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that the enemy received the staggering blow, and the advantage
thus gained was followed up to yet greater advantage At no time
appears this hero stronger, grander, than now, when, without
authority, without the royal sanction, in one sense an outlaw, with the
people of the country against him, his own countrymen coming to
war on him, his force insignificant as compared with that of any one
of his several enemies, he yet holds them all at bay, by his iron nerve
and ever ready strategic resources, keeping them asunder, pitting
one against another, playing on the foibles of them all as easily and
serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.
Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror’s brilliant visions of
conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to
advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of
the opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor
and themselves, or to attack the foreigners’ quarters on their own
account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine
would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it
would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to
Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the
enemy would be to surrender the most important part of the
conquest.
To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the
capital and meet this new visitation—such a measure would render
his already small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its
equal in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and
resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez’
messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts
and promises, to sow discord in the enemy’s camp. The priests
Guevara and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at
work, and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus
would he seduce to his purpose the opponent’s troops, in so far at
least as to effect a compromise by which Narvaez might leave him in
comparative peace.[654] Who shall say that his good fortune may not
still favor him! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer
to the enemy, so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to
give himself a more imposing appearance by the addition of native
auxiliaries. Another reason for this advance was by his presence to
counteract the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a
superior force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an
impostor.
He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of
awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused
their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded
with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious
discontent in the enemy’s camp. Hundreds, they said, would be
ready to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold
front. Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been
echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not
on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance
and secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless
Narvaez. With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they
could not fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but
promptly suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his
comrades of their glorious achievements under Cortés, and their
probable fate should Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was
an unanimous approval of the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon
commissioned the captains to represent the matter to the men, and
to ascertain who were willing to follow, and who should remain in
Mexico.[655]
On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch
questioned him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other
force. Cortés well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the
state of affairs. He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give
him pain. He and his men had been sent by their king on this
mission, and were from the royal province of Castile, whilst the
forces on the coast were a rebellious horde from the outside
province of Biscay, and inferior to them, as Otomís, for instance,
were inferior to the nobler Aztecs. They had come with the design of
injuring the natives, and Cortés as their protector; but with the aid of
his patron saint he would have no trouble in chastising them, and in
securing their vessels for his speedy departure.[656] Alvarado, the
tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico, and him he recommended to the
monarch’s consideration, requesting that supplies be provided and
peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would react with terrible
effect on himself and his people. The emperor promised that this
should be done, and offered not only guides, but an army to aid him.
The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec troops could not be
relied on.[657]
It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with
Cortés, should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico,
since self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of
his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and
with the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured.
The defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the
guns and most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were
left with the garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over
abundant, owing to the drought, maize and other provisions were
brought from Tlascala to serve in case of need. The men were
promised wealth and honors if they remained faithful, and their
somewhat hot-headed commander was exhorted to prudence. “You
are few in number,” said Cortés to them on leaving, “and yet you are
strong; finally, have a care of your prisoner.”[658]
About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with
seventy Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience.[659] There were also
native carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and
guides who were to take them by a short southern route through
Aztec territory to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the
Iztapalapan causeway, and there took his leave with friendly
demonstration, while a number of chieftains continued with him for
some distance on the way to the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no
