Nature of Search Warrant

Washington Distillers Inc., v. CA, G.R. No. 118151, August 22, 1996

FACTS: Private respondent requested assistance in prosecuting alleged illegal users, buyers, sellers or traffickers of its registered
bottles. In response to private respondents request, NBI agents, accompanied by Atty. Jaime de la Cruz, private respondents legal
counsel, conducted surveillance operations at the premises of petitioner Washington Distillers in Sta. Lucia, San Fernando, Pampanga.
They filed an application for a warrant to search the premises of Washington Distillers and to seize empty and filled 350cc round white
flint bottles with blown-in marks of Ginebra San Miguel and La Tondea, Inc. Executive Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa issued a search
warrant, pursuant to which agents of the NBI seized from the premises of petitioners 314,289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles,
of which 3,708 were filled and 310,581 were empty. The seized bottles were deposited in the warehouse of private respondent La
Tondea Distillers, Inc. in Velasquez, Tondo, Manila on the ground that there was no space for storage in the court or in the NBI
compound. Petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrant.

ISSUE: Is the validity of the search warrant be sustained?

RULING: NO. (1) The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a result of the failure of the NBI to commence
criminal prosecution and the bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners in the absence of any civil action for their
recovery.
(2) Respondent Judge Descallar, as assisting judge of Branch XXVIII of the RTC of Manila, had authority to quash the search warrant
issued by the regular judge, Hon. De la Rosa.
(3) Although respondent Judge Descallars ruling that the second warrant could not be enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga is
erroneous, his ruling should have been sustained on the other ground on which it is based, i.e., violation by private respondent La
Tondea of the rule against forum-shopping in obtaining the search warrant.

DISCUSSION: In the case at bar, there has been not even an attempt to prosecute for violation of R.A. No. 623, pursuant to which the
application for search warrant was ostensibly made. The NBI, which applied for the search warrant in 1993, did not file any case against
petitioners.

Contrary to the requirement of Rule 126, 11 that property seized by virtue of a search warrant must be deposited in custodia legis, the
NBI delivered the bottles to the private respondent La Tondea. It is claimed that this was done because there was no place for storage
either at the NBI compound or in the premises of the RTC. This is not a good excuse. Some place could have been found or rented for
the purpose, but the delivery of the bottles to private respondent cannot be made without giving the impression that private respondent
has been given possession of bottles claimed by petitioners to have been lawfully acquired by them.
Indeed in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals through then Justice Narvasa, that if no criminal case is instituted after
the seizure made pursuant to a search warrant, the property seized should be delivered to its rightful owner, or at least to the person
from whom it had been seized. The property could not be permitted to stay in a perpetual state of custodia legis.

A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a civil action. It is a special criminal process, the order of issuance of
which cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent status or character of the seized property. It cannot therefore be resorted to, as
was done here by private respondent, as a means of acquiring property or of settling a dispute over the same.

It is settled that a judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently assigned to him. In this case, the fact that
Judge De la Rosa was the executive judge is not material, because jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in him qua executive
judge. Applications for search warrant are made to the executive judge only for administrative purposes.Judge Descallar, as assisting
judge, was competent to resolve the motion seeking to quash the search warrant.

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. This is exactly what private respondent did in seeking the issuance of a search warrant from the Manila
Regional Trial Court, after failing to obtain warrants from the Pampanga courts. It is noteworthy that the ruling of Judge Descallar on
this point was not assailed in the certiorari proceeding before the Court of Appeals. Hence, even though his ruling on the territorial
reach of the warrant issued by Judge De la Rosa was erroneous in light of the subsequent ruling in Malaloan, the Court of Appeals
should have sustained Judge Descallars order quashing the warrant on the ground that private respondent La Tondea was guilty of
forum-shopping.

Savage v. Taypin, G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.
The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Development
Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savage’s products are the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to the
issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

ISSUE: Can a search warrant be issued?

RULING: NO. There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling provisions on
Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment
of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused, for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even
begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic
the other issues raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and
void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.

