.ece). The Hindu. 21
June 2023. ISSN 0971-751X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0971-751X). Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20230624144712/https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slams-china-
at-un-for-blocking-move-to-designate-2611-accused-sajid-mir-as-global-terrorist/article6699304
3.ece) from the original on 24 June 2023. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
180. Moghul, Rhea; McCarthy, Simone (25 August 2023). "India's Modi and China's Xi agree to
'intensify efforts' to deescalate border issue following rare meeting" (https://edition.cnn.com/202
3/08/24/asia/brics-summit-india-china-modi-xi-meeting-intl-hnk/index.html). CNN. Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20230826223944/https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/24/asia/brics-sum
mit-india-china-modi-xi-meeting-intl-hnk/index.html) from the original on 26 August 2023.
181. Bajpai, Kanti; Ho, Selina; Miller, Manjari Chatterjee (25 February 2020). "Introduction: Taking
stock—a multi–disciplinary view of China–India relations. The impact of triangular relations.".
Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations (https://books.google.com/books?id=r6PSDwA
AQBAJ). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-00154-0.
182. Upadhyaya, Priyankar (1987). "2". Nonaligned States and India's International Conflicts
(Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Jawaharlal Nehru University
thesis) (http://hdl.handle.net/10603/16265). Centre For International Politics Organization And
Disarmament School Of International Studies New Delhi. pp. 75–80. hdl:10603/16265 (https://h
dl.handle.net/10603%2F16265).
183. Upadhya, Sanjay (27 February 2012). Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and
India (https://books.google.com/books?id=M8nfCgAAQBAJ). Routledge. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-136-
33550-1.
184. PTI (18 April 2018). "India China Nepal economic corridor: China moots India-Nepal-China
economic corridor through Himalayas" (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-m
oots-india-nepal-china-economic-corridor-through-himalayas/articleshow/63815372.cms). The
Times of India. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210625070642/https://timesofindia.indi
atimes.com/world/china/china-moots-india-nepal-china-economic-corridor-through-himalayas/a
rticleshow/63815372.cms) from the original on 25 June 2021. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
185. Behera, Anshuman; Mayilvaganan, M. (4 March 2021). "The China–Nepal–India Economic
Corridor: wishful thinking or regional aspiration beyond rhetoric?" (https://doi.org/10.1080/0035
8533.2021.1904586). The Round Table. 110 (2): 250–263.
doi:10.1080/00358533.2021.1904586 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00358533.2021.1904586).
ISSN 0035-8533 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0035-8533). S2CID 233464054 (https://api.se
manticscholar.org/CorpusID:233464054).
186. Mohanty, Sachidananda (August 2020). "The Chinese Betrayal, Early Warnings Unheeded:
Lessons from Sardar Patel and Sri Aurobindo" (http://www.friendsoftibet.org/research/downloa
d/The_Chinese_Betrayal_09102020.pdf) (PDF). Friends of Tibet. pp. 16–19. Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20210120011402/http://friendsoftibet.org/research/download/The_Chines
e_Betrayal_09102020.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 20 January 2021. Retrieved 30 January
2021.
187. Šumit, Ganguly (2022). "Obama, Trump and Indian foreign policy under Modi" (https://www.ncb
i.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7980102). Nature Public Health Emergency Collection. 59 (1):
9–23. doi:10.1057/s41311-021-00294-4 (https://doi.org/10.1057%2Fs41311-021-00294-4).
PMC 7980102 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7980102).
188. Smith, Sheila. "The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know" (https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-i
ndo-pacific-what-know). Council on Foreign Relations. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0230503162143/https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know) from the original on 3
May 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
189. "Galwan Valley: China and India clash on freezing and inhospitable battlefield" (https://www.bb
c.com/news/world-asia-india-53076781). BBC News. 17 June 2020. Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20220531131817/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53076781) from the
original on 31 May 2022. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
190. Karackattu, Joe Thomas (26 May 2020). "The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border
Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan" (https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.18
04726). Asian Affairs. 51 (3): 590–604. doi:10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726 (https://doi.org/1
0.1080%2F03068374.2020.1804726). ISSN 0306-8374 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0306-83
74). S2CID 222093756 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:222093756).
191. Lintner, Bertil (15 April 2019). "Introduction". The Costliest Pearl: China's Struggle for India's
Ocean (https://books.google.com/books?id=fN-RDwAAQBAJ). Oxford University Press. p. 3.
ISBN 978-1-78738-240-4.
192. Hall, Ian; Ganguly, Šumit (1 February 2022). "Introduction: Narendra Modi and India's foreign
policy" (https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00363-8). International Politics. 59 (1): 1–8.
doi:10.1057/s41311-021-00363-8 (https://doi.org/10.1057%2Fs41311-021-00363-8).