intention of encumbering himself with heavy war material, for the
little he possessed could not avail against the superior armament of
the enemy. His must be a light corps, capable of quick movements;
stratagem should supply the place of numbers. And now what hopes
and fears were theirs as they marched on toward the sea! Surely so
brave a little army was never more beset by pitfalls and snares.
On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel,
with one hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the
expedition. About a score of these, suspected of favoring too
strongly the Cuban governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the
enterprise might not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder
were distributed the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec
and adjoining region, in order to encourage loyalty.[660]
Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco
Rodriguez, with instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors.
He succeeded in enlisting several thousand; but as it became
evident whom they were to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly
the terrible effect of Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to
desert, so that only a few presented themselves before Cortés, and
they were dismissed with presents.[661]
During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main
road and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not
far from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from
Narvaez demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for
although the latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by
holding a review of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the
disposition of the men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather
disposed to underrate the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of
the ludicrous he amused the camp with his description of the vanity
and carelessness of the leader, and the arrogant assumption of the
officers. When, therefore, at Quecholac[662] they encountered
Alonso de Mata,[663] notary of Narvaez, who had been sent with four
witnesses to advise Cortés of his commission and demands, he was
told first to produce his own credentials as royal notary, and being
unable to do so he was refused a hearing.[664] The official mission of
the messengers being thus disposed of, Cortés soothed their
wounded pride with soft words and hospitable cheer; he gave them
presents, and took care before dismissing them to feast their eyes
on the gold and jewels which he caused his men to display, and to
let them know that thousands of Tlascaltec and other troops were on
the way to join him. Their report to Narvaez was a confirmation of
Guevara’s statement, and did much to promote the growing
disaffection toward Narvaez.
The army now descended from the plateau to Ahuilizapan, and
followed the slope northward to Huatusco. This town appears to
have been situated on the head-waters of the present Rio Jamapa.
Half-way down this river, about ten leagues south of Cempoala, lay
the town of Tampaniquita,[665] which was the rendezvous. A number
of Indians who here appeared with complaints of outrages by
Narvaez were consoled with promises of speedy relief. Sandoval
had come by a long and difficult mountain route to avoid the enemy,
and had brought with him about sixty able-bodied soldiers, the old
and infirm remaining at Papalote.[666]
This addition raised the force to about two hundred and sixty
men, according to common statement, including the deserters from
Narvaez. Among the number were five horsemen, and a few archers
and musketeers.[667] They were poorly equipped, for they brought
from Mexico little else than well-worn escaupiles, or quilted cotton
armor, shields, swords, and dirks, a miserable outfit in which to meet
the well armed troops of Narvaez.[668] But the ready resource of
Cortés had found a remedy. He had noticed in the hands of the
Chinantecs a spear, twenty feet in length, which struck him at once
as a formidable weapon, either in defence or attack. It would be
particularly serviceable against cavalry. Immediately on hearing of
Narvaez’ arrival he had sent a messenger to that province with an
order for three hundred of the pikes, to be finished not with the usual
iztli head, but with double points of copper, a metal which abounded
in that region. The natives having previously tendered submission to
the Spaniards, Cortés also asked them for two thousand warriors, to
join him on pentecost day at the rendezvous. Both of these requests
were promptly granted, and before the Spaniards were on the
ground the messenger had returned with a force of Indians bearing
the weapons,[669] with points superior in finish to the models sent.
The messenger was Tobilla, a soldier from the Italian wars, and an
expert at arms, particularly with the lance. Under his instruction the
soldiers soon became expert pikemen, and gained no little praise.
Add to this courage, increased by many victories, their admirable
discipline, their influence over the natives, and their knowledge of the
country, and the little band assumes more formidable proportions.
Under the several influences surrounding him the original fierce
design of Narvaez in his dealings with Cortés had cooled somewhat.
The calm confidence and caustic wit of Olmedo tended to inspire
respect for his commander, which was not lessened by the rumor of
vast Indian armies massing under his banner. Nor were his men
apparently inclined to turn the sword against their countrymen.
Before the return of Mata he despatched a commission to Cortés
demanding the surrender of the country, but offering him liberty to
depart for any other region, accompanied by those who wished to
follow his fortunes. With this object vessels and stores would be
provided. The bearers of this proposal were his old friend Andrés de
Duero, Guevara, another clergyman named Juan de Leon, and one
or two others.[670]
Duero, it will be remembered, had greatly assisted Cortés in
fitting out his expedition from Cuba; in fact, without his intervention
Cortés would never have been appointed to the command. Láres
was dead, and it was quite natural, after this lapse of time, that
Duero should desire to look in on Mexico, and for that reason had
joined the expedition of Narvaez. Yet his sympathies were wholly
with his partner, and after a warm embrace he came at once to the
subject of his ducats. Their interview was private and protracted, and