Personal Property Siezed

Tenorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110604, October 10, 2003

FACTS: P/Lt. Christopher L. Tambungan applied with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTc) or the issuance of a warrant to search the
dwelling of private respondent Antonio Coseng. The private respondent was suspected of having in his possession or control untaxed
smuggled goods. The court granted the application and issued Search Warrant with specific orders to the police officers to search for
the articles therein described and to bring the same to the court. Tambungan and some police officers served the search warrant on a
certain Johnny Corpsuz who was in the house to be searched. The police officers conducted a search in the presence of the barangay
officials and counsel for the private respondent. Instead of bringing the seized goods to the Court, Tambungan called Senior Inspector
Alex Bautista of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and reported the seizure of the goods. Without authority from the court, Tambungan
later turned over the seized goods to P/Lt. Allbert Cruz of the CAPCOM. He later turned over the goods to Bautista who issued a receipt
therefor. Bautista in turn turned over the goods to the Legal and Investigation Staff Enforcement and Security Service of the BOC,
which then stored the goods at the Bureau WarehouseNo. 6. The trial court issued an order directing Tambungan and the Bureau of
Customs to turn over all the seized articles to the court within fifteen days. The trial court forthwith ordered Alex Bautista, Buenaventura
Maniego and Gilbert Cruz to appear before the court to explain why they should not be declared in contempt for their failure to deliver
the seized articles to the court. Despite the repeated order of the court to turn over the seized items, the petitioners still did not comply.
The court issued a resolution holding the respondents therein guilty of indirect contempt. Aggrieved, the therein respondents filed
notices of appeal. The RTC issued a resolution affirming with modification the resolution of the MeTC. Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution which the RTC rendered a resolution granting respondent Rosqueta’s
motion. Meanwhile, the other respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the goods seized should be delivered to the court.

RULING: Rule 126, Section 11 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. - The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the
judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

The duty of petitioner Tambungan to deliver the items seized by him to the court which issued the search warrant is mandatory in
character. This is evident by the use in the rule of the word must. The rule is not merely a piddling procedural rule. The requirement is
to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties or the tampering thereof or the loss of such goods due to the
negligence of the officers effecting the seizure or their deliberate acts. On the face of the search warrant issued by the court, petitioners
Tambungan and Cruz were commanded to bring the goods described therein to the court to be dealt with as the law requires. The
officers enforcing the search warrant were acting on orders of the court; hence, were under its supervision and control. The Court has
inherent disciplinary power over such officers and can thus enforce its powers against them. Such officers may not retain possession
and custody of the items seized unless with the approval of the court that issued the warrant. Absent such approval, the said officers
had no authority to deliver the items seized to another person or agency of the government. If the items seized are delivered to others
or another government agency without the approval of the court that issued the search warrant, goods are not considered in the
custody of the court. If the officers enforcing the warrant refuse to turn over the goods, as ordered by the court, they may be cited for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court.

Case law has it that the court which issued the search warrant acquires jurisdiction over the items seized under the said warrant. Only
that court which issued the warrant may order the release or disposition thereof. The jurisdiction, custody and control of the court over
the items seized cannot be interfered with even by the BOC via a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the COC over the said
goods. In this case, petitioner Tambungan and Cruz of the CAPCOM turned over the seized goods to Senior Inspector Alex Bautista of
the BOC, who, in turn, delivered the goods to the Legal and Investigation and Security Service of the BOC without any authority from
the court. By their acts, the petitioners defied the Rules of Court, repudiated their mandate, and abused and demeaned court
processes.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector on the said goods pertains only to the goods seized pursuant to the authority under
the TCC. Goods seized on the basis of a search warrant issued by the court under Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are in
custodia legis, subject to the control and disposition of the court that issued the search warrant. The court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction over the goods by a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Customs; and of its jurisdiction to dispose
and release the goods as the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure so mandate.
 Probable Cause

Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, GR No. 161106, January 13, 2014

FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of RISOO (Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office) of the PNP files
applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City, to search the office of Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) and the application
alleged that WWC were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of PD 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other
Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and
evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government. RTC granted the application for search
warrants after the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular
computers and servers that would be taken.

ISSUE: Whether or not search warrants were issued upon probable cause?