ISSN 1740-3898 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1740-3898). PMC 8556799 (https://www.ncbi.n
lm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8556799).
193. Banerjee, Anamitra (25 April 2022). "Comparing India's Look East and Act East Policies" (http
s://www.jkpi.org/comparing-indias-look-east-and-act-east-policies/). JK Policy Institute.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230501021839/https://www.jkpi.org/comparing-indias-l
ook-east-and-act-east-policies/) from the original on 1 May 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
194. "Comparing India's Look East and Act East Policies" (https://www.jkpi.org/comparing-indias-loo
k-east-and-act-east-policies/). JK Policy Institute. 25 April 2022. Archived (https://web.archive.o
rg/web/20230501021839/https://www.jkpi.org/comparing-indias-look-east-and-act-east-policie
s/) from the original on 1 May 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
195. Jha, Prem Shankar (May 2017). "China–India Relations under Modi: Playing with Fire" (http://jo
urnals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0009445517696630). China Report. 53 (2): 158–171.
doi:10.1177/0009445517696630 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0009445517696630). ISSN 0009-
4455 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0009-4455). S2CID 157801747 (https://api.semanticschola
r.org/CorpusID:157801747). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230501021839/https://jou
rnals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0009445517696630) from the original on 1 May 2023.
Retrieved 12 May 2023.
196. Zhu, Cuiping (12 August 2017). India's Ocean: Can China and India Coexist? (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=9fwwDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22India+can+successfully+reshape+Asia%E2%8
0%99s+post-colonial+order%22+nehru&pg=PA42). Springer. ISBN 978-981-10-5726-7.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230827230020/https://books.google.com/books?id=9f
wwDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22India+can+successfully+reshape+Asia%E2%80%99s+post-colonial+
order%22+nehru&pg=PA42) from the original on 27 August 2023. Retrieved 22 June 2023.
197. "Sino-Indian War | Causes, Summary, & Casualties" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sino-Ind
ian-War). www.britannica.com. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230521172340/https://
www.britannica.com/topic/Sino-Indian-War) from the original on 21 May 2023. Retrieved
27 April 2023.
198. G, C. (19 April 2021). "The Challenge of a Two-Front War: India's China-Pakistan Dilemma •
Stimson Center" (https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-challenge-of-a-two-front-war-indias-china-p
akistan-dilemma/). Stimson Center. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230418103545/htt
ps://www.stimson.org/2021/the-challenge-of-a-two-front-war-indias-china-pakistan-dilemma/)
from the original on 18 April 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
199. Ellis-Petersen, Hannah; Hassan, Aakash (28 April 2023). "Indian anger and Chinese
indifference quash hopes of border resolution" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/2
8/india-accuses-china-of-aggressions-amid-border-stalemate). The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077
(https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0261-3077). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2023051520
4007/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/28/india-accuses-china-of-aggressions-ami
d-border-stalemate) from the original on 15 May 2023. Retrieved 15 May 2023.
200. "Military Exercises" (https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1605121). PIB. 4 March
2020. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20220603210046/https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseD
etail.aspx?PRID=1605121) from the original on 3 June 2022. Retrieved 7 November 2020.
201. Bhattacharyya, Rajeev (27 December 2019). "Hand-in-Hand 2019: Indian and Chinese Armies
Come Together for Joint Military Exercise" (https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/hand-in-hand-201
9-indian-and-chinese-armies-come-together-for-joint-military-exercise/). The Diplomat.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20201127160719/https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/hand-
in-hand-2019-indian-and-chinese-armies-come-together-for-joint-military-exercise/) from the
original on 27 November 2020. Retrieved 7 November 2020.
202. Kishore Kumar Khera (2017). International Military Exercises: An Indian Perspective (https://ids
a.in/system/files/jds/jds_11_3_2017_international-military-exercises.pdf) Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20201224035134/https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds_11_3_2017_international-
military-exercises.pdf) 24 December 2020 at the Wayback Machine, Journal of Defence
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 July–September 2017, pp. 17–40
203. "Exercise Hand-in-Hand 2019: Troops from India, China to conduct joint drill this week" (https://
www.financialexpress.com/defence/exercise-hand-in-hand-2019-troops-from-india-china-to-con
duct-joint-drill-this-week/1782237/). The Financial Express. 2 December 2019. Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20210415013646/https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/exercise-
hand-in-hand-2019-troops-from-india-china-to-conduct-joint-drill-this-week/1782237/) from the
original on 15 April 2021. Retrieved 7 November 2020.
204. "Does China-Russia Cooperation Hurt India's National Interests?" (https://thediplomat.com/202