appears to have been satisfactory, Cortés receiving on the one hand
valuable information about Narvaez’ plans and position, and Duero,
on the other, coming forth with weighted pockets, as an instalment of
the larger sum to follow. According to Bernal Diaz it was arranged
that Duero should receive valuable grants and offices if he
persuaded the alguacil mayor and other leaders so to manage affairs
that Narvaez should be captured or killed, and Cortés acknowledged
captain-general over all the troops.[671] Whatever may have been
the agreement, there is no doubt that Duero promised to promote his
friend’s schemes in the other camp.
Guevara and the other members of the commission were also
loaded with presents, and confirmed as supporters of Cortés. As for
Narvaez’ proposition, he charged them to reply that he would listen
to none but a royal mandate, and would hold the country for the king,
as was the duty of a loyal subject, and to this he and his followers
were prepared to pledge their lives. Still, he was ready to meet
Narvaez, each accompanied by ten attendants, in order that their
respective claims might peradventure be happily adjusted. It was
supposed by the captains of Cortés, who had influenced the
proposal, that the result would be a division of territory, and to this
they were willing to agree.[672]
Duero had been requested by Narvaez to persuade Velazquez
de Leon to visit their camp, in the hope that a personal meeting
might win him to their cause.[673]
Velazquez’ disregard of the former summons from the enemy
had confirmed the faith of Cortés in his loyalty, and since a visit to
the camp of Narvaez might lead to important information, he advised
him to go; at the same time intimating that his heavy ornaments
might have a happy effect on that gold-thirsty crew.[674] With a view
to temporize he was authorized to offer himself as mediator between
the two generals, and with a supply of gold for bribes he went over to
the camp of Narvaez. There he met a most cordial reception. Gently
the commander remonstrated at his adherence to a traitor who had
so deeply injured his relatives. “He is no traitor,” replied Velazquez
warmly, “there has been no treason either acted or intended.” He
would not listen to any overtures, even when coupled with the
promise of a command second only to that of Narvaez. “I have sworn
loyalty to Cortés,” he said, “and I will remain true.” Nevertheless, that
he might not appear ungracious, he promised to use his efforts
toward the recognition of Narvaez’ supremacy. A review of the troops
was held to impress him with the superiority of the forces with which
he might soon have to contend.
A courtier in manner, and with a fine presence, Velazquez
quickly won his way among the captains and staff; nor did he fail to
improve the opportunity by presenting his general’s cause in the
most attractive light. No little weight was given to his words by the
heavy gold chain which fell in several coils upon his breast.[675]
Cortés affirms that the proposal for an interview with Narvaez
had been accepted, and that he was preparing to attend it when the
warning came that advantage would be taken of the meeting to seize
or kill him.[676] If treachery was intended, it is more likely to have
originated with Cortés, who was by no means scrupulous, as we
have seen, while Narvaez appears to have borne the reputation of a
man of honor.[677] It is still more probable that Cortés invented the
warning in order to be free before his followers, and before Narvaez,
to carry out a more momentous project, which, with the increased
knowledge of affairs in the enemy’s camp, and with the growth there
of his party, had begun to unfold in his mind.
It was a grand conception; yet grander still the execution. It was
a different matter with a small force to fall upon a well appointed
army of countrymen; different from war on naked savages, to
surprise them by night, or otherwise to vanquish them. Yet this was
what Cortés now proposed to do. Nor, in adopting this bold measure,
does he lay himself open to the charge of rashness or recklessness.
His situation was desperate: he must conquer or be conquered.
Cortés was no abstract theorist: he dealt mainly in concrete facts;
not necessarily demonstrated facts, but facts reached often by
intuition alone. With facts, intuitively or practically arrived at, he kept
himself well stored. He possessed many noble qualities, but on the
whole, as we have seen, his character was not cast in an
immaculate mould. He was exceedingly religious; and while, as I
have said, he would not let religion stand in the way of his ambition,
yet he was more bigoted than any of his followers. Aside from the
chivalrous abandonment of himself to fate, and the brilliant
achievements thence arising, there was little admirable in him. He
knew nothing of lofty magnanimity, although he did many
magnanimous acts; he knew nothing of pure disinterestedness, or a
generosity of soul, although he was ofttimes exceedingly generous.
He had none of that sense of unswerving justness and sensitiveness
to wrong which characterized Grijalva. His self-possession never left
him. He was a power within himself, and he knew it. Thus it was in
Mexico now; and for years afterward when Mexico was all America,
he was Agamemnon, king of men, the greatest of Greece when
Greece was all the world.
Under the present inspiration, he sent Rodrigo Álvarez Chico
and a notary[678] to withdraw the proposal he had made Narvaez for
an interview, and to demand of him the production of a royal
commission, authorizing his presence there, which commission
would be respected; otherwise he must cease meddling with the
affairs of the country. The followers of Narvaez were to be formally
forbidden to obey his orders; and they were to appear before Cortés
within a specified time, and learn from him what the interests of the
king required of them. Failing in this, he would have them seized and
dealt with as rebels against his majesty.[679]
The cool impudence of this demand, coming from the captain of
a little band of outlaws hemmed in between hostile forces, gave rise
to no small amusement in the enemy’s camp. Narvaez chose
nevertheless to regard the matter seriously, receiving the message
as an insolent defiance. He declared he would no longer show
forbearance toward the traitor; he set a price on the head of Cortés,
announced the estate of his followers to be confiscated, and
proclaimed open war against them.[680]
Immediately after despatching his ultimatum Cortés broke camp
and followed his messengers at a quick march.[681] At Rio de
Canoas, or La Antigua, Velazquez came up with letters from Duero
and others. They had probably been written under a preconcerted
arrangement, for they were read to the leaders and discussed, the
result being a unanimous resolution to advance. So forward they
went, Cortés exclaiming, “Death to the ass or to him who drives
it!”[682]
 Crossing the swollen river with some difficulty,[683] he hurried on
to Rio Chachalacas, over a league from Cempoala, where camp was
formed quietly and without fires.[684] This sudden movement, coming
immediately after Duero’s interview with Cortés, confirms the
supposition that a plot had been concocted by them, which was to
surprise Narvaez under advantageous circumstances arranged by
confederates. There were to be no half-way measures; all must be
staked on one cast.[685]
Calling his men round him, he made one of those stirring
appeals in which he knew so well how to animate their spirit and
touch their heart. He reviewed their right to the conquest, and their
promises to hold the country for the king. “And now comes this
emissary of Señor Velazquez,” Cortés continued, “full of envy and
treacherous design, to appropriate the fruit of your hard-won
victories. This pompous Narvaez, while seizing your riches and
clothing himself in your glory, would load you with impositions and
brand you with dishonor. Will you submit to this? Will you, who have
overcome mighty hosts, who have seized empires, who even now
hold monarchs in your hands, will you place your necks in the yoke
and humbly submit to the unjust demands of this instrument of your
ancient enemy? God, who has always been with us, will still fight on
our side, if we will be true to him and true to our king. We must fight,
and it is for life; ay, and more than life—for honor and glorious
inheritance.” Cheer after cheer burst from the men, while the
captains hastened to assure Cortés that they would follow him to the
death.[686]
Although it was generally understood that coöperation was
expected within the enemy’s camp, the prudent general made no
mention of the fact, lest it might render the men less self-reliant. He
pointed out, however, that their opponents, although more numerous
than they, were unused to war, effeminate, disheartened from
hardships, and discontented with their commander. He explained the
arrangement of Narvaez’ camp, and divided the force into three
parties, under the command respectively of Sandoval, Olid, and
himself, the position of the former as alguacil mayor and
comandante on the coast, and the second as maestre de campo,
entitling them to this distinction, young as they were, particularly
since Cortés retained the direction of affairs. To the former, aided by
Jorge and Gonzalo Alvarado, Alonso de Ávila, and eighty men, was
intrusted the task of attacking Narvaez’ special quarters, with the
formally worded command to seize him, dead or alive.[687] As a
further inducement toward the accomplishment of this important end,
rewards of three thousand, two thousand, and one thousand pesos
respectively were promised to the first three soldiers who should
secure the general.[688] Olid received the important order to capture
the artillery, from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended.
With him were Andrés de Tapia, Diego Pizarro, and others. Cortés
himself was to follow and render aid where most needed, supported
by Ordaz, Grado, the brothers Chico, and others.[689] The password
was ‘Espíritu Santo,’ suggested by Olmedo with reference to
pentecost day, on which all these events took place.
While occupied with their preparations a deserter arrived, sent
by Duero, it seems, to warn Cortés that, advised of his approach by
the Indians,[690] Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best
part of his troops in the field[691] between him and Cempoala. To this
he had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains,
who had not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival
general. This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés
not a little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp,
protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue,
however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was the
beginning of the rainy season.[692] Most of Narvaez’ men, unused to
military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the camp,
found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what they
termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe. The
friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling by
ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a
handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They
would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters,
and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be
given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no
means relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters
before dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain
and two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder
of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the
men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to
reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was ‘Santa María.’
Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when informed
of this movement. Pointing out to his men the effeminacy and
unsoldierly qualities of the rabble with which they had to deal, and
the carelessness and inefficiency of their commander, he ordered an
immediate advance on Cempoala, where they would now be
scarcely expected. “You know the maxim,” he said, “‘upon the enemy
at dawn;’ but better still, we will surprise them by night.[693] Let each
strive to excel his comrade in valor.” These words were received with
hearty approval, for anything was preferable to suspense in a dreary
bivouac without fire or comfort. Crossing the creek they marched
noiselessly over the plain, through the rain, drenched and hungry.
On reaching the brook, near the town, they came upon the two
scouts of the enemy, Gonzalo Carrasco and Alonso Hurtado; they
captured the former, while the latter, warned by the cry of his
comrade, hurried into camp to give the alarm. Carrasco was
compelled under threats to answer a number of questions on the
position and plans of his party, and was menaced with death if he
played false.[694]

A cross had been erected at the ford,[695] probably during the

first march to Cempoala, and here the army knelt in all humility to do
reverence. Father Olmedo then gave the men the general
absolution, and appealed to heaven to bless the efforts now to be
made in behalf of their faith and the king, closing with the soul-
stirring assurance that victory should be theirs. The men, one and
all, felt no doubt that they were about to fight not only for their own
rights, but for God and their sovereign; and if the robber could feel
encouraged in his lawless pursuit after kneeling at the shrine of St
Demas, surely these heroes of a hundred fights were stronger for
their religious faith. Therefore it was with renewed confidence that
the men buckled tighter their escaupiles, and pike in hand, their main
reliance, they resumed the march with quickened steps, leaving the
baggage and horses in the care of Marina and the carriers. The
horsemen stationed in the field were not encountered, thanks to
Duero who was one of them.

It was just past midnight, on the morning of whit-monday,[696]

when they entered Cempoala. Owing to the darkness and the
presence of troops in the field, together with the recent marches and
countermarches, the presence of the intruders was not suspected till
they had almost crossed the plaza. The storm was not wholly past,
but the moon peered forth at times between the chasing clouds,
dimly revealing the buildings occupied by the enemy. These
consisted of three conspicuous edifices, rising upon pyramidal
foundations, the ascent to which was by a wide staircase along one
of the slopes. The highest was a temple, known as Nuestra Señora
since the iconoclastic achievement of Cortés therein, and this was
occupied by the troops of Diego Velazquez. Next to it was the
building held by the captain-general, guarded by the whole battery of
guns.[697]
Hurtado had arrived nearly half an hour before and given
warning, but instead of immediately calling to arms, Narvaez lost
time with questions, which elicited only that his companion had been
seized and that he fancied he had heard Spanish voices. Some of
the captains, friendly to Cortés, ridiculed the story as a dream, and
entertained the general with speculations about the projects of the
audacious rebel.[698] While so occupied the alarm of the sentinels
was heard. Cortés was upon them.[699] Narvaez at once became the
self-possessed commander, and hastened to issue the necessary
orders. There was a rush to arms, and the confusion was increased
by the appearance of innumerable fire-flies, which the besieged
mistook for the fire-arms and spears of a large army.[700]
In order to avoid the range of the guns, Cortés had kept his men
along the sides of the approaches, and on finding himself discovered
he shouted, “Close with them! At them!” Fife and drum joined in and
echoed the cry.[701] Olid rushed on the battery, ranged along a
terrace on the ascent to the commander’s house. So sudden was
the attack that those of the artillerymen who still remained loyal had
time to discharge only one gun, which killed two men.[702] The next
instant Olid, Pizarro, and their followers had practically secured the
pieces, and were pressing the defenders, who offered little
resistance. At the same time Sandoval rushed past and hurried up
the stair-way to the summit, where Narvaez stood to receive him.
[703]A volley of arrows and bullets was fired at him, but being poorly
aimed, out of consideration for comrades below, he escaped
unharmed. Nothing daunted, Sandoval’s followers pressed onward in
a compact column, and in a moment they were on the summit
platform. “Surrender!” shouted their leader with resolute confidence,
to which Narvaez responded with a jeer, calling on his men to spare
no traitors. But the order was an empty one, for their swords and
short Spanish lances availed nothing against the line of bristling
copper points on the long pikes of the attacking party, and step by
step they were driven backward into the building. What they did with
their fire-arms or cross-bows is not stated.
Meanwhile Cortés was doing brave work below. One body
engaged the cavalry, unhorsing with the all-effective pike those who
had managed to reach the saddle, and cutting the girths. Another
body turned their attention to the reinforcements which came rushing
from the adjoining quarters to the scene of action, and taking
advantage of the confusion and the darkness, relieved only at fitful
intervals by the moon, their cool opponents readily disarmed the
greater number, so that but a small proportion made their way
through the besieging lines.[704] While thus occupied they heard a
shout from above, “Victory! Victory for Cortés! Narvaez is dead!”[705]
Cortés immediately caused the cry to be taken up by the rest of his
men, which added to the confusion of the enemy.
It appears that Sandoval, although reinforced by a portion of
Olid’s party, could not effect an entry into the building to which his
pikes had driven those who still adhered to Narvaez, a number
having passed over to his side before this. After watching the vain
skirmishing for a while, Lopez, the ship-builder, bethought himself of
setting fire to the dry palm roof of the otherwise substantial building.
The besieged now had no recourse but to come out, which they did,
headed by Narvaez. No sooner had they appeared on the platform
than Sandoval’s men charged them with the pikes, and the
commander was the first to receive a thrust, in the left eye, which
bore him down as he cried out: “Santa María, save me!” In an instant
Pedro Sanchez Farfan was upon him,[706] and he was dragged
down the steps and placed in a chapel. Awed by this mischance the
rest speedily surrendered.
 Alférez Fuentes fought valiantly till overthrown with two pike
thrusts. “Our Lady save me!” he cried, still clutching the standard.
“She shall!” responded Sandoval, averting the pikes of the excited
soldiers.[707]
The cry of victory and the rumor of Narvaez’ death had stayed
the stream of reinforcements from the adjoining houses, wherein
defence was now alone thought of. Recognizing that a charge on
them might meet with more determined opposition, Cortés resolved
to bring the enemy’s own battery to his aid.[708] By the time the guns
were in position, most of the forces of Sandoval and Olid were free
to aid Velazquez de Leon in the task of reducing the quarters in
which Salvatierra and Diego Velazquez still held out.
They were summoned to submit to the king and to Cortés, under
pain of death, but gave a defiant answer. The guns were now
brought into play, and fired first over their heads to frighten them. As
the balls came whizzing by, the blustering Salvatierra, who had
sworn to eat the ears of Cortés, declared himself sick. His fierceness
changed to abject fear, and his men asserted that they never saw a
captain behave so contemptibly. The shots, supported by promises,
soon brought about the surrender of this pyramid.
The last to hold out was Diego Velazquez, a brave fellow, well
liked by his followers; but after a few more parleys, and the loss of
three men from well directed shots, his party was also prevailed on
to descend and deliver up their arms,[709] the leaders being secured
and removed in irons to the chapel, the wounded receiving there the
attentions of a surgeon. Cortés looked in to examine their condition,
and as the whisper reached Narvaez that the hero of the day was
present, he turned and said: “Señor Cortés, you may hold high the
good fortune you have had, and the great achievement of securing
my person.” With a twinkle of malicious merriment Cortés regarded
for a moment his fallen foe, whose insufferable conceit did not desert
him even here, and said: “Señor Narvaez, many deeds have I
performed since coming to Mexico, but the least of them all has been
to capture you.”[710]

FOOTNOTES
[654] ‘Velazquez ... si yua en persona no podia escusar de respetarle, aunque por
su buena, y blãda condicion, confiaua que le traeria a qualquier buen partido; pero
temia que yendo otro qualquier General.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix.

[655] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 144; Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi.; Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 90. ‘Afirman muchos, que en essa saçon estaba tan bien quisto Cortés,
que si á todos los quisiera llevar, todos se fueran trás él.’ Oviedo, iii. 509. Which is
exaggerated, as we have seen.

[656] ‘Debia ser alguna mala gente, y no vasallos de V. A.,’ is Cortés’ version of
the reply, Cartas, 119-20, while his interpreter, Aguilar, gives it more literally as
‘una gente vizcaynos e que no los enbiava el enperador.’ Testimonio, in Cortés,
Residencia, ii. 47, 184. Gomara adds that Cortés said he was going to protect
Montezuma’s subjects, and to keep the strangers on the coast till he was ready to
depart. The emperor probably dissimulated, ‘holgando que vnos Christianos a
otros se matassen.’ Hist. Mex., 145. Forgetting that the declared purposes of
Narvaez were well known in Mexico, Herrera renders the answer that this captain
was a brother of Cortés, sent with a present from their king. Both would come up
to the capital and then leave the country. The rumored enmity was due to an order
from Spain to avenge any injury suffered at the hands of the natives, dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. i. Brasseur de Bourbourg follows him.

[657] ‘Aquellos españoles le dejaba encomendados con todo aquel oro y joyas
que él me habia dado ... y le dí muchas joyas y ropas á él,’ et seq. Cortés, Cartas,
119-20. ‘Aun prometiò, que embiaria en nuestra ayuda cinco mil hombres de
guerra, e Cortes ... bien entendiò que no los auia de embiar, e le dixo, que no auia
menester.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 91; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 135.
Ixtlilxochitl assumes in one place that Cortés asked for men, and was told that
Aztecs dared not fight Spaniards, but would go as carriers. In another version the
confederate kings grant the auxiliaries. Hist. Chich., 300; Relaciones, 389, 412.
Solis assumes that Montezuma is devoted to Cortés; so does Zamacois, who sees
a proof thereof in the offer of troops. He could not communicate with Narvaez for
want of interpreters, and had he wished to aid the latter he would have attacked
the Spanish quarters. Hist. Mex., ii. 70-1. All of which shows that this author is not
profound either in investigation or argument.