RULING: Yes. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. They determine probable cause based on
"evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the offender.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if
the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses
testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a
showing of probable cause. In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by
the witnesses.

On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.
In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They
neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was
exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the
conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."

The quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on
lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants
are general warrants.

STOP AND FRISK

People v. Johnson, 401 Phil. 734

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Leila Johnson was frisked at the airport by the lady frisker when the latter felt something hard in the abdominal area of Johnson
which turned out to be shabu when she was brought to the rest room for further inspection. In her defense, accused-appellant alleged
that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she
was handcuffed and taken to the womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She
insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. After another two
hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that the
packages were hers.

ISSUE: Are the procedural inspection conducted in airports, in violation of the constitutional rights against searches and seizures?

RULING: No. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in
a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
The constitutional right of Leila was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
Xxx
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the
same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom
they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential
robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a
quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?
Ruling: The Supreme Court of the United States held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a
limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly
burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

Search of a Moving Vehicle

Caballes vs CA, G.R. No. 136292, 15 January 2002.

PUNO, J.

FACTS: During patrol, Sgt Noceta and Pat. De Castro flagged down the petitioner’s passenger jeep due to suspicion that it contained
smuggled goods because it was covered by kakawati leaves. With the petitioner’s consent, the officers checked the cargo and
discovered wires owned by the National Power Corporation. Petitioner was convicted of theft by the trial court. The judgment was
affirmed by the CA upon appeal. On the question of the validity of the warrantless search and seizure the trial court cited a number of
jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches of a moving vehicle on the grounds of practicality or when accused is caught in flagrante.
Petitioner however contends that mere suspicion that the vehicle contained smuggled goods didn’t constitute probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure. Neither did he give consent, implied or expressed for he officers to search his vehicle.
ISSUE: Was the warrantless search and seizure made by the officers valid?
RULING: NO. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. However, when a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. We hold that the fact that the vehicle
looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause"
as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.

Checkpoint; Body Checks in Airport

Sales vs People, Gr No. 191023, 6 February 2013

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: Petitioner, Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of marijuana. The facts
show that petitioner was subjected to a routine frisk at the airport’s pre-departure area. During the said frisking, authorities found a
slight bulge in the petitioner’s short pants. He was asked to empty his pocket which he obliged to do so but refused to open his hands.
This led the authorities to believe that he was in possession of something illegal. After a more thorough search of petitioner’s person,
Airport authorities found two rolled papers containing marijuana. Petitioner was subsequently arrested and convicted for the above
mentioned crime.

Issue: Was the warrantless search of the person of the petitioner valid?

Held: Yes. In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport,
this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures due to increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism.

56. Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.136292, 15 January 2002.

PUNO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was driving a passenger jeep when he was stopped at a checkpoint. It was discovered that he was carrying cables
conductors covered by “kakawati” leaves belonging to the National Power Corp. Petitioner was arrested, charged and convicted with
the crime of theft.

Petitioner claims the checkpoint conducted on his vehicle was violative of his right against searches and seizures for lack of probable
cause.

ISSUE: Are checkpoints violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable searches?

RULING: Qualify. “Stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as
long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be
a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4)
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.

62. Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6 February 2013.

Facts: Airport security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the
final security check at the airport’s pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to
Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the “slightly bulging” item while frisking petitioner.

Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1 Trota-
Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous search
was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner walked past through the metal
detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. He likewise mentioned the fact that he was carrying
a bundle of money at that time, which he said was not accounted for.

Issue: Whether or not there was an irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner?

Ruling: No. In People v. Johnson,16 which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the
airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.

The Court finds no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the
frisker’s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner’s short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance.

Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said
provision reads:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition
printed thereon:
“Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, ” which shall constitute a part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier.

IN PLAIN VIEW

63. People v. Hadji Socor Cadidia, G.R. No. 191263, 16 October 2013.

Facts: Trayvilla frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area 4 and she noticed something unusual and thick in the
area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness.
Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused to
the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they
discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I.
Appang. Accused-appellant Hadji Socor Cadidia was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 by the trial court and was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure?
Ruling: Yes. Airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure. As held in similar cases of People v. Johnson73 and People v.
Canton, 74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when
they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the
validity of airport frisking thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travellers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

69. People v. Macalaba, G.R. Nos. 146284-86, 20 January 2003.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

Facts: Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
with violations of the Presidential Decree No. 1866; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code; and Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238, respectively.