3/04/does-china-russia-cooperation-hurt-indias-national-interests/). thediplomat.com. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/20230425175205/https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/does-china-rus
sia-cooperation-hurt-indias-national-interests/) from the original on 25 April 2023. Retrieved
25 April 2023.
205. Bhattacharji, Romesh (4 December 2009). "Where is the dam?" (https://frontline.thehindu.com/
world-affairs/article30185326.ece). The Hindu. Frontline. Archived (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20201021075434/https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article30185326.ece) from the
original on 21 October 2020. Retrieved 4 November 2020.
206. Chellaney, Brahma (2011). Water: Asia's New Battleground (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=XvDWA3wlc8AC). Georgetown University Press. p. 177. ISBN 978-1-58901-798-6.
207. Ho, Selina (3 September 2018). "Power Asymmetry and the China–India Water Dispute". In
Paul, T. V. (ed.). The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era (https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=3_t0DwAAQBAJ&q=Indian+strategic+culture). Georgetown University Press.
pp. Chapter 7. ISBN 978-1-62616-600-4.
208. "Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on Comprehensive Trade and Economic
Cooperation" (http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/6567_bilateral-documents-11-april-20
05.pdf) (PDF). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2005. Archived (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20210704154421/http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/6567_bilateral-doc
uments-11-april-2005.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 4 July 2021. Retrieved 4 July 2021.
209. Khanna, Tarun (December 2007). "China + India: The Power of Two" (https://hbr.org/2007/12/c
hina-india-the-power-of-two). Harvard Business Review. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/
20201018192311/https://hbr.org/2007/12/china-india-the-power-of-two) from the original on 18
October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
210. Gupta, Anil K.; Wang, Haiyan (30 March 2009). Getting China and India Right: Strategies for
Leveraging the World's Fastest Growing Economies for Global Advantage (https://books.googl
e.com/books?id=Mfbxq2bXREkC). John Wiley & Sons. pp. Preface. ISBN 978-0-470-44109-1.
211. "Ban on Chinese apps, including TikTok, surprises India content makers" (https://www.bbc.co
m/news/world-asia-india-53232486). BBC. 30 June 2020. Retrieved 9 January 2024.
212. "India plays an integral role in boosting supply chain resilience through friendshoring: Yellen" (h
ttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/trade/exports/insights/india-plays-an-integral-rol
e-in-boosting-supply-chain-resilience-through-friendshoring-yellen/articleshow/101814084.cm
s?from=mdr). The Economic Times. 17 July 2023. ISSN 0013-0389 (https://www.worldcat.org/i
ssn/0013-0389). Retrieved 9 January 2024.
213. Galani, Una; Larsen, Peter Thal (18 January 2024). "Exclusive: India could ease China
investment curbs if border stays calm" (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-could-
ease-china-investment-curbs-if-border-stays-calm-2024-01-18/). Reuters. Retrieved
19 January 2024.
214. "India Gripes Over Border, Trade Woes on Li's First Foreign Trip" (https://www.cnbc.com/id/100
749094). CNBC. Reuters. 19 May 2013. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2013110419343
9/http://www.cnbc.com/id/100749094) from the original on 4 November 2013. Retrieved
20 May 2013.
215. "India to reach US$100 billion dollar trade with China by 2015" (http://economictimes.indiatime
s.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/India-hopes-to-reach-100-billion-dollar-trade-with-China-by
-2015-Krishna/articleshow/11813148.cms). The Economic Times. 9 February 2012.
216. "Trademap" (https://www.trademap.org/). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/202011100315
15/https://www.trademap.org/) from the original on 10 November 2020. Retrieved 18 October
2020.
217. "US, China woo India for control over Asia-Pacific" (https://web.archive.org/web/201305310238
01/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-07/india/32100282_1_asia-pacific-defen
ce-cooperation-defence-secretary). 31 May 2013. Archived from the original (http://articles.time
sofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-07/india/32100282_1_asia-pacific-defence-cooperation-defen
ce-secretary) on 31 May 2013. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
218. "Full Text of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Speech at the India-China Business Forum in
Shanghai" (https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/full-text-of-prime-minister-narendra-modis-speech
-at-the-india-china-business-forum-in-shanghai-763508). NDTV.com. Archived (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20230501024212/https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/full-text-of-prime-minister-nar
endra-modis-speech-at-the-india-china-business-forum-in-shanghai-763508) from the original
on 1 May 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
219. "India-China bilateral trade set to hit $100 billion by 2015" (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
business/india-business/India-China-bilateral-trade-set-to-hit-100-billion-by-2015/articleshow/1
4323128.cms). The Times of India. 22 June 2012. ISSN 0971-8257 (https://www.worldcat.org/i
ssn/0971-8257). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230511132628/https://timesofindia.in
diatimes.com/business/india-business/india-china-bilateral-trade-set-to-hit-100-billion-by-2015/
articleshow/14323128.cms) from the original on 11 May 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
220. "With US trade under a cloud, China opens to Indian pharma". The Times of India. Archived
from the original on 2 August 2018. Retrieved 13 July 2018.
221. Sen, Amiti (12 July 2018). "India tells China: $63-b trade deficit untenable". @businessline.
222. "India-China bilateral trade hits historic high of USD 84.44 bln in 2017". The Economic Times.
7 March 2018. Archived from the original on 3 May 2018. Retrieved 2 May 2018.
223. "Top China Imports". Archived from the original on 16 May 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
224. "Top China Exports". Archived from the original on 21 May 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
225. "Top India Imports". Archived from the original on 3 May 2016. Retrieved 16 May 2016.
226. "Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry". PRS Legislative Research. Retrieved 20
October 2020.
227. "Trade Statistics, India Department of Commerce" (https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistics/).
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210209172422/https://commerce.gov.in/trade-statistic
s/) from the original on 9 February 2021.
228. Aiyar, Swaminathan. "India's New Protectionism Threatens Gains from Economic Reform" (http
s://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/indias-new-protectionism-threatens-gains-economic-reform).
www.cato.org. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20230503115421/https://www.cato.org/pol
icy-analysis/indias-new-protectionism-threatens-gains-economic-reform) from the original on 3
May 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
229. Echeverri-Gent, John; Sinha, Aseema; Wyatt, Andrew (8 August 2021). "Economic distress
amidst political success: India's economic policy under Modi, 2014-2019" (https://doi.org/10.10
80/14736489.2021.1958582). India Review. 20 (4): 402–435.
doi:10.1080/14736489.2021.1958582 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F14736489.2021.1958582).
ISSN 1473-6489 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1473-6489). S2CID 224897363 (https://api.se
manticscholar.org/CorpusID:224897363).
230. "PM Modi backtracks on free-trade vow with import curbs in India" (https://timesofindia.indiatim
es.com/business/india-business/pm-modi-backtracks-on-free-trade-vow-with-import-curbs-in-in
dia/articleshow/74209998.cms). The Times of India. 19 February 2020. ISSN 0971-8257 (http
s://www.worldcat.org/issn/0971-8257). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2023050102183
9/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/pm-modi-backtracks-on-free-trad
e-vow-with-import-curbs-in-india/articleshow/74209998.cms) from the original on 1 May 2023.
Retrieved 27 April 2023.
231. Krishnankutty, Pia (15 June 2021). "43% Indians did not buy 'Made in China' products since
Galwan clash last year, survey says" (https://theprint.in/india/43-indians-did-not-buy-made-in-c
hina-products-since-galwan-clash-last-year-survey-says/677860/). ThePrint. Archived (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20210625164540/https://theprint.in/india/43-indians-did-not-buy-made-in-c
hina-products-since-galwan-clash-last-year-survey-says/677860/) from the original on 25 June
232. Sharma, Rakesh (3 July 2023). "India State Refiners Consider Paying in Yuan for Russian
Crude" (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/india-state-refiners-consider-pay
ing-in-yuan-for-russian-crude). Bloomberg. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2023070608
4806/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/india-state-refiners-consider-payin
g-in-yuan-for-russian-crude) from the original on 6 July 2023. Retrieved 5 July 2023.
233. Nidhi, Verma; Aftab, Ahmed (16 October 2023). "As India frowns on paying for Russian oil with
yuan, some payments held up" (https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/india-frowns-pa
ying-russian-oil-with-yuan-some-payments-held-up-sources-say-2023-10-16/#:~:text=It%20is%
20unclear%20whether%20the,%2C%22%20said%20a%20ministry%20official.). Reuters.
234. 2014 World Service Poll (http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20160410000527/http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentr
e/country-rating-poll.pdf) 10 April 2016 at the Wayback Machine BBC
235. "Chapter 2: China's Image" (https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-i
mage/). Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. 14 July 2014. Retrieved 18 February
2024.
236. "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other" (https://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-h
ow-asians-view-each-other/). Pew Research Center. 14 July 2014. Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20151015203043/http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-
each-other/) from the original on 15 October 2015. Retrieved 10 October 2015.
237. "China most distrusted nation, says survey of Indian youth" (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.co
m/world/china/china-most-distrusted-nation-says-survey-of-indian-youth/articleshow/85340235.
cms). The Times of India. 15 August 2021. ISSN 0971-8257 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/097
1-8257). Retrieved 18 February 2024.
238. CHRISTINE HUANG, MOIRA FAGAN AND SNEHA GUBBALA (29 August 2023). "Indians'
views of other countries" (https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/08/29/indians-views-of-oth
er-countries/). Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Retrieved 18 February 2024.
239. The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China (22 July 2008) p 5. online (https://www.pewres
earch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2008/07/2008-Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-2-July-
22-2pm.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20190929191306/https://www.pewresearch.
org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2008/07/2008-Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-2-July-22-2p
m.pdf) 29 September 2019 at the Wayback Machine
240. Brar, Aadil (29 May 2023). "More Chinese now regard India as a security threat. Only 8%
consider it favourable" (https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/more-chinese-now-regard-india-a
s-a-security-threat-only-8-consider-it-favourable/1599378/). ThePrint. Archived (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20230630154743/https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/more-chinese-now-regard
-india-as-a-security-threat-only-8-consider-it-favourable/1599378/) from the original on 30 June
2023. Retrieved 30 June 2023.
241. Olander, Eric (1 June 2023). "Only 8% of Chinese Have a Favorable View of India, Says New
Tsinghua Univeristy Poll" (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2023/06/01/only-8-of-chinese-have-a-fa
vorable-view-of-india-says-new-tsinghua-univeristy-poll/). The China-Global South Project.
Retrieved 18 February 2024.
Further reading
Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, eds. Routledge Handbook of China–
India Relations (Routledge, 2020). excerpt (https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Handbook-Chi
na-India-Relations-Bajpai-ebook/dp/B0855JQYJJ/) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2020
0708224536/https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Handbook-China-India-Relations-Bajpai-ebo
ok/dp/B0855JQYJJ) 8 July 2020 at the Wayback Machine
Bagchi, Prabodh Chandra, Bangwei Wang, and Tansen Sen. 2012. India and China:
interactions through Buddhism and diplomacy : a collection of essays by Professor Prabodh
Chandra Bagchi. Singapore: ISEAS Pub.
Bayram, Duygu Çağla. "The Geopolitical Scenarios of the 'Quad' Countries, The United States,
Japan, Australia and India." in Global Maritime Geopolitics (Transnational Press London, 2022)
pp 167–185. online (https://www.tplondon.com/product/maritime-geopolitics/) Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20220802103242/https://www.tplondon.com/product/maritime-geopolitic
s/) 2 August 2022 at the Wayback Machine
Bhat, R. B., & Wu, C. (2014). Xuan Zhang's mission to the West with Monkey King. New Delhi :
Aditya Prakashan, 2014.
Chandra, Lokesh. 2016. India and China. New Delhi : International Academy of Indian Culture
and Aditya Prakashan, 2016.
Casson, Lionel, ed. (1989), The Periplus Maris Erythraei: Text With Introduction, Translation,
and Commentary (https://books.google.com/books?id=qQWYkSs51rEC), Princeton: Princeton
University Press, ISBN 0-691-04060-5, archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2023020123033
8/https://books.google.com/books?id=qQWYkSs51rEC) from the original on 1 February 2023,
retrieved 2 November 2022.
Chaudhuri, S. K. (2011). Sanskrit in China and Japan. New Delhi: International Academy of
Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.
Chellaney, Brahma, "Rising Powers, Rising Tensions: The Troubled China-India Relationship,"
SAIS Review (2012) 32#2 pp. 99–108 in Project MUSE (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_revie
w/v032/32.2.chellaney.html)
Davies, Henry Rudolph. 1970. Yün-nan, the link between India and the Yangtze. Taipei: Ch'eng
wen.
De, B. W. T. (2011). The Buddhist tradition in India, China & Japan. New York: Vintage Books.
Deepak, B.R. & Tripathi, D.P. The Future of India China Relations (http://www.free-press-releas
e.com/news-the-future-of-india-china-relations-1346254066.html) Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20190302011509/http://www.free-press-release.com/news-the-future-of-india-china-r
elations-1346254066.html) 2 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine "India China Relations –
Future Perspectives", Vij Books, July 2012
Forbes, Andrew; Henley, David (2011). "Past, present and future commercial Sino-Indian links
via Sikkim," in: China's Ancient Tea Horse Road. Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books. ASIN:
B005DQV7Q2
Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding. The India-China Relationship: What the United States
Needs to Know (https://web.archive.org/web/20090304185843/http://www.asiasociety.org/publi
cations/indiachina01.html). Columbia University Press: 2004. ISBN 0-231-13237-9.
Garver, John W. China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic
(2015), pp 146–62, 435–44, 734–57.
Garver, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. University of
Washington Press: 2002. ISBN 0-295-98074-5.
Gokhale, Vijay. "The road from Galwan: the future of India-China Relations." Carnegie India 10
(2021) online (https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Gokhale_Galwan.pdf) Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20220722040440/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Gokhale_Galwan.pdf)
22 July 2022 at the Wayback Machine.
Harris, Tina (2013). Geographical Diversions: Tibetan Trade, Global Transactions (https://book
s.google.com/books?id=RU58AAAAQBAJ). University of Georgia Press, United States.
ISBN 0820345733. pp. 208.
Hongyu Wang, ‘Sino-Indian Relations: Present and Future’, Asian Survey 35:6, June 1995.
Jain, Sandhya, & Jain, Meenakshi (2011). The India they saw: Foreign accounts. New Delhi:
Ocean Books. Contains material about Chinese Buddhist pilgrims and explorers to India.
Kondapalli, Srikanth, eds. China's Military and India (2012)
Kondapalli, Srikanth. "India-China Relations." in Forging New Partnerships, Breaching New
Frontiers: India's Diplomacy during the UPA Rule 2004–14 (2022): 86+.
Ling Zhu, ’China-Pakistan Alliance against India’, UPI Asia.com, 9 September 2008, in
Jagannath P. Panda, Dragon Looks South: Current Drives in China's South Asian
Neighbourhood Policy, in China and its neighbours (ed. Srikant Kondapalli, Emi Mifune),
Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2010.
Lintner, Bertil. Great game east: India, China, and the struggle for Asia's most volatile frontier
(Yale University Press, 2015)
Liping Xia, ‘The Evolution of Chinese Views Toward Cbms’, in Michael Krepon, Dominique M.
McCoy, and Matthew C.J. Rudolp (Eds.), A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for
Regional Security, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993.
Lu, Chih H.. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Legal Study. Greenwood Press: 1986. ISBN 0-
313-25024-3.
Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford handbook of Indian
foreign policy (2015) excerpt (https://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Handbook-Indian-Foreign-Polic
y/dp/0198799063/) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20210915060518/https://www.amazo
n.com/Oxford-Handbook-Indian-Foreign-Policy/dp/0198799063) 15 September 2021 at the
Wayback Machine pp 356–369.
Nilakanta Sastri, K. A. (2002) [1955]. A history of South India from prehistoric times to the fall of
Vijayanagar. New Delhi: Indian Branch, Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-560686-7.
K. M. Panikkar (1957). India and China. A study of cultural relations. Asia Pub. House:
Bombay.
Paul, T.V. et al. eds. The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era (2018) excerpt (https://ww
w.amazon.com/China-India-Rivalry-Globalization-South-Affairs/dp/1626165998/) Archived (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20230410095153/https://www.amazon.com/China-India-Rivalry-Global
ization-South-Affairs/dp/1626165998) 10 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine
Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations,
600–1400. University of Hawaii Press: 2003. ISBN 0-8248-2593-4.
Shabbir, Muhammad Omer, Rabia Bashir, and Sara Saleem. "Geo-Strategic importance of
Indian Ocean: clash of interests between China and India." Journal of Indian Studies 5.1
(2019): 47–60. online (http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/indianStudies/PDF/4_v5_1_19.pdf)
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?
Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2003. ISBN 1-58826-169-7.
Talone, Andrew J. How the United States Can Reinforce India as a Counterbalance to China in
the Indian Ocean Region from a Military Standpoint (US Army Command and General Staff
College, 2019) online (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085438.pdf) Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20220713115732/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085438.pdf) 13 July 2022 at the
Wayback Machine
Varadarajan, S. India, China and the Asian Axis of Oil (https://web.archive.org/web/200607080
85440/http://www.hindu.com/2006/01/24/stories/2006012403181000.htm), January 2006
Yutang, Lin. 1942. The wisdom of China and India. New York: Random House.
Yoder, Brandon K., and Kanti Bajpai. "Introduction: Explaining Cooperation and Rivalry in
China-India Relations." Journal of Contemporary China (2022): 1–16.
External links
White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations (https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/898911/1/0
2_VIII_12-09-1959_p15_p85_PII.pdf)
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru : White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations (https://eparlib.nic.i
n/bitstream/123456789/809075/1/pms_02_08_12-09-1959.pdf) page 16
White Paper II Containing Notes Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between The
Governments of India and China During September-November 1959 (https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstr
eam/123456789/899521/1/02_IX_16-11-1959_p74_p74_PII.pdf)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=China–India_relations&oldid=1221084745"

China-India Relations - Wikipedia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

China-India Relations - Wikipedia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

09/05/2024, 15:16 China–India relations - Wikipedia

acted as economic contact between

Many sources describe Bodhidharma, the founder of the Zen school of

Tang and Harsha dynasties

and 留夢炎 Liu Mengyan's 中俺集 Zhong'anji.[35][36] 桑哥

According to Badauni and Ferishta, the Delhi Sultanate

African zebras and giraffes. Zheng He and his company paid

After the Ming treasure voyages, private Chinese traders

In the 18th to 19th centuries, the Sikh Empire expanded into

Believing that then-Republican China and British India were

Partially to enlist India's aid against both Japanese and

It is the popular perception that the catchphrase of India's

bridge. Noted Indian scholar Rahul Sankrityayan and

After signing the 1954 agreement, India published new

India (Marxist) in 1964.

The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign

In 2004, the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula

In 2005, China and India signed the 'Strategic and Cooperative

In October 2009, the Asian Development Bank formally

The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks, before

China and India have been working together to produce

Water sharing and hydro–politics

Brahma Chellaney has written that "India's formal recognition

An alternate view is also presented in relation to "misinformation spread by some (Indian)

In June 2012, China asserted that "Sino-Indian ties"

Following that conference, bilateral

Bilateral and multilateral relations

Chindian People of mixed Indian and Chinese ancestry

India–Hong Kong relations

Sino-Indian border dispute

66. "Jiang Meets Gandhi" (https://web.archive.org/web/20220602143024/http://125.22.40.134:808

89. "indiatodaygroup.com" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080602213750/http://www.indiatodaygro

102. David Miliband, Written Ministerial Statement on Tibet (29/10/2008) (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/n

114. "Nri" (http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/visa-and-immigration/china-hints-at-scrapping-stapl

124. "China reiterates claim on Arunachal Pradesh through mouthpiece" (http://timesofindia.indiatim

155. India, China likely to jointly undertake projects in Afghanistan (https://economictimes.indiatime

204. "Does China-Russia Cooperation Hurt India's National Interests?" (https://thediplomat.com/202

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=China–India_relations&oldid=1221084745"

You might also like