[658] Bernal Diaz places the force at 83 men, with 10 cross-bows, 14 firelocks, 4
large guns, falconets, 7 horses, and all the ammunition; 150 men were left, and
150 taken, Oviedo; a little over 50 were left, Tapia; all wished to go, but 200 were
left and 250 taken, including the men of Velazquez, with 8 to 9 horses, and a force
of carriers, Gomara; 150 left, 250 taken, with a number of Indians, Ixtlilxochitl; 150
left, Probanza de Lejalde. B. V. de Tapia, who remained with Alvarado, says 130;
Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36. Cortés’ own account distributes the total of
his force as follows: 140 left at Mexico, 150 absent under Velazquez, 70 taken by
himself, 150 at Villa Rica; but this is more than the original number given on
setting out for the plateau. The Villa Rica force may, however, have been reduced
by later drafts, for other authorities allow only about 70 men for this fortress. In the
Ramusio edition of the Cartas 140 men are given as the garrison left under
Alvarado, while 60 are taken by Cortés, Viaggi, iii. 244, but later issues place the
former figure at 500, which is evidently a misprint. However much the figures of
different writers may vary, it seems to be admitted that war and disease had made
a considerable inroad upon them.

[659] ‘Fizo capitan dellos a Alonzo Davila.’ Monjaras and Aguilar, in Cortés,
Residencia, ii. 48, 184.

[660] ‘Que seria fasta catorze mill castellanos.’ Monjaras, in Cortés, Residencia, ii.
49. ‘Cinco o seys mill.’ Tirado, in Id., 7.
[661] ‘Porq̄ le pareciò q̄ auia conseguido su intento.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
Perhaps in spreading the rumor that he came with Indian auxiliaries. Among the
auxiliaries were 400 men from Huexotzinco, under Pedro Gonzalez de Trujillo.
Tirado, and others, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 247 et seq.; ii. 7 et seq. It is this
expedition of Rodriguez, assisted by Diego Garcia, Alonso de Ojeda, and Juan
Marquez, as captains, that has misled Gomara, and particularly Herrera, in
supposing that the whole expedition received a grand reception at Tlascala; but,
beside the above reference, Cortés intimates clearly enough that he did not go
that way, and he certainly did take a more southerly route to the coast than on the
previous journey. Cartas, 120. Bernal Diaz also says: ‘embiò Cortes a Tlascala â
rogar ... que nos embiassen de presto quatro mil hombres.’ Hist. Verdad., 91.
Prescott falls not only into this generally adopted error, but states that 600 troops
were asked for, Mex., ii. 243, whilst the chroniclers all say from 4000 to 10,000.‘La
maior parte de ellos se bolviò, porque aquella Nacion no estaba acostumbrada à
pelear fuera de su Tierra.’ Torquemada, i. 482. A not very sound excuse, since
their troops had already gone to Mexico.

[662] About twenty leagues east of Cholula.

[663] ‘Vezino de la Puebla, que era ballestero.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 90.

[664] ‘Púsole preso en su pié de amigo.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta,

Col. Doc., i. 441. But this is not likely. Bernal Diaz says that Narvaez was told to
send communications to Tampaniquita. Hist. Verdad., 91; Cortés, Residencia, i.
248, ii. 185.

[665] Torquemada and Clavigero attempt to correct this spelling, but Bernal Diaz is
sustained by Orozco y Berra, in Mex., Noticias Ciudad, 244-6. Bernal Diaz also
mentions Mitalaguita, which may be Metlangutla, a few leagues farther east. Hist.
Verdad., 91. Herrera states that they passed through Cotastlan, by which he
means probably the province, and not the town, of Cuetlachtlan. dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
i.

[666] Herrera, ubi sup., leaves Ircio in command at Villa Rica, which is improbable.
Sandoval arrived at the rendezvous the day after us. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad.,
92; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 3-9. Prescott makes him join long before this, on the
high plateau, but he misunderstands his authorities, and is quite at sea with
respect to the route followed by the forces.

[667] Bernal Diaz and Herrera say 266 in all; Torquemada has 266, beside
captains and five horsemen; Cortés, 250 in all; Tapia, about 250.

[668] ‘Por vn peto, ó capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro, dieramos aquella

noche quãto nos pidierã por ello.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98.