The testimonies of SPO1 Pandez corroborated with PO3 Mendez differ on some parts of the tesitmonies of the accused. Basically, the
Police Officers were ordered to search for respondent who is allegedly driving a carnapped car, the accused on the other hand alleged
he borrowed it from a friend. On the side of the Police Officers, upon alighting with the car, they saw in plain view the .45 caliber gun
and later on four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu and a self sealing plastic bag containing two fake 1,000 bill, magazine
and ammunitions. On the version of the accused upon reaching the headquarters he was told to surrender his bag and the officers
confiscate the same items.

After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence. However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No.
1238 for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425).

Dissatisfied with the judgment, respondent interposed this appeal.

Issue: Is the warrantless arrest and seizure conducted by the officers is in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, therefore
rendering the evidence inadmissible?

Ruling: No, there was a valid warrantless arrest and seizure therefore the evidence is admissible. Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that
reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are
(1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners. Another exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is authorized
under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.

The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by
ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car.
They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for
the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu. These sachets of shabu were therefore in
"plain view" of the law enforcers.

Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the
following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain
view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not
transgress his constitutional rights.
70. Miclat Jr. Vs People, G.R. No. 176077, 31 August 2011.

FACTS: Petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station. On the other hand, the
defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness.

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a
Decision[6] convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA. On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision [8] affirming in toto the decision
of the RTC.

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution
were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction
of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: Whether or not peeping through a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of plain view doctrine for a warrantless seizure
to be lawful?
Ruling: Yes. Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly
arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting
officer. As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also
falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the
exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

71. Fajardo vs People, G.R. No. 190889, 10 January 2011.

FACTS: Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before
the RTC.
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan. accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.]
M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number , two (2) pieces short magazine of M16
Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items
were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operation Group.

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the discovery of the two (2) receivers come within the purview of the plain view doctrine?

RULING: Yes, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible.
The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's
control and management.

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly
bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession,
was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios
actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers. Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a
firearm can only proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her
shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

74. People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

Facts: The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the
Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four gift wrapped packages to be sent in Zurich Switzerland. The
proprietress, Anita Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and expect the packages however
appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no
longer insisted. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and
husband of Anita, following standard procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI
agents and a photographer went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the box in which appellants’ packages were places and
in the presence of the NBI agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.

Issue: Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
who made search and inspection of the said packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part
of Mr. Job as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the search is made upon the
request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured first if it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made in the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.

In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private individual as to bring
it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by
the exercise by the sovereign authority.

75. Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014

FACTS: The Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) sent a team of inspectors headed by
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, who will conduct a routine inspection of the houses at La
Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals,
conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked
the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said
meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to inform him of the
inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and
number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the
Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with
notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño.

But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in
his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected without his permission and over the objections of his
maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside down and took
photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter. They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or
a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he
found that some of his personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house.

ISSUE: Is petitioner’s contention correct?

RULING: NO. The constitutional guarantee applies only if the search was done by the government. VECO and its team are not
government agents. Not being agents of the state, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.

The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents
tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. The
Court has made this clear in its pronouncements, including that made in People v. Marti.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?

Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of
abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who
suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and the stability of social order. Moreover, according to a commentator, "the exercise of right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others; it cannot be said that a person exercises a right
when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of one’s rights
and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and
good faith.

Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without
prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present,
to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked.
The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.

ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOM LAWS

77. Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 146706, July 15, 2005

Facts: Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable goods (branded watches, etc) after PAF officers
were observing their conduct and found it to be suspicious during a special mission given to them to make a routine surveillance to
check on reports of alleged trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by PAL employees. Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue: Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Ruling: Yes. Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a
surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other
words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team
properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.

In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law.
They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the
case at bar.

In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of
customs duties. The Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the
ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individual’s
private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm.