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Estrada Vs Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651


June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor
as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the
judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known
as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,"
insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio
and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD
The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the "wall of
separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing
the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes
that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which
An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it
is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment.
Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist
interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism,
which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is
a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the
first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion The
second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and
practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure
the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.

Garces Vs. Estenzo 104 SCRA 510


G.R. L-53487 May 25, 1981

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and
that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available
to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the
altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to
the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the
image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8
Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or
beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their
property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation
of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Q. What is the meaning of the inviolability of the separation of Church and State?
A. See Article III, Section 5. (SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.)

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC V. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC
674 SCRA 92 (2012)

FACTS: Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) is a religious corporation and a former constituent of United Church of Christ
in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP), another religious corporation. BUCCI started the construction of a fence that encroached upon the
right of way allocated by UCCP for Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI), an action which later led to the formal break-up of BUCCI and UCCP
and BUCCI’s amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. UCCP thereafter filed a complaint for rejection of decision, that
separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws. SEC dismissed this petition
and defended BUCCI’s right to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate and
disassociate, such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. UCCP still maintains that it has the sole power to decide whether BUCCI
could disaffiliate from it as this involves a purely ecclesiastical affair.

ISSUE: Whether the determination of the validity of disaffiliation of respondents is purely an ecclesiastical affair – NO.
RULING: The issue is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship
of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of
the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. BUCCI, as a juridical
entity, is separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities
and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides
that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may
exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and corporate.

GERONA VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION


Facts:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule Department Order 8 says that
the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while
the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge.
Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from Buenavista Community School in Uson,
Masbate when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. They did not do so
out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in
their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec of Education that their children be
exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention but this was denied. As a result, the petitioners
filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said
DO No. 8.

Issue:
Whether Department Order No 8 is valid.
Held:
Department Order 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot
be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are
religious groups or sects or followers.

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU


G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN
G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act
making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to
anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control..

Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A.
No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and
present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)
The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
"external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem
and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will
shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" . What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession
and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the
petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious
group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.
Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled violates their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila


G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

Topic: Non-Infringement of Religion


Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines, with its principal office in Manila. They distribute and sell bibles throughout the country. The City
Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it violated Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 as it was conducting business of
general merchandise since November 1945, without the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license and required them to
secure the permit and license within three days together with compromise in the sum of P5,821.45. To avoid the closure of their
business, they paid under protest. They filed a complaint and prayed that the ordinance be declared illegal and unconstitutional as it
infringes religious freedom.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 are unconstitutional because it provides for religious censorship and the free
exercise of its religious profession through the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature in the Philippines.

Held:
No.
Ordinance No. 3000 is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the plaintiff. It does not
contain any provisions prescribing religious censorship nor does it restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious
profession. The necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax a business, trade or
occupation. As to Ordinance No. 2529 with respect to the license fees, they are not imposed directly upon any religious institution
but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations, such as retail “dealers in general merchandise.”
Article III, Section 1(7) guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In the case at bar, the license fee is imposed upon
appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature which is not for commercial rather for purely religious
purposes.
The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. The power to impose a
license tax on the exercise of this freedom is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck
down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is flat
license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.
For this reason, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, as it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its right of dissemination of religious beliefs. As to Ordinance No. 3000,
as amended, it does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices.

G.R. No. 164785


April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,
in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, respondent.

Topic: Parens Patriae


Facts

In 2004, Eliseo F. Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan aired in UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba.
Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against Soriano in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of
the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. The MTRCB found Soriano liable for his utterances and imposed on him a three-month
suspension from his program.

Issues : Whether or not the suspension by the MTRCB is null and void for violation of freedom of religion, speech, and expression.

Ruling: No, the suspension does not violate freedom of religion, speech, and expression.

According to Art. 3 of the 1987 Consitution, “[n]o law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof…” and “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press…”

In this case, there is nothing in Soriano’s statements expressing religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of
religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.
Consequently, Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least taking into consideration that the program is for general
viewership and in a timeslot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children, exposing them to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. In this sense, the Court finds such utterances not entitled to protection under the umbrella of
freedom of speech.

Therefore, the suspension does not violate the freedom of religion, speech and expression, hence, it is valid.

Doctrine
Freedom of religion as well as of speech and expression, like any other rights, are not absolute. They may be regulated to some
extent to serve important public interests.

Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the
State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. As such, the welfare of the children and the State’s mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae*, constitute a substanstial and compelling government interest in regulating TV broadcast.

* - the government, or any other authority, regarded as the legal protector of citizens unable to protect themselves
- to protect the children who, because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive
language

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. CA


FACTS:
This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For Moving Pictures and
Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without
jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of
expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering
petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration
the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes
of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA
which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their
petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV program and its grave
abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with such.

Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On
the account of suppression of religious freedom,the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption
of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the
petitioner’s freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni
Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioner’s TV program while it reversed and set
aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, petitioner,


-versus-CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondent.
G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019

Facts:
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure dated May 18, 2015. He raised the issue on declaring article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional,
hence Articles 46 (4) and 55(6) of the Family Code null.

He had identified himself as a member of the LGBTQI+ community hence he claimed that the Family Code has a "normative impact"
on the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He was also allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to
marry the same-sex which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines.

He also acclaimed that the case is of transcendental importance and that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1
and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, procedural niceties must be set aside.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the self-idenfication of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him
the standing to challenge the Family Code;
2. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted; and
3. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty.

Ruling:
1. No. Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as
that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”; “impairment” of his “ability to find
and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to settle down and have a
companion for life in his beloved country”; or influence over his “decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country”
cannot be recognized by this as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships” and “to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country” does not constitute legally demandable
rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his
admitted inability to find a partner.
Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him. His assertions of injury
cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the
Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur.

2. No. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this
Court. We explained that the decisive factor in whether this court should permit the invocation of transcendental importance is
not merely the presence of “special and important reasons” but the nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court
declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the issue raised should only be questions of law.
3. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better left to
Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise.

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its
very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal
barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a
result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the
discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples, families formed by
couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender
stereotypes within the family.

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